1 Supplementary Appendix

Supplementary Appendix for:

International Economic Relations and American Support for Antitrust Policy

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1.1 Media Analysis

For our coded media analysis we used NexisUni to search for news stories about antitrust policies between January 1, 1990 through August 31, 2021. Our search sought to identify news stories related to antitrust policies and enforcement, so we queried "antitrust AND policy OR enforcement".[28] We limited our search to the 25 US newspapers with the highest digital and print distribution, and then searched those that were available through NexisUni. This resulted in the following newspapers:

- The New York Times
- New York Times Abstracts
- New York Daily News
- Philadelphia Inquirer
- The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
- Los Angelas Times
- Los Angelas Times Online
- USA Today
- The Wall Street Journal Abstracts

NexisUni organizes its search results based on the "relevance" of the article to the search, and within the first 1,000 search results we randomly selected 525 stories which we then coded. This selection provided news stories from across the time periods. In expectation, random selection would lead us to expect the number of stories for each year, or four-year period, to be proportional to the volume of coverage. Given our sample size, it

[28]We sought to identify sources that discussed antitrust policy and/or enforcement to examine the arguments used in favor or against antitrust policies and their enforcement. When searching just for "antitrust" we find that there is a similar increase in media coverage throughout the timeperiord examined.

is possible that the sampled proportion could differ from the population proportion. However, since we are not primarily concerned about the absolute volume of coverage, we focus on the proportion of stories within each period that present certain arguments about antitrust. To do this, each article was coded manually by the author and/or research assistants. We began with multiple readers coding each article, identifying prominent themes in the headlines and text of the articles. We compared the coding results and found the inter-coder reliability to be 98 percent. We then proceeded to have one coder per document, with the research team regularly meeting to flag and discuss any coding decisions that were not obvious. Since we focus on the proportion of articles that include specific arguments about antitrust, even if our random selection under-represented articles from a specific period, that should not systematically bias the proportion of articles coded as including specific arguments during that period.

The coding rules for the themes discussed asked the coders to select a 1 if the specific theme/topic was mentioned, and a 0 otherwise.

- Competition: Article mentions antitrust laws promoting competition

- Prices: Article mentions antitrust laws reducing prices of products

- Helps US Competitiveness: Article mentions how antitrust laws make the US or US businesses more competitive, especially against foreign competition

- Hurts US Competitiveness: Article mentions how antitrust laws make the US or US businesses less competitive, especially against foreign competition

- International Coordination/Enforcement: Article mentions international coordination or enforcement issues related to antitrust

The coders were also told "If you're unsure about a variable, get a second opinion. If still unsure, leave the box empty and highlight it yellow."

Comparison to Figure 1 - Volume of Media Coverage with Constant Set of Sources

In Figure 1 of the manuscript we examine the total volume of coverage about antitrust policy and enforcement since 1990. However, it is possible that the upward trend in the volume of coverage is due to an increasing number of media sources over time. To address this concern, we replicated the analysis from Figure 1 of the manuscript using a constant set of sources. To do so, we replicated the Nexis Uni search for Figure 1, but limited the sources to the following:

- The New York Times
- New York Daily News
- Philadelphia Inquirer
- The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
- Los Angelas Times
- USA Today

We find that the upward trend in coverage is evident in both searches. Using the constant set of sources, we see a dramatic rise in the volume of coverage near the end of the 1990s and then a steady increase since then, as shown in Figure 8.

Another potential concern when evaluating the change in coverage over time is that the volume of coverage is changing, even within a constant set of sources. For example, if news sources increased their reporting on politics and financial matters in general, it could be that an increase in coverage about antitrust would be largely drowned out, since the total coverage on such topics would also be rising. To examine this, we searched the set of sources specified above for "tax*" coverage over two decades. This search gives us a comparison by which we can evaluate how the change in the volume of antitrust coverage compares to changes in coverage of taxes, which are arguable one of the most important economic policies in the United States. We find that from 2000 to 2020 the volume of

FIGURE (8) **Volume of Media Coverage - Constant Set of Sources**

Figure 8 shows the number of news stories from 1990 through August 2021 using a constant set of media sources. The results are from a Nexis Uni search with the search terms "antitrust AND policy OR enforcement" which means each story has to have the word "antitrust" and have at least "policy" or "enforcement" (or both) in the story.

antitrust media coverage increased by 42 percent. However, the volume of tax media coverage decreased by 40 percent during the same time. This suggests that the rise is antitrust media coverage was not likely to be drowned out by reporting on other economic news.[29]

[29]We also compare google trends data from 2004 through 2021, and find that the relative interest (searches) in antitrust, compared to taxation, has increased over time. Though taxation receives more interest throughout—and is cyclical with peaks prior to April 15th—we find that the relative intreest has shifted from 0.22 in January 2024 (when data became available) to 0.34 in August of 2021 when our media analysis ends. This comparison suggests that the salience of antitrust, compared to taxation, has increased throughout our period of analysis.

1.2 Sample Demographics

Table (3) Sample Demographics

Demographic	Portion of Sample	U.S. Population
Age 18 to 24	0.116	0.132
Age 25 to 39	0.271	0.266
Age 40 to 59	0.346	0.325
Age >60	0.267	0.293
Female	0.517	0.510
Household income $0 to $50,000	0.439	0.371
Household income $50,001 to $100,000	0.350	0.288
Household income $100,001 to $150,000	0.124	0.156
Household income >$150,000	0.088	0.185
Attended college	0.547	0.611
Republican	0.346	0.340
Democrat	0.342	0.330

Note: Table 3 reports the sample demographics with a comparison to the U.S. population. Population data is from the Census Bureau and are for 2019 for age, gender, income, and education. Partisan identification is from Pew Research's 2020 data of registered voters.[30]

1.3 Control Conditions

The following results in Table 4 test whether there are different responses to the Pure Control without Domestic Targeting or the control condition that specifies "Antitrust laws are frequently enforced against large companies based in the United States." There are no significant differences in either of our dependent variables across the control conditions.

Table (4) Effect of Domestic Targeting in Control vs. Pure Control: 5-Point Measures

Without Domestic Targeting	−0.022
	(0.088)
Constant	3.676***
	(0.042)
Observations	584
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Dependent variables are measured from 1 to 5 with higher values associated with greater support.

1.4 Individual Measures

We measured national superiority using questions from Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti (2009). Our specific questions are as follows. The responses were summed and then scaled from zero to one, with higher values representing high levels of national superiority.

"How superior is the United States compared to other nations?"
"Vastly superior" / "Very superior" / "Not so superior" / "Not at all superior"

"How many things about America make you ashamed?"
"Very many" / "Many" / "Not many" / "None"

To measure respondent ideology, we used a standard seven-point ideology scale, which was asked as follows. Higher values correspond to more conservative individuals, and so we label the measure "conservatism" in the paper.

"When it comes to politics do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, or extremely conservative?"

We ask respondents to self-report their political affiliation.

"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, an independent, or what?"
"Democrat", "Republican", "Independent", or "No Preference."

We measured political knowledge based off of a domestic and international knowledge question. Those who correctly answered both were considered to be high in political

knowledge. Prior to answering the questions, respondents were reminded "It is important to us that you do NOT use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources? [yes/no]. The questions were:

"Who is the prime minister of Great Britain? "

"Tony Abbott" / "Theresa May" / "Boris Johnson" / "Angela Merkel"

"How long is the term of office for a representative in the U.S. House of Representatives?"

"2 years" / "4 years" / "6 years" / "8 years"

1.5 Heterogenous Effects by Political Knowledge and Education

We next test whether those with higher levels of political knowledge and education respond differently to our treatments. This analysis allows us to address two questions of interest. The first is whether those who are more politically savvy respond differently to concerns about national efficiency, or America being at a relative disadvantage. The second question is whether individuals with high political knowledge or education may have had an easier time understanding the treatments. If less knowledgeable or less educated respondents found the treatment wordings difficult to understand, then we would expect to have larger treatment effects amongst individuals with high political knowledge and those with more education.[31] This means that a significant positive interaction for our Foreign Targeting treatment and a significant negative interaction for the American Disadvantage treatment would suggest that our treatments may have been overly complex.

[31]We use a five-point measure of education where: 1=less than high school *or* high school/GED, 2=some college, 3=2 year degree, 4=4 year degree, 5=MA, Doctoral, or Professional Degree (JD, MD).

We test whether our treatments have differential effects in Tables 5 and 6. We do not find consistent evidence to suggest that our treatments were too complex. In fact, all of the interaction effects are *negatively* signed, which means we have smaller treatment effects amongst those who have high political knowledge and those with more education for the Foreign Targeting treatments. None of these interactions reach traditional levels of significance ($p < 0.05$). We do find that political knowledge and education are both positively correlated with support for stronger antitrust laws, but they are not significant moderators for our treatments. This gives us greater confidence that the treatments were not too complex for respondents across the political knowledge spectrum.

Table (5) Political Knowledge Interactions

	American Disadvantage	Foreign Targeting
	(1)	(2)
American Disadvantage	-0.174^{***}	
	(0.064)	
Foreign Targeting		0.113^{**}
		(0.051)
High Knowledge	0.269^{***}	0.202^{***}
	(0.091)	(0.064)
Efficiency	0.009	
	(0.074)	
American Disadvantage * High Knowledge	-0.061	
	(0.114)	
Efficiency * High Knowledge	-0.138	
	(0.130)	
Foreign Targeting * High Knowledge		-0.126
		(0.089)
Constant	3.588^{***}	3.593^{***}
	(0.052)	(0.036)
Observations	1,740	1,795

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. Model 1 does not include Foreign Targeting since it was never paired with the American Disadvantage treatment. Conversely, Model 2 does not include the American Disadvantage treatment, for the same reason.

Table (6) Education Interactions

	American Disadvantage	Foreign Targeting
	(1)	(2)
American Disadvantage	−0.069	
	(0.120)	
Foreign Targeting		0.199**
		(0.097)
Education	0.088***	0.081***
	(0.029)	(0.021)
Efficiency	−0.007	
	(0.141)	
American Disadvantage * Education	−0.044	
	(0.037)	
Education * Efficiency	−0.014	
	(0.042)	
Foreign Targeting * Education		−0.041
		(0.029)
Constant	3.419***	3.417***
	(0.096)	(0.069)
Observations	1,721	1,773

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. Model 1 does not include Foreign Targeting since it was never paired with the American Disadvantage treatment. Conversely, Model 2 does not include the American Disadvantage treatment, for the same reason.

1.6 Heterogenous Effects by Focus on Tech

Given the importance of Big Tech companies in the U.S., we now examine whether individuals who are focused on tech companies when thinking about antitrust policies respond differently to our treatments than respondents who are not explicitly focused on tech companies. To assess which respondents were focused on tech companies we coded the free responses to the question "When thinking about the previous questions about antitrust laws, what were your thoughts or considerations?" We coded all free responses that mentioned tech*, Amazon, Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft, and/or Apple as being focused on tech companies. We then test whether our treatments have differential effects for those who were focused on tech or not, which are reported in Table 7. We do not find any significant interactions between our treatments and the Tech variable, though we do find that respondents focused on tech have higher baseline levels of support for antitrust policies.

1.7 Respondent's Concerns about China

In designing our experiment we deliberately chose to maintain a level of abstraction (Brutger et al., 2022) so that the results were not specific to antitrust being used against firms from a specific country. That said, it is possible that respondents were primarily thinking about firms from a particular country, such as China, which could alter the interpretation of the results. To assess which respondents were focused on China we coded the free responses to the question "When thinking about the previous questions about antitrust laws, what were your thoughts or considerations?" Any respondents who mentioned "China" were coded as thinking about China. However, out of our entire sample, only 5 respondents said they were thinking about China. Though this analysis cannot rule out that some subset of respondents were focused on China, it appears that this group makes up a negligible portion of our respondents, and so we do not need to be concerned that our results are specific to targeting firms from China. Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that the use of antitrust policy against Chinese firms, or by

Table (7) Tech Interactions

	American Disadvantage	Foreign Targeting
	(1)	(2)
American Disadvantage	−0.198***	
	(0.054)	
Foreign Targeting		0.085**
		(0.043)
Tech	0.542**	0.392**
	(0.239)	(0.177)
Efficiency	−0.024	
	(0.062)	
American Disadvantage * Tech	0.038	
	(0.302)	
Efficiency * Tech	−0.358	
	(0.366)	
Foreign Targeting * Tech		−0.373
		(0.256)
Constant	3.658***	3.647***
	(0.044)	(0.030)
Observations	1,741	1,795

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. Model 1 does not include Foreign Targeting since it was never paired with the American Disadvantage treatment. Conversely, Model 2 does not include the American Disadvantage treatment, for the same reason.

China against US firms, would be viewed in a substantively different manner, but analyzing such differences is left for future research.

1.8 Nationalism - Extended Analysis

As noted in section 1.4, the national superiority measure, sometimes referred to as 'national chauvinism' is drawn from questions from Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti (2009). The measure is frequently used by scholars of international relations, appearing in well-published articles, such as Kertzer and Brutger (2016), Kertzer and McGraw (2012), and Brutger and Strezhnev (2022). In our sample, we find that the distribution of the national superiority measure is relatively normally distributed, as shown in Figure 9. The figure displays the raw national superiority measure (before it is rescaled to 0-1), and demonstrates that there is significant variation in the measure across the sample.

FIGURE (9) **National Superiority**



Figure 9 displays the distribution of the raw national superiority scores for our survey respondents.

We also test the robustness of the national superiority interaction effects using a dichotomous version of the measure. We split the sample into low and high national

superiority respondents, counting those who score above 0.5 on the 0-1 scale as high in national superiority.[32] We report the interaction effects, with and without controls, in Figure 8. Consistent with the results reported in the manuscript, we find that there is a positive and highly significant interaction between national superiority and the Foreign Targeting treatment. We also find that the American Disadvantage treatment has a strong negative effect regardless of nationalism.

[32]We find similar results if we use quartile splits and count those in the bottom qurtile as low national superiority and those in the top quartile as high national superiority respondents.

Table (8) Interaction Effects with Dichotmous Measure of Nat. Superiority

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Targeting	−0.016	−0.015		
	(0.053)	(0.053)		
Foreign Targeting * High Nat. Superiority	0.241***	0.240***		
	(0.088)	(0.088)		
American Disadvantage			−0.255***	−0.244***
			(0.068)	(0.068)
American Disadvantage * High Nat. Superiority			0.136	0.115
			(0.111)	(0.110)
High Nat. Superiority	−0.169***	−0.128**	−0.200**	−0.160*
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Male		0.099**		0.234***
		(0.043)		(0.045)
Conservatism		−0.047***		−0.051***
		(0.014)		(0.014)
College Degree		0.109**		0.094**
		(0.045)		(0.047)
High Income		0.031		0.033
		(0.047)		(0.049)
Efficiency			−0.073	−0.074
			(0.077)	(0.076)
Efficiency * High Nat. Superiority			0.058	0.039
			(0.130)	(0.128)
Constant	3.722***	3.785***	3.760***	3.787***
	(0.038)	(0.070)	(0.056)	(0.083)
Observations	1,755	1,754	1,705	1,704

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. Models 1 and 2 do not include the American Disadvantage treatment, since it was never paired with the Foreign Targeting Treatment. Conversely, Models 3 and 4 do not include Foreign Targeting for the same reason. High Income is an indicator for whether respondents make $75,000 or more, which is aproximately the median household income in the United States. Conservatism is a seven-point ideology measure, where higher values correspond tobeing more conservative (the measure is provided in the appendix, section 1.4.

1.9 Partisanship and Heterogenous Effects

To test the robustness of our interaction effects, we first assess whether they hold when controlling for partisanship of the respondent, instead of ideology (Table 9). We then examine whether partisan identification has a significant interaction effect with our treatments (Table 10). We find that nationalism has a strong and consistent effect, even when controlling for partisanship, and that partisanship does not significantly moderate our treatment effects.

In Table 9 we find that the results remain substantively equivalent when controlling for whether the respondent identities as a Republican or not.[33] In Table 10 we find that partisanship is not a significant moderator of our treatment effects. The American Disadvantage treatment maintains its strong and significant effect, though the Foreign Targeting treatment loses significance, since the model does not account for the divergent responses of those who are low/high in nationalism.

The analysis also provides a useful comparison of the effect of our treatments relative to the effect of partisanship. Though partisans have somewhat different baseline levels of support, as shown in Figure 3 of the paper, once we control for other factors, as in Table 9, partisanship has a smaller effect than our Foreign Targeting and American Disadvantage treatments. Of the other controls, we find that having a college degree has a consistently positive effect and national superiority has a large negative effect.

[33]The results are also consistent when including an indicator for Republican and an indicator for Democrat, with independents as the baseline.

Table (9) Interaction Effects with National Superiority Controlling for Partisanship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Targeting	−0.214**	−0.216**		
	(0.100)	(0.100)		
Foreign Targeting * National Superiority	0.576***	0.589***		
	(0.182)	(0.182)		
American Disadvantage			−0.359***	−0.337***
			(0.128)	(0.127)
American Disadvantage * National Superiority			0.304	0.272
			(0.226)	(0.225)
National Superiority	−0.452***	−0.522***	−0.473***	−0.513***
	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.180)	(0.184)
Male		0.092**		0.231***
		(0.043)		(0.045)
Republican		0.058		−0.020
		(0.049)		(0.050)
College Degree		0.109**		0.098**
		(0.045)		(0.047)
High Income		0.016		0.026
		(0.047)		(0.050)
Efficiency			−0.072	−0.078
			(0.142)	(0.141)
Efficiency * National Superiority			0.022	0.019
			(0.259)	(0.258)
Constant	3.885***	3.786***	3.926***	3.778***
	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.102)	(0.106)
Observations	1,755	1,754	1,705	1,704

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. Models 1 and 2 do not include the American Disadvantage treatment, since it was never paired with the Foreign Targeting Treatment. Conversely, Models 3 and 4 do not include Foreign Targeting for the same reason. High Income is an indicator for whether respondents make $75,000 or more, which is aproximately the median household income in the United States. Conservatism is a seven-point ideology measure, where higher values correspond tobeing more conservative (the measure is provided in the appendix, section 1.4.

Table (10) Interaction Effects with Partisan ID

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Targeting	0.046	0.055		
	(0.052)	(0.052)		
Foreign Targeting * Republican	0.079	0.066		
	(0.089)	(0.090)		
American Disadvantage			−0.162**	−0.146**
			(0.067)	(0.067)
American Disadvantage * Republican			−0.107	−0.142
			(0.111)	(0.111)
Republican	0.0001	0.024	0.017	0.065
	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.090)	(0.092)
National Superiority		−0.239**		−0.382***
		(0.099)		(0.101)
Male		0.096**		0.232***
		(0.043)		(0.045)
College Degree		0.102**		0.102**
		(0.046)		(0.047)
High Income		0.019		0.028
		(0.047)		(0.050)
Efficiency			−0.024	−0.039
			(0.076)	(0.076)
Efficiency * Republican			−0.037	−0.065
			(0.129)	(0.129)
Constant	3.658***	3.659***	3.670***	3.676***
	(0.037)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.077)
Observations	1,793	1,754	1,739	1,704

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. Models 1 and 2 do not include the American Disadvantage treatment, since it was never paired with the Foreign Targeting Treatment. Conversely, Models 3 and 4 do not include Foreign Targeting for the same reason. High Income is an indicator for whether respondents make $75,000 or more, which is aproximately the median household income in the United States. Conservatism is a seven-point ideology measure, where higher values correspond tobeing more conservative (the measure is provided in the appendix, section 1.4.

1.10 Weighted Analysis

To account for the fact that our sample was not fully representative of the US adult population, we also present results that weight the sample based on age, income, college degree, political party affiliation, and gender. We used the 'anesrake' package by Pasek and Pasek (2018). The design effect is 1.12, which is well within reasonable bounds. We replicate the analysis from Table 2 of the paper using the weighted variables, which are reported in Table 12. We find that the sign and significance of the treatment effects and their interactions are robust when using the weighted analysis.

Table (11) Weighting Summary

Demographic	Target Proportion	Unweighted Proportion	Weighted Proportion
Age 18 to 24	0.13	0.115	0.13
Age 25 to 39	0.26	0.269	0.26
Age 40 to 59	0.32	0.350	0.32
Age >60	0.29	0.266	0.29
Male	0.49	0.480	0.496
High Income ($\geq$ \$100k)	0.341	0.214	0.341
Attended college	0.389	0.452	0.389
Democrat	0.330	0.344	0.33
Republican	0.34	0.346	0.34

1.11 Heterogeneous Effects from Import Competition

We expected that those individuals with first-hand experience working in sectors with substantial import-competition would be more sensitive to information about the relative effects of antitrust law on domestic and foreign firms. The empirical results are only weakly consistent with this expectation - so we discuss both the expectation and results here.

We expected employees of import-competing firms to be especially attentive to information that may benefit or hurt their employer, as it relates to the security of their job or the level of their wages, and they are likely receptive to such concerns even when their specific firm is not at risk. If those who work in import-competing industries are informed that antitrust law disadvantages domestic firms, we expected them to become less

Table (12) Weighted Interaction Effects with National Superiority

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Targeting	−0.217**	−0.214**		
	(0.100)	(0.100)		
Foreign Targeting * National Superiority	0.582***	0.578***		
	(0.182)	(0.181)		
American Disadvantage			−0.363***	−0.344***
			(0.128)	(0.126)
American Disadvantage * National Superiority			0.314	0.289
			(0.227)	(0.224)
National Superiority	−0.458***	−0.353***	−0.484***	−0.408**
	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.181)	(0.183)
Male		0.098**		0.232***
		(0.043)		(0.045)
Conservatism		−0.043***		−0.045***
		(0.014)		(0.014)
College Degree		0.105**		0.083*
		(0.044)		(0.046)
High Income		0.059		0.084
		(0.054)		(0.057)
Efficiency			−0.076	−0.081
			(0.142)	(0.140)
Efficiency * National Superiority			0.032	0.038
			(0.260)	(0.257)
Constant	3.887***	3.898***	3.930***	3.907***
	(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.102)	(0.113)
Observations	1,754	1,754	1,704	1,704

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12 reports the sample weighted results. We used the 'anesrake' package to implement survey weights to match the national adult population based on age, income, college degree, political party affiliation, and gender (Pasek and Pasek, 2018). The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. Models 1 and 2 do not include the American Disadvantage treatment, since it was never paired with the Foreign Targeting Treatment. Conversely, Models 3 and 4 do not include Foreign Targeting for the same reason. High Income is an indicator for whether respondents make $75,000 or more, which is aproximately the median household income in the United States. Conservatism is a seven-point ideology measure, where higher values correspond tobeing more conservative (the measure is provided in the appendix, section 1.4.

supportive of antitrust law since they are already well aware of the realities of international competition. Conversely, if they are informed that antitrust law disadvantages foreign firms, we expected them to become more supportive of antitrust law as a form of protection.

We now proceed to discuss whether those who work in import-competing sectors are actually more responsive to the American Disadvantage and Foreign Targeting treatments than those not working in import-competing sectors. To test the effect of working in an import-competing industry, each respondent was asked to identify what type of work they did. We matched the respondent's employment industry to trade and production data from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[34] We then coded an indicator variable, called import-competing, which equals one for sectors with an import-share in the top quartile of the import-shares for all sectors. We then interact the import-competing indicator with the two treatments of interest. The full results are displayed in Table 1.12.

[34]Data is from the OECD 2015 data available at https://stats.oecd.org.

1.12 Import-Competing Interactions

Table (13) Interaction Effects with Import Competing

	1	2	3	4
Foreign Targeting	0.089*	0.092**		
	(0.047)	(0.047)		
Foreign Targeting * Import Competing	−0.099	−0.104		
	(0.111)	(0.111)		
American Disadvantage			−0.179***	−0.182***
			(0.060)	(0.059)
American Disadvantage * Import Competing			−0.092	−0.072
			(0.140)	(0.139)
Import Competing	0.047	0.064	0.095	0.095
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.113)	(0.111)
Male		0.108**		0.214***
		(0.043)		(0.045)
Conservatism		−0.050***		−0.059***
		(0.013)		(0.013)
College Degree		0.099**		0.094**
		(0.046)		(0.047)
High Income		0.028		0.031
		(0.047)		(0.049)
Efficiency			−0.021	−0.038
			(0.069)	(0.069)
Efficiency * Import Competing			−0.093	−0.070
			(0.158)	(0.156)
Constant	3.648***	3.739***	3.658***	3.749***
	(0.034)	(0.070)	(0.048)	(0.079)
Observations	1,753	1,745	1,701	1,694

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. Models 1 and 2 do not include the American Disadvantage treatment, since it was never paired with the Foreign Targeting Treatment. Conversely, Models 3 and 4 do not include Foreign Targeting for the same reason. High Income is an indicator for whether respondents make $75,000 or more, which is aproximately the median household income in the United States. Conservatism is a seven-point ideology measure, where higher values correspond tobeing more conservative (the measure is provided in the appendix, section 1.4.

We do not find that those in import-competing sectors respond differently to our treatments than those in non-import competing sectors. We display the marginal effects of

FIGURE (10) **Marginal Effects by Import Competing**



Figure 10 shows the marginal effects of the Foreign Targeting and American Disadvantaged treatments amongst those who are, or are not, employed in import competing sectors. The marginal effects are calculated using Anton Strezhnev's Interaction Plots in R code (2013), and are generated using Models 1 and 3 from Table 13.

the American Disadvantage and Foreign Targeting treatments in Figure 10. The right panel shows that the American Disadvantage treatment has a strong negative effect, regardless of whether the respondent works in an import-competing sector or not. By contrast, the effect of Foreign Targeting is not significant amongst either group, which is consistent with the null main effect that did not account for the divergent reactions of those who are low and high in National Superiority. When compared to the interaction effect with National Superiority, its clear that National Superiority has a much larger effect on how respondents react to the Foreign Targeting treatment than a respondent's sector of employment. We also test whether the results are consistent when using alternative measures of trade exposure, such as the share of profits in a sector that come from trade and the sector's trade balance. These tests are included below in Section 1.14, which shows that none of the trade variables significantly moderate the effects of our treatments.

1.13 Sectoral Trade Data

Table (14) Sectoral trade

Sector name	Import-share	Export-share	Total trade	Import-competing
Wholesale trade	0.459	0.214	0.673	1
Manufacturing	0.151	0.142	0.293	1
Retail trade	0.105	0.014	0.120	1
Transportation and storage	0.091	0.025	0.116	1
Mining and quarrying	0.077	0.091	0.168	0
Information and communication	0.024	0.011	0.035	0
Utilities	0.014	0.012	0.027	0
Professional, scientific and technical	0.014	0.013	0.027	0
Financial and insurance activities	0.013	0.016	0.028	0
Agriculture. forestry and fishing	0.008	0.015	0.023	0
Arts, entertainment and recreation	0.008	0.005	0.013	0
Administrative and support service	0.006	0.009	0.014	0
Accommodation and food service	0.003	0.004	0.008	0
Construction	0.003	0.002	0.005	0
Other service activities	0.003	0.004	0.007	0
Human health and social work	0.002	0.002	0.004	0
Real estate activities	0.001	0.001	0.001	0
Education	0.000	0.000	0.000	0

Note some of the names have been shortened to facilitate presentation. Data is from the OECD 2015 data available at https://stats.oecd.org

1.14 Alternative Measures of Sensitivity to Foreign Competition

As an alternative to the import-competing indicator variable presented above, we also assess whether the results are robust to regressions using two continuous variables: trade share of profits, to capture the extent to which a given sector is dependent on trade, and trade balance, to capture the relative importance of exports to imports in each sector. Both variables are again at the sector level from the OECD. Consistent with the paper's results for respondents who work in import-competing, we once again find that these measures of respondent's trade exposure do not have significant interactions with our treatments.

Table 15 reports the regression results for trade share interacted with each of the treatments. The trade share is the share of imports and exports in a sector's profits. Table 16 reports the regression results for the trade balance with each of the treatments. The trade balance is measured as the log of exports minus the log of imports.[35]

[35]The log is taken before the subtraction to allow for the presence of a negative trade balance.

Table (15) Interaction Effects with Trade Share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Targeting	0.064	0.067		
	(0.052)	(0.052)		
Amer. Disadvantage			-0.228^{***}	-0.225^{***}
			(0.065)	(0.064)
Trade Share	0.039	0.075	0.182	0.175
	(0.333)	(0.333)	(0.439)	(0.436)
Male		0.126^{***}		0.198^{***}
		(0.047)		(0.048)
Conservatism		-0.050^{***}		-0.054^{***}
		(0.014)		(0.014)
College		0.043		0.092^{*}
		(0.050)		(0.052)
High Income		0.032		0.033
		(0.050)		(0.053)
Foreign Targeting * Trade Share	-0.316	-0.350		
	(0.466)	(0.465)		
Efficiency			-0.043	-0.051
			(0.077)	(0.076)
Amer. Disadvantage * Trade Share			-0.219	-0.186
			(0.554)	(0.550)
Efficiency * Trade Share			-0.366	-0.296
			(0.697)	(0.690)
Constant	3.688^{***}	3.801^{***}	3.711^{***}	3.781^{***}
	(0.037)	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.086)
Observations	1,505	1,500	1,472	1,467

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. The trade share is the share of imports and exports in a sector's profits. Models 1 and 2 do not include the American Disadvantage treatment, since it was never paired with the Foreign Targeting Treatment. Conversely, Models 3 and 4 do not include Foreign Targeting for the same reason. High Income is an indicator for whether respondents make $75,000 or more, which is aproximately the median household income in the United States. Conservatism is a seven-point ideology measure, where higher values correspond tobeing more conservative (the measure is provided in the appendix, section 1.4.

Table (16) Interaction Effects with Trade Balance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Targeting	0.056	0.056		
	(0.047)	(0.047)		
Amer. Disadvantage			-0.228^{***}	-0.227^{***}
			(0.059)	(0.059)
Trade Balance	-0.059	-0.056	-0.093	-0.081
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Male		0.119^{**}		0.191^{***}
		(0.047)		(0.048)
Conservatism		-0.050^{***}		-0.055^{***}
		(0.014)		(0.014)
College		0.052		0.105^{**}
		(0.050)		(0.052)
High Income		0.031		0.030
		(0.050)		(0.053)
Trade Balance * Foreign Targeting	0.036	0.032		
	(0.062)	(0.062)		
Efficiency			-0.052	-0.060
			(0.069)	(0.068)
Amer. Disadvantage * Trade Balance			0.054	0.032
			(0.078)	(0.077)
Efficiency * Trade Balance			0.065	0.046
			(0.088)	(0.087)
Constant	3.679^{***}	3.793^{***}	3.705^{***}	3.776^{***}
	(0.034)	(0.076)	(0.048)	(0.084)
Observations	1,505	1,500	1,472	1,467

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variable is support for strengthening antitrust laws, which is measured from 1 to 5. The trade balance is measured as the log of exports minus the log of imports. Models 1 and 2 do not include the American Disadvantage treatment, since it was never paired with the Foreign Targeting Treatment. Conversely, Models 3 and 4 do not include Foreign Targeting for the same reason. High Income is an indicator for whether respondents make $75,000 or more, which is aproximately the median household income in the United States. Conservatism is a seven-point ideology measure, where higher values correspond tobeing more conservative (the measure is provided in the appendix, section 1.4.