Instructions

This is an experiment that examines voting behavior. The instructions are simple and if you are careful and make good decisions you can earn a considerable amount of money. Your actual payment from the experiment will depend on your decisions, but also on the decisions that other subjects make, and chance. You will participate in a series of elections, however you will not be told the number of elections there will be. During each election period you will be presented with two alternatives: Red and Green. Your task is to vote for the alternative that you think will yield you the higher monetary amount for that election period. Note that during the experiment you will be referred to by a subject number. Hence, your actions will be anonymous to the proctor and the other subjects in the experiment.

A. Payoffs

To determine what your payoff will be for each election period consider the payoff matrix below. A similar payoff matrix will be displayed on your computer monitor when we begin the experiment.

Payoff matrix for Red types 

	Red Wins	Green Wins	
You vote for Red	$1.25	$1.00	
You vote for Green	$0.50	$0.75	

In each period of the experiment you will be assigned a color type -- Red or Green. Your color type in conjunction with the voting decisions that you and other subjects make will determine how much money you will receive in a period. 

Let's assume that your color type in a period is Red. According to this payoff matrix, if you are a Red type and you vote for Red and Red wins, then you would receive $1.25 for that period. If you vote for Green and Red wins, then you would receive 50 cents for that period. If you vote for Red and Green wins, then you would receive $1.00 for that period. Finally, if you vote for Green and Green wins, then you would receive 75 cents for that period.

Payoff matrix for Green types

	Red Wins	Green Wins	
You vote for Red	$0.75	$0.50	
You vote for Green	$1.00	$1.25	

A similar payoff matrix is displayed if your color type in a period is Green. According to this payoff matrix, if you are a Green type and you vote for Green and Green wins, then you would receive $1.25 for that period. If you vote for Red and Green wins, then you would receive 50 cents for that period. If you vote for Green and Red wins, then you would receive $1.00 for that period. Finally, if you vote for Red and Red wins, then you would receive 75 cents for that period.

Note that the payoffs in both payoff matrices are the same but inversed for the Green and Red types. This inverse pattern will hold throughout the experiment. Please note that the actual payoffs in the experiment will be different from what is displayed in the payoff matrices illustrated here. Also note that the values in a payoff matrix represent cash values that will be paid to you when the experiment terminates.

B. Information about your color type and the color types of other subjects

In each election period the program will randomly assign you and other subjects to a color type: Green or Red. Each subject’s color type is equally likely to be Green or Red.

Recall that your color type determines the payoff you will receive based on which alterative you vote for and which alternative actually wins. In the experiment the program will display information about color types in the form of boxes. The boxes represent the degree of uncertainty you have about your own color type and the color types of other subjects. Consider the following five-person example:

Example for Subject 1

The color of the boxes indicates your color type and the color types of other subjects. Let's assume this is the display that subject 1 sees. Subject 1's box is solid red, so she knows for certain that she is a Red type. Since subject 2's box is colored half red and half green, subject 1 knows that subject 2 has a 50% chance of being a Red or a Green type. Similarly, she knows that subject 3 has a 50% chance of being a Red or a Green type. Since subject 4's box is solid red, she knows with certainty that subject 4 is a Red type. Finally, since subject 5's box is colored half green and half red, she knows that subject 5 has a 50% chance of being a Green or a Red type.

Example for Subject 2

In this example, let's assume that the program randomly determined that subject 2 is a Red type. Notice that her box is solid red.

In this example subject 2 knows that subjects 1 and 4 are also Red types since these two boxes are solid red. Since the boxes of subjects 3 and 5 are half green and half red, she knows that each of these subjects has a 50% chance of being a Green or a Red type.

Example for Subject 3

In this last example let's assume that subject 3 has been randomly determined to be a Green type. Again notice that her box is a solid green color. According to the display, subject 3 knows that subject 1 is also a Green type since her box is a solid green color. She also knows that subject 4 is a Red type since her box is solid red. Since subjects 2 and 5 have boxes that are half green and half red, she knows that each of these subjects has a 50% chance of being a Green or a Red type.

Please recall that in each election period, your color type as well as the color types of the other subjects will be randomly assigned. 

B.1. Specific instructions for full-type information treatment

We have provided a general discussion of how colored boxes (solid red, solid green, or half red and half green) provide information about the color types of subjects voting in the election. The experiment in which you will participate structures information in a very specific way. In each election period, once the color types of the five subjects voting in the election are determined, this information is fully revealed to all five subjects. 

Example 1

In an election period, let’s assume that the program randomly determined that subjects 1 and 5 are Red types while subjects 2, 3 and 4 are Green types. Then, the display seen by each of the five subjects is as follows: the boxes of subjects 1 and 5 are solid red while the boxes of subjects 2, 3 and 4 are solid green.

Example 2

In an election period, let’s assume that the program randomly determined that subject 2 is a Red type while subjects 1, 3, 4 and 5 are Green types. Then, the display seen by each of the five subjects is as follows: the box of subject 2 is solid red while the boxes of subjects 1, 3, 4 and 5 are solid green.

B.2. Specific instructions for own-type information treatment

We have provided a general discussion of how colored boxes (solid red, solid green, or half red and half green) provide information about the color types of subjects voting in the election. The experiment in which you will participate structures information in a very specific way. In each election period, once the color types of the five subjects voting in the election are determined, each subject is apprised of her own color type only. 

Example 1

In an election period, let’s assume that the program randomly determined that subjects 1 and 5 are Red types while subjects 2, 3 and 4 are Green types. 

(i) Consider the display of subject 1. The box of subject 1 will be solid red; so subject 1 will know that her own type is Red. However, the boxes of subjects 2, 3, 4 and 5 will be half red and half green; so subject 1 will not know the types of subjects 2, 3, 4 and 5 (each has a 50% chance of being a Red or a Green type).

(ii) Consider the display of subject 2. The box of subject 2 will be solid green; so subject 2 will know that her own type is Green. However, the boxes of subjects 1, 3, 4 and 5 will be half red and half green; so subject 2 will not know the types of subjects 1, 3, 4 and 5 (each has a 50% chance of being a Red or a Green type).

Example 2

In an election period, let’s assume that the program randomly determined that subject 2 is a Red type while subjects 1, 3, 4 and 5 are Green types. 

(i)	Consider the display of subject 3. The box of subject 3 will be solid green; so subject 3 will know that her own type is Green. However, the boxes of subjects 1, 2, 4 and 5 will be half red and half green; so subject 3 will not know the types of subjects 1, 2, 4 and 5 (each has a 50% chance of being a Red or a Green type).

(ii) Consider the display of subject 4. The box of subject 4 will be solid green; so subject 4 will know that her own type is Green. However, the boxes of subjects 1, 2, 3 and 5 will be half red and half green; so subject 4 will not know the types of subjects 1, 2, 3 and 5 (each has a 50% chance of being a Red or a Green type).

C. Voting

After subjects’ color type-specific information has been given, you will be allowed to vote for either alternative Green or alternative Red. Whichever alternative gets a majority of the votes will be declared the winner and you will be awarded the payment associated with your vote choice.

C.1. Specific instructions for sequential voting treatment

The experiment in which you will participate structures voting in a specific way: voting will take place in a sequence with subject 1 voting first, subject 2 voting second, subject 3 voting third, subject 4 voting fourth, and subject 5 voting last. 

Note carefully that immediately after a subject votes, the subject’s box will assume the color of the alternative chosen by the subject. 

Consider subject 1. If subject 1 votes for alternative Red, then the box of subject 1 will be colored solid red in the display of all five subjects participating in the election. On the other hand, if subject 1 votes for alternative Green, then the box of subject 1 will be colored solid green in the display of all five subjects participating in the election. Observe therefore that when subject 2 is prompted by the program to vote, her display will indicate how subject 1 has voted. 

Now consider subject 2.  If subject 2 votes for alternative Red, then the box of subject 2 will be colored solid red in the display of all five subjects participating in the election. On the other hand, if subject 2 votes for alternative Green, then the box of subject 2 will be colored solid green in the display of all five subjects participating in the election. Observe therefore that when subject 3 is prompted by the program to vote, her display will indicate how subject 1 and subject 2 have voted. 

The general principle is this: when a subject is prompted to vote in an election, the colored boxes in her display will indicate how those who have preceded her have voted.

Example

In an election, suppose that subject 1 votes for alternative Green, subject 2 votes for alternative Red, and subject 3 votes for alternative Red.

(i) When subject 4 is prompted by the program to vote, her display will show that the box of subject 1 is solid green while the boxes of subjects 2 and 3 are solid red.

Suppose subject 4 votes for alternative Green.

(ii) When subject 5 is prompted by the program to vote, her display will show that the boxes of subjects 1 and 4 are solid green while the boxes of subjects 2 and 3 are solid red.

    C.2. Specific instructions for simultaneous voting treatment

The experiment in which you will participate structures voting in a specific way. Each subject will vote for alternative Green or alternative Red without knowing how the other subjects have voted. Once all five subjects have voted, the display of each subject will (i) show the number of votes cast in favor of alternative Green and the number of votes cast in favor of alternative Red, and (ii) specify the alternative, Green or Red, that is the election winner.

D. Final payments

After the election results and the payoff for that election period are revealed, you will participate in another election. After each election period a running tally of your cumulative earnings will be displayed on your computer screen. So you will know your cumulative earnings after each election period. You will participate in a series of elections, however you will not know how many elections there will be. 

After the experiment is over you will be paid in cash, and in private, the amount you have earned. Hence, while you are being paid other subjects will not know how much money you have earned.

You are not allowed to talk or communicate with other subjects while the experiment is taking place. Also note that there will be different games being conducted at the same time. Each of you will be randomly assigned to a particular game. You will not know which subjects have been assigned to which games.

E. Summary

	1. You will be assigned to one of several games
2. A payoff matrix will be displayed that reveals the amount you can win in a single period.
3. Your payment is based on which alternative you vote for and which alternative wins.
4. You and other subjects will be randomly assigned a color type each election period: Green or Red. Each subject has a 50% chance of being a Green type and a 50% chance of being a Red type.
 	5. You will be given information about the color types of other subjects.
 	6. You will vote for either alternative Green or alternative Red.
 	7. After everyone has voted the majority winner will be announced and your payment for that period will be displayed on your computer screen.
 	8. The process will repeat at #4 for an indeterminate number of periods.

Click here when you have read the instructions and are ready to proceed