

## Appendix

(1) Without control, (2) controlling for demographics (gender, age, education, country, and income), (3) controlling for demographics and voter game outcome, (4) controlling for demographics, voter outcome, and study dummies

**Table S1. The relationship between parochialism DIFI measure and compromise.**

	Compromise in early stage				Compromise in late stage			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Parochialism DIFI measure</i>	-0.052*	-0.050*	-0.048*	-0.051*	-0.064**	-0.069**	-0.074***	-0.084***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
<i>Gender: Male</i>		-0.035	-0.029	-0.024		-0.079	-0.073	-0.053
		(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)		(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)
<i>Age</i>		-0.002	-0.002	-0.002		-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0002
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
<i>Country: US</i>		-0.011	-0.023	-0.041		0.004	-0.013	-0.064
		(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.082)		(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.091)
<i>Winner: Other Team</i>			0.192***	0.151**			0.252***	0.169***
			(0.051)	(0.055)			(0.047)	(0.046)
<i>Winner: Own Team</i>			-0.028	-0.079			0.116	0.073
			(0.073)	(0.075)			(0.071)	(0.069)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.001	0.183	0.134	0.360	-0.001	-0.354	-0.470	-0.286
	(0.021)	(0.249)	(0.243)	(0.270)	(0.024)	(0.306)	(0.318)	(0.351)
<i>Education dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Income dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Treatment dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Observations	2,129	2,079	2,079	2,079	1,916	1,869	1,869	1,869
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.007	0.017	0.033	0.004	0.015	0.030	0.060

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

**Table S2. The relationship between universalism DIFI measure and compromise.**

	<i>Compromise in early stage</i>				<i>Compromise in late stage</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Universalism DIFI measure</i>	0.044*	0.050*	0.048*	0.051*	0.057*	0.051*	0.046*	0.047*
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
<i>Gender: Male</i>		-0.034	-0.028	-0.024		-0.076	-0.069	-0.051
		(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)		(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.050)
<i>Age</i>		-0.002	-0.002	-0.002		-0.0003	-0.0002	-0.0001
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
<i>Country: US</i>		-0.005	-0.017	-0.034		-0.0005	-0.021	-0.074
		(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.083)		(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.092)
<i>Winner: Other Team</i>			0.189***	0.146**			0.244***	0.158***
			(0.051)	(0.055)			(0.047)	(0.047)
<i>Winner: Own Team</i>			-0.036	-0.089			0.105	0.063
			(0.072)	(0.075)			(0.071)	(0.070)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.001	0.205	0.157	0.386	-0.001	-0.338	-0.446	-0.242
	(0.021)	(0.245)	(0.241)	(0.265)	(0.024)	(0.301)	(0.312)	(0.341)
<i>Education dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Income dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Treatment dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Observations	2,129	2,079	2,079	2,079	1,916	1,869	1,869	1,869
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.007	0.016	0.033	0.003	0.013	0.026	0.056

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

**Table S3. The relationship between DG giving and parochialism and universalism DIFI measures.**

	<i>Parochialism DIFI measure</i>				<i>Universalism DIFI measure</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>DG giving</i>	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.037* (0.015)	-0.041** (0.015)	-0.042** (0.015)	0.143*** (0.014)	0.114*** (0.014)	0.114*** (0.014)	0.114*** (0.014)
<i>Gender: Male</i>		-0.009 (0.032)	-0.009 (0.032)	-0.006 (0.032)		0.040 (0.027)	0.042 (0.027)	0.041 (0.027)
<i>Age</i>		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)		0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
<i>Country: US</i>		0.432*** (0.053)	0.425*** (0.053)	0.407*** (0.053)		-0.492*** (0.049)	-0.499*** (0.049)	-0.503*** (0.049)
<i>Winner: Other Team</i>			0.026 (0.036)	0.011 (0.041)			0.079* (0.033)	0.093** (0.034)
<i>Winner: Own Team</i>			0.077* (0.039)	0.064 (0.042)			0.025 (0.037)	0.038 (0.038)
<i>Constant</i>	0.016 (0.017)	-0.805*** (0.195)	-0.827*** (0.198)	-0.964*** (0.212)	0.033* (0.015)	-0.181 (0.285)	-0.199 (0.282)	-0.215 (0.287)
<i>Education dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Income dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Treatment dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Observations	4,764	4,731	4,731	4,731	4,764	4,731	4,731	4,731
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.033	0.034	0.038	0.021	0.057	0.058	0.061

Note:

\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

**Table S4. The relationship between DG giving and compromise.**

	<i>Compromise in early stage</i>				<i>Compromise in late stage</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>DG giving</i>	0.050*	0.046*	0.050*	0.053*	0.077**	0.077**	0.076**	0.076**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
<i>Gender: Male</i>		-0.033	-0.027	-0.022		-0.070	-0.064	-0.046
		(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)		(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
<i>Age</i>		-0.002	-0.002	-0.002		-0.001	-0.001	-0.0004
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
<i>Country: US</i>		-0.018	-0.027	-0.044		0.003	-0.015	-0.069
		(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.082)		(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.091)
<i>Winner: Other Team</i>			0.189***	0.148**			0.245***	0.162***
			(0.051)	(0.054)			(0.047)	(0.046)
<i>Winner: Own Team</i>			-0.051	-0.102			0.085	0.045
			(0.074)	(0.076)			(0.070)	(0.069)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.002	0.204	0.157	0.386	0.006	-0.342	-0.451	-0.244
	(0.021)	(0.247)	(0.241)	(0.268)	(0.024)	(0.287)	(0.297)	(0.328)
<i>Education dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Income dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Treatment dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Observations	2,095	2,078	2,078	2,078	1,885	1,868	1,868	1,868
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.007	0.017	0.033	0.005	0.016	0.030	0.059

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

**Table S5. The relationship between DIFI measures of own team/other team and compromise.**

	<i>Compromise in early stage</i>				<i>Compromise in late stage</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>DIFI Own Team</i>	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.041* (0.021)	-0.043* (0.023)	-0.047* (0.023)	-0.050* (0.023)
<i>DIFI Other Team</i>	0.065** (0.024)	0.066** (0.025)	0.067** (0.025)	0.071** (0.025)	0.081*** (0.024)	0.081** (0.024)	0.087*** (0.025)	0.097*** (0.025)
<i>Gender: Male</i>		-0.037 (0.047)	-0.031 (0.046)	-0.026 (0.046)		-0.081 (0.051)	-0.075 (0.050)	-0.056 (0.050)
<i>Age</i>		-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)		-0.0004 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.002)
<i>Country US</i>		0.011 (0.082)	-0.0005 (0.080)	-0.014 (0.084)		0.019 (0.095)	0.003 (0.092)	-0.043 (0.095)
<i>Winner: Other Team</i>			0.195*** (0.051)	0.153** (0.055)			0.254*** (0.047)	0.170*** (0.047)
<i>Winner Own Team</i>			-0.028 (0.072)	-0.078 (0.075)			0.115 (0.071)	0.073 (0.070)
<i>DIFI Own Team:DIFI Other Team</i>	-0.014 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.012 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.026)
<i>Constant</i>	0.001 (0.022)	0.187 (0.246)	0.139 (0.241)	0.357 (0.266)	0.006 (0.025)	-0.338 (0.308)	-0.452 (0.321)	-0.277 (0.352)
<i>Education dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Income dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Treatment dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Observations	2,129	2,079	2,079	2,079	1,916	1,869	1,869	1,869
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.009	0.018	0.035	0.006	0.016	0.031	0.062

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

**Table S6. The relationship between DIFI measures of own team/other team and giving in the DG.**

	<i>DIFI Own Team</i>				<i>DIFI Other Team</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>DG giving</i>	0.061*** (0.013)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.043** (0.014)	0.043** (0.014)	0.129*** (0.016)	0.087*** (0.015)	0.089*** (0.016)	0.090*** (0.016)
<i>Gender: Male</i>		0.055 (0.031)	0.056 (0.031)	0.058 (0.031)		0.062* (0.028)	0.063* (0.028)	0.060* (0.028)
<i>Age</i>		0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)		0.0004 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)
<i>Country: US</i>		-0.347*** (0.049)	-0.354*** (0.049)	-0.358*** (0.049)		-0.835*** (0.060)	-0.833*** (0.060)	-0.815*** (0.060)
<i>Winner: Other Team</i>			0.041 (0.034)	0.029 (0.037)			0.007 (0.036)	0.014 (0.041)
<i>Winner: Own Team</i>			0.057 (0.034)	0.047 (0.038)			-0.040 (0.039)	-0.032 (0.043)
<i>Constant</i>	0.037** (0.014)	-0.506 (0.268)	-0.526 (0.269)	-0.612* (0.288)	0.015 (0.018)	0.488* (0.201)	0.497* (0.201)	0.578** (0.217)
<i>Education dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Income dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Treatment dummies</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Observations	4,764	4,731	4,731	4,731	4,764	4,731	4,731	4,731
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.024	0.025	0.029	0.017	0.106	0.107	0.110

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$