Appendix A: Data on Representation in International Organizations

We coded the race of IO leaders for 25 prominent worldwide IOs. Our data cover the period of 1945 to 2021, but not all IOs existed throughout this entire period. The total number of IOs was just 5 in 1945. All 25 IOs existed from 2003 to 2021.

Our sample includes the United Nations, all UN "specialized agencies" and "related organizations", as well as UNICEF and the ICC. The full list of IOs in the sample are, in alphabetical order: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Criminal Court (ICC), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labor Organization (ILO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International Trade Centre (ITC), Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), United Nations (UN), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), World Trade Organization (WTO).

Two research assistants independently coded the race of IO leaders at these 25 institutions. Since it is not always possible to know how individuals self-identify, we instructed our research team to code leaders based on how others would most likely perceive the racial identity of the individual. Leaders were coded in binary fashion, as either (1) Black/African American, or (2) from any one of the US Census Bureau's remaining racial categories, which include white, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.

In recognition of the socially constructed nature of racial classifications, when coding whether an IO leader is Black, several criteria were taken into account, in a sequential manner. Our team's first step was to consider a leader's phenotypic features, particularly their skin tone. In cases where skin tone alone is ambiguous, we asked our team to draw on media discussions to consider how the individual's race was perceived at the time. For instance, our coding of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as non-Black is influenced in part by the fact that he was not viewed as Black at the time of his appointment. Similarly, our coding of Kamil Idris, WIPO Director General from 1997 to 2007, as Black partly reflected the way his race was portrayed publicly. When no clear information is available on public perceptions of an individual's race, we instructed our team to rely on other contextual features, such as an individual's nationality. For example, an individual from a country where most of the population is not of African descent would be less likely to be perceived as Black than an individual with similar pigment but is from an African

country or from a country whose population is predominantly of African descent (e.g., Jamaica, Haiti).

Out of a total of 204 leaders, 14 were coded as Black. The data feature a high degree of inter-coder reliability: the two research assistants agreed in their coding of 203 of the 204 individuals. The authors jointly made the final determination in the one case of disagreement. Table A1 lists the 14 Black leaders along with the IO that they led, their year of appointment, and their nationality.

Table A1: List of Black IO Leaders

Name	IO	Appointment Year	Nationality
Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow	UNESCO	1974	Senegalese
Jacques Diouf	FAO	1994	Senegalese
Kofi Annan	UN	1997	Ghanaian
Kamil Idris	WIPO	1997	Sudanese
Kandeh Yumkella	UNIDO	2006	Sierra Leonean
Hamadoun Touré	ITU	2007	Malian
Kanayo F. Nwanze	IFAD	2009	Nigerian
Bishar A. Hussein	UPU	2012	Kenyan
Lassina Zerbo	CTBTO	2013	Burkinabé
Tedros Adhanom	WHO	2017	Ethiopian
Gilbert Houngbo	IFAD	2017	Togolese-Canadian
Chile Eboe-Osuji	ICC	2018	Nigerian
Pamela Coke-Hamilton	ITC	2020	Jamaican
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala	WTO	2021	Nigerian-American

Appendix B: Internet-Search Data on Okonjo-Iweala's Appointment

To explore the level of public attention to Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala's appointment to head the WTO, we use Google search-volume data. Web-search volume is widely considered a useful proxy for the level of salience of an issue (Mellon 2014; Ripberger 2011). We collected weekly data on search volume for the topic of "World Trade Organization" from Google Trends for 177 countries. To measure the degree to which Okonjo-Iweala's appointment increased attention on the organization, we compare search volume in each country in the week that her appointment was announced (February 14-20) to the average search volume in the country in the first six weeks of the year (January 1 to February 13).

The average increase in search volume about the WTO across the full set of 177 countries was 21 percentage points. Next, we sought to assess whether public interest in Okonjo-Iweala's historic appointment was stronger in Black-majority countries than in other countries. This requires us to code whether a country has a majority Black population, which is undoubtedly challenging. We coded this variable as follows. All Sub-Saharan African countries (based on the World Bank's classification) were coded as Black-majority countries. In addition, we coded seven Caribbean countries as having a majority Black population: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and Grenadines. The coding of the Caribbean countries was based on data from three sources: CIA World Factbook, Ethnic Power Relations database, and United Nations Statistics Division data on population by ethnic group (available at https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode:26).

Figure B1 compares the increase in Google search volume in countries with predominantly Black countries and in non-Black-majority countries. In the former, search volume increased by 34 percentage points on average, compared to a mean increase of 16 in the latter group. The difference across the two groups is large and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). This provides suggestive evidence that interest in the appointment of a Black IO leader was stronger among Black communities than elsewhere.

Figure B1: Google Searches for World Trade Organization



Appendix C: Description of Survey Methodology and Data

The survey in South Africa was fielded by Dynata online between August 24 and September 9, 2021. The survey was offered in the four most common languages in South Africa: English, Zulu, Xhosa, and Afrikaans. The questions were originally written in English and then translated into the other three languages. The survey begins with a series of demographic questions (race, education, age, gender, region), the respondents then received questions about the WTO and WHO, with the order of those experiments in random order, and then ends with additional attitudinal and demographic questions (including income, employment status, prior vote choice). Dynata included several quality checks to ensure that respondents were paying attention to the survey, and removed respondents that failed their internal quality checks or that provided incorrect responses to two or more of the three attention-check questions.

Survey respondents were informed that their participation was voluntary. Prior to completing the survey, they read a script stating the following: "Your personal privacy is important to Dynata and will be protected. Your personal information will never be used, sold, or transferred for the purpose of sales, direct marketing, or advertising Participation in any survey, or other type of marketing research study or event, is completely voluntary. The information you share shall remain anonymous and be treated in accordance with data protection laws and industry guidelines. Do you agree to participate?" Only subjects that agreed to participate were admitted into the study. Subjects were also required to be of adult age (18 years or older) to participate.

For compensation, Dynata gave respondents "points" that can be converted into gift card. The exact amount that each respondent was compensated varied, but was equivalent to about $1.00 per respondent. Our study did not involve any forms of deception nor did we intervene in any political processes.

The South Africa survey included some basic demographic quotas for gender, age, and education, to avoid having an overly skewed sample. Nevertheless, Table C1 shows that the South African survey is not representative. The survey over-represents more educated individuals, younger respondents, and women, particularly for the Black subsample. All population estimates come from Statistics South Africa. Data for educational attainment is based on data from the 2011 Census (available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Statistical%20release.pdf). Data on gender and age distribution come from the 2019 mid-year population estimates (available at https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022019.pdf).

Table C1: Demographic Characteristics of South African Sample

Education	White Sample	White Population	Black Sample	Black Population
Less than HS	14%	24%	7%	65%
HS grad	17%	40%	28%	27%
Above HS	69%	36%	65%	8%
Age				
18-24 Years	7%	9%	38%	19%
25-44 Years	44%	32%	49%	52%
45-64 Years	40%	34%	13%	22%
65+ Years	9%	24%	1%	7%
Gender				
Female	57%	51%	69%	51%

The US survey was fielded online by Dynata from September 21 to September 27, 2021. The survey was conducted in English. The survey was structured similarly to the South Africa survey. Respondents first received a series of demographic questions (race, education, age, gender, region), followed by the WTO and WHO experiments, which were in random order, and then ended with additional attitudinal and demographic questions (including income, employment status, prior vote choice). As with the other survey, to ensure a high-quality sample, Dynata removed respondents that did not pass their internal quality checks or that provided incorrect responses to two or more of the three attention-check questions.

The survey included quotas for age, gender, education, and whether a respondent is in an urban, suburban, or rural area, for each racial group. We did so to help ensure that the samples of white and Black Americans are representative of the larger populations along these dimensions. We focused on these dimensions since they have important effects on political attitudes in the US, and are therefore potentially important in shaping peoples' views about IOs and their responses to our treatments. Table C2 shows that our white and Black samples in the United States largely track the two groups' national demographic profiles in terms of education, age, gender, and region.

Table C2 estimates the education and gender distribution in the population based on 2019 Census data from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2019/demo/educational-attainment/cps-detailed-tables.html. Data on educational attainment are also from 2019, based on the following Census tables: https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2019/national/asrh/nc-est2019-asr5h.xlsx. Data on urban, rural, and suburban population is based on 2010 Census data, as presented at https://ruralhome.org/wp-content/uploads/storage/research_notes/rrn-race-and-ethnicity-web.pdf. Our survey questions on age, education, and gender should be directly

comparable to Census data, however the measure of urban/rural/suburban is based on subjective assessments in our survey whereas Census data is based on the size of the local population, rendering any comparisons imperfect.

Table C2 also compares the share of Black and white citizens that voted for Biden. The final row compares the sample share of the two-party vote that went to Biden with the share of validated non-Hispanic white and Black voters that did so, based on Pew Research Data (https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/06/30/behind-bidens-2020-victory/). To make our sample data comparable to this population estimate, we do not include the 20% of subjects that report voting for either a third candidate or not voting in the election. Our sample skews slightly towards Biden voters, and under-samples Trump voters, compared to the broader population of both Black and white Americans.

Table C2: Demographic Characteristics of US Sample

	White Sample	**White Population**	**Black Sample**	**Black Population**
Education				
HS or below	35%	38%	35%	46%
Some college	33%	28%	37%	30%
College grad	21%	22%	20%	15%
Postgraduate	11%	12%	8%	8%
Age				
18-24 Years	7%	11%	18%	14%
25-44 Years	33%	33%	38%	39%
45-64 Years	32%	33%	29%	31%
65+ Years	28%	23%	15%	15%
Gender				
Female	51%	51%	53%	54%
Region				
Rural	29%	26%	11%	14%
Suburban	54%	54%	44%	44%
Urban	17%	21%	45%	42%
Voting				
Biden	51%	43%	89%	92%

The WTO experiment in each survey followed the same format. Subjects first read one of four versions of the WTO vignette and then answered the main question about confidence in the WTO. This was followed by a question about WTO membership. The next three questions asked about perceived interests, fairness, and expertise; the order of those three questions was randomized. The wording for these questions is as follows:

- Do you agree or disagree that South Africa/the United States should remain a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)?
- Do you agree or disagree that the World Trade Organization's (WTO) decision-making processes are fair?
- Do you agree or disagree that the World Trade Organization's (WTO) serves the economic interests of South Africa/the United States?
- Do you agree or disagree that the World Trade Organization's (WTO) top leaders are highly qualified experts on international trade?

For these four questions, respondents were given an 11-point sliding scale, from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree."

After these questions, respondents moved on to a separate survey page, where they answered the manipulation-check questions. This began with the following script: "From what you understand about the World Trade Organization (WTO), which of the following attributes do you think describe the WTO's leader? Please do not seek out new information to answer these questions. We are interested in your best guess based on what you already know." The question about race offered three response options: (1) White; (2) Black; (3) Asian. The question about country/region of origin offered three response options: (1) United States of America (North America); (2) Nigeria (Africa); (3) Japan (Asia).

Table C3 presents summary statistics for the main variables included in the South Africa survey. The main text describes the main treatment and outcome variables in detail. The pre-treatment covariates are operationalized in the following manner:

- *Black:* Binary variable coded as 1 if subject self-identifies as "Black" and 0 if subject self-identifies as "White". Subjects that responded "other" were dropped from the survey
- *Education:* Measures the respondent's highest level of educational attainment, using the following categories: (1) No formal schooling; (2) Grade four to Grade Nine; (3) Grade Ten (4) Grade Eleven (5) Grade Twelve (6) National Certificate/National Diploma; (7) Trade Certificate; (8) Bachelors Degree; (9) Occupational Certificate; (10) Higher Diploma; (11) Honours Degree; (12) Post Graduate Certificate; (13) Masters Degree; (14) Doctorate Degree.
- *Age:* Measures respondent age using the following categories: (1) 18-24 years old; (2) 25-34 years old; (3) 35-44 years old; (4) 45-54 years old; (5) 55 or more years old.
- *Female:* Measures a respondent's gender identity. Respondents that self-identify as "female" are coded as 1, and those that self-identify as "male" or "other" are coded as 0.

- *Income:* Measures a respondent's household income over the past 12 months, using the following categories: (1) Less than 5,000 ZAF; (2) 5,000-10,000 ZAF; (3) 10,000-20,000 ZAF; (4) 20,000-50,000 ZAF; (5) 50,000-100,000 ZAF; (6) 100,00-150,000 ZAF; (7) 150,000-200,000 ZAF; (8) 200,000-250,000 ZAF; (9) 250,000-350,000 ZAF; (10); more than 350,000 ZAF
- *Vote:* Indicates which candidate/party the respondent voted for in the 2019 presidential election, using the following categories: (0) Cyril Ramaphosa/ANC; (1) Mmusi Maimane/Democratic Alliance; (2) Julius Malema/EFF; (3) Pieter Groenewald/Freedom Front Plus; (4) Other candidate/party; (5) Did not vote.
- *Province:* Indicates which province a respondent lives in: (1) Eastern Cape; (2) Free State; (3) Gauteng; (4) KwaZulu-Natal; (5) Limpopo; (6) Mpumalanga; (7) North West; (8) Northern Cape; (9) Western Cape.

Table C3: Summary Statistics for South Africa Survey

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
WTO Confidence	2,001	6.56	2.21	0	10
American Treatment	2,001	0.25	0.43	0	1
Black American Treatment	2,001	0.25	0.43	0	1
Black African Treatment	2,001	0.25	0.43	0	1
Black	2,001	0.56	0.50	0	1
Education	2,001	7.19	2.77	1	14
Age	2,001	2.69	1.40	1	5
Female	2,001	0.64	0.48	0	1
Income	2,001	5.38	3.08	1	10
Vote	2,001	2.07	2.04	0	5
Province	2,001	4.22	2.33	1	9

Table C4 presents summary statistics for the main variables included in the US survey. The main text describes the main treatment and outcome variables in detail. The pre-treatment covariates are operationalized in the following manner:

- *Black:* Binary variable coded as 1 if subject self-identifies as "Black" and 0 if subject self-identifies as "White". Subjects that responded that they belonged to a different racial or ethnic group were excluded from the survey. The additional response categories were Hispanic or Latino; Asian or Asian American; Native American; Middle Eastern; Two or more races; and Other.
- *Education:* Measures the respondent's highest level of educational attainment, using the following categories: (1) Did not graduate from high school; (2) High school graduate; (3) Some college or technical school, but not degree (yet); (4) Vocational degree, technical degree, or associate's degree; (5) Bachelor's degree; (6) Postgraduate degree.

- *Age:* Measures respondent age using the following categories: (1) 18-24 years old; (2) 25-34 years old; (3) 35-44 years old; (4) 45-54 years old; (5) 55 or more years old.
- *Female:* Measures a respondent's gender identity. Respondents that self-identify as "female" are coded as 1, and those that self-identify as "male" or "other" are coded as 0.
- *Income:* Measures a respondent's household income over the past 12 months, using the following categories: (1) Less than $25,000; (2) $25,000-$50,000, (3) $50,001-$75,000; (4) $75,001-$100,000; (5) $100,001- $150,000; (6) $150,0001-$200,000; (7) More than $200,000.
- *Vote:* Indicates which candidate/party the respondent voted for in the 2020 presidential election, using the following categories: (1) Joe Biden (Democratic Party); (2) Donald Trump (Republican Party); (3) A third candidate/party; (4) I did not vote in the election.
- *Region:* Indicates which US Census division a respondent lives in. A list of Census divisions is available at https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf. The categories are as follows: (1) New England; (2) Middle Atlantic; (3) East North Central; (4) West North Central; (5) South Atlantic; (6) East South Central; (7) West South Central; (8) Mountain; (9) Pacific.

Table C4: Summary Statistics for US Survey

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
WTO Confidence	3,033	6.09	2.63	0	10
American Treatment	3,033	0.25	0.43	0	1
Black American Treatment	3,033	0.25	0.43	0	1
Black African Treatment	3,033	0.25	0.43	0	1
Black	3,033	0.50	0.50	0	1
Education	3,033	3.43	1.44	1	6
Age	3,033	3.45	1.44	1	5
Female	3,033	0.52	0.50	0	1
Income	3,033	2.70	1.53	1	7
Vote	3,033	1.81	1.11	1	4
Region	3,033	4.82	2.15	1	9

Table C5 presents the regression output underlying the plots presented in Figure 3 in the main paper. This specification includes dummy variables for each treatment condition, for race, and the interaction between these two. In this particular specification, we treat the "American" treatment as the baseline experimental group to compare this condition with the "Black American" treatment. Individuals that identify as Black are the baseline racial category.

Table C5: Baseline Regression Results

	(1) S. Africa	(1) U.S.
Control Group	-0.15	-0.56***
	[0.181]	[0.186]
Black American Treatment	0.59***	0.71***
	[0.180]	[0.185]
Black African Treatment	0.48***	0.87***
	[0.180]	[0.186]
White	-0.68***	-0.55***
	[0.194]	[0.185]
Control GroupXWhite	-0.25	-0.10
	[0.273]	[0.262]
Black American TreatmentXWhite	-0.46*	-0.37
	[0.274]	[0.262]
Black African TreatmentXWhite	-0.47*	-0.86***
	[0.274]	[0.262]
Constant	6.76***	6.28***
	[0.127]	[0.131]
Observations	2,001	3,033
R-squared	0.063	0.061

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure C2 tests the effect of IO leaders' region-of-origin on legitimacy perceptions. To do so, we compare the "Black African" and "Black American" conditions. The figure shows that the effect is small and statistically insignificant for Black South Africans Black Americans, and white South Africans. For white Americans, the effect is modestly sized (-0.34) and statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.

Figure C2: Effect of Region on Confidence in WTO



Note: Circles indicate average treatment effect of IO leader region, by comparing mean confidence levels in "Black African" and "Black American" treatment groups. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for marginal effects. The top, middle, and lower plots show this marginal effect for white respondents, Black respondents, and the difference between Black and white respondents, respectively.

Figure C3 examines an alternative measure of legitimacy, drawing on five separate questions from the survey. The five questions are (1) confidence in the WTO; (2) support for WTO membership; (3) perceptions of whether the WTO serves national economic interests; (4) perceptions of procedural fairness; and (5) beliefs about the competence of the WTO leadership. The complete wording of these questions is provided above. We take the mean of these variables, all of which are 11-point sliding scales, to construct this alternative dependent variable.

The results based on this variable, presented in Figure C3, are a very similar to the results using our preferred measure of legitimacy, as presented in Figure 3. In both countries, the "Black American" treatment has a statistically significant positive effect among Black citizens, but a null effect among white respondents.

Figure C3: Alternative Measure of Legitimacy



Note: Circles indicate average treatment effect of IO leader race on an index variable measuring legitimacy perceptions. The effect of race is calculated by comparing average levels of this dependent variable in "Black American" and "American" treatment groups. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for marginal effects. The top, middle, and lower plots show this marginal effect for white respondents, Black respondents, and the difference between Black and white respondents, respectively.

Appendix D: Heterogeneity among White Individuals

Appendix D examines the heterogeneity among white individuals' reactions to Black IO leadership. We focus on the role of political ideology and values. We expect that white individuals with more right-wing or conservative worldviews will have more negative views of Black-led IOs than left-wing, progressive, white citizens. Similarly, we anticipate that white conservatives will respond to our treatments differently from Black individuals. The Black subgroup is the baseline category in this model.

We consider four related, but distinct, aspects of an individual's ideology and values that could potentially moderate their response to Black IO leadership. For each variable, we compare the effects of Black IO leadership across three types of respondents: Black individuals, left-wing white individuals, and right-wing white individuals. To do so, we interact the treatment with two separate variables: one that indicates the respondent is a left-wing white individual and one signifying that the respondent is a right-wing white individual.

First, we consider an individual's prior voting behavior. Our expectation is that white people that voted for socially liberal or progressive parties will respond differently than white individuals that voted for conservative parties. In South Africa, respondents are coded as liberal if they voted for a socially-progressive party in the 2019 general election (African National Congress, Democratic Alliance, or Economic Freedom Fighters), and are labeled conservative otherwise. In the United States, we code individuals that voted for Biden in the 2020 election as liberals and others as conservatives.

Table D1 presents the output from these regression models, while Figure D1 presents the main results of interest in graphical form. In both countries, the effect of Black IO leadership has the largest (positive) effect among Black respondents, followed by white individuals that voted for socially liberal parties, and least-positive effect among white people that voted for conservative parties. The treatment effect is significant at the 90% confidence level for white Biden voters in the United States, but it is not significantly different from zero for non-Biden-voting white people in the United States, or for either group of white people in South Africa. In both countries, the difference between Black individuals and white liberals is not significant, nor is the difference between white liberals and white conservatives. The bottom plot of the figure shows that "Black American" treatment has a significantly weaker effect among white conservatives compared to Black people ($p < 0.05$ in South Africa; $p < 0.10$ in the US).

Table D1: Moderating Role of Partisanship

	(1) S. Africa	(2) U.S.
Control Group	-0.15	-0.56***
	[0.181]	[0.180]
Black American Treatment	0.59***	0.71***
	[0.179]	[0.179]
Black African Treatment	0.48***	0.87***
	[0.179]	[0.180]
White Liberal Vote	-0.29**	0.43*
	[0.115]	[0.233]
White Conservative Vote	-0.51**	-1.25***
	[0.254]	[0.209]
Control GroupXWhite Liberal Vote	-0.36	-0.11
	[0.319]	[0.332]
Black American TreatmentXWhite Liberal Vote	-0.23	-0.17
	[0.321]	[0.328]
Black African TreatmentXWhite Liberal Vote	-0.27	-0.47
	[0.319]	[0.337]
Control GroupXWhite Conservative Vote	-0.10	-0.04
	[0.371]	[0.294]
Black American TreatmentXWhite Conservative Vote	-0.82**	-0.55*
	[0.371]	[0.296]
Black African TreatmentXWhite Conservative Vote	-0.86**	-0.96***
	[0.377]	[0.292]
Constant	6.76***	6.28***
	[0.126]	[0.127]
Observations	2,001	3,033
R-squared	0.070	0.123

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure D1: Interaction Between Partisanship and Race



Note: Circles indicate average treatment effect of IO leader race, by comparing mean confidence levels in "American" and "Black American" treatment groups. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for marginal effects. The top three plots show this marginal effect for Black respondents, white subjects that voted for socially liberal parties, and white individuals that voted for conservative parties, respectively. The bottom three plots show the difference between Black respondents and liberal-voting whites, difference between conservative-voting whites and liberal-voting whites, and between Black respondents and white conservatives, respectively.

The second variable that we examine is an individual's self-placement along an 11-point ideological scale that ranges from "left" (0) to "right" (10). Individuals that self-place between 0 and 5 (the center/mid-point on the scale) are coded as left-wing while those that self-place as 6 or higher are defined as right-wing. Table D2 presents the regression results using this measure of ideology, and Figure D2 plots the main effects of interest. The broad patterns in the United States largely fit our expectations, with the effect of Black IO leadership being most positive among Black respondents, close to zero among right-wing whites, and at intermediate levels for left-leaning white people. The treatment effect is significantly larger for the Black subgroup compared to the right-wing white subgroup ($p < 0.1$). By contrast, the patterns among white South Africans go in the opposite direction than we anticipated: the effect of the treatment is close to zero for left-wing white individuals, but modestly positive (though not statistically significant) among right-wing white South Africans.

Table D2: Moderating Role of Left-Right Ideology

	(1) S. Africa	(2) U.S.
Control Group	-0.146	-0.557***
	[0.181]	[0.186]
Black American Treatment	0.588***	0.707***
	[0.179]	[0.185]
Black African Treatment	0.477***	0.869***
	[0.179]	[0.186]
White Left	-0.857***	-0.487**
	[0.228]	[0.220]
White Right	-0.406	-0.615***
	[0.263]	[0.234]
Control GroupXWhite Left	-0.102	-0.014
	[0.315]	[0.307]
Black American TreatmentXWhite Left	-0.580*	-0.202
	[0.314]	[0.310]
Black African TreatmentXWhite Left	-0.353	-0.747**
	[0.319]	[0.311]
Control GroupXWhite Right	-0.466	-0.241
	[0.382]	[0.340]
Black American TreatmentXWhite Right	-0.067	-0.583*
	[0.390]	[0.333]
Black African TreatmentXWhite Right	-0.633*	-1.008***
	[0.375]	[0.332]
Constant	6.755***	6.280***
	[0.127]	[0.131]
Observations	2,001	3,033
R-squared	0.068	0.063

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure D2: Interaction Between Left-Right Ideology and Race



Note: Circles indicate average treatment effect of IO leader race, by comparing mean confidence levels in "American" and "Black American" treatment groups. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for marginal effects. The top three plots show this marginal effect for Black respondents, left-wing white subjects, and right-wing white individuals, respectively. The bottom three plots show the difference between Black respondents and left-wing whites, difference between right-wing whites and left-wing whites, and between Black respondents and right-wing whites, respectively.

The third measure of political values that we examine captures individuals' beliefs about the value of diversity. Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed that "racially diverse organizations function more effectively." We code those that strongly or somewhat agree with this statement as holding a liberal/progressive views and those that report neither agreeing nor disagreeing, somewhat disagreeing, or strongly disagreeing as being conservative. The results, presented in Table D3 and Figure D3, are in line with expectations. The effect of Black IO leadership is close to zero in both countries among white individuals that do not agree that racially diverse organizations are more effective. Among white people that agree that racially diverse organizations are more effective, the treatment effect is moderately positive, but smaller than the effect among Black individuals.

Table D3: Moderating Role of Pro-Diversity Attitudes

	(1) S. Africa	(2) U.S.
Control Group	-0.146	-0.557***
	[0.180]	[0.181]
Black American Treatment	0.588***	0.707***
	[0.178]	[0.181]
Black African Treatment	0.477***	0.869***
	[0.178]	[0.181]
White Pro-Diversity	-0.432*	0.138
	[0.248]	[0.227]
White Anti-Diversity	-0.886***	-1.142***
	[0.235]	[0.217]
Control GroupXWhite Pro-Diversity	-0.366	-0.106
	[0.350]	[0.320]
Black American TreatmentXWhite Pro-Diversity	-0.163	-0.184
	[0.356]	[0.318]
Black African TreatmentXWhite Pro-Diversity	0.091	-0.449
	[0.349]	[0.320]
Control GroupXWhite Anti-Diversity	-0.151	-0.103
	[0.329]	[0.307]
Black American TreatmentXWhite Anti-Diversity	-0.630*	-0.594*
	[0.326]	[0.308]
Black African TreatmentXWhite Anti-Diversity	-0.959***	-1.234***
	[0.331]	[0.306]
Constant	6.755***	6.280***
	[0.126]	[0.128]
Observations	2,001	3,033
R-squared	0.081	0.108

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure D3: Interaction Between Pro-Diversity Attitudes and Race



Note: Circles indicate average treatment effect of IO leader race, by comparing mean confidence levels in "American" and "Black American" treatment groups. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for marginal effects. The top three plots show this marginal effect for Black respondents, white respondents with pro-diversity views, and white individuals with anti-diversity views, respectively. The bottom three plots show the difference between Black respondents and pro-diversity whites, difference between anti-diversity white people and pro-diversity white people, and between Black respondents and anti-diversity whites, respectively.

The final variable that we explore asks respondents about their agreement with the following: "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs." This question has been used in previous work as a proxy for ethnocentric attitudes (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). We code respondents that somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement as ethnocentrists, while others are treated as holding multicultural values. As shown in Table D4 and Figure D4, the results are once again broadly consistent with intuition, though in this case the pattern is starker in South Africa than in the United States. The effect of Black IO leadership is not statistically significant for either group of white individuals, but the point estimate is moderately positive for white individuals that support multiculturalism while close to zero for ethnocentric whites. In South Africa, the difference between whites with ethnocentrist attitudes and Black individuals is statistically significant.

Table D4: Moderating Role of Ethnocentrist Attitudes

	(1) S. Africa	(2) U.S.
Control Group	-0.146	-0.557***
	[0.181]	[0.186]
Black American Treatment	0.588***	0.707***
	[0.180]	[0.185]
Black African Treatment	0.477***	0.869***
	[0.180]	[0.185]
White Multicultural	-0.836***	-0.770***
	[0.217]	[0.203]
White Ethnocentric	-0.309	-0.000
	[0.295]	[0.275]
Control GroupXWhite Multicultural	-0.105	-0.029
	[0.306]	[0.285]
Black American TreatmentXWhite Multicultural	-0.262	-0.299
	[0.310]	[0.287]
Black African TreatmentXWhite Multicultural	-0.383	-0.642**
	[0.306]	[0.288]
Control GroupXWhite Ethnocentric	-0.596	-0.158
	[0.410]	[0.402]
Black American TreatmentXWhite Ethnocentric	-0.882**	-0.535
	[0.402]	[0.388]
Black African TreatmentXWhite Ethnocentric	-0.670	-1.399***
	6.755***	6.280***
Constant	[0.127]	[0.131]
	2,001	3,033
Observations	0.064	0.065
R-squared	6.755***	6.280***

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure D4: Interaction Between Ethnocentric Attitudes and Race



Note: Circles indicate average treatment effect of IO leader race, by comparing mean confidence levels in "American" and "Black American" treatment groups. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for marginal effects. The top three plots show this marginal effect for Black respondents, white people who value multicultural, and white individuals with ethnocentric attitudes, respectively. The bottom three plots show the difference between Black respondents and multicultural whites, difference between ethnocentric white individuals and multicultural white individuals, and between Black respondents and ethnocentric whites, respectively.

In sum, these exploratory analyses suggest that white peoples' partisanship, ideology, and cultural values may impact how they respond to Black IO leadership. To be sure, in no case did we detect statistically distinguishable differences between the responses of left-wing white individuals and right-wing white individuals, but the difference was in the correct direction in seven of the eight cases. In most cases, the starkest difference in how the different groups respond to Black IO leadership lies between Black individuals and conservative white individuals. In six of the eight models, we detect some at least modestly statistically significant differences (at the 90% confidence level or higher) in the treatment-effect sizes between these two groups. We interpret this as preliminary evidence that the effect of Black IO leadership on peoples' confidence in IOs is more positive for Black individuals than for conservative white ones.

Additionally, there is a consistent pattern in the United States in which white people with more left-wing views—in terms of their voting, ideology, attitudes about racial diversity,

and multicultural values—tend to respond positively to Black IO leadership. Across all four of these moderator variables, the "Black American" treatment has a positive and statistically significant effect among left-leaning white Americans ($p < 0.05$ in two cases; $p < 0.1$ in two cases). By contrast, the effect of this treatment was never statistically significant for the conservative white subsample in the United States, and it was not significant for either left-wing or right-wing white South Africans. This suggests that the overall positive effect of the "Black American" treatment among the full sample of white Americans is largely driven by white Americans with more progressive political values.

Appendix E: Causal Mediation Analysis

We use causal mediation methods to test whether perceived fairness, interests, and expertise are important mechanisms that connect an IO leader's race and confidence in that IO. Causal mediation analysis decomposes the average treatment effect, or "total effect," of the treatments into two components. The "causal mediation effect" refers to the effect that is accounted for by the mediator variable, in this case beliefs about fairness, interests, or expertise. The mediation effect is calculated as the product of two coefficients: (1) the estimated effect of the treatment on the mediator; and (2) the estimated effect of the mediator on the outcome. The "direct effect" is the remaining effect that consists of all other potential channels through which the treatment influences confidence in the WTO, and it is measured as the effect of the treatment on WTO confidence, after controlling for the mediator.

Our mediation models include a respondent's treatment status, race, and the interaction between experimental condition and race on the right-hand side of these models. Our models also include a standard set of pre-treatment covariates, namely education, age, gender, income, region, and prior vote choice. Even though our treatment is randomly assigned, since the mediators are not randomly assigned it is appropriate to adjust for these covariates to limit the possibility that these confounders bias our estimated effects of the mediators on the outcome variable (Imai et al. 2011, 770-772).

Tables E1 and E2 present the output from the regression models that were used to estimate the causal mediation effects of race in South Africa and the US, respectively. Table E3 presents the main quantities of interest from these analyses, namely the decomposition of the total effect of the "Black American" treatment into the causal mediation effect and direct effect. Across the four groups and three mediators, we find two mediation effects that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level: (1) perceptions of fairness among Black Americans; and (2) perceptions of economic interests among Black South Africans. Perceptions of national interests has a statistically significant mediation effect at the 90% confidence level for the Black American subsample.

Table E1: Causal Mediation Models for Effect of Race in South Africa

	(1) Confidence	(2) Fairness	(3) Confidence	(4) Interests	(5) Confidence	(6) Expertise
Control	-0.348**	0.222	-0.407***	0.390*	-0.321**	0.191
	[0.150]	[0.193]	[0.142]	[0.206]	[0.154]	[0.184]
Black American	0.385***	0.228	0.346***	0.355*	0.415***	0.190
	[0.117]	[0.191]	[0.116]	[0.205]	[0.129]	[0.182]
Black African	0.249	0.276	0.173	0.489**	0.348**	0.108
	[0.152]	[0.191]	[0.171]	[0.205]	[0.160]	[0.182]
White	-0.273*	-0.217	-0.215	-0.382	-0.290*	-0.204
	[0.145]	[0.231]	[0.153]	[0.247]	[0.170]	[0.220]
ControlXWhite	0.080	-0.525*	0.104	-0.676**	0.129	-0.670**
	[0.176]	[0.291]	[0.176]	[0.311]	[0.201]	[0.277]
Black AmericanXWhite	-0.174	-0.390	-0.227	-0.352	-0.161	-0.452
	[0.176]	[0.291]	[0.174]	[0.311]	[0.187]	[0.277]
Black AfricanXWhite	-0.341	-0.179	-0.290	-0.321	-0.234	-0.405
	[0.230]	[0.291]	[0.251]	[0.311]	[0.247]	[0.277]
Fairness	0.561***					
	[0.021]					
Interests			0.471***			
			[0.024]			
Expertise					0.512***	
					[0.023]	
Education	0.027*	0.024	0.037**	0.007	0.025	0.031
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.019]
Age	-0.035	0.139***	-0.031	0.158***	0.002	0.081*
	[0.029]	[0.045]	[0.035]	[0.049]	[0.034]	[0.043]
Female	-0.011	0.081	0.055	-0.043	0.034	0.000
	[0.089]	[0.111]	[0.085]	[0.119]	[0.102]	[0.106]
Income	0.025*	0.008	0.034***	-0.010	0.020*	0.019
	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.012]	[0.021]	[0.012]	[0.019]
DA voter	-0.439***	-0.504***	-0.388***	-0.709***	-0.411***	-0.605***
	[0.104]	[0.180]	[0.095]	[0.192]	[0.119]	[0.171]
EFF Voter	0.092	-0.764***	0.116	-0.961***	0.105	-0.862***
	[0.166]	[0.215]	[0.173]	[0.230]	[0.160]	[0.205]
FFP Voter	-0.287*	-0.512*	-0.171	-0.856***	-0.201	-0.728***
	[0.161]	[0.275]	[0.167]	[0.294]	[0.174]	[0.262]
Other Candidate Voter	-0.505***	-0.958***	-0.491***	-1.169***	-0.329	-1.393***
	[0.184]	[0.282]	[0.166]	[0.302]	[0.228]	[0.269]
Non-Voter	-0.449***	-0.790***	-0.486***	-0.862***	-0.536***	-0.697***
	[0.103]	[0.142]	[0.105]	[0.151]	[0.124]	[0.135]
Constant	3.313***	6.314***	3.614***	6.877***	3.004***	7.516***
	[0.241]	[0.292]	[0.270]	[0.312]	[0.244]	[0.278]
R-squared	0.434	0.053	0.370	0.079	0.354	0.066

Note: Regional fixed-effects not shown. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table E2: Causal Mediation Models for Effect of Race in United States

	(1) Confidence	(2) Fairness	(3) Confidence	(4) Interests	(5) Confidence	(6) Expertise
Control	-0.326**	-0.328*	-0.113	-0.683***	-0.213	-0.502***
	[0.137]	[0.182]	[0.157]	[0.186]	[0.154]	[0.183]
Black American	0.396***	0.399**	0.496***	0.279	0.481***	0.285
	[0.127]	[0.181]	[0.135]	[0.185]	[0.129]	[0.182]
Black African	0.502***	0.495***	0.807***	0.069	0.666***	0.270
	[0.125]	[0.182]	[0.114]	[0.186]	[0.113]	[0.183]
White	-0.102	0.091	0.105	-0.220	-0.062	0.036
	[0.111]	[0.187]	[0.153]	[0.191]	[0.138]	[0.188]
ControlXWhite	0.010	-0.096	-0.264	0.317	-0.085	0.039
	[0.158]	[0.257]	[0.183]	[0.262]	[0.195]	[0.258]
Black AmericanXWhite	-0.178	-0.213	-0.280	-0.075	-0.267	-0.090
	[0.162]	[0.257]	[0.202]	[0.262]	[0.185]	[0.258]
Black AfricanXWhite	-0.415***	-0.465*	-0.581***	-0.250	-0.464***	-0.407
	[0.155]	[0.256]	[0.178]	[0.262]	[0.156]	[0.258]
Fairness	0.707***					
	[0.017]					
Interests			0.651***			
			[0.015]			
Expertise					0.688***	
					[0.014]	
Education	0.035*	0.037	0.041	0.030	-0.003	0.093**
	[0.021]	[0.037]	[0.028]	[0.038]	[0.023]	[0.037]
Age	-0.073***	-0.022	-0.053**	-0.054	-0.076***	-0.018
	[0.021]	[0.033]	[0.022]	[0.034]	[0.023]	[0.034]
Female	-0.086*	0.011	-0.047	-0.048	0.047	-0.181*
	[0.051]	[0.094]	[0.062]	[0.096]	[0.057]	[0.094]
Income	0.036	0.107***	0.061**	0.079**	0.081***	0.046
	[0.024]	[0.035]	[0.024]	[0.035]	[0.024]	[0.035]
Trump Voter	-0.346***	-1.921***	-0.396***	-2.008***	-0.352***	-1.965***
	[0.075]	[0.121]	[0.100]	[0.123]	[0.091]	[0.121]
3rd Party Voter	-0.406**	-2.023***	-0.487**	-2.071***	-0.641**	-1.738***
	[0.204]	[0.289]	[0.211]	[0.296]	[0.273]	[0.291]
Non-Voter	-0.465***	-1.320***	-0.520***	-1.347***	-0.589***	-1.174***
	[0.084]	[0.132]	[0.096]	[0.134]	[0.085]	[0.132]
Constant	2.153***	6.193***	2.119***	6.777***	1.871***	6.775***
	[0.219]	[0.320]	[0.271]	[0.327]	[0.245]	[0.322]
R-squared	0.599	0.129	0.549	0.138	0.580	0.128

Note: Regional fixed-effects not shown. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table E3: Causal Mediation Results

Fairness	Black S. Africans	White S. Africans	Black Americans	White Americans
Mediation Effect	0.13	-0.09	0.28	0.13
	[-0.08, 0.32]	[-0.31, 0.12]	[0.03, 0.52]	[-0.12, 0.38]
Direct Effect	0.39	0.21	0.39	0.21
	[0.16, 0.62]	[-0.03, 0.47]	[0.12, 0.66]	[-0.06, 0.48]
Total Effect	0.52	0.12	0.67	0.34
	[0.21, 0.81]	[-0.21, 0.45]	[0.31, 1.05]	[-0.02, 0.72]
Interests				
Mediation Effect	0.17	0.001	0.18	0.13
	[0.01, 0.32]	[-0.18, 0.18]	[-0.03, 0.38]	[-0.13, 0.38]
Direct Effect	0.35	0.12	0.49	0.21
	[0.12, 0.58]	[-0.15, 0.40]	[0.22, 0.76]	[-0.11, 0.52]
Total Effect	0.51	0.12	0.67	0.33
	[0.23, 0.77]	[-0.21, 0.44]	[0.33, 1.04]	[-0.06, 0.77]
Expertise				
Mediation Effect	0.10	-0.13	0.19	0.13
	[-0.06, 0.25]	[-0.34, 0.06]	[-0.05, 0.44]	[-0.10, 0.36]
Direct Effect	0.42	0.26	0.47	0.21
	[0.10, 0.75]	[-0.04, 0.57]	[0.21, 0.73]	[-0.08, 0.49]
Total Effect	0.52	0.12	0.67	0.34
	[0.17, 0.87]	[-0.25, 0.48]	[0.32, 1.05]	[-0.02, 0.73]

Table E4 provides sensitivity analysis for the mediation models presented in Table E3. The identification of causal mediation effects relies on the assumption that there are no pre-treatment covariates that confound the relationship between the mediator and outcome. Since this assumption is not directly testable, sensitivity analysis is useful for determining how large a violation of this assumption would be required to alter one's conclusions. Here, we present the results from a sensitivity analysis developed by Imai et al. (2011). The intuition behind the sensitivity analysis is that pre-treatment confounding would produce a correlation between the error term of the mediator model and the error term for the outcome model. If the mediation effects would continue to be statistically significant even when the error terms are strongly correlated, this would indicate that the results are insensitive to violations of this assumption.

Table E4 reports the rho value for which the average causal mediation effect (ACME) of each mediator reaches zero. The rho value refers to the correlation between the error term of the mediator model and the error term of the outcome model. The table presents these estimates for each case in which we obtain statistically significant mediation effects. We find that the "Interests" variable would continue to have a positive mediation the

relationship between race and confidence among Black respondents so long as rho is less than 0.54 in South Africa, and less than 0.68 in the United States. Fairness perceptions continue to mediate the effect of race among Black Americans as long as the rho is less than 0.74. We find similarly sized rho values would be required to eliminate the mediation effects of region via interests and expertise among white Americans (0.68 and 0.71, respectively). On the whole, it would require a very strong error correlation, and thus very large violations of this assumption, to overturn our findings. Put differently, these mediation results are robust even in the face of sizable degrees of pre-treatment confounding.

Table E7: Sensitivity Analysis

Group	Mediator	Rho where ACME = 0
Black South Africans	Interest	0.54
Black Americans	Fairness	0.73
Black Americans	Interest	0.68

The analyses in this section focus on causal mediation methods because they are the most useful approach for testing our underlying causal argument. However, to maintain transparency, Figure E1 examines the effect of the race treatment on the three outcomes that we use as mediators (perceived fairness, interests, and expertise) following the exact approach outlined in our pre-analysis plan. It also includes a fourth outcome variable, which we do not view as a plausible mediator, but rather a different type of outcome variable: support for continued membership in the WTO. In these models, we treat these four variables as dependent variables, and follow the same specification used in our main analyses of the WTO confidence variable, which is to include only the treatment conditions and their interactions with respondents' race as explanatory variables.

Figure E1 shows the effect of the race treatment on each outcome for Black respondents, white respondents, and the difference between the two groups. As in the earlier analyses, we estimate the effect of race as the difference between the "Black American" and "American" conditions. Consistent with the mediation results, we find that Black leaders increase the perception that the WTO serves South African economic interests among Black respondents in that country. The effect of the treatment on perceived economic interests among Black Americans falls short of statistical significance ($p = 0.12$). Additionally, among Black Americans, information that the WTO leader is Black increases the perception that the WTO is procedurally fair ($p < 0.05$), and has a marginally significant effect on the belief that the WTO is led by highly qualified experts ($p < 0.1$).

Our "Black American" treatment does not have a statistically significant effect on support for WTO membership. A likely reason for these weak findings is the near-universal agreement that their countries should retain their WTO membership among the groups that are most likely to respond to our treatments (Black South Africans and Black

Americans). For example, among control-group respondents, the modal Black American and Black South Africa gives a 10 on this question; by contrast, the mode for these groups on the WTO confidence question is a 5. The high baseline levels of support for this outcome create a ceiling effect that makes it more difficult for the treatment to further increase support.

Figure E1: Effect of Race Treatment on Perceptions of Fairness, Interests, and Expertise



Appendix F: Compliance with Experimental Treatments

One challenge with our analyses, common to (web-based) survey experiments, is that respondents may not fully comply with the treatments. Some respondents may have prior knowledge about the race of the WTO leader (and would therefore constitute "always-takers" in our experiment). Other respondents may lack this prior information but also not pay sufficient attention to our experimental treatments to acquire this information even when treated (i.e. they are "never-takers"). In Appendix F, we conduct additional analyses to show that non-compliance among some survey respondents leads us to under-estimate the effects of IO leaders' race in the main results.

First, we estimate the effect of IO leaders' race among compliers. Here, we shift away from our "intent-to-treat" analysis, which compares mean levels of responses across treatment conditions. As a complementary approach, we now more directly examine whether the treatment-induced change in beliefs about the WTO leader's race influences confidence in the WTO. In other words, this approach estimates the average effect of knowing that an IO leader is Black among individuals who acquired this knowledge from our experimental treatment. We use an instrumental-variables (IV) approach to estimate this "complier average causal effect" (CACE). In this analysis, the belief that the WTO leader is Black is the (endogenous) treatment of interest. The "Black American" treatment is our instrument. The models include a standard set of pre-treatment demographic controls: a respondent's income, education, gender, age, vote choice, and region fixed effects. We estimate separate models for each racial group within each country.

IV regression provides an unbiased estimate of a complier average causal effect when five assumptions are satisfied (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). Two assumptions (random assignment of the instrument and correlation between instrument and endogenous regressor) are known to hold already. Two others, monotonicity and the stable unit treatment value assumption, are unlikely to be problematic in this setting.

The fifth, the exclusion restriction, seems plausibly satisfied, but it is always difficult to fully rule out potential violations of this assumption. In the IV models, we restrict our analyses to the "American" and "Black American" conditions, discarding respondents in the control group and in the "Black African" condition because their perceptions of leader nationality differ from respondents in these two conditions. Restricting our sample to these two experimental groups makes it more plausible that the exclusion restriction holds. That said, even if the exclusion restriction is violated, this should not be a major concern here either because IV estimates are less sensitive to exclusion-restriction violations when the instrument is very strong (Angrist et al. 1996, 451), as is the case here (see Figure 2 and first-stage F-statistics reported in Tables F1 and F2).

Tables F1 and F2 present the results from our IV estimation for South Africa and the US, respectively. The bottom row shows the first-stage F statistic. In all cases, it is very large, indicating that the instrument is highly relevant. The top row in each column provides our estimated CACEs. Among Black Americans, we estimate that finding out

that the WTO leader is Black due to this treatment increases confidence by about three points. This effect is about 1.2 points among Black South Africans. The effects for these two groups is statistically significant. The CACEs are considerably smaller among white subjects, with estimated effects of 0.7 in the US, which is marginally significant ($p < 0.1$), and close to zero and statistically insignificant among white South Africans. These results provide additional support that Black leadership at IOs increases these organizations' legitimacy among Black citizens. In sum, the results in this section provide further evidence for the importance of leader race on IO legitimacy perceptions.

Table F1: Instrumental Variable Estimates (South Africa)

	(1) Black S. African	(2) White S. African
Believe Leader is Black	1.21***	0.22
	[0.426]	[0.384]
Education	0.01	0.04
	[0.040]	[0.033]
Age	0.13	-0.17**
	[0.098]	[0.074]
Female	-0.06	-0.14
	[0.216]	[0.184]
Income	0.04	-0.00
	[0.037]	[0.036]
DA voter	-0.49	-1.45***
	[0.446]	[0.398]
EFF Voter	-0.61*	-1.65
	[0.314]	[1.372]
FFP Voter	-0.59	-2.37***
	[0.510]	[0.560]
Other Candidate Voter	-1.00	-1.98***
	[0.839]	[0.495]
Non-Voter	-0.77***	-1.76***
	[0.220]	[0.415]
Constant	6.79***	7.55***
	[0.545]	[0.616]
Observations	569	432
First-Stage F Stat	133.8	115.0

Note: Regional fixed-effects not shown. Standard errors in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table F2: Instrumental Variable Estimates (United States)

	(1) Black American	(2) White American
Believe Leader is Black	3.01***	0.67*
	[0.801]	[0.393]
Education	0.06	-0.10
	[0.080]	[0.075]
Age	-0.00	-0.18***
	[0.065]	[0.068]
Female	-0.29	0.02
	[0.192]	[0.188]
Income	0.20**	0.15**
	[0.077]	[0.068]
Trump Voter	-1.43***	-2.14***
	[0.345]	[0.207]
3rd Party Voter	-1.61**	-2.03***
	[0.817]	[0.527]
Non-Voter	-1.17***	-1.66***
	[0.265]	[0.262]
Constant	3.01***	0.67*
	[0.801]	[0.393]
Observations	758	761
First-Stage F Stat	59.9	216.5

Note: Regional fixed-effects not shown. Standard errors in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We also explore an approach suggested by Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2014), which is to examine whether there is heterogeneity in responses among subjects that passed all of our instructional manipulation checks versus those that did not. They find that treatment effects are stronger among respondents that passed more attention checks. To ensure that we have high-quality, attentive, respondents, we included three attention-check questions in the surveys, and excluded respondents that failed two or more of these checks. The attention checks we included are as follows. The first question in the survey told respondents that "careful attention to survey questions is critical. To show that you are paying attention, please select 'I have a question'". They were offered three responses: (1) I understand; (2) I do not understand; and (3) I have a question. The second attention-check question provided a list of nine colors and asked respondents to select red from the list. The third attention-check question included an item in a grid of question that specified that "For this item, please just select somewhat disagree".

To help assess overall degrees of attentiveness, and examine whether it impacts our findings, we can compare responses among those that pass *all* attention checks. We refer to subjects that pass all three checks as "high attention" subjects, and those that did not

pass all checks as "low attention" subjects. Overall, 70% of our South African survey-takers and 63% of those in the United States are "high attention" subjects.

There are clear differences between respondents that passed all three attention checks and those that did not, suggesting that attentiveness reduced both awareness of the information provided and ultimately the magnitude of the treatment effects we estimate. As a first cut at this issue, we examined whether less attentive respondents were less likely to answer our post-treatment manipulation-check questions correctly. To address this question, we regress the belief that the WTO leader is Black as a function of the treatments, whether the respondent was highly attentive (proxied by correctly answering all attention check questions), and the interaction between the two. Figure F3 plots the marginal effect of the "Black American" versus the "American" condition for low attention respondents, high attention respondents, and the difference between the two groups (the interaction term between the "Black American" treatment and a high-attention dummy).

Figure F1 shows that, in both countries, the "Black American" treatment increases the likelihood that respondents believe the WTO leader is Black among both low- and high-attention respondents. However, the size of this effect is significantly larger among respondents that correctly answered all attention-check questions. This suggests that a lack of respondent attentiveness contributes to the less-than-perfect compliance with our treatments.

Figure F1: Perceptions of Race Among Low- and High-Attention Respondents



Finally, we examine whether the treatments had a stronger effect on the ultimate outcome of interest—perceptions of WTO legitimacy—among more attentive respondents. We follow the same specifications as in the prior figures, interacting the treatments with a measure of attentiveness, and run split-sample estimations for Black respondents and white respondents. Figure D2 presents the results for the effect of race, comparing mean levels of confidence in the "Black American" and "American" conditions. We find that the presence of a Black IO leader increases confidence in the WTO among Black subjects that passed all attention checks. However, the effect of leader race is not statistically distinguishable from zero in either the United States or South Africa among Black individuals that failed one attention check. The size of the treatment effects are also much smaller among low-attention respondents (0.14 in South Africa and 0.39 in the United States) compared to high-attention respondents (0.76 in South Africa, 0.91 in United States). We also find that, among white Americans, the "Black American" treatment significantly increases confidence for respondents that passed all the attention checks, but not among those that failed one attention check. Overall, these patterns suggest that the presence of inattentive respondents may lead us to underestimate the effect of Black IO leadership.

Figure F2: Attentiveness Moderates Effect of Race Treatment on WTO Confidence



Appendix G: Models with Control Variables

Figure G1 plots the estimated effect of race for Black respondents, white respondents, and the difference in effects between the two groups. The results in this figure are based on models that include controls for education, income, age, gender, previous vote choice, and region. Figure G2 presents analogous information from a model that controls for these demographic variables and also includes interactions between each demographic variable and each treatment condition. This model helps accounts for the possibility that other demographic variables that are correlated with race might also moderate responses to our treatment (see, e.g., Kam and Trussler 2017). The inclusion of these controls has limited effects on the main results. The effects of race are similar in size and significance to Figure 3, which is based on models without any controls.

Figure G1: Effect of Race with Demographic Controls



Note: Circles indicate average treatment effect of IO leader race, by comparing mean confidence levels in "Black American" and "American" treatment groups, in models that include controls for pre-treatment demographics. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for marginal effects. The top, middle, and lower plots show this marginal effect for white respondents, Black respondents, and the difference between Black and white respondents, respectively.

Figure G2: Effect of Race with Demographic Controls and Interactions



Note: Circles indicate average treatment effect of IO leader race, by comparing mean confidence levels in "Black American" and "American" treatment groups, in models that include controls for pre-treatment demographics as well as interactions between the demographic controls and experimental condition. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for marginal effects. The top, middle, and lower plots show this marginal effect for white respondents, Black respondents, and the difference between Black and white respondents, respectively.

Table G1 presents complete output from the models with demographic controls, which were used to generate Figure G1. However, to ease the comparison of effect sizes across the different explanatory variables, we have rescaled all the right-hand side variables so that they range from zero to one. This was done so that the regression coefficients are more comparable, with each one showing how a change from the minimum to maximum value on that variable changes the expected value of the dependent variable. As described further in the main text, the effect of the Black American treatment is large relative to most demographic variables in the model.

Table G1: Regression Models with Control Variables

	(1)	(2)
Control	-0.22	-0.56***
	[0.179]	[0.177]
Black American	0.51***	0.68***
	[0.177]	[0.177]
Black African	0.40**	0.85***
	[0.177]	[0.177]
White	-0.39*	-0.04
	[0.213]	[0.182]
ControlXWhite	-0.21	-0.06
	[0.269]	[0.250]
Black AmericanXWhite	-0.39	-0.33
	[0.269]	[0.250]
Black AfricanXWhite	-0.44	-0.74***
	[0.269]	[0.250]
Education	0.53**	0.30*
	[0.241]	[0.179]
Age	0.17	-0.35***
	[0.168]	[0.130]
Female	0.03	-0.08
	[0.103]	[0.091]
Income	0.26	0.67***
	[0.166]	[0.202]
DA voter	-0.72***	
	[0.166]	
EFF Voter	-0.34*	
	[0.199]	
FFP Voter	-0.57**	
	[0.254]	
Other Candidate Voter	-1.04***	
	[0.261]	
Non-Voter	-0.89***	
	[0.131]	
Trump Voter		-1.70***
		[0.118]
Third Party Voter		-1.84***
		[0.282]
Non-Voter		-1.40***
		[0.128]
Constant	6.97***	6.61***
	[0.251]	[0.290]
Observations	2,001	3,033
R-squared	0.105	0.154

Note: Regional fixed-effects not shown. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix H: Causal Moderation Effects

Table H1 examines whether demographic variables influence how subjects respond to our race treatment. To address this question, we estimate separate models for Black respondents and for white subjects. This was done to facilitate our ability to interpret whether demographic variables moderate the responses to our treatment within particular racial groups.

In each model, we interact the treatment with a single demographic variable. The first column shows the result from models where the treatments interact with education; column 2 shows results when treatments are interacted with income; column 3 uses gender as the moderator; column 4 uses age; and column 5 whether the respondent voted for the incumbent (the ANC in South Africa and Biden in the United States). For non-binary moderators (education, income, and age), we normalize them so that the median is set to zero. This is done so that the base effect captures the effect of the race treatment in the median category, which is a theoretically meaningful quantity.

Table H1 presents two quantities from each model. The columns labeled "race effect" show the estimated effect of race—quantified, as before, as the effect of the "Black American" condition vis-à-vis the "American" condition—for respondents at median levels of the demographic variable. The columns labeled interaction present the coefficient on the interaction between the "Black American" treatment and the listed demographic variable.

We find no evidence that these demographic variables moderate the responses of either white or Black respondents. The Black American treatment does not have a statistically significant interaction in any of the twenty models. This provides reassuring evidence that over-sampling certain demographic groups is unlikely to have a large impact on our results and therefore that our sample ATEs are likely to provide accurate estimates of the population ATEs.

Table H1: Causal Moderation Effects

Black South Africans	**Education**	**Income**	**Female**	**Age**	**Vote**
Race Effect	0.72***	0.61***	0.33	0.64***	0.49*
	[0.20]	[0.19]	[0.34]	[0.19]	[0.26]
Interaction	-0.12	0.04	0.37	-0.17	0.06
	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.41]	[0.16]	[0.38]
White South Africans	**Education**	**Income**	**Female**	**Age**	**Vote**
Race Effect	-0.003	-0.03	-0.21	0.39	0.05
	[0.21]	[0.07]	[0.29]	[0.30]	[0.19]
Interaction	0.11	-0.05	0.60	-0.17	0.82
	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.39]	[0.15]	[0.82]
Black Americans	**Education**	**Income**	**Female**	**Age**	**Vote**
Race Effect	0.72***	0.68***	0.49*	0.87***	0.59*
	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.27]	[0.21]	[033]
Interaction	0.03	0.04	0.38	0.19	0.14
	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.36]	[0.12]	[0.39]
White Americans	**Education**	**Income**	**Female**	**Age**	**Vote**
Race Effect	0.44**	0.34	0.33	0.33*	0.16
	[0.20]	[0.21]	[0.27]	[0.19]	[0.23]
Interaction	-0.19	0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.37
	[0.13]	[0.12]	[0.38]	[0.14]	[0.36]

Appendix I: Follow-Up WTO Experiment

A follow-up survey was fielded to 1226 Black American respondents between January 19 and 22, 2022. As in the prior US survey, this one was fielded online by Dynata in English, using the same quality-control measures. The survey question ordering was similar to the prior surveys: it started with several demographic questions (including race, education, age, gender, and region), was followed by the WTO experiment, then some other attitudinal and demographic questions.

This survey included a similar set of demographic quotas as in the prior US survey, focusing in this case on education, age, and gender. (Unlike the prior US survey, we did not include quotas for urban, suburban, and rural respondents because this variable seemed more likely to influence political attitudes among white than among Black respondents). Table I1 compares the demographic breakdown of this sample with the population estimates for Black Americans. The sources used to estimate these population percentages are described in Appendix C. Overall, this sample closely mirrors the broader population of Black Americans in terms of education, age, and gender.

Table I1: Demographic Characteristics of US Sample

	Black Sample	**Black Population**
Education		
HS or below	47%	46%
Some college	29%	30%
College grad	16%	15%
Postgraduate	8%	8%
Age		
18-24 Years	18%	14%
25-44 Years	40%	39%
45-64 Years	29%	31%
65+ Years	13%	15%
Gender		
Female	54%	54%
Voting		
Biden	88%	92%

We included a modified version of our original WTO experiment in this survey. As described in the main text, we included a version of the "American" condition and a version of the "Black American" condition, both of which included more extended contextual detail about the WTO.

Figure I1 presents the means and 95% confidence intervals for the two experimental conditions in this follow-up experiment. Mean confidence is 5.98 in the "American" condition and 6.76 in the "Black American" condition. The mean difference between the two conditions is 0.79 ($p < 0.01$). The magnitude of this effect is very similar—and in fact slightly larger—than the equivalent effect in our original experiment.

Figure I1: Main Results of Extended Vignette WTO Experiment



Appendix J: WHO Experiment

The main US survey, fielded in September 2021 to 3000 respondents, included an experiment on a second IO, the World Health Organization (WHO). This experiment is useful for determining whether our main findings based on the WTO experiment travel to other IOs. The order of the two experiments (WHO and WTO) was randomized across subjects.

The WHO experiment includes three conditions. A control group received the following text: "The World Health Organization (WHO) is an international institution that is responsible for promoting health worldwide. The leader of the WHO is a 56-year-old man. How much confidence do you personally have in the WHO?" The "race" treatment group modifies the text in the second sentence slightly to highlight the WHO leader's race. That sentence reads "The leader of the WHO is a 56-year-old Black man." The "race and region" condition adds one word to the previous condition, which specifies that the leader is African. The relevant sentence in this condition is as follows: "The leader of the WHO is a 56-year-old Black, African, man." As in the other experiment, this question uses an 11-point scale that ranges from "no confidence" to "complete confidence".

One limitation of this experiment is that it does not as neatly distinguish race from region-of-origin. (For example, we did not include a condition that mentions the leader's region but not his race because we expected information about his African origins to have a strong impact on the leader's perceived race). The upper panels in Figure J1 shows that the treatments that mentioned that the leader is Black substantially increased the proportion of respondents that believed he was Black compared to the control group. However, the bottom panels of Figure J1 show that simply mentioning race also altered subjects' perceptions of the leader's region-of-origin. The proportion of American respondents that believed the WHO leader is a co-national is significantly lower in the "race" condition than in the control condition (0.77 vs. 0.81; $p < 0.05$ for difference-in-proportions test). In South Africa, the proportion who believed the WHO leader is co-regional was about 10 percentage points higher in the race condition than in the control group (0.28 vs. 0.38; $p < 0.01$ for difference-in-proportions test). Since this treatment altered perceptions of region, it is possible that any differences in confidence between the race and control conditions may be attributable to factors besides the leader's race. The results therefore must be interpreted with a greater degree of caution than the WTO experiment.

Figure J1: Manipulation Checks for WHO Experiment



Figure J2 presents the mean levels of confidence in the WHO across experimental conditions for each racial subgroup within each country. The bars provide 95% confidence intervals.

Following the pre-analysis plan, we regress WHO confidence on indicators of which experimental condition the subject received, the race of respondent, and interactions between treatment and race. Table J1 presents the regression output from these models. We present our estimates of the effect of race from these models in Figure 5 of the main text. Overall, the WHO experiment provides further evidence that co-racial leadership increases IO legitimacy perceptions among Black individuals.

Figure J2: Confidence in the World Health Organization



Table J1: Regression Results for WHO Experiment

	(1) S. Africa	(1) U.S.
Black Treatment	0.31*	0.57***
	[0.177]	[0.177]
Black African Treatment	0.32*	0.73***
	[0.177]	[0.177]
White	-0.79***	-0.81***
	[0.194]	[0.176]
Black TreatmentXWhite	-0.19	-0.18
	[0.274]	[0.249]
Black African TreatmentXWhite	-0.38	-0.34
	[0.275]	[0.249]
Constant	7.01***	6.39***
	[0.125]	[0.125]
Observations	2,002	3,033
R-squared	0.039	0.038

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix K: ILO Experiment

An experiment on the ILO was included in our February 2023 survey of 3050 Americans. The sample was split roughly evenly between self-identified Black (N = 1527) and self-identified white respondents (N = 1523). The survey began with a series of demographic questions, was followed immediately by the ILO experiment, and then some unrelated attitudinal questions before respondents encountered the conjoint experiment, and ended with a few additional attitudinal questions.

As in the first US survey, we included demographic quotas for age, gender, education, and whether a respondent lives in an urban, suburban, or rural area. Table K1 compares the demographic attributes of the sample with the population attributes. (Appendix C describes the sources used to construct the population estimates). The white sample closely matches the white population along these dimensions. The Black sample also largely matches the Black American population, though the sample does somewhat under-represent the share of the Black population with low levels of education (high school degree or below).

Table K1: Demographic Characteristics of Feb. 2023 Sample

	White Sample	**White Population**	**Black Sample**	**Black Population**
Education				
HS or below	37%	38%	33%	46%
Some college	31%	28%	33%	30%
College grad	25%	22%	23%	15%
Postgraduate	7%	12%	11%	8%
Age				
18-24 Years	10%	11%	14%	14%
25-44 Years	32%	33%	35%	39%
45-64 Years	34%	33%	35%	31%
65+ Years	23%	23%	15%	15%
Gender				
Female	50%	51%	52%	54%
Region				
Rural	29%	26%	13%	14%
Suburban	53%	54%	44%	44%
Urban	19%	21%	43%	42%
Voting				
Biden	47%	43%	89%	92%

The ILO experiment contained three conditions. Subjects in the control condition received a small amount of information about the ILO, including that the leader is Canadian. No information was provided about the leader's race. The complete script is as follows: "The International Labor Organization (ILO) is an international institution that works with governments to set labor standards. Last year, the ILO appointed a new leader, who is a Canadian man. How much confidence do you personally have in the ILO?". In the second group, respondents were provided information about the leader's race. Specifically, "Canadian man" was replaced with "Black man from Canada." The third group maintained the same information about race as the second condition, but highlighted the leader's second nationality; instead of referring to the leader as a "Black man from Canada," this script describes him as a "Black man from the African country of Togo."

Figure K1 shows the pattern in responses to our manipulation-check questions to determine if the treatments altered perceptions of race and nationality in the intended manner. The left panel shows the proportion of respondents that reported that they believed the ILO head is Black. As can be seen in the figure, about 20% of respondents in the control condition believe that the ILO head is Black compared to 80% and 84% in the other two conditions. The difference between the first conditions and the other two are obviously very large and highly significant; the difference between the second and third groups are quite modest, but the differences are statistically significant.

Figure K1: Manipulation Checks for ILO Experiment



The right panel of Figure K1 displays the share of respondents that believe the ILO leader is from Togo. Very few respondents in either the control (3%) and "Black Canadian" condition (5%) report that the ILO leader is from Togo, and the difference between the

two conditions is not statistically significant. The gap between those two conditions and the third condition is very large, where 66% of subjects responded that the ILO head is from Togo. Overall, the experiment worked largely as intended: respondents in the "Canadian" and "Black Canadian" conditions have different perceptions but very similar perceptions of nationality; respondents in the "Black Canadian" and "Black Togolese" conditions have similar perceptions of race, but distinct perceptions of nationality.

Figure K2 plots the mean levels of confidence in the ILO by experimental condition and subjects' racial identity. For Black Americans, the ILO is perceived as far more legitimate in the "Black Canadian" than the "Canadian" condition, and the difference between the "Black Canadian" and "Black Togolese" conditions are small and statistically insignificant. This provides further evidence of the primacy of co-racial rather than regional representation among Black Americans. The patterns are broadly similar, albeit weaker, among white Americans: average confidence is higher in the "Black Canadian" than "Canadian" condition, and there are no significant differences between the "Black Canadian" and "Black Togolese" conditions.

Figure K2: Confidence in the International Labor Organization



Table K2 presents the regression results for the ILO experiment. The output in Table K2 is used to generate the marginal effects that are plotted in Figure 4 in the main manuscript.

Table K2: Regression Results for ILO Experiment

Black Canadian Treatment	1.05***
	[0.159]
Black Togolese Treatment	0.96***
	[0.152]
White	-0.17
	[0.156]
Black Canadian TreatmentXWhite	-0.54**
	[0.220]
Black Togolese TreatmentXWhite	-0.64***
	[0.221]
Constant	5.45***
	[0.109]
Observations	3,050
R-squared	0.033

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix L: Conjoint Experiment

In our February 2023 survey, we included a conjoint experiment that asked respondents about their attitudes towards a hypothetical IO. The experiment began with the following description: "Most international organizations receive the bulk of their funding from national governments. We want to know whether you think that the US government should increase, decrease, or maintain the current level of funding for the following hypothetical international organizations. Information on the first institution is presented in the table below."

Respondents were provided with six pieces of information about these candidates. We selected a range of attributes to help disguise our central interest in the race of an IO leader. Table L1 lists these attributes as well as the categories used for each attribute. Each respondent evaluated five IOs, viewing a table similar to Table L1, with one attribute listed per category. The order of attributes was randomly assigned across respondents but were fixed within respondents. For half of our subjects, information about the institution's leader was presented before the information about the institution's staff while the order was reversed for the other half of subjects. "Facts about the Institution" was always presented first as this seemed the most logical starting place.

We selected values on the other attributes that cover the plausible range of values on these dimensions. Importantly for our purposes, we include information on the IO leader's country of origin. For this attribute, we selected countries to maximize coverage across different geographic regions (United States, Europe, Africa, Latin America) while restricting it to countries that have sizable numbers of both white and Black residents.

At the bottom of each table, respondents were asked the following question: "What do you think the United States should do with this international institution's funding?" The responses were provided on an 11-point sliding scale ranging from "reduce funding" to "increase funding"; "keep current funding level" was listed at the mid-point of the scale. We focus in this case on funding, rather than "confidence" as in the other experiments, because this was a more concrete and meaningful attitude in the context of a hypothetical organization.

Figure L1 presents the complete regression output from this experiment. To estimate our quantities of interest, following our pre-analysis plan, we include indicators for all randomly assigned attributes as predictors, as well as an indicator for the respondent's race, and an interaction term between the IO leader's race and respondent's racial identity. The circles present the estimated regression coefficients from these models, which can be interpreted "average marginal component effects," reflect the marginal effects of a given attribute averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes (Hainmueller et al. 2014). In other words, they estimate the effect of a particular randomly-assigned attribute across the weighted average of all other combinations of attributes.

Table L1: Conjoint Experimental Design

Facts about the Institution	
Number of Member Countries	[randomly assign one of the following four options: (1) Less than 50; (2) Between 50 and 100; (3) Between 100 and 150; (4) More than 150]
Age of Institution	[randomly assign one of the following four options: (1) Less than 25 years old; (2) 25-50 years old; (3) 50-100 years old; (4) Over 100 years old]
Facts about the Institution's Leader	
Leader's Country of Origin	[randomly assign one of the following seven options: (1) United States; (2) United Kingdom; (3) France; (4) South Africa; (5) Namibia; (6) Colombia; (7) Brazil]
Leader's Race	[randomly assign one of the following two options: (1) White; (2) Black]
Facts about the Institution's Staff	
Number of Staff Members	[randomly assign one of the following five options: (1) Less than 500; (2) Between 500 and 1,000; (3) Between 1,000 and 5,000; (4) Between 5,000 and 10,000; (5) More than 10,000]
Gender Composition of Staff	[randomly assign one of the following seven options: (1) Around 50% male and 50% female; (2) Around 55% male and 45% female; (3) Around 45% male and 55% female; (4) Around 65% male and 35% female; (5) Around 35% male and 65% female; (6) Around 75% male and 25% female; (7) Around 25% male and 75% female]

In our statistical analyses, the first category listed in Table L1 is used as the baseline group; estimated effects in Figure J1 show that value compared to this baseline category. The bars in the figure present 95% confidence intervals. The standard errors from which the confidence intervals are based are clustered at the level of an individual respondent to allow for arbitrary correlations in the error term for each subject. Table L2 presents the complete output from the regression model.

Since we interact the "Black IO leader" variable with a variable denoting whether the respondent self-identifies as white, the plotted effect of this IO leader's race indicates the effect for the baseline group, which is respondents that identify as Black. The interaction term indicates the difference in the effect of having a Black IO leader among white respondents compared to among Black respondents.

For our purposes, the main finding from this experiment is that the race of an IO leader matters. Black Americans are more supportive of funding IOs with Black leaders than funding IOs with white leaders, with a mean difference of 0.37. This effect is statistically significant at high levels of confidence ($p < 0.01$). The interaction term is of nearly identical magnitude but in the opposite direction, consistent with a zero effect of IO leaders' race among white respondents, as shown in Figure 5 in the main text.

The other attributes have largely anticipated effects. IOs with foreign leaders – particularly those from France, Colombia, and Brazil – receive less support on average compared to those with American leaders. IOs with staff that is overwhelmingly male (65% or 75% male) receive less support than those with a more balanced gender composition.

Figure L1: Complete Results from Conjoint Experiment



Table L2: Regression Results for Conjoint Experiment

Black IO Leader	0.37***
	[0.057]
White Respondent	-0.72***
	[0.076]
Black IO Leader X White Respondent	-0.38***
	[0.074]
Member Countries: 50-100	-0.03
	[0.050]
Member Countries: 100-150	0.01
	[0.051]
Member Countries: 150+	-0.04
	[0.052]
Institution Age: 25-50 Years	0.07
	[0.051]
Institution Age: 50-100 Years	-0.01
	[0.051]
Institution Age: 100+ Years	0.02
	[0.052]
IO Leader Nationality: UK	0.03
	[0.067]
IO Leader Nationality: France	-0.13**
	[0.064]
IO Leader Nationality: S. Africa	-0.04
	[0.066]
IO Leader Nationality: Namibia	-0.07
	[0.066]
IO Leader Nationality: Colombia	-0.18***
	[0.066]
IO Leader Nationality: Brazil	-0.17***
	[0.067]
Staff Size: 500-1,000	0.04
	[0.055]
Staff Size: 1,000-5,000	-0.03
	[0.052]
Staff Size: 5,000-10,000	0.00
	[0.057]
Staff Size: 10,000+	-0.05
	[0.056]
Staff Composition: 55% Male	-0.01
	[0.066]
Staff Composition: 45% Male	-0.03
	[0.064]
Staff Composition: 65% Male	-0.18***
	[0.064]
Staff Composition: 35% Male	0.08
	[0.067]
Staff Composition: 75% Male	-0.13**
	[0.065]
Staff Composition: 25% Male	0.06
	[0.065]
Constant	5.51***
	[0.099]
Observations	15,250
R-squared	0.048

Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix M: Kenya Survey

Dynata fielded a survey in Kenya from February 8-14, 2023. The sample was restricted to those that self-identify as "Black/African," a group that represents the overwhelming majority of the Kenyan population; according to Kenya's Census data, those that identify as Asian, Arab, American, or European make up less than 0.01% of the country's total population (Orinde 2019).

The first experiment included in this survey was a simplified version of the WTO experiment. To maximize statistical power, we included only the two experimental conditions that are most relevant for testing our main hypothesis, one that describes the WTO leader as "American" and one that describes the WTO leader as a "Black American." The control/"American" script read as follows: "The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international institution that deals with the rules of trade between nations. Recently, the WTO appointed a new leader, who is American." The treatment, or "Black American," script is the following: "The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international institution that deals with the rules of trade between nations. Recently, the WTO appointed a new leader, who is a Black American." All subjects were then asked the following question: "How much confidence do you personally have in the WTO?" Responses were provided along a 11-point sliding scale from "no confidence" to "complete confidence."

For the WTO experiment, the mean in the control condition is 6.96. The mean in the treatment condition is 7.41. The difference-in-means is therefore -0.46 ($p < 0.01$). The first column of Table M1 presents the output from our OLS regression model.

The second experiment in this survey focused on the ILO. As with the WTO experiment, we focus on the two main conditions of interest. Respondents in the control, or "Canadian" condition received the following information: "The International Labor Organization (ILO) is an international institution that works with governments to set labor standards. Last year, the ILO appointed a new leader, who is a Canadian man." Treatment-group respondents were provided with the following script: "The International Labor Organization (ILO) is an international institution that works with governments to set labor standards. Last year, the ILO appointed a new leader, who is a Black man from Canada." All respondents were asked "How much confidence do you personally have in the ILO?" and were given an 11-point sliding scale that ranged from "no confidence" to "complete confidence."

The average confidence in the ILO among control-group respondents was 7.10, and that statistic was 7.38 for the treatment group. The mean difference is -0.29 ($p < 0.05$). The second column of Table M1 presents the output from the OLS regression model.

Table M1: WTO and ILO Experiments in Kenya

	(1) WTO	(2) ILO
Treatment	0.446***	0.286**
	[0.140]	[0.140]
Constant	6.962***	7.098***
	[0.099]	[0.099]
Observations	1,000	1,000
R-squared	0.010	0.004

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The final experiment was the conjoint experiment. This experiment followed the exact protocols used in the conjoint designed that was fielded in the US, and described in Appendix K. The only difference is that this survey asks whether the Kenyan government should provide funding to these IOs, rather than asking about what the US government should do.

Our analyses of the conjoint data also mirror the approach used in the US. Here, the only difference is that we do not include an interaction term between the racial identity of the respondent and IO leader's race, because there is no variation in respondents' race within this sample. Table M2 presents the complete regression output.

Table M2: Regression Results for Conjoint Experiment

Black IO Leader	0.247***
	[0.084]
Member Countries: 50-100	0.093
	[0.110]
Member Countries: 100-150	0.185
	[0.112]
Member Countries: 150+	0.088
	[0.112]
Institution Age: 25-50 Years	0.000
	[0.104]
Institution Age: 50-100 Years	-0.042
	[0.110]
Institution Age: 100+ Years	-0.065
	[0.106]
IO Leader Nationality: UK	0.095
	[0.143]
IO Leader Nationality: France	-0.135
	[0.147]
IO Leader Nationality: S. Africa	0.131
	[0.137]
IO Leader Nationality: Namibia	0.205
	[0.141]
IO Leader Nationality: Colombia	-0.142
	[0.142]
IO Leader Nationality: Brazil	-0.159
	[0.143]
Staff Size: 500-1,000	0.227*
	[0.122]
Staff Size: 1,000-5,000	0.166
	[0.117]
Staff Size: 5,000-10,000	0.253**
	[0.119]
Staff Size: 10,000+	0.213*
	[0.119]
Staff Composition: 55% Male	-0.364***
	[0.136]
Staff Composition: 45% Male	-0.342**
	[0.142]
Staff Composition: 65% Male	-0.361**
	[0.141]
Staff Composition: 35% Male	-0.391***
	[0.140]
Staff Composition: 75% Male	-0.448***
	[0.143]
Staff Composition: 25% Male	-0.448***
	[0.137]
Constant	5.449***
	[0.233]
Observations	5,000
R-squared	0.01

Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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