Online Appendix

A Appendix: Full set of descriptive statistics

Table 10: Means of variables by treatment and project

	All			Random (assigned)			Random (preferred)			Choice				
	Random	Choice	Difference	Safe	Risky	Difference	Safe	Risky	Difference	Safe	Risky	Difference	Difference	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(2)-(1)	(3)	(4)	(4)-(3)	(5)	(6)	(6)-(5)	(7)	(8)	(8)-(7)	(7)-(5)	(8)-(6)
A. Individual characteristics														
Age	30.48	31.36	.88	30.12	30.83	.72	30.80	29.45	-1.35	31.18	32.09	.91	.38	2.64
Male	.33	.35	.02	.30	.35	.05	.32	.34	.03	.32	.48	.16	.00	.13
Schooling	11.53	11.25	-.28	11.20	11.85	.65	11.76	10.79	-.97*	11.26	11.17	-.09	-.50	.38
8 years	.28	.27	.00	.35	.20	-.15*	.23	.41	.18*	.24	.39	.15	.01	-.02
8 <years <12	.11	.11	.00	.12	.10	-.02	.11	.10	-.01	.13	.04	-.08	.02	-.06
12 <=years <15	.46	.52	.06	.40	.52	.12	.48	.38	-.10	.54	.43	-.10	.05	.06
years>=15	.16	.10	-.06	.13	.18	.05	.18	.10	-.07	.09	.13	.04	-.08	.03
Married	.45	.48	.03	.43	.47	.03	.43	.52	.09	.46	.57	.10	.03	.05
Household (HH) head	.64	.66	.02	.67	.62	-.05	.65	.62	-.03	.63	.78	.15	-.02	.16
Monthly income	4844	4897	53	4571	5117	546	4590	5641	1052	4569	6252	1684	-21	611
Religion (1=christian)	.84	.85	.01	.83	.85	.02	.87	.76	-.11	.86	.78	-.08	.00	.02
Occupational status														
Employed	.13	.14	.01	.15	.10	-.05	.09	.24	.15*	.13	.17	.05	.04	-.07
Self-employed	.19	.27	.08	.15	.23	.08	.20	.17	-.03	.25	.35	.10	.05	.18
Unemployed	.50	.45	-.05	.50	.50	.00	.52	.45	-.07	.46	.39	-.07	-.05	-.06
Other	.18	.14	-.04	.20	.17	-.03	.20	.14	-.06	.16	.09	-.07	-.04	-.05
Ethnicity:														
Kamba	.07	.05	-.02	.07	.07	.00	.08	.03	-.04	.05	.04	-.01	-.02	.01
Kikuyu	.07	.05	-.02	.07	.07	.00	.05	.10	.05	.04	.09	.04	-.01	-.02
Kisii	.13	.10	-.02	.13	.12	-.02	.12	.14	.02	.09	.13	.04	-.03	-.01
Luhya	.35	.36	.01	.33	.37	.03	.40	.21	-.19**	.37	.30	-.06	-.03	.10
Luo	.27	.31	.05	.28	.25	-.03	.25	.31	.06	.31	.35	.04	.05	.04
Nubian	.11	.10	-.01	.12	.10	-.02	.09	.17	.08	.11	.09	-.02	.02	-.09
Other	.02	.03	.01	.00	.03	.03	.01	.03	.02	.03	.00	-.03*	.02	-.03
Health-related characteristics														
Health problem	.33	.33	.01	.27	.38	.12	.33	.31	-.02	.32	.39	.08	-.01	.08
Chronical health problem	.13	.20	.08*	.15	.10	-.05	.09	.24	.15*	.18	.30	.13	.09*	.06
Visited health care provider	.43	.43	.00	.38	.48	.10	.45	.38	-.07	.43	.43	.00	-.02	.06
Health expenditures[a]	2497	1016	-1481	4242	752	-3490	3104	590	-2514	991	1115	124	-2113	525
Health expend.= 0	.57	.59	.03	.57	.57	.00	.56	.59	.03	.61	.52	-.09	.05	-.06
Enrolled in health insurance (HI)	.42	.44	.02	.48	.35	-.13	.36	.59	.22**	.44	.43	-.01	.08	-.15
Enrolled in other insurance	.08	.09	.01	.10	.07	-.03	.05	.17	.12	.09	.09	-.01	.04	-.09
Social preferences														
Inequality aversion 1 (disadv.)[b]	.18	.20	.03	.23	.12	-.12*	.15	.24	.09	.19	.26	.07	.04	.02
Inequality aversion 2 (adv.)[b]	.24	.32	.08	.30	.18	-.12	.23	.28	.05	.31	.39	.09	.07	.12
Fairness	.32	.34	.02	.32	.32	.00	.33	.28	-.05	.35	.30	-.04	.02	.03
Trust	.13	.19	.07	.15	.10	-.05	.14	.07	-.07	.21	.13	-.08	.07	.06

	All			Random (assigned)			Random (preferred)			Choice				
	Random	Choice	Difference	Safe	Risky	Difference	Safe	Risky	Difference	Safe	Risky	Difference	Difference	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(2)-(1)	(3)	(4)	(4)-(3)	(5)	(6)	(6)-(5)	(7)	(8)	(8)-(7)	(7)-(5)	(8)-(6)
Helpfulness	.30	.31	.01	.30	.30	.00	.35	.14	-.21***	.32	.26	-.05	-.04	.12
GSS Index[c]	.74	.84	.10	.77	.72	-.05	.82	.48	-.34**	.87	.70	-.18	.05	.21
B. Household characteristics														
No. of adults	2.71	2.60	-.11	2.90	2.52	-.38	2.59	3.07	.48	2.63	2.48	-.15	-.04	-.59
No. of children	2.49	2.44	-.05	2.52	2.47	-.05	2.68	1.90	-.78	2.07	3.96	1.88	-.61	2.06
Monthly per capita (p.c.) income	2072	2958	886*	1929	2215	286	1904	2600	696	2954	2974	20	1050*	374
No. of other earners	.63	.73	.10	.68	.57	-.12	.57	.79	.22	.82	.35	-.47***	.25*	-.45**
No. of dependent HH members	3.48	2.96	-.52	3.43	3.52	.08	3.65	2.93	-.72	2.88	3.26	.38	-.76	.33
HH is in wealth index quartile[d]														
Poorest quartile	.13	.17	.04	.12	.15	.03	.14	.10	-.04	.18	.13	-.05	.04	.03
Poorer quartile	.36	.44	.08	.30	.42	.12	.38	.28	-.11	.44	.43	-.01	.06	.16
Richer quartile	.27	.22	-.05	.30	.23	-.07	.26	.28	.01	.21	.26	.05	-.05	-.01
Richest quartile	.24	.17	-.07	.28	.20	-.08	.21	.34	.14	.17	.17	.01	-.04	-.17
Health-related characteristics														
Health expenditures (p.c.)	1634	692	-941	2621	647	-1975	1596	1753	157	678	751	73	-918	-1001
Expected future health shock[e]	4.11	4.65	.54	4.27	3.95	-.32	4.18	3.90	-.28	4.43	5.57	1.13	.26	1.67
Foregone health care	.43	.51	.08	.35	.50	.15*	.44	.38	-.06	.52	.48	-.04	.08	.10
Prop. of HH members enrolled in HI	.25	.25	.00	.28	.21	-.08	.21	.38	.17*	.25	.24	-.02	.05	-.14
C. Experimental outcomes														
Risk preference[f]	3.42	3.59	.18	3.47	3.37	-.10	3.07	4.52	1.45***	2.99	6.09	3.10***	-.08	1.57**
Understanding of instructions[g]	1.22	1.23	.01	1.21	1.24	.03	1.21	1.26	.05	1.22	1.28	.07*	.01	.03
Observations	120	118		60	60		91	29		95	23			

Note: Statistically significant mean differences are marked as follows: *$p < .10$, **$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$.; [a]in the past 3 months; [b]Inequality aversion 1 (disadvantageous): Dummy which takes the value 1 if respondent thinks that others should not own much more than herself; Inequality aversion 2 (advantageous): dto. ...not own much less... (see Section 2.3); [c]No. of GSS questions positively answered (see Section 2.3); [d]The wealth index bases on the ownership of 11 household items (house, land, poultry, goats, sheep, cows/bullocks, refrigerator, radio, bicycle, motorcycle, car) and is constructed by using weights generated by principal component analysis; [e]Expected likelihood of unaffordable HH health expenditures within next year; [f]No. of lottery the subject has chosen out of 8 different lotteries with an increasing degree of riskiness, with 1(=safe income) to 8 (=riskiest lottery) (see Section 2.3); [g]Average number of trials needed to answer the comprehension test questions correctly.

Table 11: Means of variables by treatment and preferred project

	CHOICE Safe (1)	RANDOM (preferred) Safe (2)	Difference (1)-(2)	CHOICE Risky (3)	RANDOM (preferred) Risky (4)	Difference (3)-(4)
A. Individual characteristics						
Age	31.18	31.04	.14	32.09	31.59	.50
Male	.32	.29	.02	.48	.35	.13
Schooling (years)	11.26	11.40	-.13	11.17	11.06	.12
8 years	.24	.31	-.07	.39	.35	.04
8 <years < 12	.13	.13	.00	.04	.12	-.07
12 <=years <15	.54	.42	.12	.43	.41	.02
years>=15	.09	.15	-.05	.13	.12	.01
Married	.46	.40	.07	.57	.47	.09
Household (HH) head	.63	.69	-.06	.78	.65	.14
Monthly income	4569	4478	90	6252	6135	117
Religion (1=christian)	.86	.83	.03	.78	.71	.08
Occupational status						
Employed	.13	.10	.02	.17	.18	.00
Self-employed	.25	.17	.09	.35	.24	.11
Unemployed	.46	.54	-.08	.39	.53	-.14
Other	.16	.19	-.03	.09	.06	.03
Ethnicity						
Kamba	.05	.08	-.03	.04	.06	-.02
Kikuyu	.04	.08	-.04	.09	.18	-.09
Kisii	.09	.13	-.03	.13	.12	.01
Luhya	.37	.35	.01	.30	.18	.13
Luo	.31	.23	.08	.35	.18	.17
Nubian	.11	.13	-.02	.09	.24	-.15
Other	.03	.00	.03*	.00	.06	-.06
Health-related characteristics						
Health problem	.32	.27	.04	.39	.35	.04
Chronical health problem	.18	.13	.05	.30	.24	.07
Visited health care provider	.43	.38	.06	.43	.35	.08
Health expenditures(Hexp)						
No health expenditures	.61	.58	.03	.52	.65	-.13
0 < Hexp <= 500	.15	.06	.08*	.26	.12	.14
500 < Hexp <=2500	.16	.23	-.07	.09	.12	-.03
Hexp > 2500	.08	.13	-.04	.13	.12	.01
Enrolled in health insurance (HI)	.44	.42	.03	.43	.47	-.04
Enrolled in other insurance	.09	.08	.01	.09	.18	-.09
Social preferences						
Inequality aversion 1 (disadv.)	.19	.17	.02	.26	.06	.20*
Inequality aversion 2 (adv.)	.31	.29	.01	.39	.24	.16
Fairness	.35	.33	.01	.30	.29	.01
Trust	.21	.17	.04	.13	.06	.07
Helpfulness	.32	.33	-.02	.26	.12	.14
GSS Index	.87	.83	.04	.70	.47	.23
B. Household characteristics						
No. of adults	2.63	2.75	-.12	2.48	2.76	-.29
No. of children	2.07	2.69	-.61	3.96	1.94	2.02
Monthly per capita (p.c.) income	2954	1964	990	2974	3171	-197
No. of other earners	.82	.63	.20	.35	.71	-.36
No. of dependent HH members	2.88	3.54	-.66	3.26	2.88	.38
HH is in wealth index quartile						
Poorest quartile	.18	.13	.05	.13	.12	.01
Poorer quartile	.44	.33	.11	.43	.35	.08
Richer quartile	.21	.27	-.06	.26	.18	.08
Richest quartile	.17	.27	-.10	.17	.35	-.18
Health-related characteristics						
Health expenditures (p.c.)	678	2614	-1936	751	1119	-368
Expected future health shock	4.43	4.46	-.03	5.57	4.18	1.39
Foregone health care	.52	.40	.12	.48	.53	-.05
Prop. of HH members enrolled in HI	.25	.25	.00	.24	.36	-.12
C. Experimental outcomes						
Risk preference	.89	.85	.04	.43	.65	-.21
Understanding of instructions	1.22	1.19	.03	1.28	1.24	.04
Observations	95	48		23	17	

Note: Statistically significant mean differences are marked as follows: *$p < .10$, **$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$.

Table 12: Means of variables by year and preferred project

	All			Safe preferred			Risky preferred		
	2017[+]	2018	Difference	2017[+]	2018	Difference	2017[+]	2018	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(1)-(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)-(4)	(5)	(6)	(5)-(6)
A. Individual characteristics									
Age	30.48	30.20	.28	30.80	30.02	.78	29.45	30.90	-1.46
Male	.33	.32	.00	.32	.34	-.02	.34	.24	.11
Schooling (years)	11.53	12.69	-1.16***	11.76	12.88	-1.12**	10.79	11.90	-1.11
8 years	.28	.17	.11*	.23	.16	.07	.41	.19	.22*
8 <years < 12	.11	.12	-.01	.11	.11	.00	.10	.19	-.09
12 <=years <15	.46	.43	.02	.48	.44	.05	.38	.43	-.05
years>=15	.16	.27	-.12**	.18	.29	-.12*	.10	.19	-.09
Married	.45	.52	-.07	.43	.49	-.07	.52	.62	-.10
Religion (1=christian)	.84	.82	.02	.87	.82	.04	.76	.81	-.05
Household (HH) head	.64	.56	.09	.65	.60	.05	.62	.38	.24*
Monthly income	4844	4959	-115	4590	5054	-464	5641	4576	1065
Occupational status									
Employed	.13	.14	-.02	.09	.13	-.04	.24	.19	.05
Self-employed	.19	.27	-.08	.20	.26	-.06	.17	.33	-.16
Unemployed	.50	.39	.11*	.52	.42	.09	.45	.24	.21
Other	.18	.20	-.01	.20	.19	.01	.14	.24	-.10
Ethnicity									
Kamba	.07	.08	-.01	.08	.07	.01	.03	.10	-.06
Kikuyu	.07	.07	.00	.05	.07	-.02	.10	.05	.06
Kisii	.13	.05	.08**	.12	.04	.09**	.14	.10	.04
Luhya	.35	.36	-.01	.40	.36	.03	.21	.33	-.13
Luo	.27	.32	-.05	.25	.32	-.06	.31	.33	-.02
Nubian	.11	.08	.03	.09	.07	.02	.17	.10	.08
Other	.02	.06	-.04	.01	.07	-.06**	.03	.00	.03
Health-related characteristics									
Health problem	.33	.42	-.10	.33	.41	-.08	.31	.48	-.17
Chronical health problem	.13	.15	-.03	.09	.15	-.07	.24	.14	.10
Visited health care provider	.43	.44	-.01	.45	.46	-.01	.38	.38	.00
Health expenditures	2497	559	1938	3104	640	2465	590	231	359
Health expend.= 0	.57	.66	-.09	.56	.64	-.07	.59	.76	-.18
Enrolled in health insurance (HI)	.42	.32	.10	.36	.31	.06	.59	.38	.21
Enrolled in other insurance	.08	.05	.04	.05	.04	.02	.17	.10	.08
Social preferences									
Inequality aversion 1 (disadv.)	.18	.31	-.14**	.15	.28	-.13**	.24	.43	-.19
Inequality aversion 2 (adv.)	.24	.30	-.06	.23	.31	-.08	.28	.29	-.01
Fairness	.32	.24	.08	.33	.24	.09	.28	.24	.04
Trust	.13	.07	.06	.14	.08	.06	.07	.00	.07
Helpfulness	.30	.32	-.02	.35	.27	.08	.14	.52	-.39***
GSS Index	.74	.62	.12	.82	.59	.24**	.48	.76	-.28
B. Household characteristics									
No. of adults	2.71	3.20	-.49	2.59	3.20	-.61	3.07	3.19	-.12
No. of children	2.49	2.20	.29	2.68	2.09	.59	1.90	2.62	-.72**
Monthly per capita (p.c.) income	2072	2101	-30	1904	2242	-339	2600	1532	1068
No. of other earners	.63	.69	-.06	.57	.71	-.13	.79	.62	.17
No. of dependent HH members	3.48	2.57	.91*	3.65	2.51	1.14*	2.93	2.81	.12
HH is in wealth index quartile									
Poorest quartile	.13	.12	.01	.14	.12	.03	.10	.14	-.04
Poorer quartile	.36	.15	.21***	.38	.14	.24***	.28	.19	.09
Richer quartile	.27	.35	-.08	.26	.40	-.14**	.28	.14	.13
Richest quartile	.24	.38	-.14**	.21	.34	-.13**	.34	.52	-.18
Health-related characteristics									
Health expenditures (p.c.)	1634	520	1114	1596	524	1072	1753	501	1252
Expected future health shock	4.11	4.07	.04	4.18	4.53	-.35	3.90	2.19	1.71*
Foregone health care	.43	.46	-.04	.44	.47	-.03	.38	.43	-.05
Prop. of HH members enrolled in HI	.25	1.56	-1.31	.21	.26	-.05	.38	6.81	-6.43
C. Experimental outcomes									
Risk preference	3.42	3.57	-.15	3.07	3.29	-.23	4.52	4.67	-.15
Observations	120	106		91	85		29	21	

Note: Statistically significant mean differences are marked as follows: *$p < .10$, **$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$. [+]RANDOM only.

B   Appendix: Full set of results

Table 13: Mean transfers to worse-off partners by group

	Donor's project Actual R_i	Donor's project Preferred R_i^*	Partner's project R_j	Donor's payoff x_i	Partner's payoff x_j	N	KSh T_i	Share τ_i	$\mu_i \le .5$ $\rho_i = 0$ 0	$\mu_i < .5$ $\rho_i > 0$ $(0,e)$	$\mu_i = .5$ $\rho_i > 0$ e	$\mu_i > .5$ $\rho_i > 0$ (e, x_i)	$\mu_i > .5$ $\rho_i = 0$ x_i
									Share with transfer T_i equal to or in range
			RANDOM: all subjects										
(1)	ALL	ALL	ALL			180	202	.313	.367	.306	.172	.089	.067
(2)	SAFE	ALL	RISKY	500	0	60	141	.281	.383	.350	.133	.017	.117
(3)	RISKY	ALL	SAFE	1000	500	60	193	.385	.400	.233	.117	.233	.017
(4)	RISKY	ALL	RISKY	1000	0	60	273	.273	.317	.333	.267	.017	.067
			RANDOM: subjects with $R_i \ne R_i^*$										
(5)	ALL	$R_i \ne R_i^*$	ALL			98	188	.277	.418	.265	.184	.092	.041
(6)	SAFE	RISKY	RISKY	500	0	12	134	.268	.500	.250	.000	.000	.250
(7)	RISKY	SAFE	SAFE	1000	500	43	167	.333	.442	.209	.140	.209	.000
(8)	RISKY	SAFE	RISKY	1000	0	43	223	.223	.372	.326	.279	.000	.023
			RANDOM: subjects with $R_i = R_i^*$										
(9)	ALL	$R_i = R_i^*$	ALL			82	220	.356	.305	.354	.159	.085	.098
(10)	SAFE	SAFE	RISKY	500	0	48	142	.285	.354	.375	.167	.021	.083
(11)	RISKY	RISKY	SAFE	1000	500	17	259	.518	.294	.294	.059	.294	.059
(12)	RISKY	RISKY	RISKY	1000	0	17	398	.398	.176	.353	.235	.059	.176
			CHOICE: all subjects ($R_i = R_i^*$)										
(13)	ALL	ALL	ALL			141	157	.282	.383	.362	.121	.028	.106
(14)	SAFE	SAFE	RISKY	500	0	95	161	.322	.305	.442	.084	.011	.158
(15)	RISKY	RISKY	SAFE	1000	500	23	99	.198	.609	.217	.043	.130	.000
(16)	RISKY	RISKY	RISKY	1000	0	23	200	.200	.478	.174	.348	.000	.000

Note: $\tau_i = T_i/(x_i - x_j)$ measures the share of the payoff difference given to the partner. $e = 0.5(x_i - x_j)$ indicates equal splitting of the payoff difference.

Table 14: Results for transfers to worse-off partners

	Donor's project R_i	Partner's project R_j	Rows in Table A13	KSh T_i	Pv	Share τ_i	Pv	0	Pv	$(0,e)$	Pv	e	Pv	(e,x_i)	Pv	x_i	Pv
Naïve estimate of the effect of CHOICE: $E[T_i|C_i = 1] - E[T_i|C_i = 0]$																	
(1)	ALL	ALL	(13)-(1)	-45*	.23	-.031	.48	.016	.76	.056	.29	-.052	.20	-.061***	**.03**	.040	.20
(2)	SAFE	RISKY	(14)-(2)	20	.47	.041	.47	-.078	.32	.092	.26	-.049	.33	-.006	.74	.041	.48
(3)	RISKY	SAFE	(15)-(3)	-94**	**.06**	-.188**	**.06**	.209*	**.09**	-.016	.88	-.073	.31	-.103	.30	-.017	.54
(4)	RISKY	RISKY	(16)-(4)	-73	.30	-.073	.30	.162	.17	-.159+	**.15**	.081	.47	-.017	.54	-.067**	.21
Hypothesis 1 ($R_i \ne R_i^*$ matters in RANDOM): $E[T_i|R_i \ne R_i^*, C_i = 0] - E[T_i|R_i = R_i^*, C_i = 0]$																	
(5)	ALL	ALL	(5)-(9)	-32	.33	-.079	**.14**	.113	**.12**	-.088	.20	.025	.66	.006	.88	-.057	**.13**
(6)	SAFE	RISKY	(6)-(10)	-8	.40	-.016	.40	.146	.36	-.125	.42	-.167***	**.13**	-.021	.62	.167	**.11**
(7)	RISKY	SAFE	(7)-(11)	-92	.26	-.185	.26	.148	.30	-.085	.49	.081	.38	-.085	.49	-.059	**.11**
(8)	RISKY	RISKY	(8)-(12)	-175*	**.08**	-.175*	.08	.196+	**.15**	-.027	.84	.044	.73	-.059	**.11**	-.153	**.03**
Hypotheses 2-5 (causal effect of CHOICE): $E[T_i|R_i = R_i^*, C_i = 1] - E[T_i|R_i = R_i^*, C_i = 0]$																	
(9)	ALL	ALL	(13)-(9)	-62+	**.10**	-.075	**.14**	.078	.24	.008	.90	-.038	.42	-.057*	**.06**	.009	.83
(10)	SAFE	RISKY	(14)-(10)	19	.75	.037	.75	-.049	.56	.067	.44	-.082	**.14**	-.010	.62	.075	.22
(11)	RISKY	SAFE	(15)-(11)	-160**	**.03**	-.320**	**.03**	.315**	**.05**	-.077	.58	-.015	.83	-.164	.21	-.059	.24
(12)	RISKY	RISKY	(16)-(12)	-198*	**.05**	-.198*	**.05**	.302**	**.05**	-.179	.20	.113	.45	-.059	.24	-.176*	**.04**
Hypothesis 4 (ruling out attributions of responsibility and choice egalitarianism):																	
(13)	RISKY	RISKY	(16)-(12)	-38	.29	.122	.45	-.013	.87	-.102	.48	.128	.46	.105	.41	-.118	**.10**
	RISKY	SAFE	-[(15)-(11)]														

Note: $\tau_i = T_i/(x_i - x_j)$ measures the share of the payoff difference given to the partner. $e = 0.5(x_i - x_j)$ indicates equal splitting of the payoff difference. ***/**/*/+ indicates significance on the 1/5/10/15% level, which is based on the wild bootstrap with 999 replications. P-values (Pv) refer to differences in the distributions of transfers and are obtained from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. P-values $\le 15\%$ are marked with bold font.

C Appendix: Effect of Game 1

Table 15: Effect of Game 1

| | KSh T_i | | Share τ_i | | | | Share with tranfer T_i equal to or in range | | | | | | | |
| | RANDOM | CHOICE | RANDOM | CHOICE | RANDOM^0 | CHOICE^0 | RANDOM$^{(0,e)}$ | CHOICE$^{(0,e)}$ | RANDOM^e | CHOICE^e | RANDOM$^{(e,x_i)}$ | CHOICE$^{(e,x_i)}$ | RANDOM^{x_i} | CHOICE^{x_i} |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
T1	-6.547		.00449		.0284		-.00704		-.0132		-.0343		.0261	
	(45.74)		(.0684)		(.0896)		(.0808)		(.0638)		(.0395)		(.0436)	
T2		13.05		.0239		-.132		.141		.00735		-.0174		.00126
		(32.91)		(.0594)		(.0892)		(.0917)		(.0595)		(.0265)		(.0546)
Constant	204.8***	152.1***	.311***	.272***	.355***	.435***	.308***	.306***	.178***	.118***	.103***	.0353*	.0561**	.106***
	(25.68)	(23.40)	(.0377)	(.0407)	(.0546)	(.0580)	(.0520)	(.0520)	(.0405)	(.0336)	(.0275)	(.0195)	(.0224)	(.0342)
Observations	180	141	180	141	180	141	180	141	180	141	180	141	180	141

Note: RANDOM was conducted after treatment T1 or T3 of the first game, CHOICE after T2 or T4. T3 and T4 are the reference groups. OLS regression. Outcomes: Transfers to worse-off partners with safe and risky project. */**/*** indicates statistical significance on the 1/5/10% level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (in parentheses).

D Appendix: Estimation results with control variables

The following estimates control for the five variables with statistically significant imbalances across randomized samples in Table 10: chronical health problem, monthly per capita income, foregone health care, inequality aversion 1, 8 years of schooling.

Table 16: Estimation results with control variables

	Donor's project R_i	Partner's project R_j	Rows in Table 7	KSh T_i	Pv	Share τ_i	Pv	0	Pv	$(0,e)$	Pv	e	Pv	(e,x_i)	Pv	x_i	Pv
Average effects of CHOICE on transfers without conditioning on preferred project (naïve estimate)																
(1)	ALL	ALL	(13)-(1)	-49+	.23	-.039	.48	.007	.76	.059	.29	-.031	.20	-.060**	**.03**	.026	.20
(2)	SAFE	RISKY	(14)-(2)	11	.47	.021	.47	-.040	.32	.058	.26	-.039	.33	-.008	.74	.030	.48
(3)	RISKY	SAFE	(15)-(3)	-114*	**.06**	-.228*	**.06**	.195	**.09**	.005	.88	-.059	.31	-.092	.30	-.050	.54
(4)	RISKY	RISKY	(16)-(4)	-73	.30	-.073	.30	.144	.17	-.180*	**.15**	.136	.47	-.008	.54	-.092*	.21
Difference in average transfers between donors assigned to unwanted versus preferred project in RANDOM																
(5)	ALL	ALL	(5)-(9)	-25	.33	-.071	**.14**	.095	**.12**	-.051	.20	-.001	.66	.006	.88	-.049	**.13**
(6)	SAFE	RISKY	(6)-(10)	21	.40	.041	.40	-.047	.36	.029	.42	-.149**	**.13**	-.028	.62	.195	**.11**
(7)	RISKY	SAFE	(7)-(11)	-47	.26	-.093	.26	.077	.30	-.077	.49	.083	.38	-.053	.49	-.030	**.11**
(8)	RISKY	RISKY	(8)-(12)	-182	**.08**	-.182	.08	.123	**.15**	.122	.84	-.005	.73	-.084	**.11**	-.156	**.03**
Average effects of CHOICE on transfers for subjects in preferred project																
(9)	ALL	ALL	(13)-(9)	-67+	**.10**	-.083	**.14**	.069	.24	.022	.90	-.030	.42	-.059*	**.06**	-.002	.83
(10)	SAFE	RISKY	(14)-(10)	11	.75	.023	.75	-.032	.56	.053	.44	-.067	**.14**	-.013	.62	.059	.22
(11)	RISKY	SAFE	(15)-(11)	-166+	**.03**	-.333+	**.03**	.291*	**.05**	-.068	.58	-.020	.83	-.109	.21	-.094	.24
(12)	RISKY	RISKY	(16)-(12)	-218*	**.05**	-.218*	**.05**	.286*	**.05**	-.177	.20	.166	.45	-.048	.24	-.227*	**.04**
Difference in effects of CHOICE on transfers to partners in risky versus safe project for donors in preferred risky project																
(13)	RISKY	RISKY	(16)-(12)	-51	.29	.115	.45	-.006	.87	-.110	.48	.187	.46	.061	.41	-.133	**.10**
	RISKY	SAFE	-[(15)-(11)]														

Note: $\tau_i = T_i/(x_i - x_j)$ measures the share of the payoff difference given to the partner. $e = 0.5(x_i - x_j)$ indicates equal splitting of the payoff difference. ***/**/*/+ indicates significance on the 1/5/10/15% level, which is based on the wild bootstrap with 999 replications. P-values (Pv) refer to differences in the distributions of transfers and are obtained from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. P-values ≤ 15% are marked with bold font.

E Appendix: The risk preference game

In the game, each subject was asked to choose one out of eight different lotteries (see Table 17, columns 2 to 4). The first alternative offers a certain amount of 320 Kenyan Shillings. The subsequent lotteries yield either a high (HEADS) or a low (TAILS) payoff with probability .5. While the first six lotteries are increasing in expected values and variances of payoffs, the last lottery R has the same expected payoff as Q, but implies a higher variance. Hence, only risk-neutral or risk-loving subjects should choose this dominated gamble (Binswanger, 1980). Typically, the lottery numbers that subjects choose in ordered lottery designs (here: 1 to 8) are directly used as risk preference indicator (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 2002).

Table 17: Risk preference game: payoffs, expected values, risk and levels of risk aversion

Lottery number	Lottery	High payoff HEADS (p=.5)	Low payoff TAILS (p=.5)	Expected value	Standard deviation	Risk aversion range (CRRA)[a]	Fraction of subjects (%)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1	K	320	320	320	0	3.95 to infinity	33.2
2	L	400	280	340	60	1.32 to 3.95	14.3
3	M	480	240	360	120	.81 to 1.32	9.2
4	N	560	200	380	180	.58 to .81	12.6
5	O	640	160	400	240	.45 to .58	2.5
6	P	720	120	420	300	.35 to .45	8.0
7	Q	800	80	440	360	0 to .35	11.3
8	R	880	0	440	440	-infinity to 0	8.8

Note: [a] As common in literature, we assume the individual's utility function $u(x) = \frac{x^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$, where γ is the CRRA parameter describing the degree of relative risk aversion. The intervals for the CRRA parameter were determined by computing γ where the expected utility from one option equals the expected utility from the next option, i.e. where the individual is indifferent between two neighbouring lotteries.

F Appendix: Experimental instructions (exemplarily for CHOICE)

The entire experiment involved three games. Thereof, only two games are relevant for this study, with Game 2 corresponding to the risk preference game and Game 3 to the risk solidarity game. For the sake of simplicity, we therefore present a version of the original instructions shortened by the parts that are not relevant for this study.

General instructions

Welcome and thank you for participating in our study. You are now taking part in an experiment on economic decision-making.

Three Games:
In the following, you will play three short games, named [*Game 1,*] *Game 2* and *Game 3*. In each game, you will make one or several decisions. The result of your decision(s) will determine how much money you can finally earn in the respective game. We will explain later, how these three games work in detail.

Payment:
However, please note that we will only pay you according to the result in one of the three games.

How will we determine your payment?
The computer will record what you have finally earned [in Game 1,] in Game 2 and in Game 3. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select [Game 1,] Game 2 or Game 3 with equal chance. We will pay you in shillings the final earnings you have made in this selected game. So, please remember that you will receive either your final earnings [from Game 1 or] from Game 2 or from Game 3, according to what game the computer will randomly select. Therefore, it is important to think carefully about the choice you make in each game.

Test Questions:
Before each game starts, we will ask you to answer a few test questions to check if the rules of the games are clear to you. Please note that you will not get money for your answers and decisions in these test questions.

Questionnaire:
After completing the three games, we will ask you to answer a few short questions about yourself and your household.

All your decisions and answers in this study will be kept confidential and only used for academic research purposes.

Instructions for Game 2

[Game 2 is very similar to the game before. But please note that it is completely independent from Game 1]. Here is how Game 2 works.

Project Income:

Assume that within your business, you have [again] a choice of 8 different income opportunities and you have to decide which one you want to realize. The table on your screen describes these income opportunities, named *Project K* to *R*:

[Screenshot 1]

Project	HEADS	TAILS	
K	320	320	OK
L	400	280	OK
M	480	240	OK
N	560	200	OK
O	640	160	OK
P	720	120	OK
Q	800	80	OK
R	880	0	OK

We will ask you to choose 1 out of the 8 projects. How much money you can earn from a project is [again] based on flipping a coin. [As in the game before,] the computer flips a coin after you have chosen your preferred project. If the coin lands on heads, you earn the amount given in the column "HEADS" in the row of your chosen project. If the coin lands on tails, you earn the amount given in the column "TAILS" in the row of your chosen project. Please choose the project that you prefer the most. There is no right or wrong answer.

Summary:

The picture on your screen shows the sequence of events in Game 2.
Please note that steps 2 to 3 will be done after you have completed the decision task of GAME 3.

Instructions for Game 3

In this game, you will make decisions that will determine your earnings and the earnings of another participant. Please note that Game 3 is completely independent of [Game 1 and] Game 2. Here is how Game 3 works.

1) Project Choice
In this game, you have a choice of 2 different income opportunities, named Project X and Y. The table on your screen describes these two projects.

Game 3:				
	Please choose one of the two projects. Please choose the one you prefer the most. There is no right or wrong answer.			
Project	**HEADS**	**TAILS**		
X	500	500	OK	
Y	1000	0	OK	

With each of these projects you can earn some income. We will ask you to choose 1 of the 2 projects. The amount of money you can earn from a project is again based on flipping a coin, as in Game [1 and] 2. If the coin lands on heads, you earn the amount in the column "HEADS" for your chosen project. If the coin lands on tails, you earn the amount in the column "TAILS" for your chosen project. Please choose the project that you prefer the most. There is no right or wrong answer.

2) Partner

After you have chosen your preferred project, the computer will randomly pair you with another person in this room. However, you will not know which person your partner is. His or her identity will be not revealed either during or after the game.

Your partner will also have already chosen either project X or Y. How much he/she will earn from the project is also determined by coin flip. Please note that another coin will be flipped for your partner, so that you both get individual results (i.e. heads or tails). Please also note that you will not know your partner's project choice and project income until the end of Game 3.

3) Transfers

In this game, you can give some of your project income to your partner if you want to. Please note that you can give some of your income to your partner, but you do not have to. The amount that you decide to transfer to your partner will be deducted from your project income and added to your partner's project income.

Just as you, your partner can give some of his/her income to you if he/she wants to, but he/she also does not have to. The amount that he/she decides to transfer to you will be deducted from his/her project income and added to your project income.

Please note that you both will decide how much you want to transfer to your partner before both of your project incomes are determined by coin flip. So, we will ask you both to decide in advance on the amount you wish to transfer for every possible combination of incomes you both might earn. The next 2 examples will explain the possible cases.

Example 1 – You choose Project X
Please look at your screen.

[Screenshot 4]

This screen appears, if you have chosen Project X. With Project X, you will earn 500 shillings, regardless of whether the coin lands on heads or on tails. We will ask you to decide how much you would like to transfer from your project income of 500 shillings to your partner. As the partner's income is not yet known, we will ask you to decide on your transfers for every possible amount that your partner might have earned with his/her chosen project.

Therefore, the first question (in green) ask what amount you would like to transfer from your project income of 500 shillings to your partner if your partner has also chosen Project X and earns 500 shillings. Please enter the amount that you would like to give to your partner by using the number pad. You can enter any amount between 0 and your full project income, that is 500 shillings in this example.

[Screenshot 5]

Similarly, the second and third questions ask what amount you would like to transfer to your partner if you earn 500 shillings and your partner has chosen Project Y and earns 1000 or 0 shillings. For each question, you can enter any amount between 0 and your full project income, that is 500 shillings. Your entered transfer amounts will appear in the small grey boxes (here on your screen, they are left empty).

Please note that later only one of the three possible partner's incomes will be realized, depending on which project your partner has chosen and what the result of the partner's coin flip is. The transfer amount that you have stipulated for exactly this realized partner's income will be deducted from your project income afterwards.

Example 2 – You choose Project Y

[Screenshot 6]

If you have chosen Project Y, you will earn 1000 shillings if the coin lands on heads and 0 shillings if the coin lands on tails. If you earn 0 shillings, you cannot make any transfers to your partner. If you earn 1000 shillings, you can transfer some money to your partner. So, we will ask you to decide how much you would like to transfer to your partner if you would earn 1000 shillings. As in Example 1, we will ask you to enter your transfer amounts for each of your partner's possible project incomes, that is 500, 1000 and 0 shillings. Again, you can enter any amount between 0 and your full project income, that is 1000 shillings in this case.

As already explained in Example 1, later only one of the three possible partner's incomes will be realized. The transfer amount that you have stipulated for exactly this realized partner's income will be deducted from your project income afterwards.

Please note that you and your partner make the transfer decisions simultaneously. Please also note that you will not know how much your partner has decided to give to you until the end of Game 3. Also, your partner will not know your transfer decisions until the end of Game 3.

4) Expectation about the transfer you receive
After you have entered your three transfer decisions, we will ask you to estimate how much money your partner will transfer to you.

Example 1 – You have chosen Project X

[Screenshot 7]

This screen appears if you have chosen Project X. With Project X, you will earn 500 shillings, regardless of whether the coin lands on heads or on tails. The first question (in pink) asks how much money you expect to receive from your partner in the case that your partner has also chosen Project X and also earns 500 shillings. You can enter any amount between 0 and the full income of <u>your partner</u>, that is 500 shillings in this case.

[Screenshot 8]

Similarly, the second question asks how much money you expect to receive from your partner in the case that you earn 500 shillings and your partner has chosen Project Y and earns 1000 shillings. You can enter any amount between 0 and the full income of <u>your partner</u>, that is 1000 shillings in this case. Please note that your partner CANNOT transfer money to you if he/she has chosen Project Y and earns 0 shillings, so we do not ask you about your expectations in this case.

Example 2 – You have chosen Project Y

[Screenshot 9]

Similarly, if you have chosen Project Y, you will earn either 1000 shillings or 0 shillings, depending on the result of your coin flip. We will, however, only ask you to enter how much money you expect to receive from your partner if YOU earn 0 shillings and YOUR PARTNER earns 500 shillings or 1000 shillings.

Please note that your partner will never be informed about your expectations. Also, you will never be informed about the expectations of your partner.

5) Coin flip

After you have entered the amounts that you expect to receive in transfers, the computer will determine your project income by flipping a coin. The computer will also determine your partner´s project income by flipping another coin. The computer will now credit you and your partner with the transfer amounts that you each stipulated for each other for exactly the now realized incomes.

6) Final earnings of Game 3:

Your final earnings from Game 3 will be your project income MINUS the transfer that you made to your partner PLUS the transfer that your partner made to you.

<u>Summary:</u>

The picture on your screen shows the sequence of events in Game 3.

[Screenshot 10]