Supplementary Material For "The Vietnam Draft Lottery and Whites' Racial Attitudes: Evidence from the General Social Survey"

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Contents

SI 1 Existing Studies of the VDL's Effects on Social and Political Attitudes

Table SI 1.1: Studies that Leverage the VDL in order to Identify Causal Effects on Social or Political Attitudes

Study	Relevant Lottery	Subjects (N)	Key findings
Erikson and Stoker (2011)	1969	High school students (260)	Immediate effects (1973 survey) (i) Among college-bound students, recipients of adverse (low) draft numbers were more dovish, possessed more liberal ideological views, were more likely to report voting for and supporting McGovern over Nixon, and were more likely to act in alignment with this partisan bias; (ii) Draft-vulnerable Republicans were more likely to switch parties than draft-vulnerable Democrats; (iii) Null effects among non-college bound students. Long-term effects (1982 and 1997 surveys) (i) VDL effects on attitudes toward the Vietnam War persist, but effects on dovishness and political ideology diminish later in life; (ii) Although immediate effects on party ID were marginal, "respondents [whose 1965 party identifications were destabilized] stuck with their new partisanship rather than revert to 1965 values."
Green, Davenport and Hanson (2019)	1969, 1970, 1971	Draft-eligible men (Survey: 675)	No long-term effects of VDL status on partisan identification, political attitudes, or voter turnout in surveys conducted in 2014 and 2016. No apparent effects on party registration or turnout when voter files are matched to VDL status.
Rubin and Peplau (1973)	1971	Groups of 19-year-old males (58)	(i) Overall, draft-eligible men responded more favorably to recipients of adverse lottery numbers than lottery winners; (ii) However, subjects who exhibited beliefs that "the world is a just place where good people are rewarded and bad people are punished" reacted more favorably to winners, and expressed greater resentment toward losers.
Staw, Notz and Cook (1974)	1971	Male undergraduate students at 3 Illinois universities (493)	Draft-vulnerable men were more likely to favor rapid troop withdrawal from Vietnam.
Notz, Staw and Cook (1971)	1969	Male undergraduate students at Northwestern University (Study 1: 232, Study 2: 588)	(i) Null effect of draft-vulnerability on likelihood of signing anti-war petition; (ii) Men with safer lottery numbers were more likely to favor rapid troop withdrawal from Vietnam.
Longino (1973) Bergan (2009)	1969	University of Virginia students (141)	Men with safer lottery numbers were more likely to support troop withdrawal and change their attitudes about war, but these relationships are not statistically significant.
Henderson (2010)	1969	Draft-eligible men (571)	Among men facing high draft risk, the VDL may have reduced political participation and induced conservative political attitudes.

SI 2 Background on the Vietnam Draft Lottery

SI 2.1 Lotteries and Military Service

The Vietnam Draft Lottery (VDL), conducted annually from 1969 to 1975, determined the order in which young American men were called to serve in the Vietnam War. In total, the VDL resulted in the conscription of 2.215 million out of 27 million draft-eligible American men. American men born in 1944-1950, 1951, and 1952 were eligible for conscription in the 1969, 1970, and 1971 Lotteries, respectively. The four lotteries conducted after 1971 did not result in calls to service, and the President's authority to induct troops into the military expired on June 30, 1973. We focus on the 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972 Lotteries, with the 1972 Lottery serving to shed light on causal mechanisms.

In each lottery, priority for conscription was determined by the random assignment of lottery numbers (1 through 365 or 366) to birth dates. That is, lottery numbers represent the order in which draft-eligible men were called for conscription in the following year. As reported in Table SI 2.1, the highest lottery numbers called for conscription (APNs) in the 1969, 1970, and 1971 Lotteries were 195, 125, and 95, respectively. The fact that draft risk varies by lottery necessitates the use of inverse probability weights when modeling outcomes. Inverse probability weights in effect eliminate the correlation between birth year and draft lottery status.

Table SI 2.1: Vietnam Draft Lottery Information

Lottery Year	Date of Drawing	Associated Birth Year(s)	APN
1969	Dec 01 1969	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950	195
1970	Jul 01 1970	1951	125
1971	Aug 05 1971	1952	95
1972	Feb 02 1972	1953	0
1973	Mar 08 1973	1954	0
1974	Mar 20 1974	1955	0
1975	Mar 12 1975	1956	0

The connection between exposure to the VDL and actual service in the military varied markedly by birth cohort. Prior to the first VDL in 1969, cohorts born from 1944 through 1949 were subject to the (non-lottery) draft, and these men either joined the military or obtained deferments prior to the lottery. As a result, there is very little statistical relationship between their VDL status and their military service. As shown in Table SI 2.2 below, when we regress military service as measured by the GSS on VDL for these cohorts, we obtain a meager coefficient of 0.024 with a standard error of 0.031 (N=1,068). By contrast, for men born from 1950 through 1952, who became newly draft-eligible during each year's lottery, the corresponding coefficient is 0.171 with a standard error of 0.037 (N=608), an estimate very close to the 16 percent compliance rate that Angrist (1990) obtains using administrative data. The estimate for the 1953 cohort also reveals a weak relationship between VDL status (assuming a faux APN of 95 for placebo analysis) and military service.

In sum, the statistical connection between VDL and military service *only* exists for the 1950-1952 cohorts, which is why they are the focus of our analysis here. If cross-racial contact in the military was the causative agent behind the effects we observe on race-related outcomes,

it is telling that we see apparent effects only for the 1950-1952 cohorts and not for the 1944-1949 or 1953 cohorts. For the latter groups, the VDL did not bring about a change in military service.

Table SI 2.2: Compliance Rate Comparison (White Draft-Eligible Men – 1969-1972 Lotteries)

	Birth Year		
	1944-1949	1950-1952	1953
VDL status	0.0235	0.1708**	0.0323
	(0.0310)	(0.0373)	(0.0677)
Observations	1,068	608	199

p-values computed using one-sided hypothesis tests (h: +). *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Estimates obtained using weighted least squares (OLS for 1953). Fixed effects for survey year not shown. Compliance estimates constructed using a binary version of the GSS variable *vetyears*.
vetyears: Have you ever been on active duty for military training or service for two consecutive months or more? If yes, what was your total time on active duty?
(0 = No active duty, 1 = Yes, less than 2 years, 2 = Yes, 2-4 years, 3 = Yes, more than 4 years, 4 = Some, don't know how long)

SI 2.2 Evidence on the Nature of White-Black Contact in the Military during the Vietnam Era

Although the evidence is patchy, some instructive accounts emphasize the prevalence of Black/White contact due to the diffusion of Black service members throughout the U.S. Army in the wake of desegregation during the 1950s. Although White officers outnumbered Black officers in the Army by more than 20:1, White enlisted men were exposed to a growing number of Black non-commissioned officers in the Army during this period (Moskos 1973, p.99-100) due to increasingly egalitarian policies and higher tendency among Black enlisted men to reenlist. Whites' contact with Black service members was especially prevalent among enlisted men (Butler and Wilson 1978, p.466). Overall, race relations among Black and White Americans in Vietnam were reportedly more harmonious than they were in the United States (Fiman, Borus and Stanton 1975, p.44), a point confirmed by military assessments of battlefield morale as well as journalistic accounts (Villarreal 2020, p.108-112).

SI 3 Assessing Sample Attrition

One question that is often raised about VDL-based identification strategies is whether those who take surveys are a random sample of the VDL-eligible population. If those who were drafted have systematically different response rates from those who were not drafted (perhaps

due to dying in battle or emigrating to avoid the draft), the symmetry between treatment and control groups may be jeopardized.

One way to assess asymmetries in response rates is to compare the actual proportion of birth dates that were drafted each year of the VDL to the proportion of drafted GSS respondents among all draft-eligible GSS respondents. We find a high degree of correspondence. It appears that drafted men were slightly more likely to respond to the GSS, but this difference seems too small to be consequential.

Table SI 3.1: Assessing Attrition among White Men, by Birth Year and Lottery Year

Lottery Year	Birth Year	Expected Proportion Drafted	Proportion Drafted in GSS Data	Number of GSS Respondents
1969	1944-1949	0.5338	0.5530	2112
1969	1950	0.5342	0.5396	391
1970	1951	0.3425	0.3802	384
1971	1952	0.2596	0.2704	429
1972*	1953	0.2603	0.2506	399
All		0.4599	0.4686	3715

*Assumes APN of 95 for placebo analysis. No draft calls were issued for this lottery cohort.

SI 4 Comparing Publicly Released and Restricted GSS Variables for VDL Status Among White Males

For confidentiality reasons, the GSS does not publicly release the exact VDL status of all respondents. Instead, the VDL status variable available through the GSS website is perturbed such that 10% of non-missing values are flipped. Across all respondents with non-missing VDL status values, an equal number of 0s (undrafted) are changed to 1s (drafted) as 1s to 0s.

Table SI 4.1: Proportion of White Males With Drafted Birth Dates in Public and Restricted GSS Data

Lottery Year	Birth Year	Proportion Treated (Public Data)	Proportion Treated (Restricted Data)
1969	1944-1949	0.5327	0.5530
1969	1950	0.5166	0.5396
1970	1951	0.4063	0.3802
1971	1952	0.2890	0.2704
1972*	1953	0.3108	0.2506
All		0.4659	0.4686

*Assumes APN of 95 for placebo analysis. No draft calls were issued for this lottery cohort.

SI 5 Identification of the Complier Average Causal Effect

Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), using the Vietnam Draft Lottery as an example, define four latent groups in the population of subjects based on their potential outcomes. Let subjects' randomly assigned draft status be denoted z. Let a given subject's treatment status – serving in the military – be $d_i = 1$ if a subject serves in the military or $d_i = 0$ otherwise. Define the

potential outcome $d_i(z)$ to be whether a given subject would serve in the military if assigned a given draft status.

Compliers are those who take the treatment (i.e., serve in the military) if and only if drafted. Never-takers are those who do not serve in the military regardless of draft status. Always-takers are those who serve in the military regardless of draft status. The final category is Defiers, those who serve in the military if and only if they are *not* drafted. In order to identify the average effect among Compliers (see Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) for a proof), one assumes that there are no Defiers, which makes intuitive sense in this application. Three other core assumptions are invoked as well: ignorability, SUTVA, and excludability. Ignorability is credible here given random assignment, and while there are concerns about the randomness of the 1969 Lottery given the physical process by which birth dates were shuffled, these concerns seem to have no material bearing on public opinion outcomes (Berinsky and Chatfield 2015). SUTVA essentially implies that there are no unmodeled potential outcomes due to spillovers or alternative versions of the treatment. Excludability in this context implies that the lottery affects outcomes only via military service, not some other pathway. For outcomes having to do with racial attitudes, excludability implies that the draft lottery number per se has no effect on racial attitudes, nor does the lottery number set in motion other processes that would diminish prejudice (e.g., draft evasion). One possible threat to excludability might occur if lottery-induced opposition to Richard Nixon were to precipitate a more liberal view of African Americans; however, for the lotteries that actually drafted men into the military, we see little evidence of shifts in political attitudes measured by the GSS. And, in keeping with the exclusion restriction, White men in the 1944-1949 cohort, who are almost all Never-takers and Always-takers, show no liberalization of their racial attitudes as a result of the VDL.

SI 6 Deviations from the Pre-Analysis Plan

This research project got underway in late 2022, when we applied to NORC to request that they append VDL status to the General Social Survey. This request was approved, and we paid a processing fee before NORC began their work. As described in SI 4, NORC created public and restricted versions of the VDL status variable. The public version was posted on the GSS website as part of the GSS 1972-2021 cross-sectional cumulative data file on February 1, 2023. The restricted version was provided directly by NORC on April 19, 2023. We did not have access to either VDL status variable until February 1, 2023, and so our pre-analysis plan (dated January 23, 2023 but posted publicly on January 31, 2023) was blind to outcomes.

The analysis presented in this research note largely follows our pre-analysis plan. However, we deviated from the plan in some important ways, and this section clarifies these departures.

When writing the pre-analysis plan, we were unaware of the marked variations in compliance rates across birth-year cohorts. Our plan focuses on "US born respondents with birthdates that made them eligible for conscription in a VDL year in which a draft order was issued (i.e., American respondents who were born in or between the years 1944 and 1953)" (p.1), and the initial drafts of this manuscript pooled all of the cohorts eligible for the 1969, 1970, or 1971 Vietnam Draft Lotteries.

Well after the plan was finalized, we noticed that compliance rates were nearly zero for the cohorts of respondents who turned 19 before the year of the first VDL. Looking back at Angrist (1990, p.315), we realized that he excludes those born before 1950 because the older men had already been subject to the draft in previous years. Our pre-analysis plan was designed to employ the same identification strategy as Angrist (1990), which is why we said we would rely on his estimated compliance rate (16 percent) when calculating the CACE. Since the 1944-1949 cohorts cannot illuminate the causative effects of military service and their compliance rate is far below Angrist's, the plan in effect has a contradiction. Because the causal mechanism of military service is crucial to our argument about race-related outcomes, we resolve this contradiction by restricting our attention to the 1950-1952 cohorts.

The exclusion of cohorts with low compliance rates has two implications for our analysis. First, by raising the overall compliance rate, we increase the magnitude of the expected ITT effect and increase the precision with which the CACE is estimated, albeit for a smaller pool of respondents. Second, when analyzing the 1944-1949 cohorts separately, we are in effect gauging the effects of exposure to the lottery without any indirect pathway through military service (on the grounds that the lottery did nothing to induce military service among these cohorts). Thus, the 1944-1949 cohorts serve much the same analytic role as the 1953 cohort, for which the VDL did not lead to military service. For White men in the 1944-1949 cohorts, the tables corresponding to those reported in the text are presented in Dataverse Supplement 4 (see Tables DVS4 2.1 to 2.3). As Figure SI 7.1 shows, the point estimates for the 1944-1949 and 1950-1952 cohorts are quite different. The 1944-1949 cohorts show no evidence of liberalized views on race-related questions.

Second, the pre-analysis plan discusses a total of ten outcome domains, but our research note focuses on the three race-related domains and the domain of political orientations. The fact that attention is devoted primarily to some outcomes rather than others raises the possibility of false discovery due to multiple comparisons. The pre-analysis plan envisioned a Bonferroni-Holm multiple comparisons correction assuming a total of ten (domain) comparisons. In the end, we pooled the race-related outcomes together into a single outcome and conducted a Bonferroni correction that adjusted for the 28 distinct outcome measures that were alluded to in our plan across all domains. As shown in the text, this adjustment causes the joint statistical significance of the race-related items to fall short of the conventional 0.05 level.

Third, although the race-related attitudinal measures used in this paper correspond to the ones specified in our pre-analysis plan, the plan grouped them differently. Specifically, the racial attitudes and race-related policy views categories each contain a mixture of measures from domain 3 (preferences for interracial contact) and domain 4 (racial prejudices, attitudes concerning racial equality and affirmative action) in the pre-analysis plan. Since the outcome variables are the same, the joint significance of all of the items pooled is unaffected by this recategorization. See DVS5 for a detailed discussion of coding choices, including deviations from the plan that reflect the fact that some of the originally listed outcome measures were excluded for technical reasons (e.g., they were only asked of subgroups based on their previous answers) and some items that were alluded to but not mentioned explicitly were included.

Fourth, the pre-analysis plan defines additive indices by grouping substantively similar

variables within domains. This categorization method was vague and resulted in indices that grouped many outcomes with few overlapping years of survey data. We redefine standardized indices using a more definitive approach. Within domains, two or more outcomes are grouped as a singular index if they are substantively similar *and* either stem from the same base GSS question or are nearly identical in wording (in the latter case, analysis is not restricted to survey years in which all components are measured). Applying these criteria results in more comparisons among the race-related outcomes, but also a more conservative Bonferroni correction. The recategorization of domains 3 and 4 does not affect outcome groupings using this approach.

Fifth, the pre-analysis plan states that additive indices are constructed following the standardization of component measures but does not specify whether other (non-index-component) outcomes are also standardized. In the analysis, all outcome measures are standardized to facilitate the interpretation of regression coefficients. DVS5 lays out in detail when and how the indices were constructed.

Sixth, the pre-analysis plan specifies that we would assess the joint significance of the grouped items using fixed-effects meta-analysis. Given the sheer number of items measured in different surveys, setting up a conventional meta-analysis proved to be an immense and unworkable undertaking. Instead, as described in SI 9.1.1, we “stacked" the data and used survey-year fixed effects and randomization inference. This procedure is analogous to a fixed-effects meta-analysis but relies on individual-level data.

Seventh, by way of clarification, in order to estimate regression Equation (2), it is necessary to measure a given outcome in at least two GSS survey years. Therefore, in addition to requiring 50 subjects for each outcome, we also require at least two surveys. This criterion does not affect the inclusion of race-related outcomes, because every instance in which a race-related outcome was measured in a single GSS survey involved fewer than 50 applicable respondents.

Finally, the pre-analysis plan specifies that we will analyze Whites and non-Whites separately for race-related outcomes. Here we have analyzed them separately for all outcomes to facilitate comparison across outcome measures.

SI 7 Additional Results: Draft-Eligible White Males (1950-1952 Cohorts)

SI 7.1 Interracial Contact

In our pre-analysis plan, measures of interracial contact were included among the race-related outcomes. Space constraints, however, led us to move these results to the Supplementary Material. The estimated ITTs for all years pooled are equivocal, but the modeled ITT effects in 1978 are sizable, suggesting that treated White men initially became more likely to live in integrated neighborhoods and to have more social interaction with Black people. The pattern of negative interaction effects suggests that the VDL's effects wore off over time, which is similar to the pattern of results for racial attitudes and support for race-related policies.

Table SI 7.1: VDL Effects on Interracial Contact

	Measures of Interracial Contact			
	raclive (1)	racwork (2)	racchurh (3)	nonwhitefriends (4)
VDL status (Equation 1)	−0.0150	0.0508	0.1286	0.1521
	(0.0593)	(0.1140)	(0.1239)	(0.2477)
VDL status (Equation 2)	0.0697	0.2728	0.3238	1.7494**
	(0.1118)	(0.3796)	(0.2500)	(0.5009)
VDL Status · year	−0.0042	−0.0086	−0.0241	−0.1063**
	(0.0047)	(0.0141)	(0.0268)	(0.0296)
Observations	1,117	292	269	74

p-values computed using one-sided hypothesis tests (h: $+\beta_1$, $+\beta_1^*$, $-\beta_2^*$). *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Estimates obtained using weighted least squares. Fixed effects for survey year not shown. All outcome measures are standardized by dividing by the standard deviation of the weighted control group. Variable labels in italics refer to the naming convention in the GSS codebook.
Pooled coefficients and results of joint significance tests reported in Tables SI 9.1 and 9.2.
High outcome values = high levels of interracial contact.
GSS Question Wording:
raclive: Are there any [African-American for White Rs, White for Black Rs] families living in your neighborhood? (reverse coded)
racwork: Are the people who work where you work all White, mostly White, about half and half, mostly Black, or all Black?
racchurh: Do [African-Americans for White Rs, Whites for Black Rs] attend the church that you, yourself, attend most often, or not? (reverse coded)
Non-White Friends: ten-item index
frndrac1, frndrac2, frndrac3, frndrac4, frndrac5, race1, race2, race3, race4, race5: Respondents provided names of their five closest friends. For each name, the following question was asked: Is (NAME) Asian, Black, Hispanic, White or something else? (coded as binary, =1 if at least one friend is non-White)

SI 7.2 Comparing Results from the 1950-1952 Cohorts and the 1944-1949 and 1953 Cohorts

The low compliance rates of the 1944-1949 and 1953 cohorts imply that we should see weak effects on race-related outcomes, assuming that military service is a necessary component of attitude change. Figure SI 7.1 shows the contrasting results for the three cohort groups. On average, the high-compliance cohorts born 1950-1952 show stronger estimated ITT effects on the 20 race-related outcomes than the low-compliance cohorts born 1944-1949 and 1953.



Figure SI 7.1: Comparing Estimated VDL Effects Based on Equation 1 for White Males Born 1944-1949, 1950-1952, and 1953

SI 7.3 Other Pre-specified Outcomes

SI 7.3.1 Support for the Draft

Measures of support for the draft were asked in 1982, 1983, and 1984. Caution is warranted when interpreting the interaction between VDL and survey year because draft-related questions were not asked after 1984. Overall, the small N makes these results uninformative.

Table SI 7.2: VDL Effects on Support for the Draft

	Measures of Support for the Draft		
	draftfeel (1)	milvolfeel (2)	natserve (3)
VDL status (Equation 1)	−0.1032	−0.2456	0.0989
	(0.2227)	(0.2239)	(0.2607)
VDL status (Equation 2)	−0.5563	0.1164	0.9940
	(1.5861)	(1.4478)	(1.4710)
VDL Status · year	0.0971	−0.0790	−0.2037
	(0.3364)	(0.3120)	(0.3295)
Observations	106	88	68

p-values computed using two-sided hypothesis tests. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Estimates obtained using weighted least squares. Fixed effects for survey year not shown. All outcome measures are standardized by dividing by the standard deviation of the weighted control group. Variable labels in italics refer to the naming convention in the GSS codebook.
High outcome values = support for the draft.
GSS Question Wording:
Support for the Draft: two-item index
(i) *draft*: Do you think we should return to a military draft at this time, or should we continue to rely on volunteers? (reverse coded)
(ii) *draftem*: If respondent answered "volunteers" or "don't know" to (i): If there were a national emergency, do you think we should return to a military draft or should we continue to rely on volunteers? (reverse coded)
Attitudes Toward Volunteer Military: two-item index
(i) *milvolok*: All things considered, how well do you think relying on volunteers has worked for the armed forces (very well, fairly well, or not well)?
(ii) *milqual*: How would you rate the quality of the men and women now serving in the armed forces (excellent, good, not so good, or poor)?
National Service: two-item index
(i) *feserve*: How would you feel about a program that required young women to give one year of service to the nation – either in the military forces or in non-military work – would you strongly favor it, probably favor it, probably oppose it, or strongly oppose it? (reverse coded)
(ii) *meserve*: And how would you feel about such a program for all young men? (reverse coded)

SI 7.3.2 Attitudes Toward Social Programs and Economic Inequality

Because racial attitudes and attitudes toward economic inequality are correlated, one might wonder whether the VDL's effects on racial attitudes carry over to effects on egalitarianism. Interestingly, we see little evidence of an egalitarian effect, whether for the pooled sample or for the modeled effect in 1978.

Table SI 7.3: VDL Effects on Attitudes Toward Social Programs and Economic Inequality

	Measures of Egalitarianism	
	fareandss (1)	ineqincome (2)
VDL status (Equation 1)	−0.0972 (0.0638)	0.0730 (0.0711)
VDL status (Equation 2)	−0.0349 (0.1478)	0.2039 (0.1346)
VDL Status · year	−0.0027 (0.0057)	−0.0065 (0.0057)
Observations	1,020	841

p-values computed using one-sided hypothesis tests (h: $+\beta_1, +\beta_1^*, -\beta_2^*$). *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Estimates obtained using weighted least squares. Fixed effects for survey year not shown. All outcome measures are standardized by dividing by the standard deviation of the weighted control group. Variable labels in italics refer to the naming convention in the GSS codebook. High outcome values = egalitarian views.
GSS Question Wording:
Welfare and Social Security: two-item index
(i) *natfare*: Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare? (reverse coded)
(ii) *natsoc*: Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on social security? (reverse coded)
Income Inequality: two-item index
(i) *eqwlth*: Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel? (reverse coded)
(ii) *equalize*: Do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor? (reverse coded)

SI 7.3.3 Support for Defense Spending and Tolerance of Militarists

It is plausible to suppose that either the VDL itself or VDL-induced service might affect attitudes toward the military and militarists. We estimate a negative ITT effect on support for defense spending, especially when focusing on the modeled ITT in 1978. We see no indication of an effect on confidence in the military. Political tolerance of militarists seems to be negatively affected, although this effect appears to subside over time.

Table SI 7.4: VDL Effects on Support for Defense Spending and Tolerance of Militarists

	Measures of Support for Defense Spending and Tolerance of Militarists			
	milspending (1)	conarmy (2)	proudmil (3)	allowmil (4)
VDL status (Equation 1)	−0.1117	−0.0414	−0.2449	0.0652
	(0.0752)	(0.0689)	(0.2233)	(0.0739)
VDL status (Equation 2)	−0.2074	0.0299	0.1673	−0.3035
	(0.1298)	(0.1222)	(0.7820)	(0.1443)
VDL Status · year	0.0054	−0.0037	−0.0154	0.0173
	(0.0060)	(0.0053)	(0.0280)	(0.0058)
Observations	693	821	67	763

p-values computed using one-sided hypothesis tests (h: $+\beta_1$, $+\beta_1^*$, $-\beta_2^*$). *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Estimates obtained using weighted least squares. Fixed effects for survey year not shown. All outcome measures are standardized by dividing by the standard deviation of the weighted control group. Variable labels in italics refer to the naming convention in the GSS codebook.
High outcome values = high levels of support for defense spending and political tolerance of militarists.
GSS Question Wording:
Support for Defense Spending: two-item index
(i) *natarms*: Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on the military, armaments, and defense? (reverse coded)
(ii) *sparms*: Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending on the military and defense. (reverse coded)
conarmy: As far as the people running the military are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? (reverse coded)
proudmil: Are you very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, or not proud at all of America's armed forces? (reverse coded)
Stratocracy: three-item index
(i) *spkmil*: Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak, or not? (reverse coded)
(ii) *colmil*: Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? (reverse coded)
(ii) *libmil*: Suppose he wrote a book advocating doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. Would you favor removing it from the public library, or not?

SI 7.3.4 Trust in People and U.S. Institutions

The VDL's effects here seem modest. Confidence in political institutions, confidence in the press, trust in people, and anomia are weakly predicted by VDL status.

Table SI 7.5: VDL Effects on Trust in People and U.S. Institutions

	Measures of Trust in People and U.S. Institutions				
	coninst (1)	conpress (2)	trustppl (3)	anomia (4)	selfvothers (5)
VDL status (Equation 1)	0.0569	−0.0719	−0.0524	−0.1959	0.3276
	(0.0685)	(0.0666)	(0.0694)	(0.1131)	(0.2360)
VDL status (Equation 2)	−0.0188	−0.1325	−0.0586	−0.1255	1.1821
	(0.1216)	(0.1181)	(0.1319)	(0.2611)	(0.9708)
VDL Status · year	0.0040	0.0032	0.0003	−0.0079	−0.0574
	(0.0052)	(0.0051)	(0.0056)	(0.0264)	(0.0632)
Observations	827	821	828	326	91

p-values computed using two-sided hypothesis tests. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Estimates obtained using weighted least squares. Fixed effects for survey year not shown. All outcome measures are standardized by dividing by the standard deviation of the weighted control group. Variable labels in italics refer to the naming convention in the GSS codebook.
High outcome values = high levels of trust in people and U.S. institutions.
GSS Question Wording:
Confidence in U.S. Institutions: three-item index
(i) *confed*: Would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in the people running... Executive branch of the U.S. government (reverse coded)
(ii) *conjudge*: U.S. Supreme Court (reverse coded)
(iii) *conlegis*: Congress (reverse coded)
conpress: Would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in the people running... U.S. media/press (reverse coded)
Trust in Others: two-item index
trust, cantrust: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (reverse coded)
Anomia: three-item index
(i) *anomia5*: Agreement with: In spite of what some people say, the lot (situation/condition) of the average man is getting worse, not better.
(ii) *anomia6*: Agreement with: It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world with the way things look for the future.
(iii) *anomia7*: Agreement with: Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man.
Self Before Others: two-item index
(i) *equal1*: Agreement with: In our society everyone must look out for himself. It is of little use to unite with others and fight for one's goals in politics or in unions.
(ii) *selfirst*: Agreement with: You have to take care of yourself first, and if you have any energy left over, then help other people.

SI 7.3.5 Political Involvement

Self-reported voter turnout appears to rise among treated White men, although not to a degree that would overcome corrections for multiple comparisons. We see no apparent effect on political activism. Small N makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions about interest in politics.

Table SI 7.6: VDL Effects on Political Involvement

	Measures of Political Involvement		
	votelast (1)	mempolit (2)	polint (3)
VDL status (Equation 1)	0.1129*	−0.0795	0.2075
	(0.0550)	(0.0978)	(0.2851)
VDL status (Equation 2)	0.1457	−0.0272	−0.7592
	(0.1053)	(0.1732)	(0.5960)
VDL Status · year	−0.0016	−0.0059	0.0497
	(0.0044)	(0.0160)	(0.0270)
Observations	1,192	373	71

p-values computed using two-sided hypothesis tests. *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Estimates obtained using weighted least squares. Fixed effects for survey year not shown. All outcome measures are standardized by dividing by the standard deviation of the weighted control group.
Variable labels in italics refer to the naming convention in the GSS codebook.
High outcome values = high levels of political involvement.
GSS Question Wording:
votelast: If eligible, did you vote in the most recent presidential election? (1=no, 2=yes)
mempolit: Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of political clubs? (reverse coded)
polint: How interested would you say you personally are in politics? (reverse coded)

SI 7.3.6 Miscellaneous

These results provide mixed and inconsistent support for the hypothesis that VDL status affected views about foreign aid, interest in defense policy, support for military secrecy, or opinions about the share of Black service members in the armed forces. Education levels seem unaffected by VDL status.

Table SI 7.7: VDL Effects on Miscellaneous Measures

	Miscellaneous Measures								
	educ (1)	intmil (2)	nataid (3)	proudpol (4)	milpay (5)	blnumok (6)	sectech (7)	secmilop (8)	givblood (9)
VDL status (Equation 1)	0.0859	0.0867	0.0304	−0.1964	−0.4947*	−0.2630	−0.0291	−0.7320*	0.0353
	(0.0586)	(0.1756)	(0.0802)	(0.2160)	(0.2053)	(0.2466)	(0.2438)	(0.3303)	(0.1857)
VDL status (Equation 2)	−0.0257	−2.3528	0.1956	0.5538	−0.8027	−1.2855	−1.1837	−1.6248	0.4296
	(0.1118)	(1.7716)	(0.1366)	(0.7510)	(1.8759)	(1.8488)	(2.7113)	(6.3395)	(1.0995)
VDL Status · year	0.0055	0.0718	−0.0094	−0.0281	0.0683	0.2104	0.0644	0.0471	−0.0135
	(0.0047)	(0.0519)	(0.0063)	(0.0270)	(0.4133)	(0.3769)	(0.1505)	(0.3337)	(0.0371)
Observations	1,202	120	654	66	78	79	80	53	127

Hypothesis tests specified below (in accordance with pre-analysis plan). *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Estimates obtained using weighted least squares. Fixed effects for survey year not shown. All outcome measures are standardized by dividing by the standard deviation of the weighted control group. Variable labels in italics refer to the naming convention in the GSS codebook.

GSS Question Wording:

educ: What is the highest grade in elementary school/high school/college that you finished and got credit for? (h: $+\beta_1$, $+\beta_1^*$, $-\beta_2^*$)

intmil: Are you very interested (1), moderately interested (2), or not at all interested (3) in issues about military and defense policy? (reverse coded) (h: $+\beta_1$, $+\beta_1^*$, $-\beta_2^*$)

nataid: Are we spending too much (3), too little (1), or about the right amount (2) on foreign aid? (reverse coded) (h: 2)

proudpol: How proud are you of America's political influence in the world (1=very proud, 4=not at all proud) (reverse coded) (h: 2)

milpay: Should the pay and benefits that people in the armed forces receive be larger (1), smaller (3), or are they the right amount now (2)? (reverse coded) (h: 2)

blnumok: At the present time, about 22 percent of the armed forces are Black. All things considered, do you think there are too many Blacks in the armed forces (1), about the right number (2) or should there be more (3)? (h: 2)

sectech: Agreement with the following statement: In order to maintain America's leadership in the world, the government should maintain a high level of secrecy surrounding technology with military uses. (1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree) (reverse coded) (h: 2)

secmilop: Should the government maintain a high level of secrecy surrounding military operations? (1=definitely should, 4=definitely should not) (reverse coded) (h: 2)

givblood: During the past 12 months, how often have you donated blood? (coded as binary, yes=1) (h: 2)

SI 8 Female Placebo Check Results

Because women were not drafted, their VDL status (the draft status of men with the same birth date) should have no bearing on the outcomes examined in this paper. The placebo results Dataverse Supplement reports regression results that give a sense of the sampling distribution of results under the maintained hypothesis of no ITT effect (see Tables DVS3 1.1 to 1.10).

SI 9 Joint Significance Tests for Outcomes with Multiple Measures: Racial Attitudes, Race-Related Policy Views, Interracial Contact, and Political Orientations

SI 9.1 Approach

In order to assess the joint significance of the ITT effect on multiple outcomes, we conduct a regression analysis that "stacks" the data for all respondents who were asked one or more of the outcome measures; we then apply randomization inference to this stacked regression in order to calculate exact p-values.

SI 9.1.1 Stacking

One challenge with working with multiple outcomes using the GSS is that respondents are asked different outcome measures depending on which year they responded to the survey. In order to pool the data for a joint significance test, we create a stacked dataset for which the number of rows is as follows. Let N be the number of respondents, and let Q_i be the number of questions that respondent i answers. The total number of rows is $\sum_{i=1}^{N} Q_i$. Each row in which a respondent appears contains the respondent's treatment status, T_i. The regression model below is analogous to Equation (1) in the text in that it controls for survey-year fixed effects S_j and uses inverse probability weights to account for varying draft risk by age-cohort. It also includes fixed effects for each of the outcome measures M_k:

$$Y_s = \beta_1 T_i + S_j \Gamma + M_k \Delta + u_s$$

where s indexes the row number for the stacked dataset.

SI 9.1.2 Randomization Inference

In order to calculate the p-value of $\hat{\beta}_1$, we assume the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect and conduct randomization inference by reassigning respondents to treatment or control within each VDL cohort. Because the null hypothesis maintains that treated and untreated potential outcomes are identical, we can reassign observations and assume that the potential outcome they reveal will be identical to the outcome they actually revealed in practice. This amounts to a clustered assignment insofar as respondents appear multiple times when they answer multiple outcome questions. This procedure is replicated 10,000 times in order to

generate a reference distribution under the sharp null hypothesis. We report both the randomization inference p-value of the observed value of $\hat{\beta}_1$ and the randomization inference p-value of the observed value of the F-statistic. (We cross-checked these p-values using bootstrapping and obtained similar results.)

In order to assess the joint significance of $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ and $\hat{\beta}_2^*$, we again assume the sharp null hypothesis of no effect. For each simulated regression, we calculate the F-statistic and use it to form the null sampling distribution. We also save the $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ and $\hat{\beta}_2^*$ estimates from each simulation so that we can further investigate the proportion of simulations that yield the expected pattern of positive $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ and negative $\hat{\beta}_2^*$ estimates for race-related outcomes.

SI 9.1.3 Bonferroni Correction

We compute the Bonferroni-corrected p-value to address the heightened probability of false discovery when performing several statistical tests simultaneously. This very conservative correction entails dividing the nominal 0.05 alpha level by the total number of outcome measures, including secondary outcomes listed above. We count the set of 20 race-related outcomes as a single outcome, and we count the four party-related outcomes as a single outcome. The remaining 26 outcome variables bring the total number of comparisons to 28. Thus, to achieve significance at the 0.05 level given 28 comparisons, a p-value for a given outcome must be less than $0.05/28 = 0.0018$.

SI 9.2 Results

Figures 9.1 and 9.3 illustrate the results of these hypothesis tests for the 20 race-related items. We start by estimating the pooled value of $\hat{\beta}_1$, which is 0.07143 for men in the 1950-1952 cohorts. Figure SI 9.1 displays the histogram of 10,000 simulated randomizations under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect. Just 137 of the simulated estimates exceed the observed value, implying a p-value of 0.0137.

A corresponding plot for the four measures of party-related attitudes tests the significance of the pooled estimate of $\hat{\beta}_1$. Here, 4863 of the 10,000 simulated random assignments generate an estimate smaller (more Democratic or liberal) than the observed estimate of -0.01369.

As a placebo check, we conduct the same randomization inference tests for women born 1950-1952. The pooled $\hat{\beta}_1$ for the race-related items is positive but not more than would be expected by chance: the one-tailed p-value is 0.0922. The pooled $\hat{\beta}_1$ for the four party-related items has a one-tailed p-value of 0.0786.

Next, we consider the joint tests of significance for men's estimates of $\hat{\beta}_1^* = 0.17785$ and $\hat{\beta}_2^* = -0.00551$. For the race-related items, the null hypothesis is again no treatment effect, but the alternative is a positive treatment effect that diminishes over time (in other words, a positive β_1^* and negative β_2^*). Figure SI 9.3 shows the two-dimensional distribution of estimates under the sharp null hypothesis. The points show the expected negative correlation between the estimates of $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ and $\hat{\beta}_2^*$. The observed location of $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ and $\hat{\beta}_2^*$ is an outlier in the upper left tail. Only 144 of the 10,000 simulations produce an F-statistic larger than the observed

F-statistic of 10.0397. And only 46 of the 10,000 simulations produce a larger F-statistic *and* return a positive $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ *and* return a negative $\hat{\beta}_2^*$. If there were truly no VDL effect on race-related outcomes for White men born 1950-1952, we would see a pattern of results this extreme in the predicted direction by chance with probability 0.0046.

The joint test for the four party-related items yields a much higher p-value. The observed estimate lies near the center of the null distribution, and 2901 of the 10,000 simulations produce an F-statistic larger than the observed F-statistic of 0.5208 and return a negative $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ and return a positive $\hat{\beta}_2^*$, implying a p-value of 0.2901.

Contrast this result with the corresponding pattern for women. For race-related items, the observed $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ is 0.09750 and $\hat{\beta}_2^*$ is -0.00308. Of the 10,000 simulations, 2578 render an F-statistic larger than the observed F-statistic of 3.5891. And 579 of the 10,000 simulations produce a larger F-statistic and return a positive $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ and return a negative $\hat{\beta}_2^*$. These larger p-values reflect the fact that women were unaffected by the VDL. They also serve as a reminder that caution is needed when interpreting specific regression results because the strong negative correlation between $\hat{\beta}_1^*$ and $\hat{\beta}_2^*$ routinely generates outlying estimates.

Nonsignificant results for women also hold for the four party-related outcomes. Of the 10,000 simulations, 3685 render an F-statistic larger than the observed F-statistic of 2.2931.



Figure SI 9.1: Visualization of Randomization Inference P-values for the ITT Under the Sharp Null of No Treatment Effect, by Sex, for All 20 Race-related Outcomes



Figure SI 9.2: Visualization of Randomization Inference P-values for the ITT Under the Sharp Null of No Treatment Effect, by Sex, for All Four Measures of Political Orientations



Figure SI 9.3: Visualization of Randomization Inference P-values for the Joint Test of the Conditional Effect and the Interaction Effect from Equation 2 Under the Sharp Null of No Treatment Effect, by Sex, for All 20 Race-related Outcomes. (Red = Observed estimate pair, Black = Simulated estimate pairs when F-statistic is greater than observed and both coefficients are in the expected directions, Blue = Simulated estimate pairs when F-statistic is greater than observed but outside the expected quadrant. The remaining gray points are estimate pairs from simulations whose F-statistics are smaller than the observed value.)



Figure SI 9.4: Visualization of Randomization Inference P-values for the Joint Test of the Conditional Effect and the Interaction Effect from Equation 2 Under the Sharp Null of No Treatment Effect, by Sex, for All Four Measures of Political Orientations. (Red = Observed estimate pair, Black = Simulated estimate pairs when F-statistic is greater than observed and both coefficients are in the expected directions, Blue = Simulated estimate pairs when F-statistic is greater than observed but outside the expected quadrant. The remaining gray points are estimate pairs from simulations whose F-statistics are smaller than the observed value.)

Table SI 9.1: Applying Randomization Inference to Pooled Estimates - IPW Specification (Equation 1)

			Equation 1 Tests				
Sample	Outcome Cat	Spec	Obs $\hat{\beta_1}$	p(Sim $\hat{\beta_1}$ > Obs $\hat{\beta_1}$)	Obs F-stat	p(Sim F > Obs F)	p(Sim F > Obs F + Sim $\hat{\beta_1}$ correctly signed)
White Male Born 1950-1952	All 20 Race-Related	IPW	0.07143	0.0137	10.8224	0.0323	0.0123
White Male Born 1950-1952	Political Ideology	IPW	−0.01369	*0.4863	0.1557	0.8004	0.4828
White Male Born 1950-1952	Racial Attitudes	IPW	0.09029	0.0266	5.9487	0.0627	0.0235
White Male Born 1950-1952	Race-Related Policy Prefs	IPW	0.07418	0.0605	5.2418	0.0936	0.0546
White Male Born 1950-1952	Interracial Contact	IPW	0.02685	0.2006	0.3184	0.6194	0.1966
White Female Born 1950-1952	All 20 Race-Related	IPW	0.04171	0.0922	4.0040	0.2116	0.0856
White Female Born 1950-1952	Political Ideology	IPW	−0.06844	*0.0786	4.4455	0.1473	0.0710
White Female Born 1950-1952	Racial Attitudes	IPW	0.03528	0.2704	0.8898	0.4779	0.2628
White Female Born 1950-1952	Race-Related Policy Prefs	IPW	0.05979	0.0499	4.0133	0.1539	0.0430
White Female Born 1950-1952	Interracial Contact	IPW	0.00036	0.5077	0.00006	0.9941	0.5076
White Male Born in 1953	19 Race-Related with $N >= 50$		−0.01251				
White Male Born in 1953	Political Ideology		−0.10909	*0.1460	2.3448	0.2905	0.1460
White Male Born 1944-1949	All 20 Race-Related	IPW	−0.01556				
White Male Born 1944-1949	Political Ideology	IPW	−0.01533	*0.3454	0.3495	0.6864	0.3454

Bonferroni-corrected significance threshold (0.05 level): 0.001786
RI not conducted if observed coefficient is not in expected direction.
*p(Sim $\hat{\beta_1}$ < Obs $\hat{\beta_1}$)

Table SI 9.2: Applying Randomization Inference to Pooled Estimates - IPW Specification (Equation 2)

			Equation 2 Tests				
Sample	Outcome Cat	Spec	Obs $\hat{\beta}_1^*$	Obs $\hat{\beta}_2^*$	Obs F-stat	p(Sim F > Obs F)	p(Sim F > Obs F + Sim $\hat{\beta}_1^*$, $\hat{\beta}_2^*$ correctly signed)
White M 1950-1952	All 20 Race-Related	IPW	0.17785	−0.00551	10.0397	0.0144	0.0046
White M 1950-1952	Political Ideology	IPW	−0.06579	0.00258	0.5208	0.7973	0.2901
White M 1950-1952	Racial Attitudes	IPW	0.19234	−0.00459	4.0476	0.0814	0.0359
White M 1950-1952	Race-Related Policy Prefs	IPW	0.18323	−0.00633	5.1805	0.0618	0.0274
White M 1950-1952	Interracial Contact	IPW	0.16858	−0.00739	1.9477	0.2172	0.0402
White F 1950-1952	All 20 Race-Related	IPW	0.09750	−0.00308	3.5891	0.2578	0.0579
White F 1950-1952	Political Ideology	IPW	−0.08669	0.00096	2.2931	0.3685	0.1133
White F 1950-1952	Racial Attitudes	IPW	0.07784	−0.00203	0.6562	0.6667	0.2841
White F 1950-1952	Race-Related Policy Prefs	IPW	0.09861	−0.00237	2.4334	0.3031	0.0663
White F 1950-1952	Interracial Contact	IPW	0.12196	−0.00692	1.6858	0.2460	0.0608
White M 1953	19 Race-Related with $N >= 50$		0.12752	−0.00728	2.1230	0.3754	0.1563
White M 1953	Political Ideology		−0.40563	0.01496	5.0649	0.0914	0.0392
White M 1944-1949	All 20 Race-Related	IPW	−0.11884	0.00549			
White M 1944-1949	Political Ideology	IPW	0.04054	−0.00286			

Bonferroni-corrected significance threshold (0.05 level): 0.001786
RI not conducted if observed coefficients are not in expected directions.

SI 10 Revisions Following Comments from Reviewers

SI 10.1 Additional Outcome Measures

This subsection responds to a reviewer who asked us to investigate whether VDL status affected attitudes on "hot button issues": abortion, homosexuality, gun control, capital punishment, and women's rights. Table SI 10.1 shows that these five (non-preregistered) outcomes do move in the liberal direction. The one index that shows a relationship with the VDL that crosses the 0.05 significance threshold (making no adjustment for multiple comparisons) concerns gender equality, which is rather unexpected as a consequence of military service during this era.

SI 10.2 Testing Relative Fit of Model with Non-linear Time Interaction

This subsection responds to a reviewer who asked us to investigate whether VDL status interacts non-linearly with time. In particular, the reviewer wondered whether the results change if we include, in addition, an interaction between VDL status and time-squared. We report the nested F-tests comparing the linear time-by-VDL base model to the model that also includes time-squared-by-VDL. None of the 24 nested comparisons fall below the $p < 0.05$ threshold. These results may change if the GSS were to ask the same questions in the future; currently, our ability to estimate over-time decay is limited by the fact that certain race-related questions appear only during a particular era.

Nested F-Test Results (Pr(>F))
Racial Attitudes
liveblks: 0.6879, *racpush*: 0.0799, *racchldschool*: 0.7312, *racdin*: 0.3768, *marblkrelwht*: 0.2445, *racdifindex*: 0.6503, *blkrelwht1*: 0.2859, *closeblkrelwht*: 0.8640

Race-Related Policy Preferences
racchng: 0.6703, *racmar*: 0.7413, *racopen*: 0.2330, *racpres*: 0.7311, *natrace*: 0.1355, *helpblk*: 0.3402, *affrmact*: 0.3327, *racseg*: 0.0685

Political Orientations
polviews: 0.7551, *partyid*: 0.3963, *preschoice*: 0.3075, *poltemp*: 0.7221

Interracial Contact
raclive: 0.1427, *racwork*: 0.7825, *racchurh*: 0.3708, *nonwhitefriends*: 0.5274

Table SI 10.1: VDL Effects on Miscellaneous "Hot Button" Issues

	Miscellaneous "Hot Button" Issues				
	abindex (1)	homosex (2)	gunlaw (3)	cappun (4)	feindex (5)
VDL status (Equation 1)	0.0380	0.0707	0.0978	0.1046	0.1722*
	(0.0711)	(0.0752)	(0.0717)	(0.0622)	(0.0677)
VDL status (Equation 2)	0.1356	0.0525	0.1354	0.0801	0.2563*
	(0.1263)	(0.1483)	(0.1411)	(0.1169)	(0.1247)
VDL Status · year	−0.0053	0.0008	−0.0017	0.0012	−0.0043
	(0.0056)	(0.0059)	(0.0055)	(0.0048)	(0.0053)
Observations	821	739	793	1,130	774

p-values computed using two-sided hypothesis tests. *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Estimates obtained using weighted least squares. Fixed effects for survey year not shown. All outcome measures are standardized by dividing by the standard deviation of the weighted control group.
Variable labels in italics refer to the naming convention in the GSS codebook.
The outcome variables in this table were suggested by a reviewer and are not in the pre-analysis plan.
High values = alignment with liberal issue stances.
GSS Question Wording:
Views on Abortion: seven-item index
Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if... (all reverse coded)
(i) *abdefect*: there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?
(ii) *abnomore*: she is married and does not want any more children?
(iii) *abhlth*: the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy?
(iv) *abpoor*: the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?
(v) *abrape*: she became pregnant as a result of rape?
(vi) *absingle*: she is not married and does not want to marry the man?
(vii) *abany*: the woman wants it for any reason?
homosex: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex–do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?
gunlaw: Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun? (reverse coded)
cappun: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
Support for Women's Rights Movement: five-item index
(i) *fepol*: Agreement with: Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women.
(ii) *fepres*: If your party nominated a woman for President, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job? (reverse coded)
(iii) *fefam*: Agreement with: It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.
(iv) *fework*: Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her? (reverse coded)
(v)*fehome*: Agreement with: Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men.

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