

# **Supplementary Material**

## **Targeted Nativism: Ethnic Diversity and Radical**

### **Right Parties in Europe**

Government and Opposition

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## **Appendix A: Illustrative Cases of Targeted Nativism in Sweden and Bulgaria**

### **Logic of Multi-Method: Why Illustrative Cases**

The cases (examination of targeted nativism in Sweden and Bulgaria) are integrated in the research design to illustrate how to identify targeted nativism in practice and how to apply theoretical framework of targeted nativism to concrete cases of successful radical right parties. In other words, relying on in-person interviews, radical right parties' documents, and their online platforms, as well as secondary literature on these two cases, I aim to understand: (1) whether radical right actors target specific groups or if their targeting is "diffused" (directed towards everyone who is not a member of ethnic majority), and (2) how nativist targeting is framed, explained, and justified. In particular, I looked for the negative portrayals of targeted minority groups that mention their ethnocultural distinctiveness, political activism, and/or cultural accommodation (as well as other possible framings of nativist othering).

### **Logic behind Case Selection**

The cases of Sweden and Bulgaria were chosen to illustrate targeted nativism of radical right parties for several reasons. The successful radical right mobilization in both cases is relatively new phenomenon: the radical right party *Ataka* entered Bulgarian national parliament in 2005, while *Sweden Democrats* got parliamentary representation in Sweden in 2010. Therefore, both cases focus on more recent radical right mobilization. Comparatively speaking, these cases are less researched, especially in the same project.

The nature of ethnic diversity and general characteristics of the two countries are very different. Sweden represents a case of the radical right mobilization against immigrants, while

Bulgarian radical right primarily targets historical minorities. Sweden is a wealthy consolidated democracy with universal welfare state, while Bulgaria is one of the poorest EU member states that transitioned to democracy in the 1990s, and still faces many challenges tied to economic development and democratic consolidation. Majority ethno-nationalism is significantly more present and visible in Bulgaria compared to Sweden (overall, economic left/right cleavage is more significant for structuring party system in Sweden compared to Bulgaria where political conflict along the lines of integration/demarcation has higher prominence). The cases allow us to understand similarities and differences in nativist targeting in very different contexts in Europe. In particular, finding corroborating evidence that the radical right in such disparate cases relies on the logic of targeted nativism strengthens the overall argument made in this article.

### **Summary of the Evidence**

Table A1 summarizes how nativist targeting by the radical right parties is framed/explained/justified in Sweden and Bulgaria, aiming to connect the qualitative evidence with the stated hypotheses of targeting due to minority's (1) ethnocultural differences, (2) political success, and (3) ethnocultural accommodation. One should keep in mind the difference in general contexts between two cases since in the Swedish case the direct discussion of ethnocultural difference is seen as a taboo (cf. Koning 2019; Pred 2000; Schall 2016), while in the Bulgarian case targeted nativism is often very explicit, and nativist tropes (especially against Roma minorities) are occasionally used by the mainstream political actors. Therefore, it was hard to find direct evidence for nativist targeting in Sweden (such evidence is more implicit), and relatively easy to find explicit reference to nativist targeting of specific groups (Turks and especially Roma) in Bulgaria.

<b>Hypotheses / Logic of Targeted Nativism</b>	<b>Sweden</b>	<b>Bulgaria</b>
H1: cultural threat	Indirect references: lack of exposure to Swedish culture (implying cultural difference), lack of knowledge of Swedish language leading to unemployability, lack of work ethics (distinguishing older work migrants and newer asylum seekers/refugees), Islam sometimes tied to terrorism in discussions	Very explicit for Roma minority: cultural incompatibility, criminal inclinations, low success in life due to culture, general difference, threat due to demographic growth, Islam; for Turkish minority: Islam, different language that prevents them to be part of the Bulgarian nation, self-exclusion
H2: political backlash	Not commented on (generally it was recognized that minorities are less politically active)	Ethnic Turkish party (DPS/MRF) sometimes mentioned as corrupt actor that leads Bulgarian Turks away from their identification with Bulgaria
H3: backlash against ethnocultural accommodation	Not commented on	Not commented on

**Table A1.** Summary of the Qualitative Evidence Supporting Hypotheses on Targeted Nativism

## Appendix B: States and Ethnic Groups in the Dataset

Table B1 summarizes information regarding the ethnic minorities included in the dataset. The categories used for classification come from the CREG dataset. I include only ethnic minorities that pass threshold of at least 1% of the total population (noting that the data for only 19 countries include information about ethnic groups with relative size below 1%). Since the focus of the article is on ethnic groups that are identified as “nonnative ... fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007, 22), I exclude titular ethnic groups (except for multiethnic countries without a single titular ethnic group – such as Belgium, or Bosnia and Herzegovina). Looking at the analyzed time period (1993-2013), I also note the increase of number of ethnic groups in the dataset in several countries as some minorities pass threshold of 1% of total resident population (e.g., in Poland, Portugal, or Finland). Thus, one should not consider the ethnic structure of resident population as static, but changeable over time (for more details on the CREG, see Nardulli et al. 2012).


<b>State</b>	<b>Ethnic Groups – Minorities</b>
Albania	Greek, Roma, Other
Austria	Turk, Yugoslavian, Other
Belarus	Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, Other
Belgium	Flemish, Walloon, Other
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosniak, Serb, Croat, Other
Bulgaria	Turk, Roma, Macedonian
Croatia	Serb, Other
Cyprus	Turk, Other
Czech Republic	Moravian, Slovak

Denmark	Other
Estonia	Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Other
Finland	Swedish, Other
Germany	Yugoslavian, Turk, Other
Greece	Macedonian, Albanian, Turk
Hungary	Serb, Roma, German
Ireland	Other
Italy	Other
Latvia	Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Russian, Polish, Belorussian, Other
Lithuania	Russian, Polish, Belorussian, Other
Macedonia	Albanian, Serb, Turk, Roma, Other, Bosniak
Moldova	Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Gagauz, Other
Netherlands	Turk, Moroccan, Other
Norway	Other
Poland	German
Portugal	Capeverdean, Spanish, Brazilian, Other
Romania	Roma, Hungarian
Serbia	Bosniak, Roma, Croat, Albanian, Hungarian, Montenegrin, Other
Slovakia	Roma, Hungarian
Slovenia	Serb, Croat, Bosniak, Other
Spain	Catalan, Basque, Galician, Other
Sweden	Finnish, Other
Switzerland	Swiss, French, Italian, German, Other
Ukraine	Russian, Other
United Kingdom	Irish, Pakistani, Indian, Black, Welsh, Scottish

**Table B1.** Ethnic Minorities in Europe, the CREG Dataset

## Appendix C: Category “Other” in the Dataset

The further look into the category “other,” especially its relative size, clearly reveals that this is more than a residual category. Figure C1 shows the relative size of population that was identified as “other” for the first and the last year in the dataset (1993 and 2013), as it is reported in the CREG dataset. Several European countries use this category to define all population that is not part of local ethnic majority (see table B1).



**Figure C1.** Share of the Category “Other” (%), the CREG Dataset

## Appendix D: Radical Right Parties

I identify the radical right parties using as the primary source a list provided by Cas Mudde as the Appendix A in his book (2007, 305-308), and matching it with Manifesto Project Database (Volkens et al. 2015). The list includes only those radical right parties that in the period of analysis (1993-2013) have managed to win at least one seat in the country legislature (in bicameral systems, I use the information for the lower chamber). I consulted additional literature to extend and update this list, as well as to identify the ethnic minorities that are met with hostility by these parties. In the next step, I compared identified targets of the radical right parties with ethnic categories that are reported in the CREG dataset (see Appendix B). The challenge here was deciding when to include category “other” among targeted minorities. I have consulted additional literature and relevant resources (e.g., Minorities at Risk Dataset, All Minorities at Risk Dataset, MIPEX, Minorities Rights Group International country reports, official statistical bureaus of individual countries) to estimate likely structure of this heterogeneous group. In cases where the group “other” is predominantly immigrant, this group is included among targets for anti-immigrant parties. In the case of anti-minority parties, this group is included if its structure gives indication that it is targeted by radical right. For the list of literature consulted in the process of coding, see Appendix I below.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Radical Right Party</b>	<b>Targeted Groups</b>
Albania	National Front (BK) Party for Justice, Integration and Unity (PDIU)	Greeks, Roma, Other
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	Turk, Yugoslavian, Other



Belgium	Flemish Block (VB) Flemish Interest (VB)	Walloons, Other
	National Front Belgium (FN Belge) People's Party (PP)	Other
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Party of Democratic Action (SDA) Bosnian-Herzegovian Patriotic Party (BPS)	Serbs, Croats
	Croatian Democratic Union BiH (HDZ BiH) Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990)	Serbs, Bosniaks
	Serb Democratic Party (SDS) Serb Radical Party RS (SRS RS) Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) – since 2006	Bosniaks, Croats
Bulgaria	Ataka	Turks, Roma
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) – until 2000 Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) Croatian Party of Rights Dr. Ante Starčević (HSP AS)	Serbs
Czech Republic	Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR RSC) – until 1998	Other
Denmark	Danish People's Party	Other
Estonia	Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) Estonian Citizen (EK)	Russians
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) Golden Dawn (XA) Independent Greeks (ANEL)	Albanians, Turks, Macedonians
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) Movement for Better Hungary (Jobbik)	Roma
Italy	Northern League (LN)	Other
Latvia	For Fatherland and Freedom (TB)	Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Poles,

	National Alliance “All for Latvia!” – For Fatherland and Freedom (NA)	Russians, Others, Belarusians
Lithuania	Young Lithuania	Russians, Poles, Belarusians, Other
Macedonia	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO DPMNE) – until 1998	Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Roma, Other
Netherlands	Centre Democrats (CD) Party for Freedom (PVV)	Turks, Moroccans, Other
Poland	League of Polish Families (LPR)	Germans
Romania	Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) Greater Romania Party (PRM)	Hungarians, Roma
Serbia	Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	Bosniaks, Roma, Croats, Albanians, Hungarians
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	Hungarians, Roma
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party (SNS)	Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Other
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Other
Switzerland	Swiss Democrats (SD/DS)	Other
Ukraine	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU) All-Ukrainian Political Movement Stave Independence of Ukraine Svoboda	Russians, Other

**Table D1.** Radical Right Parties in Europe with Political Representation at the State Level (1993-2013)

## Appendix E: Targeted Nativism

The dependent variable measures targeted nativism. It connects success of the radical right parties to the ethnic groups/minorities that are negatively targeted (selected and excluded) through the nativist cleavage. The electoral breakthrough of the radical right parties signals that negative views and hostility towards targeted minorities resonate among the electorate voting for these parties, given the prominence of anti-diversity/anti-minority framing of their appeal. Success of the radical right is meaningful for the targeted groups. In order to study targeted nativism using the quantitative analysis, we need to use minority group (at a specific time) as a unit of analysis; that way we can make explicit distinction between minorities that are facing nativism of the radical right and those that are not.

I capture the logic of targeted nativism and operationalize it in the following way:

1. I compile the list of all radical right parties that in the period 1993-2013 have had seats in national legislatures in their respective countries (Table D1),
2. I determine which ethnic minorities in the country are targeted by the means of nativist cleavage,
3. I code the exposure to targeted nativism for ethnic minorities that are singled out by the negative rhetoric of the radical right parties with the political presence in the national legislature (for other minorities, targeted nativism is absent despite electoral success of these parties).

For example, the electoral success of the Bulgarian radical right party Ataka signaled ethnic hostility towards two groups that were clearly identified and ostracized by Ataka using targeted nativism: Turkish and Roma minorities. In Table E1 below I illustrate how I coded targeted

nativism associated with its electoral breakthrough in 2005, when this party won 8.1% of votes at the national elections. The dependent variable is operationalized as a binary measure of the *presence of targeted nativism* when the radical right party is present in the national parliament; such presence is meaningful for the targeted minorities.

Additionally, I create another variable (this alternative dependent variable is used for robustness checks only; see Appendix H): the *strength of targeted nativism*, which is operationalized through a percentage of votes that such party won in the national elections. In the case of several parties targeting the same minority, I account for the increased strength of targeted nativism by using the total percentage of votes given to **all** radical right parties hostile towards a single minority group in the same period. I do not use this variable in the main analysis, considering that strength of targeted nativism could vary also due to the choice of nativist exclusionary claims (which can be more or less extreme), and the reception of radical right nativist frames by population at large, which is difficult to measure (especially across countries).

Ethnic Minorities	Dependent Variable: Targeted Nativism	
	Binary: presence of targeted nativism	Continuous: strength of targeted nativism
Turks	1	8.1
Roma	1	8.1
Macedonians	0	0

**Table E1.** Coding Targeted Nativism (Example for Bulgaria 2005).

## Appendix F: Distinctiveness Index

The distinctiveness index measures the degree to which different ethnic groups living in the same country differ from each other in terms of race, language, and religion. These dimensions are commonly taken into account as the shared ascriptive elements of collective identity, and those that tie an individual to a specific collective ethnic category. For each country, independent of the number of groups and their relative sizes, I consider the largest group as the reference category and compare all other groups to it (the largest group is usually absolute ethnic majority, though that does not have to necessarily be the case, as shown on the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The distinctiveness index describes distinctiveness of individual ethnic groups, and it can differ significantly among minorities in the same country. I do not aggregate distinctiveness index at the country level since I consider distinctiveness a property of individual ethnic groups.

*Race.* To determine whether groups belong to the same race, I relied on the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (variable RACE). This dataset acknowledges lack of support for the concept of race in strictly genetic/biological sense, and instead uses the concept of continental/geographic race. More precisely, the MAR uses five racial types, and “Europoid” type (as the most common in the dataset) includes all European people, but also indigenous people of North Africa (Berbers, Egyptians), Middle Eastern people (Arabs, Persians), and some Central and South Asian people (Pashtuns, Baluchis), as explained in their codebook. In practice, focusing on Europe, I note that most groups in the dataset are coded as 0 (“no physical differences in appearance”). Notably, Roma minority in all European countries is coded as 1 (“physically distinguishable subtype of same racial stock”). I take this distinction into consideration, coupled

with a common racialization of Roma minority (see, for example, Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2017), which is present across the continent, and code Roma ethnic group as different in terms of race, compared to local ethnic majorities in European countries. This decision does not indicate judgment of Roma's biological race (I reject biological treatment of race) but reflects common racial/racist othering of Roma people in Europe.

*Language.* The primary source to determine which language a specific group speaks was, again, the MAR dataset (variable LANG). I compared languages spoken by different ethnic groups, aiming to determine whether linguistic difference (and also need for its accommodation) is present. The practical challenge was determining whether a particular group was linguistically assimilated, especially accounting for multilingual groups. For example, Roma ethnic group is known to be linguistically assimilated in some countries (e.g., Hungary), while linguistically distinct in others (e.g., North Macedonia). In order to deal with the ambiguous cases, I consulted additional literature, listed in Appendix I.

*Religion.* To determine which religion is associated with particular ethnic group, I relied on the MAR dataset (variables BELIEF and RELIGS1), which defines plurality religion of the group (variable RELIGS1 uses a list of religions) and give indications about religious difference (BELIEF). For the ambiguous cases, I consulted additional literature, listed in Appendix I. I accounted for all religious differences that are politically relevant, such as different sects within the same religion (e.g., distinguishing between Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic Christians).

While I am aware that creation of the distinctiveness index required simplification of the actual social reality, given that any ethnic group is internally heterogeneous, I was led by the idea of emphasizing the aspects of difference that are traditionally perceived as politically and socially relevant, and *typical* for a specific ethnic group. These elements (race, religion,

language) create possibility both for distinguishing and othering particular group, which can be used by contemporary radical right parties. I am aware that distinctiveness as such is a constructed rather than “objective” collective trait (e.g., identifying religion traditionally associated with a particular ethnic group does not account for prominence of secularism; linguistic distinctiveness does not tell us if the members of ethnic group are capable of using the language of ethnic majority).<sup>1</sup> The distinctiveness index is time-invariant for any ethnic group, recognizing that collective distinctiveness (and perception of such distinctiveness) tends to be stable over time.

Finally, I present two examples of coding the distinctiveness index, using the cases of Greece and Slovenia (Tables F1 and F2), including ethnic minorities that pass the threshold of 1% of resident population (difference is coded as 1 so the higher value of the index implies higher distinctiveness).

<b>Greece (reference group: Greek)</b>				
<b>Ethnic Minority</b>	<b>Race</b>	<b>Language</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Distinctiveness Index</b>
Macedonian	0	1	0	1
Albanian	0	1	1	2
Turkish	0	1	1	2

**Table F1.** Coding Distinctiveness Index, Greece

<b>Slovenia (reference group: Slovene)</b>				
<b>Ethnic Minority</b>	<b>Race</b>	<b>Language</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Distinctiveness Index</b>
Serb	0	1	1	2
Croat	0	1	0	1
Bosniak	0	1	1	2

**Table F2.** Coding Distinctiveness Index, Slovenia

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
<sup>1</sup> For discussion on complexity inherent to the study of “language communities,” see Laitin 2000.

## **Appendix G: Collective Ethnic Rights**

The concept of collective ethnic rights and distinction between different types of these rights come from Kymlicka (1995), who distinguishes between special representation rights, self-government rights, and polyethnic rights. Special representation rights are operationalized as ethnic quotas and coded as present if a group in question benefits from quota in a given year (Bird 2014; Htun 2004; Krook and O'Brien 2010). Self-government rights are operationalized as presence of ethnic devolution where a minority in question is a beneficiary. I disregarded difference in degree of ethnic devolution (e.g., whether there is a regional legislature, whether region with devolved powers has fiscal autonomy, etc.) since I wanted primarily to capture the symbolic dimension of ethnic devolution, the notion that in the territory where an ethnic group is a local majority, it has the power to manage affairs internal to the region – I used texts of state constitutions for information about presence of ethnic devolution. The issue of cultural rights was more complex, since they are a heterogeneous category that include a range of accommodative measures acknowledging and protecting cultural difference in the domains of language, religion, dress, food, ethnic holidays, cultural mores, etc. I opted to focus on linguistic accommodation since minority language rights are relevant issue for most historical and immigrant minorities, while in practice accommodation is commonly executed by introducing “mother tongue” language classes in the public school system. At the same time, the right to use one’s language in public schools is automatically recognized for linguistically assimilated minorities.



The data indicate overall increase in these rights over time (see Figure G1). Ethnic quotas are very rare, as well as ethnic decentralization (which nevertheless increased over time). All language rights in Figure G1 account for linguistically assimilated minorities.



**Figure G1.** Presence of Different Types of Collective Ethnic Rights in European Countries (Total Number of Ethnic Minorities: 1993: 100, 2013: 105).

## Appendix H: Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks

### The Strength of Targeted Nativism

I recognize that the radical right parties widely differ in size of their electoral support, which could be seen as an extent of popular endorsement of their political agenda. Therefore, it should be important to distinguish between the radical right parties with sizable electoral support and those that barely manage to pass the electoral threshold. Overall, during the timeframe of the analysis, most radical right parties remained relatively small. In the dataset, almost 67% of observations (i.e., ethnic minorities in a given year) are not associated with targeted nativism, and only in 15.5% of observations (ethnic minorities) are targeted by the radical right parties that have support from over 10% of electorate.


In the models reported in Table H1, I operationalize the *strength of targeted nativism* through a percentage of votes given to a radical right party targeting specific minority (see Appendix E for coding). The logic behind this approach is that a minority gets exposed to stronger targeted nativism when a hostile radical right party performs better, signaling that nativist exclusion resonates *more strongly* among the electorate. I recognize that this operationalization of strength of targeted nativism is problematic and should be used with caution, especially in cross-national context. Here I assume that all that matters for stronger targeted nativism is more votes, discounting the differences in the expressions of nativism towards minorities among countries and among radical right parties. While it is reasonable to expect that sharp increase in popularity of the radical right comes together with more visibility of exclusion and hostility towards targeted minorities, it is difficult to defend their equivalence. Keeping these caveats in mind, I use this analysis to check whether different operationalization

of targeted nativism affects the results. The initial models (Table H1 below) show support for the hypotheses of cultural threat (hypothesis 1), and political backlash (hypothesis 2). Once we include all independent variables in Model 4, the distinctiveness index remains significant at 5% level, while the variable measuring support for ethnic minority party changes its sign but remains significant, indicating that minorities with stronger ethnic parties are less likely to be associated with stronger targeted nativism. This is a curious finding, which remains stable once we include additional controls in Model 5. However, this effect is quite small, as is visible in Figure H1 which compares the main analysis with the new model specification. However, this finding is consistent with the literature that emphasizes beneficial effects of descriptive representation, which can increase visibility of minorities and improve attitudes towards stigmatized minorities (e.g., Mansbridge 1999).

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Ethnic Group Size (%)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.012)	0.032* (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)
Distinctiveness Index	0.733** (0.270)			0.602* (0.249)	0.610* (0.244)
Vote for Ethnic Party (%)		0.195*** (0.032)		-0.119** (0.036)	-0.110** (0.036)
Collective Ethnic Rights			0.089 (0.303)	0.084 (0.365)	0.074 (0.358)
Unemployment					0.012 (0.041)
Parliamentary Regime					-5.722*** (0.920)
Mean District Magnitude					0.004 (0.004)
Decentralization					-0.995* (0.487)
Polyarchy					-5.301* (2.232)
Former Communist Country					-2.248 (2.844)
Constant	5.252*** (1.468)	4.784*** (1.072)	5.218*** (1.132)	4.551** (1.454)	13.734*** (3.332)
Observations	1,588	2,013	2,104	1,530	1,516
Clusters/Countries	30	33	34	29	29
Year Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Rho	0.6658	0.5822	0.5385	0.7154	0.7438
AIC	9791.956	12078.68	13150.330	9030.729	8867.040
BIC	9926.212	12218.87	13291.62	9174.721	9042.726

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table H1.** Explaining the Strength of Targeted Nativism of Radical Right Parties in Europe



**Figure H1.** Comparing Models Focusing on the Presence of Targeted Nativism (logit) and the Strength of Targeted Nativism (ols)

Note: “Logit” is Model 5 in Table 1; for “ols” model see Model 5 in Table H1 in the Appendix H. Reported coefficient values and 95% confidence intervals.

To understand this finding and compare it to the findings in the main analysis (also shown in Figure H1), where percentage of vote for ethnic party is not significant, I turn to the descriptive data. We know that in many European countries the minorities that are targeted by the radical right nativism are immigrant minorities without corresponding ethnic parties. Among historical minorities, the situation varies. Among minorities with successful ethnic parties, over time some (like Serbs in Croatia) saw an overall decrease in the confrontational nativism of the radical right, while others (like Turks in Bulgaria) witnessed an overall increase. Some politically empowered minorities were not exposed to the nativism of the radical right (e.g., ethnic

minorities in Spain, and, more recently, in North Macedonia). Given that some of the strongest radical right parties in Europe target immigrant minorities without corresponding ethnic parties, it seems that minorities with successful ethnic parties are overall significantly less associated with stronger nativism. It seems that a successful ethnic minority party does not shield a minority from the exposure to targeted nativism (as shown in the main analysis), but it is overall associated with weaker targeted nativism of radical right parties (as shown in Table H1). Among controls, the parliamentary regimes and more decentralized countries are associated with weaker targeted nativism. I also find significant association between stronger targeted nativism and lower level of democracy, which makes sense theoretically as these parties often have authoritarian tendencies (e.g., Mudde 2007, 22). Finally, I confirm that former communist countries do not show significant difference from the rest of Europe.

### **Deeper Look into the Cultural Threat Hypothesis**

Given the importance of cultural threat hypothesis, I examine several alternative ways to account for the effect of ethnic diversity. One could argue that distinction between historical and immigrant minorities might explain some results. In Table H2 I include an additional binary measure that describes an ethnic minority as historical (as opposed to immigrant). I code as *historical groups* those that were established in the country before WWII, as distinct from those groups that migrated in response to the demand for labor in the postwar period, or due to the process of decolonization, which also increased immigration. Using the CREG dataset (which goes back to 1945), I tracked changes in ethnic groups' relative sizes over time, estimating how long they were present in individual states. This additional variable does not turn to be significant, nor it improves overall fit of the models (compared to the models reported in the

main analysis). However, inclusion of this variable might be seen as problematic for the model specification since the *vote for ethnic party* is specific for historical minorities only. In all models the reported effect of the *distinctiveness index* remains significant.

Next, I examine the possibility that the Islamophobia might explain which minorities are more likely to be targeted by the radical right.<sup>2</sup> Models reported in Table H3 include additional variable for the *Muslim minorities*, testing for potential explanation that hostility towards Muslim minorities might explain cultural threat better than the distinctiveness index. I coded an ethnic group as predominantly Muslim, using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, cross-checked with other sources. In all additional models, this variable remains insignificant (in models that exclude distinctiveness index [not reported here], the variable indicating Muslim minority remains insignificant as well).

Finally, I (re)construct the distinctiveness index in a more nuanced way, accounting not only whether ethnic minority shares collective identity trait with majority, but also how similar they are to each other on a specific trait (whether groups are “partially distinctive”). I recoded the elements of distinctiveness index, creating the *nuanced distinctiveness index* in a following way:

- *Race*: I coded cases where a group can be distinguished as racially different, even though it belongs to the same racial group (as defined in geographical terms in the MAR dataset) as partially distinctive (0.5); in practical terms that included minorities

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<sup>2</sup> I recognize being unable to fully account for all Muslim minorities in Europe, since some countries include ethnic minorities (especially immigrants) in the heterogeneous group named “other” (effectively undercounting Muslim minorities), so these results should be viewed with caution.

such as Roma, Indian, and Pakistani (they all belong to “Europoid” geographical/racial group as defined by MAR).

- *Language*: I coded minorities as partially distinctive (0.5) if they speak distinctive language, which belongs to the same linguistic family (e.g., Catalan vs. Spanish in Spain; Bosnian vs. Serbian vs. Croatian in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ukrainian vs. Russian in Ukraine).
- *Religion*: I coded minorities as partially distinctive (0.5) if they belong to “different sect within same religion” as defined by the MAR (in Europe this applies to different sects within Christianity, e.g., Orthodox Russians in Latvia, Catholic Croats in Serbia, etc.).

In Table H4, I report results using the alternative nuanced distinctiveness index, and the results remain essentially the same.

	M1	M2	M3
Ethnic Group Size (%)	0.016 (0.014)	0.013 (0.015)	0.013 (0.015)
Historical Group	-0.001 (0.559)	-0.106 (0.575)	-0.239 (0.582)
Distinctiveness Index	0.885*** (0.217)	0.790** (0.228)	0.768** (0.228)
Vote for Ethnic Party (%)	-0.039 (0.029)	-0.048 (0.032)	-0.049 (0.032)
Collective Ethnic Rights	-0.226 (0.232)	-0.157 (0.247)	-0.138 (0.247)
Unemployment		0.073* (0.030)	0.073* (0.030)
Parliamentary Regime		-1.035 (0.898)	-0.548 (0.931)
Mean District Magnitude		-0.016** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.005)
Decentralization		0.372 (0.440)	0.727 (0.504)
Polyarchy		-4.312 (2.621)	-3.117 (2.626)
Former Communist Country			3.533 (2.065)
Constant	-1.911 (1.088)	-0.137 (2.597)	-4.057 (3.477)
Observations	1,551	1,537	1,537
Clusters/Countries	29	29	29
Year Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes
Rho	0.8362	0.8538	0.8329
AIC	1047.427	974.8289	973.921
BIC	1191.786	1145.632	1150.061

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table H2.** Explaining the Presence of Targeted Nativism of Radical Right Parties in Europe, Accounting for Historical/Immigrant Minorities



	M1	M2	M3
Ethnic Group Size (%)	0.020 (0.016)	0.017 (0.017)	0.017 (0.017)
Muslim Group	-0.258 (0.329)	-0.252 (0.347)	-0.219 (0.347)
Distinctiveness Index	1.013*** (0.242)	0.930*** (0.257)	0.910*** (0.257)
Vote for Ethnic Party (%)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.046 (0.034)	-0.048 (0.034)
Collective Ethnic Rights	-0.174 (0.228)	-0.113 (0.240)	-0.108 (0.240)
Unemployment		0.076* (0.030)	0.076* (0.030)
Parliamentary Regime		-1.080 (0.921)	-0.588 (0.958)
Mean District Magnitude		-0.017** (0.005)	-0.016** (0.005)
Decentralization		0.264 (0.454)	0.604 (0.518)
Polyarchy		-4.308 (2.657)	-3.108 (2.668)
Former Communist Country			3.723 (2.167)
Constant	-2.233* (1.021)	-0.395 (2.584)	-4.537 (3.543)
Observations	1,507	1,493	1,493
Clusters/Countries	29	29	29
Year Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes
Rho	0.8443	0.8647	0.8483
AIC	1032.557	959.5101	958.504
BIC	1176.140	1129.383	1133.686

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table H3.** Explaining the Presence of Targeted Nativism of Radical Right Parties in Europe, Accounting for the Muslim Minorities

	M1	M2	M3
Ethnic Group Size (%)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.019 (0.016)	0.017 (0.017)
Nuanced Distinctiveness Index	0.955*** (0.222)	0.993*** (0.228)	0.955*** (0.241)
Vote for Ethnic Party (%)		-0.053 (0.030)	-0.062 (0.033)
Collective Ethnic Rights		-0.361 (0.231)	-0.274 (0.246)
Unemployment			0.076* (0.030)
Parliamentary Regime			-0.662 (0.966)
Mean District Magnitude			-0.016** (0.005)
Decentralization			0.601 (0.523)
Polyarchy			-3.226 (2.702)
Former Communist Country			4.014 (2.220)
Constant	-1.768 (1.059)	-1.895 (1.040)	-4.332 (3.590)
Observations	1,608	1,550	1,536
Clusters/Countries	30	29	29
Year Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes
Rho	0.8721	0.8583	0.8571
AIC	1043.557	1030.671	955.104
BIC	1172.743	1169.667	1125.886

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table H4.** Explaining the Presence of Targeted Nativism of Radical Right Parties in Europe, Using Nuanced Distinctiveness Index

#### **Robustness Check: Ethnic Minority Parties**

To examine the robustness of results regarding the hypothesis of political backlash against politically successful minorities, I use the alternative specification accounting for the presence of

ethnic minority parties in state parliaments, rather than the size of ethnic minority vote. The main result remains robust (Table H5).

	M1	M2	M3
Ethnic Group Size (%)	0.008 (0.014)	0.0002 (0.015)	0.000 (0.015)
Distinctiveness Index	0.921*** (0.211)	0.892*** (0.223)	0.880*** (0.223)
Ethnic Party in Parliament	-0.030 (0.288)	0.157 (0.321)	0.155 (0.321)
Collective Ethnic Rights	-0.296 (0.239)	-0.303 (0.260)	-0.299 (0.260)
Unemployment		0.074* (0.030)	0.073* (0.030)
Parliamentary Regime		-1.134 (0.924)	-0.643 (0.963)
Mean District Magnitude		-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)
Decentralization		0.250 (0.450)	0.584 (0.515)
Polyarchy		-4.014 (2.620)	-2.923 (2.632)
Former Communist Country			3.591 (2.173)
Constant	-1.638 (0.993)	-0.003 (2.555)	-3.997 (3.526)
Observations	1,609	1,595	1,595
Clusters/Countries	30	30	30
Year Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes
Rho	0.8477	0.8698	0.8561
AIC	1056.654	979.1467	978.4014
BIC	1196.621	1145.760	1150.389

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table H5.** Explaining the Presence of Targeted Nativism of Radical Right Parties in Europe, Accounting for the Presence of Ethnic Parties in State Parliaments

### Robustness Check: The Strength of Collective Ethnic Rights

Following similar logic, I examine the robustness of the findings by changing the measurement for collective ethnic rights, accounting for their strength. Most ethnic minorities benefit only from one form of collective accommodation (usually, ethnocultural rights regarding minority language instruction in public school system, as discussed in Appendix G), and the presence of higher degree of collective ethnic rights is often associated with historically strained interethnic relations (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, North Macedonia, Spain). In the models that include the alternative measure for ethnocultural accommodation (strength of collective ethnic rights), this variable remains statistically insignificant (Table H6). The change in how we account for the effect of collective ethnic accommodation does not affect the significance of the main finding, confirming its robustness.

	M1	M2	M3
Ethnic Group Size (%)	0.006 (0.007)	0.016 (0.014)	0.014 (0.015)
Distinctiveness Index		0.881*** (0.214)	0.782*** (0.224)
Vote for Ethnic Party (%)		-0.040 (0.029)	-0.050 (0.031)
Collective Ethnic Rights Degree	-0.181 (0.119)	-0.195 (0.208)	-0.138 (0.220)
Unemployment			0.073* (0.030)
Parliamentary Regime			-0.547 (0.938)
Mean District Magnitude			-0.015** (0.005)
Decentralization			0.735 (0.511)
Polyarchy			-3.133 (2.637)
Former Communist Country			3.456 (2.078)
Constant	-0.466 (0.740)	-1.893 (0.994)	-4.199 (3.487)
Observations	2,125	1,551	1,537
Clusters/Countries	34	29	29
Year Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes
Rho	0.8002	0.8401	0.8367
AIC	1572.526	1045.538	972.1534
BIC	1708.403	1184.552	1142.956

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table H6.** Explaining the Presence of Targeted Nativism of Radical Right Parties in Europe, Accounting for the Degree of Collective Ethnic Rights

## Appendix I: Secondary Literature Consulted in the Process of Data Coding

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