

Parental Background and Other-Regarding Preferences in Children

Experimental Economics

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Electronic Supplementary Material

This file contains supplementary figures and tables

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Figure S1 Choice Situation – Binary Choice Games



Figure S2 Experimental Shop



Figure S3 Choice Situation – Patience






Figure S4 Choices in Prosocial Games across Age Groups



Note: Error bars provide 95% exact confidence intervals.

Figure S5 Choices in Envy Games across Age Groups



Note: Error bars provide 95% exact confidence intervals.

Table S1 Summary of Payoffs and Classification of Types

	Egalitarian choice in:			
	Costly prosocial game (1,1) vs.(2,0)	Costless prosocial game (1,1) vs.(1,0)	Costly envy game (1,1) vs.(2,3)	Costless envy game (1,1) vs.(1,2)
Altruistic	1	1	0	0
Inequality averse	1	1	1	1
Spiteful	0	0	1	1
Selfish	0	0 or 1	0	0 or 1
Selfish-weakly altruistic	0	1	0	0
Selfish-weakly inequal. averse	0	1	0	1
Selfish-weakly spiteful	0	0	0	1
Selfish-other	0	0	0	0

Table S2 Choices in Games and Other-Regarding Types: Controlling for Experimental Design Effects

Dependent variable	Egalitarian Choices in Games				Other-Regarding Types				
	Costly prosocial game (1,1) vs.(2,0)	Costless prosocial game (1,1) vs.(1,0)	Costly envy game (1,1) vs.(2,3)	Costless envy game (1,1) vs.(1,2)	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish	Ambiguous
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PANEL A: TREATMENT EFFECTS									
Low parental education	-0.173** (0.078)	-0.070 (0.078)	-0.043 (0.050)	0.028 (0.069)	-0.115*** (0.040)	-0.055 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.032)	0.155** (0.061)	0.042 (0.075)
Observations	267	267	264	265	262	262	262	262	262
PANEL B: EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS									
Low parental education	-0.157** (0.075)	-0.080 (0.077)	-0.031 (0.052)	0.004 (0.066)	-0.111** (0.043)	-0.041 (0.039)	-0.016 (0.016)	0.133** (0.060)	0.035 (0.080)
Observations	267	267	264	265	262	262	262	262	262
PANEL C: ORDER OF GAMES AND POSITION OF EGALITARIAN OPTION									
Low parental education	-0.128** (0.063)	-0.035 (0.075)	-0.049 (0.052)	0.018 (0.068)	-0.108*** (0.039)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.033)	0.151** (0.060)	0.016 (0.076)
Observations	263	263	261	261	259	259	259	259	259

Notes: Columns 1-4 marginal effects from logit estimates, Columns 5-9 marginal effects from multinomial logit estimates, standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the teacher level.
 *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Panel A includes dummy variables for 3 out of 4 treatment types, Panel B includes dummy variables for 3 out of 4 experimenters, and Panel C includes dummy variables indicating the game which was played first and the position of egalitarian option (1=left). Additionally, we control for the same set of variables as in Tables 2 and 3.

Table S3 Choices in Games and Other-Regarding Types: In-Group and Out-Group Treatments

Dependent variable	Egalitarian Choices in Games				Other-Regarding Types				
	Costly prosocial game (1,1) vs.(2,0)	Costless prosocial game (1,1) vs.(1,0)	Costly envy game (1,1) vs.(2,3)	Costless envy game (1,1) vs.(1,2)	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish	Ambiguous
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PANEL A: IN-GROUP TREATMENT									
Low parental education	-0.189 (0.145)	0.054 (0.152)	-0.144 (0.147)	0.106 (0.139)	-0.151* (0.079)	-0.058 (0.060)	-0.047** (0.022)	0.280* (0.148)	-0.024 (0.179)
Observations	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72
PANEL B: OUT-GROUP TREATMENTS									
Low parental education	-0.171** (0.078)	-0.120 (0.095)	0.004 (0.066)	-0.006 (0.078)	-0.108** (0.045)	-0.049 (0.048)	-0.001 (0.039)	0.099 (0.068)	0.060 (0.078)
Observations	195	195	192	193	190	190	190	190	190

Notes: Columns 1-4 marginal effects from logit estimates, Columns 5-9 marginal effects from multinomial logit estimates, standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the teacher level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. In all columns of both panels, we control for the same set of variables as in Tables 2 and 3.

Table S4 Comparison of Samples Included in and Excluded from the Analysis

	Children whose parents filled the questionnaire			Children whose parents did not fill the questionnaire	
	Mean	SD		Mean	SD
<i>Panel A: Child's characteristics</i>					
Age (years)	7.829	(2.116)	***	8.682	(2.345)
Female	0.505	(0.501)		0.554	(0.499)
School performance	2.248	(0.940)	***	2.551	(0.965)
Bad math grade	0.316	(0.467)		0.418	(0.496)
Share of good answers in IQ test	0.709	(0.141)		0.735	(0.101)
Low height	0.441	(0.497)		0.453	(0.499)
High absence	0.427	(0.497)		0.434	(0.499)
<i>Panel B: Choices in the experiments</i>					
Costly prosocial game (egalitarian choice)	0.445	(0.498)		0.490	(0.501)
Costless prosocial game (egalitarian choice)	0.675	(0.469)		0.684	(0.466)
Costly envy game (egalitarian choice)	0.295	(0.457)		0.301	(0.460)
Costless envy game (egalitarian choice)	0.544	(0.499)		0.522	(0.501)
Altruistic	0.156	(0.364)		0.195	(0.397)
Inequality-averse	0.089	(0.286)		0.065	(0.247)
Spiteful	0.063	(0.244)		0.084	(0.279)
Selfish	0.398	(0.490)		0.325	(0.470)
Selfish-weakly altruistic	0.108	(0.311)		0.104	(0.306)
Selfish-weakly inequal. averse	0.115	(0.320)		0.084	(0.279)
Selfish-weakly spiteful	0.100	(0.301)		0.065	(0.247)
Selfish-other	0.074	(0.263)		0.071	(0.258)
Ambiguous	0.368	(0.483)		0.403	(0.492)
Current patience (today vs. tomorrow)	0.527	(0.500)		0.497	(0.502)
Future patience (in 7 days vs. in 8 days)	0.631	(0.483)		0.638	(0.482)
Observations	275			157	

Notes: Means, standard deviations in parentheses. Difference in means significant at the 1% level
***, at the 5% level **, and at the 10% level *.

Table S5 Heckman Sample Selection Model (Correction for Parental Non-Response)

Dependent variable	Egalitarian Choices in Games				Other-Regarding Types				
	Costly prosocial game (1,1) vs.(2,0)	Costless prosocial game (1,1) vs.(1,0)	Costly envy game (1,1) vs.(2,3)	Costless envy game (1,1) vs.(1,2)	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish	Ambiguous
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Low parental education	-0.162** (0.066)	-0.055 (0.063)	-0.048 (0.065)	0.005 (0.072)	-0.118** (0.051)	-0.056 (0.041)	-0.024 (0.036)	0.136** (0.067)	0.063 (0.065)
Parents separated	0.061** (0.025)	0.052** (0.023)	0.028 (0.026)	0.035 (0.029)	0.038* (0.019)	0.001 (0.016)	0.002 (0.014)	-0.077*** (0.025)	0.036 (0.024)
Mother not working full-time	0.068 (0.074)	-0.049 (0.072)	0.031 (0.075)	0.059 (0.092)	-0.053 (0.059)	0.016 (0.048)	-0.014 (0.042)	-0.046 (0.075)	0.097 (0.073)
Age	0.021 (0.074)	0.008 (0.070)	0.014 (0.073)	-0.082 (0.080)	0.015 (0.058)	-0.033 (0.046)	0.061 (0.040)	-0.030 (0.075)	-0.013 (0.073)
Female	0.072 (0.060)	-0.035 (0.057)	-0.007 (0.059)	-0.011 (0.065)	0.013 (0.046)	-0.010 (0.037)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.028 (0.060)	0.006 (0.058)
Observations (total)	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404
Observations (uncensored)	253	253	250	251	248	248	248	248	248

Notes: Heckman 2-stage sample selection model (2nd stage equation is OLS), standard errors in parentheses. Selection variables are Female, Low height and Grade. Female, Grade, and Low height are all negatively related to selection into the sample. The coefficient by the Mills ratio is insignificant in all regressions. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.

Table S6 Comparison of IQ and Non-IQ samples

	IQ sample			Non-IQ sample	
	Mean	SD		Mean	SD
<i>Panel A: Child's and family characteristics</i>					
Age (years)	7.804	(1.987)		7.856	(2.255)
Female	0.503	(0.502)		0.508	(0.502)
Low parental education	0.273	(0.447)		0.250	(0.435)
Parents separated	0.203	(0.403)		0.182	(0.387)
Mother not working full-time	0.468	(0.501)		0.512	(0.502)
Number of siblings	1.091	(0.711)		1.031	(0.736)
Birth order	1.496	(0.502)		1.553	(0.499)
School performance	2.188	(0.946)		2.307	(0.935)
Bad math grade	0.297	(0.460)		0.333	(0.475)
Low height	0.359	(0.481)	***	0.523	(0.501)
High absence	0.393	(0.493)		0.464	(0.503)
<i>Panel B: Choices in the experiments</i>					
Costly prosocial game (egalitarian choice)	0.479	(0.501)		0.409	(0.494)
Costless prosocial game (egalitarian choice)	0.664	(0.474)		0.687	(0.465)
Costly envy game (egalitarian choice)	0.340	(0.476)	*	0.246	(0.432)
Costless envy game (egalitarian choice)	0.532	(0.501)		0.557	(0.499)
Strongly altruistic	0.171	(0.378)		0.140	(0.348)
Strongly inequality-averse	0.093	(0.291)		0.085	(0.280)
Strongly spiteful	0.064	(0.246)		0.062	(0.242)
Selfish	0.336	(0.474)	**	0.465	(0.501)
Selfish-weakly altruistic	0.086	(0.281)		0.132	(0.340)
Selfish-weakly inequal. averse	0.071	(0.258)	**	0.163	(0.371)
Selfish-weakly spiteful	0.107	(0.310)		0.093	(0.292)
Selfish-other	0.071	(0.259)		0.077	(0.268)
Ambiguous	0.336	(0.474)		0.248	(0.434)
Patient (today vs. tomorrow)	0.531	(0.501)		0.523	(0.501)
Patient (in 7 days vs. in 8 days)	0.640	(0.482)		0.621	(0.487)
Observations	143			132	

Notes: Means, standard deviations in parentheses. Difference in means significant at the 1% level ***, at the 5% level, ** and at the 10% level *.

Table S7 Choices in Games and Other-Regarding Types: Mother's and Father's Education

Dependent variable	Egalitarian Choices in Games				Other-Regarding Types				
	Costly prosocial game (1,1) vs.(2,0)	Costless prosocial game (1,1) vs.(1,0)	Costly envy game (1,1) vs.(2,3)	Costless envy game (1,1) vs.(1,2)	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish	Ambiguous
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PANEL A: MOTHER'S EDUCATION									
Mother has low education	-0.163** (0.074)	-0.072 (0.078)	-0.046 (0.052)	0.021 (0.069)	-0.114*** (0.040)	-0.049 (0.039)	-0.030 (0.032)	0.153*** (0.056)	0.040 (0.075)
Observations	266	266	263	264	261	261	261	261	261
PANEL B: FATHER'S EDUCATION									
Father has low education	-0.160** (0.078)	-0.029 (0.071)	-0.055 (0.048)	0.023 (0.076)	-0.107** (0.046)	-0.042 (0.039)	-0.043 (0.030)	0.154** (0.061)	0.038 (0.083)
Observations	257	257	254	255	252	252	252	252	252

Notes: Columns 1-4 marginal effects from logit estimates, Columns 5-9 marginal effects from multinomial logit estimates, standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the teacher level.

*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. In all columns of both panels, we control for the same set of variables as in Tables 2 and 3.

Table S8 Other-Regarding Types and Parental Background: Error Rate Analysis

Dependent variable	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish-weakly altruistic	Selfish-weakly inequality averse	Selfish-weakly spiteful	Selfish-other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Low parental education	-0.071** (0.033)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.000 (0.016)	0.050* (0.028)	0.002 (0.023)	0.051* (0.029)	0.004 (0.011)
Parents separated	0.038 (0.050)	-0.037 (0.024)	0.006 (0.022)	0.020 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.009)
Mother not working full-time	0.052 (0.039)	-0.006 (0.035)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.023)	-0.027 (0.019)	0.007 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.009)
Age	0.049*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.031*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.003)
Female	0.017 (0.033)	0.043* (0.023)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	0.013 (0.008)
Observations	262	262	262	262	262	262	262
Mean of dependent variable	0.293	0.084	0.086	0.151	0.174	0.146	0.066

Notes: OLS, standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the teacher level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Dependent variables are individual probabilities of being each of the seven other-regarding types as estimated by the error rate analysis.

Methodological note:

Following the literature, we use the following setup. Let $i=1,2,\dots,N$ denote subjects and $k=1,2,\dots,7$ denote different types of other-regarding preferences they may exhibit. In each of the four games a child makes a binary decision which can be consistent or inconsistent with its type k . Only one out of two possible decisions is consistent with a single type k . Inconsistent choice happen as a result of errors in decision making. We use $\varepsilon_k \in (0,1)$ to denote the probability that a k -type child makes an error in a single game. Errors are i.i.d. across subjects and games. Then, the likelihood of observing a child with x_k^i decisions consistent with its type is:

$$L_k^i(x_k^i|\varepsilon_k) = \left[1 - \frac{1}{2}\varepsilon_k\right]^{x_k^i} \left[\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon_k\right]^{4-x_k^i}, \quad (1)$$

We weight the right-hand-side of the above likelihood function by the prior probabilities of being a certain type, p_k , take logarithms and sum over the whole sample to obtain the following log-likelihood function:

$$\ln L(p, \varepsilon|x) = \sum_{i=1}^N \ln \left(\sum_{k=1}^7 p_k \left[1 - \frac{1}{2}\varepsilon_k\right]^{x_k^i} \left[\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon_k\right]^{4-x_k^i} \right). \quad (2)$$

The above model has 13 independent parameters to be estimated: seven error probabilities and six type probabilities. We estimate them using the observed distribution of decisions across games.

Given the estimates of prior probabilities of being a certain type and of the type-specific error probabilities, we can calculate individual probabilities of being each of the seven types. First, we use equation (1) to retrieve individual probabilities to observe a given pattern of choices conditional on type, $P(x_i|k)$. Next, we apply the Bayes rule to calculate the probabilities of being type j :

$$P_i(k_i = j|x_i) = \frac{P(x_i|k_i=j)\hat{p}_j}{\sum_{k=1}^7 P(x_i|k_i=k)\hat{p}_k}. \quad (3)$$

These individual probabilities of being a certain type are used as dependent variables in regression analysis of the relationship between parental background and the prevalence of other-regarding preferences reported in Table S8.

Table S9 Other-Regarding Types and Parental Background: Types Classified Based on the Costly Sharing Game and the Costly Envy Game

Dependent variable	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low parental education	-0.103** (0.048)	-0.051 (0.051)	-0.005 (0.057)	0.159*** (0.056)
Parents separated	0.014 (0.078)	-0.018 (0.038)	0.011 (0.063)	-0.008 (0.075)
Mother not working full-time	0.051 (0.067)	0.034 (0.057)	-0.053 (0.041)	-0.032 (0.054)
Age	0.072*** (0.017)	0.015 (0.009)	0.006 (0.011)	-0.092*** (0.012)
Female	0.066 (0.059)	0.057 (0.040)	-0.058 (0.046)	-0.065 (0.072)
Observations	264	264	264	264

Notes: Marginal effects from logit estimation, standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the teacher level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Only two games (costly sharing and costly envy) are used to classify subjects into types. Children are defined as altruistic if they maximize the payoff of their partner in both games, as inequality averse if they minimize differences in payoffs by always choosing the egalitarian option, as spiteful if they always minimize their partner's payoff, and as selfish if they maximize their own payoff in both games.

Table S10 Total Payoff and Payoff of the Partner

Dependent variable	Total payoff	Partner's payoff
	(1)	(2)
Low parental education	0.064 (0.232)	-0.168** (0.076)
Parents separated	0.106 (0.265)	0.007 (0.087)
Mother not working full-time	0.057 (0.210)	0.064 (0.069)
Age	0.030 (0.049)	0.100*** (0.016)
Female	0.028 (0.205)	0.118* (0.067)
Total payoff		0.770*** (0.020)
Observations	262	262

Notes: OLS, standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the teacher level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Total payoff is defined as the total number of tokens allocated by a decision-maker during all four games to self and to the partner; Partner's payoff is defined as the total number of tokens allocated to the anonymous partner during all four games.

Table S11 Child Characteristics and Parental Background

Dependent variable	School performance	Bad math grade	Share of good answers in IQ test	Patient now	Patient in the future	High absence	Low height	Number of siblings	Birth order
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Low parental education	0.394*** (0.138)	0.257*** (0.092)	-0.003 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.082)	-0.010 (0.072)	0.132 (0.083)	-0.009 (0.061)	-0.081 (0.090)	0.061 (0.056)
Age	-0.021 (0.055)	0.121*** (0.027)	0.008 (0.008)	0.034** (0.016)	0.041** (0.018)	0.043* (0.026)	0.007 (0.010)	0.033* (0.019)	-0.012 (0.014)
Female	-0.118 (0.090)	-0.027 (0.079)	0.028 (0.023)	0.010 (0.067)	-0.013 (0.069)	0.144** (0.063)	0.013 (0.047)	0.037 (0.097)	0.051 (0.073)
Parents separated	0.339 (0.220)	0.159 (0.116)	-0.022 (0.022)	0.146* (0.081)	0.079 (0.091)	0.189** (0.085)	0.029 (0.066)	-0.223 (0.161)	-0.144 (0.090)
Mother not working full time	0.140 (0.117)	0.075 (0.095)	-0.027 (0.027)	0.072 (0.061)	0.069 (0.057)	0.067 (0.120)	0.066 (0.059)	0.297*** (0.061)	-0.005 (0.062)
Constant	2.225*** (0.553)	-1.454*** (0.277)	0.646*** (0.076)	-0.299** (0.149)	-0.227 (0.154)	-0.652*** (0.252)	-0.153 (0.104)	0.703*** (0.170)	1.597*** (0.143)
Observations	196	129	141	268	264	114	254	266	268

Notes: Columns 1,3,8 and 9 OLS, Columns 2,4,5,6 and 7 marginal effects from logit estimates, standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the teacher level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.

Table S12 The Role of Skills, Health, Siblings and Peers

Dependent variable	Egalitarian Choices in Games				Other-Regarding Types					
	Costly prosocial game	Costless prosocial game	Costly envy game	Costless envy game	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish	Ambiguous	
	(1,1) vs. (2,0)	(1,1) vs. (1,0)	(1,1) vs. (2,3)	(1,1) vs. (1,2)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)						
PANEL A: SCHOOL PERFORMANCE										
Low parental education	-0.193** (0.084)	-0.130* (0.073)	-0.025 (0.066)	0.044 (0.087)	-0.192*** (0.057)	-0.065 (0.054)	-0.013 (0.031)	0.156** (0.066)	0.114 (0.093)	
School performance	0.034 (0.043)	0.011 (0.033)	-0.031 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.045)	0.023 (0.029)	-0.010 (0.016)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.030 (0.041)	0.010 (0.045)	
Observations	195	195	193	194	192	192	192	192	192	
PANEL B: BAD MATH GRADE										
Low parental education	-0.100 (0.105)	-0.136 (0.102)	0.099 (0.087)	0.155 (0.124)	-0.264*** (0.074)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.019)	0.072 (0.115)	0.195 (0.143)	
Bad math grade	-0.213*** (0.068)	0.024 (0.108)	-0.216** (0.106)	-0.046 (0.103)	-0.043 (0.062)	-0.124*** (0.037)	0.002 (0.021)	0.256*** (0.068)	-0.092 (0.090)	
Observations	128	129	127	127	126	126	126	126	126	
PANEL C: IQ										
Low parental education	-0.225** (0.090)	-0.101 (0.106)	-0.078 (0.065)	0.026 (0.080)	-0.105* (0.57)	-0.106** (0.047)	-0.019 (0.035)	0.189** (0.073)	0.041 (0.087)	
Share of good answers in IQ test	0.074 (0.392)	-0.098 (0.384)	0.164 (0.306)	-0.144 (0.211)	-0.025 (0.221)	0.050 (0.161)	0.242** (0.122)	-0.145 (0.358)	-0.121 (0.291)	
Observations	140	141	139	139	138	138	138	138	138	
PANEL D: CURRENT PATIENCE										
Low parental education	-0.166** (0.075)	-0.074 (0.077)	-0.044 (0.052)	0.017 (0.068)	-0.113*** (0.041)	-0.048 (0.038)	-0.029 (0.032)	0.155*** (0.058)	0.036 (0.075)	
Current patience	-0.052 (0.063)	-0.087* (0.053)	0.003 (0.072)	-0.062 (0.062)	-0.020 (0.047)	-0.030 (0.031)	0.001 (0.038)	0.064 (0.079)	-0.015 (0.051)	
Observations	267	267	264	265	262	262	262	262	262	

Table S12, continued The Role of Skills, Health, Siblings and Peers

Dependent variable	Egalitarian Choices in Games				Other-Regarding Types				
	Costly prosocial game	Costless prosocial game	Costly envy game	Costless envy game	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish	Ambiguous
	(1,1) vs. (2,0)	(1,1) vs. (1,0)	(1,1) vs. (2,3)	(1,1) vs. (1,2)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)					
PANEL E: FUTURE PATIENCE									
Low parental education	-0.166** (0.075)	-0.062 (0.083)	-0.040 (0.052)	0.003 (0.071)	-0.110*** (0.040)	-0.049 (0.040)	-0.028 (0.033)	0.146** (0.059)	0.042 (0.075)
Future patience	-0.027 (0.078)	0.100 (0.063)	-0.027 (0.057)	0.043 (0.081)	0.017 (0.061)	0.009 (0.040)	-0.011 (0.031)	0.044 (0.075)	-0.060 (0.054)
Observations	263	263	260	261	258	258	258	258	258
PANEL F: LOW HEIGHT									
Low parental education	-0.187*** (0.071)	-0.065 (0.076)	-0.050 (0.061)	0.004 (0.075)	-0.113*** (0.041)	-0.061 (0.039)	-0.025 (0.034)	0.152** (0.060)	0.048 (0.078)
Low height	0.004 (0.051)	-0.082 (0.054)	-0.034 (0.056)	-0.099** (0.048)	0.013 (0.039)	-0.027 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.029)	0.022 (0.062)	0.008 (0.061)
Observations	253	253	250	251	248	248	248	248	248
PANEL G: HIGH ABSENCE									
Low parental education	-0.203 (0.148)	-0.137 (0.086)	0.004 (0.073)	0.014 (0.141)	-0.271*** (0.085)	-0.090 (0.060)	0.007 (0.010)	0.124 (0.109)	0.230* (0.128)
High absence	0.026 (0.070)	0.059 (0.048)	0.080 (0.093)	0.041 (0.116)	0.057 (0.088)	0.086* (0.050)	-0.021 (0.020)	0.007 (0.098)	-0.130 (0.090)
Observations	113	113	111	112	110	110	110	110	110
PANEL H: NUMBER OF SIBLINGS									
Low parental education	-0.159** (0.076)	-0.083 (0.077)	-0.044 (0.052)	0.019 (0.070)	0.112*** (0.042)	-0.047 (0.037)	-0.029 (0.032)	0.146** (0.059)	0.043 (0.078)
Number of siblings	0.065 (0.052)	-0.034 (0.033)	-0.053 (0.053)	-0.056 (0.052)	0.029 (0.037)	-0.038 (0.027)	0.011 (0.014)	-0.043 (0.067)	0.042 (0.058)
Observations	265	265	262	263	260	260	260	260	260

Table S12, continued The Role of Skills, Health, Siblings and Peers

Dependent variable	Egalitarian Choices in Games				Other-Regarding Types				
	Costly prosocial game	Costless prosocial game	Costly envy game	Costless envy game	Altruistic	Inequality averse	Spiteful	Selfish	Ambiguous
	(1,1) vs. (2,0)	(1,1) vs. (1,0)	(1,1) vs. (2,3)	(1,1) vs. (1,2)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PANEL I: BIRTH ORDER									
Low parental education	-0.164** (0.073)	-0.071 (0.077)	-0.042 (0.051)	0.024 (0.069)	-0.114*** (0.041)	-0.048 (0.038)	-0.031 (0.032)	0.153*** (0.056)	0.040 (0.075)
Birth order	-0.020 (0.071)	-0.011 (0.063)	-0.032 (0.046)	-0.082 (0.069)	0.027 (0.033)	-0.005 (0.036)	0.027 (0.031)	0.012 (0.059)	-0.061 (0.065)
Observations	267	267	264	265	262	262	262	262	262
PANEL J: CLASS FIXED EFFECTS									
Low parental education	-0.153** (0.067)	-0.036 (0.081)	-0.030 (0.058)	0.017 (0.088)	-0.131** (0.059)	-0.035 (0.042)	-0.039 (0.035)	0.141** (0.054)	0.064 (0.086)
Observations	267	267	264	265	262	262	262	262	262

Notes: Columns 1-4 marginal effects from logit estimates, Columns 5-9 marginal effects from multinomial logit estimates, Panel J reports coefficients from OLS regression in all 9 columns due to too many explanatory variables for multinomial logit. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the teacher level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. In all columns of all panels, we control for the same set of variables as in Tables 2 and 3. In some cases the coefficient by Low parental education differs from the baseline regression estimate. This is always driven by sample selection due to availability of respective control variables, some of which are only measured on specific sub-samples of children. Repeating the baseline regression on restricted samples gives statistically the same estimates as those reported in this table (available on request).

Table S13 World Values Survey – Full Set of Parental Values

Dependent variable	Good manners (1)	Independence (2)	Hard work (3)	Responsibility (4)	Imagination (5)	Tolerance (6)
Low education	0.027 (0.028)	0.003 (0.028)	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.078** (0.038)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.090** (0.039)
Married or couple	0.033 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.032)	0.001 (0.031)	0.021 (0.041)	-0.012 (0.013)	0.050 (0.043)
Employed	-0.068** (0.029)	-0.023 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.029)	0.028 (0.039)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.057 (0.041)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Female	-0.005 (0.028)	-0.058** (0.028)	-0.035 (0.028)	0.048 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.074* (0.038)
Number of qualities chosen	0.125*** (0.015)	0.075*** (0.020)	0.127*** (0.015)	0.172*** (0.022)	0.022** (0.011)	0.180*** (0.025)
Region fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	867	867	867	867	864	867
Dependent variable	Thrift (7)	Determination (8)	Religious faith (9)	Unselfishness (10)	Obedience (11)	
Low education	0.181*** (0.039)	-0.063* (0.035)	0.053*** (0.019)	-0.064* (0.034)	0.051** (0.024)	
Married or couple	0.017 (0.043)	-0.041 (0.040)	0.010 (0.017)	-0.062* (0.037)	0.047* (0.026)	
Employed	-0.007 (0.041)	0.057 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.019)	0.001 (0.036)	0.005 (0.024)	
Age	0.003** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	
Female	-0.052 (0.039)	-0.081** (0.035)	0.028* (0.017)	0.043 (0.035)	0.034 (0.023)	
Number of qualities chosen	0.194*** (0.030)	0.130*** (0.025)	0.032** (0.013)	0.125*** (0.026)	0.053*** (0.017)	
Region fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
Observations	867	864	864	864	864	

Notes: Logit, marginal effects, standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.