

# Supplementary Materials

## Legislative Term Limits and Ideological Representation

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## A Descriptive Information

**TABLE A.1:** Term Limit Impact Years

State	House	Senate
Arkansas	1998	2000
Arizona <sup>a</sup>		2000
California	1996	1998
Colorado	1998	1998
Florida	2000	2000
Maine	1996	1996
Michigan	1998	2002
Missouri	2002	2002
Montana	2000	2000
Nevada	2010	2010
Ohio	2000	2000
Oklahoma	2004	2004
Oregon <sup>b</sup>	1998	2000
South Dakota	2000	2000

*Note:* Table presents first year of impact for term-limits for state-chambers in my data. Information primarily from National Conference of State Legislatures.<sup>1</sup> <sup>a</sup>No Arizona House elections are included in my data due to that chamber's use of multi-member districts. <sup>b</sup>Oregon's term limits were overturned in 2002.

**TABLE A.2:** Summary Statistics

Statistic	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Democratic Two-Party Vote Share	0.517	0.503	0.335	0.000	1.000	59,298
Democrat Wins	0.504	1	0.500	0	1	59,298
Ideal Point Estimate	-0.037	0.002	0.902	-3.211	3.408	59,298
Term Limits	0.207	0	0.405	0	1	59,298
Upper Chamber	0.211	0	0.408	0	1	59,298
South	0.359	0	0.480	0	1	59,298
Contested Election	0.610	1	0.488	0	1	59,298

## B Additional Results

### B.1 Full Fixed Effects Model Results

**TABLE B.1:** Term Limit Adoption and Leapfrog Representation: Full Model Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Shor-McCarty Score				
Dem. Wins	-1.441** (0.060)	-1.438** (0.062)		-1.310** (0.050)	
Term Limits	0.205** (0.068)	0.139** (0.052)	0.034 (0.027)	0.052* (0.031)	0.043** (0.019)
Dem. Two-Party Share - 0.5	-0.095 (0.067)	0.119** (0.058)	0.033 (0.026)	0.130** (0.016)	0.076** (0.009)
Dem. Wins × Term Limits	-0.411** (0.107)	-0.378** (0.104)	-0.086 (0.060)	-0.184** (0.057)	-0.086** (0.024)
Dem. Wins × Dem. Share	-0.054 (0.116)	-0.327** (0.063)	-0.366** (0.059)	-0.028* (0.016)	-0.059** (0.013)
Term Limits × Dem. Share	-0.048 (0.163)	0.093 (0.167)	-0.069 (0.067)	0.034 (0.036)	0.029 (0.019)
Dem. Wins × Dem. Share × Term Limits	0.626* (0.361)	0.118 (0.139)	0.145 (0.099)	0.096** (0.035)	0.028 (0.027)
Constant	0.681** (0.046)				
Unit Fixed Effects		S-C	S-C-P	D	D-P
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P	Y	Y-P
Observations	59,298	59,298	59,298	59,298	59,298

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. In the fixed effects labels, “S” indicates “state,” “C” indicates “chamber,” “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.10 (two-tailed).

## B.2 Fixed Effects Professionalism Models

**TABLE B.2:** Term Limit Adoption and Leapfrog Representation: Professionalism Heterogeneity

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Shor-McCarty Score				
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limits	-0.290** (0.093)	-0.266** (0.094)	-0.054 (0.044)	-0.179** (0.065)	-0.092** (0.020)
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limits $\times$ Professionalism	-0.099** (0.041)	-0.106** (0.037)	0.025 (0.023)	-0.038 (0.032)	0.002 (0.008)
Unit Fixed Effects		S-C	S-C-P	D	D-P
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P	Y	Y-P
Observations	45,330	45,330	45,330	45,330	45,330

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. Lower-order terms are suppressed for clarity. In the fixed effects labels, “S” indicates “state,” “D” indicates “district,” “C” indicates “chamber,” “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed).

## B.3 Fixed Effects Chamber Models

**TABLE B.3:** Term Limit Adoption and Leapfrog Representation: Chamber Heterogeneity

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Shor-McCarty Score				
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limits	-0.396** (0.130)	-0.380** (0.127)	-0.083 (0.071)	-0.190** (0.066)	-0.084** (0.027)
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limits $\times$ Senate	-0.063 (0.198)	0.015 (0.192)	-0.014 (0.110)	0.029 (0.127)	-0.012 (0.060)
Unit Fixed Effects		S-C	S-C-P	D	D-P
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P	Y	Y-P
Observations	59,298	59,298	59,298	59,298	59,298

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. Lower-order terms are suppressed for clarity. In the fixed effects labels, “S” indicates “state,” “D” indicates “district,” “C” indicates “chamber,” “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed).

## B.4 Fixed Effects Region Models

**TABLE B.4:** Term Limit Adoption and Leapfrog Representation: Regional Heterogeneity

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Shor-McCarty Score				
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limits	-0.339**	-0.357**	-0.060	-0.203**	-0.104**
	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.085)	(0.065)	(0.030)
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limits $\times$ South	0.182	0.166	-0.067	0.079	0.053
	(0.191)	(0.180)	(0.100)	(0.122)	(0.043)
Unit Fixed Effects		S-C	S-C-P	D	D-P
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P	Y	Y-P
Observations	59,298	59,298	59,298	59,298	59,298

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. Lower-order terms are suppressed for clarity. In the fixed effects labels, “S” indicates “state,” “D” indicates “district,” “C” indicates “chamber,” “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed).

## C Robustness Checks

### C.1 Third-Order Polynomial

**TABLE C.1:** Term Limit Adoption and Leapfrog Representation: Third-Order Polynomial of Running Variable

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Shor-McCarty Score				
Dem. Wins × Term Limits	−0.174** (0.088)	−0.226** (0.080)	−0.064 (0.058)	−0.151** (0.074)	−0.052* (0.027)
Unit Fixed Effects		S-C	S-C-P	D	D-P
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P	Y	Y-P
Observations	59,298	59,298	59,298	59,298	59,298

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. Lower-order terms are suppressed for clarity. In the fixed effects labels, “S” indicates “state,” “D” indicates “district,” “C” indicates “chamber,” “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.10 (two-tailed).

### C.2 Lagged Dependent Variable Models

**TABLE C.2:** Term Limit Adoption and Leapfrog Representation: Lagged Dependent Variable

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Shor-McCarty Score		
Dem. Wins × Term Limits	−0.253** (0.060)	−0.250** (0.060)	−0.243** (0.063)
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P
Observations	40,181	40,181	40,181

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. Lower-order terms are suppressed for clarity. In the fixed effects labels, “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.10 (two-tailed).

### C.3 Contested Elections

**TABLE C.3:** Local Linear RD Results: Contested Elections

	Shor-McCarty Score	
	With Term Limits	Without Term Limits
Democrat Wins	-1.559 (0.071)	-1.329 (0.051)
Bandwidth	0.15	0.099
Effective Observations	5891	11574

*Note:* Entries are local linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by state-chamber in parentheses. Observations are at the election level. Estimated using the `rdrobust` package in R.

**TABLE C.4:** Term Limit Adoption and Leapfrog Representation: Contested Elections

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Shor-McCarty Score				
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limits	-0.301** (0.094)	-0.262** (0.087)	-0.097* (0.058)	-0.190** (0.065)	-0.101** (0.029)
Unit Fixed Effects		S-C	S-C-P	D	D-P
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P	Y	Y-P
Observations	36,176	36,176	36,176	36,176	36,176

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. Lower-order terms are suppressed for clarity. In the fixed effects labels, “S” indicates “state,” “D” indicates “district,” “C” indicates “chamber,” “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed).

## C.4 Term-Limitedness

**TABLE C.5:** Term Limitedness and Leapfrog Representation

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Shor-McCarty Score				
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limitedness	-0.357*	-0.348*	-0.044	-0.055	-0.070**
	(0.205)	(0.180)	(0.106)	(0.096)	(0.031)
Unit Fixed Effects		S-C	S-C-P	D	D-P
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P	Y	Y-P
Observations	58,549	58,549	58,549	58,549	58,549

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. Lower-order terms are suppressed for clarity. In the fixed effects labels, “S” indicates “state,” “D” indicates “district,” “C” indicates “chamber,” “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed).



## C.5 Matched Sample

**TABLE C.6:** Local Linear RD Results: Matched Sample of States

	Shor-McCarty Score	
	With Term Limits	Without Term Limits
Democrat Wins	-1.558 (0.071)	-1.453 (0.053)
Bandwidth	0.158	0.133
Effective Observations	6154	8817

*Note:* Entries are local linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by state-chamber in parentheses. Observations are at the election level. Estimated using the `rdrubust` package in R.

**TABLE C.7:** Term Limit Adoption and Leapfrog Representation: Matched Sample of States

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Shor-McCarty Score				
Dem. Wins $\times$ Term Limits	-0.328** (0.121)	-0.264** (0.115)	-0.095 (0.070)	-0.088 (0.062)	-0.083** (0.024)
Unit Fixed Effects		S-C	S-C-P	D	D-P
Time Fixed Effects		Y	Y-P	Y	Y-P
Observations	35,817	35,817	35,817	35,817	35,817

*Note:* Table presents linear regression coefficients, with standard errors, clustered by state-chamber, in parentheses. Lower-order terms are suppressed for clarity. In the fixed effects labels, “S” indicates “state,” “D” indicates “district,” “C” indicates “chamber,” “P” indicates “party,” and “Y” indicates “year.” \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed).