Appendix 1: Theoretical Model

1.1 Set up

We model worker behaviour under asymmetric information. The worker selects effort having observed planting conditions completely. The contract for a given block is determined by the firm, having observed an imperfect signal of planting conditions on that block. Our model is based on the work of **?**, **?** and **?**. It is stylized to capture the important and relevant details of production in the tree-planting industry. Workers are heterogeneous in terms of risk preferences and ability. For tractability, the model assumes specific functional forms for utility and the distribution of shocks that allow closed-form solutions for effort and indirect utility in the presence of heterogeneous risk preferences. In deriving comparative static results we are careful to identify those that are specific to the chosen functional forms and those that hold more generally.

Planting contracts are divided into blocks $j \in \{1, ...J\}$. Each morning, workers are randomly assigned to plant an area of a particular block. We model a block as a distribution of productivity shocks, dentoted S_{ij}, which represent elements that affect worker productivity, but are beyond the worker's control. When workers are assigned to plant on a particular block, they draw a particular value of S, from that distribution before choosing their effort level. The daily production of worker i on block j, denoted $Y_{ij} > 0$, is written

$$Y_{ij} = E_{ij} S_{ij} \tag{1}$$

where E represents worker effort. The productivity shock S_{ij} is independent across individuals and time within a block. Its variance is constant across blocks so that variation in planting conditions across blocks is solely due to changes in μ_j.[1] We assume

$$ln(S_{ij}) \sim N(\mu_j, \sigma^2).$$

Worker preferences over earnings, W, and effort are represented by a separable, Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function

[1] The assumption of a constant variance ensures that workers are ex-ante indifferent among piece-rate contracts across blocks (see equation (11) below). This allows us to concentrate on the effect of risk preferences on the choice between piece rates and fixed wages in a simplified setting. If σ^2 varies across blocks, calculating the risk associated with any contract requires integrating over possible values of σ^2, considerably complicating the theoretical analysis.

$$U(W_{ij}, E_{ij}) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\delta_i}[W_{ij} - C_i(E_{ij})]^{\delta_i} & \text{if } W_{ij} > C_i(E_{ij}) \\ -\infty & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

where $C_i(E) = \frac{1}{\eta}\kappa_i E^{\eta}$ is the cost of effort for worker i. The parameter κ_i is the worker's monetary cost of effort; it is inversely related to the worker's ability. The parameter δ_i is a constant risk-preference parameter, $\eta > 1$ defines the curvature of the cost of effort function.

We begin by modelling behaviour under piece rates, the standard contract in the firm. We then turn to fixed-wage contracts, and ultimately the choice between them.

1.2 Piece rate contracts

Daily earnings under a piece-rate contract are determined by the observed production Y_{ij} and the piece rate r_j:

$$W_{ij} = r_j Y_{ij}$$

The timing is as follows.

1. For a given block, j to be planted, nature chooses (μ_j, σ^2), the actual conditions on the block.
2. The firm knows σ^2, but observes $\tilde{\mu}_j$, a noisy signal of μ_j:

$$\mu_j = \tilde{\mu}_j + \epsilon_j \tag{3}$$

   where $\epsilon_j \sim N(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$.

3. Given the values of σ^2 and $\tilde{\mu}_j$, the firm offers the worker a piece-rate contract;
4. The worker observes the same noisy signal $\tilde{\mu}_j$, σ^2 and accepts or rejects the piece-rate contract.
5. If the worker accepts the contract, he/she observes s_{ij}, a particular draw of S_{ij} and chooses his/her effort level e_{ij}^p, producing Y_{ij}.
6. The firm observes production Y_{ij} and pays earnings.

To solve the model we work backwards. Optimal effort is

$$e_{ij}^p = \left[\frac{r_j s_{ij}}{k_i}\right]^{\gamma} \text{ where } \gamma = \frac{1}{\eta - 1}. \tag{4}$$

Effort is independent of the risk preferences because it is determined after observing s_{ij}.[2]

Earnings under the piece-rate contract on block j are

$$W(s_{ij}) = \frac{r_j^{\gamma+1}}{\kappa_i^{\gamma}} s_{ij}^{\gamma+1}, \tag{5}$$

the cost of effort $C(e_{ij})$ is

$$C(e_{ij}) = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma+1} \frac{r_j^{\gamma+1}}{\kappa_i^{\gamma}} s_{ij}^{\gamma+1}, \tag{6}$$

giving indirect utility of worker i on block j as

$$V^p(s_{i,j}) = \frac{1}{\delta_i} \frac{r_j^{\delta_i(\gamma+1)}}{(\gamma+1)^{\delta_i} \kappa_i^{\delta_i \gamma}} s_{ij}^{\delta_i(\gamma+1)}. \tag{7}$$

If a worker observed μ_j their indirect utility from planting on block j would be:

$$\mathcal{E}\left[V_{ij}^p(\mu_j)\right] = \frac{1}{\delta_i} \frac{r_j^{\delta_i(\gamma+1)}}{(\gamma+1)^{\delta_i} \kappa_i^{\delta_i \gamma}} \exp^{\delta_i(\gamma+1)\mu_j + \frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)^2 \delta_i{}^2 \sigma^2} \tag{8}$$

where $\mathcal{E}$ denotes the expectation operator. However, the firm only observes $\tilde{\mu}_j$. Substituting from (3) and taking expectations gives the firm's expectation of worker indirect utility when the contract is bid

$$\frac{1}{\delta_i} \frac{r_j^{\delta_i(\gamma+1)}}{(\gamma+1)^{\delta_i} \kappa_i^{\delta_i \gamma}} \exp^{\delta_i(\gamma+1)\tilde{\mu}_j + \frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)^2 \delta_i{}^2 (\sigma^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)}. \tag{9}$$

Following **?** we assume that the firm selects the piece rate on block j to satisfy the marginal worker's participation constraint, who we assume to be risk neutral.[3] The marginal worker is defined as the worker who is indifferent between any piece-rate contract and his/her alternative, defined by

[2] The second order condition is satisfied for $\kappa_i > 0, \eta > 1 (\gamma > 0)$.

[3] Unlike **?**, we do not estimate the marginal workers' risk preferences within a structural model. Setting the marginal worker's risk parameter to 1 does not therefore affect our results. It is also consistent with the firm's personnel policy and discussions with the firm manager. The firm sets the piece rate to ensure that earnings are constant across blocks which is consistent with our model (see equation (12) in the text).

$\bar{w}$ (all other workers earn rents). The piece rate r_j satisfies

$$\frac{r_j^{(\gamma+1)}}{(\gamma+1)k_h^{\gamma}} \exp^{((\gamma+1)\tilde{\mu}_j+\frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)^2(\sigma^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2))} = \bar{w}$$

or

$$r_j^{\gamma+1} = \bar{w}(\gamma+1)k_h^{\gamma} \exp^{-\left[(\gamma+1)\tilde{\mu}_j+\frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)^2(\sigma^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2)\right]} \tag{10}$$

Substituting from (10) into (9), the expected utility for individual i of the piece-rate contract on any block j is

$$\mathcal{E}\left[V_{ij}^{p}(\delta_i,\kappa_i)\right] = \frac{1}{\delta_i}\left[\bar{w}\left(\frac{k_h}{\kappa_i}\right)^{\gamma}\right]^{\delta_i} \exp^{\frac{1}{2}\delta_i(\gamma+1)^2(\delta_i-1)(\sigma^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2)} \tag{11}$$

Equation (11) is constant across blocks. It therefore gives a worker's indirect utility from the piece rate contract prior to knowing where he/she will be planting. It depends on the planter's risk preferences and ability. The block-specific terms now represent perception errors rather than variances. Risk is measured by the term $\sigma^2+\sigma_\epsilon$, which captures variability in the daily shock that the worker receives and misperception of planting conditions (and hence improper pricing) on a particular block.

Expected earnings under piece rates are found from (5) and (10)

$$E\left[w_{ij}^{p}((\delta_i,\kappa_i)\right] = \bar{w}(\gamma+1)\left(\frac{k_h}{\kappa_i}\right)^{\gamma} \tag{12}$$

which are constant across contracts and collapse to $\bar{w}(\gamma+1)$ for the marginal worker.

To understand (12), notice the expected cost of effort under a piece-rate contract is

$$E\left[C(e_{ij}^{p})\right] \quad = \quad \gamma\bar{w}\left(\frac{k_h}{\kappa_i}\right)^{\gamma} \tag{13}$$

The marginal worker is compensated for his/her alternative $\bar{w}$ and additional effort costs which, from (13) is equal to $\gamma\bar{w}$. Other workers's expected earnings are prorated by the term κ_h/κ_i reflecting their ability relative to that of the marginal worker.

1.3 Fixed-wage contracts

Under the fixed-wage contract the worker receives a payment of W^f, independent of his/her production. We assume that the worker agrees to provide a minimum effort level e^{fw} upon observing

$\tilde{\mu}_j$, that can be enforced through monitoring. This allows us to focus on contract choice in a relatively simple framework.[4] We specify that effort levels under fixed wages are proportional to the expected effort level under piece rates:

$$e_{ij}^{fw} = \psi_i \mathcal{E}(e_{ij}^{p}) \quad 0 < \psi_i < 1.$$

Using (4) and taking expectations, worker effort under fixed wages is

$$e_{ij}^{fw}(\tilde{\mu}_j) = \psi_i \frac{r_j^{\gamma} \exp^{\gamma \tilde{\mu}_j + \frac{1}{2}\gamma^2(\sigma^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)}}{\kappa_i^{\gamma}}. \tag{14}$$

Utility under a contract paying W_f is equal to

$$V_{ij}^{f} = \frac{1}{\delta_i}\left[W_f - c(e_{ij}^{fw})\right]^{\delta_i} \tag{15}$$

Substituting from (14) and using (10), indirect utility under the fixed-wage contract, W_f is

$$\mathcal{E}\left[V_{ij}^{f}(\delta_i, \kappa_i, W_f)\right] = \frac{1}{\delta_i}\left[W_f - \gamma \psi_i^{\frac{\gamma+1}{\gamma}} \bar{w} \left(\frac{k_h}{\kappa_i}\right)^{\gamma} \exp^{-\frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)(\sigma^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)}\right]^{\delta_i}, \tag{16}$$

which is constant across blocks. We note that equilibrium utility is decreasing in σ^2, even for risk averse workers. This is because earnings are fixed, hence σ^2 only affects effort (and their costs). The direct effect is to increase effort through (14), which more than offsets the decrease in r_j to satisfy the marginal workers participation constraint (10).

1.4 Contract choice and predictions

The worker selects a contract before knowing which block he/she will be planting on. Given the expected utility of planting under piece rates and under fixed wages is constant across blocks, the worker's choice is simply based on a comparison of (11) and (16). Recall the worker was offered a sequence of fixed-wage contracts, each specifying a different W_f.

[4] Incentive models generate positive effort levels under fixed wages through termination contracts that introduce dynamic elements into the setting. **?** and **?** are well-known examples. **?** provides an empirical application.

For a given W_f, the worker's decision rule is

$$\text{Choose} \begin{cases} \text{Fixed-Wage Contract} & \text{if } \mathcal{E}\left[V_{ij}^{f}(\delta_i, \kappa_i, W_f)\right] > \mathcal{E}\left[V_{ij}^{p}(\delta_i, \kappa_i)\right] \\ \text{Piece-Rate Contract} & \text{if } \mathcal{E}\left[V_{ij}^{f}(\delta_i, \kappa_i, W_f)\right] < \mathcal{E}\left[V_{ij}^{p}(\delta_i, \kappa_i)\right]. \end{cases} \tag{17}$$

The worker is indifferent between contracts at W_f^*, his/her certainty equivalent. Equating utilities and rearranging gives

$$W_f^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i) = \bar{w}\left(\frac{k_h}{\kappa_i}\right)^{\gamma}\left[\exp^{\frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)^2(\sigma^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2)(\delta_i-1)} + \gamma\psi_i^{\frac{\gamma+1}{\gamma}}\exp^{-\frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)(\sigma^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2)}\right]. \tag{18}$$

The piece rate contract in (12) is based on the marginal worker's indifference across contracts. It adjusts worker i's earnings to compensate for his/her cost of effort relative to his/her alternative $\bar{w}$. The certainty equivalent is based on worker i's indifference between piece-rate and fixed-wage contracts. It therefore adjusts (12) to take into account individual i's attitude towards risk and the fact that effort under fixed wages is not zero. Inspection of equation (18) shows that the certainty equivalent consists of two parts. The first part captures the risk of earnings under piece rates from (12), prorated for worker i's risk preferences relative to the risk-neutral marginal worker. The second part captures the expected cost of effort under fixed wages.

Given utility under the fixed-wage contract is strictly increasing in W_f, the worker prefers all fixed-wage contracts offering $W_f > W_f^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i)$. The decision rule (17) can therefore be written

$$\text{Choose} \begin{cases} \text{Fixed-Wage Contract} & \text{if } W_f > W_f^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i) \\ \text{Piece-Rate Contract} & \text{if } W_f \leqslant W_f^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i) \end{cases} \tag{19}$$

This is shown in Figure 1, where we graph the function

$$G(W_f; \kappa_i, \delta_i) = W_f^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i) - W_f, \tag{20}$$

as a function of W_f (which we take as representing the different fixed wages offered in our contract-choice experiment). Fixed wage contracts are preferred whenever $W_f > W_f^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i)$, or $G(W_f; \kappa_i, \delta_i) < 0$. The piece-rate contract is preferred whenever $W_f < W_f^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i)$, or $G(W_f; \kappa_i, \delta_i) > 0$.

Figure 1: *Contract Choice Rule*



1.4.1 Predictions

Comparative statics can be conducted to investigate how changes in risk tolerance and ability affect W^*. Equation (19) describes the set of fixed-wage contracts that is preferred to the piece-rate contract for a given set of risk preferences, δ_i, and ability, κ_i. The results are presented graphically for our specific model and functional forms.

Prediction 1: The number of piece-rate contracts chosen increases with the degree of risk tolerance:

$$\frac{\partial W^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i)}{\partial \delta_i} > 0. \tag{21}$$

Figure (2) shows this effect. An increase in risk tolerance (an increase of δ_i) increases the expected utility of the piece-rate contract and the certainty equivalent. The function $G(W_f, \kappa_i, \delta_i)$ shifts to the right and the worker prefers more piece-rate contracts and fewer fixed-wage contracts. This result can be generalized to more general representations of risk preferences. A complete treatment is available in Pratt (1964).

Prediction 2: The number of piece-rate contracts chosen increases with ability (a lower value of

κ_i):

$$\frac{\partial W^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i)}{\partial \kappa_i} < 0. \tag{22}$$

Figure (3) shows the effect of an increase of κ_i (a decrease in ability). The function $G(W_f, \kappa_i, \delta_i)$ shifts to the left, decreasing the certainty equivalent (W^*) and the worker selects fewer piece-rate contracts and more fixed-wage contracts. This prediction aligns with Lazear's (1986), sorting arguments wherein high-ability workers are attracted to piece rate contracts. In our context, high-ability workers have a higher certainty equivalent. However, caution must be exercised in interpreting this result. When ability interacts with risk preferences this effect is ambiguous and must be determined empirically; see Appendix 1 in **?**.

Figure 2: *Effect of an increase in risk tolerance ($\delta_i^1 > \delta_i^0$)*



Figure 3: *Effect of an increase in κ_i ($k_i^1 > k_i^0$)*



1.4.2 The cost of risk in contracting

The model is also informative over the contracting costs of risk. Interpreting $\mathcal{R} = \sigma^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2$ as risk, and differentiating (18), we have

$$\frac{\partial W_f^*(\kappa_i, \delta_i)}{\partial \mathcal{R}} = \bar{w} \left(\frac{k_h}{\kappa_i}\right)^\gamma \left[\frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)^2(\delta_i - 1) \exp^{\frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)^2(\sigma^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2)(\delta_i-1)} \right. \tag{23}$$

$$\left. - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)\gamma\psi_i^{\frac{\gamma+1}{\gamma}} \exp^{-\frac{1}{2}(\gamma+1)(\sigma^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2)}\right]. \tag{24}$$

The first term reflects the increased contracting costs due to risk. It is negative for risk-averse workers ($\delta_i < 1$), suggesting such workers would be willing to accept a lower fixed wage at higher risk levels. For risk-averse workers, riskier settings imply higher relative costs of providing incentives.

Appendix 2: Experimental Protocol

2.1 Lottery Experiments

Each morning, a member of the research team met with a group of twenty workers before they left for planting. Participation was voluntary. For this, and all successive meetings, planters were compensated $20 for their time, typically 20-25 minutes. All planters participated. The team member introduced himself to the workers as an economist who was conducting a field study on workers' attitudes towards risk. Planters were invited to participate in the study on a voluntary basis. The workers were informed that by participating they would receive $20 as compensation for their time. They were informed that by participating they would partake in a lottery in which they would earn between $2 and $77. They were also told that each participant could earn a different amount and that the exact amount that each participant earned would depend on the choices that he/she made and on chance. Finally the participants were asked to make all decisions on their own and not to discuss their choices with their colleagues. They were informed that their earnings would be added to their next pay cheque.

Participants were given an instruction sheet, a decision sheet and a pen. The instruction sheet was then read aloud to the participants by the team member. Once the reading was finished, the participants were asked if they had any questions. Each participant then filled in the decision sheet by himself/herself, making 10 decisions. Each decision was between a safe lottery and a risky lottery. The decision sheet for the LSL is given in Table 1. The safe lottery paid either a high payoff of $40 or a low payoff of $32, while the risky lottery paid either a high payoff of $77 or a low payoff of $2. The decision sheet for the HSL is given in Table 2. Here, the safe lottery paid either a high payoff of $80 or a low payoff of $64, while the risky lottery paid either a high payoff of $144 or a low payoff of $4.. Once they had all filled in the decision sheet, planters drew two poker chips (with replacement), numbered 1-10, from an opaque bag. The first draw determined the decision to be used for the experiment. The second draw determined the earnings of the participant. For example, for the LSL, if the first chip was numbered 4 and the second chip was numbered 2, the participant would win $40 if he/she had selected Lottery A for decision 4 and would win $77 if he/she had selected Lottery B for decision 4.

Table 1: *Decision Sheet for the Low-stakes-lottery Experiment*

Your name in capital letters: ________________________

	Option A	My choice is A	Option B	My choice is B
Decision 1	$40.00 if chip is 1 $32.00 if chip is 2 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 $2.00 if chip is 2 to 10	
Decision 2	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 2 $32.00 if chip is 3 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 2 $2.00 if chip is 3 to 10	
Decision 3	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 3 $32.00 if chip is 4 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 3 $2.00 if chip is 4 to 10	
Decision 4	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 4 $32.00 if chip is 5 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 4 $2.00 if chip is 5 to 10	
Decision 5	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 5 $32.00 if chip is 6 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 5 $2.00 if chip is 6 to 10	
Decision 6	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 6 $32.00 if chip is 7 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 6 $2.00 if chip is 7 to 10	
Decision 7	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 7 $32.00 if chip is 8 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 7 $2.00 if chip is 8 to 10	
Decision 8	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 8 $32.00 if chip is 9 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 8 $2.00 if chip is 9 to 10	
Decision 9	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 9 $32.00 if chip is 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 9 $2.00 if chip is 10	
Decision 10	$40.00 if chip is 1 to 10		$77.00 if chip is 1 to 10	

Table 2: *Decision Sheet for the High-stake lottery Experiment*

Your name in capital letters: ________________________

	Option A	My choice is A	Option B	My choice is B
Decision 1	\$80 if chip is 1 \$64.00 if chip is 2 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 \$4.00 if chip is 2 to 10	
Decision 2	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 2 \$64.00 if chip is 3 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 2 \$4.00 if chip is 3 to 10	
Decision 3	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 3 \$64.00 if chip is 4 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 3 \$4.00 if chip is 4 to 10	
Decision 4	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 4 \$64.00 if chip is 5 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 4 \$4.00 if chip is 5 to 10	
Decision 5	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 5 \$64.00 if chip is 6 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 5 \$4.00 if chip is 6 to 10	
Decision 6	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 6 \$64.00 if chip is 7 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 6 \$4.00 if chip is 7 to 10	
Decision 7	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 7 \$64.00 if chip is 8 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 7 \$4.00 if chip is 8 to 10	
Decision 8	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 8 \$64.00 if chip is 9 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 8 \$4.00 if chip is 9 to 10	
Decision 9	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 9 \$64.00 if chip is 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 9 \$4.00 if chip is 10	
Decision 10	\$80.00 if chip is 1 to 10		\$154.00 if chip is 1 to 10	

2.2 Contract-Choice Experiment

Each morning, a member of the research team met with a group of approximately twenty workers before they left for planting. The planters were invited to participate in a lottery which would determine the manner in which they would be paid over the next two work days: either their usual piece rate contract or a fixed wage, independent of the number of trees they planted.

Participants were presented with a decision sheet listing 12 decisions. Each decision was between their regular piece rate and a particular fixed-wage contract. The fixed wage contract for decision 1 was $100 per day. It was then incremented by $50 at each decision, reaching $650 per day at decision 12. The decision sheet is given in Table 3. For each decision, the participant was asked to choose between their regular piece rate contract and the daily fixed wage listed for that decision. They were informed that once they had completed the decision sheet they would draw a poker chip, numbered between 1 and 12, from an opaque bag. The number drawn would determine the decision to be used and their choice for that decision would determine the manner in which they would be paid over the next two work days. For example, in the fifth decision, each worker chose between earning a fixed wage of $300 per day and their regular piece-rate. If decision five was selected at random and the worker had chosen the fixed wage for decision five, he/she would receive $300 per day, independent of his/her production, for the next two days of work. If, however, the worker had chosen the piece rate at decision five, he/she would receive his/her regular piece-rate contract over the next two days.

Table 3: *Decision Sheet for the contract-choice experiment*

Your name in capital letters: ________________________

	Option A	My choice is A	Option B	My choice is B
Decision 1	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $100 per day	
Decision 2	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $150 per day	
Decision 3	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $200 per day	
Decision 4	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $250 per day	
Decision 5	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $300 per day	
Decision 6	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $350 per day	
Decision 7	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $400 per day	
Decision 8	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $450 per day	
Decision 9	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $500 per day	
Decision 10	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $550 per day	
Decision 11	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $600 per day	
Decision 12	Piece rate		Daily fixed wage of $650 per day	