
**Explaining the Allocation of Legislative Specialization**

**Online Appendix**

**Online Appendix A.**


**Figure 1. Party Size and the Degree of Concentration of Legislative Specialization**

**The Second Part of the U-shaped curve: From the Extreme Right to the Centre of the Curve (Increase in Party Size)**

****


**Online Appendix A**

**Figure 2. The First Part of the U-shaped curve (for Niche Parties): From the Centre to the Extreme Left of the Curve (Further Decrease in Party Size)**

****

**Online Appendix B.**


**Figure 1. Net Benefits Across Policy Jurisdictions. The Solution for Niche Parties**

****

Note: When the ownership of the policy jurisdiction is achieved, the curve of net benefits shifts upward to reflect this increase. This shift represents the opportunity to acquire ownership of this policy jurisdiction. The shift in the curve of net benefits when targeting the first policy jurisdiction is significant for niche or small parties, as these benefits might ensure their survival. The idea is that ownership of this policy jurisdiction provides the party with greater net benefits than targeting further other policy jurisdictions. This analysis could be formalized by comparing the areas under the curves. The mathematical details of this formal analysis go beyond the formulation of this article.

**Online Appendix B.**


**Figure 2. Net Benefits Across Policy Jurisdictions. The Solution for (Relatively) Medium Sized Parties**

****

Note: The graph suggests that medium size parties target a greater number of policy jurisdictions and issue ownership is less profitable for them.

**Online Appendix B.**

**Figure 3. Net Benefits Across Policy Jurisdictions. The Solution for (Relatively) Large Sized Parties**



Note: The graph suggests that big sized parties target fewer number of policy jurisdictions since these parties aim to own them (see the comparison with Online Appendix B-Figure 2). As a result, the concentration of legislative specialization grows

**Online Appendix C. Interviews to Legislators**

**Chile**

**Interview 1:**

Party: A legislative group of independent legislators (they are not affiliated to any party)

Chamber: Deputies

This legislator states that she discussed the contents of her bill initiatives with other members of her legislative group (independents) even when she does not belong to a particular party. Due to the small size of her legislative group, she thinks that her legislative group specializes only in a few topics: digital technology and education. This legislator can also identify some policy jurisdictions in which other Chilean parties specialize (e.g. PPD with women rights, *Democracia Cristiana* with agriculture, *Partido Radical* with education). This legislator also believes that citizens learn about parties’ programmatic agendas from parties’ allocation of legislative efforts across policy jurisdictions. Finally, she also contends that citizens take into account parties’ reputations in key policy jurisdictions when deciding for which party to vote.

**Interview 2:**

Party: Alianza (*Unión Democrática Independiente*)

Chamber: Deputies

This legislator points out that party leaders attempt to promote legislative specialization in certain key policy jurisdictions. The deputy believes that it is important for parties’ electoral success to develop reputations as the most capable to solve problems in key policy areas. Legislators coordinate these strategies in a mandatory meeting once a week. Furthermore, legislators also participate in additional meetings, which are usually organized to coordinate legislative efforts around a particular issue or policy area. During these meetings, party leaders sometimes request to draft a bill initiative on a particular topic from legislators. Finally, this legislator identifies certain policy jurisdictions in which he perceives that his party (*Unión Democrática Independiente*) invests more legislative efforts. These policy areas are education, transportation, housing, and security.

**Interview 3:**

Party: Concertación (*Partido por la Democracia*)

Chamber: Senators

This legislator contends that the Chilean executive is the main agenda setter, and consequently, the executive structures most of the programmatic agenda in the legislature. Despite this dominance, the Chilean parties still play a role by targeting specific policy jurisdictions (e.g. PPD with consumers’ protection and rights). Furthermore, he perceives that the coordination at the coalition (of parties) level is more relevant and effective than the coordination at the party level when structuring legislative specialization. The effectiveness of this coordination is stronger within the coalition that controls the executive. The senator recognizes that party leaders sometimes request the elaboration of bill initiatives from legislators.

**Interview 4:**

Party: Alianza (*Renovación Nacional*)

Chamber: Senators

The senator notices that there is some coordination (between leaders and legislators) within the *Alianza* to structure its agenda in congress. This coordination weakened after the *Alianza* lost control of the executive. However, this coordination has been strengthening since the *Concertación* took over the presidency in March 2014. *Alianza*’s senators meet every Tuesday to analyze and coordinate the bill initiatives they propose through the committees. The senator perceives that the Committees of Constitution, Education, Labor, and Health have received more attention from the *Alianza*. He also believes that more coordination is needed to reinforce the electoral prospects of legislative specialization.

**Interview 5:**

Party: *Concertación* (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*)

Chamber: Deputies

This legislator contends that the coalitions (rather than the parties) coordinate the programmatic agenda and specialization within the Chilean Congress. Legislators from *Concertación* meet every Monday to coordinate the legislative agenda. According to this legislator, parties’ intervention in the legislative agenda is insignificant and has tended to disappear over time.

**Paraguay**

**Interview 6:**

Party: *Frente Guasú* (*Partido de Participación Ciudadana*)

Chamber: Senators

This legislator points out that most linkages between the two traditional parties in Paraguay (*Partido Colorado* and *Partido Liberal*) and Paraguayans have been mostly clientelistic (favors to receive public services and patronage). During the *Partido* *Colorado*´s dictatorship, the *Partido* *Colorado* and the weak opposition led by the *Partido Liberal* did not develop programmatic linkages that could help voters distinguish between these two parties. For this legislator, both parties have been very similar in their legislative agendas. This lack of programmatic differences in the legislative work began changing with the emergence of the left (*Frente Guasú*) in Paraguay and transition to democracy (marked with the triumph of leftist candidate, Fernando Lugo, in the 2008 general elections).

*Frente Guasú*’s number of representatives is currently low (only 5 senators). Due to this disadvantage, *Frente Guasú* usuallytargets a few policy jurisdictions through its bill initiatives. These policy jurisdictions pertain to 1) the provision of services provided by the Paraguayan state (e.g. education, health); 2) social issues (e.g. gay rights); and 3) the distribution of wealth (e.g. subsidies, taxes). These five legislators meet periodically (every Tuesday) to discuss the content of their bill initiatives.

**Interview 7:**

Party: *Partido Colorado*

Chamber: Deputies

This legislator states that *Partido Colorado’*slegislators meet every Wednesday to discuss their legislative agenda and their bill initiatives. In these meetings, party leaders often suggest drafting specific bill initiatives. This legislator identifies education, health, agriculture, and security as the key policy jurisdictions that her party emphasizes in its legislative work. She can only distinguish programmatic differences (in the legislative agenda) during recent years (after the transition to democracy that occurred in 2008). These differences pertain to the regulation of marihuana (with the *Partido Liberal),* abortion and gay rights (with the left).

**Uruguay**

**Interview 8:**

Party: *Partido Colorado*

Chamber: Senators

This legislator can identify key policy areas in which the *Partido Colorado* invests more resources in its legislative agenda. These policy areas are education, security, and economic growth. *Partido Colorado’*slegislators meet once a week to discuss their bill initiatives. Sometimes, they discuss in great detail the contents of the bills. During these meetings, party leaders also highlight the importance of these key policy areas. The legislator also contends that these policy jurisdictions have tended to remain the same during the latest decades. The legislator also perceives that the coordination within his legislative party has become increasingly effective over time (especially during Mujica’s presidency). Finally, this legislator thinks that the Uruguayan press helps parties show their legislative efforts to their constituencies.

**Interview 9:**

Party: *Partido Colorado*

Chamber: Deputies

This legislator can identify key policy areas in which the *Partido Colorado* invests more legislative efforts. These policy areas are education, security, and health. *Partido Colorado’*slegislators meet once a week to coordinate their legislative initiatives. These key policy areas receive special attention during these meetings. The legislator also believes that these policy concerns are shared by most Uruguayans.

The legislator also perceives that the degree of coordination has reinforced over time. *Partido Colorado’*s party leaders (within congress) constantly ask for more attention on these policy jurisdictions. Party leaders often request drafting specific bill initiatives from legislators. Finally, this legislator thinks that persistence in the use of bill initiatives (number of bill initiatives proposed over time) related to a particular policy jurisdiction helps parties create reputation as the most competent to solve problems pertaining to this policy jurisdiction.

**Interview 10:**

Party: *Frente Amplio*

Chamber: Deputies

This legislator identifies social policies (social programs, gender rights, and other human rights) and labor as the two priority jurisdictions of the *Frente Amplio.* The legislator perceives that legislators from other parties propose several initiatives to signal their preferences in a few key policy jurisdictions without much hope of having them approved; they adopt these strategies to distinguish themselves from the *Frente Amplio.* Most of these initiatives propose radical solutions that the *Frente Amplio* usually rejects.

In sum, this concentration of legislative efforts in a few policy areas finds two types of responses from the *Frente Amplio*: it responds with alternative initiatives with different policy positions and/or it blocks the approval of other parties’ initiatives to diminish their electoral impact.

*Frente Amplio’*slegislators meet at least once a week to both coordinate their legislative agenda and discuss the content of their bill initiatives. Party leaders often request the drafting of specific bill initiatives from legislators; and more frequently from legislators belonging to key committees (e.g. labor, human rights). Interestingly, the legislator also states that the most productive legislators of his party work in these key committees.

**Online Appendix D. Volatility, Number of Effective Parties, and Legislative Capabilities**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Countries** | **Volatility (Jones 2005)** | **Number of Political Parties** | **Legislative Capabilities**  **(Stein et al.2006)** | **Centralization**  **Index**  **(Jones 2005)** |
| **Chile** | **4** | **5.94\*** | **High** | **9** |
| Honduras | 6 | 2.30 | Low | 12 |
| El Salvador | 9 | 3.50 | Medium | 12 |
| **Nicaragua** | **15** | **2.39** | **Medium** | **13.5** |
| **Mexico** | **15** | **2.79** | **Medium** | **10** |
| **Uruguay** | **16** | **2.73** | **High** | **11** |
| **Paraguay** | **18** | **2.73** | **Medium** | **11** |
| Panama | 19 | 3.09 | Medium | 11 |
| **Brazil** | **21** | **7.81** | **High** | **8.5** |
| Costa Rica | 23 | 3.12 | Medium | 12.5 |
| Ecuador | 26 | 6.71 | Medium | 12 |
| Argentina | 27 | 3.18 | Low | 9 |
| **Colombia** | **27** | **5.00** | **High** | **8.75** |
| Bolivia | 28 | 5.21 | Medium | 14 |
| **Dominican Republic** | **30** | **2.52** | **Low** | **10** |
| Venezuela | 40 | 4.75 | Medium | 10.5 |
| **Guatemala** | **49** | **3.46** | **Low** | **14.5** |
| **Peru** | **51** | **4.24** | **Low** | **12** |

Source: Jones (2005)

\*Calculated by author

**Online Appendix E. Specialization by Parties and by Party Systems**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Parties*** | ***Number of Initiatives Proposed by Party*** | ***Specialization (Gini Index Weighted by Issue Importance)*** | ***Specialization (Gini Index)*** | ***Number of Legislators*** |
| **Brazil (2011-2014)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido de los Trabajadores | 1,093 | 0.31 | 0.44 | 87 |
| Movimiento Democrático Brasileño | 1,033 | 0.33 | 0.45 | 72 |
| Partido Social Democrático | 796 | 0.31 | 0.43 | 45 |
| Partido de la Social Democracia Brasileña | 796 | 0.34 | 0.46 | 45 |
| Partido Progresista | 516 | 0.36 | 0.44 | 40 |
| Partido de la Republica | 469 | 0.34 | 0.46 | 31 |
| Democratas | 583 | 0.36 | 0.43 | 28 |
| Partido Socialista Brasileño | 555 | 0.31 | 0.45 | 25 |
| Solidaridad | 85 | 0.33 | 0.51 | 21 |
| Partido Republicano de Orden Social | 93 | 0.32 | 0.43 | 20 |
| Partido Democratico Laborista | 532 | 0.33 | 0.49 | 18 |
| Partido Laborista Brasileño | 187 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 18 |
| Partido Comunista de Brasil | 151 | 0.29 | 0.43 | 15 |
| Partido Social Cristiano | 293 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 12 |
| Partido Republicano Brasileño | 171 | 0.28 | 0.48 | 10 |
| Partido Verde | 247 | 0.33 | 0.40 | 8 |
| Partido Popular Socialista | 158 | 0.30 | 0.52 | 7 |
| Partido de Movilizaicon Nacional | 63 | 0.27 | 0.53 | 3 |
| Partido Socialismo y Libertad | 58 | 0.38 | 0.54 | 3 |
| Partido Laborista de Brasil | 59 | 0.41 | 0.49 | 3 |
| Partido Republicano Progresista | 12 | 0.49 | 0.57 | 2 |
| Source: https://www2.camara.leg.br/  Law Initiatives: 7,554 (excludes those initiatives proposed  by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 11.5 |  |  |  |  |
| **Colombia (2010-2015)** |  |  |  |  |
| Movimiento MIRA | 70 | 0.32 | 0.70 | 1 |
| Partido Liberal Colombiano | 257 | 0.33 | 0.65 | 38 |
| Partido Social de Unidad Social | 289 | 0.27 | 0.64 | 48 |
| Movimiento de Integración Nacional | 11 | 0.44 | 0.75 | 1 |
| Polo Democrático Alternativo | 57 | 0.40 | 0.73 | 5 |
| Partido Cambio Radical | 91 | 0.37 | 0.68 | 16 |
| Partido de Integración Nacional | 97 | 0.32 | 0.70 | 11 |
| Partido Verde | 57 | 0.44 | 0.73 | 3 |
| Alianza Social Indígena | 26 | 0.45 | 0.74 | 1 |
| Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia | 2 | 0.60 | 0.92 | 1 |
| Apertura Liberal | 23 | 0.38 | 0.73 | 2 |
| Movimiento Popular Unido | 10 | 0.47 | 0.85 | 1 |
| Afro Vides | 23 | 0.27 | 0.64 | 1 |
| Partido Conservador Colombiano | 249 | 0.30 | 0.64 | 36 |
| Source: https://www.camara.gov.co/  Law Initiatives: 857 (excludes those initiatives proposed  by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 4.98 |  |  |  |  |
| **Chile (1990-1994)** |  |  |  |  |
| Concertación | 90 | 0.49 | 0.61 | 80 |
| Alianza | 58 | 0.44 | 0.59 | 47 |
| Partido Demócrata Cristiano  Partido por la Democracia  Partido Radical  Renovación Nacional  Unión Demócrata Independiente | 78  15  8  40  60 | 0.51  0.55  0.43  0.42  0.45 | 0.62  0.73  0.62  0.54  0.58 | 52  20  7  34  13 |
| Source: https://www.camara.cl/ |  |  |  |  |
| Law Initiatives: 1,152 (excludes those initiatives proposed  by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.66 |  |  |  |  |
| **Chile (1994-1998)** |  |  |  |  |
| Concertación  Alianza | 243  185 | 0.42  0.45 | 0.53  0.60 | 78  54 |
| Renovación Nacional  Unión Demócrata Independiente  Unión Centro Progresista  Partido Demócrata Cristiano  Partido Socialista de Chile  Partido por la Democracia  Partido Radical Socialdemócrata | 146  95  7  194  103  103  10 | 0.43  0.49  0.43  0.42  0.45  0.45  0.36 | 0.59  0.65  0.68  0.53  0.52  0.59  0.60 | 34  17  3  41  17  18  2 |
| Source: https://www.camara.cl/  Law Initiatives: 959 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 4.64 |  |  |  |  |
| **Chile (1998-2002)** |  |  |  |  |
| Concertación  Alianza | 711  228 | 0.40  0.46 | 0.52  0.61 | 80  54 |
| Renovación Nacional  Unión Demócrata Independiente  Partido Demócrata Cristiano  Partido Socialista de Chile  Partido por la Democracia  Partido Radical Socialdemócrata  Unión de Centro Progresista | 172  135  259  160  163  57  6 | 0.43  0.48  0.42  0.44  0.41  0.39  0.56 | 0.58  0.63  0.55  0.52  0.53  0.58  0.77 | 31  22  48  12  16  4  2 |
| Source: https://www.camara.cl/  Law Initiatives: 711 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 4.43 |  |  |  |  |
| **Chile (2002-2006)** |  |  |  |  |
| Concertación  Alianza | 461  494 | 0.39  0.41 | 0.52  0.56 | 68  56 |
| Unión Demócrata Independiente  Renovación Nacional  Partido Demócrata Cristiano  Partido por la Democracia  Partido Socialista de Chile  Partido Radical Socialdemócrata | 281  348  326  260  235  102 | 0.43  0.41  0.40  0.38  0.45  0.36 | 0.57  0.56  0.54  0.50  0.55  0.56 | 34  22  25  23  14  6 |
| Source: https://www.camara.cl/  Law Initiatives: 1,180 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 5.08 |  |  |  |  |
| **Chile (2006-2010)** |  |  |  |  |
| Concertación  Alianza | 1,348  1,360 | 0.35  0.40 | 0.47  0.54 | 56  60 |
| Partido Regionalista de los Independientes  Partido Demócrata Cristiano  Partido por la Democracia  Partido Socialista de Chile  Partido Radical Socialdemócrata  Renovación Nacional  Unión Demócrata Independiente | 167  664  770  868  343  801  810 | 0.37  0.35  0.34  0.41  0.38  0.42  0.40 | 0.52  0.46  0.46  0.49  0.49  0.54  0.54 | 1  25  22  19  8  22  38 |
| Source: https://www.camara.cl/  Law Initiatives: 2,711 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 5.26 |  |  |  |  |
| **Chile (2010-2014)** |  |  |  |  |
| Concertación  Alianza | 1,314  1,383 | 0.34  0.36 | 0.49  0.51 | 62  64 |
| Partido Demócrata Cristiano  Partido por la Democracia  Partido Socialista de Chile  Partido Radical Socialdemócrata  Partido Comunista de Chile  Unión Demócrata Independiente  Renovación Nacional  Partido Regionalista de los Independientes | 896  818  850  402  203  891  841  229 | 0.34  0.33  0.39  0.32  0.33  0.36  0.37  0.34 | 0.49  0.47  0.49  0.46  0.49  0.52  0.50  0.50 | 23  21  13  5  3  40  24  3 |
| Source: https://www.camara.cl/  Law Initiatives: 2,400 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 5.19 |  |  |  |  |
| **Dominican Republic (2002-2006)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido de Liberación Dominicana  Partido de Liberación Dominicana/Fuerza Nacional Progresista  Partido Revolucionario Dominicano  Partido Reformista Social Cristiano  Partido Reformista Social Cristiano/Partido Popular Cristiano | 531  125  1,475  768  78 | 0.29  0.19  0.55  0.40  0.36 | 0.53  0.41  0.73  0.59  0.62 | 41  2  98  42  1 |
| Source: http://www.camaradediputados.gob.do/app/app\_2011/cd\_frontpage.aspx  Law Initiatives: 4,168 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 2.59 |  |  |  |  |
| **Dominican Republic (2006-2010)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido de Liberación Dominicana  Partido de Liberación Dominicana/Fuerza Nacional Progresista  Partido de Liberación Dominicana/Unión Demócrata Cristiana  Partido Revolucionario Dominicano  Partido Reformista Social Cristiano  Partido Reformista Social Cristiano/Partido Popular Cristiano | 1,523  159  29  1,187  646  66 | 0.42  0.50  0.19  0.43  0.37  0.32 | 0.61  0.62  0.40  0.60  0.55  0.51 | 113  2  2  66  26  1 |
| Source: http://www.camaradediputados.gob.do/app/app\_2011/cd\_frontpage.aspx  Law Initiatives: 6,513 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 2.48 |  |  |  |  |
| **Guatemala (1996-2000)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido de Avanzada Nacional  Frente Republicano Guatemalteco  Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala  Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteco  Unión del Centro Nacional  Unión Democrática  Movimiento de Liberación Nacional | 272  84  64  20  21  4  6 | 0.38  0.36  0.33  0.42  0.37  0.51  0.65 | 0.53  0.47  0.52  0.62  0.69  0.79  0.75 | 44  18  6  4  1  1  1 |
| Source: http://www.congreso.gob.gt/index.php  Law Initiatives: 788 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 2.73 |  |  |  |  |
| **Guatemala (2000-2004)** |  |  |  |  |
| Frente Republicano Guatemalteco  Partido de Avanzada Nacional  Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca/ Desarrollo Integral Autentico  Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca  Partido Libertador Progresista | 186  83  8  6  4 | 0.42  0.41  0.68  0.51  0.51 | 0.63  0.67  0.79  0.75  0.79 | 63  37  9  1  7 |
| Source: http://www.congreso.gob.gt/index.php  Law Initiatives: 736 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 2.75 |  |  |  |  |
| **Guatemala (2004-2008)** |  |  |  |  |
| Frente Republicano Guatemalteco  Partido de Avanzada Nacional  Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca  Desarrollo Integral Auténtico  Unión Democrática  Alianza Nueva Guatemala  Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza  Partido Unionista  Gran Alianza Nacional  Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca | 98  82  10  18  5  43  129  53  168  31 | 0.30  0.33  0.58  0.43  0.83  0.32  0.39  0.40  0.34  0.27 | 0.47  0.51  0.68  0.71  0.79  0.48  0.54  0.61  0.54  0.56 | 43  17  1  1  2  6  32  7  47  2 |
| Source: http://www.congreso.gob.gt/index.php  Law Initiatives: 770 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 4.57 |  |  |  |  |
| **Guatemala (2008-2012)** |  |  |  |  |
| Frente Republicano Guatemalteco  Partido de Avanzada Nacional  Unión del Centro Nacional  Unión Democrática  Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza  Partido Unionista  Gran Alianza Nacional  Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca  Encuentro por Guatemala  Centro de Acción Social  Partido Patriota | 38  8  23  1  226  36  102  13  43  21  119 | 0.36  0.38  0.39  0.33  0.43  0.37  0.48  0.39  0.44  0.34 | 0.62  0.68  0.60  0.53  0.74  0.57  0.68  0.54  0.62  0.56 | 14  3  5  1  51  7  37  2  4  5  29 |
| Source: http://www.congreso.gob.gt/index.php  Law Initiatives: 615 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 4.86 |  |  |  |  |
| **México (2007-2009)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido Revolucionario Institucional  Partido Acción Nacional | 657  599 | 0.39  0.38 | 0.65  0.62 | 106  206 |
| Partido de la Revolución Democrática | 650 | 0.39 | 0.63 | 125 |
| Convergencia | 148 | 0.39 | 0.59 | 18 |
| Partido Verde Ecologista de México  Partido del Trabajo | 203  45 | 0.37  0.39 | 0.60  0.68 | 17  11 |
| Nueva Alianza | 137 | 0.36 | 0.60 | 9 |
| Alternativa | 52 | 0.41 | 0.72 | 5 |
| Source:  http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ |  |  |  |  |
| Law Initiatives: 2,491 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.52 |  |  |  |  |
| **México (2010-2012)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido Revolucionario Institucional  Partido Acción Nacional  Partido de la Revolución Democrática  Partido Verde Ecologista de México  Partido del Trabajo  Movimiento Ciudadano  Nueva Alianza | 1,375  804  502  302  319  92  347 | 0.38  0.39  0.40  0.41  0.42  0.39  0.36 | 0.61  0.62  0.64  0.63  0.65  0.65  0.63 | 242  142  63  22  14  6  8 |
| Source:  http://www.diputados.gob.mx/  Law Initiatives: 3,737 (excludes those initiatives proposed by the executive) |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 2.99 |  |  |  |  |
| **Nicaragua (2007-2011)** |  |  |  |  |
| Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional  Partido Liberal Constitucionalista  Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense  Movimiento Renovador Sandinista | 965  760  477  68 | 0.35  0.32  0.31  0.17 | 0.76  0.73  0.67  0.52 | 38  25  23  3 |
| Source: http://www.asamblea.gob.ni/ |  |  |  |  |
| Law Initiatives: 2,587 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.04 |  |  |  |  |
| **Paraguay (2003-2008)** |  |  |  |  |
| Asociación Nacional Republicana  Movimiento Patria Querida  Partido Encuentro Nacional  Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico  Partido País Solidario  Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos | 467  128  29  320  51  141 | 0.40  0.36  0.36  0.40  0.40  0.39 | 0.63  0.53  0.57  0.61  0.57  0.62 | 37  10  1  20  2  10 |
| Source: http://www.congreso.gov.py/  Law Initiatives: 1,119 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.53 |  |  |  |  |
| **Paraguay (2008-2013)** |  |  |  |  |
| Asociación Nacional Republicana | 1,165 | 0.40 | 0.60 | 30 |
| Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico | 1,098 | 0.40 | 0.63 | 27 |
| Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos | 776 | 0.39 | 0.59 | 15 |
| Partido Patria Querida  Movimiento Popular Tekojoja  Partido Democrático Progresista  Partido Encuentro Nacional  Partido País Solidario | 176  48  69  1  15 | 0.38  0.39  0.39  0.35  0.47 | 0.58  0.64  0.64  0.75  0.74 | 3  1  1  1  2 |
| Source:  http://www.congreso.gov.py/ |  |  |  |  |
| Law Initiatives: 3,171 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.59 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Perú (2001-2006)** |  |  |  |  |
| Frente Independiente Moralizador-Perú Posible (alianza) | 815 | 0.31 | 0.50 | 45 |
| Perú Posible | 3,813 | 0.33 | 0.55 | 45 |
| Partido Aprista Peruano | 2,491 | 0.29 | 0.52 | 28 |
| Unidad Nacional | 3,543 | 0.37 | 0.56 | 17 |
| Frente Independiente Moralizador | 1,725 | 0.39 | 0.57 | 11 |
| Unión por el Perú | 974 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 6 |
| Somos Perú | 382 | 0.29 | 0.51 | 4 |
| Acción Popular | 987 | 0.34 | 0.57 | 3 |
| Solución Popular | 88 | 0.35 | 0.54 | 1 |
| Todos por la Victoria | 83 | 0.22 | 0.47 | 1 |
| Renacimiento Andino | 253 | 0.36 | 0.58 | 1 |
| Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría | 63 | 0.47 | 0.69 | 3 |
| Source: http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ |  |  |  |  |
| Law Initiatives: 13,456 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 4.37 |  |  |  |  |
| **Perú 2006-2011** |  |  |  |  |
| Unión por el Perú  Partido Aprista Peruano  Unidad Nacional  Alianza por el Futuro  Frente de Centro  Perú Posible  Renovación Nacional | 1,999  1,216  595  397  411  344  168 | 0.31  0.29  0.35  0.38  0.32  0.32  0.35 | 0.49  0.47  0.55  0.57  0.51  0.52  0.53 | 45  36  17  13  5  2  2 |
| Source:  http://www.congreso.gob.pe/  Law Initiatives: 5,040 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.78 |  |  |  |  |
| **Uruguay (1985-1990)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido Colorado  Partido Nacional  Partido Demócrata Cristiano  Partido Unión Cívica | 243  511  421  66 | 0.39  0.40  0.48  0.47 | 0.64  0.63  0.65  0.63 | 55  46  27  2 |
| Source:  http://www0.parlamento.gub.uy  Law Initiatives: 777 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 2.88 |  |  |  |  |
| **Uruguay (1990-1995)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido Colorado | 309 | 0.38 | 0.64 | 40 |
| Partido Nacional | 423 | 0.37 | 0.62 | 53 |
| Frente Amplio | 276 | 0.44 | 0.58 | 28 |
| Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo | 182 | 0.51 | 0.66 | 11 |
| Source: http://www0.parlamento.gub.uy |  |  |  |  |
| Law Initiatives: 577 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.28 |  |  |  |  |
| **Uruguay (1995-2000)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido Colorado | 248 | 0.40 | 0.67 | 43 |
| Partido Nacional | 439 | 0.40 | 0.66 | 41 |
| Encuentro Progresista | 209 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 40 |
| Nuevo Espacio | 89 | 0.50 | 0.68 | 6 |
| Source: http://www0.parlamento.gub.uy  Law Initiatives: 559 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.27 |  |  |  |  |
| **Uruguay (2000-2005)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido Colorado | 280 | 0.42 | 0.73 | 46 |
| Partido Nacional | 366 | 0.42 | 0.69 | 29 |
| Encuentro Progresista | 290 | 0.50 | 0.65 | 52 |
| Nuevo Espacio | 79 | 0.54 | 0.74 | 5 |
| Source: http://www0.parlamento.gub.uy |  |  |  |  |
| Law Initiatives: 480  Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 3.06 |  |  |  |  |
| **Uruguay (2005-2010)** |  |  |  |  |
| Partido Colorado | 194 | 0.37 | 0.63 | 14 |
| Partido Nacional | 569 | 0.38 | 0.64 | 47 |
| Encuentro Progresista | 363 | 0.48 | 0.62 | 69 |
| Partido Independiente | 25 | 0.42 | 0.73 | 1 |
| Source: http://www0.parlamento.gub.uy |  |  |  |  |
| Law Initiatives: 919 |  |  |  |  |
| Effective Number of Legislative Parties: 2.39 |  |  |  |  |

**Online Appendix F**. **Issues Included in the Analyses**

Policy Jurisdisction 1: Audit and Drug Control

Policy Jurisdisction 2: Defense and Law Enforcement

Policy Jurisdisction 3: Economy and Production

Policy Jurisdisction 4: Education, Science, and Culture

Policy Jurisdisction 5: Decentralization and Public Administration

Policy Jurisdisction 6: Environmental care

Policy Jurisdisction 7: International relations

Policy Jurisdisction 8: Population care and housing

Policy Jurisdisction 9: Infrastructure, tourism, and transportation

Policy Jurisdisction 10: Labor affairs

Policy Jurisdisction 11: Health and Social Security

Policy Jurisdisction 12: International trade and integration

**Online Appendix G. Further Explanations of the Indices Used in Analyses**

Volatility

Jones´s indicator of volatility is calculated based on the Pedersen Index (1979). This index is the most employed, accepted, and well-known measure of electoral volatility. The index is calculated following these steps: 1) subtracts the percentage of votes won by every party in an election from that won in the previous election, 2) takes the absolute value of this result, 3) sums the results for all parties, and finally 4) divides this total by two. This index provides a measure of the magnitude of changes in the composition of the legislature over time. Given that its calculation is based on percentages, this index allows for comparing degrees of volatility across countries. According to my theory, these changes can alter the incentives party leaders face when deciding to push for further (or lower) concentration of legislative specialization.

Legislative Capabilities

In my analysis, I employ the Congress Capabilities Index of legislative capabilities, which is constructed by Sebastián Saiegh and reported by Stein et al. (2006). The index compares legislatures according to eight indicators, five quantitative and three qualitative. The first two quantitative indicators measure the confidence of citizens and business people in the performance of congress. The third indicator reflects the average years of legislator experience, and the fourth, the percentage of legislators with university educations. Finally the fifth indicator assesses the average number of committee memberships per legislator. The qualitative indicators consider the strength of committees, whether the legislature is a good place to build a career, and technical expertise. The Index relies on several secondary sources and the legislator survey of the University of Salamanca. By aggregating these eight considerations, the Index provides a three-category classification of legislative capabilities: High, Medium, and Low.

As the authors of the report states (Stein et al. 2006), this index constitutes a first attempt that is described as “preliminary and imperfect” to measure the legislative capabilities of the Latin American legislative bodies. Despite any imperfection, this index focuses on assessing capabilities only in Latin American congresses, which might constitute an advantage since all Latin American countries share presidential systems. Adjustments to the methodology might be needed for parliaments. In addition, this index was constructed by a single researcher, which ensures the application of similar criteria in the evaluation (across legislative studies). As Table 1, Online Appendix J, Online Appendix K, and Online Appendix L, although the variable “Legislative Capabilities” presents the expected sign, it is not consistently significant across all specifications.

I employ an additional measure of legislative capabilities in the estimations as an additional robustness check. This index, reported by Fish and Kronig (2009), is based on questionnaires to specialists who have expert knowledge of specific countries and their institutions. Although this index includes broader criteria than the index constructed by Saiegh, the measurement error might increase as the scores reported were calculated based on the evaluations of different experts. Consult Fish and Kronig (2009) for further details on which criteria were employed to construct this index. In any alternative model, the variable “Legislative Capabilities” calculated based on the Fish’s and Kronig’s index does not become statistically significant.

Jones’s *Index of Centralization of Power in the Political Parties* (2005)

This index is composed by five indicators:

1. Leaders’ right to select legislative candidates: it takes the value of 3 if the nomination is made mostly by party leaders; it takes the value of 2 if the nomination is made mostly by regional party leaders; and it takes the value of 1 if the nomination is made mostly by individual candidates. If the party leaders can choose the legislative candidates, party leaders’ power shall increase *vis a vis* other influential actors within their organizations (e.g. legislators).
2. The design of the electoral system used for the election of legislative candidates: it takes the value of 3 if a single national district in which a closed party system is used; it takes the value of 2.5 if a combination of national closed party list and regional closed party lists is employed; it takes the value of 2 if regional closed party lists exist; it takes the value of 1.5 if a mixture of a single national district and open lists is used; it takes the value of 1.5 if a combination of regional closed party lists and single-member districts; and it takes the value of 1 if either single-member plurality or open lists within regional multi-member districts exists. An electoral system characterized by a single national district in which a closed party system is used should help strengthen leaders’ power as leaders are increasingly able to influence other members’ behavior of their parties, especially those attempting to run for legislative elections.

Most Latin American countries have adopted systems with closed lists, which favor the influence of party leaders (Ames 2001). The exceptions are found in Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru.

1. The timing of presidential and legislative elections: it takes the value of 3 if the presidential and legislative elections are concurrent; it takes the value of 2 if one-half of the presidential elections are held simultaneously with the legislative election; and it takes the value of 1 if less than one-third of the presidential and legislative elections are held concomitantly. If the presidential and legislative elections are concurrent, party leaders are able to influence other members’ actions. As the presidential contest constitutes the priority for the party, the necessity to coordinate and win the presidential election tends to strengthen the role of party leaders.
2. The presence of autonomous regional leaders: it takes the value of 3 if there are no directly elected regional governors; it takes the value of 2 if elected regional governors have limited political and administrative autonomy; and it takes the value of 1 if elected regional governors possess a relevant level of political and administrative autonomy. It becomes straightforward to argue that the power of party leaders decreases as the relative autonomy of regional officials grows. At least, party leaders’ control over regional affairs should diminish.
3. Presidential primaries held: it takes the value of 3 if none of the major parties hold primaries to select their presidential candidates; it takes the value of 2.5 if less than one-third of the major parties employed primaries; it takes the value of 2 if between two-thirds and one-third of the major parties hold primaries; it takes the value of 1.5 if at least two-thirds of the major parties have chosen their candidates through primaries; and it takes the value of 1 if all major parties have held primaries for recent elections. If primaries are held, party leaders could lose influence within their organizations as they have to share the selection of candidates with more party members.

Countries in which the most powerful party leaders can be found are Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Online Appendix B displays these scores. However, even in countries where national party leaders are consider to be relatively weaker (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile), party leaders still possess several other tools and prerogatives to influence legislators’ behavior, such as guaranteed access to mass media, control of public campaign finance (in case reelection is permitted), the use of the party label and the issues the party owns, support from the party for their legislative agendas, and disciplinary actions.

**Online Appendix H. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analyses**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variables** | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
| **Dependent variables** |  |  |  |  |
| Gini Coefficient | 0.65 | 0.12 | 0.35 | 0.92 |
| Weighted Gini Coefficient | 0.43 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.99 |
| Herfindahl Index | 0.32 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 1.0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Independent variables** |  |  |  |  |
| Size of the Party | 15.85 | 16.14 | 0.39 | 62.5 |
| Size of the Party^2 | 511.60 | 797.320 | 0.15 | 3906.25 |
| Electoral Volatility | 74.69 | 15.87 | 51.0 | 95.0 |
| Seat Volatility | 26.65 | 18.04 | 4.0 | 51.0 |
| Legislative Capabilities | 2.12 | 0.92 | 1.0 | 3.0 |
| Centralization Index | 11.06 | 2.03 | 8.5 | 14.5 |
| Ruling Party | 0.10 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| Effective Number of Political Parties | 4.30 | 1.99 | 2.39 | 11.50 |
| District Magnitude | 5.77 | 4.28 | 2.0 | 19.0 |

**Online Appendix I. Definitions for Variables Used in Analyses**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Variables** | Description | Sources |
| **Dependent variables** |  |  |
| Gini Coefficient | Measure of inequality or concentration based on the Gini Index (Morgan 1962) | Constructed by author employing the data provided by Legislatina Database (http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/base\_de\_datos.htm) |
| Weighted Gini Coefficient | Measure of inequality weighted by the relative importance of policy jurisdictions | Constructed by author, employing the the *Stata* command “ineqdec0” |
| Hirschman-Herfindahl Index | Measure of concentration. Calculated by squaring the percentage of legislative seats held by a party, and the summing the resulting numbers. The design of the index is based on the works of A.O. Hirschman (1945) and O.C. Herfindahl (1950). The score was then divided by 10000 | Constructed by author employing the data provided by Legislatina Database (http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/base\_de\_datos.htm) |
|  |  |  |
| **Independent variables** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | Percentage of legislative seats held by a party | Constructed by author employing the data provided by Legislatina Database (http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/base\_de\_datos.htm) |
| Size of the Party^2 | Squared of the percentage of legislative seats held by a party | Constructed by author |
| Electoral Volatility | Measure of volatility based on based on the Pedersen Index (1979) | Taken from Jones (2005) |
| Seat Volatility | Measure of volatility based on based on the Pedersen Index (1979) and legislative elections | Taken from Jones (2005) |
| Legislative Capabilities | Measure of legislative capabilities composed by eight features. The quantitative indicators assess: the confidence of citizens and business people in the performance of congress, the average years of legislator experience and percentage of legislators with university educations, and the average number of committee memberships per legislator. The qualitative indicators consider the strength of committees, whether the legislature is a good place to build a career, and technical expertise. | Taken from Stein et al. (2006) |
| Centralization Index | Measure of centralization of power within parties | Taken from Jones (2005) |
| Ruling party | Measured dichotomously (1=when either the party is controlling the executive or is member of a coalition controlling the executive ) | Constructed by author |
| Efective Number of Political Parties | Measure of fragmentation based on based on the Laakso-Taagepera Index (1979) | Constructed by author |
| District Magnitude | Mean district magnitude of the lower house | Taken from Thorsten et al (2001)+ |

**+** Beck Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Gro­, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh (2001). “New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions." World Bank Economic Review, 15: 1, 165-176.

**Online Appendix J. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level (Fractional Response Models)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Fractional Response Models** | |
| **Models:** | **1** | **2** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -1.05\*\* | -2.09\*\*\* |
|  | (0.44) | (0.68) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.02\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0003\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.002 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.01) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* |
|  | (0.06) | (0.10) |
| Centralization Index | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.04) |
| Ruling Party | -0.07 | -0.07 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Number of Observations | 884 | 884 |
| Log pseudolikelihood | -570.19 | -544.53 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%. These models employ party-clustered standard errors

**Online Appendix K. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level. Including Additional Controls**

**Table 1. Employing Country, Party, and Period Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Fractional Response Models** | | | | | | |
|  | **Country Fixed Effects** | | **Party Fixed Effects** | | **Period Fixed Effects** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3+** | **Model 4+** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -4.81\*\*\* | -4.54\*\*\* | -0.71\*\*\* | -0.29 | -5.07\*\*\* | -4.88\*\*\* |
|  | (0.44) | (0.54) | (0.22) | (0.27) | (0.52) | (0.97) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* | -0.01\*\* | -0.02\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.01) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.00507) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0004\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\* | 0.0003\*\*\* | 0.0005\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.00002) | (0.00004) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | 0.03 | 0.002 | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.003 | 0.04\* | 0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Legislative Capabilities | -0.003 | 0.44 | -0.13 | 0.03 | -0.15 | 0.27 |
|  | (0.32) | (0.30) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.34) | (0.37) |
| Centralization Index | 0.34\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.34\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.07) |
| Ruling Party | -0.07\*\* | -0.08 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.10\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| Number of Observations | 884 | 884 | 884 | 884 | 884 | 884 |
| Log pseudolikelihood | -563.66 | -537.78 | 953.81 | 562.35 | -560.78 | -532.29 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%; + a truncated model was run for Models 3 and 4 as the fractional response model did not converge

**Online Appendix K. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level. Including Additional Controls**

**Table 2. Employing Party and Period Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Multilevel Models** | | | |
|  | **Party Fixed Effects** | | **Period Fixed Effects** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -0.71\*\*\* | -0.19\*\*\* | -0.66\*\*\* | -0.55\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.09) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.01\*\*\* | -0.005\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00003) | (0.00003) | (0.00002) | (0.00003) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.003 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Legislative Capabilities | -0.13\*\*\* | 0.02 | -0.04\*\* | 0.05 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Centralization Index | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.02\*\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.003) |
| Ruling Party | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Number of Observations | 884 | 884 | 884 | 884 |
| Log pseudolikelihood | 953.81 | 536.08 | 873.90 | 385.34 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%

**Online Appendix K. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level. Including Additional Controls**

**Table 3. Employing District Magnitude**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Fractional Response (Multilevel) Models** | |
| **Models:** | **1** | **2** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -0.70 | -1.99 |
|  | (1.18) | (1.51) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.01) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0004\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.003 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.24 | 0.33 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.21) |
| Centralization Index | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.12\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.06) |
| Ruling Party | -0.06 | -0.06 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| District Magnitude | -0.02 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Number of Observations | 884 | 884 |
| Number of Groups (countries) | 10 | 10 |
| Log-likelihood | -569.32 | -544.44 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%

**Online Appendix K. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level. Including Additional Controls**

**Table 4. Controlling for Seat Volatility**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Fractional Response (Multilevel) Model** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 2** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -1.18\*\* | -2.51\*\*\* |
|  | (0.46) | (0.75) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.02\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0004\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |
| Seat Volatility | -0.002 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.21 | 0.29 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.22) |
| Centralization Index | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.13\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Ruling Party | -0.07 | -0.06 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| Number of Observations | 884 | 884 |
| Number of Groups (countries) | 10 | 10 |
| Log-likelihood | -570.22 | -544.72 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10

**Online Appendix L. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level (Employing the Weighted Gini coefficient)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Fractional Response (Multilevel) Model** |
| **Model** | **Model 1** |
| **Variables** | DV: Weighted Gini Coefficient |
| Constant | |  | | --- | | -2.45\*\*\* | | (0.86) | |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.02\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0003\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) |
| **Control Variables** |  |
| Electoral Volatility | |  | | --- | | 0.01\* | | (0.01) | |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.04 |
|  | (0.06) |
| Centralization Index | 0.13\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) |
| Ruling party | -0.12\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) |
| Number of Observations | 819 |
| Number of Groups (countries) | 10 |
| Log-likelihood | -554.71 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%

**Online Appendix M. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level (Including bill initiatives targeting local constituencies)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Fractional Response (Multilevel) Models** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 2** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -1.57 | -2.94\* |
|  | (1.26) | (1.77) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.02\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0003\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.0003 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.27 | 0.26 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.26) |
| Centralization Index | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.17\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.07) |
| Ruling party | -0.08 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.09) |
| Number of Observations | 887 | 887 |
| Number of Groups (countries) | 10 | 10 |
| Log-likelihood | -575.74 | -534.05 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%

**Online Appendix N. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level (excluding the smallest parties)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Fractional Response (Multilevel) Models** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 2** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -1.42 | -2.59\*\* |
|  | (1.12) | (1.17) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.02\*\* | -0.03\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0002\*\* | 0.0004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.0005 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.24 | 0.27 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.18) |
| Centralization Index | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Ruling Party | -0.07 | -0.07 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.08) |
| Number of Observations | 778 | 778 |
| Number of Groups | 10 | 10 |
| Log-likelihood | -506.17 | -472.77 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%

**Online Appendix O. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level (Tobit Models)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Tobit Multilevel** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 3** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | 0.25 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.241) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.01\*\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00001) | (0.00002) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | 0.0001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.05 | 0.06\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Centralization Index | 0.03\*\* | 0.03\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Ruling Party | -0.02 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Number of Observations | 884 | 884 |
| Number of Groups | 10 | 10 |
| Log-likelihood | 777.55 | 196.80 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%

**Online Appendix P. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level (Panel Data Model employing Random Effects)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Panel Data Model** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 3** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.06 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.08) |
| Dependent Variable (lagged) | 0.50\*\*\* | 0.39\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.00005\*\*\* | 7.82e-05\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00001) | (2.25e-05) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.0004) | (0.001) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Centralization Index | 0.02\*\*\* | 0.01\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.005) |
| Ruling Party | -0.01 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Number of Observations | 753 | 753 |
| Number of Groups | 10 | 10 |
| R-squared Overall | 0.37 | 0.22 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%

**Online Appendix Q. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level (Panel Data Model employing Random Effects)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Panel Data Models** | | | | | | |
|  | **Country Fixed Effects** | | **Party Fixed Effects** | | **Period Fixed Effects** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -0.30\*\* | -0.24 | -0.68\* | -0.22 | -0.37\*\* | -0.26 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.21) | (0.38) | (0.61) | (0.15) | (0.25) |
| Dependent Variable (lagged) | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.01\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* | 0.0001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00001) | (0.00002) | (0.00002) | (0.00004) | (0.00001) | (0.00002) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.001 | -0.004 | 0.01 | -0.002 | 0.001 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.09 | 0.13 | -0.005 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.10 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.18) | (0.13) | (0.20) | (0.11) | (0.19) |
| Centralization Index | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.04\*\* | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.04 | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.04\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Ruling Party | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.003 | -0.01 | -0.02\* | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Number of Observations | 753 | 756 | 753 | 756 | 753 | 756 |
| Number of Groups | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| R-squared Overall | 0.43 | 0.26 | 0.55 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.31 |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%

**Online Appendix R. Explaining Legislative Specialization at the Party Level (Estimator for Unequal Probability Sampling)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Model** | **Fractional Response (Multilevel) Models** | |
| **Model** | **Model 1** | **Model 2** |
| **Variables** | DV: Gini Coefficient | DV: Herfindahl Index |
| Constant | -1.58\*\*\* | -3.08\*\*\* |
|  | (0.24) | (0.45) |
| **Testing Size of the Party** |  |  |
| Size of the Party | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.01) |
| Size of the Party^2 | 0.0004\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* |
|  | (6.35e-05) | (9.76e-05) |
| **Control Variables** |  |  |
| Electoral Volatility | -0.003 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Legislative Capabilities | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.47\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| Centralization Index | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Ruling party | -0.09\*\* | -0.09\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Number of Observations | 884 | 884 |
| Number of Groups (countries) | 10 | 10 |
| F(6, 869) | 36.99\*\*\* | 17.69\*\*\* |

\*\*\* statistically significant at the 1%; \*\* statistically significant at the 5%; \* statistically significant at the 10%