**Appendix A. Background Information of Survey Experiment and Main Results**

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| **Table-A1.** Description of Variables |
| *Dependent Variable* |  |
| FREETRADE\* | Do you support liberalization of the market via free trade?1 (Oppose), 2 (Somewhat oppose), 3 (Neither), 4 (Somewhat support), 5 (Support) |
| *Independent Variable* |  |
| TREATMENTS | 0 (Control Group), 1 (Group A), 2 (Group B), 3 (Group C), 4 (Group D) |
| *Control Variables* |  |
| INCOME | What was the annual household income (January through December of 2014) before tax? Please include bonuses and other irregular incomes.1 (<2,000) 2 (2,000~4,000) 3 (4,000~6,000) 4 (6,000~8,000) 5 (8,000~10,000)6 (10,000~12,000) 7 (12,000~14,000) 8 (>14,000) unit: JPY in thousands |
| SECURITY | If you quit the current work, do you think it will be difficult to find a new job with the equivalent amount of income? (If you are not employed, please refer to a family member who is employed)1 (difficult); 2 (somewhat difficult); 3 (Neutral); 4 (somewhat easy); 5 (easy) |
| POLITICAL SUPPORT | 0 (swing voters), 1 (LDP supporters), 2 (non-LDP supporters) |
| EMPLOYED | 1 if employed (including formal and informal jobs), 0 otherwise |
| EDUCATION | What is the last educational institution that you were enrolled?1 (elementary/ junior high); 2 (high school); 3 (community school); 4 (university);5 (graduate school) |
| ABROAD | 1 if having an experience visiting/ residing abroad, 0 if no experience |
| AGE | 20~69 |
| FEMALE | 1 if female, 0 if male |
| MARRIED | 1 if married, 0 if single |
| PREFECTURE\*\* | 1 Hokkaido, 2 Aomori, 3 Iwate, 4 Miyagi, 5 Akita, 6 Yamagata, 7 Fukushima, 8 Ibaraki, 9 Tochigi, 10 Gunma, 11 Saitama, 12 Chiba, 13 Tokyo, 14 Kanagawa, 15 Niigata, 16 Toyama, 17 Ishikawa, 18 Fukui, 19 Yamanashi, 20 Nagano, 21 Gifu, 22 Shizuoka, 23 Aichi, 24 Mie, 25 Shiga, 26 Kyoto, 27 Osaka, 28 Hyogo, 29 Nara, 30 Wakayama, 31 Tottori, 32 Shimane, 33 Okayama, 34 Hiroshima, 35 Yamaguchi, 36 Tokushima, 37 Kagawa, 38 Ehime, 39 Kochi, 40 Fukuoka, 41 Saga, 42 Nagasaki, 43 Kumamoto, 44 Oita, 45 Miyazaki, 46 Kagoshima, 47 Okinawa |
| Notes:\*: For robustness check, this variable is classified into three categories: 1 (Oppose), 2 (Neutral), 3 (Support).\*\*: For robustness check, this variable is replaced by logged values of prefectural level agriculture and forestry revenue (Statistics of Japan 2015), labeled as AGRICULTURE. |

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| **Table-A2.** Descriptive Statistics |
| **Variable** | ***Mean*** | ***Standard Deviation*** | ***Minimum*** | ***Maximum*** |
| **FREETRADE** (5 categories)**FREETRADE** (3 categories)**INCOME****SECURITY****POLITICAL SUPPORT** (3 categories)**EMPLOYED****EDUCATION****ABROAD****AGE****FEMALE****MARRIED****AGRICULTURE** | 3.50 (4)2.39 (3)3.58 (3)1.90 (1)(0)0.683.49 (4)0.5647.000.420.657.19 | 0.960.701.781.110.770.470.930.5014.330.490.481.00 | 1111001020005.72 | 5385215169119.39 |
| Obs | 1,744 |
| Notes:1) Values in parentheses record modes.2) Independent variables (TREATMENTS and POLITICAL SUPPORTS) as well as PREFECTURE are excluded since they are unordered categorical variables (see Appendix 3). |

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| **Table-A3.** Balanced Demographics (Mean Scores) of Five Groups |
| **Variable** | **Group A** | **Group B** | **Group C** | **Group D** | **Control Group** |
| **INCOME** | 3.62 (3) | 3.62 (3) | 3.66 (3) | 3.56 (3) | 3.44 (3) |
| **SECURITY****POLITICAL SUPPORT** | 1.94 (1)(0) | 1.80 (1)(0) | 1.88 (1)(0) | 1.95 (1)(0) | 1.94 (1)(0) |
| **EMPLOYED** | 0.68 | 0.71 | 0.66 | 0.67 | 0.69 |
| **EDUCATION** | 3.46 (4) | 3.57 (4) | 3.47 (4) | 3.45 (4) | 3.50 (4) |
| **ABROAD** | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.61 | 0.57 | 0.56 |
| **AGE** | 46.99 | 46.51 | 47.73 | 46.70 | 47.08 |
| **FEMALE** | 0.40 | 0.42 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.40 |
| **MARRIED** | 0.64 | 0.67 | 0.61 | 0.65 | 0.68 |
| **AGRICULTURE** | 7.24 | 7.20 | 7.16 | 7.15 | 7.17 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Obs | 351 | 373 | 355 | 330 | 335 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Notes: Values in parentheses record modes. |

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| **Table-A4.** Ordered Logit Regressions on Public Support for Trade Liberalization |
|  | Overall | Income Level | Job Security |
|  | M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | M(5) | M(6) |
| *Treatments* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A | 0.05 (0.14) | 0.02 (0.15) | -0.17 (0.33) | -0.13 (0.34) | -0.18 (0.28) | -0.08 (0.29) |
|  GROUP B | -0.46\*\* (0.14) | -0.50\*\* (0.15) | -0.68 (0.33) | -0.63 (0.34) | -0.45 (0.31) | -0.56 (0.32) |
|  GROUP C | -0.16 (0.14) | -0.19 (0.14) | -0.16 (0.32) | -0.12 (0.31) | -0.41 (0.29) | -0.46 (0.29) |
|  GROUP D | -0.09 (0.14) | -0.05 (0.15) | -0.33 (0.33) | -0.35 (0.34) | -0.22 (0.30) | -0.23 (0.30) |
| *Interactions* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A\*INCOME |  |  | 0.06 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.08) |  |  |
|  GROUP B\*INCOME |  |  | 0.06 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.08) |  |  |
|  GROUP C\*INCOME |  |  | -0.00 (0.08) | -0.02 (0.08) |  |  |
|  GROUP D\*INCOME |  |  | 0.07 (0.08) | 0.09 (0.09) |  |  |
|  GROUP A\*SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.12 (0.13) | 0.05 (0.13) |
|  GROUP B\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | -0.01 (0.15) | 0.03 (0.16) |
|  GROUP C\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.14 (0.14) | 0.14 (0.14) |
|  GROUP D\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.07 (0.14) | 0.09 (0.14) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INCOME |  | 0.08\*\* (0.03) | 0.08 (0.06) | 0.05 (0.06) | -0.06 (0.10) | 0.08\*\* (0.03) |
| SECURITY |  | 0.04 (0.05) |  | 0.04 (0.05) |  | -0.03 (0.10) |
| LDP (*Political Support*) |  | 0.51\*\*\* (0.11) |  | 0.52\*\*\* (0.11) |  | 0.51\*\*\* (0.11) |
| NON-LDP (*Political Support*) |  | -0.00 (0.14) |  | 0.00 (0.14) |  | -0.00 (0.14) |
| EMPLOYED |  | 0.01 (0.11) |  | 0.01 (0.11) |  | 0.02 (0.11) |
| EDUCATION |  | 0.10 (0.06) |  | 0.11 (0.06) |  | 0.10 (0.06) |
| ABROAD |  | 0.45\*\*\* (0.10) |  | 0.44\*\*\* (0.10) |  | 0.45\*\*\* (0.10) |
| AGE |  | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) |  | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) |  | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) |
| FEMALE |  | -0.65\*\*\* (0.11) |  | -0.65\*\*\* (0.11) |  | -0.65\*\*\* (0.11) |
| MARRIED |  | -0.14 (0.11) |  | -0.14 (0.11) |  | -0.14 (0.11) |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -2338.55 | -2225.45 | -2326.34 | -2224.42 | -2337.46 | -2224.76 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.05 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; N=1,744; Fixed effects included in Models 2, 4, 6; Group E as base (*Treatments*); Swing voters as base (*Political Support*). M(1) is used to produce Table 2; M(3) and M(5) are used to produce Figure 2. |

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| **Table-B1.** Mean Responses to Survey Experiment Questions in Treatments |
|  |  | **Treatments** |
|  |  | *Group A*(Consumer) | *Group B*(Income-Earner) | *Group C*(A 🡪 B) | *Group D*(B 🡪 A) |
| Consumer Questions | [A-1] We can obtain foreign products at a cheaper price once the market liberalizes | Agree (53.3)Neither (37.9)Disagree (9.8) |  | Agree (56.3)Neither (34.7)Disagree (9.0) | Agree (57.3)Neither (33.3)Disagree (9.4) |
| [A-2] If the market liberalized through free trade, how much do you think the price of meat would become per gram? Currently, meat costs 400 yen per 100 gram | Below ¥400 (93.7)Just ¥400 (2.9)Above ¥400 (3.4) |  | Below ¥400 (92.4)Just ¥400 (4.8)Above ¥400 (2.8) | Below ¥400 (92.3)Just ¥400 (4.8)Above ¥400 (2.9) |
| [A-3] If the market prohibited the inflow of imports, what do you think the price of a TV would be? Currently, a TV costs 40,000 yen | Below ¥40,000 (15.1)Just ¥40,000 (18.5)Above ¥40,000 (71.4) |  | Below ¥40,000 (15.5)Just ¥40,000 (23.7)Above ¥40,000 (60.8) | Below ¥40,000 (12.1)Just ¥40,000 (21.5)Above ¥40,000 (66.4) |
| Income-EarnerQuestions | [B-1] Free trade brings about negative impacts on domestic industries and employment |  | Agree (32.7)Neither (45.0)Disagree (22.3) | Agree (27.9)Neither (49.3)Disagree (22.8) | Agree (32.7)Neither (44.6)Disagree (22.7) |
| [B-2] If the market liberalized through free trade, what do you think the unemployment rate would become? Unemployment rate in April 2015 was 3.3% |  | Below 3.3% (18.2)Just 3.3% (9.9)Above 3.3% (71.9) | Below 3.3% (15.5)Just 3.3% (14.6)Above 3.3% (69.9) | Below 3.3% (13.3)Just 3.3% (10.3)Above 3.3% (76.4) |
| [B-3] If the market liberalized through free trade, what do you think the median income would be? The median income was 4,150,000 yen in 2013 |  | Below ¥415 (67.3)Just ¥415 (13.7)Above ¥415 (19.0) | Below ¥415 (64.2)Just ¥415 (18.3)Above ¥415 (17.5) | Below ¥415 (69.4)Just ¥415 (12.1)Above ¥415 (18.5) |
| *N* |  | 351 | 373 | 355 | 330 |
| Note: Response rate (%) in parentheses; For the answers in the first questions of both “consumer” and “income-earner” categories, “agree” and “somewhat agree” are aggregated as “agree” while “disagree” and “somewhat disagree” are as “disagree.” |

**Appendix B. Disaggregation of Respondents by Treatment Questions**

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| **Table-B2.** Distribution of Responses by the Number of Questions Answered in Intended Direction |
| Treatment | Number of Responses Based on Activation of Priming |
|  | **[Activated]**≥2 (⅔ out of 3 Qs)(Mean *FREETRADE*) | **[Not Activated]**≤1 (⅓ out of 3 Qs)(Mean *FREETRADE*) |
| A(351 respondents) | 283(3.78) | 68(2.91) |
| B(373 respondents) | 232(3.09) | 141(3.68) |
|  | **[Both Activated]**≥2 (Consumer) &≥2 (Income-Earner) | **[Consumer]**≥2 (Consumer) &≤1 (Income-Earner) | **[Income-Earner]**≤1 (Consumer) & ≥2 (Income-Earner) | **[None]**≤1 (Consumer) & ≤1 (Income-Earner) |
| C(355 respondents) | 165(3.42) | 112(4.03) | 50(2.86) | 28(2.89) |
| D(330 respondents) | 181(3.47) | 89(4.06) | 40(2.83) | 20(3.15) |

Description:

To better examine the tendencies across respondents, we disaggregated their answer choices depending on how many questions they answered in an intended direction. For instance, among the respondents assigned to the consumer treatment (Group A), some of them may have answered all three questions in a manner that acknowledge consumer benefits while others may have not. To assess these divergent degrees of support for free trade, the table above groups respondents based on the number of questions that they answered in the expected way.

 For the three questions in the consumer priming treatment (Group A), we assumed that the greater number of responses that were answered in the intended direction, the better the respondents understood consumer benefits arising from free trade. Thus, we generated a binary distinction between those who correctly answered two or three questions (understanding consumer benefits fairly well) and those who answered one or none of questions correctly (not understanding consumer benefits).[[1]](#footnote-1) The results (upper part of the table) show that among the 351 respondents in Group A, 283 of them seem to understand consumer benefits well while 68 do not. The former group revealed a higher support for trade liberalization, scoring a mean of 3.78 for *FREETRADE* compared to 2.91 for the latter.

 The three questions in the income-earner priming treatment (Group B) mainly ask about the potential negative impacts that free trade may bring to domestic employment conditions. In this sense, those who answered all three questions in the intended direction more clearly acknowledge the negative impacts compared to those who only answered one or none of the questions as expected. Therefore, we again dichotomized the respondents into those who answered two or three questions as expected (viewing free trade imposing negative impacts on employment) and those who answered one or one of questions as expected (not viewing free trade as negative).[[2]](#footnote-2) The results (upper part of the table) show that among the 373 respondents in Group B, 232 of them seem to acknowledge the negative impacts that free trade may bring to domestic employment conditions while 141 did not. Understandably, the former group revealed a lower support for free trade (3.09) compared to the latter (3.68).

 The respondents assigned to Groups C and D faced double treatments, answering six questions in total. We followed an identical categorization scheme that we used for Groups A and B. Because our classification on questions for each priming is binary, the scheme yielded four combinations (lower part of the table): 1) those whose perspectives as consumers and income-earners are both activated, 2) those for whom only the consumer perspective is activated, 3) those for whom only the income-earner perspective is activated, and 4) those with no activation of either the consumer or income-earner perspective.

 The results from Groups C and D exhibit similar tendencies, regardless of the order of treatment. The largest number of respondents fell into the first category where they viewed both the benefits and harms of free trade based on both consumer and income-earner perspectives (165 in Group C and 181 in Group D). The second largest group viewed the benefits of free trade only based on the consumer perspective (112 in Group C and 89 in Group D). The third largest group was the third category, where respondents viewed free trade only via the income-earner perspective (50 in Group C and 40 in Group D), followed by the fourth group, where respondents’ perspectives were not activated by either priming. As expected, their values for *FREETRADE* decline as they only view free trade based on employment concerns or do not see benefits from either perspective while the values increase as they view free trade via the consumer perspective.

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| **Table-B3.** Replication of Table-A4 (Ordered Logit Regressions on Public Support for Trade Liberalization) among Respondents Who Answered Questions in Intended Directions |
|  | Overall | Income Level | Job Security |
|  | M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | M(5) | M(6) |
| *Treatments* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A | 0.39\*\* (0.15) | 0.32\* (0.16) | 0.12 (0.35) | 0.17 (0.37) | 0.19 (0.31) | 0.23 (0.32) |
|  GROUP B | -0.87\*\*\* (0.16) | -0.94\*\*\* (0.17) | -0.68 (0.40) | -0.67 (0.41) | -1.22\*\*\* (0.35) | -1.37\*\*\* (0.37) |
|  GROUP C | -0.29 (0.18) | -0.29 (0.19) | -0.06 (0.40) | -0.22 (0.40) | -0.62 (0.39) | -0.63 (0.40) |
|  GROUP D | -0.19 (0.16) | -0.11 (0.17) | -0.35 (0.36) | -0.35 (0.37) | -0.17 (0.61) | -0.22 (0.35) |
| *Interactions* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A\*INCOME |  |  | 0.07 (0.09) | 0.04 (0.09) |  |  |
|  GROUP B\*INCOME |  |  | -0.06 (0.10) | -0.08 (0.10) |  |  |
|  GROUP C\*INCOME |  |  | -0.07 (0.10) | -0.02 (0.10) |  |  |
|  GROUP D\*INCOME |  |  | 0.05 (0.09) | 0.07 (0.09) |  |  |
|  GROUP A\*SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.11 (0.14) | 0.05 (0.15) |
|  GROUP B\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.19 (0.16) | 0.23 (0.18) |
|  GROUP C\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.17 (0.17) | 0.18 (0.18) |
|  GROUP D\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | -0.01 (0.15) | 0.06 (0.15) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INCOME |  | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.06 (0.06) |  | 0.06 (0.04) |
| SECURITY |  | 0.04 (0.06) |  | 0.04 (0.06) | -0.07 (0.10) | -0.05 (0.11) |
| LDP (*Political Support*) |  | 0.46\*\* (0.14) |  | 0.46\*\* (0.14) |  | 0.46\*\* (0.14) |
| NON-LDP (*Political Support*) |  | 0.03 (0.17) |  | 0.03 (0.17) |  | 0.01 (0.17) |
| EMPLOYED |  | 0.07 (0.14) |  | 0.07 (0.14) |  | 0.08 (0.14) |
| EDUCATION |  | 0.09 (0.07) |  | 0.09 (0.07) |  | 0.09 (0.07) |
| ABROAD |  | 0.32\*\* (0.12) |  | 0.31\* (0.12) |  | 0.33\*\* (0.12) |
| AGE |  | 0.01\* (0.00) |  | 0.01\* (0.00) |  | 0.01\* (0.00) |
| FEMALE |  | -0.75\*\*\* (0.13) |  | -0.74\*\*\* (0.13) |  | -0.75\*\*\* (0.13) |
| MARRIED |  | .05 (0.14) |  | 0.06 (0.14) |  | 0.05 (0.14) |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1584.86 | -1508.28 | -1579.00 | -1507.17 | -1583.48 | -1506.89 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.07 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; N=1,196; Fixed effects included in Models 2, 4, 6; Group E as base (*Treatments*); Swing voters as base (*Political Support*). |

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| **Table-B4.** Replication of Table-A4 (Ordered Logit Regressions on Public Support for Trade Liberalization) among Respondents Who Did Not Answer Questions in Intended Directions  |
|  | Overall | Income Level | Job Security |
|  | M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | M(5) | M(6) |
| *Treatments* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A | -1.33\*\*\* (0.21) | -1.23\*\*\* (0.25) | -1.39\*\* (0.47) | -1.45\* (0.61) | -1.94\*\*\* (0.45) | -1.52\*\* (0.53) |
|  GROUP B | 0.15 (0.17) | 0.15 (0.19) | -0.49 (0.40) | -0.39 (0.43) | 0.77 (0.44) | 0.79 (0.48) |
|  GROUP C | -0.04 (0.16) | -0.13 (0.17) | -0.21 (0.38) | -0.03 (0.38) | -0.27 (0.33) | -0.46 (0.34) |
|  GROUP D | 0.04 (0.21) | 0.02 (0.22) | -0.29 (0.48) | -0.54 (0.50) | -0.25 (0.43) | -0.14 (0.44) |
| *Interactions* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A\*INCOME |  |  | 0.01 (0.13) | 0.06 (0.16) |  |  |
|  GROUP B\*INCOME |  |  | 0.16 (0.09) | 0.15 (0.10) |  |  |
|  GROUP C\*INCOME |  |  | 0.04 (0.09) | -0.02 (0.09) |  |  |
|  GROUP D\*INCOME |  |  | 0.09 (0.12) | 0.16 (0.13) |  |  |
|  GROUP A\*SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.30 (0.18) | 0.14 (0.23) |
|  GROUP B\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | -0.37 (0.24) | -0.37 (0.25) |
|  GROUP C\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.12 (0.17) | 0.18 (0.17) |
|  GROUP D\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.15 (0.19) | 0.08 (0.19) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INCOME |  | 0.09\* (0.04) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.04 (0.06) |  | 0.09\* (0.04) |
| SECURITY |  | 0.02 (0.07) |  | 0.03 (0.07) | -0.07 (0.10) | -0.02 (0.11) |
| LDP (*Political Support*) |  | 0.36\* (0.17) |  | 0.36\* (0.17) |  | 0.35\* (0.17) |
| NON-LDP (*Political Support*) |  | -0.01 (0.21) |  | -0.02 (0.21) |  | -0.00 (0.21) |
| EMPLOYED |  | 0.01 (0.17) |  | -0.00 (0.17) |  | 0.04 (0.17) |
| EDUCATION |  | 0.14 (0.08) |  | 0.15 (0.08) |  | 0.13 (0.09) |
| ABROAD |  | 0.65\*\*\* (0.15) |  | 0.65\*\*\* (0.15) |  | 0.65\*\*\* (0.15) |
| AGE |  | 0.02\*\*\* (0.01) |  | 0.02\*\*\* (0.01) |  | 0.02\*\* (0.01) |
| FEMALE |  | -0.63\*\*\* (0.16) |  | -0.64\*\*\* (0.16) |  | -0.63\*\*\* (0.16) |
| MARRIED |  | -0.33\* (0.16) |  | -0.33\* (0.16) |  | -0.35\* (0.16) |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1155.29 | -1073.13 | -1145.89 | -1071.02 | -1150.94 | -1069.70 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.09 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; N=883; Fixed effects included in Models 2, 4, 6; Group E as base (*Treatments*); Swing voters as base (*Political Support*). |

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| **Table-B5.** Replication of Table-A4 (Ordered Logit Regressions on Public Support for Trade Liberalization) among Respondents Who Understand Consumer Benefits  |
|  | Overall | Income Level | Job Security |
|  | Consumer Benefits | ~Consumer Benefits | Consumer Benefits | ~Consumer Benefits | Consumer Benefits | ~Consumer Benefits |
|  | M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | M(5) | M(6) | M(7) | M(8) | M(9) | M(10) | M(11) | M(12) |
| *Treatments* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A | 0.39\*\* (0.15) | 0.32\* (0.15) | -1.33\*\*\* (0.21) | -1.25\*\*\* (0.23) | 0.12 (0.35) | 0.17 (0.36) | -1.36\*\* (0.46) | -1.52\*\* (0.56) | 0.18 (0.30) | 0.23 (0.31) | -1.91\*\*\* (0.44) | -1.44\*\* (0.59) |
|  GROUP B | -0.47\*\* (0.15) | -0.51\*\* (0.15) | -0.48\*\* (0.15) | -0.50\*\* (0.16) | -0.68\* (0.33) | -0.68\* (0.34) | -0.71\* (0.35) | -0.71\* (0.36) | -0.46 (0.31) | -0.55# (0.33) | -0.47 (0.33) | -0.54 (0.34) |
|  GROUP C | 0.19 (0.15) | 0.11 (0.15) | -1.35\*\*\* (0.18) | -1.30\*\*\* (0.22) | 0.24 (0.35) | 0.15 (0.35) | -0.98\* (0.38) | -0.69 (0.44) | -0.09 (0.31) | -0.23 (0.32) | -1.48\*\*\* (0.35) | -1.24\*\* (0.40) |
|  GROUP D | 0.18 (0.16) | 0.21 (0.16) | -1.31\*\*\* (0.25) | -1.36\*\*\* (0.27) | -0.03 (0.35) | -0.05 (0.36) | -1.62\*\* (0.55) | -1.70\*\* (0.59) | -0.05 (0.31) | -0.08 (0.32) | -1.55\*\* (0.54) | -1.38\* (0.54) |
| *Interactions* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GROUP A\*INCOME |  |  |  |  | 0.07 (0.09) | 0.04 (0.09) | 0.00 (0.13) | 0.07 (0.15) |  |  |  |  |
| GROUP B\*INCOME |  |  |  |  | 0.06 (0.09) | 0.05 (0.09) | 0.06 (0.09) | 0.06 (0.09) |  |  |  |  |
| GROUP C\*INCOME |  |  |  |  | -0.02 (0.09) | -0.01 (0.08) | -0.11 (0.10) | -0.18 (0.11) |  |  |  |  |
| GROUP D\*INCOME |  |  |  |  | 0.06 (0.09) | 0.07 (0.09) | 0.09 (0.16) | 0.10 (0.16) |  |  |  |  |
| GROUP A\*SECURITY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.11 (0.14) | 0.05 (0.14) | 0.29 (0.18) | 0.10 (0.22) |
| GROUP B\*SECURITY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.01 (0.15) | 0.02 (0.16) | -0.01 (0.16) | 0.02 (0.17) |
| GROUP C\*SECURITY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.15 (0.15) | 0.18 (0.15) | 0.07 (0.16) | -0.03 (0.18) |
| GROUP D\*SECURITY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.12 (0.14) | 0.15 (0.15) | 0.12 (0.22) | 0.01 (0.23) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INCOME |  | 0.09\*\* (0.03) |  | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.08 (0.06) | 0.06 (0.06) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.06) |  | 0.09\*\* (0.03) |  | 0.04 (0.04) |
| SECURITY |  | 0.06 (0.05) |  | -0.01 (0.07) |  | 0.06 (0.05) |  | -0.00 (0.07) | -0.06 (0.10) | -0.02 (0.10) | -0.07 (0.10) | -0.02 (0.11) |
| LDP |  | 0.42\*\*\* (0.12) |  | 0.44\*\* (0.17) |  | 0.43\*\*\* (0.12) |  | 0.44\*\* (0.17) |  | 0.43\*\*\* (0.12) |  | 0.44\*\* (0.17) |
| NON-LDP |  | 0.08 (0.16) |  | -0.22 (0.21) |  | 0.08 (0.15) |  | -0.22 (0.22) |  | 0.08 (0.15) |  | -0.22 (0.22) |
| EMPLOYED |  | 0.01 (0.12) |  | 0.37\* (0.16) |  | 0.01 (0.12) |  | 0.36\* (0.16) |  | 0.01 (0.12) |  | 0.36\* (0.16) |
| EDUCATION |  | 0.07 (0.06) |  | 0.05 (0.08) |  | 0.07 (0.06) |  | 0.06 (0.08) |  | 0.07 (0.06) |  | 0.05 (0.08) |
| ABROAD |  | 0.42\*\*\* (0.11) |  | 0.56\*\*\* (0.14) |  | 0.42\*\*\* (0.11) |  | 0.57\*\*\* (0.14) |  | 0.43\*\*\* (0.11) |  | 0.57\*\*\* (0.14) |
| AGE |  | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) |  | 0.02\*\* (0.01) |  | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) |  | 0.02\*\* (0.01) |  | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) |  | 0.02\*\* (0.01) |
| FEMALE |  | -0.77\*\*\* (0.12) |  | -0.30\* (0.15) |  | -0.77\*\*\* (0.12) |  | -0.30\* (0.15) |  | -0.77\*\*\* (0.12) |  | -0.31\* (0.15) |
| MARRIED |  | -0.08 (0.12) |  | -0.03 (0.16) |  | -.07 (0.12) |  | -0.03 (0.16) |  | -0.07 (0.12) |  | -0.03 (0.16) |
| Obs | 1,538 | 1,538 | 914 | 914 | 1,538 | 1,538 | 914 | 914 | 1,538 | 1,538 | 914 | 914 |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -2029.46 | -1929.13 | -1210.70 | -1146.48 | -2018.87 | -1928.53 | -1205.00 | -1144.67 | -2028.35 | -1927.85 | -1209.37 | -1146.35 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.08 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; Fixed effects included in Models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10; Group E as base (*Treatments*); Swing voters as base (*Political Support*); “consumer benefits” including respondents who positively answered at least two out of three questions in consumer priming, holding control group and Group B constant; “~consumer benefits” including respondents who did not positively answer at least two out of three questions in consumer priming, holding control group and Group B constant. |

**Appendix C. Robustness Checks**

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| **Table-C1.** Robustness Check 1: Ordered Logit Regressions Excluding Significant Control Variables |
|  | M(2) | M(4) | M(6) |
| *Treatments* |  |  |  |
| GROUP A | 0.04 (0.15) | -0.14 (0.34) | -0.13 (0.30) |
| GROUP B | -0.48\*\* (0.14) | -0.71\* (0.34) | -0.45 (0.32) |
| GROUP C | -0.15 (0.14) | -0.06 (0.32) | -0.42 (0.29) |
| GROUP D | -0.06 (0.15) | -0.28 (0.34) | -0.20 (0.31) |
| *Interactions* |  |  |  |
| GROUP A\*INCOME |  | 0.05 (0.09) |  |
| GROUP B\*INCOME |  | 0.06 (0.09) |  |
| GROUP C\*INCOME |  | -0.03 (0.08) |  |
| GROUP D\*INCOME |  | 0.06 (0.09) |  |
| GROUP A\*SECURITY |  |  | 0.09 (0.13) |
| GROUP B\* SECURITY |  |  | -0.02 (0.15) |
| GROUP C\* SECURITY |  |  | 0.14 (0.14) |
| GROUP D\* SECURITY |  |  | 0.07 (0.14) |
|  |  |  |  |
| INCOME |  | 0.07 (0.06) |  |
| SECURITY | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.00 (0.04) | -0.07 (0.10) |
| LDP (*Political Support*) |  |  |  |
| NON-LDP (*Political Support*) |  |  |  |
| EMPLOYED | 0.28\*\* (0.10) | 0.20\* (0.10) | 0.29\*\* (0.10) |
| EDUCATION |  |  |  |
| ABROAD |  |  |  |
| AGE |  |  |  |
| FEMALE |  |  |  |
| MARRIED | 0.20\* (0.10) | 0.10 (0.10) | 0.20\* (0.10) |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -2303.64 | -2295.85 | -2302.63 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; N=1,744; Fixed effects included; Group E as base (*Treatments*); Swing voters as base (*Political Support*). Model numbers taken from the main regression results (Table-A4 in Appendix A). |

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| **Table-C2.** Robustness Check 2: Ordered Logit Regressions Including Prefecture-Level Agricultural Revenues |
|  | M(2) | M(4) | M(6) |
| *Treatments* |  |  |  |
| GROUP A | 0.05 (0.14) | -0.14 (0.33) | -0.14 (0.28) |
| GROUP B | -0.47\*\* (0.14) | -0.61 (0.33) | -0.57 (0.31) |
| GROUP C | -0.19 (0.14) | -0.17 (0.31) | -0.48 (0.29) |
| GROUP D | -0.06 (0.15) | -0.39 (0.33) | -0.25 (0.30) |
| *Interactions* |  |  |  |
| GROUP A\*INCOME |  | 0.05 (0.08) |  |
| GROUP B\*INCOME |  | 0.04 (0.08) |  |
| GROUP C\*INCOME |  | -0.00 (0.08) |  |
| GROUP D\*INCOME |  | 0.09 (0.08) |  |
| GROUP A\*SECURITY |  |  | 0.10 (0.13) |
| GROUP B\* SECURITY |  |  | 0.05 (0.15) |
| GROUP C\* SECURITY |  |  | 0.16 (0.14) |
| GROUP D\* SECURITY |  |  | 0.10 (0.13) |
|  |  |  |  |
| INCOME | 0.08\*\* (0.03) | 0.05 (0.06) | 0.08\*\* (0.03) |
| SECURITY | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | -0.05 (0.10) |
| LDP (*Political Support*) | 0.49\*\*\* (0.11) | 0.49\*\*\* (0.11) | 0.49\*\*\* (0.11) |
| NON-LDP (*Political Support*) | 0.01 (0.14) | 0.01 (0.14) | 0.01 (0.14) |
| EMPLOYED | -0.04 (0.11) | -0.04 (0.10) | -0.04 (0.11) |
| EDUCATION | 0.10 (0.05) | 0.10\* (0.05) | 0.10 (0.05) |
| ABROAD | 0.45\*\*\* (0.10) | 0.44\*\*\* (0.10) | 0.45\*\*\* (0.10) |
| AGE | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) |
| FEMALE | -0.68\*\*\* (0.10) | -0.68\*\*\* (0.10) | -0.68\*\*\* (0.10) |
| MARRIED | -0.14 (0.11) | -0.13 (0.11) | -0.13 (0.11) |
| AGRICULTURE | -0.12\* (0.05) | -0.12\* (0.05) | -0.12\* (0.05) |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -2247.98 | -2247.00 | -2247.16 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; N=1,744; Group E as base (*Treatments*); Swing voters as base (*Political Support*). Model numbers taken from the main regression results (Table-A4 in Appendix A). |

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| **Table-C3.** Robustness Check 3: Ordered Logit Regressions Classifying the Dependent Variable into 3 Categories |
|  | M(2) | M(4) | M(6) |
| *Treatments* |  |  |  |
| GROUP A | 0.03 (0.15) | -0.11 (0.34) | -0.22 (0.30) |
| GROUP B | -0.42\*\* (0.15) | -0.55 (0.35) | -0.56 (0.33) |
| GROUP C | -0.15 (0.15) | -0.08 (0.31) | -0.42 (0.30) |
| GROUP D | -0.07 (0.15) | -0.27 (0.34) | -0.23 (0.32) |
| *Interactions* |  |  |  |
| GROUP A\*INCOME |  | 0.04 (0.09) |  |
| GROUP B\*INCOME |  | 0.04 (0.09) |  |
| GROUP C\*INCOME |  | -0.02 (0.08) |  |
| GROUP D\*INCOME |  | 0.06 (0.09) |  |
| GROUP A\*SECURITY |  |  | 0.13 (0.13) |
| GROUP B\* SECURITY |  |  | 0.07 (0.15) |
| GROUP C\* SECURITY |  |  | 0.14 (0.14) |
| GROUP D\* SECURITY |  |  | 0.08 (0.14) |
|  |  |  |  |
| INCOME | 0.08\*\* (0.03) | 0.05 (0.06) | 0.08\* (0.03) |
| SECURITY | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) | -0.07 (0.10) |
| LDP (*Political Support*) | 0.49\*\*\* (0.12) | 0.49\*\*\* (0.12) | 0.49\*\*\* (0.12) |
| NON-LDP (*Political Support*) | -0.04 (0.15) | -0.03 (0.15) | -0.04 (0.14) |
| EMPLOYED | 0.04 (0.11) | 0.04 (0.11) | 0.05 (0.11) |
| EDUCATION | 0.10 (0.06) | 0.10 (0.06) | 0.10 (0.06) |
| ABROAD | 0.50\*\*\* (0.10) | 0.50\*\*\* (0.10) | 0.50\*\*\* (0.10) |
| AGE | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) | 0.02\*\*\* (0.00) |
| FEMALE | -0.61\*\*\* (0.11) | -0.61\*\*\* (0.11) | -0.61\*\*\* (0.11) |
| MARRIED | -0.14 (0.11) | -0.14 (0.11) | -0.14 (0.11) |
| Log Pseudolikelihood | -1604.87 | -1604.32 | -1604.22 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; N=1,744; Fixed effects included; Group E as base (*Treatments*); Swing voters as base (*Political Support*). Model numbers taken from the main regression results (Table-A4 in Appendix A). |

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| **Table-C4.** Robustness Check 4: OLS Regressions on Public Support for Trade Liberalization |
|  | Overall | Income Level | Job Security |
|  | M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | M(5) | M(6) |
| *Treatments* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A | 0.04(0.07) | 0.03 (0.07) | -0.03 (0.16) | 0.02 (0.16) | -0.08 (0.14) | -0.02 (0.14) |
|  GROUP B | -0.27\*\*\* (0.07) | -0.26\*\*\* (0.07) | -0.32 (0.17) | -0.29 (0.16) | -0.28 (0.16) | -0.28 (0.16) |
|  GROUP C | -0.08 (0.07) | -0.10 (0.07) | -0.07 (0.16) | -0.06 (0.15) | -0.22 (0.15) | -0.21 (0.14) |
|  GROUP D | -0.05 (0.07) | -0.03 (0.07) | -0.14 (0.16) | -0.15 (0.16) | -0.13 (0.15) | -0.11 (0.15) |
| *Interactions* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  GROUP A\*INCOME |  |  | 0.02 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) |  |  |
|  GROUP B\*INCOME |  |  | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) |  |  |
|  GROUP C\*INCOME |  |  | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) |  |  |
|  GROUP D\*INCOME |  |  | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) |  |  |
|  GROUP A\*SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.06 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.06) |
|  GROUP B\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.01 (0.07) |
|  GROUP C\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.06 (0.07) |
|  GROUP D\* SECURITY |  |  |  |  | 0.05 (0.07) | 0.04 (0.06) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INCOME |  | 0.04\*\*\* (0.01) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) |  | 0.04\*\*\* (0.01) |
| SECURITY |  | 0.03 (0.02) |  | 0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.05) | -0.00 (0.05) |
| LDP (*Political Support*) |  | 0.25\*\*\* (0.05) |  | 0.25\*\*\* (0.05) |  | 0.25\*\*\* (0.05) |
| NON-LDP (*Political Support*) |  | -0.05 (0.07) |  | -0.05 (0.07) |  | -0.05 (0.07) |
| EMPLOYED |  | -0.00 (0.05) |  | -0.00 (0.05) |  | -0.00 (0.05) |
| EDUCATION |  | 0.03 (0.03) |  | 0.03 (0.03) |  | 0.03 (0.03) |
| ABROAD |  | 0.21\*\*\* (0.05) |  | 0.21\*\*\* (0.05) |  | 0.21\*\*\* (0.05) |
| AGE |  | 0.01\*\*\* (0.00) |  | 0.01\*\*\* (0.00) |  | 0.01\*\*\* (0.00) |
| FEMALE |  | -0.28\*\*\* (0.05) |  | -0.28\*\*\* (0.05) |  | -0.28\*\*\* (0.05) |
| MARRIED |  | -0.07 (0.05) |  | -0.07 (0.05) |  | -0.07 (0.05) |
| Constant | 3.58\*\*\* (0.05) | 2.69\*\*\* (0.19) | 3.41\*\*\* (0.12) | 2.71\*\*\* (0.21) | 3.63\*\*\* (0.11) | 2.75\*\*\* (0.21) |
| R2 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.12 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; N=1,744; Fixed effects for Models 2, 4, 6; Group E as base (*Treatments*); Swing voters as base (*Political Support*) |

1. The responses are coded as 1 if they selected “agree” or “somewhat agree” to [A-1], estimated a price below 400 yen for [A-2], or estimated a price above 40,000 yen for [A-3] (understanding consumer benefits). They are coded as 0 if otherwise (not understanding consumer benefits). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The responses are coded as 1 if they selected “agree” or “somewhat agree” to [B-1], estimated a rate above 3.3% for [B-2], or estimated a median income below 4,150,000 yen for [B-3] (viewing free trade as imposing negative impacts on employment). They are coded as 0 if otherwise (not viewing free trade as negative). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)