

Appendix to:
“The Effects of Import Shocks, Electoral Institutions,
and Radical Party Competition on Legislator Ideology:
Evidence from France”

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A How to Measure Ideology

A.1 Spatial Voting Models

Perhaps most influential among spatial models of voting is [Poole and Rosenthal \(1985\)](#)'s NOMINATE project. W-NOMINATE scores have been used extensively to measure polarity in both the US Senate and House of Representatives ([Garand, 2010](#); [Poole and Rosenthal, 1985](#); [Poole et al., 2011](#)). These scores have been applied outside of the American context as well, and in legislatures with more than two political parties, including the European Parliament (EP) ([Haspel, Remington and Smith, 1998](#); [Hix and Noury, 2009](#); [Meyerrose, 2018](#)). However, W-NOMINATE is a static model that can only provide information on the ideological distance between legislators that served in the same legislative session and participated in the same roll call votes. Therefore, Poole and Rosenthal developed DW-NOMINATE, a dynamic extension of the W-NOMINATE model that allows for intertemporal comparisons of ideological positions ([McCarty, 2011](#)).

While allowing for comparisons across time, the DW-NOMINATE model has several limitations both practically and theoretically. Most problematically, the DW-NOMINATE model constrains legislators' ideal points to move linearly through time, and any individual's spatial movements are "apportioned evenly across their entire congressional career" ([Caughey and Schickler, 2016](#), 12). As such, DW-NOMINATE is not well-suited to measure the types of rapid and non-monotonic ideological shifts that we expect to occur as legislators respond to international trade shocks and the resulting economic dislocations.

One alternative to DW-NOMINATE is the Optimal Classification (OC) method. According to [Rosenthal and Voeten \(2004\)](#), the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) assumptions underlying NOMINATE and its derivatives can be problematic in non-US legislatures, often due to issues surrounding party discipline. [Rosenthal and Voeten \(2004\)](#) propose [Poole \(2000\)](#)'s non-parametric optimal classification (OC) method, which does *not* rely on distributional assumptions about errors, as an alternative to spatial models for non-US

legislatures, using the French Fourth Republic as a test case. Although there are methodological advantages to the OC method, the resulting ideal points in one dimension are simply a rank ordering of legislators so that two adjacent legislators can either be very close to or quite distant from one another. This, combined with the fact that the OC method does not allow for inter-temporal comparisons, makes this method unable to capture the changes in legislator ideology over time we explore in this paper. For all these reasons, we rely on the Bayesian dynamic item response (IRT) model to construct our dependent variable.

A.2 Abstentions in Roll Call Voting

In legislative studies, vote abstentions are typically treated as missing at random and simply removed from the dataset. However, this assumption that abstentions can be ignored is typically made out of convenience, but is difficult to justify in practice. Oftentimes, abstentions are intentional, strategic acts (Forgette and Sala, 1999) that have been attributed to a range of considerations, such as legislator indifference, the fact that legislators often have competing principals,¹ or to institutional incentives (Carey, 2007; Desposato, 2001; Fiorina, 1974; Mühlböck and Yordanova, 2017; Rosas and Shomer, 2008). Following these theoretical arguments, we argue that abstentions among French senators are strategic decisions driven by the institution’s vote counting rules. Votes in the French Senate require an absolute majority to pass; in other words, they require that a majority of *all* eligible voting members of the Senate, not just senators participating in a given roll call vote, vote affirmatively. Given these strict requirements, we argue that abstentions essentially equate to nay votes in this context; therefore, we code them accordingly before estimating the IRT models.

A.3 Concerns with Roll Call-Based Spatial Models

Party discipline may render roll call votes uninformative (Carey, 2007). The power parties have to influence how their legislators vote also has implications for the spatial models them-

¹e.g. their constituents and their political party

selves: in legislatures with high or varying levels of party discipline, parametric assumptions that errors are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) are violated. Another concern surrounding ideal points derived from roll call data is that legislation for which roll call votes are recorded constitutes a non-random subset of all policy proposals (Ainsley et al., 2020; Clinton, 2012); generally, roll calls are reserved for substantively important or contentious issues. The fact that votes are recorded only for more salient policy topics again comes back to the issue of party discipline: party leaders are more likely to try to influence individual votes in these scenarios.

These issues regarding party discipline are less a concern in the French Senate. First, France permits intra-party competition in candidate selection,² making party discipline more difficult to enforce.³ The fact that the Senate cannot be dissolved by the President or by votes-of-no-confidence should also provide senators with some independence vis-à-vis their parties. Finally, looking at the French National Assembly, Hug (2010) finds little evidence that the non-random nature of roll call votes biases spatial estimates. Since our focus is on ideological shifts among legislators, not parties, we are less concerned about this selection bias; if anything, increased party discipline and cohesion should make it more difficult to observe individual shifts.


B Economic and Cultural IRT Scores

Drawing on the categories the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al., 2020) identifies to capture and categorize the content of party manifestos, we use the short descriptions of each roll call bill we collected to hand-code each of the 3589 bills in our dataset as either a) economic, b) cultural, or c) neither.


Using the short descriptions of each bill provided by the French Senate website (in French), we code economic bills as ones that reference issues within the Comparative Mani-

²France allows for both official and dissident party lists.

³Witness the proliferation of *Diverse autres* parties since the advent of parity, as men moved down on party lists formed dissident lists and/or independent parties. See Southwell (2013).



(a) Economic



(b) Cultural

Figure 1: Distribution of CAP codes for our hand-coded bills, 2004–2014.

festo Project (CMP) dataset’s *Domain 4: Economy*, *Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life*, and *Domain 7: Social Groups*. The Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) dataset includes a variable that identifies the major topic of French Senate bills from 2006–2014. Since these codings are only available for a subset of the time period on which we focus, we had to rely on our own hand-coding of the bills to identify the economic bills in our dataset. However, we also verify that our coding aligns with the CAP dataset. Similarly, we code cultural bills as ones that reference issues within the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset’s *Domain 1: External Relations* and *Domain 6: Fabric of Society*. Figure 1 shows the CAP codes that correspond to our economic and cultural bills, where available, and Table 1 reports the mean economic cultural IRT scores by party across all seven sessions (1996–2017) included in our dataset.

Party	Mean Economic IRT Score	Mean Cultural IRT Score
Groupe République et territoires/Les Indépendants	0.57	0.39
UMP/Les Républicains	0.51	1.15
RI/UREI	0.45	0.69
GD/RDE/RDSE	0.27	-0.37
UNR/UDR/RPR	0.78	-0.24
Center	0.38	0.72
Non-inscrit	0.18	0.81
LaRem	0.01	-0.54
Greens	-0.03	-0.55
Communist	-0.13	-1.27
Socialist	-0.15	-1.22

Table 1: Mean Party IRT Scores, Sessions 13–19

Our final analysis datasets contain 1430 senator-session observations; all senators in this dataset had multiple observations which could be used to calculate ideological change scores across sessions.⁴ Similarly, our department-level dataset contains 570 department-session observations for both the economic and cultural dimensions.

B.1 A Note on Immigration as a Cultural Issue

As noted above, we treat bills related to immigration and second dimension cultural issues. While immigration undoubtedly has economic implications, we follow an extensive existing literature in classifying immigration as part of a distinct, second ideological dimension. Until recently, scholars generally agreed that western politics took place primarily along a single, economic, left-right dimension (Poole et al., 2011), and this single dimension served as the basis for party politics (Kitschelt et al., 1999). However, more recently a new and distinct socio-cultural dimension has emerged (Kriesi et al., 2008; Alonso and Claro da Fonseca,

⁴We have two more observations for the cultural (1430) than the economic dimension (1428) due to our rule of dropping obs with fewer than 25 economic votes per session. Two senators (René Monory and Gérard Larcher) each had one containing 25 votes- Monory in 1998, Larcher in 2011.

2012). There is overwhelming agreement among party scholars that this new societal cleavage in the western European context is at its core linked to two issues —immigration and European integration— and that it has been further solidified by the migration and euro crises.

While scholars recognize that immigration has distributional effects, the majority of work on this topic to-date largely supports the idea that immigration is primarily a second dimension issue (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). This theoretical decision is supported by data. Empirical studies that test the links between individuals’ anti-immigrant attitudes and concerns about labor-market competition are highly contested (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Malhotra, Margalit and Mo, 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014), and scholars widely treat immigration as a primarily cultural concern that has resulted from rapid changes in post-industrial societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Indeed, scholars who have operationalized ideology in the European context (e.g., Hix, Noury and Roland (2007)) find immigration to be a foundational issue for this second dimension.

C Description of Electoral Systems Used in the French Senate

The French Senate uses both majoritarian and proportional electoral rules. PR rules are familiar to most political scientists. For the majoritarian districts, all elections are two-round FPP, but some are single-member while others are multi-member MNTV. In the majoritarian MNTV, candidates run against each other for m positions, where m is the district magnitude. Each voter selects up to m candidates on the ballot. Voters are unable to vote for the same candidate more than once but may cast votes across more than one party list; they are also not obliged to cast all their votes. In the first round, the m candidates with a majority of votes are the winners. If any remaining seats are open, a second round is held. Any candidate who participated in the first round may participate in the second. In

our data m ranged from 2 to 4.

D Imports Per Worker (IPW) Measure and Instrumental Variables Strategy

We follow [Autor, Dorn and Hanson \(2013\)](#); [Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum \(2014\)](#) and [Autor et al. \(2020\)](#) in constructing the IPW measure as follows:

$$\Delta IPW_{Fit} = \sum_j \frac{L_{ijt}}{L_{jt}} \quad (1)$$

where $\Delta IMPORTS_{Fjt}$ represents the change in imports to France (F) from trading partners in industry j over the past n years. This figure is normalized by L_{it} , the number of workers in the same region and industry at the beginning of the sample period. The department/region-specific trade shock is calculated by taking the weighted sum of the changes in imports per worker across industries ($\frac{L_{ijt}}{L_{jt}}$), where the weights capture the relative importance of a given industry in a given department/region.

In the main paper we used imports from China to calculate the IPW measure. For robustness checks, below we run two additional set of results using imports from a broader range of LDC trading partners used to calculate the IPW measure. First, following [Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum \(2014\)](#), we use China and a set of East European countries. As an additional check, we create an IPW based the broader set of LDCs used in [Colantone and Stanig \(2018\)](#): Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Moldova, Albania, Gambia, Mozambique, Angola, Georgia, Nepal, Armenia, Ghana, Niger, Azerbaijan, Guinea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Benin, Guyana, Samoa, Bhutan, Haiti, Sao Tome, Burkina Faso, India, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Kenya, Somalia, Cambodia, Lao, PDR, Sri Lanka, Central African Rep., Lesotho, St. Vincent, Chad, Madagascar, Sudan, China, Malawi, Togo, Comoros,

Maldives, Uganda, Congo, Mali, Vietnam, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Yemen, Eritrea.

Following previous studies, we address the possible endogeneity of legislative voting patterns to the trade shock by instrumenting Δ IPW using the growth in imports from China to five other wealthy European countries: Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and the UK (Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum, 2014). The identifying assumption is that LDC imports to these other countries should predict imports to France, but should be uncorrelated with product-demand shocks within France; this therefore isolates the supply-driven components of changes in French import exposure. This strategy guards against two potential inferential concerns. The first is that legislators’ ideological positions may be driven by positive demand shocks, which could also translate into higher imports from China; this would result in a downward bias in our estimates. The instrumental variables strategy also guards against the possibility that some regions are more (or less) politically important and hence protected from trade via domestic compensation. This could bias estimates upward, as districts with more compensation might also have more moderate representatives (and those with less compensation more radical representatives).

We follow Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum (2014) in selecting the countries used in calculating the instrument. The trading partners include Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Our instrumental variable for IPW is defined as:

$$\Delta \overline{IPW}_{Fit} = \sum_j \frac{L_{ijt}}{L_{jt}} \quad (2)$$

where we substitute into equation 1 $\Delta \text{IMPORTS}_{EUjt}$ for $\Delta \text{IMPORTS}_{Fjt}$.

The underlying logic of instrumental variables estimation is that the bias in OLS when a regressor is partially endogenous can be corrected by identifying another factor—the instrumental variable—that is correlated with the endogenous regressor (relevance) and only affects the variable of interest through that channel, after controlling for other included re-

gressors (exclusion restriction). The validity of the instrument with respect to the exclusion restriction was discussed in the paper. Below in Table 3, we assessed the instrument’s relevance by estimating the first stage relationship between imports per worker in equation (2). The instrument is a strong predictor of IPW in France: these effects are highly statistically significant. In models with a single endogenous regressor reported below in Section L we use a robust weak instrument test (Pflueger and Wang, 2015) to reject the null that the endogenous variables are jointly zero at the 5 percent level. For models with multiple endogenous regressors we report the f-statistic and associated worst-case benchmark critical value (again 5 percent) of the minimum eigenvalue of the Cragg–Donald statistic as computed by Stock and Yogo (2005).

E Additional Analysis: Trade, Voting and Incumbency in Senate Elections

In the paper we reference analyses pertaining to how import penetration affects voters— in this case, the electorate for the French Senate: the 150,000 members of the Senate’s Electoral College. Below we provide results from Senate elections between 1998 and 2017, defining the trade measure over each department’s electoral cycle. For each renewal, we regress the change in the percent of senators from different partisan camps on the change in IPW since the previous election for PR and first-round majoritarian elections.⁵ We find that increases in IPW are associated with a decline in the proportion of centrist senators and an increase in the vote share of left-wing senators. The coefficient for changes in IPW on changes in the representation of right senators is modestly negative but statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, this evidence suggests that as import penetration increases, senators from

⁵Results here exclude election years in which districts experienced an electoral system change, as the shift from a majoritarian to a PR system would likely result in greater electoral success for candidates from left parties. Because senate terms were reformed partway through our sample, we standardize the IPW variable to reflect an annual average during the previous senate term. The number of observations is relatively small (N=231) due to staggered elections and the nature of Senate terms, which run 6-10 years.

center and right-wing parties are more likely to be replaced with left-leaning senators.




Figure 2: Trade and Vote Shares in Senate Elections

Do the local elites who elect senators punish incumbents for increases in trade? In the US context, Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) find that increases in IPW had little effect on the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Our findings in the context of the French Senate were similar. In our data, we had 835 observations where incumbent senators were running for re-election. Figure 3 below shows the coefficients on the change IPW on the probability of sitting incumbents being re-elected. Although the coefficients are positive, confidence intervals are wide. Thus, although we find evidence that the representation of left-leaning senators increases in response to increases in localized import penetration, there is no strong evidence that this results in the ousting of sitting incumbents.

In light of the lack of clear evidence of economic voting (ie, punishing incumbents for negative economic outcomes), we explored another potential mechanism for explaining the increase in the representation of left-wing senators: patterns of candidate coordination among parties. Our hypothesis here was that perhaps different increased import penetration resulted in less coordination among some party families in the presentation of candidates. Figures 4a and 4b present some preliminary evidence here, again using data from Senate elections between 1997 and 2017. The N remains small, but overall we find suggestive evidence that





Figure 3: Trade and Incumbent Re-Election in Senate Elections

increases in import penetration are associated with less candidate coordination, as more candidates enter senate races. Nevertheless, we see no appreciable difference across party families here.



(a) Change in Number of Candidates (Total)

(b) Change in Number of Candidates (By Party)

Figure 4: IPW and Candidate Coordination

F Radical Party Strength: Argument and Measures

F.1 Argument

In the main paper, we outlined a baseline expectation that in departments hard hit by trade with a strong pre-existing far-right, we should right-wing legislators to shift to the right on cultural issues. Similarly, we expected individual politicians from the mainstream left to shift to the left on both dimensions when confronted with a strong far-left challenger. One issue worth explaining here is how and why our expectations about mainstream responses to a strong far-left differ from those outlined in [Watson \(2015\)](#). In Watson’s discussion of the political and policy consequences of a strong far-left, she highlighted the importance of unions in ‘encapsulating’ voters, rendering them electorally unavailable to mainstream center-left and center-right parties. This, she argued, resulted in a tendency for center-left parties operating in the context of a strong far-left to move their policies to the right, in an effort to appeal to the more electorally available centrist voters.

In theory, this logic of a strong far left driving a shift to the right on the part of mainstream left politicians could be applied to local electoral constituencies (rather than national-level party systems), even for the indirectly elected Senate. Why, then, do we posit that the response of left politicians to trade in the context of a trade shock should result in a shift to the left? As Watson argues in her book, the logic of an encapsulating far-left applied for much of the early postwar period in France, when the *Parti Communiste Francaise* (the PCF) was arguably the most powerful force in national politics. By the mid-1950s, the party boasted some 800,000 members and was regularly taking one-quarter of the vote in national elections. Together, the PCF and its auxiliary organizations, most prominently its powerful CGT trade union, deliberately created a vast cultural subsystem whose goal was to supervise and actively politicize the working class. One reason for the PCF’s sustained electoral success was its network of organizations which valorized the historical role of the working class and promoted an ideological worldview of class struggle. As is now

well-documented, however, this powerful transmission-belt model of party-union relations in France has weakened dramatically. Moreover, the functional equivalent of the CGT at the local level— red municipalities (Kriegel, 1970; Kriegel, Braun and Muresianu, 1979)— has also declined. With this slow but steady organizational disembedding of communist voters, and the resultant fragmentation of the radical left, there are today far fewer disincentives for mainstream left parties to respond to electoral threats on their left flank. It is this changed organizational context of the far-left, despite its numerical strength, that accounts for our different theoretical expectations about the political consequences of the relative strength of the far-left vis-a-vis those outlined above.


F.2 Radical Party Strength Measures

In the main paper we use two measures of radical party strength, one for the far-right and the other for the far-left. Using data from Senate elections, we leveraged Ministry of Interior’s “party nuances” to categorize parties as either left, center, or right. We include in the far-right category the National Front/Rally, *Divers Droite*, MNR, *extrême droit* and so on. For far-left parties, we include parties with the party nuances of *Parti Communiste*, *divers gauche*, and various Green parties. We then calculated the share of the far-right(left) as a percent of the total right (left) vote, at the start of session $t-1$.⁶ We then interacted this vote share measure with our IPW variable (including the total right/left vote as a percent of the overall vote as a control). For Majoritarian constituencies, we generated our vote share measures based on vote tallies for all candidates in Round 1 elections; for PR constituencies, we used the percent of the radical left/right vote list share as a percent of the total left/right party list share.


Given that the selectorate for senate elections are local elected mayors and councillors, and the FN’s historic lack of a widespread local power base in French municipalities, it is perhaps unsurprising that the mean far-right share in Senate constituencies was approximately

⁶Our outcome continues to be a legislator’s policy shift on economic and cultural issues between session t and t minus 1.

10 percent, about half that of the equivalent far-left share (at approximately 23 percent).



(a) Far Left Vote Share




(b) Far Right Vote Share


Figure 5: Density Plots of Vote Share for Far-Left and Far-Right Departments

G Marginal Effects Plots for Radical Party Strength Models


The paper reported coefficients for the interaction of IPW x Radical Party Strength (for both radical left and radical right parties). Here we provide the associated marginal effects plots.




(a) Econ-Overall, Model 1: Economic Demographic Controls




(b) Econ-Overall, Model 2: Adding Political Controls A




(c) Econ-Overall, Model 3: Adding Political Controls B




(d) ID-Overall, Model 1




(e) ID-Overall, Model 2




(f) ID-Overall, Model 3




(g) Econ-Ctr Right Senators, Model 1




(h) Econ-Ctr Right Senators, Model 2




(i) Econ-Ctr Right Senators, Model 3




(j) Culture-Ctr Right Senators, Model 1




(k) Culture-Ctr Right Senators, Model 2




(l) Culture-Ctr Right Senators, Model 3




(m) Econ-Left Senators, Model 1




(n) Econ-Left Senators, Model 2




(o) Econ-Left Senators, Model 3



(p) Culture-Left Senators, Model 1



(q) Culture-Left Senators, Model 2



(r) Culture-Left Senators, Model 3

Figure 6: Marginal Effects for IPW x Radical Left Strength: Overall Response; Response of Ctr-Right and Left Senators




Figure 7: Marginal Effects for IPW x Radical Right Strength: Overall Response; Response of Ctr-Right and Left Senators

H Partisan Responses to Radical Party Strength: Additional Results

In the main paper, we report results showing the response of left versus center/right senators to changes in IPW, contingent on the pre-existing strength of the radical left. For left senators, we included all senators associated with the PCF, diverse left, Greens and the PS in the “left” category. One question is whether the findings of a strong leftward shift in departments with a strong radical left are driven by (for example) communist senators, or whether the leftward shift is evident across senators from all left parties. In Figures 8 and 9, we show results from models in which we compare the responses of (1) all left senators (shown in paper); with (2) just senators from the Greens and PS; and (3) just PS senators. Although the confidence intervals increase slightly when we use just socialist and green legislators, likely due to the smaller sample size, the coefficients remain negative and largely similar. When we look at just the socialists, the effect size is somewhat smaller but confidence intervals are tighter. Taken together, these models suggest that, across different definitions of “mainstream left,” that increasing import penetration in the context of a strong radical left drives an accommodative strategy among the mainstream left.





Figure 8: Different Left Partisan Responses to Local Radical Left Strength: Economic Dimension


Figures 8 and 9 use a measure which defines radical left strength in terms of the communist, *divers gauche* and Green share of the total left vote. In Figures 10 and 11 we show



(a) Response of All Left Senators (b) Response of Socialist, Green Senators (c) Response of Socialist Senators

Figure 9: Different Left Partisan Responses to Local Radical Left Strength: Socio-Cultural Dimension

results which use narrower measures of radical left strength, based only on the electoral strength of the communists and *divers gauche*, on the one hand, and of the greens, on the other. Interestingly, the stronger the Greens’ share of the vote, the more of a leftward shift on both the economic and cultural dimensions (although confidence intervals overlap across strong communist/green strength).




(a) Far Left Vote Share (Comm + Greens) (b) Communist Vote Share (c) Green Vote Share


Figure 10: Partisan Responses to Different Measures of Radical Left Strength: Economic Dimension

Finally, in Figures 12 and 13 we show different left partisan responses to a strong radical left when we define radical left strength in terms of communist and *divers gauche* strength only.


Another question posed to us by a reviewer related to the independent effect of competition from radical parties on legislative ideological shifts. All regression models in the manuscript include broad measures of political competition (vote margin in the previous



(a) Far Left Vote Share (Comm + Greens)




(b) Communist Vote Share




(c) Green Vote Share


Figure 11: Partisan Responses to Different Measures of Radical Left Strength: Socio-Cultural Dimension



(a) Response of All Left Senators




(b) Response of Socialist, Green Senators




(c) Response of Socialist Senators


Figure 12: Different Left Partisan Responses to Local Radical Left Strength: Economic Dimension



(a) Response of All Left Senators




(b) Response of Socialist, Green Senators



(c) Response of Socialist Senators

Figure 13: Different Left Partisan Responses to Local Radical Left Strength: Socio-Cultural Dimension


election). Here, we additionally estimate models which include radical party competition as controls for the overall result on the economic dimension shown in paper Figure 3 (ie, not interacted with IPW); their inclusion does not change the coefficient on the identified coefficient of interest: imports per worker. The coefficients on radical party strength variables themselves are very imprecisely estimated, but their signs suggest that as radical left (right) party strength increases, legislative ideology moves to the left (right). The independent effect of radical party strength on legislator ideology is also captured in the constituent term of the interacted models (far left strength x IPW), and reported later in this appendix, in Appendix L.



(a) Coefficients on IPW, Vote Margin and Radical Left Share (b) Coefficients on IPW, Vote Margin and Radical Rt Share

Figure 14: Coefficients on IPW and Electoral Competition measures, Senator-level dataset.

Note: Coefficients here correspond to fully saturated models in Paper Figure 3, using senator-level dataset.



(a) Coefficients on IPW, Vote Margin and Radical Left Share (b) Coefficients on IPW, Vote Margin and Radical Rt Share

Figure 15: Coefficients on IPW and Electoral Competition measures, Dept. Dataset

Note: Coefficients here correspond to fully saturated models in Paper Figure 3, using department-level dataset.

I Majoritarianism and Trade: Additional Results

In the main paper we refer readers to the appendix for models exploring the interactive effects of Δ IPW and majoritarianism. We report these summary results below, in Table 2, for both individual and department-level models. These individual senator-level results tell us that sitting senators serving in majoritarian districts respond to Δ IPW, but do not take into account how the election of new senators shapes ideological shifts within departments. The department-level models, reported in the lower panel of Table 2, address this question and suggest some overall effect of electoral institutions. For the economic dimension, as import exposure increases in majoritarian settings, relative to a PR system, department-level IRT scores move further leftward. Panel B of Table 2 also suggests trade induces a very modest leftward shift on cultural issues, although the confidence intervals are large.

Dep var:	(1) Δ Economic Ideology Score	(2) Δ Cultural Ideology Score
Senator models:		
Δ IPW	-2.7** [0.98]	0.34 [0.37]
Δ IPW*Majoritarian	-0.45 [0.94]	-0.69* [0.38]
Department models:		
Δ IPW	6.65 [5.87]	-2.90 [8.07]
Δ IPW*Majoritarian	-14.35** [5.59]	-.62 [7.70]
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS
Econ & Demog ctrls	Y	Y
Political ctrls	Y	Y
Dept & Yr FEs	Y	Y
Obs	1428/568	1430/570

Table 2: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

In the main paper, we hypothesized that for the second (socio-cultural) dimension of politics, increasing import penetration in the context of majoritarian electoral institutions should lead to an additional rightward shift in ideology in districts with a stronger far-right. This is because it is departments with stronger radical rights where the ideological dimension is more likely to have been activated (see paper Table 1). Due to space constraints we were unable to explore this hypothesis in the paper but we provide preliminary evidence here. In Panel 16a we report coefficients on the interaction of Δ IPW, radical right strength and majoritarianism. The coefficients in the top panel suggest that majoritarianism in the context of a strong radical right have little additional effect on senator ideology. In the lower panel, however, which looks at the sub-sample of competitive departments (with a vote margin of 15 or smaller), the coefficient goes in the hypothesized direction (majoritarianism exerts an additional rightward effect), although confidence intervals are large.




Figure 16: Trade, Majoritarianism and Radical Party Strength

If the presence of a strong radical left pushes (leftist) senators to the left on the economic and cultural dimensions, the large body of scholarship on electoral institutions suggests that majoritarianism, and especially competitive majoritarianism, should magnify these effects. Next we explore this possibility for the economic dimension. Panel 16b of Figure 16 shows coefficients on the interaction of Δ IPW, radical left strength and competitive majoritarianism, where the dependent variable is the change in the ideology score for economic policy. When we look at the sub-sample of competitive departments, the coefficient is strongly negative (in the range of -15), suggesting that competitive majoritarianism in the context of a

strong radical left drives senator ideology further to the left, but the null of no effect cannot be rejected.

Although we have no clear priors on how majoritarianism should matter for second dimension politics in the context of a strong radical left, for the sake of transparency we implement a similar exercise as above, but using the change in the IRT score on the socio-cultural dimension as our dependent variable. The results, shown in Figure 16, suggest that competitive majoritarianism in the context of a strong radical left exerts an additional leftward effect— although again, confidence intervals are large.

These plots therefore provide suggestive (but not conclusive) evidence that competitive majoritarianism pulls the cultural ideology of senators in departments with a strong far-right further to the right, and that it pushes senators in departments with a strong far-left further to the left on both the economic and socio-cultural dimensions.

J Trade’s Positive Effects

One potential concern with our analysis is that we focus on the negative effects of globalization (import shocks), rather than both its positive and negative effects. Although trade liberalization with low-wage countries such as China brings significant costs to workers/regions in import-competing industries, one could argue this is only one half of the trade story. There are two possible concerns here. The first is what one might call the WalMart effect: the fact that trade with low-wage countries such as China not only negatively affects import-competing industries, but also has positive effects via the provision of cheap goods to French consumers. The second is our analytic focus on imports rather than exports. Both foci might predispose us to overstating the negative consequences (and ignoring the net effects) of trade on elite political ideology. We address both concerns below.

J.1 Consumer Effects

With respect to the first concern, there is of course a consumer side to any trade story. Consumers in France and elsewhere benefit from lower prices of low-skilled goods. That said, there are important methodological reasons that this should not affect our results. Our natural experiment is looking at differences across production and how this shifts political orientations. The important point for our analysis is that this consumer side effect (cheaper goods) impacted every region in France more or less equally, whereas our focus is on the production side of trade. Any consumer-driven side-effects of trade should not affect our estimates because they are not driven by differences in production.

To additionally allay concerns relating to consumer effects, we also estimated additional models which include average department-level income per capita as a control, as average income should help absorb differences on the consumer side wherein lower-income regions may have been more positively affected by the availability of cheaper low-skilled goods. The coefficient plots below show that inclusion of income in our regression models has little effect on the main coefficient of interest: the change in imports per worker.




Figure 17: Addressing Consumer Effects: Replication of Paper Figure 3, with average department GDP per capita as control

Note: Independent variable is imports per worker, measured in hundreds of euros. All models estimated using 2SLS.






Figure 18: Addressing Consumer Effects: Replication of Paper Figure 4 (Majoritarianism), with average department GDP per capita as control.

Note: For Panels 18a and 18b, the plots report the coefficient on ΔIPW interacted with majoritarianism. Model 1 (top) includes economic and demographic controls (as defined in manuscript Table 2); Model 2 (middle) adds political controls A; and Model 3 adds Political controls B. $N=1430$ for Panel 18a; $N=570$ for Panel 18b. Panels (b) and (d) report coefficients on the interaction of ΔIPW , majoritarianism and the vote margin of a department, at different levels of vote margin, using the full set of controls (ie Model 3). $N=1430$ for Panel 18a and 570 for Panel 18b. All models include unit and session fixed effects.




(a) Strong Radical Left




(b) Strong Radical Right


Figure 19: Addressing Consumer Effects: Replication of Paper Figure 6 (Trade and Radical Party Strength: Overall Results).




(a) Economic Dimension: Radical Left Strength



(b) Economic Dimension: Radical Right Strength



(c) Cultural Dimension: Radical Left Strength



(d) Cultural Dimension: Radical Right Strength

Figure 20: Addressing Consumer Effects: Replication of Paper Figure 7 (Trade and Radical Party Strength: By Party Family)

J.2 Net Trade Exposure

Here we address the potential differential effects of trade liberalization across imports and exports. On the one hand, increasing import competition decreases manufacturing employment and causes labor market distress. In contrast, manufacturing employment may increase if local areas benefit from export opportunities to new markets.⁷

There are undoubtedly winners from trade and globalization, but empirical evidence on whether these winners seek to influence/change policy is mixed, given that they typically benefit from the status quo. For example, focusing on political elites, [Guiso \(2017\)](#) argues that politicians have few electoral incentives to air positive trade messages. In the Brazilian case, [Campello and Urdinez \(2021\)](#) find that both voters and legislators from regions hard hit by import shocks express more negative views toward China; however, they find no significant effect of exports on the attitudes or behavior of either voters or legislators. On the other hand, [Dippel et al. \(2017\)](#), using a similar instrumental variable approach to the one we employ, find that while localized increases in imports increase support for nationalist parties among voters, this effect is moderated when one uses a net exposure measure (imports minus exports).

Although there are mixed findings in the literature, we explore the possibility that trade liberalization encompasses both political losers but also winners— and that this could have downstream effects politically— we follow [Dippel et al. \(2017\)](#) and re-estimate the models from the manuscript using instrumented changes in net trade exposure as the independent variable. Using this net exposure variable weakens our instrument somewhat, but remains above acceptable thresholds (ie, larger than the largest critical value).⁸

⁷Another possibility is that imports alter employment through input-output dynamics. [Aghion et al. \(2022\)](#)'s study using firm-level data suggests that imports which intensify direct competition with domestic firms are most likely to spur a contraction of domestic manufacturing. Imports that supply inputs have no clear effect on employment.

⁸Autor's instrumental variables approach has been so influential because it is designed to address the problem of separating shocks to product demand and shocks to foreign product demand. As [Autor, Dorn and Hanson \(2016\)](#) note, however, this identification strategy has little predictive power for exports. This is true in our setting, where the effective F-statistics for changes in exports per worker fail to exceed the worst-case benchmarks. For example, for models reported in Figure 3 of the paper, the effective F-statistics

Below we reproduce the coefficient plots presented in the paper using this net exposure variable. The results are similar to those reported in the main manuscript, which uses imports per worker as the independent variable. For the overall result (manuscript Figure 3), we find that an increase in the net exposure variable (as with the IPW measure) results in a leftward ideological shift on the economic dimension among individual senators and at the department level. For the models interacting majoritarianism and trade (Figure 5), at the individual level coefficients remain close to zero and statistically insignificant. At the department level, coefficients remain strongly negative, suggesting that majoritarian electoral systems push senators in trade-affected departments further to the left. In models which interact trade exposure, majoritarianism and vote margins, the coefficients are similar although confidence intervals increase slightly. For models interacting net exposure and the strength of the radical left and right (Figures 6 and 7), the coefficients and confidence intervals on trade are also similar to those reported in the manuscript.

In sum, our findings here are consistent with the large and robust body of literature focusing on the *import* component of trade shocks as driving political responses.

for the change in EPW are in the range of 1-3, when the worst-case 5 percent benchmark thresholds of tau are 16. In contrast, effective F-statistics for the net exposure variable are in the range of 48-50; for the IPW variable effective F-Stats are very strong, at 198-202.




Figure 21: Addressing Net Trade Exposure: Replication of Paper Figure 3, with Net Trade Exposure as the Independent Variable

Note: Independent variable is imports per worker, measured in hundreds of euros. All models estimated using 2SLS.






Figure 22: Addressing Net Trade Exposure: Replication of Paper Figure 4 (Majoritarianism)– with Net Trade Exposure as the Independent Variable.

Note: For Panels 22a and 22b, the plots report the coefficient on ΔIPW interacted with majoritarianism. Model 1 (top) includes economic and demographic controls (as defined in manuscript Table 2); Model 2 (middle) adds political controls A; and Model 3 adds Political controls B. N=1430 for Panel 22a; N=570 for Panel 18b. Panels (b) and (d) report coefficients on the interaction of ΔIPW , majoritarianism and the vote margin of a department, at different levels of vote margin, using the full set of controls (ie Model 3). N=1430 for Panel 18a and 570 for Panel 22b . All models include unit and session fixed effects.




(a) Strong Radical Left




(b) Strong Radical Right


Figure 23: Addressing Net Trade Exposure: Replication of Paper Figure 6 (Trade and Radical Party Strength: Overall Results)– with Net Trade Exposure as the Independent Variable.




(a) Economic Dimension: Radical Left Strength



(b) Economic Dimension: Radical Right Strength



(c) Cultural Dimension: Radical Left Strength



(d) Cultural Dimension: Radical Right Strength

Figure 24: Addressing Net Trade Exposure: Replication of Paper Figure 7 (Trade and Radical Party Strength: By Party Family)– with Net Trade Exposure as the Independent Variable

K Description of variables

Variable name	Variable description	Source
L_rt_district	Dummy variable indicating whether department had a majority of senators from right-wing party in previous session.	Senat website, Extraits de la Table Nominative
L_pct_imm	Percent of department comprised of immigrants	INSEE Estimations de Population
L_total_pop	Total population of department, logged	INSEE Estimations de Population
L_pct_female	Percent of department comprised of females	INSEE Estimations de Population
L_pct_industry	Percent of active population employed in industry at start of prior session.	INSEE Estimations de Population
L_pct_60plus	Percent of department population age 60+	INSEE Estimations de Population
L_pct_40to59	Percent of department population age 40to59+	INSEE Estimations de Population
L_pct_20to39	Percent of department population age 20to39+	INSEE Estimations de Population
vote_margin	Vote margin in department at last election. For PR districts: vote margin is calculated by subtracting the vote share of the party taking the second-most seats from the party winning the most seats. For majoritarian districts: difference in the vote totals between a winner with the lowest vote total and a runner-up, a loser with the greatest vote total (Cary, 2011, p. 1-2).	Ministry of the Interior
Major	Majoritarian district	Senat website, https://data.senat.fr/les-senateurs/
local_offices	Number of local offices held	
local_dummy	Dummy variable indicating whether average number of local office holders in the department is above the mean.	
district_seats	District magnitude (number of senate seats)	Code Electoral, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
divided_leg	Percent of session that upper and lower chambers controlled by different parties.	Senat website, Extraits de la Table Nominative
reelection_session	Dummy variable indicating whether a senator faces re-election at the end of the senate session.	Code Electoral, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
ESchange	Dummy variable indicating whether the department's electoral system changed from the previous senate session.	Code Electoral, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
first_session_seatexpand	Dummy variable indicating whether the department experienced an expansion of senate seats from the previous period.	Code Electoral, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
A38_FR	Change in imports per worker, hundreds of euros. Employment figures for French regions were disaggregated to the A38 level according to INSEE's Nomenclature Agr\eg\ee (2008). To link the imports data based on NACE codes to the French data on employment we use a crosswalk provided by INSEE, linking the A38 codes in the Nomenclature Agr\eg\ee to the \textit{Nomenclature d'activit'es fran\ccaise}, which is organized in parallel to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE).	INSEE, Comext
FR_share	Percent of total right vote received by far-right candidate in prior Senate election for that department.	Ministry of the Interior and Les élections sénatoriales en France - Politiquemania
FL2_share	Percent of total left vote received by radical left parties in prior Senate election for that department.	Ministry of the Interior and Les élections sénatoriales en France - Politiquemania
all_left_share	Percent of total vote earned by left parties in prior Senate election for that department.	Authors
all_right_share	Percent of total vote earned by left parties in prior Senate election for that department.	Authors
matricule or pid	Senator identification number.	INSEE [string] (matricule); pid [numeric] (authors)

L Full Tables from the Paper

Here we report full results from the summary coefficient plots presented in the main paper. In models with a single endogenous regressor the effective F-Statistic reports a robust weak instrument test ([Pflueger and Wang, 2015](#)) to reject the null that the endogenous variables are jointly zero at the 5 percent level. For models with multiple endogenous regressors we report the Cragg and Donald F-statistic and associated 5 percent worst-case benchmark critical value as computed by Stock and Yogo (2005).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	ΔIPW	ΔIPW	ΔIPW
ΔIPW (IV)	0.1*** (0.01)	0.1*** (0.01)	0.1*** (0.01)
Right controls district	0.0 (0.08)	0.0 (0.08)	0.0 (0.08)
Pct Immigrants	-0.2 (0.26)	-0.2 (0.26)	-0.2 (0.26)
Total pop, log	-0.7 (1.24)	-0.3 (1.29)	-0.2 (1.29)
Pct Female	0.2 (0.17)	0.2 (0.17)	0.2 (0.17)
Pct Industry	-0.4** (0.18)	-0.4** (0.19)	-0.4** (0.19)
Pct Pop 60+	-0.4 (0.35)	-0.3 (0.37)	-0.3 (0.37)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.3* (0.16)	0.3* (0.16)	0.3* (0.16)
Pct Pop 20-39	0.3 (0.37)	0.3 (0.37)	0.3 (0.37)
Major. district		-0.1 (0.12)	-0.1 (0.12)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.0 (0.08)	0.0 (0.08)
Dist. Magnitude		-0.4** (0.15)	-0.4*** (0.16)
Re-election		0.0 (0.06)	0.0 (0.06)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.0 (0.11)
Δ Dist. Magn.			0.3 (0.21)
Divided Leg			0.5 (0.72)
Observations	570	568	568
Adjusted R^2	0.831	0.834	0.834
F	26.8	26.4	26.0

Table 3: IV First Stage

Note: First stage of two-stage least squares regression. Controls include: Column (1): département controlled by right party in previous session, plus demographic controls for start-of-period log population, age and gender structure, and percent of population comprised of immigrants for the département. Column (2): political controls include measures of the degree of electoral competitiveness in the district, the nature of the electoral system district magnitude, and whether a senator is facing re-election in that session. Column (3): additional political controls include dummies for change in the electoral system and whether the department experienced a seat expansion, as well as the percent of time the upper and lower chambers were divided. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Δ IPW	-4.68*** (1.49)	-4.82*** (1.48)	-4.74*** (1.48)
Right controls district	4.79*** (1.84)	5.17*** (1.83)	5.01*** (1.85)
Pct Immigrants	-11.37 (8.41)	-12.73 (8.33)	-12.95 (8.33)
Total pop, log	-29.09 (34.49)	-47.06 (35.29)	-42.47 (35.36)
Pct Female	-8.49* (4.81)	-5.27 (4.81)	-4.36 (4.83)
Pct Industry	-18.19*** (4.23)	-15.86*** (4.22)	-16.21*** (4.22)
Pct Pop 60+	41.08*** (9.21)	36.02*** (9.49)	36.96*** (9.50)
Pct Pop 40-59	7.32** (3.64)	5.76 (3.60)	5.96* (3.59)
Pct Pop 20-39	6.11 (9.61)	6.33 (9.59)	6.25 (9.57)
Major. district		-10.69*** (2.48)	-9.47*** (2.56)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-1.16 (2.25)	-1.99 (2.29)
Dist. Magnitude		-9.51*** (3.43)	-8.84** (3.59)
Re-election		-0.42 (0.97)	-0.55 (0.97)
Δ Elect. Syst			-4.00** (2.04)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-2.95 (4.13)
Divided Leg			-28.07* (17.05)
Observations	1428	1421	1421
Adjusted R^2	0.303	0.312	0.312
F_eff	293.1/37.4	290.3/37.4	290.6/37.4

Table 4: IV Second Stage: Trade and Ideology, Economic Dimension (Senator-level)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Δ IPW	-14.20** (7.14)	-14.17** (7.12)	-14.31** (7.08)
Right controls district	16.90** (8.45)	15.62* (8.45)	14.24* (8.50)
Pct Immigrants	-9.06 (26.07)	-7.98 (26.02)	-8.44 (25.90)
Total pop, log	103.07 (125.10)	138.87 (130.61)	165.52 (130.47)
Pct Female	-7.81 (17.28)	-12.83 (17.51)	-9.15 (17.51)
Pct Industry	-28.92 (18.48)	-34.16* (18.67)	-37.01** (18.59)
Pct Pop 60+	80.64** (35.10)	96.23*** (37.02)	100.46*** (36.90)
Pct Pop 40-59	17.62 (16.69)	20.14 (16.71)	21.71 (16.63)
Pct Pop 20-39	68.99* (37.47)	74.39** (37.76)	77.22** (37.56)
Major. district		19.58 (12.19)	24.71** (12.27)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-5.20 (7.75)	-5.90 (7.71)
Dist. Magnitude		2.29 (15.83)	1.86 (16.79)
Re-election		7.02 (5.66)	6.24 (5.66)
Δ Elect. Syst			-29.22*** (10.93)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-3.63 (21.37)
Divided Leg			-103.07 (73.51)
Observations	570	568	568
Adjusted R^2	0.201	0.201	0.207
F_eff	199.5/37.4	195.8/37.4	195.4/37.4

Table 5: IV Second Stage: Trade and Ideology, Economic Dimension (Department-level)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Majoritarian=1 \times Δ IPW	-0.27 (0.95)	-0.14 (0.94)	-0.23 (0.94)
Δ IPW	-2.72*** (0.98)	-3.28*** (1.00)	-3.17*** (1.00)
Majoritarian=1	-8.59*** (3.24)	-10.14*** (3.27)	-8.72*** (3.35)
Right controls district	5.14*** (1.84)	5.15*** (1.83)	4.95*** (1.85)
Pct Immigrants	-10.23 (8.37)	-12.17 (8.34)	-12.31 (8.33)
Total pop, log	-54.23 (35.58)	-45.06 (35.77)	-40.11 (35.87)
Pct Female	-5.52 (4.84)	-5.21 (4.82)	-4.23 (4.83)
Pct Industry	-16.60*** (4.23)	-16.27*** (4.20)	-16.60*** (4.20)
Pct Pop 60+	32.46*** (9.43)	35.59*** (9.47)	36.51*** (9.49)
Pct Pop 40-59	5.27 (3.54)	4.93 (3.53)	5.21 (3.53)
Pct Pop 20-39	2.05 (9.33)	3.78 (9.32)	3.86 (9.31)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-1.14 (2.25)	-1.97 (2.28)
Dist. Magnitude		-8.47** (3.31)	-7.66** (3.44)
Re-election		-0.37 (0.97)	-0.52 (0.97)
Δ Elect. Syst			-4.01** (2.04)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-3.63 (4.08)
Divided Leg			-34.13** (16.33)
Observations	1428	1421	1421
Adjusted R^2	0.311	0.313	0.313
F_eff	1024.9/19.8	1017.5/19.9	1016/19.9

Table 6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade and Majoritarianism, Senator-level

Note: Dependent variable is change in ideology score, measured as 100 times the change in IRT score for relevant bills; IPW is measured in hundreds of euros. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.. F-Stat is Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values of 10 percent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Majoritarian=1 \times Δ IPW	-15.79*** (5.54)	-15.34*** (5.55)	-14.19** (5.61)
Δ IPW	7.43 (5.84)	7.28 (5.88)	6.46 (5.92)
Majoritarian=1	47.63*** (15.49)	48.38*** (15.98)	50.49*** (15.90)
Right controls district	16.56** (8.34)	15.80* (8.35)	14.17* (8.41)
Pct Immigrants	-1.70 (25.82)	-1.77 (25.83)	-3.05 (25.73)
Total pop, log	189.17 (127.74)	168.52 (129.57)	186.08 (129.44)
Pct Female	-9.23 (17.30)	-9.84 (17.34)	-6.47 (17.35)
Pct Industry	-27.29 (18.56)	-27.79 (18.56)	-30.76* (18.52)
Pct Pop 60+	100.63*** (36.29)	98.07*** (36.63)	100.55*** (36.53)
Pct Pop 40-59	17.85 (16.14)	18.92 (16.22)	19.69 (16.15)
Pct Pop 20-39	75.70** (36.88)	74.95** (37.06)	76.22** (36.88)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-4.71 (7.67)	-5.42 (7.64)
Dist. Magnitude		6.84 (15.49)	8.42 (16.42)
Re-election		6.65 (5.60)	5.81 (5.61)
Δ Elect. Syst			-24.68** (10.97)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-10.44 (21.16)
Divided Leg			-127.72* (71.51)
Observations	570	568	568
Adjusted R^2	0.219	0.216	0.221
F_eff	473/19.9	468.8/19.9	457.8/19.9

Table 7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade and Majoritarianism, Department-level

Note: Dependent variable is change in ideology score, measured as 100 times the change in IRT score for relevant bills; IPW is measured in hundreds of euros. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.. F-Stat is Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values of 10 percent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Δ Econ (VM=5)	Δ Econ (VM=10)	Δ Econ (VM=15)	Δ Econ (VM=20)
Majoritarian \times Competitive \times Δ IPW	-17.09*** (3.54)	-11.43*** (2.48)	-5.02** (2.06)	0.52 (1.93)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	1.40 (0.86)	1.75** (0.89)	1.89* (1.08)	-0.24 (1.48)
Competitive \times Δ IPW	14.44*** (3.13)	8.06*** (2.17)	3.23** (1.64)	-0.40 (1.32)
Majoritarian \times Competitive	36.75*** (7.98)	16.75*** (5.30)	10.56** (5.04)	-1.49 (4.99)
Δ IPW	-3.93*** (0.94)	-3.87*** (0.94)	-3.99*** (0.98)	-3.12** (1.27)
Majoritarian	-14.78*** (3.46)	-12.60*** (3.61)	-14.14*** (3.96)	-8.08* (4.75)
Competitive	-30.42*** (6.91)	-8.33** (4.11)	-5.94 (3.61)	3.58 (3.40)
Right controls district	5.65*** (1.84)	4.61** (1.83)	5.26*** (1.86)	4.92*** (1.84)
Pct Immigrants	-12.62 (8.31)	-14.35* (8.29)	-12.24 (8.31)	-11.61 (8.41)
Total pop, log	-29.13 (35.76)	-27.35 (35.82)	-42.10 (35.84)	-33.25 (36.15)
Pct Female	-2.81 (4.85)	-3.51 (4.83)	-4.02 (4.86)	-5.04 (4.87)
Pct Industry	-16.35*** (4.21)	-16.23*** (4.21)	-16.70*** (4.19)	-17.18*** (4.22)
Pct Pop 60+	38.06*** (9.50)	37.26*** (9.46)	36.71*** (9.46)	36.33*** (9.50)
Pct Pop 40-59	4.68 (3.51)	4.22 (3.51)	4.60 (3.52)	5.17 (3.54)
Pct Pop 20-39	1.83 (9.32)	3.13 (9.37)	2.29 (9.37)	3.73 (9.40)
Dist. Magnitude	-8.91** (3.47)	-6.27* (3.40)	-6.98** (3.46)	-6.26* (3.47)
Re-election	-0.73 (0.98)	-0.85 (0.97)	-0.64 (0.98)	-0.65 (0.98)
Δ Elect. Syst	-1.62 (2.08)	-1.24 (2.09)	-2.39 (2.08)	-3.77* (2.02)
Δ Dist. Magn.	-3.55 (4.08)	-3.52 (4.07)	-3.49 (4.10)	-3.81 (4.15)
Divided Leg	-40.64** (16.33)	-35.15** (16.26)	-36.52** (16.37)	-34.68** (16.32)
Observations	1421	1421	1421	1421
Adjusted R^2	0.316	0.320	0.314	0.312
F_eff	388.1/16.9	656.6/16.9	469.2/16.9	402.5/16.9

Table 8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade, Electoral Systems and Electoral Marginality, Economic Dimension (senator-level)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Δ Econ (VM=5)	Δ Econ (VM=10)	Δ Econ (VM=15)	Δ Econ (VM=20)
Majoritarian \times Competitive \times Δ IPW	-9.09 (16.22)	-1.13 (12.67)	-1.77 (11.22)	-10.01 (10.59)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	-6.09 (4.89)	-7.79 (5.14)	-8.35 (5.97)	-4.32 (7.84)
Competitive \times Δ IPW	-12.89 (14.96)	-13.00 (11.58)	-7.38 (9.72)	-2.28 (8.43)
Majoritarian \times Competitive	19.81 (34.90)	-9.46 (24.20)	-23.77 (22.81)	19.23 (23.25)
Δ IPW	4.62 (5.34)	4.66 (5.41)	6.32 (5.73)	5.48 (7.08)
Majoritarian	37.10** (15.83)	47.08*** (16.83)	56.81*** (18.42)	32.02 (21.45)
Competitive	16.19 (30.80)	30.09 (21.17)	24.23 (18.45)	-9.76 (18.33)
Right controls district	11.39 (8.35)	12.12 (8.37)	11.78 (8.43)	12.81 (8.42)
Pct Immigrants	-9.55 (25.36)	-8.22 (25.78)	-4.44 (25.60)	-8.10 (25.97)
Total pop, log	188.18 (127.47)	207.34 (127.98)	183.05 (128.77)	188.14 (129.57)
Pct Female	-2.88 (17.14)	-2.76 (17.28)	-3.78 (17.31)	-1.74 (17.38)
Pct Industry	-31.11* (18.35)	-34.16* (18.42)	-33.97* (18.37)	-30.23 (18.44)
Pct Pop 60+	105.49*** (35.87)	106.77*** (36.11)	102.92*** (36.38)	106.03*** (36.46)
Pct Pop 40-59	16.85 (15.92)	17.16 (16.07)	17.56 (16.02)	19.84 (16.03)
Pct Pop 20-39	74.06** (36.42)	80.00** (36.69)	87.48** (36.92)	80.99** (37.28)
Dist. Magnitude	12.18 (16.28)	12.82 (16.34)	13.62 (16.46)	8.76 (16.62)
Re-election	4.51 (5.55)	4.50 (5.57)	4.97 (5.58)	5.70 (5.62)
Δ Elect. Syst	-27.53** (10.97)	-29.36*** (11.18)	-28.62** (11.18)	-25.32** (10.92)
Δ Dist. Magn.	-11.43 (20.93)	-12.49 (21.02)	-12.31 (21.10)	-9.96 (21.39)
Divided Leg	-120.91* (70.54)	-112.63 (70.77)	-98.02 (72.14)	-124.11* (71.81)
Observations	568	568	568	568
Adjusted R^2	0.239	0.230	0.227	0.225
F_eff	269.7/16.9	385.3/16.9	267.2/16.9	208.7/16.9

Table 9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade, Electoral Systems and Electoral Marginality, Economic Dimension (dept-level)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-5.87* (3.01)	-6.93** (2.98)	-7.65*** (2.96)
Δ IPW	-1.16 (1.12)	-1.44 (1.11)	-1.14 (1.10)
Far Left Share	29.79*** (8.15)	31.58*** (8.08)	33.55*** (8.06)
Total Left Vote	-29.75** (13.18)	-34.49*** (13.18)	-38.31*** (13.21)
Pct Immigrants	-10.38 (8.38)	-11.48 (8.31)	-11.63 (8.30)
Total pop, log	-14.74 (34.38)	-33.39 (35.16)	-30.22 (35.22)
Pct Female	-6.40 (4.80)	-3.13 (4.82)	-1.91 (4.83)
Pct Industry	-20.02*** (4.29)	-17.51*** (4.27)	-18.02*** (4.26)
Pct Pop 60+	42.33*** (9.19)	37.52*** (9.46)	38.40*** (9.48)
Pct Pop 40-59	7.07** (3.51)	5.82* (3.49)	6.03* (3.48)
Pct Pop 20-39	5.64 (9.42)	6.14 (9.38)	6.03 (9.36)
Major. district		-10.46*** (2.46)	-9.23*** (2.55)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.09 (2.25)	-0.91 (2.28)
Dist. Magnitude		-8.40** (3.31)	-6.98** (3.44)
Re-election		0.10 (0.98)	-0.08 (0.98)
Δ Elect. Syst			-4.63** (2.04)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-6.38 (4.06)
Divided Leg			-38.44** (16.20)
Observations	1428	1421	1421
Adjusted R^2	0.306	0.314	0.315
F_eff	968.3/16.4	969.4/16.4	993.7/16.4

Table 10: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-2.41** (1.17)	-2.75** (1.16)	-2.94** (1.16)
Δ IPW	-0.19 (0.44)	-0.28 (0.43)	-0.21 (0.43)
Far Left Share	10.54*** (3.17)	11.04*** (3.14)	11.53*** (3.14)
Total Left Vote	-3.92 (5.13)	-5.23 (5.14)	-6.23 (5.16)
Pct Immigrants	0.30 (3.26)	-0.09 (3.24)	-0.17 (3.24)
Total pop, log	17.77 (13.38)	9.75 (13.71)	11.04 (13.75)
Pct Female	-2.12 (1.87)	-0.90 (1.87)	-0.55 (1.88)
Pct Industry	-9.71*** (1.66)	-8.74*** (1.66)	-8.89*** (1.66)
Pct Pop 60+	16.05*** (3.58)	13.44*** (3.68)	13.78*** (3.69)
Pct Pop 40-59	3.39** (1.36)	2.85** (1.36)	2.92** (1.36)
Pct Pop 20-39	4.30 (3.67)	4.13 (3.66)	4.07 (3.65)
Major. district		-4.21*** (0.96)	-3.79*** (0.99)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.23 (0.88)	-0.08 (0.89)
Dist. Magnitude		-2.74** (1.29)	-2.42* (1.34)
Re-election		-0.18 (0.38)	-0.23 (0.38)
Δ Elect. Syst			-1.48* (0.79)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-1.46 (1.58)
Divided Leg			-14.39** (6.32)
Observations	1430	1423	1423
Adjusted R^2	0.378	0.385	0.385
F_eff	970.6/16.4	971.8/16.4	996.2/16.4

Table 11: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	22.85*** (8.34)	22.74*** (8.25)	23.24*** (8.29)
Δ IPW	-3.58*** (0.82)	-4.07*** (0.83)	-4.08*** (0.83)
Far Right Share	-21.79* (11.34)	-23.39** (11.22)	-25.36** (11.29)
Total Right vote	56.48*** (6.99)	53.78*** (6.99)	52.59*** (7.07)
Pct Immigrants	-5.30 (8.30)	-6.91 (8.25)	-7.37 (8.25)
Total pop, log	-23.14 (33.85)	-32.04 (34.75)	-28.36 (34.85)
Pct Female	-8.34* (4.74)	-6.22 (4.76)	-5.51 (4.77)
Pct Industry	-13.94*** (4.19)	-12.32*** (4.17)	-12.70*** (4.17)
Pct Pop 60+	37.07*** (9.07)	34.71*** (9.33)	35.76*** (9.36)
Pct Pop 40-59	8.10** (3.46)	7.18** (3.45)	7.36** (3.45)
Pct Pop 20-39	3.53 (9.19)	4.48 (9.17)	4.42 (9.16)
Major. district		-7.62*** (2.45)	-6.56*** (2.54)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.43 (2.21)	-1.18 (2.25)
Dist. Magnitude		-8.40*** (3.26)	-8.21** (3.39)
Re-election		0.12 (0.96)	0.04 (0.96)
Δ Elect. Syst			-3.53* (2.03)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-1.07 (4.07)
Divided Leg			-47.31*** (16.09)
Observations	1426	1419	1419
Adjusted R^2	0.328	0.333	0.332
F_eff	1103.5/16.4	1101.9/16.4	1088.9/16.4

Table 12: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	6.60** (3.21)	6.29** (3.18)	6.35** (3.19)
Δ IPW	-1.04*** (0.32)	-1.19*** (0.32)	-1.19*** (0.32)
Far Right Share	-9.14** (4.39)	-9.57** (4.35)	-10.19** (4.37)
Total Right vote	14.30*** (2.75)	12.96*** (2.75)	12.58*** (2.78)
Pct Immigrants	1.64 (3.26)	1.09 (3.24)	0.88 (3.24)
Total pop, log	14.25 (13.28)	8.27 (13.65)	9.86 (13.69)
Pct Female	-2.83 (1.86)	-1.88 (1.87)	-1.62 (1.87)
Pct Industry	-7.76*** (1.64)	-7.05*** (1.63)	-7.19*** (1.63)
Pct Pop 60+	15.08*** (3.56)	13.12*** (3.66)	13.55*** (3.67)
Pct Pop 40-59	3.76*** (1.36)	3.31** (1.35)	3.38** (1.35)
Pct Pop 20-39	3.44 (3.61)	3.49 (3.60)	3.45 (3.60)
Major. district		-3.60*** (0.96)	-3.18*** (1.00)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.10 (0.87)	-0.39 (0.88)
Dist. Magnitude		-2.77** (1.28)	-2.76** (1.33)
Re-election		-0.12 (0.38)	-0.14 (0.38)
Δ Elect. Syst			-1.35* (0.80)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-0.09 (1.60)
Divided Leg			-17.26*** (6.32)
Observations	1428	1421	1421
Adjusted R^2	0.387	0.392	0.392
F_eff	1148.9/16.4	1146.6/16.4	1134.6/16.4

Table 13: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Right (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-2.27 (2.77)	-3.62 (2.68)	-3.89 (2.66)
Δ IPW	-2.87*** (1.00)	-2.92*** (0.97)	-2.83*** (0.97)
Far Left Share	8.99 (7.45)	12.72* (7.26)	13.67* (7.23)
Total Left Vote	-30.61** (11.97)	-39.71*** (11.74)	-40.87*** (11.76)
Pct Immigrants	16.29* (8.73)	18.40** (8.53)	18.94** (8.54)
Total pop, log	-47.50 (32.05)	-52.15 (32.07)	-56.05* (32.25)
Pct Female	-11.70*** (4.32)	-8.90** (4.22)	-8.84** (4.25)
Pct Industry	-16.81*** (3.79)	-11.84*** (3.75)	-12.02*** (3.75)
Pct Pop 60+	15.90* (8.46)	11.69 (8.53)	11.19 (8.55)
Pct Pop 40-59	2.72 (3.45)	0.82 (3.36)	0.91 (3.36)
Pct Pop 20-39	5.01 (9.34)	1.56 (9.08)	1.82 (9.08)
Major. district		-12.00*** (2.22)	-12.32*** (2.30)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		1.42 (2.04)	1.53 (2.08)
Dist. Magnitude		-11.99*** (2.80)	-11.14*** (2.90)
Re-election		3.44*** (0.91)	3.35*** (0.91)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.66 (1.84)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-4.51 (3.96)
Divided Leg			20.89 (14.63)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.437	0.469	0.468
F_eff	715.8/16.4	727.2/16.4	762.8/16.4

Table 14: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-12.53*** (3.98)	-11.55*** (3.74)	-11.67*** (3.74)
Δ IPW	3.32** (1.64)	2.61* (1.54)	2.67* (1.56)
Far Left Share	40.48*** (14.08)	36.47*** (13.17)	38.45*** (13.23)
Total Left Vote	-57.78*** (21.49)	-13.08 (20.91)	-8.97 (21.32)
Pct Immigrants	-38.65*** (9.04)	-37.29*** (8.52)	-36.78*** (8.48)
Total pop, log	-127.48*** (46.07)	-109.05** (45.45)	-95.23** (45.50)
Pct Female	-0.23 (6.67)	-0.07 (6.53)	0.42 (6.50)
Pct Industry	8.10 (6.96)	8.78 (6.50)	7.49 (6.48)
Pct Pop 60+	-8.36 (12.56)	-9.01 (12.17)	-7.41 (12.11)
Pct Pop 40-59	-11.29** (4.45)	-10.85** (4.25)	-10.42** (4.23)
Pct Pop 20-39	-18.64 (11.51)	-14.57 (10.76)	-15.52 (10.70)
Major. district		4.46 (3.14)	6.94** (3.30)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		6.03** (2.77)	5.56** (2.79)
Dist. Magnitude		4.05 (3.54)	3.21 (3.62)
Re-election		-8.53*** (1.11)	-8.65*** (1.10)
Δ Elect. Syst			-6.01** (2.56)
Δ Dist. Magn.			2.29 (4.08)
Divided Leg			-11.42 (21.66)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.615	0.661	0.662
F_eff	228.0/16.4	220.4/16.4	216.0/16.4

Table 15: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Party Response to Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	22.34*** (7.67)	24.37*** (7.47)	24.60*** (7.47)
Δ IPW	-4.32*** (0.77)	-4.73*** (0.75)	-4.71*** (0.75)
Far Right Share	-18.03 (11.27)	-24.24** (10.98)	-23.81** (11.00)
Total Right Vote	39.40*** (6.23)	36.54*** (6.18)	36.80*** (6.26)
Pct Immigrants	21.57** (8.69)	22.24*** (8.53)	22.78*** (8.54)
Total pop, log	-57.20* (31.66)	-56.75* (31.92)	-59.73* (32.10)
Pct Female	-12.99*** (4.26)	-11.06*** (4.19)	-11.49*** (4.22)
Pct Industry	-12.90*** (3.71)	-9.18** (3.69)	-9.08** (3.70)
Pct Pop 60+	11.56 (8.36)	9.10 (8.47)	8.36 (8.50)
Pct Pop 40-59	4.24 (3.42)	2.54 (3.36)	2.46 (3.36)
Pct Pop 20-39	6.46 (9.12)	3.58 (8.94)	3.60 (8.94)
Major. district		-9.38*** (2.25)	-9.95*** (2.33)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		1.22 (2.01)	1.61 (2.06)
Dist. Magnitude		-11.25*** (2.80)	-11.06*** (2.89)
Re-election		3.36*** (0.90)	3.37*** (0.91)
Δ Elect. Syst			1.74 (1.84)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-0.97 (4.00)
Divided Leg			15.23 (14.67)
Observations	949	949	949
Adjusted R^2	0.451	0.474	0.472
F_eff	771.7/16.4	775.8/16.4	779.8/16.4

Table 16: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	7.47 (13.02)	0.34 (12.00)	-0.61 (12.29)
Δ IPW	-1.68 (1.31)	-1.52 (1.21)	-1.38 (1.21)
Far Right Share	-12.70 (13.56)	-3.61 (12.48)	-6.08 (12.80)
Total Right Vote	-21.52 (15.00)	-29.47** (14.04)	-30.55** (14.39)
Pct Immigrants	-36.16*** (9.03)	-36.40*** (8.43)	-36.24*** (8.38)
Total pop, log	-120.91** (47.13)	-122.70*** (45.95)	-112.00** (45.97)
Pct Female	1.03 (6.58)	3.09 (6.34)	3.62 (6.32)
Pct Industry	10.72 (7.09)	12.12* (6.58)	10.71 (6.58)
Pct Pop 60+	-5.55 (12.47)	-10.01 (11.91)	-8.51 (11.85)
Pct Pop 40-59	-7.74* (4.39)	-9.38** (4.14)	-9.02** (4.12)
Pct Pop 20-39	-5.06 (11.62)	-5.46 (10.79)	-6.39 (10.82)
Major. district		3.68 (3.10)	5.85* (3.24)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		5.12* (2.76)	4.49 (2.78)
Dist. Magnitude		5.61 (3.53)	4.95 (3.61)
Re-election		-8.78*** (1.07)	-8.82*** (1.07)
Δ Elect. Syst			-5.74** (2.60)
Δ Dist. Magn.			2.07 (4.17)
Divided Leg			5.41 (22.75)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.610	0.662	0.663
F_eff	204.1/16.4	203.2/16.4	190.5/16.4

Table 17: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Party Response to Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-0.89 (1.18)	-1.13 (1.17)	-1.21 (1.16)
Δ IPW	-0.80* (0.43)	-0.89** (0.42)	-0.86** (0.42)
Far Left Share	1.37 (3.10)	1.58 (3.08)	1.86 (3.06)
Share of vote for right parties	6.21** (2.53)	5.01** (2.52)	4.63* (2.56)
Pct Immigrants	10.25*** (3.79)	10.38*** (3.78)	10.53*** (3.78)
Total pop, log	6.20 (13.99)	3.00 (14.30)	1.61 (14.38)
Pct Female	-3.13* (1.89)	-2.23 (1.88)	-2.20 (1.90)
Pct Industry	-9.25*** (1.66)	-7.88*** (1.67)	-7.98*** (1.68)
Pct Pop 60+	4.35 (3.68)	1.70 (3.78)	1.48 (3.79)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.84 (1.50)	0.23 (1.50)	0.25 (1.50)
Pct Pop 20-39	1.37 (4.09)	0.17 (4.06)	0.26 (4.06)
Major. district		-4.05*** (1.00)	-4.19*** (1.03)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.74 (0.91)	0.79 (0.93)
Dist. Magnitude		-3.32*** (1.25)	-3.02** (1.29)
Re-election		0.15 (0.40)	0.10 (0.41)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.25 (0.82)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-1.68 (1.79)
Divided Leg			5.77 (6.55)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.481	0.489	0.488
F_eff	744.8/16.4	755.9/16.4	794.5/16.4

Table 18: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-4.33*** (1.21)	-4.51*** (1.19)	-4.50*** (1.18)
Δ IPW	1.13** (0.50)	1.09** (0.49)	1.07** (0.49)
Far Left Share	12.46*** (4.41)	12.13*** (4.31)	12.68*** (4.29)
Share of vote for right parties	-12.41*** (4.53)	-13.62*** (4.48)	-12.27*** (4.51)
Pct Immigrants	-9.40*** (2.81)	-10.13*** (2.77)	-10.02*** (2.74)
Total pop, log	-34.85** (14.44)	-34.47** (14.89)	-28.77* (14.81)
Pct Female	-1.64 (2.08)	-1.23 (2.13)	-1.15 (2.11)
Pct Industry	7.04*** (2.21)	7.40*** (2.16)	6.79*** (2.14)
Pct Pop 60+	2.29 (3.92)	1.93 (3.96)	2.33 (3.92)
Pct Pop 40-59	-1.21 (1.36)	-1.89 (1.35)	-1.85 (1.34)
Pct Pop 20-39	4.02 (3.60)	3.95 (3.52)	2.84 (3.51)
Major. district		0.21 (1.02)	1.31 (1.06)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		2.42*** (0.91)	2.34*** (0.90)
Dist. Magnitude		0.49 (1.16)	-0.14 (1.19)
Re-election		-1.51*** (0.35)	-1.50*** (0.35)
Δ Elect. Syst			-2.21*** (0.83)
Δ Dist. Magn.			2.38* (1.32)
Divided Leg			8.23 (7.34)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.652	0.664	0.669
F_eff	240.4/16.4	231.5/16.4	229.0/16.4

Table 19: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Response to Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Rt Share \times Δ IPW	6.88** (3.31)	6.88** (3.27)	7.41** (3.27)
Δ IPW	-1.22*** (0.34)	-1.36*** (0.34)	-1.37*** (0.34)
Far Rt Share	-10.17** (4.89)	-11.52** (4.84)	-11.99** (4.84)
Total Right Vote	6.22** (2.76)	4.45 (2.78)	4.11 (2.81)
Pct Immigrants	11.04*** (3.84)	11.02*** (3.82)	11.31*** (3.83)
Total pop, log	3.21 (14.02)	-0.54 (14.34)	-2.27 (14.43)
Pct Female	-3.70** (1.89)	-2.87 (1.88)	-2.86 (1.90)
Pct Industry	-9.01*** (1.64)	-7.69*** (1.65)	-7.78*** (1.66)
Pct Pop 60+	4.07 (3.70)	1.65 (3.80)	1.38 (3.81)
Pct Pop 40-59	1.14 (1.51)	0.57 (1.50)	0.62 (1.50)
Pct Pop 20-39	1.23 (4.05)	0.23 (4.02)	0.28 (4.02)
Major. district		-4.04*** (1.01)	-4.15*** (1.05)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.53 (0.91)	0.55 (0.93)
Dist. Magnitude		-3.36*** (1.25)	-2.99** (1.29)
Re-election		0.16 (0.40)	0.11 (0.41)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.21 (0.83)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-2.01 (1.80)
Divided Leg			4.84 (6.59)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.478	0.485	0.484
F_eff	815.9/16.4	819.2/16.4	824.4/16.4

Table 20: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Rt (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Rt Share \times Δ IPW	5.34 (3.98)	4.18 (3.87)	2.94 (3.95)
Δ IPW	-0.70* (0.40)	-0.72* (0.39)	-0.64* (0.39)
Far Rt Share	-6.56 (4.14)	-4.89 (4.03)	-5.09 (4.11)
Total Right Vote	-15.50*** (4.58)	-16.40*** (4.53)	-15.60*** (4.62)
Pct Immigrants	-9.90*** (2.76)	-10.66*** (2.72)	-10.56*** (2.69)
Total pop, log	-36.47** (14.40)	-38.08** (14.82)	-32.76** (14.76)
Pct Female	-0.75 (2.01)	0.02 (2.04)	0.06 (2.03)
Pct Industry	7.78*** (2.17)	8.03*** (2.12)	7.35*** (2.11)
Pct Pop 60+	1.73 (3.81)	0.66 (3.84)	1.15 (3.80)
Pct Pop 40-59	-1.08 (1.34)	-1.83 (1.34)	-1.72 (1.32)
Pct Pop 20-39	5.25 (3.55)	5.07 (3.48)	4.17 (3.47)
Major. district		-0.20 (1.00)	0.82 (1.04)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		2.06** (0.89)	1.94** (0.89)
Dist. Magnitude		0.83 (1.14)	0.25 (1.16)
Re-election		-1.47*** (0.35)	-1.46*** (0.34)
Δ Elect. Syst			-2.11** (0.84)
Δ Dist. Magn.			2.38* (1.34)
Divided Leg			11.73 (7.30)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.663	0.674	0.678
F_eff	204.1/16.4	203.2/16.4	190.5/16.4

Table 21: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Response to Strong Radical Rt (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

M Robustness I: Models Using Alternative IPW Measure

Here we report the same models as in the previous section, but using a version of IPW which was constructed using imports from China, other LDCs and Eastern Europe, as reported in [Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum \(2014\)](#).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IPW	Δ IPW	Δ IPW
Instrument (Dauth)	0.2*** (0.02)	0.2*** (0.02)	0.2*** (0.02)
Right controls district	0.1 (0.17)	0.1 (0.17)	0.1 (0.17)
Pct Immigrants	0.1 (0.52)	0.1 (0.52)	0.1 (0.52)
Total pop, log	-0.8 (2.49)	-0.5 (2.61)	-0.6 (2.63)
Pct Female	0.2 (0.34)	0.2 (0.35)	0.1 (0.35)
Pct Industry	-0.4 (0.37)	-0.4 (0.37)	-0.4 (0.38)
Pct Pop 60+	-0.2 (0.70)	-0.3 (0.74)	-0.3 (0.74)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.5 (0.33)	0.5 (0.33)	0.5 (0.33)
Pct Pop 20-39	0.9 (0.74)	0.9 (0.75)	0.9 (0.75)
Major. district		-0.1 (0.24)	-0.1 (0.25)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.2 (0.15)	-0.2 (0.15)
Dist. Magnitude		-0.4 (0.30)	-0.4 (0.32)
Re-election		0.0 (0.11)	0.0 (0.11)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.1 (0.22)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-0.1 (0.43)
Divided Leg			0.8 (1.47)
Observations	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.792	0.792	0.791
F	21.1	20.3	19.9

Table 22: IV First Stage

Note: First stage of two-stage least squares regression. Controls include: Column (1): département controlled by right party in previous session, plus demographic controls for start-of-period log population, age and gender structure, and percent of population comprised of immigrants for the département. Column (2): political controls include measures of the degree of electoral competitiveness in the district, the nature of the electoral system district magnitude, and whether a senator is facing re-election in that session. Column (3): additional political controls include dummies for change in the electoral system and whether the department experienced a seat expansion, as well as the percent of time the upper and lower chambers were divided. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Δ IPW	-1.01 (0.96)	-0.99 (0.97)	-1.10 (0.97)
Right controls district	4.66** (1.86)	5.06*** (1.86)	4.76** (1.87)
Pct Immigrants	-10.74 (8.46)	-11.10 (8.44)	-11.32 (8.43)
Total pop, log	-23.96 (34.65)	-44.09 (35.77)	-40.07 (35.87)
Pct Female	-8.35* (4.85)	-6.10 (4.88)	-5.04 (4.90)
Pct Industry	-18.71*** (4.29)	-16.52*** (4.32)	-16.81*** (4.31)
Pct Pop 60+	39.81*** (9.30)	32.13*** (9.58)	33.00*** (9.58)
Pct Pop 40-59	5.32 (3.69)	3.86 (3.67)	4.30 (3.67)
Pct Pop 20-39	1.03 (9.70)	-0.81 (9.65)	-0.17 (9.63)
Major. district		-10.03*** (2.51)	-8.88*** (2.59)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.68 (2.28)	-1.58 (2.31)
Dist. Magnitude		-5.19* (3.14)	-4.34 (3.25)
Re-election		-0.41 (0.99)	-0.61 (0.99)
Δ Elect. Syst			-4.16** (2.07)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-5.15 (4.13)
Divided Leg			-41.44** (17.20)
Observations	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.294	0.299	0.300
F_eff	236.4/37.4	230.2/37.4	228.1/37.4

Table 23: IV Second Stage: Trade and Ideology, Economic Dimension (Senator-level)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Δ IPW	-12.20* (6.36)	-12.35* (6.37)	-13.43** (6.36)
Right controls district	18.31** (8.69)	17.39** (8.68)	15.81* (8.76)
Pct Immigrants	-4.44 (26.71)	-2.23 (26.64)	-2.77 (26.63)
Total pop, log	104.34 (127.71)	143.66 (133.23)	168.22 (133.67)
Pct Female	-7.80 (17.65)	-12.91 (17.86)	-8.88 (17.93)
Pct Industry	-28.35 (18.87)	-33.47* (19.04)	-36.64* (19.05)
Pct Pop 60+	82.99** (35.88)	99.69*** (37.66)	103.71*** (37.67)
Pct Pop 40-59	21.14 (17.67)	24.54 (17.67)	27.01 (17.65)
Pct Pop 20-39	78.63** (39.50)	83.98** (39.54)	88.58** (39.49)
Major. district		19.13 (12.43)	24.38* (12.57)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-8.23 (7.90)	-9.09 (7.89)
Dist. Magnitude		1.42 (15.93)	1.75 (16.77)
Re-election		6.69 (5.77)	5.75 (5.80)
Δ Elect. Syst			-30.03*** (11.20)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-9.45 (21.74)
Divided Leg			-95.55 (76.19)
Observations	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.167	0.166	0.165
F_eff	65.1/37.4	64.2/37.4	64.0/37.4

Table 24: IV Second Stage: Trade and Ideology, Economic Dimension (Department-level)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	-0.53 (0.57)	-0.54 (0.57)	-0.58 (0.57)
Δ IPW	0.88 (0.71)	0.82 (0.71)	0.86 (0.71)
Majoritarian	-7.39** (2.93)	-8.25*** (2.98)	-7.04** (3.07)
Right controls district	5.09*** (1.85)	5.13*** (1.86)	4.79** (1.87)
Pct Immigrants	-9.26 (8.42)	-10.08 (8.44)	-10.17 (8.43)
Total pop, log	-44.68 (35.94)	-37.98 (36.39)	-34.01 (36.47)
Pct Female	-4.72 (4.88)	-5.04 (4.88)	-3.88 (4.90)
Pct Industry	-17.72*** (4.25)	-17.47*** (4.26)	-17.85*** (4.25)
Pct Pop 60+	33.65*** (9.54)	34.29*** (9.59)	35.23*** (9.59)
Pct Pop 40-59	3.22 (3.57)	2.91 (3.58)	3.30 (3.58)
Pct Pop 20-39	-3.12 (9.40)	-3.32 (9.41)	-2.79 (9.40)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.87 (2.27)	-1.77 (2.30)
Dist. Magnitude		-4.41 (3.09)	-3.33 (3.18)
Re-election		-0.29 (0.98)	-0.49 (0.99)
Δ Elect. Syst			-3.99* (2.06)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-6.00 (4.10)
Divided Leg			-52.12*** (16.51)
Observations	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.303	0.301	0.302
F_eff	1413/19.9	1406/19.9	1416.7/19.9

Table 25: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade and Majoritarianism, Senator-level

Note: Dependent variable is change in ideology score, measured as 100 times the change in IRT score for relevant bills; IPW is measured in hundreds of euros. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.. F-Stat is Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values of 10 percent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	-8.10** (3.28)	-7.94** (3.28)	-6.98** (3.32)
Δ IPW	7.79* (4.03)	7.68* (4.03)	6.63 (4.07)
Majoritarian	34.60*** (13.41)	35.93*** (13.94)	38.28*** (13.88)
Right controls district	16.13* (8.38)	15.62* (8.38)	13.84 (8.43)
Pct Immigrants	-3.29 (25.90)	-2.51 (25.86)	-4.03 (25.76)
Total pop, log	196.80 (128.51)	176.60 (130.10)	192.01 (129.84)
Pct Female	-8.93 (17.38)	-9.17 (17.38)	-5.70 (17.38)
Pct Industry	-29.55 (18.57)	-29.76 (18.54)	-32.82* (18.49)
Pct Pop 60+	102.57*** (36.51)	101.68*** (36.63)	103.54*** (36.49)
Pct Pop 40-59	14.42 (16.17)	16.37 (16.23)	17.08 (16.14)
Pct Pop 20-39	72.32* (37.16)	72.64* (37.16)	73.62** (36.97)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-5.76 (7.66)	-6.52 (7.63)
Dist. Magnitude		8.59 (15.15)	10.44 (15.97)
Re-election		6.48 (5.61)	5.61 (5.62)
Δ Elect. Syst			-25.38** (11.03)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-12.65 (21.16)
Divided Leg			-145.10** (71.38)
Observations	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.212	0.210	0.215
F_eff	780.4/19.9	775/19.9	758/19.9

Table 26: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade and Majoritarianism, Department-level

Note: Dependent variable is change in ideology score, measured as 100 times the change in IRT score for relevant bills; IPW is measured in hundreds of euros. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.. F-Stat is Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values of 10 percent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Δ Econ (VM=5)	Δ Econ (VM=10)	Δ Econ (CM=15)	Δ Econ (VM=20)
Majoritarian \times Competitive \times Δ IPW	-10.89*** (2.15)	-7.95*** (1.51)	-4.10*** (1.20)	0.54 (1.06)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	0.96* (0.52)	1.18** (0.55)	1.35** (0.61)	-0.10 (0.85)
Competitive \times Δ IPW	8.92*** (1.98)	6.56*** (1.38)	3.09*** (1.05)	-0.18 (0.85)
Majoritarian \times Competitive	29.01*** (6.48)	12.65*** (4.38)	9.37** (4.09)	-2.47 (4.06)
Δ IPW	-0.41 (0.66)	-0.52 (0.66)	-0.48 (0.68)	0.20 (0.87)
Majoritarian	-13.63*** (3.20)	-12.17*** (3.37)	-13.11*** (3.58)	-7.34* (4.19)
Competitive	-21.83*** (5.55)	-6.97** (3.36)	-5.67* (3.01)	3.66 (2.98)
Right controls district	5.32*** (1.86)	4.48** (1.85)	5.25*** (1.88)	4.75** (1.86)
Pct Immigrants	-11.50 (8.39)	-12.61 (8.38)	-10.64 (8.40)	-9.83 (8.51)
Total pop, log	-28.95 (36.32)	-30.88 (36.38)	-44.27 (36.40)	-35.94 (36.91)
Pct Female	-4.04 (4.88)	-4.14 (4.88)	-3.89 (4.91)	-5.46 (4.92)
Pct Industry	-17.03*** (4.25)	-16.79*** (4.26)	-17.30*** (4.24)	-18.46*** (4.27)
Pct Pop 60+	35.06*** (9.57)	35.65*** (9.56)	34.50*** (9.55)	33.60*** (9.60)
Pct Pop 40-59	2.74 (3.55)	2.29 (3.56)	2.39 (3.56)	2.81 (3.59)
Pct Pop 20-39	-5.50 (9.39)	-3.11 (9.47)	-4.23 (9.47)	-4.24 (9.48)
Dist. Magnitude	-4.01 (3.19)	-2.54 (3.15)	-2.50 (3.19)	-1.95 (3.23)
Re-election	-0.64 (0.99)	-0.63 (0.98)	-0.57 (0.99)	-0.54 (0.99)
Δ Elect. Syst	-1.54 (2.11)	-0.24 (2.13)	-1.69 (2.11)	-3.71* (2.04)
Δ Dist. Magn.	-6.31 (4.09)	-5.51 (4.08)	-5.49 (4.10)	-5.65 (4.12)
Divided Leg	-54.30*** (16.46)	-48.91*** (16.38)	-50.14*** (16.49)	-50.26*** (16.47)
Observations	1428	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.308	0.310	0.305	0.303
F_eff	690.3/16.9	1068.6/16.9	930.3/16.9	769.3/16.9

Table 27: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade, Electoral Systems and Electoral Marginality, Economic Dimension (senator-level)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Δ Econ (VM=5)	Δ Econ (VM=10)	Δ Econ (VM=15)	Δ Econ (VM=20)
Majoritarian \times Competitive \times Δ IPW	-6.43 (9.01)	-2.07 (7.41)	-1.58 (6.46)	-2.78 (5.92)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	-2.53 (3.09)	-3.15 (3.24)	-3.23 (3.52)	-3.42 (4.60)
Competitive \times Δ IPW	-6.90 (8.32)	-5.90 (6.88)	-4.57 (5.94)	-4.21 (5.23)
Majoritarian \times Competitive	20.94 (27.23)	-5.76 (19.56)	-22.08 (18.42)	11.43 (18.83)
Δ IPW	3.92 (3.82)	4.34 (3.89)	4.97 (4.01)	6.47 (4.85)
Majoritarian	31.04** (14.44)	37.75** (15.42)	46.28*** (16.52)	28.46 (18.80)
Competitive	6.18 (23.42)	18.49 (16.90)	19.14 (14.98)	-7.88 (15.31)
Right controls district	12.03 (8.31)	12.79 (8.37)	12.02 (8.40)	12.54 (8.39)
Pct Immigrants	-9.76 (25.34)	-8.36 (25.76)	-5.23 (25.55)	-9.21 (25.88)
Total pop, log	204.08 (127.45)	213.66* (128.28)	189.38 (128.79)	206.51 (129.67)
Pct Female	-5.08 (17.12)	-3.10 (17.29)	-2.53 (17.28)	-0.72 (17.31)
Pct Industry	-35.02* (18.29)	-36.42** (18.44)	-35.37* (18.32)	-32.03* (18.36)
Pct Pop 60+	108.09*** (35.72)	108.70*** (36.03)	105.00*** (36.17)	109.41*** (36.20)
Pct Pop 40-59	14.97 (15.87)	14.95 (16.05)	16.01 (15.96)	18.50 (15.97)
Pct Pop 20-39	72.02** (36.37)	77.68** (36.76)	85.90** (36.85)	80.79** (37.08)
Dist. Magnitude	13.13 (15.79)	14.04 (15.88)	14.22 (15.94)	9.06 (16.12)
Re-election	3.74 (5.54)	4.29 (5.57)	4.53 (5.57)	5.76 (5.58)
Δ Elect. Syst	-29.40*** (11.04)	-29.80*** (11.32)	-29.18*** (11.27)	-27.37** (10.94)
Δ Dist. Magn.	-11.98 (20.81)	-12.91 (20.97)	-13.22 (20.97)	-12.35 (21.05)
Divided Leg	-133.41* (70.25)	-128.06* (70.65)	-110.64 (71.63)	-136.76* (71.11)
Observations	570	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.237	0.224	0.225	0.226
F_eff	338.4/16.9	436.2/16.9	450.8/16.9	394.8/16.9

Table 28: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade, Electoral Systems and Electoral Marginality, Economic Dimension (dept-level)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-2.09 (1.46)	-2.36 (1.46)	-2.83* (1.46)
Δ IPW	0.90 (0.55)	0.90 (0.55)	1.02* (0.55)
Far Left Share	24.07*** (7.26)	24.70*** (7.25)	26.86*** (7.25)
Total Left Vote	-32.57** (13.07)	-36.87*** (13.19)	-41.46*** (13.22)
Pct Immigrants	-9.62 (8.41)	-9.51 (8.41)	-9.65 (8.39)
Total pop, log	-8.75 (34.47)	-29.19 (35.54)	-26.96 (35.60)
Pct Female	-6.04 (4.83)	-3.70 (4.86)	-2.26 (4.87)
Pct Industry	-20.21*** (4.29)	-17.80*** (4.31)	-18.30*** (4.30)
Pct Pop 60+	42.94*** (9.24)	35.77*** (9.52)	36.75*** (9.52)
Pct Pop 40-59	5.16 (3.52)	3.98 (3.52)	4.37 (3.51)
Pct Pop 20-39	0.63 (9.43)	-0.92 (9.40)	-0.34 (9.38)
Major. district		-9.71*** (2.49)	-8.65*** (2.58)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.07 (2.26)	-1.02 (2.29)
Dist. Magnitude		-4.03 (3.08)	-2.40 (3.17)
Re-election		0.31 (0.99)	0.10 (0.99)
Δ Elect. Syst			-4.53** (2.06)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-8.93** (4.07)
Divided Leg			-54.00*** (16.28)
Observations	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.300	0.305	0.307
F_eff	1854.5/16.4	1861.0/16.4	1864.4/16.4

Table 29: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-0.80 (0.57)	-0.89 (0.57)	-1.03* (0.57)
Δ IPW	0.28 (0.21)	0.28 (0.21)	0.31 (0.21)
Far Left Share	8.14*** (2.82)	8.31*** (2.81)	8.89*** (2.82)
Total Left Vote	-4.37 (5.08)	-5.61 (5.12)	-6.86 (5.15)
Pct Immigrants	0.54 (3.27)	0.53 (3.26)	0.46 (3.26)
Total pop, log	19.91 (13.39)	11.29 (13.81)	12.29 (13.85)
Pct Female	-2.02 (1.87)	-1.05 (1.89)	-0.63 (1.89)
Pct Industry	-9.68*** (1.66)	-8.72*** (1.67)	-8.86*** (1.67)
Pct Pop 60+	16.24*** (3.59)	13.06*** (3.69)	13.40*** (3.70)
Pct Pop 40-59	2.87** (1.37)	2.36* (1.37)	2.48* (1.37)
Pct Pop 20-39	2.96 (3.67)	2.27 (3.65)	2.40 (3.65)
Major. district		-3.97*** (0.97)	-3.60*** (1.00)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.18 (0.88)	-0.15 (0.89)
Dist. Magnitude		-1.52 (1.20)	-1.12 (1.23)
Re-election		-0.12 (0.39)	-0.18 (0.39)
Δ Elect. Syst			-1.45* (0.80)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-2.21 (1.58)
Divided Leg			-18.81*** (6.33)
Observations	1430	1430	1430
Adjusted R^2	0.375	0.379	0.380
F_eff	1858.9/16.4	1865.8/16.4	1869.3/16.4

Table 30: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	10.12*** (3.18)	10.07*** (3.18)	10.45*** (3.21)
Δ IPW	0.29 (0.45)	0.22 (0.45)	0.19 (0.45)
Far Right Share	-8.36 (6.95)	-9.95 (6.96)	-11.57* (7.02)
Total Right vote	56.75*** (6.96)	54.56*** (7.01)	52.77*** (7.10)
Pct Immigrants	-6.15 (8.26)	-6.71 (8.27)	-7.12 (8.26)
Total pop, log	-20.49 (33.77)	-31.62 (34.94)	-29.32 (35.05)
Pct Female	-7.74 (4.73)	-6.29 (4.77)	-5.48 (4.78)
Pct Industry	-14.69*** (4.19)	-13.19*** (4.21)	-13.62*** (4.21)
Pct Pop 60+	37.19*** (9.06)	32.88*** (9.33)	33.72*** (9.34)
Pct Pop 40-59	4.96 (3.44)	4.04 (3.46)	4.27 (3.45)
Pct Pop 20-39	-3.33 (9.17)	-4.20 (9.17)	-4.00 (9.16)
Major. district		-6.97*** (2.46)	-6.08** (2.55)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.25 (2.21)	-1.05 (2.25)
Dist. Magnitude		-4.64 (3.02)	-4.06 (3.11)
Re-election		0.41 (0.97)	0.27 (0.97)
Δ Elect. Syst			-3.43* (2.04)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-3.50 (4.07)
Divided Leg			-62.04*** (16.07)
Observations	1426	1426	1426
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.331	0.331
F_eff	3650.1/16.4	3612.1/16.4	3553.8/16.4

Table 31: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	2.78** (1.24)	2.67** (1.24)	2.75** (1.25)
Δ IPW	0.09 (0.18)	0.06 (0.18)	0.05 (0.18)
Far Right Share	-5.10* (2.73)	-5.75** (2.73)	-6.33** (2.75)
Total Right vote	14.35*** (2.74)	13.15*** (2.75)	12.60*** (2.79)
Pct Immigrants	1.39 (3.24)	1.17 (3.24)	0.98 (3.24)
Total pop, log	15.14 (13.27)	8.35 (13.72)	9.56 (13.76)
Pct Female	-2.63 (1.85)	-1.85 (1.87)	-1.57 (1.87)
Pct Industry	-7.99*** (1.64)	-7.30*** (1.65)	-7.45*** (1.65)
Pct Pop 60+	15.13*** (3.56)	12.67*** (3.65)	13.04*** (3.66)
Pct Pop 40-59	2.84** (1.35)	2.41* (1.36)	2.49* (1.35)
Pct Pop 20-39	1.47 (3.61)	1.05 (3.60)	1.08 (3.60)
Major. district		-3.41*** (0.97)	-3.04*** (1.00)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.06 (0.87)	-0.35 (0.88)
Dist. Magnitude		-1.71 (1.19)	-1.60 (1.22)
Re-election		-0.04 (0.38)	-0.08 (0.38)
Δ Elect. Syst			-1.33* (0.80)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-0.76 (1.60)
Divided Leg			-21.49*** (6.31)
Observations	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.388	0.391	0.390
F_eff	3684.7/16.4	3647.7/16.4	3592.5/16.4

Table 32: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Right (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-0.85 (1.32)	-1.56 (1.28)	-1.64 (1.28)
Δ IPW	-0.05 (0.55)	-0.07 (0.53)	-0.02 (0.53)
Far Left Share	6.59 (6.59)	9.81 (6.45)	10.54 (6.46)
Total Left Vote	-33.55*** (12.03)	-43.45*** (11.86)	-44.52*** (11.89)
Pct Immigrants	15.25* (8.85)	17.78** (8.67)	18.44** (8.68)
Total pop, log	-39.55 (32.43)	-44.49 (32.61)	-49.26 (32.80)
Pct Female	-11.18** (4.39)	-8.56** (4.30)	-8.56** (4.33)
Pct Industry	-17.53*** (3.83)	-12.65*** (3.81)	-12.82*** (3.82)
Pct Pop 60+	15.14* (8.58)	11.27 (8.68)	10.66 (8.70)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.29 (3.52)	-1.25 (3.44)	-1.16 (3.44)
Pct Pop 20-39	-1.14 (9.51)	-3.91 (9.28)	-3.60 (9.27)
Major. district		-11.29*** (2.26)	-11.73*** (2.34)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		1.15 (2.07)	1.32 (2.11)
Dist. Magnitude		-10.49*** (2.85)	-9.53*** (2.95)
Re-election		3.73*** (0.92)	3.63*** (0.93)
Δ Elect. Syst			1.00 (1.87)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-5.11 (4.02)
Divided Leg			8.96 (14.90)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.423	0.450	0.449
F_eff	1262.0/16.4	1274.4/16.4	1287.9/16.4

Table 33: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-5.19*** (1.94)	-4.75*** (1.84)	-5.28*** (1.83)
Δ IPW	2.23*** (0.61)	1.67*** (0.57)	1.74*** (0.58)
Far Left Share	26.04** (12.27)	23.26** (11.57)	26.50** (11.60)
Total Left Vote	-54.93*** (20.78)	-12.33 (20.49)	-9.48 (20.80)
Pct Immigrants	-36.40*** (8.88)	-35.24*** (8.42)	-35.06*** (8.38)
Total pop, log	-114.13** (45.40)	-100.63** (45.12)	-87.11* (45.15)
Pct Female	-0.36 (6.55)	0.04 (6.44)	0.53 (6.42)
Pct Industry	8.35 (6.85)	9.00 (6.45)	7.67 (6.43)
Pct Pop 60+	-5.69 (12.43)	-7.62 (12.10)	-6.01 (12.03)
Pct Pop 40-59	-10.76** (4.37)	-10.33** (4.21)	-9.95** (4.19)
Pct Pop 20-39	-17.85 (11.25)	-14.30 (10.59)	-15.18 (10.53)
Major. district		4.39 (3.11)	6.90** (3.28)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		5.14* (2.75)	4.64* (2.77)
Dist. Magnitude		4.31 (3.51)	3.57 (3.59)
Re-election		-8.15*** (1.11)	-8.28*** (1.10)
Δ Elect. Syst			-6.36** (2.54)
Δ Dist. Magn.			1.47 (4.01)
Divided Leg			-17.00 (21.27)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.626	0.666	0.667
F_eff	513.6/16.4	507.8/16.4	498.7/16.4

Table 34: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Party Response to Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	9.45*** (2.80)	9.95*** (2.74)	10.13*** (2.76)
Δ IPW	-0.35 (0.45)	-0.52 (0.44)	-0.49 (0.44)
Far Right Share	-2.92 (6.71)	-7.05 (6.59)	-6.40 (6.63)
Total Right Vote	38.46*** (6.26)	35.81*** (6.21)	35.86*** (6.29)
Pct Immigrants	18.23** (8.70)	19.11** (8.55)	19.81** (8.56)
Total pop, log	-45.74 (31.74)	-45.75 (32.05)	-50.02 (32.24)
Pct Female	-11.86*** (4.29)	-10.00** (4.22)	-10.43** (4.25)
Pct Industry	-14.25*** (3.75)	-10.64*** (3.73)	-10.61*** (3.74)
Pct Pop 60+	10.89 (8.40)	8.49 (8.52)	7.55 (8.55)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.73 (3.45)	-0.82 (3.39)	-0.91 (3.39)
Pct Pop 20-39	-0.88 (9.25)	-3.48 (9.08)	-3.49 (9.07)
Major. district		-8.82*** (2.26)	-9.51*** (2.34)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		1.15 (2.03)	1.59 (2.07)
Dist. Magnitude		-9.75*** (2.81)	-9.30*** (2.91)
Re-election		3.66*** (0.90)	3.64*** (0.91)
Δ Elect. Syst			2.00 (1.86)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-2.35 (4.05)
Divided Leg			3.42 (14.79)
Observations	949	949	949
Adjusted R^2	0.444	0.466	0.465
F_eff	3499.7/16.4	3502.5/16.4	3433.9/16.4

Table 35: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	0.93 (5.39)	-1.76 (5.07)	-1.98 (5.08)
Δ IPW	1.05 (0.66)	0.73 (0.62)	0.74 (0.61)
Far Right Share	-8.00 (8.06)	-3.13 (7.54)	-6.32 (7.66)
Total Right Vote	-11.04 (15.25)	-21.72 (14.36)	-23.90 (14.65)
Pct Immigrants	-32.75*** (8.99)	-32.92*** (8.44)	-32.93*** (8.39)
Total pop, log	-104.73** (48.09)	-107.64** (46.89)	-97.61** (46.87)
Pct Female	-0.38 (6.56)	1.85 (6.36)	2.59 (6.34)
Pct Industry	9.26 (7.15)	10.63 (6.69)	9.28 (6.68)
Pct Pop 60+	-1.65 (12.52)	-6.81 (12.01)	-5.31 (11.95)
Pct Pop 40-59	-7.83* (4.39)	-9.05** (4.17)	-8.64** (4.15)
Pct Pop 20-39	-8.59 (11.54)	-8.01 (10.78)	-8.42 (10.80)
Major. district		3.81 (3.11)	5.92* (3.24)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		4.42 (2.76)	3.72 (2.78)
Dist. Magnitude		5.36 (3.53)	4.91 (3.62)
Re-election		-8.57*** (1.09)	-8.65*** (1.09)
Δ Elect. Syst			-6.02** (2.59)
Δ Dist. Magn.			1.12 (4.06)
Divided Leg			-10.85 (23.00)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.614	0.661	0.662
F_eff	509.4/16.4	495.6/16.4	486.1/16.4

Table 36: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Party Response to Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-0.26 (0.56)	-0.39 (0.56)	-0.41 (0.55)
Δ IPW	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.23)	-0.10 (0.23)
Far Left Share	0.26 (2.74)	0.39 (2.73)	0.59 (2.73)
Share of vote for right parties	6.06** (2.54)	4.93* (2.55)	4.51* (2.59)
Pct Immigrants	10.00*** (3.82)	10.23*** (3.81)	10.42*** (3.81)
Total pop, log	8.56 (14.07)	5.37 (14.41)	3.73 (14.50)
Pct Female	-3.02 (1.90)	-2.18 (1.90)	-2.17 (1.91)
Pct Industry	-9.39*** (1.67)	-8.05*** (1.69)	-8.15*** (1.69)
Pct Pop 60+	4.10 (3.70)	1.52 (3.81)	1.27 (3.82)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.19 (1.52)	-0.33 (1.52)	-0.32 (1.52)
Pct Pop 20-39	-0.18 (4.14)	-1.20 (4.12)	-1.10 (4.11)
Major. district		-3.85*** (1.01)	-4.02*** (1.04)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.66 (0.91)	0.72 (0.93)
Dist. Magnitude		-2.93** (1.26)	-2.60** (1.30)
Re-election		0.22 (0.40)	0.17 (0.41)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.35 (0.83)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-1.83 (1.80)
Divided Leg			2.75 (6.62)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.474	0.481	0.480
F_eff	1308.2/16.4	1320.1/16.4	1339.7/16.4

Table 37: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-1.66*** (0.59)	-1.75*** (0.58)	-1.95*** (0.58)
Δ IPW	0.66*** (0.19)	0.58*** (0.19)	0.59*** (0.18)
Far Left Share	7.43* (3.83)	6.97* (3.77)	8.02** (3.75)
Share of vote for right parties	-10.38** (4.53)	-12.16*** (4.49)	-11.09** (4.53)
Pct Immigrants	-8.95*** (2.74)	-9.69*** (2.71)	-9.61*** (2.68)
Total pop, log	-29.92** (14.20)	-31.05** (14.69)	-25.42* (14.61)
Pct Female	-1.56 (2.03)	-1.06 (2.08)	-1.04 (2.06)
Pct Industry	6.99*** (2.16)	7.39*** (2.13)	6.79*** (2.11)
Pct Pop 60+	2.79 (3.85)	2.10 (3.90)	2.57 (3.86)
Pct Pop 40-59	-1.15 (1.33)	-1.77 (1.33)	-1.72 (1.32)
Pct Pop 20-39	3.78 (3.51)	3.81 (3.45)	2.77 (3.44)
Major. district		0.15 (1.00)	1.28 (1.04)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		2.10** (0.89)	2.03** (0.89)
Dist. Magnitude		0.58 (1.14)	-0.06 (1.17)
Re-election		-1.37*** (0.35)	-1.37*** (0.35)
Δ Elect. Syst			-2.32*** (0.82)
Δ Dist. Magn.			2.23* (1.29)
Divided Leg			6.20 (7.18)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.666	0.675	0.680
F_eff	546.1/16.4	540.9/16.4	529.3/16.4

Table 38: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Response to Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Rt Share \times Δ IPW	2.58** (1.23)	2.57** (1.21)	2.77** (1.22)
Δ IPW	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.20)
Far Rt Share	-5.03* (2.95)	-6.33** (2.94)	-6.35** (2.96)
Total Right Vote	5.87** (2.76)	4.16 (2.78)	3.74 (2.81)
Pct Immigrants	10.11*** (3.83)	10.20*** (3.81)	10.49*** (3.82)
Total pop, log	6.58 (14.00)	2.71 (14.34)	0.76 (14.43)
Pct Female	-3.37* (1.89)	-2.57 (1.89)	-2.55 (1.90)
Pct Industry	-9.33*** (1.65)	-8.02*** (1.67)	-8.12*** (1.67)
Pct Pop 60+	3.93 (3.70)	1.48 (3.81)	1.19 (3.82)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.24 (1.52)	-0.28 (1.51)	-0.25 (1.51)
Pct Pop 20-39	-0.50 (4.09)	-1.43 (4.06)	-1.38 (4.06)
Major. district		-3.91*** (1.01)	-4.05*** (1.05)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.52 (0.91)	0.55 (0.93)
Dist. Magnitude		-2.99** (1.26)	-2.57** (1.30)
Re-election		0.24 (0.40)	0.18 (0.41)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.25 (0.83)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-2.35 (1.81)
Divided Leg			2.10 (6.62)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.475	0.482	0.481
F_eff	3538.6/16.4	3538.6/16.4	3474.1/16.4

Table 39: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Rt (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Rt Share \times Δ IPW	1.43 (1.65)	1.05 (1.64)	0.54 (1.63)
Δ IPW	0.23 (0.20)	0.16 (0.20)	0.18 (0.20)
Far Rt Share	-3.26 (2.47)	-2.36 (2.43)	-3.29 (2.46)
Total Right Vote	-12.38*** (4.67)	-13.71*** (4.64)	-13.15*** (4.71)
Pct Immigrants	-9.04*** (2.75)	-9.70*** (2.73)	-9.58*** (2.70)
Total pop, log	-32.51** (14.73)	-34.17** (15.14)	-28.60* (15.06)
Pct Female	-1.21 (2.01)	-0.48 (2.05)	-0.37 (2.04)
Pct Industry	7.48*** (2.19)	7.74*** (2.16)	7.00*** (2.15)
Pct Pop 60+	2.75 (3.84)	1.64 (3.88)	2.17 (3.84)
Pct Pop 40-59	-1.21 (1.35)	-1.84 (1.35)	-1.69 (1.33)
Pct Pop 20-39	3.95 (3.53)	3.91 (3.48)	3.19 (3.47)
Major. district		-0.11 (1.00)	0.90 (1.04)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		1.83** (0.89)	1.70* (0.89)
Dist. Magnitude		0.75 (1.14)	0.21 (1.16)
Re-election		-1.36*** (0.35)	-1.37*** (0.35)
Δ Elect. Syst			-2.17*** (0.83)
Δ Dist. Magn.			2.20* (1.31)
Divided Leg			6.43 (7.39)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.665	0.673	0.677
F_eff	509.4/16.4	495.6/16.4	486.1/16.4

Table 40: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Response to Strong Radical Rt (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

N Robustness II: Models Using Alternative Instrument

Here we report full results from the summary coefficient plots presented in the paper, but use the full set of LDC countries used in [Colantone and Stanig \(2018\)](#).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IPW (CS)	Δ IPW (CS)	Δ IPW (CS)
Instrument (CS)	0.2*** (0.02)	0.2*** (0.02)	0.2*** (0.02)
Right controls district	0.2 (0.18)	0.2 (0.18)	0.2 (0.18)
Pct Immigrants	0.1 (0.55)	0.1 (0.55)	0.1 (0.55)
Total pop, log	-1.4 (2.64)	-1.4 (2.77)	-1.5 (2.79)
Pct Female	0.2 (0.37)	0.2 (0.37)	0.2 (0.38)
Pct Industry	-0.4 (0.39)	-0.4 (0.40)	-0.3 (0.40)
Pct Pop 60+	-0.2 (0.75)	-0.3 (0.79)	-0.3 (0.79)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.3 (0.35)	0.3 (0.35)	0.3 (0.35)
Pct Pop 20-39	0.9 (0.79)	0.8 (0.79)	0.8 (0.80)
Major. district		-0.1 (0.26)	-0.1 (0.26)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.3 (0.16)	-0.3 (0.16)
Dist. Magnitude		-0.4 (0.32)	-0.4 (0.34)
Re-election		0.0 (0.12)	0.0 (0.12)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.1 (0.23)
Δ Dist. Magn.			0.1 (0.45)
Divided Leg			1.5 (1.56)
Observations	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.799	0.799	0.798
F	22.0	21.2	20.7

Table 41: IV First Stage

Note: First stage of two-stage least squares regression. Controls include: Column (1): département controlled by right party in previous session, plus demographic controls for start-of-period log population, age and gender structure, and percent of population comprised of immigrants for the département. Column (2): political controls include measures of the degree of electoral competitiveness in the district, the nature of the electoral system district magnitude, and whether a senator is facing re-election in that session. Column (3): additional political controls include dummies for change in the electoral system and whether the department experienced a seat expansion, as well as the percent of time the upper and lower chambers were divided. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Δ IPW	-0.73 (0.82)	-0.73 (0.83)	-0.84 (0.83)
Right controls district	4.71** (1.85)	5.10*** (1.86)	4.81** (1.87)
Pct Immigrants	-10.60 (8.44)	-10.95 (8.43)	-11.15 (8.42)
Total pop, log	-24.77 (34.63)	-45.06 (35.73)	-41.30 (35.82)
Pct Female	-8.13* (4.83)	-5.88 (4.86)	-4.82 (4.88)
Pct Industry	-18.97*** (4.27)	-16.77*** (4.29)	-17.06*** (4.28)
Pct Pop 60+	40.03*** (9.28)	32.34*** (9.56)	33.18*** (9.56)
Pct Pop 40-59	4.98 (3.63)	3.56 (3.62)	3.99 (3.62)
Pct Pop 20-39	0.26 (9.60)	-1.49 (9.55)	-0.85 (9.53)
Major. district		-9.99*** (2.50)	-8.87*** (2.59)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.69 (2.27)	-1.57 (2.31)
Dist. Magnitude		-5.09 (3.13)	-4.25 (3.24)
Re-election		-0.39 (0.99)	-0.59 (0.99)
Δ Elect. Syst			-4.06** (2.07)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-5.11 (4.13)
Divided Leg			-42.08** (17.20)
Observations	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.296	0.301	0.301
F_eff	294.6/37.4	288.6/37.4	288.1/37.4

Table 42: IV Second Stage: Trade and Ideology, Economic Dimension (Senator-level)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Δ IPW	-10.05* (5.43)	-10.00* (5.39)	-10.92** (5.37)
Right controls district	18.64** (8.68)	17.66** (8.66)	16.22* (8.74)
Pct Immigrants	-4.24 (26.62)	-2.06 (26.53)	-2.45 (26.51)
Total pop, log	99.18 (127.42)	134.67 (132.74)	158.55 (133.10)
Pct Female	-7.99 (17.58)	-12.87 (17.77)	-9.00 (17.84)
Pct Industry	-28.98 (18.80)	-33.93* (18.96)	-37.07* (18.96)
Pct Pop 60+	84.47** (35.79)	100.47*** (37.52)	104.67*** (37.51)
Pct Pop 40-59	18.32 (17.17)	21.70 (17.18)	23.97 (17.15)
Pct Pop 20-39	75.37* (38.98)	80.32** (38.96)	84.68** (38.88)
Major. district		18.98 (12.37)	24.14* (12.50)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-8.45 (7.88)	-9.32 (7.87)
Dist. Magnitude		3.19 (15.70)	3.27 (16.57)
Re-election		6.79 (5.74)	5.91 (5.76)
Δ Elect. Syst			-29.53*** (11.14)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-7.84 (21.62)
Divided Leg			-92.58 (76.48)
Observations	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.173	0.174	0.174
F_eff	78.5/37.4	78.8/37.4	78.9/37.4

Table 43: IV Second Stage: Trade and Ideology, Economic Dimension (Department-level)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	-0.43 (0.50)	-0.45 (0.50)	-0.48 (0.50)
Δ IPW	0.61 (0.61)	0.56 (0.62)	0.61 (0.62)
Majoritarian	-7.54*** (2.90)	-8.39*** (2.96)	-7.16** (3.05)
Right controls district	5.05*** (1.85)	5.10*** (1.86)	4.76** (1.87)
Pct Immigrants	-9.46 (8.41)	-10.28 (8.44)	-10.38 (8.43)
Total pop, log	-45.28 (35.88)	-38.40 (36.32)	-34.36 (36.41)
Pct Female	-4.92 (4.87)	-5.23 (4.87)	-4.05 (4.89)
Pct Industry	-17.52*** (4.25)	-17.27*** (4.26)	-17.66*** (4.25)
Pct Pop 60+	33.15*** (9.51)	33.81*** (9.55)	34.77*** (9.56)
Pct Pop 40-59	3.38 (3.56)	3.07 (3.58)	3.44 (3.57)
Pct Pop 20-39	-2.85 (9.38)	-3.04 (9.39)	-2.59 (9.38)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.87 (2.27)	-1.78 (2.30)
Dist. Magnitude		-4.49 (3.09)	-3.39 (3.18)
Re-election		-0.30 (0.98)	-0.51 (0.99)
Δ Elect. Syst			-4.07** (2.07)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-5.97 (4.11)
Divided Leg			-51.33*** (16.55)
Observations	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.303	0.301	0.302
F_eff	1640.9/19.9	1632.8/19.9	1655.4/19.9

Table 44: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade and Majoritarianism, Senator-level

Note: Dependent variable is change in ideology score, measured as 100 times the change in IRT score for relevant bills; IPW is measured in hundreds of euros. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.. F-Stat is Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values of 10 percent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
[1em] Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	-7.33** (2.93)	-7.16** (2.93)	-6.28** (2.96)
Δ IPW	7.27** (3.60)	7.11** (3.60)	6.21* (3.62)
Majoritarian	35.80*** (13.64)	37.01*** (14.15)	39.25*** (14.09)
Right controls district	15.97* (8.39)	15.48* (8.39)	13.69 (8.44)
Pct Immigrants	-4.62 (25.91)	-3.85 (25.87)	-5.24 (25.76)
Total pop, log	193.18 (128.51)	173.78 (130.14)	189.84 (129.89)
Pct Female	-8.90 (17.40)	-9.16 (17.40)	-5.67 (17.40)
Pct Industry	-28.82 (18.61)	-29.07 (18.58)	-32.23* (18.52)
Pct Pop 60+	99.40*** (36.49)	98.68*** (36.61)	100.92*** (36.48)
Pct Pop 40-59	14.61 (16.17)	16.49 (16.23)	17.10 (16.14)
Pct Pop 20-39	70.34* (37.12)	70.76* (37.13)	71.80* (36.92)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-5.47 (7.68)	-6.27 (7.64)
Dist. Magnitude		8.31 (15.15)	10.20 (15.96)
Re-election		6.40 (5.62)	5.54 (5.62)
Δ Elect. Syst			-25.69** (11.01)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-12.50 (21.17)
Divided Leg			-148.55** (71.66)
Observations	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.211	0.208	0.214
F_eff	825.6/19.9	821.2/19.9	808.9/19.9

Table 45: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade and Majoritarianism, Department-level

Note: Dependent variable is change in ideology score, measured as 100 times the change in IRT score for relevant bills; IPW is measured in hundreds of euros. All models estimated using 2SLS and include unit and time dummies.. F-Stat is Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values of 10 percent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Δ Econ (VM=5)	Δ Econ (VM=10)	Δ Econ (VM=15)	Δ Econ (VM=20)
Majoritarian \times Competitive \times Δ IPW	-9.70*** (1.86)	-7.15*** (1.35)	-3.95*** (1.07)	0.31 (0.96)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	0.93** (0.46)	1.12** (0.48)	1.32** (0.54)	0.05 (0.78)
Competitive \times Δ IPW	7.78*** (1.71)	5.79*** (1.23)	3.00*** (0.94)	-0.08 (0.76)
Majoritarian \times Competitive	31.17*** (6.69)	14.54*** (4.58)	11.06*** (4.27)	-2.03 (4.24)
Δ IPW	-0.48 (0.58)	-0.57 (0.59)	-0.57 (0.60)	0.00 (0.80)
Majoritarian	-13.94*** (3.20)	-12.45*** (3.37)	-13.71*** (3.60)	-7.78* (4.29)
Competitive	-23.54*** (5.79)	-8.46** (3.58)	-7.13** (3.20)	3.48 (3.15)
Right controls district	5.32*** (1.86)	4.56** (1.85)	5.38*** (1.88)	4.74** (1.86)
Pct Immigrants	-11.56 (8.38)	-13.09 (8.37)	-10.72 (8.39)	-10.00 (8.50)
Total pop, log	-30.35 (36.22)	-30.56 (36.32)	-43.90 (36.34)	-36.12 (36.83)
Pct Female	-3.79 (4.87)	-3.81 (4.87)	-3.81 (4.89)	-5.55 (4.92)
Pct Industry	-17.06*** (4.25)	-16.86*** (4.26)	-17.32*** (4.24)	-18.40*** (4.27)
Pct Pop 60+	35.08*** (9.54)	36.38*** (9.54)	35.06*** (9.52)	33.67*** (9.57)
Pct Pop 40-59	2.73 (3.54)	2.46 (3.55)	2.65 (3.56)	2.90 (3.58)
Pct Pop 20-39	-5.06 (9.37)	-1.98 (9.45)	-3.91 (9.45)	-3.87 (9.47)
Dist. Magnitude	-4.25 (3.19)	-2.70 (3.15)	-2.70 (3.19)	-2.03 (3.23)
Re-election	-0.61 (0.99)	-0.59 (0.98)	-0.55 (0.99)	-0.57 (0.99)
Δ Elect. Syst	-1.53 (2.10)	-0.28 (2.13)	-1.54 (2.11)	-3.69* (2.04)
Δ Dist. Magn.	-6.16 (4.08)	-5.40 (4.08)	-5.36 (4.10)	-5.58 (4.12)
Divided Leg	-53.07*** (16.48)	-47.84*** (16.41)	-50.87*** (16.54)	-49.38*** (16.51)
Observations	1428	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.309	0.311	0.306	0.302
F_eff	802.2/16.9	1094.8/16.9	1032.6/16.9	835.5/16.9

Table 46: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade, Electoral Systems and Electoral Marginality, Economic Dimension (senator-level)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Δ Econ (VM=5)	Δ Econ (VM=10)	Δ Econ (VM=15)	Δ Econ (VM=20)
Majoritarian \times Competitive \times Δ IPW	-6.36 (8.03)	-2.71 (6.75)	-1.41 (5.87)	-2.88 (5.35)
Majoritarian \times Δ IPW	-1.84 (2.79)	-2.35 (2.93)	-2.55 (3.19)	-2.51 (4.24)
Competitive \times Δ IPW	-5.58 (7.34)	-4.26 (6.22)	-4.07 (5.37)	-3.42 (4.70)
Majoritarian \times Competitive	21.34 (28.63)	-4.63 (20.83)	-22.81 (19.58)	11.49 (19.84)
Δ IPW	3.40 (3.43)	3.70 (3.49)	4.43 (3.61)	5.57 (4.46)
Majoritarian	30.39** (14.66)	36.75** (15.65)	46.14*** (16.85)	28.27 (19.38)
Competitive	6.87 (24.72)	17.94 (18.09)	20.39 (16.13)	-7.19 (16.30)
Right controls district	12.05 (8.34)	12.88 (8.40)	11.94 (8.43)	12.61 (8.40)
Pct Immigrants	-11.18 (25.38)	-9.44 (25.80)	-6.32 (25.56)	-10.20 (25.90)
Total pop, log	197.53 (127.63)	207.85 (128.46)	184.34 (128.83)	198.94 (129.64)
Pct Female	-5.28 (17.15)	-3.78 (17.31)	-2.93 (17.29)	-0.91 (17.34)
Pct Industry	-34.35* (18.34)	-35.43* (18.48)	-34.93* (18.35)	-31.19* (18.40)
Pct Pop 60+	106.38*** (35.77)	106.37*** (36.08)	102.60*** (36.18)	106.51*** (36.22)
Pct Pop 40-59	14.68 (15.89)	14.50 (16.06)	15.46 (15.97)	17.88 (15.97)
Pct Pop 20-39	70.29* (36.39)	75.23** (36.78)	83.79** (36.84)	78.24** (37.07)
Dist. Magnitude	12.68 (15.81)	13.59 (15.89)	14.00 (15.94)	8.92 (16.13)
Re-election	3.83 (5.55)	4.40 (5.59)	4.62 (5.58)	5.75 (5.59)
Δ Elect. Syst	-29.34*** (11.04)	-29.63*** (11.32)	-29.56*** (11.25)	-27.47** (10.90)
Δ Dist. Magn.	-11.54 (20.86)	-12.17 (21.01)	-12.76 (21.01)	-11.50 (21.06)
Divided Leg	-134.05* (70.61)	-129.27* (71.06)	-111.28 (72.01)	-137.09* (71.53)
Observations	570	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.233	0.221	0.224	0.224
F_eff	343.7/16.9	416.0/16.9	450.9/16.9	413.3/16.9

Table 47: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Trade, Electoral Systems and Electoral Marginality, Economic Dimension (dept-level)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-2.02 (1.32)	-2.31* (1.31)	-2.75** (1.31)
Δ IPW	0.77 (0.52)	0.78 (0.52)	0.92* (0.52)
Far Left Share	24.76*** (7.36)	25.54*** (7.35)	27.77*** (7.34)
Total Left Vote	-32.78** (13.09)	-37.20*** (13.21)	-41.83*** (13.24)
Pct Immigrants	-9.72 (8.42)	-9.62 (8.41)	-9.78 (8.39)
Total pop, log	-9.36 (34.49)	-30.03 (35.55)	-27.79 (35.60)
Pct Female	-6.09 (4.83)	-3.71 (4.86)	-2.26 (4.87)
Pct Industry	-20.12*** (4.29)	-17.70*** (4.31)	-18.21*** (4.30)
Pct Pop 60+	42.88*** (9.25)	35.66*** (9.52)	36.70*** (9.52)
Pct Pop 40-59	5.25 (3.51)	4.03 (3.52)	4.37 (3.51)
Pct Pop 20-39	0.95 (9.42)	-0.65 (9.39)	-0.18 (9.37)
Major. district		-9.80*** (2.49)	-8.71*** (2.58)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.08 (2.26)	-1.02 (2.29)
Dist. Magnitude		-4.14 (3.08)	-2.54 (3.18)
Re-election		0.29 (0.99)	0.08 (0.99)
Δ Elect. Syst			-4.59** (2.06)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-8.66** (4.08)
Divided Leg			-53.26*** (16.32)
Observations	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.300	0.304	0.307
F_eff	2038.6/16.4	2027.2/16.4	2057.8/16.4

Table 48: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-0.72 (0.51)	-0.82 (0.51)	-0.95* (0.51)
Δ IPW	0.23 (0.20)	0.23 (0.20)	0.26 (0.20)
Far Left Share	8.26*** (2.86)	8.49*** (2.85)	9.09*** (2.85)
Total Left Vote	-4.34 (5.09)	-5.62 (5.13)	-6.87 (5.15)
Pct Immigrants	0.52 (3.27)	0.50 (3.26)	0.43 (3.26)
Total pop, log	19.65 (13.40)	10.93 (13.82)	11.93 (13.86)
Pct Female	-2.03 (1.87)	-1.05 (1.88)	-0.63 (1.89)
Pct Industry	-9.64*** (1.66)	-8.68*** (1.67)	-8.83*** (1.67)
Pct Pop 60+	16.21*** (3.59)	13.02*** (3.69)	13.38*** (3.70)
Pct Pop 40-59	2.89** (1.36)	2.37* (1.36)	2.47* (1.36)
Pct Pop 20-39	3.06 (3.66)	2.36 (3.65)	2.45 (3.65)
Major. district		-4.00*** (0.97)	-3.62*** (1.00)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.18 (0.88)	-0.16 (0.89)
Dist. Magnitude		-1.56 (1.20)	-1.18 (1.24)
Re-election		-0.13 (0.39)	-0.18 (0.39)
Δ Elect. Syst			-1.46* (0.80)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-2.10 (1.59)
Divided Leg			-18.50*** (6.35)
Observations	1430	1430	1430
Adjusted R^2	0.375	0.379	0.379
F_eff	2043.3/16.4	2032.1/16.4	2062.9/16.4

Table 49: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	8.69*** (2.85)	8.62*** (2.85)	8.95*** (2.88)
Δ IPW	0.19 (0.42)	0.13 (0.42)	0.12 (0.42)
Far Right Share	-8.88 (7.15)	-10.45 (7.16)	-12.13* (7.23)
Total Right vote	56.42*** (6.97)	54.19*** (7.02)	52.32*** (7.10)
Pct Immigrants	-6.08 (8.27)	-6.67 (8.27)	-7.08 (8.27)
Total pop, log	-18.96 (33.79)	-30.23 (34.96)	-27.90 (35.06)
Pct Female	-8.01* (4.73)	-6.53 (4.77)	-5.69 (4.79)
Pct Industry	-14.62*** (4.19)	-13.11*** (4.20)	-13.56*** (4.21)
Pct Pop 60+	37.33*** (9.06)	32.96*** (9.33)	33.84*** (9.35)
Pct Pop 40-59	5.33 (3.44)	4.38 (3.46)	4.62 (3.45)
Pct Pop 20-39	-2.52 (9.17)	-3.42 (9.16)	-3.24 (9.15)
Major. district		-7.07*** (2.47)	-6.15** (2.55)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.26 (2.21)	-1.08 (2.25)
Dist. Magnitude		-4.75 (3.03)	-4.11 (3.12)
Re-election		0.38 (0.97)	0.24 (0.97)
Δ Elect. Syst			-3.52* (2.05)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-3.72 (4.09)
Divided Leg			-61.86*** (16.13)
Observations	1426	1426	1426
Adjusted R^2	0.329	0.330	0.330
F_eff	3063.0/16.4	3029.6/16.4	2981.4/16.4

Table 50: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	2.24** (1.11)	2.14* (1.11)	2.20** (1.12)
Δ IPW	0.06 (0.17)	0.03 (0.17)	0.03 (0.17)
Far Right Share	-5.04* (2.80)	-5.66** (2.80)	-6.25** (2.83)
Total Right vote	14.23*** (2.74)	13.01*** (2.75)	12.45*** (2.79)
Pct Immigrants	1.39 (3.25)	1.16 (3.24)	0.97 (3.24)
Total pop, log	15.65 (13.27)	8.78 (13.72)	10.00 (13.77)
Pct Female	-2.69 (1.86)	-1.90 (1.87)	-1.61 (1.88)
Pct Industry	-7.97*** (1.64)	-7.28*** (1.65)	-7.44*** (1.65)
Pct Pop 60+	15.18*** (3.56)	12.69*** (3.66)	13.07*** (3.66)
Pct Pop 40-59	2.95** (1.35)	2.51* (1.35)	2.59* (1.35)
Pct Pop 20-39	1.73 (3.60)	1.29 (3.60)	1.32 (3.59)
Major. district		-3.44*** (0.97)	-3.06*** (1.00)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		-0.06 (0.87)	-0.35 (0.88)
Dist. Magnitude		-1.74 (1.19)	-1.62 (1.22)
Re-election		-0.05 (0.38)	-0.09 (0.38)
Δ Elect. Syst			-1.35* (0.80)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-0.78 (1.61)
Divided Leg			-21.36*** (6.33)
Observations	1428	1428	1428
Adjusted R^2	0.387	0.390	0.390
F_eff	3124.2/16.4	3092.2/16.4	3046.6/16.4

Table 51: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Strong Radical Right (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-1.29 (1.21)	-1.98* (1.17)	-2.02* (1.17)
Δ IPW	0.18 (0.51)	0.18 (0.50)	0.22 (0.50)
Far Left Share	8.12 (6.70)	11.56* (6.56)	12.21* (6.56)
Total Left Vote	-34.88*** (12.06)	-44.96*** (11.89)	-45.93*** (11.92)
Pct Immigrants	15.06* (8.86)	17.61** (8.68)	18.23** (8.69)
Total pop, log	-39.84 (32.45)	-45.27 (32.62)	-49.83 (32.81)
Pct Female	-10.88** (4.38)	-8.20* (4.30)	-8.21* (4.33)
Pct Industry	-17.82*** (3.82)	-12.98*** (3.81)	-13.13*** (3.81)
Pct Pop 60+	15.25* (8.58)	11.34 (8.69)	10.75 (8.71)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.07 (3.50)	-1.54 (3.43)	-1.46 (3.43)
Pct Pop 20-39	-1.68 (9.49)	-4.55 (9.26)	-4.28 (9.26)
Major. district		-11.31*** (2.26)	-11.74*** (2.34)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		1.19 (2.07)	1.35 (2.11)
Dist. Magnitude		-10.47*** (2.85)	-9.55*** (2.95)
Re-election		3.74*** (0.92)	3.65*** (0.93)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.96 (1.87)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-4.85 (4.03)
Divided Leg			8.33 (14.95)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.422	0.450	0.449
F_eff	1310.7/16.4	1311.7/16.4	1342.1/16.4

Table 52: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-4.84*** (1.66)	-4.23*** (1.57)	-4.71*** (1.56)
Δ IPW	2.05*** (0.57)	1.43*** (0.54)	1.50*** (0.54)
Far Left Share	27.93** (12.41)	24.48** (11.71)	27.81** (11.72)
Total Left Vote	-56.08*** (20.85)	-12.57 (20.59)	-9.27 (20.89)
Pct Immigrants	-36.76*** (8.89)	-35.73*** (8.44)	-35.45*** (8.40)
Total pop, log	-116.44** (45.60)	-103.89** (45.29)	-90.27** (45.30)
Pct Female	-0.15 (6.55)	0.50 (6.44)	0.97 (6.43)
Pct Industry	8.66 (6.87)	9.25 (6.47)	7.92 (6.44)
Pct Pop 60+	-6.47 (12.43)	-8.45 (12.10)	-6.72 (12.03)
Pct Pop 40-59	-10.84** (4.39)	-10.47** (4.23)	-10.08** (4.20)
Pct Pop 20-39	-17.90 (11.28)	-14.22 (10.62)	-15.16 (10.56)
Major. district		4.17 (3.12)	6.75** (3.29)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		5.23* (2.76)	4.77* (2.78)
Dist. Magnitude		4.32 (3.51)	3.48 (3.60)
Re-election		-8.20*** (1.11)	-8.33*** (1.11)
Δ Elect. Syst			-6.40** (2.54)
Δ Dist. Magn.			1.98 (4.02)
Divided Leg			-15.55 (21.37)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.624	0.664	0.666
F_eff	691.9/16.4	676.8/16.4	675.0/16.4

Table 53: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Party Response to Strong Radical Left (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	7.71*** (2.49)	8.09*** (2.43)	8.28*** (2.46)
Δ IPW	-0.22 (0.42)	-0.38 (0.41)	-0.35 (0.41)
Far Right Share	-2.96 (6.90)	-7.08 (6.78)	-6.48 (6.83)
Total Right Vote	38.08*** (6.26)	35.36*** (6.21)	35.32*** (6.28)
Pct Immigrants	18.16** (8.72)	19.06** (8.56)	19.80** (8.57)
Total pop, log	-44.96 (31.78)	-45.20 (32.09)	-49.66 (32.27)
Pct Female	-11.91*** (4.29)	-10.02** (4.22)	-10.45** (4.25)
Pct Industry	-14.36*** (3.75)	-10.75*** (3.73)	-10.73*** (3.74)
Pct Pop 60+	11.33 (8.41)	8.89 (8.53)	7.93 (8.56)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.79 (3.44)	-0.77 (3.38)	-0.84 (3.39)
Pct Pop 20-39	-0.65 (9.24)	-3.24 (9.06)	-3.20 (9.05)
Major. district		-8.88*** (2.27)	-9.58*** (2.34)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		1.15 (2.03)	1.58 (2.08)
Dist. Magnitude		-9.79*** (2.82)	-9.27*** (2.91)
Re-election		3.65*** (0.90)	3.62*** (0.91)
Δ Elect. Syst			1.99 (1.86)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-2.72 (4.08)
Divided Leg			3.13 (14.85)
Observations	949	949	949
Adjusted R^2	0.443	0.465	0.464
F_eff	2545.9/16.4	2535.2/16.4	2502.9/16.4

Table 54: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)	Δ IRT (Econ)
Far Right Share \times Δ IPW	3.26 (4.99)	1.00 (4.68)	0.77 (4.67)
Δ IPW	0.65 (0.61)	0.29 (0.57)	0.31 (0.56)
Far Right Share	-10.25 (8.42)	-5.26 (7.87)	-8.44 (7.98)
Total Right Vote	-13.38 (15.26)	-24.29* (14.38)	-26.57* (14.65)
Pct Immigrants	-33.45*** (8.99)	-33.75*** (8.44)	-33.74*** (8.39)
Total pop, log	-110.54** (48.01)	-114.66** (46.90)	-104.48** (46.84)
Pct Female	-0.48 (6.57)	1.81 (6.38)	2.58 (6.36)
Pct Industry	9.96 (7.14)	11.47* (6.68)	10.11 (6.66)
Pct Pop 60+	-3.30 (12.48)	-8.11 (11.98)	-6.54 (11.92)
Pct Pop 40-59	-8.04* (4.39)	-9.32** (4.18)	-8.90** (4.15)
Pct Pop 20-39	-8.83 (11.56)	-8.19 (10.80)	-8.54 (10.82)
Major. district		3.91 (3.11)	6.02* (3.25)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		4.57* (2.77)	3.83 (2.79)
Dist. Magnitude		5.29 (3.54)	4.89 (3.63)
Re-election		-8.55*** (1.09)	-8.62*** (1.09)
Δ Elect. Syst			-6.11** (2.60)
Δ Dist. Magn.			0.90 (4.06)
Divided Leg			-6.35 (23.01)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.613	0.660	0.661
F_eff	474.3/16.4	467.1/16.4	467.2/16.4

Table 55: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Party Response to Strong Radical Right (Econ)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-0.36 (0.51)	-0.51 (0.51)	-0.51 (0.51)
Δ IPW	-0.01 (0.22)	-0.05 (0.22)	-0.04 (0.22)
Far Left Share	0.62 (2.78)	0.81 (2.77)	0.98 (2.77)
Share of vote for right parties	6.06** (2.54)	4.92* (2.55)	4.53* (2.59)
Pct Immigrants	9.95*** (3.82)	10.18*** (3.81)	10.36*** (3.81)
Total pop, log	8.42 (14.08)	5.15 (14.41)	3.56 (14.50)
Pct Female	-2.93 (1.90)	-2.06 (1.90)	-2.06 (1.91)
Pct Industry	-9.48*** (1.67)	-8.15*** (1.68)	-8.24*** (1.69)
Pct Pop 60+	4.10 (3.70)	1.50 (3.81)	1.26 (3.82)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.14 (1.52)	-0.41 (1.51)	-0.40 (1.51)
Pct Pop 20-39	-0.30 (4.13)	-1.35 (4.11)	-1.26 (4.10)
Major. district		-3.85*** (1.01)	-4.02*** (1.04)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.68 (0.91)	0.74 (0.93)
Dist. Magnitude		-2.94** (1.26)	-2.62** (1.30)
Re-election		0.22 (0.40)	0.18 (0.41)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.35 (0.83)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-1.74 (1.80)
Divided Leg			2.71 (6.65)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.474	0.481	0.479
F_eff	1365.5/16.4	1365.7/16.4	1401.7/16.4

Table 56: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Left Share \times Δ IPW	-1.42*** (0.51)	-1.46*** (0.50)	-1.64*** (0.50)
Δ IPW	0.59*** (0.18)	0.50*** (0.17)	0.52*** (0.17)
Far Left Share	7.65** (3.88)	7.10* (3.82)	8.23** (3.80)
Share of vote for right parties	-10.44** (4.54)	-12.29*** (4.51)	-11.06** (4.54)
Pct Immigrants	-9.01*** (2.75)	-9.78*** (2.72)	-9.68*** (2.69)
Total pop, log	-30.36** (14.28)	-32.06** (14.77)	-26.43* (14.69)
Pct Female	-1.45 (2.03)	-0.87 (2.08)	-0.86 (2.07)
Pct Industry	7.09*** (2.17)	7.48*** (2.13)	6.87*** (2.12)
Pct Pop 60+	2.59 (3.85)	1.86 (3.90)	2.36 (3.86)
Pct Pop 40-59	-1.16 (1.33)	-1.81 (1.34)	-1.76 (1.32)
Pct Pop 20-39	3.80 (3.53)	3.86 (3.47)	2.76 (3.46)
Major. district		0.06 (1.00)	1.21 (1.04)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		2.11** (0.89)	2.05** (0.89)
Dist. Magnitude		0.60 (1.15)	-0.07 (1.17)
Re-election		-1.38*** (0.35)	-1.38*** (0.35)
Δ Elect. Syst			-2.31*** (0.82)
Δ Dist. Magn.			2.37* (1.29)
Divided Leg			6.48 (7.22)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.663	0.672	0.677
F_eff	751.4/16.4	739.7/16.4	730.3/16.4

Table 57: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Response to Strong Radical Left (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Rt Share \times Δ IPW	2.04* (1.09)	2.00* (1.07)	2.18** (1.09)
Δ IPW	-0.13 (0.18)	-0.20 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.18)
Far Rt Share	-4.93 (3.03)	-6.20** (3.02)	-6.24** (3.04)
Total Right Vote	5.75** (2.76)	4.01 (2.78)	3.58 (2.81)
Pct Immigrants	10.11*** (3.83)	10.20*** (3.82)	10.49*** (3.82)
Total pop, log	6.73 (14.01)	2.78 (14.35)	0.82 (14.43)
Pct Female	-3.37* (1.89)	-2.55 (1.89)	-2.53 (1.90)
Pct Industry	-9.35*** (1.65)	-8.05*** (1.66)	-8.16*** (1.67)
Pct Pop 60+	4.04 (3.70)	1.58 (3.81)	1.29 (3.82)
Pct Pop 40-59	0.27 (1.51)	-0.26 (1.51)	-0.23 (1.51)
Pct Pop 20-39	-0.38 (4.07)	-1.33 (4.05)	-1.28 (4.05)
Major. district		-3.93*** (1.01)	-4.07*** (1.05)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		0.53 (0.91)	0.55 (0.93)
Dist. Magnitude		-3.01** (1.26)	-2.58** (1.30)
Re-election		0.24 (0.40)	0.17 (0.41)
Δ Elect. Syst			0.26 (0.83)
Δ Dist. Magn.			-2.41 (1.83)
Divided Leg			2.18 (6.64)
Observations	951	951	951
Adjusted R^2	0.475	0.482	0.481
F_eff	2613.1/16.4	2601.1/16.4	2571.9/16.4

Table 58: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Center-Right Response to Strong Radical Rt (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)	Δ IRT (ID)
Far Rt Share \times Δ IPW	1.33 (1.53)	1.04 (1.51)	0.52 (1.50)
Δ IPW	0.19 (0.19)	0.11 (0.18)	0.14 (0.18)
Far Rt Share	-3.39 (2.58)	-2.50 (2.54)	-3.35 (2.56)
Total Right Vote	-12.58*** (4.67)	-14.01*** (4.64)	-13.40*** (4.70)
Pct Immigrants	-9.09*** (2.75)	-9.78*** (2.72)	-9.65*** (2.69)
Total pop, log	-32.24** (14.69)	-34.32** (15.12)	-28.68* (15.03)
Pct Female	-1.23 (2.01)	-0.47 (2.06)	-0.37 (2.04)
Pct Industry	7.50*** (2.18)	7.77*** (2.15)	7.03*** (2.14)
Pct Pop 60+	2.48 (3.82)	1.40 (3.86)	1.93 (3.83)
Pct Pop 40-59	-1.19 (1.34)	-1.84 (1.35)	-1.69 (1.33)
Pct Pop 20-39	3.97 (3.54)	3.94 (3.48)	3.21 (3.47)
Major. district		-0.12 (1.00)	0.90 (1.04)
Electoral marginality (dummy)		1.84** (0.89)	1.70* (0.90)
Dist. Magnitude		0.76 (1.14)	0.21 (1.16)
Re-election		-1.37*** (0.35)	-1.38*** (0.35)
Δ Elect. Syst			-2.19*** (0.83)
Δ Dist. Magn.			2.22* (1.30)
Divided Leg			6.66 (7.38)
Observations	447	447	447
Adjusted R^2	0.664	0.672	0.677
F_eff	474.3/16.4	467.1/16.4	467.2/16.4

Table 59: Trade and Radical Party Strength: Left Response to Strong Radical Rt (Socio-Cultural)

Note: Second stage of two-stage least squares regression. Statistical significance: *10% ; **5% ; ***1%

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