

Appendix: Ethnoracial Hierarchies and Democratic Commitments

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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions

Support for democracy. Question wording: “Democracy can have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?” Responses occur on a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate stronger support for democracy. [Mean = 5.11, SD = 1.73, Range = (1, 7)]

Democratic rights index. Question wordings: “I am going to read to you a list of some things people might do to accomplish their political goals. I would like you to tell me how strongly you approve or disapprove of people engaging in these activities: people participate in protests permitted under the law; people participate in an organization or group to try to resolve problems in the community; people work in electoral campaigns on behalf of a political party or candidate.” Higher scores indicate stronger support for these rights. Cronbach’s alpha scores over 0.7 indicate high scale reliability. [Mean = 6.19, SD = 0.82, Range = (0, 9)]

Between-group inequality. We calculate BGI as follows:

$$BGI = \frac{1}{2\bar{y}} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n p_i p_j |\bar{y}_j - \bar{y}_i| \right)$$

where \bar{y} is the mean income in the country, p_i is the proportion of individuals who belong to group i , n is the number of groups, and \bar{y}_i is the mean income of group i . To identify the relevant ethnoracial groupings in each country and their size, we follow Baldwin and Huber 2010 in using Fearon’s 2003 data, which employ a range of secondary sources to develop a classification scheme that emphasizes country context in identifying relevant groups. Then we used AmericasBarometer data to categorize respondents into these ethnoracial groups according to their self-identification. Next we calculated the mean well-being for each ethnoracial group using a weighted scale constructed based on the presence or absence of a series of basic household goods. This

is the same scale we use to measure individual respondents' well-being below, except in calculating BGI we created 10 deciles rather than simply quintiles to attain a more fine-grained division between the scores of different ethnoracial groups. Using these data, we estimated BGI for each country-year. [Mean = -0.03, SD = 3.75, Range = (-4.64, 9.44)]

Political exclusion. V-dem variable v2pepwrSOC. Country experts evaluated the power distribution across all social groups relevant in a society that are not socioeconomic in nature but instead pertain to the dimensions of race, ethnicity, language, caste, etc. Experts score each year using a four-point scale ranging from power being monopolized in the hands of the dominant group to power being distributed roughly equally across all groups and then V-Dem researchers used a measurement model to convert these raw data into an index adjusting for across-expert variation.¹ We reverse coding so that higher values indicate a greater concentration of power in the hands of a dominant ethnoracial group while lower values indicate a more equal distribution. [Mean = 5.11, SD = 1.73, Range = (-2.5, 1.04)]

Race and ethnicity. The AmericasBarometer asks respondents to specify their ethnoracial identity and provides a list of response options designed to be as consistent as possible across countries while also reflecting the diversity of terms used in practice. We examined the ethnoracial identity item used in each country-year survey and standardized the coding to reflect how local usage aligns with the broader regional categories, creating an indicator variable for each category as follows:

- Indigenous [Mean = 0.08, SD = 0.27, Range = (0, 1)]
- Afro-descendent [Mean = 0.09, SD = 0.28, Range = (0, 1)]
- Mestizo [Mean = 0.49, SD = 0.50, Range = (0, 1)]

¹Pemstein et al., 2020.

- White [Mean = 0.27, SD = 0.44, Range = (0, 1)]
- Other ethnicity [Mean = 0.02, SD = 0.14, Range = (0, 1)]

Voted for incumbent. Coded one for those who voted for the incumbent in the last election and zero for all others. [Mean = 0.33, SD = 0.47, Range = (0, 1)]

Sociotropic evaluations. Evaluation of change in country's economic condition over the past year. Coded one for worse, two for equal, and three for better. [Mean = 1.73, SD = 0.972, Range = (1, 3)]

Religious meeting attendance. Do you attend meetings of religious groups: once per week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never? 1 to 4, coding reversed so that higher values indicate more frequent attendance. [Mean = 1.38, SD = 1.30, Range = (0, 3)]

Education. Education is an ordered variable reflecting highest level of education achieved: less than primary (0), primary (1), secondary (2), superior or more (3). [Mean = 1.80, SD = 0.81, Range = (0, 3)]

Wealth quintiles. Economic well-being is measured using a weighted scale constructed from the presence/absence of a series of basic goods in the respondents' home—television, refrigerator, telephone, cell phone, vehicle, washing machine, etc. then divided into quintile. [Mean = 2.94, SD = 1.42, Range = (1, 5)]

Female. Self-identified sex: 0 male, 1 female. [Mean = 0.51, SD = 0.50, Range = (0, 1)]

Age. Ordinal variable coded from data of birth. 16-25 (1), 26-35 (2), 36-45 (3), 46-55 (4), 56-65 (5), 65+ (6). [Mean = 2.86, SD = 1.56, Range = (1, 6)]

Urban. Place of residence is coded 1 for urban residents, 0 for rural. [Mean = 0.68, SD = 0.47, Range = (0 1)]


High group consciousness. Indicator variable. Participants were asked about the causes of disproportionately high poverty rates among people of color. Response options included “because of culture” and “because of unjust treatment.” Indigenous and Afrodescendant people who saw inequality as the product of injustice are coded high group consciousness. [Mean = 0.13, SD = 0.33, Range = (0, 1)]

Low group consciousness. Indicator variable. Participants were asked about the causes of disproportionately high poverty rates among people of color. Response options included “because of culture” and “because of unjust treatment.” Indigenous and Afrodescendant people who saw inequality as the product of culture are coded low group consciousness. [Mean = 0.20, SD = 0.40, Range = (0, 1)]


References

- Baldwin, K., & Huber, J. D. (2010). Economic versus cultural differences: Forms of ethnic diversity and public goods provision. *American Political Science Review*, 104(4), 644–662.
- Fearon, J. D. (2003). Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8(2), 195–222.
- Pemstein, D., Marquardt, K. L., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y.-t., Medzihorsky, J., Krusell, J., Miri, F., & Romer, J. (2020). *The v-dem measurement model: Latent variable analysis for cross-national and cross-temporal expert-coded data* (tech. rep.). V-Dem Working Paper Series 2020:21.

Appendix B: Country Means, Dependent Variables



(a) Country Means for Democracy Best form of Government



(b) Country Means for Democratic Rights Index

Figure B-1: Country Means for Support for Democracy and Basic Democratic Rights

Appendix C: Main Models Estimated Using Two-Way Fixed Effects as Alternative to Multi-level Model

| | Democracy Best | | Democratic Rights | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| BGI | -0.022*** (0.006) | | -0.052*** (0.010) | |
| Political exclusion | | -0.232*** (0.043) | | -1.306*** (0.150) |
| Afrodescendant | 0.008 (0.020) | 0.009 (0.019) | 0.126*** (0.030) | 0.125*** (0.030) |
| Indigenous | -0.021 (0.022) | -0.025 (0.022) | 0.132*** (0.034) | 0.131*** (0.034) |
| Mestizo | 0.036** (0.012) | 0.037** (0.012) | 0.096*** (0.018) | 0.095*** (0.018) |
| Other ethnicity | -0.094** (0.033) | -0.099** (0.033) | 0.043 (0.055) | 0.033 (0.055) |
| Voted for incumbent | 0.142*** (0.010) | 0.142*** (0.010) | 0.091*** (0.015) | 0.095*** (0.015) |
| Religious meeting attendance | 0.023*** (0.004) | 0.023*** (0.004) | 0.002 (0.006) | 0.001 (0.006) |
| Education | 0.176*** (0.007) | 0.176*** (0.007) | 0.263*** (0.011) | 0.259*** (0.011) |
| Wealth quintiles | 0.044*** (0.004) | 0.044*** (0.004) | 0.026*** (0.006) | 0.026*** (0.006) |
| Female | -0.055*** (0.009) | -0.055*** (0.009) | -0.140*** (0.014) | -0.140*** (0.014) |
| Age | 0.099*** (0.003) | 0.099*** (0.003) | 0.013** (0.005) | 0.013** (0.005) |
| Urban | -0.077*** (0.012) | -0.077*** (0.012) | -0.077*** (0.018) | -0.077*** (0.018) |
| Sociotropic economic evaluations | 0.165*** (0.007) | 0.165*** (0.007) | 0.064*** (0.010) | 0.068*** (0.010) |
| <i>N</i> | 142430 | 142430 | 92362 | 92362 |

Standard errors in parentheses, constant, year, and country coefficients excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix D: Robustness to Including General Inequality and Democratic History

| | Democracy Best | | Democratic Rights | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| BGI | -0.033*** (0.010) | | -0.102*** (0.018) | |
| Political exclusion | | -0.315*** (0.052) | | -0.219* (0.102) |
| Gini | -0.047*** (0.013) | | -0.052* (0.024) | |
| Years since democratic transition | | 0.002 (0.002) | | 0.005 (0.004) |
| Afrodescendant | -0.021 (0.030) | -0.022 (0.030) | 0.103 (0.060) | 0.101 (0.060) |
| Indigenous | -0.040 (0.033) | -0.040 (0.031) | 0.128* (0.056) | 0.126* (0.056) |
| Mestizo | 0.027 (0.018) | 0.029 (0.018) | 0.096** (0.034) | 0.095** (0.034) |
| Other ethnicity | -0.104* (0.041) | -0.098* (0.039) | 0.080 (0.083) | 0.080 (0.083) |
| Voted for incumbent | 0.140*** (0.018) | 0.139*** (0.018) | 0.104** (0.033) | 0.104** (0.033) |
| Religious meeting attendance | 0.020* (0.008) | 0.020* (0.008) | 0.002 (0.016) | 0.002 (0.016) |
| Education | 0.173*** (0.013) | 0.173*** (0.013) | 0.249*** (0.023) | 0.249*** (0.023) |
| Wealth quintiles | 0.044*** (0.007) | 0.044*** (0.007) | 0.030** (0.010) | 0.030** (0.010) |
| Female | -0.054*** (0.013) | -0.055*** (0.013) | -0.140*** (0.019) | -0.140*** (0.019) |
| Age | 0.100*** (0.007) | 0.100*** (0.007) | 0.014 (0.012) | 0.014 (0.012) |
| Urban | -0.074*** (0.020) | -0.075*** (0.019) | -0.073* (0.029) | -0.073* (0.029) |
| Sociotropic economic evaluations | 0.150*** (0.011) | 0.152*** (0.011) | 0.056** (0.018) | 0.055** (0.018) |
| Individual level N | 139658 | 142430 | 92362 | 92362 |
| Country-year level N | 93 | 95 | 61 | 61 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix E: Robustness to Including Ethnic Fractionalization

| | Democracy Best | | Democratic Rights | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| BGI | -0.038** (0.013) | | -0.095*** (0.023) | |
| Political exclusion | | -0.306*** (0.046) | | -0.138 (0.098) |
| Ethnic fractionalization | -0.172 (0.350) | -0.345 (0.196) | -0.432 (0.605) | -1.553** (0.517) |
| Afrodescendant | -0.021 (0.030) | -0.021 (0.030) | 0.102 (0.060) | 0.102 (0.060) |
| Indigenous | -0.041 (0.031) | -0.040 (0.031) | 0.128* (0.056) | 0.127* (0.056) |
| Mestizo | 0.028 (0.018) | 0.029 (0.018) | 0.095** (0.034) | 0.095** (0.034) |
| Other ethnicity | -0.098* (0.039) | -0.098* (0.039) | 0.080 (0.083) | 0.080 (0.083) |
| Voted for incumbent | 0.139*** (0.018) | 0.139*** (0.018) | 0.104** (0.033) | 0.104** (0.033) |
| Religious meeting attendance | 0.020* (0.008) | 0.020* (0.008) | 0.002 (0.016) | 0.002 (0.016) |
| Education | 0.174*** (0.012) | 0.173*** (0.012) | 0.249*** (0.023) | 0.249*** (0.023) |
| Wealth quintiles | 0.044*** (0.007) | 0.044*** (0.007) | 0.030** (0.010) | 0.030** (0.010) |
| Female | -0.055*** (0.013) | -0.055*** (0.013) | -0.140*** (0.019) | -0.140*** (0.019) |
| Age | 0.100*** (0.007) | 0.100*** (0.007) | 0.014 (0.012) | 0.014 (0.012) |
| Urban | -0.074*** (0.019) | -0.075*** (0.019) | -0.072* (0.029) | -0.072* (0.029) |
| Sociotropic economic evaluations | 0.152*** (0.011) | 0.152*** (0.011) | 0.056** (0.018) | 0.055** (0.018) |
| Individual level N | 142430 | 142430 | 92362 | 92362 |
| Country-year level N | 95 | 95 | 61 | 61 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix F: Assessing Robustness to Inclusion of Liberal Democracy Score

| | Democracy Best | | Democratic Rights | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| BGI | -0.042*** (0.009) | | -0.110*** (0.017) | |
| Political exclusion | | -0.309*** (0.059) | | -0.245* (0.114) |
| V-Dem liberal democracy index | 0.895*** (0.173) | 0.114 (0.230) | 0.567 (0.419) | 0.027 (0.582) |
| Afrodescendant | -0.021 (0.030) | -0.022 (0.030) | 0.102 (0.060) | 0.101 (0.060) |
| Indigenous | -0.040 (0.031) | -0.041 (0.031) | 0.129* (0.056) | 0.126* (0.056) |
| Mestizo | 0.030 (0.018) | 0.029 (0.018) | 0.096** (0.034) | 0.095** (0.034) |
| Other ethnicity | -0.097* (0.039) | -0.097* (0.039) | 0.081 (0.083) | 0.080 (0.083) |
| Voted for incumbent | 0.139*** (0.018) | 0.139*** (0.018) | 0.104** (0.033) | 0.104** (0.033) |
| Religious meeting attendance | 0.020* (0.008) | 0.020* (0.008) | 0.002 (0.016) | 0.002 (0.016) |
| Education | 0.173*** (0.012) | 0.173*** (0.012) | 0.249*** (0.023) | 0.249*** (0.023) |
| Wealth quintiles | 0.045*** (0.007) | 0.045*** (0.007) | 0.030** (0.010) | 0.030** (0.010) |
| Female | -0.055*** (0.013) | -0.055*** (0.013) | -0.140*** (0.019) | -0.140*** (0.019) |
| Age | 0.100*** (0.007) | 0.100*** (0.007) | 0.014 (0.012) | 0.014 (0.012) |
| Urban | -0.075*** (0.019) | -0.075*** (0.019) | -0.073* (0.029) | -0.073* (0.029) |
| Sociotropic economic evaluations | 0.152*** (0.011) | 0.152*** (0.011) | 0.055** (0.018) | 0.055** (0.018) |
| Individual level N | 142430 | 142430 | 92362 | 92362 |
| Country-year level N | 95 | 95 | 61 | 61 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix G: Robustness to Including BGI and Political Exclusion

| | (1) | (2) |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| BGI | -0.026** (0.009) | -0.103*** (0.019) |
| Political exclusion | -0.296*** (0.047) | -0.120 (0.087) |
| Afrodescendant | -0.022 (0.030) | 0.102 (0.060) |
| Indigenous | -0.039 (0.031) | 0.129* (0.056) |
| Mestizo | 0.030 (0.018) | 0.096** (0.034) |
| Other ethnicity | -0.097* (0.039) | 0.080 (0.083) |
| Voted for incumbent | 0.139*** (0.018) | 0.104** (0.033) |
| Religious meeting attendance | 0.020* (0.008) | 0.002 (0.016) |
| Education | 0.173*** (0.012) | 0.249*** (0.023) |
| Wealth quintiles | 0.044*** (0.007) | 0.030** (0.010) |
| Female | -0.055*** (0.013) | -0.140*** (0.019) |
| Age | 0.100*** (0.007) | 0.014 (0.012) |
| Urban | -0.075*** (0.019) | -0.073* (0.029) |
| Sociotropic economic evaluations | 0.152*** (0.011) | 0.055** (0.018) |
| Individual level N | 142430 | 92362 |
| Country-year level N | 95 | 61 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix H: Robustness to Analyzing White Respondents Only

| | Democracy Best | | Democratic Rights | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| BGI | -0.046*** (0.012) | | -0.123*** (0.023) | |
| Political exclusion | | -0.386*** (0.054) | | -0.283* (0.142) |
| Voted for incumbent | 0.161*** (0.027) | 0.162*** (0.027) | 0.141** (0.049) | 0.141** (0.049) |
| Religious meeting attendance | 0.005 (0.011) | 0.006 (0.011) | -0.004 (0.022) | -0.003 (0.022) |
| Education | 0.202*** (0.017) | 0.201*** (0.017) | 0.265*** (0.034) | 0.263*** (0.034) |
| Wealth quintiles | 0.060*** (0.009) | 0.060*** (0.009) | 0.048** (0.015) | 0.048** (0.015) |
| Female | -0.051** (0.019) | -0.051** (0.019) | -0.097** (0.031) | -0.098** (0.031) |
| Age | 0.110*** (0.010) | 0.110*** (0.010) | 0.006 (0.019) | 0.006 (0.019) |
| Urban | -0.084** (0.029) | -0.087** (0.029) | -0.066 (0.039) | -0.070 (0.039) |
| Sociotropic economic evaluations | 0.147*** (0.018) | 0.147*** (0.018) | 0.091*** (0.025) | 0.090*** (0.025) |
| Individual level N | 41868 | 41868 | 28496 | 28496 |
| Country-year level N | 89 | 89 | 57 | 57 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix I: Robustness to Analyzing Black and Indigenous Respondents Only

| | Democracy Best | | Democratic Rights | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| BGI | -0.047*** (0.011) | | -0.110*** (0.017) | |
| Political exclusion | | -0.253*** (0.055) | | -0.171 (0.110) |
| Voted for incumbent | 0.168*** (0.022) | 0.167*** (0.022) | 0.132** (0.044) | 0.131** (0.044) |
| Religious meeting attendance | 0.026 (0.014) | 0.028* (0.014) | -0.006 (0.028) | -0.006 (0.028) |
| Education | 0.176*** (0.020) | 0.172*** (0.020) | 0.249*** (0.039) | 0.248*** (0.039) |
| Wealth quintiles | 0.020 (0.011) | 0.023* (0.011) | 0.028 (0.018) | 0.029 (0.018) |
| Female | -0.087*** (0.022) | -0.088*** (0.022) | -0.113*** (0.034) | -0.114*** (0.034) |
| Age | 0.095*** (0.009) | 0.094*** (0.009) | 0.024 (0.018) | 0.024 (0.017) |
| Urban | -0.040 (0.032) | -0.047 (0.031) | -0.090 (0.062) | -0.093 (0.062) |
| Sociotropic economic evaluations | 0.148*** (0.020) | 0.145*** (0.020) | 0.014 (0.038) | 0.011 (0.038) |
| Individual level N | 23176 | 23176 | 14279 | 14279 |
| Country-year level N | 95 | 95 | 61 | 61 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix J: Robustness to Excluding Individual Controls

| | Democracy Best | | Democratic Rights | |
|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| BGI | -0.045*** (0.010) | | -0.106*** (0.016) | |
| Political exclusion | | -0.347*** (0.044) | | -0.201* (0.099) |
| Individual level N | 158757 | 165631 | 98727 | 104013 |
| Country-year level N | 101 | 105 | 61 | 64 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix K: Support for Democracy in Bolivia

| | (1) |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Post-Morales | 0.505* (0.140) |
| Indigenous | -0.455*** (0.015) |
| Non-Indigenous | -0.171*** (0.015) |
| Post-Morales × Indigenous | 0.407*** (0.058) |
| Post-Morales × Non-Indig | 0.157 (0.061) |
| Voted for incumbent | 0.218** (0.033) |
| Religious meeting attendance | 0.050* (0.014) |
| Education | 0.108 (0.049) |
| Wealth quintiles | 0.030* (0.011) |
| Female | -0.061 (0.024) |
| Urban | -0.130* (0.045) |
| Sociotropic economic evaluations | 0.090 (0.040) |
| Year | -0.073** (0.014) |
| Observations | 15177 |
| R^2 | 0.033 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant excluded from table.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure K-1: Placebo Test: MAS Effect in Other Countries