Supplementary Information: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership in Conflict States

August 23, 2023

Contents

1 Background on Survey Experiment and Implementation

We worked with an Afghan survey company to survey over 2,485 household surveys between August 2016 and January 2017 in three northern provinces: Balkh, Kunduz and Sar-e-Pul. The Taliban briefly occupied Kunduz during our survey collection. They had also occupied Kunduz briefly in September 2015, before IRoA forces retook control. This survey was a part of a broader project examining Afghans' attitudes towards political leadership in relation to insecurity, ethnic politics and corruption. The International Growth Centre funded the survey. Standards for pre-analysis procedures were still in flux when we ran our survey in the second half of 2016. These were the "early days" of pre-registration (Ofosu and Posner 2021). As a result we did not pre-register the survey experiment before data collection.

The survey's sampling design relies on 80 sampling points selected by random draw per province, with a quota of 10 surveys per sampling point (half male, half female respondents). Enumerators began at a central landmark in a village and sampled every third house using a random walk method. Enumerators selected adult household members using the Kish Grid method. Male enumerators surveyed male respondents and female enumerators surveyed female respondents. Accordingly, enumerators worked in mixed-gendered pairs, often consisting of husband and wife or brother and sister.

Prior to data collection, we carried out 50 pre-test surveys in Afghanistan in May 2016. Enumerators also ran focus groups and piloted the questions among native speakers of both Dari and Pashto to ensure that the treatment and control primes were clear and that the control prime did not induce any emotions about insecurity. Adjustments were made to the questionnaire following the pre-test. The 50 pre-test surveys are not included in the final sample.

We did not ask respondents about their personal experiences with insecurity. While there were differences in security between the provinces surveyed, we do not have access to a public dataset granular and reliable enough to accurately measure variation between

our sampling points. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) began publishing a dataset on security incidents in Afghanistan in 2017 after our survey data was collected.

2 Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership Survey Experiment

2.1 Balance Tables

Table 1: Balance Table: Neutral Text vs. Insecurity Prime

	Neutral Text Mean (SD)	**Insecurity Prime** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Support for Peace and Security	**5.672 (0.869)**	**5.775 (0.656)**	**0.016**
Female	0.51 (0.50)	0.556 (0.497)	0.096
Education (Numeric)	1.076 (1.471)	0.959 (1.426)	0.144
Unemployed	0.304 (0.460)	0.319 (0.467)	0.562
Voted	0.761 (0.427)	0.737 (0.441)	0.314
Pashtun	0.245 (0.430)	0.231 (0.422)	0.556
Uzbek	0.292 (0.455)	0.261 (0.440)	0.222
Tajik	0.301 (0.459)	0.322 (0.468)	0.412
Hazara	0.072 (0.258)	0.076 (0.265)	0.771
Other Ethnic Groups	0.09 (0.287)	0.109 (0.312)	0.256
Balkh	0.335 (0.473)	0.331 (0.471)	0.875
Kunduz	0.343 (0.475)	0.334 (0.472)	0.736
Sar-e-Pull	0.321 (0.467)	0.334 (0.472)	0.619
Respondents	641	658	

Education (Numeric) is a continuous variable where no education or religious education (Madrassa) equals 0, completion of primary school is 1, secondary school is 2, post-secondary vocational training is 3, some university education is 4, and completion of university education is 5. Voted equals 1 if respondent voted in the last presidential election. Support for Peace and Security is respondents' rank from 1 (Least) to 6 (Most) of the importance of leaders' ability to provide peace and security. This question was asked *after* respondents received the neutral or insecurity prime and completed the conjoint exercise.

Table 2: Balance Table: Male vs. Female Respondents

	Men Mean (SD)	**Women** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Support for Peace and Security	**5.566 (0.990)**	**5.863 (0.462)**	**< 0.001**
Education (Numeric)	1.211 (1.569)	0.847 (1.313)	< 0.001
Unemployed	0.157 (0.364)	0.447 (0.498)	< 0.001
Voted	0.807 (0.395)	0.698 (0.459)	< 0.001
Pashtun	0.249 (0.433)	0.228 (0.420)	0.371
Uzbek	0.269 (0.444)	0.283 (0.451)	0.371
Tajik	0.340 (0.474)	0.287 (0.453)	0.041
Hazara	0.059 (0.237)	0.087 (0.281)	0.062
Other Ethnic Groups	0.083 (0.275)	0.115 (0.320)	0.049
Balkh	0.348 (0.477)	0.320 (0.467)	0.289
Kunduz	0.371 (0.484)	0.310 (0.463)	0.02
Sar-e-Pull	0.281 (0.450)	0.369 (0.483)	0.001
Respondents	606	693	

Education (Numeric) is a continuous variable where no education or religious education (Madrassa) equals 0, completion of primary school is 1, secondary school is 2, post-secondary vocational training is 3, some university education is 4, and completion of university education is 5. Voted equals 1 if respondent voted in the last presidential election. Support for Peace and Security is respondents' rank from 1 (Least) to 6 (Most) of the importance of leaders' ability to provide peace and security. This question was asked *after* respondents received the neutral or insecurity prime and completed the conjoint exercise.

2.2 Mechanisms

Table 3: Mechanisms: Neutral Text vs. Insecurity Prime (All Respondents)

	Neutral Text Mean (SD)	**Insecurity Prime** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Leadership Attributes			
Provides Peace and Security	**5.672 (0.869)**	**5.775 (0.656)**	**0.016**
Military Experience	2.491 (1.226)	2.471 (1.214)	0.764
Mujahideen Experience	2.200 (1.410)	2.176 (1.388)	0.763
Strong Religious Values	3.945 (1.589)	3.891 (1.502)	0.523
Punish Crime	3.44 (1.209)	3.418 (1.262)	0.748
Governing Institutions			
National Gov (NUG) Support	2.596 (1.473)	2.637 (1.486)	0.619
Provincial Gov Support	**3.239 (1.393)**	**3.389 (1.324)**	**0.046**
International Forces Support	2.730 (1.506)	2.787 (1.502)	0.494
Respondents	641	658	

Leadership Attributes represent respondents' ratings from a scale of one to six the importance of a series of leadership attributes. A one indicated the "least important" and six the "the most important" attribute a leader could have. *Governing Institutions* represent respondents' ratings from a scale of one to five their confidence in a governance institution, with one indicating "no confidence at all" and five "a lot of confidence." *International Forces Support* represents respondents' ranking from a scale of one to five their agreement with the statement that International Forces should remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, with one indicating "strongly disagree" and five representing "strongly agree."

Table 4: Mechanisms: Neutral Text vs. Insecurity Prime (Female Respondents)

	Neutral Text Mean (SD)	**Insecurity Prime** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Leadership Attributes			
Provides Peace and Security	5.856 0.471	5.869 0.455	0.721
Military Experience	2.517 (1.185)	2.511 (1.146)	0.947
Mujahideen Experience	1.936 (1.275)	1.975 (1.281)	0.684
Strong Religious Values	3.963 (1.578)	3.825 (1.474)	0.234
Punish Crime	3.278 (1.099)	3.270 (1.246)	0.931
Governing Institutions			
National Gov (NUG) Support	2.453 (1.481)	2.525 (1.522)	0.529
Provincial Gov Support	**3.321 (1.389)**	**3.492 (1.279)**	**0.093**
International Forces Support	2.630 (1.517)	2.678 (1.504)	0.679
Respondents	327	366	

Leadership Attributes represent respondents' ratings from a scale of one to six the importance of a series of leadership attributes. A one indicated the "least important" and six the "the most important" attribute a leader could have. *Governing Institutions* represent respondents' ratings from a scale of one to five their confidence in a governance institution, with one indicating "no confidence at all" and five "a lot of confidence." *International Forces Support* represents respondents' ranking from a scale of one to five their agreement with the statement that International Forces should remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, with one indicating "strongly disagree" and five representing "strongly agree."

Figure 1: Preferences for Male and Female Leadership among Non-Treated Female Respondents with High and Low Trust in Provincial Government: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals



Respondents have high trust in their provincial government if they disclosed having moderate or high confidence in their provincial government. Respondents have low trust in their provincial government if they disclosed being "neither confident or unconfident", "mostly unconfident" or "no confidence at all" in their provincial government.

Table 5: Mechanisms: Neutral Text vs. Insecurity Prime (Male Respondents)

	Neutral Text Mean (SD)	**Insecurity Prime** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Leadership Attributes			
Provides Peace and Security	**5.481 (1.114)**	**5.658 (0.829)**	**0.028**
Military Experience	2.465 (1.269)	2.421 (1.294)	0.675
Mujahideen Experience	2.475 (1.492)	2.428 (1.475)	0.700
Strong Religious Values	3.927 (1.602)	3.973 (1.535)	0.72
Punish Crime	3.608 (1.295)	3.603 (1.26)	0.958
Governing Institutions			
Central Gov (NUG) Support	2.745 (1.452)	2.777 (1.429)	0.784
Provincial Gov Support	3.153 (1.394)	3.260 (1.370)	0.340
International Forces Support	2.834 (1.491)	2.925 (1.49)	0.457
Respondents	314	292	

Leadership Attributes represent respondents' ratings from a scale of one to six the importance of a series of leadership attributes. A one indicated the "least important" and six the "the most important" attribute a leader could have. *Governing Institutions* represent respondents' ratings from a scale of one to five their confidence in a governance institution, with one indicating "no confidence at all" and five "a lot of confidence." *International Forces Support* represents respondents' ranking from a scale of one to five their agreement with the statement that International Forces should remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, with one indicating "strongly disagree" and five representing "strongly agree."

Table 6: Mechanisms: Male vs. Female (Treated Respondents)

	Male Mean (SD)	**Female** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Manipulation Check	**0.839 (0.368)**	**0.896 (0.306)**	**0.03**
Leadership Attributes			
Provides Peace and Security	5.658 (0.829)	5.869 (0.455)	< 0.001
Military Experience	2.511 (1.146)	2.421 (1.294)	0.347
Mujahideen Experience	1.975 (1.281)	2.428 (1.475)	< 0.001
Strong Religious Values	3.973 (1.535)	3.825 (1.474)	0.211
Punish Crime	3.603 (1.260)	3.271 (1.246)	< 0.001
Governing Institutions			
Central Gov (NUG) Support	2.777 (1.429)	2.525 (1.522)	0.03
Provincial Gov Support	3.26 (1.370)	3.492 (1.279)	0.026
International Forces Support	2.925 (1.491)	2.678 (1.504)	0.036
Respondents	292	366	

Manipulation is a binary equal to one if a respondent answered the manipulation check correctly. *Leadership Attributes* represent respondents' ratings from a scale of one to six the importance of a series of leadership attributes. A one indicated the "least important" and six the "the most important" attribute a leader could have. *Governing Institutions* represent respondents' ratings from a scale of one to five their confidence in a governance institution, with one indicating "no confidence at all" and five "a lot of confidence." *International Forces Support* represents respondents' ranking from a scale of one to five their agreement with the statement that International Forces should remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, with one indicating "strongly disagree" and five representing "strongly agree."

2.2.1 Men and Women's Security Preferences

We theorize that Afghan women's support for female leadership is more vulnerable to insecurity than men's because women value security more. Female respondents in the survey experiment ranked the importance of a leader's ability to provide peace and security higher than men (5.863 vs. 5.566 out of 6, $p < 0.01$) (SI Table 2). Observational data mirrors this finding. Afghan women disclosed higher levels of fear for their security than men in the Asia Foundation Survey. Sixty four percent of Afghan women surveyed described feeling at least sometimes fearful for their own personal or their family's security over the past few days. This is five percentage points higher than the mean among male respondents, a difference significant at the one percent level. This pattern holds after controlling for respondents' education, age and marital status (SI Table 39). Men may have been less affected by the insecurity prime because of their comparatively lower concerns about insecurity.

2.3 Marginal Means and Subgroup Analysis in Conjoint Experiments

We assess whether respondents' preferences for female leaders vary across different treatment groups and genders. Most conjoint analysis examines attributes' Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE). However, AMCEs estimated across subgroups are sensitive to reference or baseline category specification (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020).

We follow Leeper et al. (2020) and use the *cregg* package to calculate and plot conditional marginal means (MM) and conduct omnibus F tests to determine whether respondents' preferences for female leaders differ across subgroups. MMs capture average levels of favorability for a profile with an attribute—like a female leader—ignoring all other attributes. AMCEs, by contrast, demonstrate how much an attribute changes an outcome's favorability relative to a baseline attribute level, conditional on averaging

across all other attributes. AMCEs and MMs are similar across an entire sample. But the AMCEs for the reference categories of attributes are zero by design (Leeper et al. 2020, p.210). Because absolute levels of favorability for a leader may vary across subgroups, a baseline attribute's favorability may also vary across subgroups. MMs incorporate these baseline differences in subgroups' preferences. MMs are therefore a more appropriate measure for conjoint subgroup analysis (Leeper et al. 2020).

2.4 H1: Results

Table 7: H1: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Female and Male Leadership Across Treatment Groups (Choice)

Leader's Gender	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**
Female	0.471	0.460
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Male	0.524	0.531
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Observations	3846	3948

Table 8: H1: Marginal Means (MM): Preferences for Female and Male Leadership Across Treatment Groups (Rating (1 to 5))

Leader's Gender	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**
Female	3.361	3.283
	(0.036)	(0.037)
Male	3.381	3.387
	(0.034)	(0.032)
Observations	3846	3948

2.5 H1: Results Comparing Doves and Hawks

We find no statistically significant difference in preferences for male leadership between treated respondents and those in the control groups among doves or hawks (F omnibus test, p: 0.99). A gender gap persists across treatment groups and preferences for reconciliation with the Taliban (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Insecurity and Preferences for Male and Female Leadership Across Control and Treatment Groups among Doves and Hawks (H1): Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals



2.6 H2: Results

Table 9: H2: Marginal Means (MM) Preferences for Female Leadership Across Gender and Treatment Groups

	Female Respondents		**Male Respondents**	
Leader's Gender	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**
Female	0.508	0.464	0.435	0.455
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Male	0.494	0.527	0.556	0.537
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Observations	1962	2196	1884	1752

We theorize that men's support for female leadership is too low to be substantially impacted by the insecurity prime. While the male control group's 43.5 percent mean probability of choosing a profile with a female leader may appear like a very high floor, this floor is propped by the numerous other profile leadership attributes (Age, Education, Ethnicity, Professional Experience) that influence a male respondent's likelihood of choosing a profile. Gender can matter less to respondents' profile selection when "bundled together with other relevant attributes and indicators of quality (Horiuchi, Smith, and Yamamoto 2020, p.83)." Furthermore, conjoint estimates poorly reflect majoritarian preferences because they average the intensity and direction of respondents' preferences (Abramson, Koçak, and Magazinnik 2022).

Observational data, however, readily shows that Afghan men have low support for female leadership. Across 14 nationally representative Asia Foundation Surveys, almost sixty percent of male respondents answered that leadership positions should mostly be for men. Over half of male respondents in Kunduz, Balkh and Sar-e-pul agreed with this statement, compared to twenty-three percent of female respondents.

2.7 H2: Results Comparing Doves and Hawks

Figure 3: Insecurity and Preferences for Male and Female Leadership Among Male Hawks and Doves: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals



Figure 4: Insecurity and Preferences for Male and Female Leadership Among Female Hawks and Doves: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals



2.8 H2: Results with Neutral and Corruption Primes as Control Group

Table 10: H2 Robust: Marginal Means (MM) Preferences for Female Leadership Across Gender and Treatment Groups

	Female Respondents		**Male Respondents**	
Leader's Gender	**All Other Text**	**Insecurity Prime**	**All Other Text**	**Insecurity Prime**
Female	0.492	0.464	0.441	0.455
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Male	0.507	0.527	0.549	0.537
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Observations	5922	2196	5040	1752

2.9 Insecurity and Preferences for Female Leadership among Non-University Educated Respondents

Roughly twelve percent of respondents completed some university-level education. There is no statistically significant difference in mean probability of support for female leadership among non-university educated men in the treatment and the control group (F omnibus test for choice, p=0.49). Among women this difference is significant at the five percent level (F omnibus test for choice, p=0.045).

Table 11: H2: Marginal Means (MM) Preferences for Female Leadership Across Gender and Treatment Groups among Non-University Educated Respondents

	Female Respondents		**Male Respondents**	
Leader's Gender	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**
Female	0.508	0.464	0.434	0.455
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Male	0.493	0.528	0.556	0.537
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Observations	1926	2124	1764	1680

2.10 Insecurity and Preferences for Female Leadership outside of Kunduz

There is no statistically significant difference in preferences for male leaders between men in the control and treatment group who reside in Sar-e-Pull and Balkh (F omnibus test for Choice, p=0.97). Male respondents from both groups favor male leaders with a mean probability of 52 percent, plus or minus 2 percentage points. Female respondents from these two provinces who received the insecurity prime, however, favored male leaders with a mean probability of 54 percent, plus or minus 2 percentage points. Women who received the neutral text were indifferent to a hypothetical leader's gender. Unlike among men, differences in preferences for male leaders among women in the treatment and the control group in Sar-e-Pull and Balkh are statistically significant above the one percent level (F omnibus test for Choice, p=0.012).

Table 12: H2: Marginal Means (MM) Preferences for Female Leadership Across Gender and Treatment Groups among respondents outside of Kunduz

	Female Respondents		**Male Respondents**	
Leader's Gender	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**
Female	0.509	0.445	0.477	0.471
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Male	0.492	0.54	0.52	0.525
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Observations	1320	1548	1206	1080

2.11 Insecurity and Preferences for Female Leadership among Unemployed Respondents

Almost a third of respondents reported being unemployed. Almost half of female respondents (44.7 percent) were unemployed, relative to fifteen percent of male respondents. Differences in probability of support for female leadership among unemployed female participants in the treatment and control group is statistically significant at the five percent level (F omnibus test for choice, p=0.035). Unemployed women who receive the insecurity prime have a mean probability of choosing a male leadership profile of 54.3 percent, plus or minus three percentage points. Unemployed women in the control group have a 49 percent mean probability of choosing a male leadership profile, plus or minus two percentage points. There is no statistically significant difference between the treatment and control group among unemployed men (F omnibus test for choice, p=0.93), but this may be because there are so few unemployed male survey respondents (n = 95).

Table 13: H2: Marginal Means (MM) Preferences for Female Leadership Across Gender and Treatment Groups among Unemployed Respondents

	Female Respondents		**Male Respondents**	
Leader's Gender	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**	**Neutral Text**	**Insecurity Prime**
Female	0.512	0.444	0.474	0.458
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.03)
Male	0.491	0.544	0.52	0.534
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Observations	864	996	306	264

2.12 Corruption and Preferences for Female Leadership

To assess whether insecurity, as opposed to any information about poor governance, undermines support for female leadership we re-run our analysis with the survey's corruption primes. The survey used two corruption primes. The first pertains to bribery. It reads:

> *Recently, Afghanistan was ranked as the third most corrupt country in the world, and one report claimed that "corruption pervades many of Afghanistan's key sectors and institutions." Additionally, another survey alleged that half of all adult Afghans reported paying at least one bribe over the course of a single year.*

The second corruption prime pertains to nepotism. It reads:

> *Recently, Afghanistan was ranked as the third most corrupt country in the world, and one report claimed that "corruption pervades many of Afghanistan's key sectors and institutions." Additionally, another report alleged that 'favoritism and patronage prevail over merit and ability' when appointing some public officials.*

We combine the two primes for this robustness check. Our findings should not change if the insecurity prime is a proxy for poor governance. Furthermore, clean governance is a stereotype associated with female leadership (Anderlini 2007). If this stereotype is prevalent in Afghanistan, the corruption prime may strengthen support for female leadership.

Unlike the insecurity prime, the corruption prime has no statistically significant effect on women's choice (F omnibus test, p = 0.268) or rating of female leadership profiles (F omnibus test, p = 0.644). It had no effect on men's preferences for female leaders either (Choice, F omnibus test, p = 0.268; Rating, F omnibus test, p = 0.995). Figure 5 plots respondents' marginal means of choosing a male or female leadership profile across gender and treatment groups. A gender gap persists among men. They are consistently more likely to choose a male leader. Women who received the neutral text and the corruption prime are just as likely to choose a male or female leader. While the insecurity prime weakens women's support for female leadership, the corruption prime does not (Table 14).

Figure 5: Corruption and Preferences for Male and Female Leadership Across Gender and Treatment Groups: Estimated Marginal Means (MM) and 95% Confidence Intervals



Table 14: Corruption: Marginal Means (MM) Preferences for Female Leadership Across Gender and Treatment Groups

	Female Respondents		**Male Respondents**	
Leader's Gender	**Neutral Text**	**Corruption Prime**	**Neutral Text**	**Corruption Prime**
Female	0.508	0.484	0.434	0.445
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.01)
Male	0.494	0.514	0.557	0.545
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Observations	1962	3942	1878	3144

2.13 Power Analysis

Given our experiment's small effect size and multiple subgroups, one may wonder whether many of our null findings stem from a lack of statistical power. Research on statistical power in conjoint experiments is still nascent (Schuessler and Freitag 2020; Stefanelli and Lukac 2020). There is even less work on power analysis for conjoint experiments that involve subgroup analysis (Stefanelli et al. 2020, p.19).

We use Schuessler et al. (2020)'s cjpowr R package to conduct power calculations. This package performs power calculations for Average Marginal Conditional Interactive Effects (AMCIEs). AMCIEs are appropriate for our analysis because we are interested in whether the interaction between receiving the insecurity prime and viewing a profile with a male leader increases the likelihood of choosing that leadership profile. Furthermore, because our insecurity prime is randomly assigned, absolute levels of favorability for a leader should not vary between treatment and control groups.

For Hypothesis 1 (H1), we estimate the AMCIE of the insecurity prime and the male leadership attribute is 0.07. We have 7,794 profile observations. Applying a twenty

five percent probability for each treatment condition[1], we calculate a power ratio of 0.875. Roughly 6,330 observations generates a power ratio of 0.8. Figure 6 plots power calculations for H1 across hypothetical sample sizes. The dotted vertical line captures the actual sample size (n = 7,794), and the horizontal line marks the conventional power ratio of 0.8.

Figure 6: H1 Power Analysis



One of our main findings from Hypothesis 2 (H2) is that unlike for female respondents, the insecurity prime has no effect on male respondents' preferences for male leaders (H2). To calculate this power ratio, we subset our observations to profiles presented to male respondents (n = 3636) and estimate an AMCIE for the insecurity prime and male leadership attribute of 0.08. Applying the same probability of treatment across the four groups (0.25), we derive a power ratio of 0.681, below the conventional rate of 0.8. A

1. There was a fifty percent probability of receiving the insecurity prime times a fifty percent probability of seeing a profile with a male leader.

sample of 4,827 profile observations would generate a power ratio of 0.8.

Figure 7: H2a Power Analysis: Men Only



Broadening the control group to include respondents who received the corruption primes (n = 6792) increases the power ratio to 0.8. The insecurity prime's effect on male respondent's preferences for female leaders remains statistically insignificant, strengthening our confidence that this null finding is not a function of low power.

The insecurity prime had a positive and statistically effect on women's preferences for profiles with male leaders (H2). We subset our observations to profiles presented to female respondents (n = 4158) and estimate an AMCIE for the insecurity prime and male leadership attribute of 0.06. Applying the same probability of treatment across the four groups (0.25), we derive a power ratio of 0.499. We are less concerned of having a Type II error - failing to reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false - because we reject the null hypothesis. However, underpowered studies are prone to Type S[2] and

2. A sign error: The probability of assigning the wrong direction for a coefficient, ie a negative sign

Type M[3] errors (Gelman and Carlin 2014). Using the cjpowr package, we estimate a less than a one percent chance of generating a coefficient in the wrong direction (Type S error). We may be overestimating the AMCIE of the insecurity prime and the male gender leadership attribute by a factor of 1.4 on average. The finding's small AMCIE magnitude mitigates substantive concerns about this exaggeration ratio.

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instead of a positive one.

3. A coefficient exaggerates the true effect size.

3 Asia Foundation Survey Analysis

3.1 Balance Tables

Table 15: Balance Table: Exposure to Insecurity

	Security Mean (SD)	**Insecurity** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Female	0.474 (0.499)	0.439 (0.496)	< 0.01
Age	34.829 (12.969)	34.754 (12.274)	0.408
Education (Numeric)	0.981 (1.297)	0.961 (1.256)	0.03
Marital Status	0.795 (0.404)	0.818 (0.386)	<0.01
Survey Exp Prov	0.116 (0.321)	0.081 (0.273)	<0.01
Provincial Gov Support	0.696 (0.460)	0.647 (0.478)	< 0.01
Respondents	104,594	24,201	

Insecurity is a binary variable equal to one if a respondent reports that they or anyone in their family has been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in their home or community in the past year. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Survey Exp Prov is a binary variable equal to one if a survey respondent resides in Balkh, Kunduz or Sar-e-Pul.

Table 16: Balance Table: Exposure to Insecurity (Female Respondents)

	Security Mean (SD)	**Insecurity** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Age	33.129 (11.754)	33.2 (11.451)	0.571
Education (Numeric)	0.601 (1.083)	0.566 (1.037)	0.002
Marital Status	0.799 (0.401)	0.807 (0.395)	0.05
Provincial Gov Support	0.715 (0.451)	0.671 (0.471)	<0.01
Respondents	49,530	10,618	

Insecurity is a binary variable equal to one if a respondent reports that they or anyone in their family has been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in their home or community in the past year. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4.

Table 17: Balance Table: Exposure to Insecurity (Male Respondents)

	Security Mean (SD)	**Insecurity** Mean (SD)	**P Value**
Age	36.359 (13.795)	35.968 (12.75)	0.003
Education (Numeric)	1.324 (1.376)	1.271 (1.324)	<0.01
Marital Status	0.791 (0.406)	0.826 (0.379)	<0.01
Provincial Gov Support	0.679 (0.467)	0.629 (0.483)	<0.01
Respondents	55,064	13,583	

Insecurity is a binary variable equal to one if a respondent reports that they or anyone in their family has been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in their home or community in the past year. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Provincial Gov Support is a dummy variable equal to one if a respondent believes their provincial government is a doing a very good or somewhat of a good job.

3.2 Descriptive Statistics: Distribution of Dependent Variables

Table 18: Distribution of Answering Leadership Positions Should Mostly Be For Men (1 = Yes; 0 = No)

Gender	Insecurity	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female	0	0.281	0.449	0	1
Female	1	0.345	0.475	0	1
Male	0	0.582	0.493	0	1
Male	1	0.634	0.482	0	1

Table 19: Distribution of Answering Leadership Positions Should Mostly Be For Women (1 = Yes; 0 = No)

Gender	Insecurity	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female	0	0.153	0.360	0	1
Female	1	0.184	0.388	0	1
Male	0	0.079	0.270	0	1
Male	1	0.096	0.295	0	1

Table 20: Distribution of Pro-Women Score

Gender	Insecurity	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female	0	−0.122	0.633	-1	1
Female	1	−0.155	0.697	-1	1
Male	0	−0.486	0.635	-1	1
Male	1	−0.523	0.661	-1	1

In all tables insecurity is a binary variable equal to one if a respondent confirmed that they or someone in their family has been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in their home or community over the past year.

3.3 H1: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership

Table 21: (H1): Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	−0.008	−0.035	0.117***	0.152***
	(0.012)	(0.040)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Female	0.375***	1.193***	−1.354***	0.104***
	(0.014)	(0.052)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Age	−0.001***	−0.002***	0.002***	−0.0004
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.022***	0.078***	−0.129***	−0.070***
(Numeric)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Married	0.004	0.009	−0.012	0.018
	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Constant	−0.407***		−0.233***	−2.372***
	(0.016)		(0.044)	(0.069)
Observations	126,849	126,849		
R^2	0.111			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			220,259.400	220,259.400

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province and wave fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 22: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Fear) (H1)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Fear	0.011	0.012	0.084***	0.253***
	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.022)
Female	0.375***	1.192***	−1.356***	0.099***
	(0.014)	(0.053)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Age	−0.001***	−0.002***	0.002***	−0.0003
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.023***	0.079***	−0.129***	−0.068***
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Married	0.003	0.007	−0.009	0.018
	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Constant	−0.401***		−0.266***	−2.490***
	(0.012)		(0.044)	(0.069)
Observations	127,332	126,849		
R^2	0.111			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			221,102.500	221,102.500

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province and wave fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 23: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (No Wave Fixed Effects) (H1)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score) (OLS)	(Pro Woman Score) (Ordered Logit)	(Mostly for) (Men)	(Mostly for) (Women)
Insecurity	−0.009	−0.040	0.126***	0.158***
	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Female	0.371***	1.182***	−1.337***	0.090***
	(0.014)	(0.055)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Age	−0.001***	−0.002***	0.002***	−0.001
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.021***	0.075***	−0.127***	−0.077***
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Married	−0.001	−0.004	0.004	0.013
	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Constant	−0.433***		−0.087***	−2.365***
	(0.019)		(0.033)	(0.056)
Observations	126,849	126,849		
R^2	0.111			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			221,378.700	221,378.700

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 24: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Balkh, Sar-e-pul, Kunduz) (H1)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	0.062*	0.186*	−0.003	0.344***
	(0.036)	(0.103)	(0.058)	(0.072)
Female	0.376***	1.183***	−1.337***	0.150***
	(0.024)	(0.085)	(0.042)	(0.058)
Age	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.011***	0.039***	−0.084***	−0.079***
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.024)
Married	0.017	0.043	−0.034	0.062
	(0.014)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.072)
Constant	−0.439***		0.242***	−1.192***
	(0.037)		(0.055)	(0.082)
Observations	13,971	13,971		
R^2	0.086			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			25,391.570	25,391.570

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use wave fixed effects. Models 1, 3 and 4 use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 25: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Hawks) (H1)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	-0.049^{*}	-0.188^{**}	0.226^{***}	0.050
	(0.027)	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.104)
Female	0.368^{***}	1.266^{***}	-1.381^{***}	0.275^{***}
	(0.030)	(0.103)	(0.060)	(0.092)
Age	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0005	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education	0.030^{**}	0.105^{***}	-0.138^{***}	0.011
(Numeric)	(0.012)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.035)
Married	-0.012	-0.045	0.031	-0.033
	(0.024)	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.104)
Constant	-0.463^{***}		-0.036	-2.706^{***}
	(0.041)		(0.160)	(0.271)
Observations	8,044	8,044		
R^2	0.143			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			13,523.910	13,523.910

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Hawks are respondents who do not "strongly" support efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals -1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 26: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Doves) (H1)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	-0.065^{**}	-0.249^{**}	0.307^{***}	0.085
	(0.026)	(0.101)	(0.062)	(0.101)
Female	0.437^{***}	1.536^{***}	-1.553^{***}	0.655^{***}
	(0.038)	(0.125)	(0.058)	(0.093)
Age	-0.0001	-0.001	0.002	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Education	0.031^{***}	0.112^{***}	-0.153^{***}	-0.022
(Numeric)	(0.010)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.035)
Married	-0.014	-0.072^{*}	0.127^{*}	0.161
	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.069)	(0.110)
Constant	-0.459^{***}		-0.365^{***}	-3.788^{***}
	(0.031)		(0.132)	(0.270)
Observations	9,644	9,644		
R^2	0.199			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			15,221.330	15,221.330

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Doves are respondents who "strongly" support efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

3.4 H2: Insecurity, Gender and Support for Female Leadership

3.4.1 Female Respondents

Table 27: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Female Respondents) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	−0.005	−0.019	0.150***	0.176***
	(0.015)	(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Age	−0.001***	−0.003***	0.004***	−0.0001
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.030***	0.093***	−0.190***	−0.041***
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Married	0.008	0.024	−0.040	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.032)
Constant	−0.033*		−1.804***	−2.137***
	(0.018)		(0.069)	(0.081)
Observations	59,275	59,275		
R^2	0.046			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			107,019.700	107,019.700

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province and wave fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 28: Fear and Support for Female Leadership (Female Respondents) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Fear	0.010	0.022	0.105***	0.205***
	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Age	−0.001***	−0.003***	0.004***	−0.00005
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.030***	0.093***	−0.187***	−0.038***
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Married	0.007	0.021	−0.036	−0.005
	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.032)
Constant	−0.037**		−1.872***	−2.252***
	(0.017)		(0.070)	(0.082)
Observations	59,603	59,603		
R^2	0.046			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			107,643.600	107,643.600

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. *Fear* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a respondent reports feeling fear "Sometimes" or "Often". Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province and wave fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 29: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Female Respondents, No Wave Fixed Effects) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	−0.006	−0.023	0.165***	0.186***
	(0.016)	(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Age	−0.001***	−0.003***	0.004***	−0.0001
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.029***	0.092***	−0.188***	−0.042***
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Married	0.003	0.011	−0.015	−0.005
	(0.011)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.032)
Constant	−0.045**		−1.770***	−2.175***
	(0.021)		(0.053)	(0.064)
Observations	59,275	59,275		
R^2	0.043			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			107,610.400	107,610.400

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 30: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Female Respondents; Balkh, Kunduz and Sar-e-pul) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	0.074**	0.331***	0.010	0.375***
	(0.033)	(0.109)	(0.094)	(0.091)
Age	0.001	0.003	−0.001	0.006*
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	0.034***	0.124***	−0.195***	−0.019
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Married	0.032	0.106	−0.139*	0.030
	(0.027)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.086)
Constant	0.001		−1.004***	−1.288***
	(0.057)		(0.143)	(0.145)
Observations	6,750	6,750		
R^2	0.031			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			12,226.730	12,226.730

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use wave fixed effects. All models use province fixed effects except for Model 2. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 31: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Female Respondents; Hawks) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	−0.060	−0.217	0.246**	−0.021
	(0.042)	(0.142)	(0.097)	(0.129)
Age	0.0001	0.0003	0.0005	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.031**	0.100*	−0.143***	0.037
(Numeric)	(0.016)	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Married	−0.025	−0.088	0.065	−0.088
	(0.030)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.120)
Constant	−0.060		−1.782***	−2.314***
	(0.041)		(0.234)	(0.285)
Observations	4,492	4,492		
R^2	0.106			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			7,687.987	7,687.987

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Hawks are respondents who do not "strongly" support efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 32: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Female Respondents; Doves) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	−0.041	−0.164	0.286***	0.151
	(0.033)	(0.122)	(0.099)	(0.129)
Age	−0.0003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.004
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Education	0.022	0.066	−0.203***	−0.084*
(Numeric)	(0.013)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Married	−0.008	−0.040	0.071	0.035
	(0.029)	(0.097)	(0.112)	(0.130)
Constant	−0.080**		−1.659***	−2.504***
	(0.038)		(0.216)	(0.287)
Observations	4,179	4,179		
R^2	0.185			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			7,007.153	7,007.153

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Doves are respondents who do "strongly" support efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

3.4.2 Male Respondents

Table 33: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Male Respondents) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	−0.011	−0.048	0.091***	0.113***
	(0.012)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.039)
Age	−0.0004*	−0.001**	0.001	−0.001
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.021***	0.083***	−0.129***	−0.122***
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Married	0.001	0.003	0.012	0.046
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.045)
Constant	−0.388***		−0.144**	−2.625***
	(0.017)		(0.056)	(0.116)
Observations	67,574	67,574		
R^2	0.048			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			111,482.400	111,482.400

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province and wave fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 34: Fear and Support for Female Leadership (Male Respondents) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Fear	0.012	0.008	0.089***	0.314***
	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.035)
Age	−0.0003*	−0.001*	0.001	−0.0003
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.021***	0.084***	−0.130***	−0.121***
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Married	0.0002	0.0004	0.015	0.045
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.045)
Constant	−0.394***		−0.162***	−2.722***
	(0.017)		(0.056)	(0.116)
Observations	67,729	67,729		
R^2	0.048			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			111,696.500	111,696.500

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province and wave fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 35: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Male Respondents, No Wave Fixed Effects) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	-0.013	-0.055	0.099^{***}	0.107^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.038)
Age	-0.0004^{**}	-0.001^{**}	0.001	-0.001
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.019^{***}	0.078^{***}	-0.127^{***}	-0.140^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Married	-0.004	-0.012	0.024	0.026
	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.045)
Constant	-0.453^{***}		0.108^{***}	-2.575^{***}
	(0.023)		(0.041)	(0.096)
Observations	67,574	67,574		
R^2	0.043			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			112,239.600	112,239.600

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals -1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 36: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Male Respondents; Balkh, Kunduz and Sar-e-pul) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	0.057	0.076	−0.047	0.287**
	(0.040)	(0.128)	(0.077)	(0.117)
Age	−0.001	−0.002	0.001	−0.004
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Education	−0.008**	−0.017	−0.034*	−0.148***
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.037)
Married	0.007	−0.004	0.037	0.149
	(0.025)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.132)
Constant	−0.483***		0.238**	−1.215***
	(0.045)		(0.109)	(0.209)
Observations	7,221	7,221		
R^2	0.011			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			12,979.830	12,979.830

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use wave fixed effects. All models use province fixed effects except for Model 2. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 37: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Male Respondents; Hawks) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	-0.051^{*}	-0.209^{*}	0.260^{**}	0.140
	(0.031)	(0.112)	(0.101)	(0.178)
Age	-0.001	-0.002	0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Education	0.021	0.092^{**}	-0.140^{***}	-0.149^{**}
(Numeric)	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.061)
Married	-0.002	-0.007	-0.017	-0.058
	(0.037)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.220)
Constant	-0.469^{***}		0.163	-2.801^{***}
	(0.046)		(0.216)	(0.590)
Observations	3,552	3,552		
R^2	0.087			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			5,697.585	5,697.585

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Hawks are respondents who do not "strongly" support efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals -1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 38: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Male Respondents; Doves) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	-0.075^{***}	-0.300^{**}	0.282^{***}	-0.111
	(0.028)	(0.118)	(0.083)	(0.171)
Age	-0.0001	-0.001	0.004	0.012^{**}
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Education	0.032^{***}	0.129^{***}	-0.143^{***}	-0.017
(Numeric)	(0.011)	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.057)
Married	-0.026	-0.122	0.193^{**}	0.298
	(0.023)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.217)
Constant	-0.395^{***}		-0.539^{***}	-4.979^{***}
	(0.043)		(0.161)	(0.588)
Observations	5,465	5,465		
R^2	0.116			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			7,857.010	7,857.010

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Doves are respondents who "strongly" support efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals -1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 39: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (All Respondents; Non-Experiment Provinces) (H1)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	−0.015	−0.165***	0.126***	0.125***
	(0.011)	(0.042)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Female	0.376***	1.218***	−1.361***	0.097***
	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Age	−0.001***	−0.00002	0.002***	−0.001
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.024***	0.107***	−0.136***	−0.071***
(Numeric)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Married	0.002	−0.018	−0.010	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.028)
Constant	−0.390***		−0.226***	−2.322***
	(0.013)		(0.046)	(0.072)
Observations	112,878	112,878		
R^2	0.114			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			194,713.600	194,713.600

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals −1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use wave fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 40: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Female Respondents, Non-Experiment Provinces) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	-0.013	-0.144^{***}	0.160^{***}	0.149^{***}
	(0.015)	(0.053)	(0.027)	(0.033)
Age	-0.001^{***}	-0.002^{*}	0.004^{***}	-0.001
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.029^{***}	0.140^{***}	-0.191^{***}	-0.048^{***}
(Numeric)	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Married	0.004	-0.001	-0.024	-0.012
	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.035)
Constant	-0.028^{*}		-1.781^{***}	-2.076^{***}
	(0.016)		(0.072)	(0.085)
Observations	52,525	52,525		
R^2	0.048			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			94,659.650	94,659.650

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals -1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use wave fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

Table 41: Insecurity and Support for Female Leadership (Male Respondents, Non-Experiment Provinces) (H2)

	DV: Do You Think Leadership Positions Should Be:			
	(Pro Woman Score)	(Pro Woman Score)	(Mostly for)	(Mostly for)
	(OLS)	(Ordered Logit)	(Men)	(Women)
Insecurity	-0.017	-0.182^{***}	0.104^{***}	0.093^{**}
	(0.011)	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.041)
Age	-0.0003	0.001	0.001	-0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.024^{***}	0.090^{***}	-0.141^{***}	-0.121^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Married	-0.0001	-0.037^{*}	0.009	0.032
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.048)
Constant	-0.381^{***}		-0.154^{***}	-2.601^{***}
	(0.015)		(0.059)	(0.119)
Observations	60,353	60,353		
R^2	0.053			
Akaike Inf. Crit.			98,399.430	98,399.430

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Model 1 uses a score where if a respondent answered "Mostly Men" it equals -1, "Equal" equals 0 and "Mostly Women" equals 1. Model 2 applies an ordered logit model for the *Pro-Women Score*. Models 3 and 4 apply Multinomial Logit Models with "Equal" as a reference group. All models use wave fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 use province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level in Models 1 and 2.

3.5 Mechanisms

Table 42: Insecurity and Support for Provincial Government (Female Respondents)

	DV: Is Your Provincial Gov Doing A Good Job (1 = Yes)?	
	(OLS)	(Logit)
Insecurity	-0.054^{***}	-0.172^{***}
	(0.020)	(0.047)
Age	0.0003	0.0005
	(0.0002)	(0.001)
Education	0.019^{***}	0.049^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.009)
Married	0.012	-0.003
	(0.014)	(0.033)
Constant	1.780^{***}	1.146^{***}
	(0.061)	(0.109)
Observations	55,983	55,983
R^2	0.088	
Akaike Inf. Crit.		63,692.670

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All models use wave and province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level.

Table 43: Insecurity and Support for Male Leadership in Provincial Government (Female Respondents)

	DV: Do You Oppose Women Representation in Prov Gov (1 = Yes)?	
	(OLS)	(Logit)
Insecurity	0.024**	0.103**
	(0.012)	(0.052)
Age	0.0002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)
Education	0.013***	0.054***
	(0.004)	(0.018)
Married	−0.007	−0.028
	(0.014)	(0.058)
Constant	0.435***	−0.261
	(0.040)	(0.166)
Observations	14,236	14,236
R^2	0.044	
Akaike Inf. Crit.		18,787.600

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All models use wave and province fixed effects. Education is a continuous variable where "No Formal School" equals 0 and "University Education" equals 4. Standard errors are clustered at the wave level.

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