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Supplemental Information for Social Pressure in the International Human Rights Regime: Why States Withdraw Treaty Reservations

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1. Supplemental Information

This document presents a series of robustness checks and tests. Table 1 gives the average values and standard deviation of the covariates for countries that did and did not make treaty reservations. Many of the average values of the covariates across the two groups are similar, indicating that countries that make reservations do not systematically differ on a number of dimensions from countries that do not make reservations. We note that countries that make reservations have higher average values of democracy than those who do not make reservations, which is consistent with previous research. Also, countries that do not make reservations have higher numbers of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) than countries that do make reservations, indicating that NHRIs may discourage countries from making reservations. We include the variables of democracy and NHRIs in the analyses so as to account for their differing effects on countries who make and do not make reservations, allowing us to isolate the effect of social pressure variables. From the analysis illustrated by Table 1, we infer that there is nothing systematic that we have not controlled for that leads to the large difference between the total number of observations and the number of observations with reservations.

Table 1. Average Value (Standard Deviation) of Covariates for Countries With and Without Reservations

	Countries without reservations	Countries with reservations
Civil Legal System	0.57 (0.49)	0.33 (0.47)
Islamic Legal System	0.14 (0.34)	0.23 (0.42)
Mixed Legal System	0.09 (0.29)	0.08 (0.27)
Democracy	1.67 (7.04)	3.55 (7.04)
Strong NHRI	2.98 (4.97)	1.34 (3.4)
Judicial Independence	0.24 (1.37)	0.7 (1.47)
Treaties Equal or Superior	0.28 (0.45)	0.24 (0.43)
Basic Rights Respected	0.18 (1.16)	0.37 (1.32)
GDP/cap (ln)	7.36 (1.49)	8.08 (1.49)
Population (ln)	16.07 (1.49)	16.9 (1.63)

Table 2 reports a series of two-stage censored probit models that adopt alternate strategies for estimating the uncertainty surrounding coefficient estimates. Each model includes all covariates from the fully specified selection model presented in the primary manuscript. Model 1 reports estimates for the full model specification using robust standard errors. Model 2 reports estimates for the full specification with robust standard errors clustered on country. Model 3 reports estimates for the full specification with robust standard errors clustered on treaty.

Table 2. Two-stage Analyses of Reservation Withdrawals with Robust Error Clustering

Outcome Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
State Objections	0.024**	0.024**	0.024
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.024)
Ongoing Periodic Review	2.000**	2.000**	2.000**
	(0.261)	(0.341)	(0.439)
Democracy	0.021**	0.021	0.021
	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.029)
Strong NHRI	0.052**	0.052**	0.052**
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.008)
Demanding Treaty Provision	-0.122	-0.122	-0.122
	(0.077)	(0.085)	(0.175)
Non-derogable Treaty Provision	0.540**	0.540**	0.540**
	(0.171)	(0.212)	(0.228)
Judicial Independence	0.024	0.024	0.024
	(0.039)	(0.083)	(0.055)
Treaties Equal or Superior	-0.234**	-0.234	-0.234**
	(0.100)	(0.175)	(0.110)
Basic Rights Respected	-0.259**	-0.259**	-0.259**
	(0.051)	(0.114)	(0.102)
GDP/cap (ln)	-0.064*	-0.064	-0.064
	(0.033)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Population (ln)	-0.181**	-0.181**	-0.181**
	(0.031)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Constant	5.021**	5.021**	5.021**
	(0.723)	(1.139)	(0.856)
** = p<.05; * = p<.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses.			

Continuation of Table2			
Selection Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civil Legal System	-0.470**	-0.470**	-0.470**
	(0.046)	(0.127)	(0.194)
Islamic Legal System	0.142**	0.142	0.142
	(0.051)	(0.154)	(0.184)
Mixed Legal System	-0.361**	-0.361	-0.361**
	(0.069)	(0.215)	(0.111)
Democracy	0.012**	0.012	0.012
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Strong NHRI	-0.054**	-0.054**	-0.054**
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Demanding Treaty Provision	0.207**	0.207**	0.207*
	(0.033)	(0.058)	(0.110)
Non-derogable Treaty Provision	-0.024	-0.024	-0.024
	(0.084)	(0.177)	(0.103)
Judicial Independence	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.044)
Treaties Equal or Superior	0.111**	0.111	0.111
	(0.041)	(0.093)	(0.117)
Basic Rights Respected	0.052**	0.052	0.052
	(0.022)	(0.054)	(0.059)
GDP/cap (ln)	0.120**	0.120**	0.120**
	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.044)
Population (ln)	0.146**	0.146**	0.146**
	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.028)
Constant	-5.373**	-5.373**	-5.373**
	(0.190)	(0.518)	(0.532)
Rho Parameter	-1.986**	-1.986**	-1.986**
	0.339	0.436	0.591
Observations	48,415	48,415	48,415
Selected Observations	629	629	629
Non-selected Observations	47,786	47,786	47,786
Error Cluster	.	Country	Treaty
** = p<.05; * = p<.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses.			

Table 3 reports a series of logit models estimated using a subset of observations that include only provisions that have received reservations. Each model includes all covariates from the fully specified outcome model presented in the primary manuscript. Model 1 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors and treaty–level fixed effects. Estimates for the fixed effects (9x) are not reported due to space constraints. Model 2 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors clustered on country. Model 3 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors clustered on treaty.

Table 3. Logit Analyses of Reservation Withdrawal on Sample of Provisions that Received Reservations

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
State Objections	0.120**	0.159**	0.159**
	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.069)
Ongoing Periodic Review	39.544**	8.285**	8.285**
	(1.423)	(1.759)	(1.566)
Democracy	0.102**	0.082*	0.082
	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.082)
Strong NHRI	0.117	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.080)	(0.117)	(0.079)
Demanding Treaty Provision	0.545	0.557	0.557*
	(0.589)	(0.374)	(0.289)
Non-derogable Treaty Provision	2.608**	2.754**	2.754**
	(0.585)	(0.501)	(0.470)
Judicial Independence	0.446*	0.222	0.222
	(0.229)	(0.348)	(0.140)
Treaties Equal or Superior	-0.944	-1.778*	-1.778
	(0.583)	(1.032)	(1.176)
Basic Rights Respected	-1.612**	-1.193**	-1.193*
	(0.306)	(0.483)	(0.645)
GDP/cap (ln)	0.059	0.122	0.122
	(0.190)	(0.410)	(0.501)
Population (ln)	-0.193	-0.109	-0.109
	(0.164)	(0.312)	(0.294)
Constant	-1.096	-3.187	-3.187
	(3.896)	(7.476)	(8.471)
Observations	627	629	629
Pseudo R2	0.785	0.746	0.746
Error Cluster	.	Country	Treaty
Fixed Effects	Treaty	.	.
** = $p<0.05$; *= $p<0.10$. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses			
Fixed effects omitted due to space constraints.			

Table 4 reports a series of linear probability models estimated using a subset of observations that include only provisions that have received reservations. Each model includes covariates from the fully specified outcome model presented in the primary manuscript and includes robust standard errors due to innate heteroskedasticity. Model 1 reports estimates for the outcome model with treaty–level fixed effects. Estimates for the fixed effects (9x) are not reported due to space constraints. Model 2 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors clustered on country. Model 3 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors clustered on treaty.

Table 4. Linear Probability Analyses of Reservation Withdrawal on Sample of Provisions that Received Reservations

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
State Objections	0.010**	0.017*	0.017
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Ongoing Periodic Review	0.918**	0.922**	0.922**
	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.018)
Democracy	0.006**	0.007*	0.007
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Strong NHRI	0.028	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.161)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Demanding Treaty Provision	0.018	0.035	0.035**
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.015)
Non-derogable Treaty Provision	0.299**	0.331*	0.331**
	(0.084)	(0.181)	(0.017)
Judicial Independence	0.008	0.012	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Treaties Equal or Superior	-0.076**	-0.073	-0.073
	(0.019)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Basic Rights Respected	-0.064**	-0.056	-0.056
	(0.011)	(0.037)	(0.031)
GDP/cap (ln)	0.032	0.001	0.001
	(0.599)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Population (ln)	-0.004	0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Constant	0.310**	-0.021	-0.021
	(0.144)	(0.220)	(0.251)
Observations	629	629	629
R2	0.777	0.766	0.766
Error Cluster	.	Country	Treaty
Fixed Effects	Treaty	.	.
** = p<0.05; *= p<0.10. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses			
Fixed effects omitted due to space constraints.			

Table 5 reports a series of logit models estimated using a full sample of country–provision–years while controlling for provisions that have received a reservation with a dichotomous variable that takes on the value of 1. Each model includes covariates from the fully specified outcome model presented in the primary manuscript in addition to the "reservation" variable. Model 1 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors and treaty-level fixed effects. Estimates for the fixed effects (9x) are not reported due to space constraints. Model 2 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors and country-level fixed effects. Estimates for the country fixed effects are not reported due to space constraints. Model 3 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors clustered on treaty. Model 4 reports estimates for the outcome model with robust standard errors clustered on country.

Table 5. Logit Analyses of Reservation Withdrawal on Full Sample, Controlling for Reservation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
State Objections	0.136**	0.056*	0.172**	0.172**
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.068)	(0.032)
Ongoing Periodic Review	42.223**	10.789**	9.522**	9.522**
	(1.566)	(1.767)	(2.191)	(2.579)
Democracy	0.102**	0.476**	0.179**	0.179**
	(0.038)	(0.136)	(0.075)	(0.050)
Strong NHRI	-0.057	-0.093	-0.076	-0.076
	(0.075)	(0.278)	(0.056)	(0.111)
Demanding Treaty Provision	0.434	0.835	0.504*	0.504
	(0.496)	(0.626)	(0.258)	(0.385)
Non-derogable Treaty Provision	2.380**	2.470**	2.693**	2.693**
	(0.566)	(0.914)	(0.436)	(0.368)
Judicial Independence	0.295	-0.073	-0.157	-0.157
	(0.184)	(0.592)	(0.228)	(0.383)
Treaties Equal or Superior	-1.044*	-0.559	-1.922	-1.922
	(0.575)	(1.909)	(1.340)	(1.320)
Basic Rights Respected	-1.282**	-2.713*	-0.965**	-0.965**
	(0.219)	(1.429)	(0.434)	(0.420)
GDP/cap (ln)	0.152	2.078	0.047	0.047
	(0.181)	(2.750)	(0.483)	(0.410)
Population (ln)	0.005	-6.690	-0.053	-0.053
	(1.679)	(9.003)	(0.314)	(0.303)
Reservation	6.604**	7.486**	6.166**	6.166**
	(0.867)	(0.612)	(0.486)	(0.794)
Constant	-11.681**	65.276	-9.834	-9.834
	(3.655)	(103.529)	(8.242)	(6.921)
Observations	46,579	10,704	48,415	48,415
Pseudo R2	0.91	0.93	0.89	0.89
Error Cluster	.	.	Treaty	Country
Fixed Effects	Treaty	Country	.	.
** = p<0.05; *= p<0.10. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses				
Fixed effects omitted due to space constraints.				