# The Distributional Preferences of Americans, 2013-2016*

Raymond Fisman, Pamela Jakiela, Shachar Kariv and Silvia Vannutelli†

February 21, 2023

*We are grateful to Ernst Fehr and Daniel Markovits for helpful discussions and for suggestions from the audience at the Ben-Porath Annual Lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a number of seminar participants. We thank the American Life Panel (ALP) team at the RAND Corporation for technical and administrative support. We acknowledge financial support from the Center for Equitable Growth (CEG) at the University of California, Berkeley. Any findings, opinions and conclusions expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions or any funding agency. The replication material for the study is available at `https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/9EQJZE&faces-redirect=true`.

†Fisman: Boston University (rfisman@bu.edu); Jakiela: Williams College (pamela.jakiela@williams.edu); Kariv: University of California, Berkeley (kariv@berkeley.edu); Vannutelli: Northwestern University (silvia.vannutelli@northwestern.edu).

# Appendix A

Table A1 : The relationship between the distributional preferences in 2013 and 2016, Full Sample

| | $\hat{\alpha}_n$ in 2016 | | $\hat{\rho}_n$ in 2016 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| $\hat{\alpha}_n$ in 2013 | 0.458*** | 0.444*** | | 1.176 |
| | (0.0356) | (0.0377) | | (1.140) |
| $\hat{\rho}_n$ in 2013 | | -0.00105 | 0.390*** | 0.364*** |
| | | (0.00118) | (0.0515) | (0.0516) |
| CCEI in 2013 | | 0.131** | | -3.628** |
| | | (0.0586) | | (1.620) |
| Observations | 687 | 687 | 687 | 687 |
| R-squared | 0.203 | 0.213 | 0.156 | 0.162 |

*Note:* The regression results reported in Table 4, also including the $\hat{\rho}_n$ estimates of self-interested subjects ($\hat{\alpha}_n = 0$) in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. All specifications are estimated via OLS. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is fair-mindedness ($\hat{\alpha}_n$) in 2016 and in columns (3)-(4) is equality-efficiency orientation ($\hat{\rho}_n$) in 2016. The independent variables are the parameter estimates, $\hat{\alpha}_n$ and $\hat{\rho}_n$, and the CCEI score in 2013.

Table A2 : The relationship between distributional preferences, economic circumstances and political preferences

| | Change in $\hat{\alpha}_n$ | | | | Change in $\hat{\rho}_n$ | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Changed Q | 0.0296* | 0.0353** | | | 0.550 | 0.471 | | |
| | (0.0161) | (0.0140) | | | (0.596) | (0.574) | | |
| Q2 in 2013 | 0.00232 | 0.0211 | | | -1.577** | -1.320** | | |
| | (0.0204) | (0.0177) | | | (0.673) | (0.631) | | |
| Q3 in 2013 | -0.00914 | 0.0290 | | | -0.989 | -1.153 | | |
| | (0.0220) | (0.0204) | | | (0.980) | (0.792) | | |
| Q4 in 2013 | 0.0263 | 0.0721*** | | | -0.924 | -0.759 | | |
| | (0.0252) | (0.0254) | | | (0.946) | (0.996) | | |
| $\hat{\alpha}_n$ in 2013 | | -0.565*** | | -0.568*** | | 0.724 | | 0.715 |
| | | (0.0389) | | (0.0386) | | (1.803) | | (1.796) |
| Female | | 0.00755 | | 0.000708 | | -0.656 | | -0.647 |
| | | (0.0142) | | (0.0143) | | (0.547) | | (0.522) |
| Non-Hispanic Caucasian | | -0.000573 | | 0.00669 | | 0.476 | | 0.249 |
| | | (0.0160) | | (0.0164) | | (0.598) | | (0.581) |
| Q2 of Age | | 0.0188 | | 0.0224 | | -1.749*** | | -1.598** |
| | | (0.0191) | | (0.0195) | | (0.643) | | (0.657) |
| Q3 of Age | | 0.0233 | | 0.0280 | | -1.802*** | | -1.670** |
| | | (0.0204) | | (0.0209) | | (0.653) | | (0.671) |
| Q4 of Age | | 0.0320 | | 0.0287 | | -1.562* | | -1.404* |
| | | (0.0201) | | (0.0206) | | (0.805) | | (0.785) |
| Some College | | 0.00640 | | 0.0169 | | 0.177 | | 0.0874 |
| | | (0.0177) | | (0.0176) | | (0.621) | | (0.609) |
| College or more | | -0.0347* | | -0.000467 | | -0.889 | | -0.960 |
| | | (0.0181) | | (0.0164) | | (0.696) | | (0.631) |
| $\hat{\rho}_n$ in 2013 | | -0.000645 | | -0.000681 | | -0.590*** | | -0.597*** |
| | | (0.00128) | | (0.00126) | | (0.0613) | | (0.0620) |
| CCEI in 2013 | | 0.138** | | 0.136** | | -1.669 | | -1.825 |
| | | (0.0614) | | (0.0605) | | (1.974) | | (2.005) |
| Changed Party | | | 0.0211 | -0.0112 | | | 0.302 | -0.224 |
| | | | (0.0215) | (0.0187) | | | (0.861) | (0.647) |
| Stayed Republican | | | -0.00747 | 0.000765 | | | 0.324 | -0.430 |
| | | | (0.0197) | (0.0174) | | | (0.830) | (0.701) |
| Stayed Democrat | | | -0.0248 | -0.0297 | | | -1.239* | -1.495** |
| | | | (0.0197) | (0.0181) | | | (0.744) | (0.686) |
| Constant | -0.0248* | 0.202*** | -0.0124 | 0.223*** | 1.072** | 1.795 | 0.504 | 1.771 |
| | (0.0146) | (0.0540) | (0.0111) | (0.0547) | (0.475) | (2.047) | (0.362) | (2.022) |
| Other CES parameter in 2013 | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| CCEI in 2013 | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual demographics | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 687 | 684 | 687 | 684 | 516 | 513 | 516 | 513 |
| R-squared | 0.00633 | 0.287 | 0.00371 | 0.279 | 0.0113 | 0.307 | 0.00782 | 0.306 |

*Note:*The regression results reported in Table 5, also including the $\hat{\rho}_n$ estimates of self-interested subjects ($\hat{\alpha}_n = 0$) in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. All specifications estimated via OLS. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is fair-mindedness ($\hat{\alpha}_n$) in 2016 and in columns (5)-(8) is equality-efficiency orientation ($\hat{\rho}_n$) in 2016. The independent variable of interest in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) is a variable which takes on values of $-1, 0, 1$ based on whether the subject's household income quartile decreased, stayed the same, or increased, respectively. The independent variable of interest in column (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) is a variable which takes on values of $-1, 0, 1$ based on whether the subject shifted to voting Republican, did not change party (or has missing data on voting), or shifted to voting Democrat, respectively. Q2, Q3 and Q4 are indicator variables for the subject's household income quartile in 2013 (Q1 is the omitted category).

Table A3 : The relationship between distributional preferences, economic circumstances and political preferences, full sample

| | Change in $\hat{\alpha}_n$ | | | | Change in $\hat{\rho}_n$ | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Changed Q | 0.0296* | 0.0353** | | | 0.297 | 0.413 | | |
| | (0.0161) | (0.0140) | | | (0.525) | (0.485) | | |
| Q2 in 2013 | 0.00232 | 0.0211 | | | -1.259** | -1.013* | | |
| | (0.0204) | (0.0177) | | | (0.627) | (0.563) | | |
| Q3 in 2013 | -0.00914 | 0.0290 | | | -1.184 | -1.091* | | |
| | (0.0220) | (0.0204) | | | (0.820) | (0.659) | | |
| Q4 in 2013 | 0.0263 | 0.0721*** | | | -0.691 | -0.154 | | |
| | (0.0252) | (0.0254) | | | (0.754) | (0.785) | | |
| Changed Party | | | 0.0211 | -0.0112 | | | 0.0450 | -0.403 |
| | | | (0.0215) | (0.0187) | | | (0.840) | (0.618) |
| Stayed Republican | | | -0.00747 | 0.000765 | | | 0.127 | -0.477 |
| | | | (0.0197) | (0.0174) | | | (0.689) | (0.574) |
| Stayed Democrat | | | -0.0248 | -0.0297 | | | -1.098* | -1.314** |
| | | | (0.0197) | (0.0181) | | | (0.656) | (0.594) |
| Other CES parameter in 2013 | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| CCEI in 2013 | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual demographics | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 687 | 684 | 687 | 684 | 687 | 684 | 687 | 684 |
| R-squared | 0.00633 | 0.287 | 0.00371 | 0.279 | 0.00694 | 0.336 | 0.00477 | 0.336 |

A full regression output including individual demographic controls of the results presented in Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. All specifications estimated via OLS. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is fair-mindedness ($\hat{\alpha}_n$) in 2016 and in columns (5)-(8) is equality-efficiency orientation ($\hat{\rho}_n$) in 2016. The independent variable of interest in column (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) is a variable which takes on values of $-1, 0, 1$ based on whether the subject's household income quartile decreased, stayed the same, or increased, respectively. The independent variable of interest in column (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) is a variable which takes on values of $-1, 0, 1$ based on whether the subject shifted to voting Republican, did not change party (or has missing data on voting), or shifted to voting Democrat, respectively. Q2, Q3 and Q4 are indicator variables for the subject's household income quartile in 2013 (Q1 is the omitted category). In columns (5)-(8), we report the results with $\hat{\rho}_n$ in 2016 as the dependent variable for the 517 (75.3%) fair-minded subjects ($\hat{\alpha}_n < 1$) in both 2013 and 2016. We obtain similar results if we also include the $\hat{\rho}_n$ estimates of self-interested subjects ($\hat{\alpha}_n = 0$).