**Appendix**

Legitimize or Delegitimize? Mainstream Party Strategy towards (Former) Pariah Parties and How Voters Respond

*NOTE: This document constitutes the Supplementary Materials for the article. It includes only the most essential supplementary information in order to comply with the APSR page limit. Please find the full Online Appendix on the dataverse page* [*https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9PXU5U*](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9PXU5U)

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# A Content analysis

NOTE: To comply with APSR page limit for supplementary materials, this section was slightly shortened. Please find the full Online Appendix on the dataverse page: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9PXU5U>

The population of the German part of this media content analysis are all statements by representatives of all parties represented in parliament about AfD (only the results for CDU/CSU are used in Figure 1) published in the print version of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* between 1 January 2017 and 31 December 2020. I also included statements of CSU – CDU’s sister party in Bavaria. CSU operates only in Bavaria, whereas CDU only operates outside of Bavaria. However, to a) maximize the number of statements and to produce a sufficient number of observations to analyse within-party trends and b) since the two parties form a common faction in the national parliament, I merged both parties. I retrieved these newspaper articles through the database Factiva. The population of the Swedish part of this media content analysis are all statements by representatives of M, S, and C about SD (again only the results for M are used in Figure 2) published in the print version of *Dagens Nyheter* between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2021. I retrieved these newspaper articles through the database Retriever.

## A1 Sampling the articles

To preselect potentially relevant articles, I used the search string ‘AfD and (CDU or CSU or FDP or SPD or Grüne or Linke)’ in Germany.[[1]](#footnote-1) This string resulted in 6,090 articles in the period from 1 January 2017 until 31 December 2020. The results for the remaining parties are shown in the Table SI3. I used the search string ‘(SD or Sverigedemokraterna) and (S or Socialdemokraterna M or Moderaterna C or Centerpartiet)’ in Sweden. This search string resulted in 8,071 articles in the period from 1 January 2010 until 31 December 2021. I show the results for C in the Table SI3.

## A2 The unit of analysis: Mainstream party representatives’ statements

Any statement by mainstream party representatives that directly refers to or conveys a clear message about AfD/SD is included in the dataset. When the same statement was quoted or paraphrased in more than one newspaper article, I coded this as only one observation in the dataset. As I conceptualize parties as unitary actors, I cover a wide range of different actors within parties. My data covers not only mainstream party statements made by professional politicians, but also by local politicians, retired politicians, and rank-and-file party members.

## A3 The coding procedure

Each statement was assigned a single code capturing the type of message it conveyed about AfD/SD. The coding scheme is described in brief in Table SI1 with examples of each category.

The first category captures statements that convey the message that AfD/SD is outright undemocratic (“Delegitimizing (explicit)”. This includes, inter alia, statements in which AfD/SD is labelled racist, fascist, or extremist. Moreover, statements accusing AfD/SD of not respecting democratic institutions are coded as a 1.

The second category captures a more implicit form of delegitimizing statements (“Delegitimizing (implicit)”). This includes, inter alia, statements in which collaborations with AfD/SD are *systematically* ruled out (van Spanje 2017) – that is, the provided reason is not disagreement over policy or a lack of experience/competence, but collaboration is ruled out as a matter of principle/legitimacy. Statements that portray AfD/SD as qualitatively different from the other parties are part of this category as well. Moreover, statements that suggest that the very existence of AfD/SD is a problem and that the party needs to be kept away from political influence are in this category. In Figures 1 and 2 in the paper, I merged codes 1 & 2.

The third category was used for all statements legitimizing AfD/SD (“Legitimizing”). This includes, inter alia, statements in which AfD/SD are portrayed as democratic – for instance, by highlighting their representative function or by emphasizing that they are constitutional – as well as statements that portray the pariah explicitly as not qualitatively different from other parties. Statements, in which representatives of CDU/M advocated for increased cooperations were also coded 3. This code was also assigned to statements in Sweden in which politicians called for cooperation with SD in the form of a minority governments. Cross-party cooperation to achieve a common (policy-)goal is a typical mode of interaction amongst parties that consider each other democratic. Hence, I conceive of this mainstream party behaviour as legitimizing.

The fourth category (“Both/unclear”) captured all statements that contained legitimizing as well as delegitimizing elements (“Both/unclear”).

The fifth category (“Negative campaigning”) was used for any statement that conveyed a message about the pariah that is not delegitimizing but is negative in its valence towards AfD/SD. This code includes statements criticizing AfD’s or SDD’s positions and/or targeting the party’s valence traits, yet which do not suggest that the party is undemocratic. In other words, with these statements, mainstream parties compete in a policy-based competition with the pariah.

Finally, the sixth category (“Residual category”) all remaining statements that fit none of the five categories described above.

One newspaper article results in more than one observation in the dataset when it contains statements about AfD by representatives of *different* mainstream parties. In a few articles, several representatives of the *same* party made statements in the same article. Yet these articles yielded only one observation. Treating every single statement in such articles as separate observations would have entailed that one article with many statements has the same effect on the data as many articles with each one statement (over a longer period of time). In other words, single articles could have a huge – potentially biasing impact – on the data. Hence, I code these articles as only one statement and followed the procedure described in the following.

When all representatives’ statements fell into the same category, this category was taken. When an article contained one delegitimizing and one legitimizing statement by another representative, the role of the representative in the party became a decisive factor for the category. I only coded the statement made by the higher-ranking politician. Suppose an article in which a local CDU politician advocates for cooperation with AfD, but this statement is fiercely condemned by a high-ranking politician who strongly delegitimized AfD. Such cases are coded as delegitimizing. However, if all representatives had an equally important position in the party and one statement was delegitimizing, but another one legitimizing in these articles, I assigned a 3. For articles, that contain a delegitimizing or a legitimizing statement by one politician and a statement, which is none of them or unclear (codes 4,5,6), I only coded the delegitimizing/legitimizing statement.

Table SI1: Description of coding scheme with examples

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Code** | **Statement type**  | **Operationalization** | **Typical example** |
| 1 | Delegitimizing (explicit) | Statements that convey the message that AfD/SD is undemocratic | *The Sweden Democrats are a neo-fascist one-issue party that respects neither people's differences nor Sweden's democratic institutions* (Dagens Nyheter 2014) |
| 2 | Delegitimizing (implicit) | Statements that implicitly convey the message that AfD/SD is undemocratic | *Speaking to journalists later, Laschet says Rivlin had inquired with concern about AfD. He assured him: “We never want to come to government functions with AfD votes*. (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2020) |
| 3 | Legitimizing | Statements that convey the message that AfD/SD is democratic | *Martina Mossberg, opposition councillor in Haninge, sees SD as “a party like any other” and is therefore open to their support.* (Dagens Nyheter 2017a) |
| 4 | Both/unclear | Statements that contain legitimizing and delegitimizing elements; statements that clearly touch upon the legitimacy of AfD/SD, yet it is unclear whether they legitimize or delegitimize | *”The M policy of not talking to SD on political issues has been abolished. But organised cooperation will not be initiated with either the Sweden Democrats or the Left Party, whose values we do not share," says Andreas Hamrin, press secretary of the Moderates.* (Dagens Nyheter 2017b) |
| 5 | Negative campaigning | Any statement that conveys a message about the pariah that is not delegitimizing, but negative in its valence towards the pariah | *So far, both the Sweden Democrats and the bourgeois parties have been very interested in standing up for the right of venture capitalists to make big money from schools. That's the dividing line in Swedish politics," says Magdalena Andersson.* (Dagens Nyheter 2017c) |
| 6 | Residual category | No delegitimizing; no legitimizing; no (negative) valence | *“CSU leader Markus Söder has called on CDU/CSU to not only deal with AfD. “You can lose elections in the east, but you have to win them above all in the west,” he told Welt**am Sonntag.“* (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019) |

To check for the reliability of the coding, a second coder coded a random subsample of 100 articles for each country. For Sweden, Krippendorff’s Alpha is .667 (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007). For Germany, Krippendorff’s Alpha is .752.

To meaningfully map communication within parties over time, a large number of statements is needed. Although I chose my search string to preselect the articles in a way that maximized the number of identified statements, the number of statements per party (see Tables SI2 and SI3) was still not very high in some years. A small number of statements poses a threat to the reliability of my estimates and hence this should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Against this backdrop, I report the results for party-year dyads in Germany, but party-*2-year* dyads in Sweden in Figures 1 and 2 of the paper. This is due to the considerably lower number of statements for each year in Sweden as compared to Germany.

# B The survey experiments

## B1 Ethical considerations

**Recruitment, Consent and Compensation**

The respondents in my survey were recruited through YouGov’s online survey panels in Germany and Sweden. YouGov sent out an email to potential respondents inviting them to participate in my survey. In this email, potential respondents received information on the survey itself as well as guarantees of respondent anonymity, information on data protection and storage, and payment details. After clicking on the invitation link and before starting the survey, respondents were again informed about the content of the study. Recruitment thus took place based on informed consent. This consent could be withdrawn at any time during the survey, and respondents could select ”Don’t know” if they preferred to answer only parts of the survey. As compensation for participating in the survey, respondents received YouGov points, which could be redeemed for vouchers. These vouchers, in turn, can be used at YouGov’s online store or YouGov’s partner stores.

**Confidentiality**

It is specified in the contracts that YouGov complies with all national legal regluations and ethical standards. I did not have direct acccess to the respondent population. The dataset sent to me by YouGov only includes a randomized ID next to the survey answers. Hence, it is not possible to trace back any information or survey responses to individual respondents.

**Deception and potential harm**

During both surveys, respondents are exposed to a mild form of deception – i.e., misinformation. To credibly manipulate (de-)legitimizing mainstream cues whilst not manipulating any confounders, the vignettes had to be fictional. However, I aimed to minimize deception in several ways. First, I did not attribute the statements to any real politicians, but used more vague sponsors of these statements, which cannot be associated with individuals as sponsors of my messages (e.g., ”MPs”). In doing so, I aimed to minimize any potential harm to real politicians. Second, as supported by the content analysis, statements akin to the ones used in my vignettes actually occur in reality. In this Appendix (A2.5), I provide links to newspaper articles that inspired the construction of my vignettes. Third, I used hypothetical language in the introduction text before the treatment to indicate the fictious nature of the vignettes. In the German experiment, respondents were told that they will read a couple of “typical” newspaper articles readers “might encounter” in daily newspapers. Fourth, and most importantly, respondents were fully debriefed. In the Swedish experiment, they were, again, explicitly made aware that they could withdraw their consent in the face of this deception. Also, they were given YouGov’s email address in case of any complaints they might have. The survey does not involve any form of identity, activity or motivation deception. Overall, I implemented a variety of measures to keep deception as well as potential harm at a minimum.

**IRB approval**

The research has been conducted in accordance with institutional and national guidelines of the author’s university. According to these guidelines, ethics approval (IRB) is not required for survey research in the social sciences. Moreover, when the two experiments were implemented, there was no norm at the author’s university to gain IRB approval for the kind of survey experiments conducted to the extent that I did not even consider doing this.

## B2 Preregistration

**Swedish experiment:** [**https://aspredicted.org/C31\_WMR**](https://aspredicted.org/C31_WMR)

**German experiment:** [**https://aspredicted.org/X1R\_2YM**](https://aspredicted.org/X1R_2YM)

**Deviations from preregistration**

To increase transparency and credibility, I registered the hypotheses, the design and the analysis of both experiments. However, when I designed and collected data for the two experiments, I did not intend to present both studies in the same paper. Both studies were initially meant to be presented as stand-alone papers. The Swedish experiment was not only designed to replicate the German experiment but also to *extend* it by answering a second research question. More specifically, the idea was to examine a second research question (“Do (de-)legitimizing strategies affect citizens’ evaluations of the mainstream party pursuing them?”) in addition to the question answered in this paper (“Do (de-)legitimizing strategies affect evaluations of the targeted pariah?”). Therefore, I added a few outcome measures and adjusted others in the Swedish experiment, which I had already used in the German experiment. As they were initially thought to result in two different papers, the preregistrations differ from each other with respect to these outcome measures.

However, after I analyzed the data of the Swedish experiment, which I fielded more than a year after the German experiment, I was struck by the strikingly similar findings, given the contextual differences of the two settings. This struck me as a key finding, which is arguably best communicated by presenting the two studies in one paper, rather than two separate papers.

Since I did not strive for maximizing coherence between the two studies when designing the questionnaires and writing the preregistration for the reason outlined above, some preregistered analyses had to be dropped in order to focus on the comparison of the two studies in this paper. For the sake of transparency, those preregistered analyses that could not be meaningfully executed for both experiments are presented in this appendix – except those analyses that pertain to the question of how (de-)legitimizing strategies affect citizens’ evaluations of the mainstream party pursuing them (see 1)).

1. **No dependent variables pertaining to survey participants’ evaluations of the mainstream party sponsoring the (de-)legitimizing cues (i.e., CDU/M):** For the reason described above, I decided to solely focus on survey participants’ evaluations of the targeted pariah parties (i.e., AfD and SD), rather than also examining evaluations of the message-sponsoring mainstream right as a second set of dependent variables in this paper.
2. **No analysis of (de-)legitimizing strategies’ effects on likeability of and propensity to vote (PTV) for targeted pariah parties:** Again, the reasoning is similar. I did not include a measure tapping likeability of AfD in the German experiment. Hence, there is no equivalent measure that could be compared, although I did measure “anger towards AfD” in the German experiment. I included the “likeability-question” in the Swedish experiment because it is a more common measure of affect towards parties but did not have concerns regarding consistency in mind for the reason outlined above.

A “PTV for AfD/SD”-question is included in both questionnaires and I preregistered looking at the effects on this outcome variable. However, I decided not to present the effects of treatment on voting for the targeted challengers in the main paper for mainly two reasons. First, my main contribution is to show that *perceptions and evaluations* can be shaped by mainstream parties. Intentions to vote for a party are conceptually different from a perception or an evaluation, although the former obviously influences the latter.

Second, the effects on voting for the targeted challenger party are presumably strongly conditioned by respondents’ ideology/partisanship and sizeable experimental effects are unlikely. However, interacting treatment with those variables leads to statistical power issues and, thus, eventually unreliable results, which I did not think through when I wrote the pre-registration.

Therefore, I decided to present the analysis of PTV for and likeability of SD/Anger towards AfD as possible downstream consequences of (de-)legitimizing strategies only in the Appendix (C1), but not in the main paper.

1. **The “SD is an extremist party”-item is not part of the “Legitimacy”-index in the Swedish experiment:** The reason for this is straightforward. I did not include this item in the German study. To maximize the comparability of the German and the Swedish experiment, I did not include this item in the analysis of the Swedish experiment either. However, as shown in Appendix C3, the results look (almost) the same when I run the same models for Figures 3, 4, and 5 with this item included in the “Legitimacy”-index.
2. **The moderating impact of partisanship is only pre-registered as “exploratory” in the German experiment:** Whilst I write in the Swedish pre-registration that “M supporters […] should be most susceptible to influences of (pretreated) messages by M”, this conditional relationship was only pre-registered as an exploratory analysis in the German experiment. However, for the sake of coherence, I nevertheless added this hypothesis in the paper.
3. **No ANOVA in analysis of German experiment:** Again, I made this decision primarily for the sake of coherence with the Swedish experiment, where I pre-registered a comparison of means. However, I also pre-registered in the German experiment that “regression analyses” will be conducted.

## B5 German vignettes

NOTE: To comply with APSR page limit for supplementary materials, this short version of the Appendix only includes the. Please find the German vignettes in the full Online Appendix on the dataverse page: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9PXU5U>

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| **Delegitimizing condition** | **Legitimizing condition** |
| **Vignette 1** | **Vignette 1** |
| **CDU district chairwoman: AfD represents rightwing extremist, undemocratic positions**In the debate on the panel discussion at the Goethe-Gymnasium in Holsterhausen, the district chairwoman of the CDU, Susanne Herzog, pleads that her party should not participate in the panel discussion because of the participation of the AfD. “As AfD represents right-wing extremist views and voices of citizens outside the range of democratic opinions the party has lost its right to speak at schools. We should not provide a platform to this party by appearing together with AfD at schools”, says Susanne Herzog. | **CDU district chairwoman: AfD represents legitimate positions of voters**In the debate on the panel discussion at the Goethe-Gymnasium in Holsterhausen, the district chairwoman of the CDU, Susanne Herzog, pleads that her party should participate in the panel discussion despite the participation of the AfD. “As AfD represents legitimate views and voices of citizens within the range of democratic opinions – even if we do not always like them –, we have to confront them in public discourse. That is how it is in a democracy”, says Susanne Herzog. |
| **Vignette 2** | **Vignette 2** |
| **Stefan Schmid (CDU): AfD regularly disdains democratic institutions**In the debate on the participation of the CDU at panel discussions at schools with AfD representatives, the chairman of the CDU faction in the city council, Stefan Schmid, is now expressing his view. Since the AfD “regularly disrespects democratic institutions”, as a democrat one cannot “treat the party like a democratic party”. Therefore, he pleads for “not sending a representative of our party to this event if a representative of the AfD will be present”. | **Stefan Schmid (CDU): AfD has been elected democratically and must not be discriminated against**In the debate on the participation of the CDU at panel discussions at schools with AfD representatives, the chairman of the CDU faction in the city council, Stefan Schmid, is now expressing his view. Since the AfD “is legitimized through its election into parliament by the electorate and is therefore democratic”, as a democrat one must not “discriminate against the party and treat them differently than all other democratic parties”. Therefore, he pleads for “sending a representative of our party to this event, even if a representative of the AfD will be present”. |
| **Vignette 3** | **Vignette 3** |
| **CDU-state interior minister: AfD creates a fertile breeding ground for violence**Also on the Länder-level important voices have expressed themselves, who demand that representatives of their party should refrain from discussing with the AfD at panel discussions. Landesinnenminister König (CDU) said: “The AfD is an undemocratic party that creates a fertile breeding ground for violence. Therefore, we should do everything to prevent the AfD from disseminating its hate. This applies to Holsterhausen as it does elsewhere.” Anything else is “incompatible with our constitutional order”. | **CDU-state interior minister: AfD is a constitutional, democratic party**Also on the Länder-level important voices have expressed themselves, who demand that representatives of their party should not back off from debates with the AfD. Landesinnenminister König (CDU) said: “The AfD is a constitutional and thus democratic party. Therefore, we should grant the party its democratic rights. This applies to Holsterhausen as it does elsewhere.” Anything else is “incompatible with our constitutional order”. |
| **Vignette 4** | **Vignette 4** |
| **CDU leadership: AfD responsible for coarsening of debating culture in our country**From the leadership of the CDU voices are getting louder, who emphasize that representatives of their party should not speak at panel discussions at schools together with AfD representatives. After all, “the party is undemocratic and responsible for the coarsening of public debating culture in our country”. Further, it is argued "that a coarsening of public debating culture driven by the AfD eventually undermines democracy if one does not set limits to providing it a platform. Thus, the CDU should definitely not participate in the panel discussion in Holsterhausen, if the AfD is present.” | **CDU leadership: Controversial opinions of the AfD must have a place in a democracy**From the leadership of the CDU voices are getting louder, who emphasize that representatives of their party should also speak at panel discussions at schools together with AfD representatives. After all, “in a democracy, the AfD as a democratic party must have room and be visible”. Further, it is argued "that a public discussion with the AfD is necessary and right in a democracy as the positions of the AfD might appear controversial, but are democratic at the end of the day. Thus, the CDU should definitely participate in the panel discussion in Holsterhausen, if the AfD is present.” |

## B6 Swedish vignettes

NOTE I: To comply with APSR page limit for supplementary materials, this short version of the Appendix only includes the. Please find the Swedish vignettes in the full Online Appendix on the dataverse page: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9PXU5U>

NOTE II: The (de-)legitimizing statements in the third condition had to be slightly different from the (de-)legitimizing statements in Conditions 1 and 2, since the statements in Conditions 1 and 2 were constructed so as to resemble each other to the largest extent possible. In Condition 3, however, respondents read both statements within one article. Hence, using the unchanged statements from Conditions 1 and 2 would have resulted in an article that sounded overly artificial.

**English translations of vignettes**

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| **Delegitimizing M** | **Legitimizing M** |
| *Vignette 1***M party board: “SD has not credibly freed itself from extremism and racism”**An important voice within M’s party board – the party’s most important decision-making body – demands that M should definitely not give ministerial posts to SD in a future government: "SD has Nazi roots and has not made sufficient efforts to deal with its past. The party has still not credibly distanced itself from extremism and racism. We must not ignore this. Therefore, M must refrain from giving ministerial posts to SD", the party board member said. | *Vignette 1***M party board: “SD has credibly freed itself from extremism and racism”**An important voice within M’s party board – the party’s most important decision-making body – demands that M should definitely give ministerial posts to SD in a future government: "SD is now a serious, democratic party and it has made sufficient efforts to deal with its past. The party has credibly freed itself from extremism and racism by now. We must acknowledge this. Therefore, I see no reason why SD should not get ministerial posts in a government led by M", the party board member said. |
| *Vignette 2***M: We should take it very seriously that SD’s representatives regularly express racist and undemocratic attitudes**In light of several controversial statements recently made by SD politicians, a leading representative of M expressed himself strongly against giving ministerial posts to SD in a potential future government. "Politicians of SD regularly express racist and undemocratic attitudes. I think we should take this very seriously”, he stated in a public debate broadcasted by SVT last Sunday. Further, he emphasized that M views SD as fundamentally different from other parties: “Politicians of democratic parties do not act like that. Our party should under no circumstances give ministerial posts to SD after the next election." | *Vignette 2***M: We should not take it too seriously that SD’s representatives sometimes say stupid things**In light of several controversial statements recently made by SD politicians, a leading representative of M expressed himself strongly in favor of giving ministerial posts to SD in a potential future government. "Politicians of SD sometimes say stupid things. I do not think we should take this too seriously”, he stated in a public debate broadcasted by SVT last Sunday. Further, he emphasized that M does not view SD as per se any different from other parties: “Politicians of other democratic parties also say stupid things sometimes. Our party should open towards giving ministerial posts to SD after the next election."  |
| *Vignette 3***MPs of M concerned about “extremist members within SD’s ranks”**In a parliamentary debate on Tuesday, MPs of M emphasized that their party must not give ministerial posts to SD in a future government. "I do not think SD makes any serious effort to deal with extremists among its members. These members reflect a structural problem within SD. SD cannot be considered a normal and democratic party. That is why I am against giving SD ministerial posts", an important MP said. Her statement received wide support amongst M’s MPs. | *Vignette 3***MPs of M not concerned about “controversial members within SD’s ranks”**In a parliamentary debate on Tuesday, MPs of M emphasized that their party must give ministerial posts to SD in a future government. "I think SD makes lots of serious and successful efforts to deal with extremists among its members. These members are in no way representative of SD. SD is a normal and democratic party. That is why I support giving SD ministerial posts", an important MP said. Her statement received wide support amongst M’s MPs.  |
| *Vignette 4***Important advisor of M: “SD puts up façade to hide undemocratic tendencies”**According to M’s political advisor, [some Swedish name], who is known to be a very important voice for M’s strategic decisions, M should under no circumstances give SD ministerial posts in a potential future government: "I do not think SD has genuinely changed its ideology. We must not be fooled by the façade that the party puts up to try to hide its undemocratic tendencies. For that reason, we must not give ministerial posts to SD." | *Vignette 4***Important advisor of M: “SD has genuinely changed its ideology”**According to M’s political advisor, [some Swedish name], who is known to be a very important voice for M’s strategic decisions, M should definitely give SD ministerial posts in a potential future government: "I think SD has genuinely changed its ideology. We have to admit that the party has become a serious, democratic competitor. For that reason, we should give ministerial posts to SD." |

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|  **Legitimizing M & Delegitimizing C** |
| *Vignette 1***M and C disagree over how SD has dealt with its past**M’s former partner C has sharply criticized M regarding their stance towards SD. The conflict sparked after an important voice within M’s party board – the party’s most important decision-making body – demanded that his party should definitely give ministerial posts to SD in a future government: "SD is now a serious, democratic party and it has made sufficient efforts to deal with its past. The party has credibly freed itself from extremism and racism by now. We must acknowledge this. Therefore, I see no reason why SD should not get ministerial posts in a government led by M", the party board member said.Yet, this view was challenged by the C as this quote from an official press release shows: ”We do not think SD has freed itself from extremism and racism. M must not ignore SD's Nazi roots and that SD has not dealt with its past appropriately. Therefore, M must refrain from giving ministerial posts to SD." |
| *Vignette 2***C criticizes M’s stance towards SD in debate over whether SD should be given ministerial posts in a future government**C’s and M’s opinion on some controversial statements made by SD politicians strongly diverged from each other as became clear during a public debate broadcasted by SVT last Sunday. A leading representative of M expressed himself strongly in favor of giving ministerial posts to SD in a potential future government. "Politicians of SD sometimes say stupid things. I do not think we should take this too seriously”, he stated in a public debate broadcasted by SVT last Sunday. Further, he emphasized that M does not view SD as per se any different from other parties: “Politicians of other democratic parties also say stupid things sometimes. Our party should open towards giving ministerial posts to SD after the next election."However, the representative of C participating in the debate strongly disagreed with this view: “Politicians of democratic parties do not express racist and undemocratic attitudes; only politicians of the SD do so regularly. I think M should take this very seriously. M should definitely not give ministerial posts to SD after the next elections." |
| *Vignette 3***C attacks M in debate over whether SD is to be considered a democratic party**In a parliamentary debate on Tuesday, MPs of M emphasized that their party must give ministerial posts to SD in a future government. This position, however, received fierce opposition from C’s MPs."I think SD makes lots of serious and successful efforts to deal with extremists among its members. These members are in no way representative of SD. SD is a normal and democratic party. That is why I support giving SD ministerial posts", an important MP said. Her statement received wide support amongst M’s MPs. An MP of C directly contradicted the view on SD expressed by M’s MPs: ”The extremist members reflect a structural problem within SD. I do not think SD has dealt with the extremists within the party in a serious way. For that reason, M must not give SD ministerial posts under any circumstances." |
| *Vignette 4***Controversy between M and C over giving SD ministerial posts** As the next general election is approaching, M and C clashed over the question of whether SD has undergone a sincere change or not during the past few years. According to M’s political advisor, [some Swedish name], who is known to be a very important voice for M’s strategic decisions, M should definitely give SD ministerial posts in a potential future government: "I think SD has genuinely changed its ideology. We have to admit that the party has become a serious, democratic competitor. For that reason, we should give ministerial posts to SD."This view was harshly criticized by C, whose spokesperson responded accordingly: ”I do not think the SD has undergone a sincere change in its ideology. M is fooled by the facade that SD puts up to try to hide its undemocratic tendencies. M must not give ministerial posts to SD." |

## B9 Manipulation checks

To assess whether respondents perceived the stimulus material as intended, they were asked two questions at the very end of the two surveys. First, the respondents were asked “To what extent do you think the AfD was portrayed as democratic or undemocratic by the CDU in the articles?” on a scale from 1 “Democratic” to 5 “Undemocratic”. Second, they were asked whether CDU advocated to participate in the panel debate in Holsterhausen or not in the articles (scale from 1 ‘Should definitely participate’ to 5 ‘Should definitely not participate’). Table SI6 shows that participants in the “CDU legitimizing” condition reported that CDU portrayed AfD much more democratic and advocated “more” in favor of participation of the panel debate/against a boycott than in the delegitimizing condition.

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|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Portrayal of AfD as democratic | Against boycott of AfD |
|  |  |  |
| CDU Leg (ref: CDU Deleg)  | 2.15\*\*\* | 2.09\*\*\* |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Constant | 1.64\*\*\* | 1.91\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,251 | 1,254 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.50 | 0.46 |

Table SI6: Manipulation check of CDU’s (de-)legitimizing cues on AfD

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In Sweden, respondents were asked “We want you to think about the articles you've just read. How was SD portrayed by the M-politician in the statement?” on a scale from 1 “Democratic” to 5 “Undemocratic”. Respondents in the condition, in which M’s legitimizing statement was countered by a delegitimizing C statement they received the following question directly after: “Regarding the statement by the C-politician. How was SD portrayed by the C-politician in the statement?” and answered this question on the same question as before. Second, Swedish respondents were asked the following question “How do you interpret the M-politician's statement?” and answered on a scale from 1 “M should definitely give ministerial posts to SD” to 5 “M should definitely not give ministerial posts to SD”. Again, if relevant, respondents received the same question regarding C’s statement.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| VARIABLES | M’s portrayal of SD as democratic | M’s position on giving SD ministerial posts |
|  |  |  |
| M Leg (ref: M Deleg) | 1.45\*\*\* | 1.70\*\*\* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| M Leg & C Deleg (ref: M Deleg) | 1.25\*\*\* | 1.66\*\*\* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Constant | 2.24\*\*\* | 2.02\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,298 | 1,271 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.27 | 0.28 |

Table SI7: Manipulation check of M’s (de-)legitimizing cues on SD

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table SI7 shows that participants in the “M legitimizing” condition and in the “M legitimizing & C delegitimizing condition” reported that M portrayed SD much more democratic and advocated “more” in favor of giving SD ministerial posts than in the “M delegitimizing” condition. To provide evidence respondents in the “M legitimizing & C delegitimizing condition” correctly perceived that C was delegitimizing, I compare the means of the questions on C’s strategy towards SD with the questions on M’ strategy towards SD in Table SI8. Respondents clearly thought that M was legitimizing whilst C was delegitimizing SD.

Table SI8: Perceptions of M’s and C’s strategy towards SD in “M legitimizing & C delegitimizing condition”

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Manipulation check** | **Mean** |
| M’s portrayal of SD as democratic | 3.5 |
| C’s portrayal of SD as democratic | 2.06 |
| M’s position on giving SD ministerial posts | 3.68 |
| C’s position on giving SD ministerial posts | 2.42 |

## B10 Regression tables for Figures 3, 4, 5a, and 5b

For the sake of conciseness, the following abbreviations will be used in the following.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Dependent variables** | Party name abbreviations (only Swedish models) |
| Legitimacy evaluations: Leg | Partisans of Centerpartiet: C |
| Tolerance judgements: Tol | Liberalerna: L |
| AgBoy: Against boycott of AfD | Kristdemokraterna: KD |
| Min: Attitudes towards giving SD ministerial posts | Miljöpartiet: MP |
|  | Socialdemokraterna: S |
|  | Vänsterpartiet: V |
|  | Sverigedemokraterna: SD |
|  | Not leaning towards any party: None |
|  | Partisans of other parties: Other |

Table SI9: Regression output for Figure 3 (only Germany)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Leg | Tol | AgBoy | Leg | Tol | AgBoy |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CDU Leg | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.05\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| CDU Deleg |  |  |  | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.09\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.34\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,318 | 1,337 | 1,266 | 1,945 | 1,976 | 1,840 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Models 1-3 compare the CDU Leg condition with the CDU Deleg condition. Models 4-6 compare the CDU Leg condition *and* the CDU Deleg condition with the control condition.

Table SI10: Regression output for Figure 3 (only Sweden)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Leg | Tol | Min | Leg | Tol | Min |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| M Deleg |  |  |  | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.03 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| M Leg | 0.03\*\* | -0.00 | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.05\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| C (ref.:M) | -0.29\*\*\* | -0.18\*\*\* | -0.25\*\*\* | -0.32\*\*\* | -0.18\*\*\* | -0.34\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| L (ref.:M) | -0.18\*\*\* | -0.08\* | -0.24\*\*\* | -0.22\*\*\* | -0.10\*\* | -0.31\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| KD (ref.:M) | 0.07 | -0.02 | 0.06 | 0.08\*\* | -0.04 | 0.08\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| MP (ref.:M) | -0.29\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | -0.31\*\*\* | -0.33\*\*\* | -0.24\*\*\* | -0.33\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| S (ref.:M) | -0.38\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* | -0.38\*\*\* | -0.27\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| V (ref.:M) | -0.45\*\*\* | -0.23\*\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* | -0.24\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| SD (ref.:M) | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.35\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| None (ref.:M) | -0.19\*\*\* | -0.16\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.19\*\*\* | -0.17\*\*\* | -0.15\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Other (ref.:M) | -0.05 | 0.01 | 0.13\* | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.12\*\* |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Constant | 0.66\*\*\* | 0.79\*\*\* | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.64\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 976 | 980 | 961 | 1,467 | 1,481 | 1,437 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.46 | 0.26 | 0.45 | 0.48 | 0.27 | 0.48 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Models 1-3 compare the M Leg condition with the M Deleg condition. Models 4-6 compare the M Leg condition *and* the M Deleg condition with the control condition.

Table SI11: Regression output for Figure 4 (only Sweden)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Leg | Tol | Min |
|  |  |  |  |
| M Leg & C Deleg (ref: M leg) | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| C (ref.:M) | -0.36\*\*\* | -0.22\*\*\* | -0.35\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| L (ref.:M) | -0.16\*\*\* | -0.06 | -0.26\*\*\* |
|  | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| KD (ref.:M) | 0.04 | -0.04 | 0.04 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| MP (ref.:M) | -0.34\*\*\* | -0.25\*\*\* | -0.37\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.07) |
| S (ref.:M) | -0.40\*\*\* | -0.24\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| V (ref.:M) | -0.45\*\*\* | -0.25\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| SD (ref.:M) | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| None (ref.:M) | -0.20\*\*\* | -0.14\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Other (ref.:M) | 0.02 | 0.10\*\* | 0.10 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) |
| Constant | 0.70\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.64\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 955 | 966 | 938 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.48 | 0.28 | 0.45 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: The models compare the “M Leg & C Deleg” with the “M Deleg” condition.

Table SI12: Regression output for Figure 5 (only Germany)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| VARIABLES | Leg | Tol | AgBoy | Leg | Tol | AgBoy | Dem | Tol | AgBoy |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CDU Leg | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.09\*\* | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| CDU Deleg |  |  |  | -0.04 | -0.00 | -0.13\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.44\*\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.57\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | 0.48\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 338 | 341 | 330 | 497 | 504 | 479 | 868 | 884 | 827 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Partisanship | CDU | CDU | CDU | CDU | CDU | CDU | Others | Others | Others |

**(continuation)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| VARIABLES | Dem | Tol | AgBoy | Dem | Tol | AgBoy | Dem | Tol | AgBoy |
| CDU Leg | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.01 | -0.04 | 0.10\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| CDU Deleg | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.08\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.06\* | -0.06\* | 0.06 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |  |  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Constant | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.49\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.87\*\*\* | 0.89\*\*\* | 0.80\*\*\* | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.95\*\*\* | 0.74\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.04) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,279 | 1,302 | 1,198 | 112 | 112 | 109 | 169 | 170 | 163 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Partisanship | Others | Others | Others | AfD | AfD | AfD | AfD | AfD | AfD |

\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Models 1-3, 7-9, and 13-15 compare the CDU Leg condition with the CDU Deleg condition. Models 4-6, 10-12, and 16-18 compare the CDU Leg condition *and* the CDU Deleg condition with the control condition. Models 1-6 only include CDU partisans. Models 13-18 only include AfD partisans. Models 7-12 include all others.

Table SI13: Regression output for Figure 5 (only Sweden)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| VARIABLES | Leg | Tol | Min | Leg | Tol | Min | Dem | Tol | Min |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| M Deleg |  |  |  | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.09 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.06) |  |  |  |
| M Leg | 0.05 | -0.00 | 0.12\*\* | 0.06 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 | -0.00 | 0.10\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.65\*\*\* | 0.79\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* | 0.64\*\*\* | 0.80\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 131 | 133 | 131 | 210 | 214 | 210 | 657 | 658 | 641 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.02 |
| Partisanship | M | M | M | M | M | M | Others | Others | Others |

**(continuation)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| VARIABLES | Dem | Tol | Min | Dem | Tol | Min | Dem | Tol | Min |
| M Deleg | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.01 |  |  |  | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |  |  |  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| M Leg | 0.06\*\* | 0.02 | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.58\*\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.91\*\*\* | 0.91\*\*\* | 0.90\*\*\* | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.92\*\*\* | 0.93\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 967 | 976 | 936 | 188 | 189 | 189 | 290 | 291 | 291 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.00 |
| Partisanship | Others | Others | Others | SD | SD | SD | SD | SD | SD |

\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Models 1-3, 7-9, and 13-15 compare the M Leg condition with the M Deleg condition. Models 4-6, 10-12, and 16-18 compare the M Leg condition *and* the M Deleg condition with the control condition. Models 1-6 only include M partisans. Models 13-18 only include SD partisans. Models 7-12 include all others.

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1. In the German search string, unlike in the Swedish search string, I only included the party name abbreviations. There are two reasons for this. First, in German newspapers, it is simply most common to use the abbreviations as opposed to the full party names. Second, only using the abbreviations resulted in a sufficient number of articles in Germany, but not in Sweden. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)