# Online Appendices for

# Best practices in replication: A case study of common information in coordination games

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#### Appendix A Experimenter's Instructions

In this appendix, we present the experimenter's instructions used to conduct the new NUS and NTU sessions.

The key difference between an experimenter's instructions versus a subject's instructions is that the former documents when an experimenter says or does what throughout the experiment. On the following pages, we provide the experimenter's instructions for Chen and Chen (2011). The content in square brackets and parentheses is not included in the instructions that subjects read. Rather, they tell other experimenters when and what to say or do.

# **Economic Decision Making Experiment: Part 1 Instructions**

# [PERFORM ACTIONS IN SQUARE BRACKETS. READ ALOUD ALL OTHER TEXT. TEXT NOT IN PARENTHESES OR BRACKETS IS DISPLAYED TO THE SUBJECTS. SOLID LINES INDICATE SCREEN SEPARATIONS FOR SUBJECTS.]

(Could everyone please move their mouse. You should see a program called "ztree" on your screen. Does anyone not see that? [If no one raises their hand, start part1.ztt program] Now you should see some text. Does anyone not see that? [If no one raises their hand, continue] I am going to read the instructions for this experiment. Please follow along on your screen or on the printout of the instructions included with your experimental materials.)

This is an experiment in decision-making. The amount of money you earn will depend upon the decisions you make and on the decisions other people make. Your earnings are given in tokens. This experiment has 2 parts and 12 participants. Your total earnings will be the sum of your payoffs in each part. At the end of the experiment you will be paid IN CASH based on the exchange rate

### \$1 = 350 tokens.

In addition, you will be paid \$5 for participation. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earn.

Please do not communicate with each other during the experiment unless asked to do so. If you have a question, feel free to raise your hand, and an experimenter will come to help you.

(Are there any questions? Please click **Continue**)

Before the experiment started everyone drew an envelope which contained either a Green or a Red slip. You have been assigned to the Green group if you received a Green slip, and the Red group if you received a Red slip. There are 6 people in each group. Your group assignment will remain the same throughout the experiment. That is, if you drew a Green slip, you will be in the Green group for the rest of the experiment, and if you drew a Red slip, you will be in the Red group for the rest of the experiment.

In Part 1 everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists. You will have 5 minutes to study these paintings. Then you will be asked to answer questions about two other paintings. Each correct answer will bring you 350 additional tokens. You may get help from or help other members in your own group while answering the questions.

After Part 1 has finished, we will give you instructions for the next part of the experiment.

(Are there any questions? Please click **Continue**)

Please open the blue folders on your desk and begin studying the paintings.

When you finish studying the paintings, please click the OK button.

# **Economic Decision Making Experiment: Part 2 Instructions (Ingroup, CK)**

[PERFORM ACTIONS IN SQUARE BRACKETS. READ ALOUD ALL OTHER TEXT. TEXT NOT IN PARENTHESES OR BRACKETS IS DISPLAYED TO THE SUBJECTS. SOLID LINES INDICATE SCREEN SEPARATIONS FOR SUBJECTS.]

([Start part2.ztt program] I am now going to read the instructions for part 2 of the experiment. Please follow along on your screen or on the printout of the instructions included with your experimental materials)

The next part of the experiment consists of 50 periods. In each period, you will be randomly matched with 1 other person in the room. If you are a member of the Green group, your match will always be a member of the Green group, and if you are a member of the Red group, your match will always be a member of the Red group. You will be reminded every period of your own group and of your match's group. Your earnings for this part of the experiment depend on your choices as well as the choices of the people you are matched with.

(Are there any questions? Please click **Continue**)

Every period, each person will choose an effort level between 110.00 and 170.00. You will earn a number of tokens equal to the minimum effort level chosen by you and the person you are matched with, minus the cost of your own effort, which is 0.75 times your own effort choice. This is captured by the equation:

#### Payoff (Tokens) = Minimum Effort – 0.75\*Your Effort

Note that the minimum effort here refers to the minimum of the effort levels chosen by you and your match. Refer to the handout for some examples.

(Please take out the payoff matrix that is included with the instructions. At the top, you are reminded of the equation used to determine your payoff. Along the left, your effort is shown. Along the top, your match's effort is shown. The cells show how many tokens you earn in each case. For example, if you choose to give an effort of 152, then you are in the row for 152. If your match choose an effort of 134, then you are in the column for 134. Where that row and column meet is in the cell that says 20, which means that you earn 20 tokens in this case. Are there any questions? Let's go back to the instructions.)

Note that there may be some case in which you earn a negative payoff. If your final payoff is negative, we will deduct that amount from your participation fee.

We will show you a running tally of the number of tokens you have earned from this part of the experiment, and after 50 rounds, we will add your earnings from Part 1 to this total and convert your total earnings into a dollar amount based on the exchange rate. We will also show you a list of your past effort choices and payoffs, as well as your matches' past effort choices and payoffs.

When you are ready to begin Part 2 of the experiment, please click OK.

# **Economic Decision Making Experiment: Part 2 Instructions (Outgroup, CK)**

[PERFORM ACTIONS IN SQUARE BRACKETS. READ ALOUD ALL OTHER TEXT. TEXT NOT IN PARENTHESES OR BRACKETS IS DISPLAYED TO THE SUBJECTS. SOLID LINES INDICATE SCREEN SEPARATIONS FOR SUBJECTS.]

([Start part2.ztt program] I am now going to read the instructions for part 2 of the experiment. Please follow along on your screen or on the printout of the instructions included with your experimental materials)

The next part of the experiment consists of 50 periods. In each period, you will be randomly matched with 1 other person in the room. If you are a member of the Green group, your match will always be a member of the Red group, and if you are a member of the Red group, your match will always be a member of the Green group. You will be reminded every period of your own group and of your match's group. Your earnings for this part of the experiment depend on your choices as well as the choices of the people you are matched with.

### (Are there any questions? Please click **Continue**)

Every period, each person will choose an effort level between 110.00 and 170.00. You will earn a number of tokens equal to the minimum effort level chosen by you and the person you are matched with, minus the cost of your own effort, which is 0.75 times your own effort choice. This is captured by the equation:

# Payoff (Tokens) = Minimum Effort – 0.75\*Your Effort

Note that the minimum effort here refers to the minimum of the effort levels chosen by you and your match. Refer to the handout for some examples.

(Please take out the payoff matrix that is included with the instructions. At the top, you are reminded of the equation used to determine your payoff. Along the left, your effort is shown. Along the top, your match's effort is shown. The cells show how many tokens you earn in each case. For example, if you choose to give an effort of 152, then you are in the row for 152. If your match choose an effort of 134, then you are in the column for 134. Where that row and column meet is in the cell that says 20, which means that you earn 20 tokens in this case. Are there any questions? Let's go back to the instructions.)

Note that there may be some case in which you earn a negative payoff. If your final payoff is negative, we will deduct that amount from your participation fee.

We will show you a running tally of the number of tokens you have earned from this part of the experiment, and after 50 rounds, we will add your earnings from Part 1 to this total and convert your total earnings into a dollar amount based on the exchange rate. We will also show you a list of your past effort choices and payoffs, as well as your matches' past effort choices and payoffs.

When you are ready to begin Part 2 of the experiment, please click OK.

(If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand.)

# **Economic Decision Making Experiment: Part 2 Instructions (Ingroup, No CK)**

[PERFORM ACTIONS IN SQUARE BRACKETS. READ ALOUD ALL OTHER TEXT. TEXT NOT IN PARENTHESES OR BRACKETS IS DISPLAYED TO THE SUBJECTS. SOLID LINES INDICATE SCREEN SEPARATIONS FOR SUBJECTS.]

([Start part2.ztt program] Please read the instructions for part 2 of the experiment on your screen, and click **Continue** when you are done. If you have a question, please raise your hand.)

[Wait for 2 minutes, or until everyone has clicked Continue.]

(Are there any questions? Please click **Continue** if you haven't done so already.)

(Please continue reading the instructions on your screen. When you are ready to begin part 2 of the experiment, please click OK.)

[Wait for 4 minutes, or until everyone has clicked OK.]

([After 4 minutes] Are there any questions? Please click OK if you haven't done so already.)

([After everyone has clicked OK] If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand.)

#### Appendix B Additional Data Analysis and Tables

This appendix contains additional data tables and analysis.

	Dependen	t variable: Effor	rt	
Information condition:	Common information			
	(1) UM	(2) NUS	(3) NTU	(4) Pooled
Ingroup	21.94***	25.33***	9.85*	17.87***
-	(6.885)	(6.121)	(5.159)	(4.448)
Constant	164.63***	140.35***	137.84***	$135.66^{***}$
	(11.309)	(7.574)	(8.573)	(5.740)
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,600	8,400	8,400	18,000
Number of Subjects	72	120	168	360
$R^2$	0.4321	0.3850	0.1201	0.1875
Information condition:		No common information		
		(2) NUS	(3) NTU	(4) Pooled
Ingroup		4.74	8.36	6.24
		(8.666)	(6.244)	(5.558)
Constant		$125.10^{***}$	145.77***	$130.43^{***}$
		(9.986)	(18.384)	(7.550)
Demographic Controls		Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		8,400	8,400	16,800
Number of Subjects		168	168	336
$R^2$		0.0754	0.0665	0.0486

Table B.1 Ingroup Effects on Effort with Demographic Controls: Random Effects

Note: Random effects regressions of ingroup matching on minimum-effort game choices. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The top panel displays the sessions with common information, and the bottom panel displays the sessions with no common information. Demographic variables are included in these regressions. The demographic variables include the following dummy variables (with omitted variables in parentheses): age (over 24), gender (male), race (Asian), marital status (single), employment status (unemployed), number of siblings (zero siblings), expenses (parents), voting history (not a voter), and volunteer status (not a volunteer). The "expenses" variable captures the response to the question of who in the subject's household is responsible for the finances of the household.

	Depende	nt variable: Effe	ort	
	Comm	on information		
	(1) UM	(2) NUS	(3) NTU	(4) Pooled
Ingroup	23.85**	27.24***	9.85*	18.45***
	(11.201)	(6.392)	(5.561)	(4.658)
Period	-0.06	-0.38***	-0.33***	-0.29***
	(0.153)	(0.143)	(0.089)	(0.071)
Constant	140.89***	143.80***	141.60***	$142.19^{***}$
	(9.305)	(4.759)	(4.298)	(3.058)
Observations	3,600	6,000	8,400	18,000
Number of Subjects	72	120	168	360
$R^2$	0.2932	0.4008	0.0918	0.1877
	No com	mon informatio	n	
		(2) NUS	(3) NTU	(4) Pooled
Ingroup		5.20	8.23	6.72
		(9.198)	(6.927)	(5.820)
Period		-0.17**	-0.21***	-0.19***
		(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.055)
Constant		143.37***	135.99***	$139.68^{***}$
		(6.137)	(4.853)	(3.968)
Observations		8,400	8,400	16,800
Number of Subjects		168	168	336
$R^2$		0.0228	0.0518	0.0347

Table B.2 Ingroup Effects on Effort with a Time Trend: Random Effects

Note: Random effects regressions of ingroup matching on minimum-effort game choices. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The top panel displays the sessions with common information, and the bottom panel displays the sessions with no common information. The period of the experiment is included as a regressor in each of these regressions. This accounts for possible learning effects. We obtain very similar results if we use ln(Period), Period<sup>2</sup>, or dummy variables for each block of 10 periods instead of Period as the regressor.

Der	endent variab	le: Effort		
Dep				
	Ingroup			
	(1) NUS	(2) NTU	(3) Pooled	
Common information	17.47***	4.55	10.02**	
	(6.311)	(5.800)	(4.690)	
Constant	141.37***	152.24***	139.94***	
	(10.365)	(10.609)	(8.356)	
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	7,200	8,400	17,400	
Number of Subjects	144	168	348	
$R^2$	0.2120	0.0872	0.1195	
Outgroup				
	(1) NUS	(2) NTU	(3) Pooled	
Common information	-3.96	2.47	-0.11	
	(7.269)	(6.086)	(5.111)	
Constant	135.02***	135.33***	134.53***	
	(9.045)	(10.979)	(6.143)	
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	7,200	8,400	17,400	
Number of Subjects	144	168	348	
$R^2$	0.1150	0.0437	0.0288	

Table B.3 Common Information Effects on Effort with Demographics: Random Effects

Note: Random effects regressions of common information on minimum-effort game choices. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The top panel displays the sessions with ingroup matching and the bottom panel displays the sessions with outgroup matching. Demographic variables are included in these regressions. The demographic variables include the following dummy variables (with omitted variables in parentheses): age (over 24), gender (male), race (Asian), marital status (single), employment status (unemployed), number of siblings (zero siblings), expenses (parents), voting history (not a voter), and volunteer status (not a volunteer). The "expenses" variable captures the response to the question of who in the subject's household is responsible for the finances of the household.

Dependent variable: Effort				
Ingroup				
	(1) NUS	(2) NTU	(3) Pooled	
Common information	16.99**	4.25	11.63**	
	(7.235)	(6.111)	(4.976)	
Period	-0.08	-0.08	-0.05	
	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.043)	
Constant	$146.45^{***}$	$140.72^{***}$	$142.97^{***}$	
	(5.394)	(3.893)	(3.344)	
Observations	7,200	8,400	$17,\!400$	
Number of Subjects	144	168	348	
$R^2$	0.1504	0.0099	0.0633	
Outgroup				
	(1) NUS	(2) NTU	(3) Pooled	
Common information	-5.04	2.63	-0.10	
	(8.571)	(6.447)	(5.549)	
Period	-0.43***	-0.47***	-0.43***	
	(0.117)	(0.074)	(0.064)	
Constant	$150.06^{***}$	$142.48^{***}$	$145.82^{***}$	
	(6.270)	(4.797)	(4.084)	
Observations	7,200	8,400	$17,\!400$	
Number of Subjects	144	168	348	
$R^2$	0.0845	0.1153	0.0801	

Table B.4 Common Information Effects on Effort with a Time Trend: Random Effects

Note: Random effects regressions of common information on minimum-effort game choices. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The top panel displays the sessions with ingroup matching, and the bottom panel displays the sessions with outgroup matching. The period of the experiment is included as a regressor in each of these regressions. This accounts for possible learning effects. We obtain very similar results if we use ln(Period), Period<sup>2</sup>, or dummy variables for each block of 10 periods instead of Period as the regressor.

Session	Experiment	Ingroup	common information	$\alpha$ estimate
1	0	1	1	0.59
2	0	1	1	0.94
3	0	1	1	0.67
4	0	0	1	0.88
5	0	0	1	0.11
6	0	0	1	0.22
7	1	1	0	0.53
8	1	1	0	0.28
9	1	1	0	0.39
10	1	1	0	0.50
11	1	1	0	0.02
12	1	1	0	0.24
13	1	1	0	0.63
14	1	0	0	0.10
15	1	0	0	0.60
16	1	0	0	-0.02
$17^{-5}$	1	Õ	0	0.11
18	1	Õ	0	0.57
19	1	Ő	0	0.64
20	1	Ő	0	0.06
20	2	1	1	0.74
22	2	1	1	0.83
23	2	0	1	0.06
$\frac{23}{24}$	2	0	1	0.00
25	2	1	1	0.95
25 26	2	0	1	0.93
20 27	$\frac{2}{2}$	1	1	0.25
27	$\frac{2}{2}$	1	1	$0.32 \\ 0.35$
29	2	0	1	0.12
30	$\frac{2}{3}$	0	1	0.22
31		1	0	0.49
32	3	0	0	-0.05
33	3	1	0	0.50
34	3	0	1	0.11
35	3	0	0	0.34
36	3	1	1	0.66
37	3	1	0	0.30
38	3	0	1	0.09
39	3	0	0	-0.05
40	3	1	1	0.83
41	3	1	0	0.29
42	3	0	0	0.82
43	3	0	1	0.54
44	3	1	1	0.76
45	3	1	0	0.24
46	3	0	1	0.16
47	3	1	0	-0.16
48	3	0	0	0.01
49	3	Õ	1	0.12
50	3	1	1	0.35
51	3	0	1	0.13
52	3	0	0	0.00
53	3	1	1	-0.26
$53 \\ 54$	3	1	0	0.26
54 55	3	0	0	0.20
	а З	1	0	
56				0.09
57	3 3	1	1	0.29
58	చ	0	1	-0.04

 ${\bf Table \ B.5} \ \ {\rm Session-level \ Other-regarding \ Parameter \ Estimates}$ 

Note: For each university,  $\delta$  and  $\lambda$  were estimated using first a coarse and then a fine grid search. Then, the displayed  $\alpha$  estimates were obtained using a grid search assuming that the estimated  $\delta$  and  $\lambda$  parameters for the university where that session took place applied. The "Experiment" column shows each session's experiment, with 0, 1, 2, and 3 meaning the original UM experiment, the Science NUS replication, the new NUS replication, and the NTU replication, respectively. "Ingroup" and "common information" displays the matching and common information treatment for each session, respectively.

#### Appendix C Survey results

This section contains the post-experimental survey and summary statistics at NUS, NTU, and UM, respectively. The UM survey results are taken from the original publication, posted on the AER website.<sup>12</sup>

#### NUS Post-experimental Survey (summary statistics in italics)

- 1. What is your age? (Mean 22.18, Std Dev 2.13, Median 22, Min 19, Max 29)
- 2. What is your gender? (*Male 45.83%*, *Female 54.17%*)
- Which of the following best describes your racial or ethnic background? (Asian 97.50%, Black 0.00%, Caucasian 2.50%, Hispanic 0.00%, Native American 0.00%, Multiracial 0.00%, Other 0.00%)
- 4. In what country or region were you primarily raised as a child? (4 sessions had the following choices: US/Canada 0.00%, Africa 0.00%, Asia 95.83%, Australia 0.00%, Europe 2.08%, Latin America 2.08%, Middle East 0.00%)(6 sessions had the following choices: Singapore 70.83%, China 8.33%, Malaysia 11.11%, Indonesia 1.39%, India 4.17%, Hong Kong 0.00%, Taiwan 1.39%, Other East Asian Country 1.39%, Australia 0.00%, Europe 1.39%, North America 0.00%, Africa 0.00%, South America 0.00%, West Asia 0.00%)
- 5. What is your marital status? (Never Married 98.33%, Currently Married 1.67%, Previously Married 0.00%)
- How would you best describe your employment status? (Employed Full Time 2.50%, Employed Part Time 6.67%, Not Employed 90.83%)
- How many siblings do you have? (Mean 1.30, Std Dev 1.00, Median 1, Min 0, Max 6)
- Who in your household is primarily responsible for expenses and budget decisions? Please select all that apply (Self 17.50%, Spouse 0.00%, Shared Responsibility with Spouse 0.83%, Parent(s) 92.50%, Other 2.50%)
- 9. Have you ever voted in a state or federal government election (in any country)? (Yes 32.50%, No 67.50%)
- Before today, how many times have you participated in any economics or psychology experimental studies? (Mean 4.98, Std Dev 7.59, Median 3, Min 0, Max 50)
- 11. In the past twelve months, have you donated money to or done volunteer work for charities or other nonprofit organizations? (Yes 71.67%, No 28.33%)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The URL for the online appendix is https://assets.aeaweb.org/assets/production/ articles-attachments/aer/data/oct2011/20091062\_app.pdf.

- 12. On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how much you think communicating with your group members helped solve the two extra painting questions, with 1 meaning "not much at all". (Mean 6.28, Std Dev 2.62, Median 7, Min 1, Max 10)
- On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to your own group throughout the experiment, with 1 meaning "not closely at all". (*Mean 4.71, Std Dev 2.54, Median 5, Min 1, Max 10*)
- 14. In Part 2 when you were asked to decide on an effort level, how would you describe the strategies you used? Please select all that apply (I tried to earn as much money as possible for myself 46.67%, I tried to earn as much money as possible for me and my match 61.67%, I tried to earn more money than my match 11.67%, I gave high effort if my previous matches gave high efforts and low effort if my previous matches gave low efforts 39.17%, Other 7.50%)
- 15. Please tell us how your match's group membership affected your decision. If I had been matched with someone from the other group [my own group], (I would have picked higher effort levels 22.99% [34.48%], I would have picked lower effort levels 9.20% [7.76%], I would not have changed my effort levels 62.36% [53.16%], Other 5.46% [4.60%])
- 16. On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how familiar you were with the paintings made by Klee and Kandinsky before this experiment, with 1 meaning "not familiar at all". (*Mean 1.62, Std Dev 1.49, Median 1, Min 1, Max 10*)

#### **NTU Post-experimental Survey**

(summary statistics in italics; 3 subjects not included due to missing or infeasible responses)

- What is your age? (Mean 20.70, Std Dev 1.68, Median 20, Min 17, Max 27)
- 2. What is your gender? (*Male 40.54%*, *Female 59.46%*)
- Which of the following best describes your racial or ethnic background? (Asian 99.10%, Black 0.30%, Caucasian 0.30%, Hispanic 0.00%, Native American 0.00%, Multiracial 0.30%, Other 0.00%)
- 4. In what country or region were you primarily raised as a child? (Singapore 62.46%, China 4.20%, Malaysia 21.92%, Indonesia 6.31%, India 1.20%, Hong Kong 0.30%, Taiwan 0.30%, Other East Asian Country 2.10%, Australia 0.00%, Europe 0.30%, North America 0.00%, Africa 0.30%, South America 0.60%, West Asia 0.00%)
- 5. What is your marital status? (Never Married 100.00%, Currently Married 0.00%, Previously Married 0.00%)
- How would you best describe your employment status? (Employed Full Time 2.10%, Employed Part Time 7.21%, Not Employed 90.69%)
- How many siblings do you have? (Mean 1.49, Std Dev 1.09, Median 1, Min 0, Max 11)
- Who in your household is primarily responsible for expenses and budget decisions? Please select all that apply (Self 14.41%, Spouse 0.30%, Shared Responsibility with Spouse 0.00%, Parent(s) 95.50%, Other 1.50%)
- 9. Have you ever voted in a state or federal government election (in any country)? (Yes 10.21%, No 89.79%)
- Before today, how many times have you participated in any economics or psychology experimental studies? (Mean 2.05, Std Dev 2.89, Median 1, Min 0, Max 20)
- 11. In the past twelve months, have you donated money to or done volunteer work for charities or other nonprofit organizations? (Yes 64.26%, No 35.74%)
- 12. On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how much you think communicating with your group members helped solve the two extra painting questions, with 1 meaning "not much at all". (Mean 6.05, Std Dev 2.72, Median 7, Min 1, Max 10)
- On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to your own group throughout the experiment, with 1 meaning "not closely at all". (*Mean 4.32, Std Dev 2.76, Median 4, Min 1, Max 10*)
- 14. In Part 2 when you were asked to decide on an effort level, how would you describe the strategies you used? Please select all that apply (*I tried to earn as much money as possible for myself 36.04%, I tried to earn as*

much money as possible for me and my match 53.75%, I tried to earn more money than my match 14.41%, I gave high effort if my previous matches gave high efforts and low effort if my previous matches gave low efforts 41.44%, Other 10.21%)

- 15. Please tell us how your match's group membership affected your decision. If I had been matched with someone from the other group [my own group], (I would have picked higher effort levels 23.81% [32.73%], I would have picked lower effort levels 8.33% [10.30%], I would not have changed my effort levels 61.31% [52.73%], Other 6.55% [4.24%])
- 16. On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how familiar you were with the paintings made by Klee and Kandinsky before this experiment, with 1 meaning "not familiar at all". (*Mean 1.68, Std Dev 1.55, Median 1, Min 1, Max 10*)

#### UMich Post-experimental Survey

 $(summary\ statistics\ in\ italics)$ 

- What is your age? (Mean 21.37, Std Dev 3.27, Median 21, Min 18, Max 40)
- 2. What is your gender? (*Male 48.53%*, *Female 51.47%*)
- Which of the following best describes your racial or ethnic background? (Asian 38.73%, Black 6.37%, Caucasian 42.16%, Hispanic 3.43%, Native American 0.49%, Multiracial 4.41%, Other 4.41%)
- In what country or region were you primarily raised as a child? (US/Canada 74.51%, Africa 0.00%, Asia 23.53%, Australia 0.49%, Europe 0.98%, Latin America 0.00%, Middle East 0.49%)
- What is your marital status? (Never Married 96.08%, Currently Married 3.43%, Previously Married 0.49%)
- How would you best describe your employment status? (Employed Full Time 5.88%, Employed Part Time 38.24%, Not Employed 55.88%)
- How many siblings do you have? (Mean 1.55, Std Dev 1.13, Median 1, Min 0, Max 6)
- Who in your household is primarily responsible for expenses and budget decisions? Please select all that apply (Self 38.24%, Spouse 0.49%, Shared Responsibility with Spouse 3.43%, Parent(s) 64.22%, Other 1.47%)
- Have you ever voted in a state or federal government election (in any country)? (Yes 53.92%, No 46.08%)
- Before today, how many times have you participated in any economics or psychology experimental studies? (Mean 3.46, Std Dev 3.47, Median 2, Min 0, Max 20)
- In the past twelve months, have you donated money to or done volunteer work for charities or other nonprofit organizations? (Yes 77.94%, No 22.06 %)
- 12. On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how much you think communicating with your group members helped solve the two extra painting questions, with 1 meaning "not much at all". (Mean 6.04, Std Dev 2.90, Median 7, Min 1, Max 10)
- On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to your own group throughout the experiment, with 1 meaning "not closely at all". (*Mean 3.97, Std Dev 2.67, Median 3, Min 1, Max 10*)
- 14. In Part 2 when you were asked to decide on an effort level, how would you describe the strategies you used? Please select all that apply (I tried to earn as much money as possible for myself 46.08%, I tried to earn as much money as possible for me and my match 50.00%, I tried to earn more money than my match 17.65%, I gave high effort if my previous matches

gave high efforts and low effort if my previous matches gave low efforts 27.45%, Other 14.22%)

- 15. Please tell us how your match's group membership affected your decision. If I had been matched with someone from the other group [my own group], (I would have picked higher effort levels 16.67% [23.61%], I would have picked lower effort levels 8.33% [1.39%], I would not have changed my effort levels 69.44% [72.22%], Other 5.56% [2.78%])
- 16. On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how familiar you were with the paintings made by Klee and Kandinsky before this experiment, with 1 meaning "not familiar at all". (*Mean 1.31, Std Dev 1.00, Median 1, Min 1, Max 6*)