

Violent Competition and Terrorist Restraint

Supplementary Appendix

Sara M. T. Polo* Blair Welsh†

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* Associate Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, sara.polo@essex.ac.uk.

† Postdoctoral Associate, New York University – Abu Dhabi, blairwelsh@nyu.edu.

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A Civil War and Intergroup Conflict Crossover




Figure A1: Civil War and Intergroup Conflict Crossover

B Data

B.1 Terrorism in Civil War

We create a link function between the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to determine if a terrorist organization is engaged in a civil war. Our sample is made up of a universe of terrorist groups engaged in an armed intrastate conflict. As opposed to attributing attacks to rebel organizations, we merely investigate whether there is a link between organizations in both datasets to determine if the terrorist organization in question is party to a civil war. The approach also differs from the linking mechanism introduced by Fortna, Lotito and Rubin (2022), who adopt a more inclusive matching criteria, which allows for attacks to be attributed to a more diverse set of organizations, such as factions and other groups with unclear connections, including descriptors such as ‘unknown’ and ‘other’. Figure A2 outlines our linking function and the breakdown of ACD-GTD group actors for the Patani insurgents in Thailand. Here, we keep the 5 organizations in the GTD as separate organizations engaged in an armed intrastate conflict.




Figure A2: Linking GTD and UCDP ACD Actors

B.2 Terrorist Infighting

We define violent competition as physical acts of violence between two non-state actors. Our measure of violent competition is behavioral. For every organization-year, we code whether and how many attacks the organization in question has launched on other organizations. We rely upon the GTD to create this measure. Using target indicators, we trace attacks on other terrorist organizations, non-state militias (`targetype1 == 17`), and violent political parties (`targetype1 == 22`). A violent political party is defined as a violent group that engages in electoral politics (GTD Codebook 2021: 37).

In our data, 36% of organizations launched at least one attack on another organization. Abu Sayyaf Group faced a very small amount of violent competition, compared to the Islamic State in Syria and the Taliban in Afghanistan, who both faced large episodes of intergroup infighting, launching a over 100 attacks on other organizations in their insurgencies.

Violent competition is qualitatively different from non-violent competition, which we discuss in the main article. Utilizing data from the MGAR Dataset, we can see that *violent* competition between militant groups is increasing over time at faster rates than non-violent competition. We plot this trend in Figure A3.




Figure A3: Violent and Non-Violent Competition

C Summary Statistics

Table A1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	<i>N</i>
Soft Ratio	0.61	0.34	0	1	2,194
Infighting <i>binary</i>	0.17	0.37	0	1	2,194
Infighting <i>log</i>	0.30	0.79	0	5.06	2,194
Nationalist	0.43	0.49	0	1	2,194
Left	0.23	0.42	0	1	2,194
Right	0.01	0.09	0	1	2,194
Religious	0.19	0.39	0	1	2,194
Regime Type	0.44	0.50	0	1	2,194
Foreign Sponsor	0.35	0.48	0	1	2,194
Territorial Control	0.34	0.47	0	1	2,194
Terrorist Attacks	31.69	97.66	1	1,249	2,194
Number of Groups	79.57	149.79	1	806	2,194
Δ Number of Groups	-7.36	80.31	-449	278	2,194
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.60	0.34	0	1	2,145
Size	2.46	0.75	1	4	2,194
GDP <i>log</i>	7.29	1.25	3.40	10.83	1,975
Population <i>log</i>	17.67	1.62	13.32	21.03	2,180
Repression	3.97	0.91	1	5	1,975
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.55	0.23	0.01	0.89	1,431

D Target Typology

Table A2: Typology of Targets

Soft Targets	Hard Targets
Abortion Related	Business
Business	Government (General & Diplomatic)
Educational Institutions	Police
Journalism & Media	Airport & Aircraft
NGO	Food or Water Supply
Private Civilians & Property	Maritime
Religious Figures & Institutions	Transportation
Tourists	Utilities
Transportation	Military
	Telecommunication

Note: For business targets, we assign attacks on gas/oil, mining, and private security firms to the hard category. For transportation, we assign attacks on buses, trains, and subways to soft. For military, we run the main models with and without military targets under the hard classification.

E Control Variables

Table A3: Operationalization of Control Variables

Variable	Operationalization
Ideology	4 binary indicators for ideology: left, right, religious, nationalist.
Size	Information on size is extracted using the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and the Center for International Security and Cooperation's Mapping Militants Project. In categorical form, 1 is an organization with up to 10 members, 2 is up to 100 members, 3 is up to 1000 members, and 4 is 10,000 or more.
Terrorist Attacks	Count variable sourced from the GTD.
Foreign Sponsorship	Binary indicator sourced from UCDP External Support Dataset and Meier's (2021) extension.
Territorial Control	Binary indicator sourced from BAAD.
Regime Type	Binary indicator where 1 is a democracy.
Government Repression	Scores from the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al., 2021).
Ethnic Fractionalization	Ethnic fractionalization index (Drazanova, 2020).
GDP and Population	Logged variables from the World Bank.

F Results for Macro-Level

Table A4: Macro-Level Results (Fractional Logit, GLM)

	Binary			Model 4	Count _{log(+1)}	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3		Model 5	Model 6
Infighting	-0.464*** (0.09)	-0.609*** (0.08)	-0.554*** (0.12)	-0.137** (0.05)	-0.242*** (0.05)	-0.241*** (0.07)
Nationalist		-0.150 (0.15)	-0.420* (0.18)		-0.168 (0.15)	-0.429* (0.18)
Left		-0.383* (0.16)	-0.562** (0.17)		-0.416** (0.16)	-0.567** (0.17)
Right		0.082 (0.42)	0.182 (0.47)		0.017 (0.42)	0.135 (0.48)
Religious		0.221 (0.16)	0.119 (0.21)		0.208 (0.16)	0.122 (0.21)
Regime Type		-0.006 (0.10)	0.180 (0.14)		-0.015 (0.11)	0.162 (0.15)
Foreign Sponsor		-0.068 (0.09)	-0.018 (0.09)		-0.073 (0.09)	-0.011 (0.09)
Territorial Control		0.177* (0.09)	-0.079 (0.10)		0.152 (0.09)	-0.092 (0.10)
Terrorist Attacks		0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Number of Groups		-0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Δ Number of Groups		-0.000 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Conflict Year		0.100 (0.10)	0.271* (0.13)		0.106 (0.10)	0.286* (0.12)
Soft Ratio _{lag}		0.197 (0.10)	0.212 (0.13)		0.194 (0.10)	0.201 (0.13)
Size			0.079 (0.05)			0.070 (0.05)
GDP _{log}			0.026 (0.05)			0.035 (0.05)
Population _{log}			-0.168** (0.06)			-0.172** (0.06)
Repression			0.012 (0.06)			0.008 (0.06)
Ethnic Fractionalization			0.418 (0.24)			0.484* (0.24)
Constant	0.507*** (0.06)	0.410* (0.17)	2.677* (1.09)	0.470*** (0.05)	0.406* (0.17)	2.661* (1.08)
AIC	2401.34	2343.41	1226.79	2411.27	2352.75	1230.25
Clusters	290	289	165	290	289	165
Observations	2194	2145	1121	2194	2145	1121

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

G Results for Micro-Level

Table A5: District-Month Analysis on ISIS in Syria (Linear Model)

	Model 1	Model 2
Infighting	-0.377*** (0.065)	-0.447*** (0.081)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.193* (0.092)	-0.258* (0.097)
Battle Deaths		-0.002** (0.001)
Terrorist Attacks		0.015 (0.009)
Territorial Control		0.032 (0.095)
Tax (Index)		0.018 (0.024)
Services (Index)		-0.015 (0.041)
Constant	1.120*** (0.083)	1.155*** (0.128)
District FE	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓
R ²	0.224	0.265
Observations	129	129

Standard errors are clustered by district and reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

H Macro-Level Robustness Tests

H.1 Macro-level: Ordinal measure of infighting

Table A6: Ordinal Measure of Infighting

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Infighting	-0.308*** (0.09)	-0.472*** (0.07)	-0.504*** (0.11)
Nationalist		-0.162 (0.15)	-0.420* (0.18)
Left		-0.396* (0.16)	-0.560** (0.17)
Right		0.036 (0.42)	0.160 (0.47)
Religious		0.219 (0.16)	0.119 (0.21)
Regime Type		-0.020 (0.11)	0.170 (0.14)
Foreign Sponsor		-0.079 (0.09)	-0.015 (0.09)
Territorial Control		0.157 (0.09)	-0.085 (0.10)
Terrorist Attacks		0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of Groups		0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Δ Number of Groups		-0.000 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Conflict Year		0.105 (0.10)	0.278* (0.12)
Soft Ratio $_{lag}$		0.195 (0.10)	0.206 (0.13)
Size			0.075 (0.05)
GDP $_{log}$			0.025 (0.05)
Population $_{log}$			-0.169** (0.06)
Repression			0.009 (0.06)
Ethnic Fractionalization			0.431 (0.24)
Constant	0.488*** (0.06)	0.411* (0.17)	2.704* (1.08)
Observations	2194	2145	1121

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

H.2 Macro-level: Linear model specification

Table A7: Linear Model with Fixed Effects

	Binary	Binary	Count (ln)	Count (ln)
Infighting	-0.117*** (0.02)	-0.124*** (0.03)	-0.057*** (0.01)	-0.065*** (0.02)
Nationalist	-0.073 (0.07)	-0.065 (0.10)	-0.073 (0.07)	-0.058 (0.09)
Left	0.226 (0.18)	0.284 (0.22)	0.233 (0.17)	0.306 (0.22)
Right	0.053 (0.04)		0.048 (0.04)	
Religious	-0.109* (0.04)	-0.058 (0.04)	-0.103* (0.04)	-0.053 (0.04)
Regime Type	-0.006 (0.08)	-0.001 (0.07)	-0.019 (0.08)	-0.010 (0.07)
Foreign Sponsor	0.030 (0.03)	0.057 (0.04)	0.031 (0.03)	0.060 (0.04)
Territorial Control	0.051 (0.05)	0.071 (0.08)	0.048 (0.05)	0.073 (0.08)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Δ Number of Groups	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Conflict Year	0.035 (0.03)	0.043 (0.04)	0.036 (0.03)	0.048 (0.04)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.012 (0.02)	0.005 (0.03)	0.011 (0.02)	0.002 (0.03)
Size		0.007 (0.02)		0.007 (0.02)
GDP <i>log</i>		-0.027 (0.05)		-0.022 (0.05)
Population <i>log</i>		-0.002 (0.26)		0.000 (0.27)
Repression		0.001 (0.02)		-0.000 (0.02)
Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.724 (0.59)		-0.739 (0.61)
Constant	0.618*** (0.16)	1.180 (4.67)	0.621*** (0.16)	1.114 (4.78)
Group FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2145	1121	2145	1121

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

H.3 Macro-level: Alternative dependent variable

Table A8: Alternative Dependent Variable: Count

	(1) Soft Attacks	(2) Soft Attacks
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-0.142 (3.281)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.008 (1.686)
Nationalist	2.742 (2.239)	2.732 (2.266)
Left	0.556 (3.534)	0.544 (3.649)
Right	15.496 (12.215)	15.474 (12.310)
Religious	8.456 (4.901)	8.432 (4.864)
Regime Type	0.059 (1.293)	0.063 (1.328)
Foreign Sponsor	-1.459 (1.678)	-1.457 (1.676)
Territorial Control	2.092 (1.294)	2.083 (1.340)
Terrorist Attacks	0.586*** (0.071)	0.586*** (0.073)
Number of Groups	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Δ Number of Groups	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Conflict Year	0.017 (1.537)	0.017 (1.514)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.508 (1.258)	-0.506 (1.247)
Constant	-2.506 (2.774)	-2.508 (2.768)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A9: Alternative Dependent Variable: Binary

	(1) Soft Binary	(2) Soft Binary
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-1.228*** (0.272)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.999*** (0.220)
Nationalist	-0.126 (0.297)	-0.125 (0.298)
Left	-0.313 (0.369)	-0.323 (0.369)
Right	0.068 (0.594)	0.175 (0.548)
Religious	0.533 (0.343)	0.530 (0.342)
Regime Type	0.002 (0.213)	-0.000 (0.213)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.132 (0.180)	-0.127 (0.181)
Territorial Control	0.376 (0.201)	0.375 (0.200)
Terrorist Attacks	0.564*** (0.077)	0.567*** (0.077)
Number of Groups	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Δ Number of Groups	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict Year	-0.064 (0.183)	-0.058 (0.183)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.258 (0.211)	0.247 (0.211)
Constant	-0.093 (0.355)	-0.096 (0.355)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A10: Poisson Model with Fixed-Effects

	(1) Terror Attacks	(2) Attacks on Civilians
Violent Competition	-0.469*** (0.021)	-0.377*** (0.050)
Any Competition	0.388*** (0.017)	0.251*** (0.039)
Terrorist Attacks <i>lag</i>	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
Group-Year FE	✓	✓
Observations	3988	3308

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$

H.4 Macro-level: Removal of military targets

Table A11: Main Models Without Military Targets

	Binary	Binary	Count	Count
Infighting	-0.644*** (0.08)	-0.549*** (0.11)	-0.240*** (0.04)	-0.235*** (0.06)
Nationalist	-0.130 (0.15)	-0.371* (0.17)	-0.151 (0.15)	-0.380* (0.17)
Left	-0.454** (0.16)	-0.597*** (0.17)	-0.489** (0.16)	-0.600*** (0.17)
Right	0.032 (0.36)	0.071 (0.38)	-0.037 (0.36)	0.029 (0.38)
Religious	0.168 (0.16)	0.089 (0.20)	0.146 (0.16)	0.090 (0.20)
Regime Type	-0.074 (0.11)	0.108 (0.14)	-0.080 (0.12)	0.093 (0.15)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.075 (0.09)	-0.003 (0.10)	-0.079 (0.10)	0.004 (0.10)
Territorial Control	0.097 (0.09)	-0.149 (0.10)	0.071 (0.09)	-0.161 (0.10)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)
Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Conflict Year	0.059 (0.10)	0.241 (0.13)	0.066 (0.10)	0.254* (0.13)
Soft Ratio $_{log}$	0.161 (0.10)	0.217 (0.13)	0.157 (0.10)	0.206 (0.13)
Size		0.043 (0.05)		0.034 (0.05)
GDP $_{log}$		0.019 (0.06)		0.028 (0.06)
Population $_{log}$		-0.194** (0.06)		-0.197*** (0.06)
Repression		0.008 (0.06)		0.004 (0.06)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.437 (0.24)		0.501* (0.24)
Constant	0.249 (0.17)	3.036** (1.13)	0.245 (0.17)	3.022** (1.12)
Observations	2145	1121	2145	1121

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

H.5 Macro-level: Reduced sample without Syria

Table A12: Main Models Without Syria

	Binary	Binary	Count	Count
Infighting	-0.616*** (0.08)	-0.562*** (0.12)	-0.257*** (0.04)	-0.245*** (0.07)
Nationalist	0.066 (0.15)	-0.422* (0.18)	0.051 (0.15)	-0.430* (0.18)
Left	-0.203 (0.16)	-0.569** (0.18)	-0.235 (0.16)	-0.573** (0.18)
Right	0.318 (0.41)	0.165 (0.47)	0.255 (0.40)	0.118 (0.48)
Religious	0.427** (0.16)	0.121 (0.22)	0.412* (0.16)	0.125 (0.22)
Regime Type	0.090 (0.11)	0.177 (0.14)	0.083 (0.11)	0.159 (0.15)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.082 (0.08)	-0.011 (0.09)	-0.085 (0.09)	-0.004 (0.09)
Territorial Control	0.095 (0.08)	-0.059 (0.10)	0.068 (0.08)	-0.073 (0.10)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Conflict Year	0.091 (0.10)	0.274* (0.13)	0.096 (0.09)	0.289* (0.12)
Soft Ratio $_{log}$	0.190 (0.10)	0.217 (0.13)	0.184 (0.11)	0.207 (0.13)
Size		0.075 (0.05)		0.066 (0.05)
GDP $_{log}$		0.026 (0.05)		0.035 (0.05)
Population $_{log}$		-0.170** (0.06)		-0.174** (0.06)
Repression		0.010 (0.06)		0.006 (0.06)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.379 (0.25)		0.449 (0.25)
Constant	0.223 (0.17)	2.759* (1.10)	0.221 (0.17)	2.737* (1.09)
Observations	2073	1114	2073	1114

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

H.6 Macro-level: Competition measured with MGAR data

Table A13: MGAR Full Data: Linear Model with Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Soft Ratio
Violent Competition	-0.068 [†] (0.041)
Any Competition	0.051 (0.035)
Nationalist	-0.077 (0.071)
Left	0.238 (0.173)
Right	0.021 (0.036)
Religious	-0.109* (0.046)
Regime Type	-0.008 (0.079)
Foreign Sponsor	0.031 (0.027)
Territorial Control	0.043 (0.046)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.000)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.030 (0.026)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.012 (0.024)
Constant	0.613*** (0.165)
Observations	2145
Year FE	✓

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.10$

H.7 Macro-level: Brutality of competitors and partners

Table A14: Brutality of Competitors and Partners

	(1) Binary	(2) Count	(3) Binary	(4) Count
Infighting	-0.623*** (0.000)	-0.256*** (0.000)	-0.609*** (0.000)	-0.241*** (0.000)
Nationalist	-0.118 (0.424)	-0.133 (0.364)	-0.070 (0.665)	-0.095 (0.556)
Left	-0.342* (0.030)	-0.373* (0.018)	-0.277 (0.134)	-0.319 (0.083)
Right	0.167 (0.728)	0.106 (0.824)	0.079 (0.850)	0.014 (0.974)
Religious	0.285 (0.071)	0.278 (0.081)	0.355 (0.073)	0.329 (0.095)
Regime Type	-0.051 (0.617)	-0.061 (0.562)	-0.010 (0.926)	-0.018 (0.868)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.091 (0.305)	-0.096 (0.285)	-0.065 (0.459)	-0.070 (0.429)
Territorial Control	0.179* (0.037)	0.154 (0.072)	0.174* (0.043)	0.149 (0.083)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.067)	0.001* (0.017)	0.001 (0.165)	0.001 (0.069)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.865)	0.000 (0.912)	-0.000 (0.802)	-0.000 (0.755)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.715)	-0.000 (0.748)	-0.000 (0.672)	-0.000 (0.699)
Conflict Year	0.109 (0.254)	0.117 (0.219)	0.098 (0.305)	0.104 (0.271)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.211* (0.038)	0.208* (0.042)	0.192 (0.065)	0.190 (0.070)
Soft Ratio (Country) <i>lag</i>	0.739*** (0.000)	0.763*** (0.000)		
Soft Attacks by Ideological Partners			-0.396 (0.230)	-0.363 (0.271)
Observations	2082	2082	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$

Table A15: Brutality of Competitors and Ideological Partners

	(1)	(2)
Infighting	-0.345 (0.219)	-0.584*** (0.142)
Soft Ratio (Country) <i>lag</i>	0.807*** (0.229)	
Infighting × Soft Ratio (Country) <i>lag</i>	-0.607 (0.448)	
Soft Ratio (Ideological Partner)		-0.380 (0.343)
Infighting × Soft Ratio (Ideological Partner)		-0.109 (0.469)
Nationalist	-0.118 (0.147)	-0.072 (0.161)
Left	-0.337* (0.157)	-0.279 (0.185)
Right	0.190 (0.476)	0.074 (0.423)
Religious	0.291 (0.158)	0.356 (0.199)
Regime Type	-0.053 (0.102)	-0.010 (0.105)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.093 (0.089)	-0.065 (0.087)
Territorial Control	0.179* (0.086)	0.174* (0.086)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.107 (0.096)	0.098 (0.095)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.210* (0.102)	0.192 (0.104)
Constant	0.001 (0.210)	0.421* (0.176)
Observations	2082	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

H.8 Macro-level: Ethnic and religious claims

Table A16: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Claims

	(1)	(2)
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-0.599*** (0.085)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.237*** (0.046)
Nationalist	-0.203 (0.157)	-0.225 (0.157)
Left	-0.312 (0.178)	-0.341 (0.179)
Right	0.090 (0.411)	0.026 (0.409)
Religious	0.251 (0.178)	0.239 (0.180)
Regime Type	-0.014 (0.104)	-0.023 (0.105)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.078 (0.086)	-0.084 (0.087)
Territorial Control	0.208* (0.087)	0.185* (0.087)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.126 (0.104)	0.134 (0.105)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.191 (0.103)	0.188 (0.104)
Ethnic Claim	0.140 (0.129)	0.148 (0.133)
Religious Claim	-0.090 (0.085)	-0.096 (0.085)
Constant	0.352 (0.199)	0.345 (0.200)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

H.9 Macro-level: Shared audience

Table A17: Shared Audience as Rival

	Binary	Count (ln)
Infighting	-0.654*** (0.083)	-0.220*** (0.045)
Nationalist	-0.156 (0.148)	-0.161 (0.149)
Left	-0.374* (0.162)	-0.422** (0.163)
Right	0.097 (0.418)	0.006 (0.424)
Religious	0.227 (0.161)	0.201 (0.164)
Regime Type	-0.007 (0.104)	-0.013 (0.107)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.069 (0.087)	-0.072 (0.089)
Territorial Control	0.177* (0.086)	0.154 (0.086)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.097 (0.095)	0.109 (0.095)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.193 (0.104)	0.198 (0.104)
Shared Audience	0.115 (0.159)	-0.123 (0.161)
Constant	0.412* (0.174)	0.404* (0.175)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$

H.10 Macro-level: Ethnic constituency

Table A18: Ethnic Constituency

	Ethnic Con. Binary IV	No Con. Binary IV	Ethnic Con. Count IV	No Con. Count IV
Infighting	-0.661*** (0.129)	-0.422*** (0.107)	-0.264*** (0.072)	-0.162** (0.054)
Nationalist	-0.236 (0.167)	-0.065 (0.368)	-0.260 (0.166)	-0.071 (0.371)
Left	-0.147 (0.316)	-0.288 (0.314)	-0.144 (0.318)	-0.321 (0.319)
Right	1.083*** (0.235)	-0.805 (0.438)	1.027*** (0.271)	-0.859 (0.454)
Religious	0.315 (0.219)	0.194 (0.318)	0.326 (0.225)	0.165 (0.323)
Regime Type	0.033 (0.155)	-0.020 (0.170)	0.038 (0.157)	-0.024 (0.176)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.202 (0.126)	0.017 (0.118)	-0.219 (0.127)	0.024 (0.121)
Territorial Control	0.203 (0.137)	0.265* (0.119)	0.194 (0.139)	0.240* (0.119)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Δ Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)
Conflict Year	0.295* (0.128)	-0.181 (0.130)	0.312* (0.126)	-0.180 (0.131)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.060 (0.140)	0.415*** (0.125)	0.057 (0.140)	0.411** (0.127)
Constant	0.422 (0.227)	0.315 (0.333)	0.398 (0.224)	0.330 (0.336)
Observations	1337	808	1337	808

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$




Figure A4: Effects of infighting for groups with and without an ethnic constituency

H.11 Macro-level: Foreign support

Table A19: Foreign Support Interaction

	(1)	(2)
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-0.651*** (0.108)	
Foreign Sponsor	-0.092 (0.100)	-0.055 (0.098)
Infighting <i>binary</i> × Foreign Sponsor	0.126 (0.157)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.225*** (0.057)
Infighting <i>count</i> × Foreign Sponsor		-0.055 (0.081)
Nationalist	-0.153 (0.149)	-0.166 (0.148)
Left	-0.386* (0.161)	-0.414** (0.160)
Right	0.092 (0.420)	0.007 (0.419)
Religious	0.220 (0.162)	0.207 (0.162)
Regime Type	-0.004 (0.105)	-0.018 (0.107)
Territorial Control	0.176* (0.086)	0.152 (0.086)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.103 (0.096)	0.104 (0.095)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.198 (0.103)	0.194 (0.104)
Constant	0.416* (0.175)	0.402* (0.174)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A20: Foreign Support Interaction: Weapons

	(1)	(2)
Infighting	-0.337*** (0.079)	-0.268** (0.095)
Weapons Support	0.112 (0.107)	0.165 (0.128)
Infighting × Weapons Support		-0.268 (0.188)
Nationalist	-0.154 (0.160)	-0.154 (0.160)
Left	-0.397* (0.173)	-0.388* (0.172)
Right	-0.078 (0.182)	-0.098 (0.180)
Religious	0.081 (0.197)	0.074 (0.195)
Regime Type	-0.013 (0.119)	-0.015 (0.118)
Territorial Control	0.117 (0.096)	0.112 (0.095)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.012 (0.157)	0.014 (0.157)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.197 (0.124)	0.195 (0.124)
Constant	0.464* (0.231)	0.450 (0.233)
Observations	1247	1247

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A21: Foreign Support Interaction: Materials

	(1)	(2)
Infighting	-0.338*** (0.079)	-0.291*** (0.088)
Material Support	0.304** (0.116)	0.349** (0.132)
Infighting × Material Support		-0.235 (0.203)
Nationalist	-0.120 (0.158)	-0.122 (0.159)
Left	-0.368* (0.178)	-0.362* (0.177)
Right	-0.004 (0.182)	-0.017 (0.182)
Religious	0.128 (0.190)	0.125 (0.190)
Regime Type	0.029 (0.119)	0.030 (0.119)
Territorial Control	0.108 (0.096)	0.106 (0.095)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.029 (0.151)	0.026 (0.151)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.186 (0.126)	0.181 (0.125)
Constant	0.390 (0.224)	0.387 (0.224)
Observations	1247	1247

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A22: Foreign Support Interaction: Training

	(1)	(2)
Infighting	-0.342*** (0.080)	-0.290** (0.100)
Training Support	0.150 (0.099)	0.187 (0.118)
Infighting × Training Support		-0.171 (0.182)
Nationalist	-0.125 (0.165)	-0.123 (0.165)
Left	-0.378* (0.177)	-0.369* (0.176)
Right	-0.052 (0.185)	-0.066 (0.185)
Religious	0.101 (0.198)	0.095 (0.197)
Regime Type	-0.030 (0.118)	-0.034 (0.118)
Territorial Control	0.117 (0.096)	0.114 (0.095)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.011 (0.156)	0.008 (0.156)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.191 (0.125)	0.187 (0.125)
Constant	0.447 (0.231)	0.442 (0.232)
Observations	1247	1247

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A23: Foreign Support Interaction: Intelligence

	(1)	(2)
Infighting	-0.339*** (0.079)	-0.346*** (0.080)
Intelligence Support	0.169 (0.202)	0.150 (0.220)
Infighting × Intelligence Support		0.172 (0.410)
Nationalist	-0.153 (0.170)	-0.153 (0.169)
Left	-0.398* (0.178)	-0.400* (0.178)
Right	-0.106 (0.178)	-0.104 (0.178)
Religious	0.064 (0.196)	0.066 (0.196)
Regime Type	-0.020 (0.118)	-0.019 (0.118)
Territorial Control	0.123 (0.095)	0.124 (0.095)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	-0.014 (0.154)	-0.015 (0.154)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.195 (0.125)	0.197 (0.125)
Constant	0.514* (0.226)	0.514* (0.226)
Observations	1247	1247

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A24: Foreign Support Interaction: Territory

	(1)	(2)
Infighting	-0.357*** (0.080)	-0.387*** (0.100)
Territorial Support	-0.172 (0.106)	-0.192 (0.119)
Infighting × Territorial Support		0.125 (0.174)
Nationalist	-0.218 (0.164)	-0.220 (0.164)
Left	-0.474** (0.173)	-0.478** (0.173)
Right	-0.210 (0.183)	-0.203 (0.184)
Religious	-0.011 (0.199)	-0.012 (0.200)
Regime Type	0.010 (0.118)	0.010 (0.118)
Territorial Control	0.129 (0.097)	0.128 (0.097)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	-0.008 (0.162)	-0.009 (0.163)
Soft Ratio _{lag}	0.193 (0.124)	0.196 (0.124)
Constant	0.619** (0.239)	0.627** (0.243)
Observations	1247	1247

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

H.12 Macro-level: Lagged civilian attacks

Table A25: Lagged Civilian Attacks Interaction

	(1)	(2)
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-0.383*** (0.090)	
Civilian Attacks <i>lag</i>	0.012* (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)
Infighting <i>binary</i> × Civilian Attacks <i>lag</i>	-0.008 (0.005)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.164*** (0.044)
Infighting <i>count</i> × Civilian Attacks <i>lag</i>		-0.000 (0.001)
Nationalist	-0.060 (0.149)	-0.066 (0.149)
Left	-0.292 (0.155)	-0.300 (0.157)
Right	0.287 (0.317)	0.270 (0.336)
Religious	0.208 (0.169)	0.214 (0.174)
Regime Type	-0.036 (0.116)	-0.037 (0.118)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.088 (0.097)	-0.089 (0.099)
Territorial Control	0.028 (0.087)	0.018 (0.088)
Terrorist Attacks	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.157 (0.114)	0.170 (0.115)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.322** (0.102)	0.307** (0.103)
Constant	0.256 (0.182)	0.260 (0.184)
Observations	1498	1498

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

H.13 Macro-level: Rebel governance

Table A26: Governance on Soft Ratio

	Soft Ratio	Soft Ratio
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-0.509*** (0.113)	
Governance	0.124 (0.111)	0.121 (0.109)
Infighting <i>binary</i> × Governance	-0.223 (0.172)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.174*** (0.051)
Infighting <i>count</i> × Governance		-0.195* (0.083)
Nationalist	-0.212 (0.154)	-0.227 (0.154)
Left	-0.314 (0.178)	-0.329 (0.179)
Right	0.096 (0.424)	0.035 (0.423)
Religious	0.247 (0.180)	0.231 (0.181)
Regime Type	-0.033 (0.106)	-0.039 (0.108)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.080 (0.086)	-0.082 (0.087)
Territorial Control	0.205* (0.087)	0.184* (0.086)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.123 (0.104)	0.128 (0.105)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.190 (0.102)	0.185 (0.103)
Ethnic Claim	0.146 (0.129)	0.159 (0.132)
Religious Claim	-0.109 (0.085)	-0.107 (0.086)
Constant	0.324 (0.201)	0.310 (0.201)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A27: Governance on Terrorist Attacks

	(1) Terrorist Attacks	(2) Terrorist Attacks
Infighting <i>binary</i>	1.281*** (0.164)	
Governance	0.243 (0.129)	0.200 (0.132)
Infighting <i>binary</i> × Governance	-0.481* (0.209)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		0.517*** (0.069)
Infighting <i>count</i> × Governance		-0.007 (0.125)
Nationalist	0.132 (0.137)	0.157 (0.144)
Left	0.403* (0.170)	0.428* (0.171)
Right	0.937 (0.595)	1.071 (0.624)
Religious	0.481** (0.172)	0.493** (0.179)
Regime Type	0.358* (0.149)	0.383* (0.154)
Foreign Sponsor	0.075 (0.094)	0.088 (0.099)
Territorial Control	0.335** (0.110)	0.364** (0.114)
Terrorist Attacks	0.008*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.200 (0.126)	0.192 (0.128)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.061 (0.073)	-0.050 (0.074)
Ethnic Claim	-0.219 (0.120)	-0.246* (0.123)
Religious Claim	0.496*** (0.092)	0.491*** (0.096)
Constant	1.510*** (0.183)	1.541*** (0.187)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

H.14 Macro-level: Conflict intensity

Table A28: Conflict Intensity Controls

	(1) Soft Ratio	(2) Soft Ratio
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-0.598*** (0.08)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.235*** (0.05)
Nationalist	-0.220 (0.16)	-0.241 (0.16)
Left	-0.450** (0.17)	-0.486** (0.17)
Right	-0.016 (0.41)	-0.085 (0.41)
Religious	0.191 (0.16)	0.175 (0.17)
Regime Type	-0.008 (0.10)	-0.016 (0.11)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.068 (0.09)	-0.073 (0.09)
Territorial Control	0.209* (0.09)	0.186* (0.09)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Conflict Year	0.116 (0.10)	0.124 (0.10)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.195 (0.10)	0.192 (0.10)
Government Battle Deaths <i>log</i>	-0.006 (0.06)	-0.004 (0.06)
Rebel Battle Deaths <i>log</i>	-0.031 (0.06)	-0.035 (0.06)
Constant	0.489** (0.18)	0.489** (0.18)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

H.15 Macro-level: Non-violent mobilization

Table A29: Protest Controls

	(1)	(2)
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-0.584*** (0.083)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.232*** (0.045)
Nationalist	-0.142 (0.146)	-0.158 (0.145)
Left	-0.387* (0.157)	-0.419** (0.157)
Right	0.072 (0.407)	0.008 (0.405)
Religious	0.231 (0.159)	0.219 (0.159)
Regime Type	0.001 (0.102)	-0.006 (0.104)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.079 (0.086)	-0.085 (0.088)
Territorial Control	0.168* (0.085)	0.144 (0.085)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.076 (0.095)	0.081 (0.094)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.196 (0.102)	0.192 (0.103)
Anti-Government Protests	-0.015* (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)
Constant	0.464** (0.172)	0.465* (0.173)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

H.16 Macro-level: Organizational size

Table A30: Size Interaction (Size as 1-4 Categorical)

	Soft Ratio	Soft Ratio
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-1.168*** (0.255)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.429** (0.142)
Size	0.087 (0.063)	0.096 (0.062)
Infighting <i>binary</i> × Size	0.215* (0.088)	
Infighting <i>count</i> × Size		0.072 (0.050)
Nationalist	-0.135 (0.150)	-0.154 (0.150)
Left	-0.381* (0.160)	-0.414** (0.160)
Right	0.195 (0.420)	0.116 (0.419)
Religious	0.257 (0.163)	0.239 (0.164)
Regime Type	-0.021 (0.107)	-0.028 (0.110)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.092 (0.086)	-0.091 (0.086)
Territorial Control	0.135 (0.084)	0.113 (0.084)
Terrorist Attacks	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Conflict Year	0.086 (0.098)	0.097 (0.098)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.191 (0.104)	0.154 (0.099)
Constant	0.224 (0.243)	0.228 (0.239)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A31: Size Interaction (Stronger/Weaker than Government Measure)

	(1) Soft Ratio	(2) Soft Ratio
Infighting <i>binary</i>	-0.645*** (0.09)	
Infighting <i>count</i>		-0.246*** (0.05)
Infighting <i>binary</i> × Size	0.255 (0.16)	
Infighting <i>count</i> × Size		0.038 (0.08)
Size	0.153 (0.12)	0.184 (0.11)
Nationalist	-0.139 (0.15)	-0.158 (0.15)
Left	-0.394* (0.16)	-0.428** (0.16)
Right	0.133 (0.42)	0.062 (0.42)
Religious	0.247 (0.16)	0.229 (0.16)
Regime Type	-0.013 (0.11)	-0.023 (0.11)
Foreign Sponsor	-0.087 (0.09)	-0.087 (0.09)
Territorial Control	0.141 (0.09)	0.119 (0.09)
Terrorist Attacks	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Number of Groups	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Δ Number of Groups	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Conflict Year	0.085 (0.10)	0.093 (0.10)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.191 (0.10)	
Constant	0.418* (0.17)	0.442** (0.17)
Observations	2145	2145

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on organization.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

I Micro-Level Robustness Tests

I.1 Micro-level: GEE specification

Table A32: Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) Specification

	Model 1	Model 2
Infighting	-1.389** (0.48)	-1.616** (0.52)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.336 (0.49)	-0.453 (0.52)
Battle Deaths		-0.006 (0.01)
Terrorist Attacks		0.039 (0.06)
Territorial Control		-0.069 (0.56)
Tax (Index)		0.107 (0.27)
Services (Index)		-0.184 (0.30)
Constant	-0.105 (0.63)	-0.099 (0.68)
District FE	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓
Observations	125	125

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.2 Micro-level: GLM specification

Table A33: Main Models with GLM Specification (Without Fixed Effects)

	Model 1	Model 2
Infighting	-1.394*** (0.22)	-1.510*** (0.21)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	0.253 (0.35)	0.269 (0.34)
Battle Deaths		-0.001 (0.00)
Terrorist Attacks		0.034 (0.03)
Territorial Control		-0.109 (0.43)
Tax (Index)		0.152 (0.15)
Services (Index)		-0.160 (0.16)
Constant	0.164 (0.30)	0.143 (0.39)
Observations	129	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.3 Micro-level: Count measure of infighting

Table A34: Main Models with Count Measure of Infighting

	Model 1	Model 2
Infighting <i>log</i>	-0.212*** (0.04)	-0.281*** (0.04)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.137 (0.10)	-0.191 (0.09)
Battle Deaths		-0.002** (0.00)
Terrorist Attacks		0.025* (0.01)
Territorial Control		0.019 (0.10)
Tax (Index)		0.013 (0.02)
Services (Index)		-0.191 (0.09)
Constant	1.066*** (0.85)	1.089*** (0.14)
District FE	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓
Observations	129	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.4 Micro-level: Removal of military targets

Table A35: Main Models Without Military Targets

	Model 1	Model 2
Infighting	-0.356*** (0.06)	-0.418*** (0.08)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.178 (0.09)	-0.242* (0.10)
Battle Deaths		-0.003** (0.00)
Terrorist Attacks		0.006 (0.01)
Territorial Control		0.042 (0.10)
Tax (Index)		0.018 (0.03)
Services (Index)		-0.025 (0.04)
Constant	1.094*** (0.08)	1.144*** (0.130)
District FE	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓
Observations	129	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.5 Micro-level: Monthly fixed effects

Table A36: Main Models with Monthly Fixed Effects

	Model 1	Model 2
Infighting	-0.412*** (0.06)	-0.473*** (0.07)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.107 (0.08)	-0.194* (0.09)
Battle Deaths		-0.002** (0.00)
Terrorist Attacks		0.016 (0.01)
Territorial Control		0.209* (0.11)
Tax (Index)		-0.001 (0.04)
Services (Index)		-0.009 (0.39)
Constant	0.567*** (0.07)	0.506*** (0.05)
District FE	✓	✓
Month FE	✓	✓
Observations	129	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.6 Micro-level: Alternative measure of dependent variable

Table A37: Main Models with Alternative Dependent Variable

	(1) Binary	(2) Count
Infighting	-0.341** (0.080)	-0.930** (0.285)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.173 (0.097)	-0.690* (0.251)
Battle Deaths	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.011** (0.004)
Terrorist Attacks	0.042*** (0.009)	0.534*** (0.056)
Territorial Control	0.003 (0.103)	0.276 (0.186)
Tax (Index)	-0.012 (0.042)	-0.072 (0.130)
Services (Index)	-0.054 (0.057)	0.219 (0.228)
District FE	✓	✓
Temporal FE	✓	✓
Observations	129	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.7 Micro-level: Foreign civilians placebo test

Table A38: Main Models with Foreign Civilians Placebo

	Foreign Civilians	National Civilians
Infighting	-0.059 (0.041)	-0.387** (0.103)
Soft Ratio _{lag}	-0.052 (0.039)	-0.205 (0.113)
Battle Deaths	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)
Terrorist Attacks	-0.005 (0.003)	0.021 (0.010)
Territorial Control	0.022 (0.025)	0.010 (0.098)
Tax (Index)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.023 (0.021)
Services (Index)	-0.021 (0.021)	0.005 (0.040)
District FE	✓	✓
Temporal FE	✓	✓
Observations	129	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.8 Micro-level: Ethnic composition of districts

Table A39: Main Models with Ethnic Audience Distinction

	Sunni Locations	Non-Sunni & Mixed Locations
Infighting	-0.422*** (0.073)	-0.498*** (0.099)
Battle Deaths	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Terrorist Attacks	0.015 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)
Territorial Control	-0.043 (0.054)	0.017 (0.157)
Tax (Index)	0.027 (0.024)	0.013 (0.042)
Services (Index)	-0.035 (0.038)	0.163** (0.086)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.232* (0.091)	-0.215* (0.096)
Constant	1.208*** (0.089)	1.205*** (0.160)
District FE	✓	✓
Temporal FE	✓	✓
Observations	123	85

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.9 Micro-level: Ethnic polygons




Figure A5: Ethnic Composition in Iraq and Syria

I.10 Micro-level: Brutality of rivals

Table A40: Main Models Controlling for Brutality of Rivals

	Model 1	Model 2
Infighting	-0.452*** (0.077)	-0.448*** (0.080)
Battle Deaths	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Terrorist Attacks	0.014 (0.009)	0.015 (0.009)
Territorial Control	0.025 (0.100)	0.030 (0.095)
Tax (Index)	0.013 (0.027)	0.018 (0.025)
Services (Index)	-0.020 (0.044)	-0.015 (0.042)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.266* (0.094)	-0.257* (0.098)
Rival Attacks	-0.034 (0.038)	
Rival Soft Attacks		-0.001 (0.005)
Constant	1.172*** (0.126)	1.153*** (0.131)
District FE	✓	✓
Temporal FE	✓	✓
Observations	129	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

I.11 Micro-level: Conditioning on brutality of rivals

Table A41: Main Models Conditioning on Brutality of Rivals

	IS Soft Attacks
Infighting	-0.537*** (0.130)
Rival Soft Attacks	0.001 (0.019)
Infighting \times Rival Soft Attacks	-0.037* (0.014)
Constant	0.850* (0.344)
Controls	✓
District FE	✓
Temporal FE	✓
Observations	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.




Figure A6: Substantive Effect of Interaction

I.12 Micro-level: Exploring audience of rivals

Table A42: Main Models Exploring Audience of Rivals

	DV: Civilian Deaths Same Audience	DV: Civilian Deaths Different Audience
UCDP Infighting (log) <i>lag</i>	-0.255*** (0.058)	0.601* (0.209)
Infighting Battle Deaths <i>lag</i>	0.056*** (0.009)	0.008* (0.001)
Battle Deaths	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Terrorist Attacks	-0.028 (0.024)	0.016 (0.019)
Territorial Control	0.319 (0.250)	-0.495 (0.410)
Tax (Index)	-0.011 (0.050)	-0.151 (0.191)
Services (Index)	-0.109 (0.108)	-0.449 (0.263)
Soft Ratio <i>lag</i>	-0.408 (0.296)	0.083 (0.414)
Constant	-0.628 (0.128)	0.760 (0.740)
District FE	✓	✓
Temporal FE	✓	✓
Observations	129	129

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on district.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.