

“An Events-Based Approach to Understanding Democratic Erosion” Supplementary Information

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A Development of the Democratic Erosion Event Dataset (DEED)

DEED grew out of a collaboration with policy partners who were interested in understanding not only whether democracies are backsliding, but also why and how they might backslide, with the goal of adjusting policy and programming accordingly. Existing datasets could identify countries where democracy indices were declining, but could not illuminate the strategies elites were using to concentrate power, nor could they capture the reactions by citizens, the media, and other institutions. DEED was designed to help fill this gap.

DEED’s data generating and coding process also represents a unique marriage—this time of pedagogy and research—that leverages supervised student work as part of the Democratic Erosion Consortium (DEC).¹ The consortium is structured around a semester-long course taught at more than 70 universities for which students write standardized qualitative narratives on countries that are plausibly experiencing democratic erosion. These narratives are then coded using an event framework (described below) that captures the event type, a brief description of the event, the year(s) in which the event occurred, and verification of the event and source credibility.

The event framework for the DEED codebook was developed through an inductive process that combined insights from existing literature with lessons from progressive test-coding of actual

¹Founded in 2017, DEC is a global network of scholars that now encompasses more than 70 universities around the world, including institutions in the US, UK, Ireland, Germany, Italy, Romania, Turkey, Israel, Mexico, Colombia, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. DEC advances pedagogy, data collection, and policy-facing analysis related to democratic erosion. For more information, see <https://www.democratic-erosion.com/>.

cases. We first created an inventory of events that could constitute democratic erosion using both the theoretical insights and pilot country narratives. We then constructed conceptually-distinct groupings of events and developed reliable variable coding definitions that could successfully adjudicate between unique event types. The full event framework is depicted in Table A.1.

In addition to classifying events into specific types, we also distinguish between the more general categories of *precursors*, *symptoms*, and *resistance*, following the logic discussed in the body of the paper. Within these categories, we further divide events into those relating to vertical or horizontal accountability. Erosion of horizontal accountability refers to the increased concentration of power within the executive at the expense of the judicial and/or legislative branches. Erosion of vertical accountability, which Coppedge (2017) defines as a reformulation of O’Donnell’s (1994) “delegative democracy,” is a reduction in the civil liberties of individuals or non-governmental bodies (e.g., the media, NGOs, or citizens from particular racial or ethnic groups).


B Descriptive statistics

As noted in the body of the paper, DEED is currently more comprehensive for some countries and years than others. With this caveat, Figure A.1 shows that the frequency of all categories of events has increased dramatically since 2000, with a peak in 2018. This may reflect an increasing prevalence of precursors and symptoms of democratic erosion, and resistance to it, over the past two decades; it may also reflect limitations of the beta version of DEED, which is most complete for more recent years. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as we show in Figure A.2, precursors of democratic erosion are more common in electoral and liberal democracies, while symptoms are more common in closed and electoral autocracies. (The paucity of events in closed autocracies likely reflects the fact that there are relatively few of these regimes, both globally and in the beta version of the dataset.)

Table A.1: Categorization Scheme to Code Events in Narrative Case Studies


Precursors	Symptoms	Resistance
<p>Threats to Horizontal Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delegitimizing or Weakening the Judiciary Delegitimizing or Weakening the Legislature Delegitimizing or Weakening Subnational Units Manipulation of Civil Service Coup or Regime Collapse Horizontal Corruption Electoral Boycott Opposition Alliance Hedging Rejecting Election Results Elite Infighting <p>Threats to Vertical Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Co-optation of the Opposition Malapportionment Electoral Fraud and Voter Suppression Electoral Violence Increasing Control over Civil Society State-Conducted Violence or Abuse Ethno-Religious Tensions Overstayed Welcome Media Bias Lack of Legitimacy Polarization Extremist/Populist Parties Party Weakness Vertical Corruption Civil War/Revolution Increased Surveillance <p>Exogenous Risk Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Non-state Violence Refugee Crisis External Influence Economic Shocks and Health Shocks Regional Unrest Spillover Border Disputes Diaspora 	<p>Reduction in Horizontal Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduction in Judicial Independence Reduction in Legislative Oversight Weakened Civil Service or Integrity Institutions Suspension of Laws or the Constitution Relaxation of Term Limits Revision of the Constitution Reducing Autonomy of Subnational Units Creation of Parallel Structures Purging of Elites Candidate Selection <p>Reduction in Vertical Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Repression of the Opposition Systemic Reduction in Election Freedom and Fairness Curtailed Civil Liberties Media Repression No-Confidence Votes or Decreased Voter Turnout Forced/Coerced Exile Foreign Military Action Discrimination against Minorities 	<p>Increase in Horizontal Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check on Executive by Judiciary Check on Executive by Legislature Check on Central Power by Subnational Units Check on Central Power by Civil Service Post-Democratic Transition to New Constitution <p>Increase in Vertical Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coalitions or Elite Pacts Increase in Electoral Integrity Increase in Civic Capacity Nonviolent Protest Violent Protest Increase in Media Protections/Media Liberalization <p>Other</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pressure from Outside Actor Exit of People or Money State Attempts to Prevent Backsliding

Figure A.1: DEED event counts by category and year



Notes: Counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED, aggregating across all countries and years from 2000-2020.

Figure A.2: DEED event counts by category and regime type




Notes: Counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED by regime type, aggregating across all years from 2000-2020. Regime types are defined using the V-Dem Regimes of the World classification scheme.

C Little & Meng (L&M) objective index components in Turkey and Brazil


Figure A.3 plots the components of the L&M index in Turkey that do not vary over the panel from 2000-2020. Figure A.4 plots the components of the index that vary. Figure A.5 plots the number of journalists jailed and killed in Turkey from 2000-2020. This latter indicator is not a component of the L&M index, but is one of the “objective” indicators they use to measure democratic backsliding worldwide. Figures A.6 and A.7 plot the components of the L&M index with no and some variation in Brazil from 2000-2020, respectively. Figure A.8 plots the number of journalists jailed and killed in Brazil from 2000-2020.

Figure A.3: L&M index components with no variation in Turkey from 2000-2020




Notes: On the y-axis on the left-hand side, counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Turkey from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in V-Dem (white circles) and the components of the L&M index (dark gray triangles) that do not vary over the panel. L&M index component names and sources are indicated above each individual graph. All L&M index components are originally scaled by the authors to range from 0 to 1 either as binary variables, simple proportions of 100 (i.e., percentages), or a simple proportion of the maximum value the variable can take, as detailed in the Supplementary Codebook.

Figure A.4: L&M index components with variation in Turkey from 2000-2020




Notes: On the y-axis on the left-hand side, counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Turkey from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in V-Dem (white circles) and the components of the L&M index (dark gray triangles) that vary over the panel. L&M index component names and sources are indicated above each individual graph. All L&M index components are originally scaled by the authors to range from 0 to 1 either as binary variables, simple proportions of 100 (i.e., percentages), or a simple proportion of the maximum value the variable can take, as detailed in the Supplementary Codebook.

Figure A.5: Jailings and killings of journalists in Turkey from 2000-2020




Notes: In the top graph, the y-axis on the left-hand side presents counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Turkey from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in the V-Dem index (white circles) over the panel. Using data from the Committee to Protect Journalists database, the middle graph presents the number of journalists imprisoned in Turkey each year over the panel, and the bottom graph presents the number of journalists killed in Turkey each year over the panel.

Figure A.6: L&M index components with no variation in Brazil from 2000-2020




Notes: On the y-axis on the left-hand side, counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Brazil from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in V-Dem (white circles) and the components of the L&M index (dark gray triangles) that do not vary over the panel. L&M index component names and sources are indicated above each individual graph. All L&M index components are originally scaled by the authors to range from 0 to 1 either as binary variables, simple proportions of 100 (i.e., percentages), or a simple proportion of the maximum value the variable can take, as detailed in the Supplementary Codebook.

Figure A.7: L&M index components with variation in Brazil from 2000-2020



Notes: On the y-axis on the left-hand side, counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Brazil from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in V-Dem (white circles) and the components of the L&M index (dark gray triangles) that vary over the panel. L&M index component names and sources are indicated above each individual graph. All L&M index components are originally scaled by the authors to range from 0 to 1 either as binary variables, simple proportions of 100 (i.e., percentages), or a simple proportion of the maximum value the variable can take, as detailed in the Supplementary Codebook.

Figure A.8: Jailings and killings of journalists in Brazil from 2000-2020




Notes: In the top graph, the y-axis on the left-hand side presents counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Brazil from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in the V-Dem index (white circles) over the panel. Using data from the Committee to Protect Journalists database, the middle graph presents the number of journalists imprisoned in Brazil each year over the panel, and the bottom graph presents the number of journalists killed in Brazil each year over the panel.

D Objective-to-subjective score mapping (OSM) index components in Turkey and Brazil


Figure A.9 plots the components of the OSM index in Turkey that do not vary over the panel from 2000-2020. Figure A.10 plots the components of the index that vary. Figures A.11 and A.12 plot the components of the OSM index with no and some variation in Brazil from 2000-2020, respectively.//

Figure A.9: OSM index components with no variation in Turkey from 2000-2020




Notes: On the y-axis on the left-hand side, counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Turkey from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in V-Dem (white circles) and the components of the OSM index (dark gray triangles) that do not vary over the panel. OSM index component names and are indicated above each individual graph and are V-Dem variables unless otherwise specified. OSM index components are either originally scaled from 0 to 1 as binary variables or simple proportions of 100 (e.g., percentages), or we re-scale them as a simple proportion of the maximum value the variable can take, as detailed in the Supplementary Codebook.

Figure A.10: OSM index components with variation in Turkey from 2000-2020




Notes: On the y-axis on the left-hand side, counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Turkey from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in V-Dem (white circles) and the components of the OSM index (dark gray triangles) that vary over the panel. OSM index component names and are indicated above each individual graph and are V-Dem variables unless otherwise specified. OSM index components are either originally scaled from 0 to 1 as binary variables or simple proportions of 100 (e.g., percentages), or we re-scale them as a simple proportion of the maximum value the variable can take, as detailed in the Supplementary Codebook.

Figure A.11: OSM index components with no variation in Brazil from 2000-2020



Notes: On the y-axis on the left-hand side, counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Brazil from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in V-Dem (white circles) and the components of the OSM index (dark gray triangles) that do not vary over the panel. OSM index component names and are indicated above each individual graph and are V-Dem variables unless otherwise specified. OSM index components are either originally scaled from 0 to 1 as binary variables or simple proportions of 100 (e.g., percentages), or we re-scale them as a simple proportion of the maximum value the variable can take, as detailed in the Supplementary Codebook.

Figure A.12: OSM index components with variation in Brazil from 2000-2020



Notes: On the y-axis on the left-hand side, counts for all events in the precursor (gray bars), symptom (dark gray bars), and resistance (light gray bars) categories in DEED for Brazil from 2000-2020. On the y-axis on the right-hand side, trends in V-Dem (white circles) and the components of the OSM index (dark gray triangles) that vary over the panel. OSM index component names and are indicated above each individual graph and are V-Dem variables unless otherwise specified. OSM index components are either originally scaled from 0 to 1 as binary variables or simple proportions of 100 (e.g., percentages), or we re-scale them as a simple proportion of the maximum value the variable can take, as detailed in the Supplementary Codebook.

E Supplementary codebook for L&M and OSM index components

The supplementary codebook below delineates the sub-components of the L&M and OSM indices plotted above. This codebook compiles entries—most often copying the exact text with minor modifications for clarity—from the original variables explicated within the following papers, appendices, and codebooks:

1. Coppedge, Michael, et al. V-Dem Codebook V12, 2022, www.vdem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf.
2. Hyde, Susan D, and Nikolay Marinov. “Codebook for National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset, 5.0.” NELDA, 20 Nov. 2019, nelda.co/#codebook.
3. Little, Andrew and Anne Meng, “Measuring Democratic Backsliding.”

4. Meng, Anne. (2020). *Constraining dictatorship: From personalized rule to institutionalized regimes*. Cambridge University Press.
5. "Methodology." Committee to Protect Journalists, 23 Apr. 2022, cpj.org/data-methodology/.
6. Scartascini, Carlos, et al. *The Database of Political Institutions 2020 (DPI2020)*, 11 Feb. 2021, publications.iadb.org/en/database-political-institutions-2020-dpi2020.

An Events-Based Approach to Understanding Democratic Erosion

Supplementary codebook

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OVERVIEW

This codebook delineates the subcomponents of the L&M Objective Index and the OSM index within the manuscript “An Events-Based Approach to Understanding Democratic Erosion.” This codebook compiles entries—most often copying the exact text with minor modifications for clarity—from the original variables explicated within the following appendices and codebooks:

1. Coppedge, Michael, et al. *V-Dem Codebook V12*, 2022, www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf.
2. Hyde, Susan D, and Nikolay Marinov. “Codebook for National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset, 5.0.” *NELDA*, 20 Nov. 2019, nelda.co/#codebook.
3. Little, Andrew and Anne Meng, “Measuring Democratic Backsliding.”
4. Meng, Anne. (2020). *Constraining dictatorship: From personalized rule to institutionalized regimes*. Cambridge University Press.
5. “Methodology.” *Committee to Protect Journalists*, 23 Apr. 2022, cpj.org/data-methodology/.
6. Scartascini, Carlos, et al. *The Database of Political Institutions 2020 (DPI2020)*, 11 Feb. 2021, publications.iadb.org/en/database-political-institutions-2020-dpi2020.

L&M OBJECTIVE INDEX

Little and Meng “construct a simple aggregate objective index (oindex) by normalizing all individual variables between 0 and 1 where [they] can do so, and taking the average. In particular, we take the average of suffrage from V-Dem; presidential vote shares, winning party seat shares, incumbent party time in office (truncated at 20 years), legislative competitiveness, and executive competitiveness from DPI; whether the incumbent party lost the last election, the multiparty index, and the process violations index from NELDA; and the presence of term limits, succession rules, and dismissal rules.”

Average of suffrage (V-Dem)

v2x_suffr

Question: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Presidential vote shares (DPI)

pressharerev

The average winner vote share in presidential elections.

L&M variable construction for the oindex: $pressharerev = 1 - percent1/100$

pressshare (in L&M)

PERCENT1

President got what % of votes in the 1st/only round?

NA if SYSTEM gets a 1 or 2, and in the case of those with a 2 in Executive Index of Electoral Competition (see below for EIEC definition). If there is a prime minister who is considered the chief executive, but there is a president with some powers (e.g., France) then we still record the president's vote %. If not an election year, records most recent election. If a vice president is completing a president's term in office, he gets the same score as the former president. If a president is prevented from taking office and later returns without an election (but within the limits of his original term) he gets the same score as his original election.

Incumbent party seat shares (DPI)

govshare
govsharerrev

The yearly average seat share of the winning party in the legislature.
L&M variable construction for the oindex: govshare=numgov/totalseats, then govsharerrev=1-govshare

NUMGOV

Records the total number of seats held by all government parties. See below for classification of parties into government and opposition. Because other variables are generated by formulas that reference this cell, a real number must always be reported.

TOTALSEATS

Total seats in the legislature, or in the case of bicameral legislatures, the total seats in the lower house. This variable includes appointed and elected seats and is calculated two ways: 1) in most cases it is calculated by adding the values for all the seat share variables (gov1seat, gov2seat, gov3seat, opp1seat, opp2seat, opp3seat, govostst, oppostst, numul); 2) it is entered by hand in cases where the seat share of some parties is not specified in the sources. Is NA when there is no legislature or when the legislature has been dissolved.

Incumbent party time in office (truncated at 20 years) (DPI)

prtyinnorm

How long the current incumbent party has been in power, truncated at 20 years.
L&M variable construction for the oindex: Transformed by the following prtyinnorm = 1-prtyin20/20

prtyin20 (in L&M)
PRTYIN

Party of chief executive has been how long in office. Same rules as YRSOFFC. NA if there are no parties, if the chief executive is an independent, or if the "party" is the army. In general, the counting restarts from 1 for a party if its name changes. However, in a few cases the sources indicated that party leadership, membership, and platform remained the same following the name change. In these cases, the name change was recorded but the year count did not restart. All of these cases are noted in the database.

Legislative competitiveness (DPI)

liec01

Legislative competitiveness indices from DPI. The index assigns higher numbers for elections where multiple parties compete and win.

L&M variable construction for the oindex: Transformed to 01 variable by liec/7.

liec

Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness
(criteria modified from the scale created by Ferree and Singh, 1999)

Scale:

- No legislature: 1
- Unelected legislature: 2
- Elected, 1 candidate: 3
- 1 party, multiple candidates: 4
- multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats: 5
- multiple parties DID win seats but the largest party received more than 75% of the seats: 6
- largest party got less than 75%: 7

Executive competitiveness (DPI)

eiec01

Executive competitiveness indices from DPI. The index assigns higher numbers for elections where multiple parties compete and win.

L&M variable construction for the oindex: Transformed to 01 variable by eiec/7.

eiec

Uses the same scale as Legislative IEC.

Whether the incumbent party lost the last election (NELDA)

partylose

Whether the incumbent's party won the election in question. To smooth out volatility driven by the fact that the set of countries holding elections in a given year changes, for each country-year Little and Meng pull the data from the most recent election in NELDA if it happened within the past six years, and then take averages of this variable.

NELDA24

Did the incumbent's party lose?

If the party associated with the incumbent (per Archigos) lost, then a "Yes" is coded. If there is no party that is associated with the incumbent, or if the regime allows no parties, then "N/A" was coded. For legislative elections in a presidential system, this variable indicates whether the party affiliated with the incumbent executive (per

Archigos) lost the election. If the election is for the executive office and the incumbent does not run, the question is coded as “Yes” if the candidate running from the incumbent’s party loses.

The multiparty index (NELDA)

multiparty

This index reflects levels of de facto and de jure multipartyism. The index includes the following measures: (1) whether opposition parties were allowed to compete in the election and no parties were banned, (2) whether multiple parties are technically legal, and (3) whether voters had a choice on the ballot. Little and Meng take the average of these variables to create a “multiparty” index with four levels ranging from 0 to 1.

L&M variable construction for the oindex: $nelda\$multiparty = (nelda\$oppallowed(1-nelda\$oppprevent) + nelda\$multilegal + nelda\$choice)/3$*

oppallowed (in L&M)

NELDA3

This variable indicates whether at least one opposition political party existed to contest the election. Some countries have multiple government parties but no opposition political party. An opposition party is one that is not in the government, meaning it is not affiliated with the incumbent party in power.

oppprevent (in L&M)

NELDA13

Were opposition leaders prevented from running?

A "Yes" was coded when at least some opposition leaders were prevented from running and con-testing the elections. A decision to boycott the election was coded "Yes" here only if it was in response to the government preventing opposition figures from running. Cases where opposition was not allowed were also coded as "yes." Note that this question is similar to nelda3 (was opposition allowed?), but is distinct in that it should be coded as "Yes" if any specific opposition party candidates are explicitly prevented from running. If nelda3 is coded "No" this question is coded "N/A." If nelda3 is "Yes" then this question is coded on a "Yes"/"No" basis.

multilegal (in L&M)

NELDA4

This variable indicates whether multiple political parties were technically legal. The legalization of multiple parties need not necessarily mean the existence of a functioning opposition party, as there may be other non-legal barriers to the development of an opposition party. Similarly, a well organized opposition party may exist but may not be legal. In cases in which there are no political parties, the answer should be “no.”

choice (in L&M)

NELDA5

This variable indicates whether the voters were allowed to make a choice between candidates (or parties, in the case of closed-list PR systems) on the ballot, which is possible when the number of candidates competing for a slot exceeds the number of slots to be filled.

The process violations index (NELDA)

process

This index captures various other electoral process violations, and includes the following variables: (1) were previous elections suspended, (2) had the current incumbent violated a term limit, and (3) did an opposition party boycott the election. In each case Little and Meng code a 1 for answering “no” to these questions and 0 otherwise, and average the three, resulting in a “(lack of) process violation” index with three levels ranging from 0 to 1.

L&M variable construction for the oindex: $nelda\$process = ((1-nelda\$suspended) + (1-nelda\$pasttl) + (1-nelda\$boycott))/3$

suspended (in L&M)

NELDA1

Were regular elections suspended before this election?

In democracies, elections take place at regular intervals or within a specified period of time. This question is specifically asking if regular elections were suspended preceding the election at hand, not if elections have ever been suspended. Therefore, if the previous round of elections had been suspended, or sometime after the last round an announcement was made that elections would not be held pending further notice, the answer to NELDA 1 would be yes. Even if a regime disbands the elected legislature and says it is paving the way for fresh elections, the answer would be yes unless they follow through on the promise in a relatively short period of time (typically less than a year). Whether elections had been suspended one or more times in a country’s history should not lead to a yes answer. What counts is the immediate past, i.e., the aftermath of the last balloting. It does not matter whether elections are held somewhat earlier or later than usual for this question, nor whether there was a regime change that affected the timing of the elections. Nor does it matter whether the freedom of elections changed. Suspending elections often means that the legislative body is also disbanded, and that the regime rules by decree. If a regime had never had elections, the answer is yes.

pasttl (in L&M)

NELDA9

Had the incumbent extended his or her term in office or eligibility to run in elections at any point in the past?

The variable is coded as “Yes” if research indicates that the incumbent extended his or her term in office or eligibility to run again in an election (seen elda43 on definition of the incumbent). A “No” indicates that the incumbent had not extended his or her term in office, while a “N/A” is coded when elections do not involve the executive office. For systems which impose no limit on the number of terms in office (e.g., most parliamentary systems), or that do not limit eligibility to run, the answer is “no.” If the position of the leader is not contested

(nelda20 is “No”), this question is coded “N/A,” but is otherwise coded on a “Yes”/“No” basis.

boycott (in L&M)
NELDA14

If at least some opposition leaders announced and carried out a public boycott of the election, a “Yes” was coded. If not, a “No” was coded. A boycott implies an overt decision by a political party not to contest the election. Typically, these leaders also encourage their supporters to boycott the election by not voting. If opposition was banned, or if there was no opposition, (if NELDA 3 is “No”) then an “N/A” was coded.

The presence of term limits (Meng 2020)

termlimit.x

Whether a regime’s constitution, in a given country-year, contains rules for term limits.

Succession rules (Meng 2020)

succession

Whether a regime’s constitution, in a given country-year, contains rules for succession.

Dismissal rules (Meng 2020)

dismiss

The presence of rules for dismissal.

Journalists imprisoned (CPJ)

journalists_imprison

The Committee to Protect Journalists keeps a database of all journalists jailed or killed as a result of doing their job since 1992. Each observation gives a date jailed or killed, the country where the event occurred, and a categorical classification of the reason for the event.

journalists_imprison is derived from this dataset and captures the number of journalists imprisoned in each country per year.

Journalists killed (CPJ)

journalists_killed

journalists_killed, also derived from the CPJ dataset, captures the number of journalists killed in each country per year.

OSM POLYARCHY INDEX

The “objective-to-subjective score mapping” (OSM) index proposed by Weitzal et al. (2023) is derived from a random forest model trained to predict scores on existing “subjective” democracy indices (including V-Dem's) using 26 “easily observable features of democracy.”

In order to scale variables from 0 to 1 for visualizations, it was necessary to artificially impose maximums for some of the numeric indices. For these, the ceiling was considered to be the largest value attained by any country in the dataset from 1900 onward for that index, allowing for comparison of the scaled values across countries and across time. For each variable where such a ceiling was imposed, the artificial scaling has been noted, as well as the value that served as the ceiling, the country which attained it, and the year it was attained.

Lower chamber Vote Share, largest party (V-Dem)

v2ellovtlg

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Lower chamber Vote Share, second largest party (V-Dem)

v2ellovtsm

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval

Lower chamber Vote Share, third largest party (V-Dem)

v2ellovttm

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

Responses: Numeric.

Lower chamber Seat Share, largest party (V-Dem)

v2ellostsl

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Lower chamber Seat Share, second largest party (V-Dem)

v2ellostss

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Lower chamber Seat Share, third largest party (V-Dem)

v2ellostts

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Responses: Numeric.

Presidential Vote Share, largest party (V-Dem)

v2elvotlrg

Question: In the first (or only round) of this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by candidate eventually winning office?

Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Presidential Vote Share, second largest party variable (V-Dem)

v2elvotsml

Question: In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Electoral Regime Index, Lower chamber (V-Dem)

v2xlg_elecreg

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the legislature on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Electoral Regime Index, Presidential (V-Dem)

v2xex_elecreg

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the executive on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Share of population with suffrage (V-Dem)

v2x_suffr

Question: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Elections multiparty (LIED) (V-Dem)

multi-party_legislative_elections

Indicates whether the lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is (at least in part) elected by voters facing more than one choice. Specifically, parties are not banned and (a) more than one party, including opposition parties, are allowed to compete or (b) candidates run without party labels but represent distinct political positions. 1=present, 0=absent.

Presidential elections consecutive (V-Dem)

v2elprescons

Question: How many consecutive presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

(no responses or scale)

Artificial maximum, imposed for 0-1 scaling: 33 (*maximum value attained since 1900 by any country in the dataset (attained by Colombia in 2022)*)

Presidential elections cumulative (V-Dem)

v2elprescumul

Question: How many presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

(no responses)

Artificial maximum, imposed for 0-1 scaling: 38 (*maximum value attained since 1900 by any country in the dataset (attained by Ecuador in 2021/2022)*)

Lower chamber election consecutive (V-Dem)

v2ellocons

Question: How many consecutive lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

(no responses or scale)

Artificial maximum, imposed for 0-1 scaling: 62 (*maximum value attained since 1900 by any country in the dataset (attained by the United States in 2022)*)

Lower chamber election cumulative (V-Dem)

v2ellocumul

Question: How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

(no responses or scale)

Artificial maximum, imposed for 0-1 scaling: 62 (*maximum value attained since 1900 by any country in the dataset (attained by the United States in 2022)*)

Election HOG turnover ordinal (V-Dem)

v2elturnhog

Question: Was there turnover in the office of the head of government (HOG) as a result of this national election?

Responses:

0: No. The head of government- retained his/her position either as a result of the outcome of

the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOG.

1: Half. The head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the

same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership.

2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. This code also applies if this is the first head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal

Election HOS turnover ordinal (V-Dem)

v2elturnhos

Question: Was there turnover in the office of the head of state (HOS) as a result of this national election?

Responses:

0: No. The head of state retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOS.

1: Half. The head of state is a different individual than before the election but from the same

party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected.

2: Yes. The head of state lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In

presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and

from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected.

This

code also applies if this is the first head of state elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal.

Election executive turnover ordinal (V-Dem)

v2eltvrexo

Question: Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

Responses:

0: No. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive.

1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of the executive office holders — the head of state or head of government changes, while the other retains their position.

2: Yes. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal.

Vote Share, two largest parties (V-Dem)

top2_combined

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what combined percentage (%) of the vote was received by the two largest parties in the first/only round? Calculated by taking the sum of *v2ellovtlg* and *v2ellovtsm*, which are the vote share won by the largest and the second-largest parties respectively in this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Difference Vote Share, two largest parties (V-Dem)

top2_difference

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what is the difference in the percentage (%) of the vote received by the largest party and the percentage (%) of the vote received by the second-largest party in the first/only round? Calculated by subtracting *v2ellovtsm*, the vote share won by the

second-largest party in this election to the lower/unicameral chamber of the legislature, from *v2ellovtlg*, the vote share won by the largest party in this election.

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Vote Share Top2 combined >= 60% (V-Dem)

top2_monopoly

Question: Is the *top2_combined* variable equal or larger than 60%?

Responses: 0: No 1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous

Independent states (V-Dem)

v2svindep

Question: Is the polity an independent state?

Responses: 0: No 1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous

Turnover Period (LIED)

turnover_period

Indicates whether a particular country-year is part of a period between an initial electoral government alternation in a multi-party electoral regime and an interruption of the same multi-party electoral regime. If another turnover event happens later in the same polity, a new turnover period begins.

Response: 1: present 0: absent

Scale: Dichotomous

Turnover Event (LIED)

turnover_event

Indicates whether a particular country-year is part of a period between an initial electoral government alternation (as indicated by a turnover event, see below) in a multi-party electoral regime and an interruption of the same multi-party electoral regime (as indicated by a score of 0 on executive elections or multi-party legislative elections, see above). If another turnover event happens later in the same polity, a new turnover period begins.

Response: 1: present 0: absent

Scale: Dichotomous

Two turnover periods (LIED)

two_turnover_period

Indicates whether a particular country-year is part of a period between a second electoral government alternation (as indicated by a turnover event, see below) in a multi-party electoral regime and an interruption of the same multi-party electoral regime (as indicated by a score of 0 on executive elections or multi-party legislative elections, see above). If two turnover events happen later in

the same polity under a new multi_party electoral regime, a new two-turnover period begins.

Response: 1: present 0: absent

Scale: Dichotomous