A Tables

LETTER	. ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ .	NUMBER	. ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ .	STABLE MATCHINGS [# GS STEPS]		
			PREFERENCE PROFILE S-A			
a	1 ≻ 3 ≻ 5 ≻ 2 ≻ 4	1	a ≻ c ≻ e ≻ b ≻ d	LETTER-OPTIMAL	$(1a, 2b, 3c, 4d, 5e)$	[4]
b	1 ≻ 2 ≻ 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 5	2	a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ c ≻ e		$(1a, 2b, 3e, 4c, 5d)$	
c	2 ≻ 1 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 ≻ 5	3	b ≻ a ≻ d ≻ e ≻ c	NUMBER-OPTIMAL	$(1a, 2b, 3d, 4e, 5c)$	[4]
d	2 ≻ 1 ≻ 4 ≻ 5 ≻ 3	4	b ≻ a ≻ e ≻ c ≻ d			
e	1 ≻ 2 ≻ 5 ≻ 3 ≻ 4	5	a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e			
			PREFERENCE PROFILE S-B			
a	2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 ≻ 5 ≻ 1	1	c ≻ d ≻ b ≻ a ≻ e	LETTER-OPTIMAL	$(1e, 2a, 3b, 4c, 5d)$	[6]
b	3 ≻ 5 ≻ 2 ≻ 1 ≻ 4	2	a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b ≻ e	NUMBER-OPTIMAL	$(1e, 2a, 3d, 4c, 5b)$	[5]
c	2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 ≻ 5 ≻ 1	3	a ≻ d ≻ b ≻ c ≻ e			
d	2 ≻ 5 ≻ 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 4	4	c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ a ≻ b			
e	3 ≻ 4 ≻ 2 ≻ 5 ≻ 1	5	c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ e			
			PREFERENCE PROFILE S-C			
a	1 ≻ 3 ≻ 5 ≻ 2 ≻ 4	1	a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ e ≻ c	LETTER-OPTIMAL	$(1a, 2b, 3c, 4d, 5e)$	[2]
b	1 ≻ 2 ≻ 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 5	2	c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ e		$(1a, 2b, 3e, 4c, 5d)$	
c	3 ≻ 4 ≻ 5 ≻ 1 ≻ 2	3	d ≻ e ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a	NUMBER-OPTIMAL	$(1a, 2b, 3d, 4e, 5c)$	[3]
d	4 ≻ 5 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1	4	e ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ b			
e	5 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 ≻ 1 ≻ 2	5	c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ b ≻ a			

Table 1: Preference profiles S-A to S-C for small markets. Stable matchings and number of steps the GS algorithms take to converge.

LETTER	. ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ .	NUMBER	. ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ . ≻ .	STABLE MATCHINGS [# GS STEPS]		
PREFERENCE PROFILE L-A						
a	1 ≻ 6 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 2 ≻ 7 ≻ 4 ≻ 9	1	a ≻ f ≻ c ≻ h ≻ e ≻ j ≻ b ≻ g ≻ d ≻ i	LETTER-OPTIMAL	(1a,2b,3c,4d,5e,6f,7g,8h,9i,10j)	[7]
b	1 ≻ 6 ≻ 2 ≻ 7 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 5 ≻ 10	2	a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ g ≻ d ≻ i ≻ c ≻ h ≻ e ≻ j		(1a,2b,3c,4d,5e,6f,7g,8j,9h,10i)	
c	2 ≻ 7 ≻ 1 ≻ 6 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 5 ≻ 10	3	b ≻ g ≻ a ≻ f ≻ d ≻ i ≻ e ≻ j ≻ c ≻ h		(1a,2b,3e,4c,5d,6f,7g,8h,9i,10j)	
d	2 ≻ 7 ≻ 1 ≻ 6 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 3 ≻ 8	4	b ≻ g ≻ a ≻ f ≻ e ≻ j ≻ c ≻ h ≻ d ≻ i		(1a,2b,3e,4c,5d,6f,7g,8i,9j,10h)	
e	1 ≻ 6 ≻ 2 ≻ 7 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 4 ≻ 9	5	a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ g ≻ c ≻ h ≻ d ≻ i ≻ e ≻ j		(1a,2b,3e,4c,5d,6f,7g,8j,9h,10i)	
f	6 ≻ 1 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 7 ≻ 2 ≻ 9 ≻ 4	6	f ≻ a ≻ h ≻ c ≻ j ≻ e ≻ g ≻ b ≻ i ≻ d		(1a,2b,3d,4e,5c,6f,7g,8j,9h,10i)	
g	6 ≻ 1 ≻ 7 ≻ 2 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 10 ≻ 5	7	f ≻ a ≻ g ≻ b ≻ i ≻ d ≻ h ≻ c ≻ j ≻ e	NUMBER-OPTIMAL	(1a,2b,3d,4e,5c,6f,7g,8i,9j,10h)	[9]
h	7 ≻ 2 ≻ 6 ≻ 1 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 10 ≻ 5	8	g ≻ b ≻ f ≻ a ≻ i ≻ d ≻ j ≻ e ≻ h ≻ c			
i	7 ≻ 2 ≻ 6 ≻ 1 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 8 ≻ 3	9	g ≻ b ≻ f ≻ a ≻ j ≻ e ≻ h ≻ c ≻ i ≻ d			
j	6 ≻ 1 ≻ 7 ≻ 2 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 9 ≻ 4	10	f ≻ a ≻ g ≻ b ≻ h ≻ c ≻ i ≻ d ≻ j ≻ e			
PREFERENCE PROFILE L-B						
a	2 ≻ 7 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 1 ≻ 6	1	c ≻ h ≻ d ≻ i ≻ b ≻ g ≻ a ≻ f ≻ e ≻ j	LETTER-OPTIMAL	(1e,2a,3b,4c,5d,6j,7f,8g,9h,10i)	[11]
b	3 ≻ 8 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 2 ≻ 7 ≻ 1 ≻ 6 ≻ 4 ≻ 9	2	a ≻ f ≻ c ≻ h ≻ d ≻ i ≻ b ≻ g ≻ e ≻ j		(1e,2a,3b,4c,5d,6j,7f,8i,9h,10g)	
c	2 ≻ 7 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 1 ≻ 6	3	a ≻ f ≻ d ≻ i ≻ b ≻ g ≻ c ≻ h ≻ e ≻ j		(1e,2a,3d,4c,5b,6j,7f,8g,9h,10i)	
d	2 ≻ 7 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 1 ≻ 6 ≻ 4 ≻ 9	4	c ≻ h ≻ d ≻ i ≻ e ≻ j ≻ a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ g	NUMBER-OPTIMAL	(1e,2a,3d,4c,5b,6j,7f,8i,9h,10g)	[9]
e	3 ≻ 8 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 2 ≻ 7 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 1 ≻ 6	5	c ≻ h ≻ a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ g ≻ d ≻ i ≻ e ≻ j			
f	7 ≻ 2 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 6 ≻ 1	6	h ≻ c ≻ i ≻ d ≻ g ≻ b ≻ f ≻ a ≻ j ≻ e			
g	8 ≻ 3 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 7 ≻ 2 ≻ 6 ≻ 1 ≻ 9 ≻ 4	7	f ≻ a ≻ h ≻ c ≻ i ≻ d ≻ g ≻ b ≻ j ≻ e			
h	7 ≻ 2 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 6 ≻ 1	8	f ≻ a ≻ i ≻ d ≻ g ≻ b ≻ h ≻ c ≻ j ≻ e			
i	7 ≻ 2 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 6 ≻ 1 ≻ 9 ≻ 4	9	h ≻ c ≻ i ≻ d ≻ j ≻ e ≻ f ≻ a ≻ g ≻ b			
j	8 ≻ 3 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 7 ≻ 2 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 6 ≻ 1	10	h ≻ c ≻ f ≻ a ≻ g ≻ b ≻ i ≻ d ≻ j ≻ e			
PREFERENCE PROFILE L-C						
a	1 ≻ 6 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 2 ≻ 7 ≻ 4 ≻ 9	1	a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ g ≻ d ≻ i ≻ e ≻ j ≻ c ≻ h	LETTER-OPTIMAL	(1a,2b,3c,4d,5e,6f,7g,8h,9i,10j)	[3]
b	1 ≻ 6 ≻ 2 ≻ 7 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 5 ≻ 10	2	c ≻ h ≻ a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ g ≻ d ≻ i ≻ e ≻ j		(1a,2b,3c,4d,5e,6f,7g,8j,9h,10i)	
c	3 ≻ 8 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 1 ≻ 6 ≻ 2 ≻ 7	3	d ≻ i ≻ e ≻ j ≻ c ≻ h ≻ b ≻ g ≻ a ≻ f		(1a,2b,3e,4c,5d,6f,7g,8h,9i,10j)	
d	4 ≻ 9 ≻ 5 ≻ 10 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 2 ≻ 7 ≻ 1 ≻ 6	4	e ≻ j ≻ c ≻ h ≻ d ≻ i ≻ a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ g		(1a,2b,3e,4c,5d,6f,7g,8i,9j,10h)	
e	5 ≻ 10 ≻ 3 ≻ 8 ≻ 4 ≻ 9 ≻ 1 ≻ 6 ≻ 2 ≻ 7	5	c ≻ h ≻ d ≻ i ≻ e ≻ j ≻ b ≻ g ≻ a ≻ f		(1a,2b,3e,4c,5d,6f,7g,8j,9h,10i)	
f	6 ≻ 1 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 7 ≻ 2 ≻ 9 ≻ 4	6	f ≻ a ≻ g ≻ b ≻ i ≻ d ≻ j ≻ e ≻ h ≻ c		(1a,2b,3d,4e,5c,6f,7g,8j,9h,10i)	
g	6 ≻ 1 ≻ 7 ≻ 2 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 10 ≻ 5	7	h ≻ c ≻ f ≻ a ≻ g ≻ b ≻ i ≻ d ≻ j ≻ e	NUMBER-OPTIMAL	(1a,2b,3d,4e,5c,6f,7g,8i,9j,10h)	[5]
h	8 ≻ 3 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 6 ≻ 1 ≻ 7 ≻ 2	8	i ≻ d ≻ j ≻ e ≻ h ≻ c ≻ g ≻ b ≻ f ≻ a			
i	9 ≻ 4 ≻ 10 ≻ 5 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 7 ≻ 2 ≻ 6 ≻ 1	9	j ≻ e ≻ h ≻ c ≻ i ≻ d ≻ f ≻ a ≻ g ≻ b			
j	10 ≻ 5 ≻ 8 ≻ 3 ≻ 9 ≻ 4 ≻ 6 ≻ 1 ≻ 7 ≻ 2	10	h ≻ c ≻ i ≻ d ≻ j ≻ e ≻ g ≻ b ≻ f ≻ a			

Table 2: Preference profiles L-A to L-C for large markets. Stable matchings and number of steps the GS algorithms take to converge.

	PROPORTION OF MYOPICALLY-RATIONAL						FINAL MATCHING			
	PROPOSALS		ACCEPTANCES		DEALS		STABILITY		EFFICIENCY	
LOW INFORMATION	0.000	0.000	0.146	0.146	0.009	0.009	0.537	0.056	0.179	0.334
	(0.92; 0.88)		(0.95; 0.94)		(0.91; 0.88)		(0.50; 0.47)		(0.88; 0.90)	
COMMITMENT	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.610	0.04	0.007	0.054
	(-; -)		(-; -)		(-; -)		(0.47; 0.50)		(0.88; 0.91)	
SEARCH COSTS	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.023	0.037	0.146
	(0.88; 0.95)		(0.93; 0.97)		(0.86; 0.93)		(0.54; 0.36)		(0.90; 0.87)	
LARGE MARKET	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000
	(0.99; 0.83)		(0.97; 0.92)		(0.96; 0.83)		(0.61; 0.17)		(0.90; 0.87)	

Table 3: Parametric and non-parametric tests for the effect of treatment variables. Reported numbers are p-values from two-sample z-tests of proportions (first) and Pearson's χ^2-tests for association (second) for binary variables, and t-tests for means (first) and Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank tests (second) for efficiency. Compared means between parentheses (treatment; base).

TREATMENT	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	L1	L2	L3	L4	L5	L6
	LOW	LOW	LOW	[LOW]	[LOW]	[LOW]	LOW	LOW	LOW	[LOW]	[LOW]	[LOW]
	COM	COM	[COM]	COM	COM	[COM]	COM	COM	[COM]	COM	COM	[COM]
	CST	[CST]	CST	CST	[CST]	CST	CST	[CST]	CST	CST	[CST]	CST
	LRG	LRG	LRG	LRG	LRG	LRG	[LRG]	[LRG]	[LRG]	[LRG]	[LRG]	[LRG]
ROUND AVERAGES												
PROPOSALS	21.56	9.89	14.53	30.31	12.67	15.96	73.89	27.61	35.78	111.06	40.39	49.22
ACCEPTANCES	6.98	5.62	5.00	9.13	6.44	4.98	22.06	13.00	10.00	26.11	16.28	10.00
REJECTIONS	3.27	1.24	0.91	7.13	1.62	1.24	15.17	4.67	3.11	28.83	6.50	5.17
CANCELLATIONS	7.67	1.82	0.98	10.09	2.84	1.02	31.56	7.89	4.56	48.56	12.67	12.39
ROUND RATES												
ACCEPTANCE	33%	63%	36%	31%	52%	33%	31%	49%	29%	24%	41%	22%
REJECTION	15%	11%	6%	24%	11%	7%	20%	16%	8%	25%	16%	10%
CANCELLATION	35%	16%	6%	32%	22%	7%	42%	28%	13%	44%	31%	25%
NO RESPONSE	17%	10%	52%	13%	15%	53%	7%	7%	50%	7%	12%	43%

Table 4: Market activity per treatment. Per-round average number of proposals, acceptances, rejections, cancellations. Average numbers were obtained counting, in each round and for each group separately, all proposals, acceptances, rejections, and cancellations, respectively, and then computing the average. Per-round average rates of acceptance, rejection, cancellation, and no response. The no-response rate collects all proposals that were automatically cancelled, i.e. proposals that were left unanswered when the market ended or, in the treatments with commitment, when either the sender or the recipient leave the market.

MARKET ACTIVITY				PROPOSALS reg. 11	ACCEPTANCES reg. 12
ROUND				-0.9651***	0.1119**
LOW	COM	CST	[LRG]	49.4380***	4.8101
LOW	COM	[CST]	LRG	-11.6667***	1.0082
LOW	COM	[CST]	[LRG]	3.1602	5.1309***
LOW	[COM]	CST	LRG	-7.0222***	-0.5550
LOW	[COM]	CST	[LRG]	11.3269***	0.4762
[LOW]	COM	CST	LRG	8.7556***	0.3816
[LOW]	COM	CST	[LRG]	86.6047***	1.3354
[LOW]	COM	[CST]	LRG	-8.8889***	1.2676*
[LOW]	COM	[CST]	[LRG]	15.9380***	5.8198***
[LOW]	[COM]	CST	LRG	-5.6000***	-0.8654*
[LOW]	[COM]	CST	[LRG]	24.7714***	-2.2478
# OFFERS				-	0.2026***
CONSTANT				29.2764***	1.7156
OBS.				378	378
(PSEUDO) R^2				0.9088	0.8325

Table 5: The effect of the treatment variables on the average number of proposals (regression 11) and on the average number of acceptances (regression 12) with cross-effects. OLS regression analysis results. Significant coefficient estimates at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Standard errors clustered at preference-profile level.

B Instructions (translated from Spanish)

The objective of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in certain situations.[1] Should you have a question, you can pose it at any moment by first raising your hand. From this moment on, you are not allowed to talk to the other participants.

The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully, you can earn some cash that you will receive at the end of the experiment. Your monetary payoff will partially depend on your decisions and also on the decisions made by the others in the group. At the end of the session, payments will be made confidentially, so no one will receive information on the other participants' earnings.

Instructions

This session consists of one practice round and 15 rounds that will determine your final payoff. At the start, the computer will randomly assign the participants to groups of 10 people. No one will know the identity of the other members' in the group. Moreover, the assignment will change in each round, therefore the composition of your group is very likely to change from round to round.

Each group will be divided in two subgroups of 5 people. The members of one subgroup will be identified by capital letters from A to E, while the members of the other will be identified by numbers from 1 to 5.

In each round, you will randomly be assigned an ID: a capital letter from A to E, or a number from 1 to 5. Your task is to find a partner in the other subgroup. If you wish, you can also remain alone. Only partnerships formed by one capital letter and one number are allowed.

In order to describe how partnerships are formed in this experiment, we have attached a figure that show a screen similar to the ones you will be seeing during the experiment. Let us suppose that in this round you have been assigned the capital A as your ID. The other participants look at similar screens.

Your ID is shown in the upper central part of the screen.

On the upper part of the screen to the left you see the payoff table that shows the amount of money that you can earn at the end of the round depending on who your partner is (at the end of the round). These amounts are expressed in Experimental Monetary Units (EMU).

On the upper part of the screen to the right you see the status (the partner) of all the participants in your group. At the beginning of each round, everybody is alone.

[1] These instructions correspond to treatment 1 and constitute the benchmark. All the other instructions, both in Spanish and English, along with the zTree programs are available upon request from the authors.

On the upper central part of the screen, below your ID, you will find your current partner's ID and also the payoff that you can earn if that person remains your partner until the end of the round. In this example, you are alone. and if the round ends like this, you would earn 0 EMU.

It is important that the payoff table displays the amount of money that you will be earning (at the end of the round) depending on with whom you are forming a partnership. In this example, you would earn 50 EMU by forming a partnership with Participant 1, 20 EMU by forming a partnership with Participant 2, etc. The screen only displays your possible earnings, but on a separate paper sheet you will also receive information about the possible earnings of the other participants. During the first 15 rounds you should be considering the data in table 1, during the next 5 rounds you should be considering the data in table 2, and during the last 5 rounds the data in table 3.

In order to send an offer to form a partnership, write an ID in the purple cell that appears on the upper central part of the screen and clic on the "send offer" button. If your ID is a number, you are only allowed to write capital letters and your own ID number (in case you want to be alone). If your ID is a letter, you are only allowed to write numbers and your own ID letter (in case you want to be alone).

The lower part of the screen shows the list of offers that you have sent and the list of the offers that you have received. To the left is the list of received offers. The table displays who sent the offer and also the status of the offer ("pending" for all new offers). To accept or to reject an offer, you have to select the row of the offer and then clic on one of the buttons: "accept offer" or "reject offer". The status of the offer will change accordingly immediately.

If you accept an offer or your offer is accepted, the ID of your partner and your expected payoff are updated immediately. To the right you find the list of offers that you sent. If you regret having sent an offer, you can withdraw it at any moment (if it is still pending).

It is important that you are not allowed to send several offers at the same time. This means that you are only allowed to send a new offer if the previously sent has already been accepted, rejected (by its recipient) or withdrawn (by you).

There are three ways of staying alone in this experiment.

- Do not send, and do not accept any offer. This way you will remain alone, since each round starts with all participants being alone.
- You already have a partner, but she decides to leave you and to form a new partnership with somebody else from your group (or to stay alone).

- You already have a partner, but you send an offer to yourself and you accept it.

Each round lasts 4 minutes. Remember that your ID and your payoff table may change from round to round.

Payoffs

At the end of each round, the computer will display the status (the partner) of all members in your group, and will compute your earnings based on who your partner is. The sum of your earnings during the 15 rounds gives your final earnings. 35 EMU will be exchanged for 1 euro.

Figure 1: Sample screen



Payoff table for the QUESTIONNAIRE. Suppose that you are **Participant A**.

	PAYOFF for				
	Participant A	Participant B	Participant C	Participant D	Participant E
with Participant 1	**10**	40	20	50	20
with Participant 2	**20**	50	10	20	10
with Participant 3	**30**	20	50	40	40
with Participant 4	**40**	10	30	30	50
with Participant 5	**50**	30	40	10	30

	PAYOFF for				
	Participant 1	Participant 2	Participant 3	Participant 4	Participant 5
with **Participant A**	**10**	**30**	**50**	**40**	**30**
with Participant B	20	50	10	10	20
with Participant C	40	20	30	50	40
with Participant D	50	40	20	20	10
with Participant E	30	10	40	30	50

Table 1: ROUNDS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

	PAYOFF for				
	Participant A	Participant B	Participant C	Participant D	Participant E
with Participant 1	50	50	40	40	50
with Participant 2	20	40	50	50	40
with Participant 3	40	20	30	10	20
with Participant 4	10	30	20	30	10
with Participant 5	30	10	10	20	30

	PAYOFF for				
	Participant 1	Participant 2	Participant 3	Participant 4	Participant 5
with Participant A	50	50	40	40	50
with Participant B	20	40	50	50	40
with Participant C	40	20	10	20	30
with Participant D	10	30	30	10	20
with Participant E	30	10	20	30	10

Table 2: ROUNDS 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10

	PAYOFF for				
	Participant A	Participant B	Participant C	Participant D	Participant E
with Participant 1	10	20	10	20	10
with Participant 2	50	30	50	50	30
with Participant 3	40	50	40	30	50
with Participant 4	30	10	30	10	40
with Participant 5	20	40	20	40	20

	PAYOFF for				
	Participant 1	Participant 2	Participant 3	Participant 4	Participant 5
with Participant A	20	50	50	20	40
with Participant B	30	20	30	10	30
with Participant C	50	40	20	50	50
with Participant D	40	30	40	40	20
with Participant E	10	10	10	30	10

Table 3: ROUNDS 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15

	PAYOFF for				
	Participant A	Participant B	Participant C	Participant D	Participant E
with Participant 1	50	50	20	10	20
with Participant 2	20	40	10	20	10
with Participant 3	40	20	50	30	40
with Participant 4	10	30	40	50	30
with Participant 5	30	10	30	40	50

	PAYOFF for				
	Participant 1	Participant 2	Participant 3	Participant 4	Participant 5
with Participant A	50	40	10	20	10
with Participant B	40	30	20	10	20
with Participant C	10	50	30	40	50
with Participant D	30	20	50	30	40
with Participant E	20	10	40	50	30