

Online Appendix to Negative Economic Shocks and the Compliance to Social Norms

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A The optimal choice

Formally, a DM (i) should choose $d_i \in \{0, 1\}$. If the setting is strategic, she will be interacting with j . By convention, $d = 1$ is the harmful action, defined as the action that causes a loss to the counterpart or prevents her from enjoying a gain. Preferences include two terms. The first is the utility of income: $u(e + w(d_i, d_j))$, where $w(\cdot)$ is the monetary payoff, and e is the initial endowment. The second term is $\mathbb{1}_{d_i \neq n} c(\theta_i)$, the psychological cost of deviating from a social norm n . The cost increases in θ_i , the propensity to comply. We have $\theta_i \in [0, 1]$, with Cumulative Density Function $F(\cdot)$. The preferences are similar to Krupka and Weber (2013), Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2018), and Levitt and List (2007). Models of preferences with social image have a similar framework, but the social image is endogenous (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Benabou and Tirole, 2006).

The problem can be written as follows

$$\max_{d_i \in \{0,1\}} u(e + w(d_i, d_j)) - \mathbb{1}_{d_i \neq n} c(\theta_i) \quad (1)$$

In some situations, like stealing, $d = 1$ transgresses a social norm (i.e. $n = 0$), in others, like punishment, it is prescribed by the norm ($n = 1$). If the norm is conditional, as in tit-for-tat, we will use the notation $n = d_j$.

An NES is modelled as $de < 0$.

The following assumptions hold:

Assumption 1. $u(\cdot) : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

$$u'(\cdot) > 0$$

$$u''(\cdot) < 0$$

Assumption 2. $c(\cdot) : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

$$c'(\theta) > 0, c''(\theta) > 0$$

Assumption 1 is the standard decreasing marginal utility of income. Assumption 2 formalizes the utility cost of norm violation and the dependence on the psychological parameter θ .

To understand the logic of the argument, consider a non strategic choice where a fairness norm is in place ($n = 0$) and $d = 1$ is a transgression. A DM of parameter θ chooses $d = 1$ if $u(e + w(1)) - u(e + w(0)) \geq c(\theta)$. The term $u(e + w(1)) - u(e + w(0))$ captures the benefit B accruing from transgressing the norm, constant across agents. The cost is increasing in θ . In Figure 1a, we plot the optimal choice as a function of θ : there is a threshold $\bar{\theta} = \theta_1$ below which DMs will transgress, and above which they will comply.

What happens when a DM suffers an NES? Due to the concavity of the utility function, the marginal utility of transgression increases, leading to more norm violations. In Figure 1a, for the new benefit curve, more DMs choose to carry out $d = 1$, i.e. $\bar{\theta}$ moves to the right, from θ_1 to θ_2 .

Consider also the opposite situation where $d = 1$ is costly and recommended by the norm (i.e. $n = 1$). A DM of parameter θ chooses $d = 1$ if $u(e + w(1)) - u(e + w(0)) \geq -c(\theta)$. The left-hand side is the utility loss from punishment, and the right-hand side is the utility cost of norm violation. In presence of an NES, concavity implies that $\frac{\partial u(e+w(1)) - u(e+w(0))}{\partial e} > 0$, the utility loss from following the norm increases and less people will choose $d = 1$. This is illustrated in Figure 1b.

In settings with interaction, we need to introduce strategic uncertainty: the DM will now maximizes $E[u(e + w(d_i, d_j)) - \mathbb{1}_{d_i \neq n} c(\theta)]$. Define p to be the expected likelihood that d_j chooses 1. There are three cases, either $n = 0$, $n = 1$, or $n = p$ (tit-for-tat). We can write the expression in a compact form as $p(u(e + w(1, 1)) -$




Figure 1: The optimal choice

$$u(e + w(0, 1)) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) \geq (1 - 2n)c(\theta).$$

Consider when the norm is tit-for-tat. The DM chooses 1 if $p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) \geq (1 - 2p)c(\theta)$. There are three terms: $u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))$ is the utility loss from retaliation, $u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))$ is the benefit of defection, and $(1 - 2p)c(\theta)$ is the (expected) psychological cost.

We will derive our predictions in the two extreme cases, $p = 0$ and $p = 1$. These predictions are testable once the beliefs are elicited in an experiment. Conditioning on a degenerate belief also represents a plausible description of decision-making in one-shot interactions. Below we will show that the conclusions are supported in equilibrium by a formal comparative statics result.

Under $p = 1$, there is a cost of retaliation if $u(e + w(0, 1)) - u(e + w(1, 1)) > 0$. When the latter condition holds, the DM chooses $d = 1$ only if the cost of transgression is larger than the cost of retaliation. Since an NES raises the cost of retaliation, the share of DMs who chooses $d = 1$ decreases. If retaliation is not costly, everybody will make the same choice, regardless of the shock.

Under $p = 0$, there is a benefit from defection if $u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0)) > 0$. The optimal choice is determined by whether $u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0)) \geq c(\theta)$. Since an NES increases the benefit from defection, the share of DMs who chooses $d = 1$ increases. If defection is not profitable, everybody will comply, regardless of the shock.

The reasoning for $n = 0$ and $n = 1$ are special cases of the tit-for-tat.

A.1 Settings

Consider our four settings: cheating, stealing, Joy of Destruction (JoD), and cooperation (prisoner's dilemma, PD).

In the cheating and stealing task, the payoffs for the DM are $w(1) > w(0)$ and the norm is $n = 0$.

The JoD is a simultaneous interaction where $d = 1$ is costly and harmful. $d = 1$ is called money burning. In the standard calibration (Abbink and Herrmann, 2011), the initial endowment is 10, the cost of burning is 1 and the damage inflicted is 5. More generally, it must hold that $w(0, 0) > w(1, 0) > w(0, 1) > w(1, 1)$. The social norm is to *retaliate*, which accounts for the evidence of costly money burning (Abbink and Herrmann, 2011). Retaliate means burning when expecting the counterpart to burn.

The prisoner's dilemma is a symmetric simultaneous game where $w(1, 0) > w(0, 0) > w(1, 1) > w(0, 1)$. We assume that the relevant social norm is conditional cooperation (Gächter, 2007).

A.2 Theoretical Predictions

As discussed in Section A, when there exists a trade-off between income and norm compliance, an NES makes people more attentive to income, leading to more transgression. For a trade-off to exist, following the norm should be costly in terms of payoff. This is the case for cheating and stealing, where the cost of following the norm is the loss of income that would accrue from choosing $d = 1$.

In the case of the JoD (Joy of Destruction) scenario, the trade-off arises when a decision-maker (DM) expects the counterpart to retaliate, making the act of "burning" costly. However, the norm dictates that retaliation is the prescribed response. Similarly, in the prisoners' dilemma, there is a clear trade-off where conditional cooperation is costly because defection leads to more profit. The presence of an NES leads to an increase in norm violations.

For the cheating and stealing tasks, in equilibrium there will be a $\bar{\theta}$, defined by $u(e + w(1)) - u(e + w(0)) = c(\bar{\theta})$ such that a share $F(\bar{\theta})$ will choose $d = 1$. Define $B(e) = u(e + w(1)) - u(e + w(0))$, by Assumption 1, $B'(e) < 0$, implying that an NES shifts $\bar{\theta}$ to the right.

This is our first prediction:

Prediction 1. *In the cheating and stealing tasks:*

- $\frac{\partial P(d=1)}{\partial e} < 0$

The JoD game introduces strategic considerations. The social norm is $n = d_j$. The payoffs are $w(0, 0) > w(1, 0) > w(0, 1) > w(1, 1)$. Define p to be the expected likelihood of $d_j = 1$. The agent chooses $d = 1$ if $pu(e + w(1, 1)) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - c(\theta)) \geq p(u(e + w(0, 1)) - c(\theta)) + (1 - p)u(e + w(0, 0))$. If $p = 0$ then $u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0)) < c(\theta)$, which implies $d = 0$ and no effect of NES. If $p = 1$, the DM will choose $d=1$ if $c(\theta) \geq (u(e + w(0, 1)) - u(e + w(1, 1)))$, i.e. if the cost of transgression is larger than the cost of retaliation. The latter is increasing in the endowment by Assumption 1, implying a rightward shift of $\bar{\theta}$ as a result of a NES.

This is our second testable prediction, which applies to the JoD:

Prediction 2. *In the JoD task:*

- $\frac{\partial P(d=1|p=1)}{\partial e} > 0$

Finally, we analyze the prisoner's dilemma game (PD). In this case $d = 1$ is No Cooperation.

We first derive the prediction for the case in which the social norm is to be a conditional cooperator ($n = d_j$). In this case, Player i will cooperate if $p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) \geq (1 - 2p)c(\theta)$. Define $B(e) = p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0)))$.

If $p = 0$, then $B(e) > 0$ and $B'(e) < 0$. In other words, an NES decreases cooperation. On the other hand, if $p = 1$, then there is no effect of shock because $B(e) > -c(\theta)$. That is, choosing $d = 1$ always gives a benefit greater than the cost.

Prediction 3. *In the prisoner's dilemma game:*

- $\frac{\partial P(d=1|p=0)}{\partial e} < 0$ under the norm $n = d_j$ and $n = 0$

A.3 Alternative Microfoundation: Loss Aversion

We used concavity to derive the prediction. Under Assumption 1, an NES is just a wealth effect. On average, individuals are risk averse (Camerer, 1995; Starmer, 2000), thus concavity seems a reasonable assumption. However, an implication of concavity is that differences in assets and not just shocks to assets would increase transgression. Notice that this interpretation would be coherent with the claim that shocks represent a plausible variation to study the causal effect of poverty (Mani et al., 2013; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Boonmanunt et al., 2020).

We can separate the cases of wealth effect from that of shock by assuming Loss aversion, i.e. the standard tenet that losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When we condition on the belief, the problem of the DM can be reduced to one of the two cases, where $d = 1$ is either costly but recommended or profitable but forbidden. As a result, we can prove the general argument without strategic interaction. Assume *a fortiori* that the utility function is linear (risk neutrality) but with loss aversion. The problem of the DM becomes:

$$\max_{d \in \{0, 1\}} e' + w(d) - v^l(\max\{0, e - e' - w(d)\}) - \mathbb{1}_{d_i \neq n} c(\theta) \quad (2)$$

with $v^l(\cdot) : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ and increasing, and e' is the current endowment, either equal to e , in the control, or lower than e in case of NES. In the formulation of the v^l function, e is the reference point.

In the control, the DM chooses 1 if $w(1) - w(0) \geq (1 - 2n)c(\theta)$, in presence of a (large enough) shock, and defining $\Delta e = e - e'$, if $w(1) - w(0) + v^l(\Delta e - w(0)) - v^l(\Delta e - w(1)) \geq (1 - 2n)c(\theta)$. Monotonicity of v ensures that this condition is met.

With loss aversion, the model generates the same predictions as in Table 1 in the manuscript, but without reducing an NES to a wealth effect. For instance, a positive shock would be void of consequences in this case, whereas under concavity the shock effect would be symmetrical.

A.4 Alternative formulation: Norm dependent utility

The DM maximizes

$$\max_{d \in \{0, 1\}} \beta u(e' + w(d)) + \theta_i N(d) \quad (3)$$

The first term $u(\cdot)$ representing the material payoff should be concave or have loss aversion and the second term is the dependence on the perceived appropriateness of each action. In our settings $N(\text{transgression}) < N(\text{compliance})$, which defines a threshold for θ . In principle, this requires a large enough difference between $N(1)$ and $N(0)$. Algebraically, if the $N(\cdot)$ s are elicited with the coordination game ($N \in [-1, 1]$), the existence of a threshold θ may be violated, but this would imply a solution in which everyone transgresses. Since social norms are grounded also on empirical expectations, this would contradict the assumption that a norm exists.

Comparative statics with the shock use the same arguments as in Subsections A.2 and A.3.

This version has the advantage that we do not express the dependence on norms only in terms of the costs of

compliance but also in terms of the self-esteem or the positive motivation coming from complying with the norm. From our modeling perspective, the avoidance of a cost plays the same role as receiving a benefit, but of course, one could explicitly incorporate the latter.

A.5 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics: general results

Table 1 in the main manuscript presents the predictions under $p = 0$ or $p = 1$. These are testable given that the beliefs are elicited in the experiments. They are also plausible as a description of how a DM interacts in a one-shot decision. They can be generalized as a formal equilibrium prediction if θ_j belongs to i 's information set.

Alternatively, Assumption 3 states that the distribution $F(\cdot)$ of the norm sensibility parameter is common knowledge. We can show that the direction of the effect of the NES is maintained.

Assumption 3. $F(\theta)$ is common knowledge.

This is the definition of equilibrium:

Definition 1. *Given a symmetric simultaneous 2×2 game, with preferences $u(e + w(d_i, d_j)) - \mathbb{1}_{d_i \neq n} c(\theta_i)$, with randomly drawn players i, j , finite payoffs functions $w(d_i, d_j)$, an equilibrium with social norm n is a distribution of choices for the population such that each DM maximizes her utility and expectations are mutually consistent.*

We apply the refinement that the equilibrium is stable. Here, stability means that small perturbations induce incentives that drive behaviour towards equilibrium.

The following proposition holds.

Proposition 1. *Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the following comparative statics hold in equilibrium: a) in the JoD, $\frac{\partial P(d=1)}{\partial e} > 0$; a) in the PD, $\frac{\partial P(d=1)}{\partial e} < 0$.*

Proof. Consider first the Prisoner's Dilemma. Notice that in an equilibrium, a DM chooses $d = 1$ iff $p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) \geq (1 - 2n)c(\theta)$. Given the payoff of the PD, $p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) > 0$. If $n = 0$ (norm of unconditional cooperation), $\exists \bar{\theta}$ such that $\forall \theta \in [0, \bar{\theta}]$, $d = 1$. In equilibrium, it must be that $p = F(\bar{\theta})$, thus $F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) - c(\bar{\theta}) = 0$. Define the equilibrium indifference condition for $\bar{\theta}$ as $\Phi(\bar{\theta}) = F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) +$

$$(1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) - c(\bar{\theta}) = 0.$$

Using Assumption 2, a single crossing property holds between the cost $c(\theta)$ and benefit $F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0)))$ of deviation, and the benefit crosses the cost curve from above, i.e. $\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta} < 0$. By Assumption 1, $\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial e} < 0$. Implicitly differentiating the equilibrium indifference conditions, gives $\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}}{\partial e} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial e}}{\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta}} < 0$, i.e a NES increases norm violation.

If the norm is $n = d_j$, the cost curve $(1 - 2F(\theta))c(\theta)$ has a zero in 0 and in $1/2$, and it is first increasing then decreasing. This implies that there is more than one equilibrium, but only one is stable. In the stable equilibrium, $\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta} < 0$ and the same comparative statics holds.

For the JoD, in equilibrium, a DM chooses $d = 1$ iff $p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) \geq (1 - 2p)c(\theta)$, where we use the social norm of retaliation. Since $p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) < 0$, only high θ retaliate, i.e. by definition of equilibrium $p = 1 - F(\bar{\theta})$. The equilibrium indifference conditions becomes $(1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) - (2F(\bar{\theta}) - 1)c(\theta) = 0$. Notice that $\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta} = -F'(\bar{\theta}) \frac{\partial p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) - (1 - 2p)c(\theta)}{\partial p}$. For stability, we need $\frac{\partial p(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) - (1 - 2p)c(\theta)}{\partial p} < 0$, thus $(1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0)))$ to cross $(2F(\bar{\theta}) - 1)c(\theta)$ from below, i.e. $\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta} > 0$. By Assumptions 1 and 2, $\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial e} > 0$, since $(1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1, 1)) - u(e + w(0, 1))) + F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1, 0)) - u(e + w(0, 0))) < 0$, $\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}}{\partial e} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial e}}{\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta}} < 0$, i.e a NES increases norm violation and reduces the share of DM choosing $d = 1$.

A.6 Social Image Concern

Andreoni and Bernheim (2009); Grossman (2015); Benabou and Tirole (2006) developed models where the DM behavior is explained not only by preferences over outcomes but is also motivated by belief-dependent social image.

We develop a simple model in the same spirit, with endogenous social image concerns and shocks. We assume that the shock realization is known to the DM but not to the counterpart (as in our experiments). The $p(\text{shock})$ is known.

This part mainly provides an intuition of the main results and is not a complete solution of the model.

The DM solves the following problem:

$$\max_{d_i \in \{0,1\}} e^j + w(d) - v^l(\max\{0, e - e^j - w(d)\}) + \theta_i \chi P(\chi|d) \quad (4)$$

where the first triple term is the concern for the material payoff, satisfying loss aversion. With a little abuse of notation, we take e^j to mean either e or e' , depending on the realization of the shock, which is known by the participant. χ is the positive image effect ("the good trait"), and θ is the concern for social image. θ plays the same role as our sensibility to social norms, but here presents an additional interpretation: it is the willingness to pay to increase social image by one unit (Battigalli et al., 2019).

Let's discuss the case of cheating. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian, plus the stability and a refinement on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.¹ The equilibrium is defined by two thresholds θ^* and $\theta' > \theta^*$ such that $F(\theta^*)$ DMs choose to transgress, $F(\theta') - F(\theta^*)$ DMs transgress only when they receive the shock and $1 - F(\theta')$ never cheat.

The θ^* and θ' are defined by the two conditions

$$w(1) - w(0) = \theta^* \chi \left[1 - \frac{p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))}{F(\theta^*) + p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))} \right] \quad (5)$$

$$w(1) - w(0) + v^l(w(0)) - v^l(w(1)) = \theta' \chi \left[1 - \frac{p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))}{F(\theta^*) + p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))} \right] \quad (6)$$

With strategic interaction, for the prisoners' dilemma, we can write (p is the probability that the counterpart is defecting):

$$w(1,0) - w(0,0) + p(w(1,1) - w(0,1) - w(1,0) - w(0,0)) = \theta^* \chi \left[1 - \frac{p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))}{F(\theta^*) + p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))} \right] \quad (7)$$

notice that the right-hand side is positive by definition of the Prisoners' Dilemma (1 is a dominant strategy). In equilibrium, it must be that $p = F(\theta^*) + p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))$. To prove existence, we can write:

$$\theta = \frac{w(1,0) - w(0,0) + (F(\theta^*) + p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))) (w(1,1) - w(0,1) - w(1,0) - w(0,0))}{\chi \left[1 - \frac{p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))}{F(\theta^*) + p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))} \right]} \quad (8)$$

¹There is positive weight only on types that deviate for the largest set of off-equilibrium beliefs. See the discussion in Grossman and van der Weele (2017), on which we rely for this discussion.


θ^* is a fixed point of the mapping above. Notice that for $\theta^* \rightarrow 0$ the denominator increases and the numerator decreases, whereas for $\theta^* \rightarrow 1$, $\theta \rightarrow 0$. This guarantees existence, but also stability because it implies that the benefit of transgression crosses the cost from above. For $\theta < \theta^*$ the benefit exceeds the costs and so there is no profitable deviation.

Now since


$$\begin{aligned}
& w(1, 0) - w(0, 0) + v^l(w(0, 0)) - v^l(w(1, 0)) + (F(\theta^*) + p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*))) \\
& (w(1, 1) - w(0, 1) - w(1, 0) - w(0, 0) + v^l(w(0, 1)) - v^l(w(1, 1)) - (v^l(w(0, 0)) - v^l(w(1, 0)))) \\
& > w(1, 0) - w(0, 0) + (F(\theta^*) + p(\text{shock})(F(\theta') - F(\theta^*)))(w(1, 1) - w(0, 1) - w(1, 0) - w(0, 0))
\end{aligned}$$

by the hypothesis of loss aversion, $\theta' > \theta^*$, the benefits cross the cost from above, which proves that θ' is separating those who chose to transgress from those who chose to conform.


B Additional Exhibits




(a) Stealing Task



(b) Die-under-the-cup



(c) Joy of Destruction




(d) Prisoners' Dilemma

Figure 2: Normative Expectations for the Stealing, Cheating, JoD, and PD tasks.


Table 1: OLS estimates of effect of NES on Rule Following

(1) Rule Following	
NES	-2.556* (1.036)
High	-1.621 (1.133)
Low	-2.079 (1.120)
Constant	7.511*** (0.963)
N	210
R ²	0.04
F-test	2.27


Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001




(a) Stealing Task



(b) Die-under-the-cup



(c) Joy of Destruction



(d) Prisoners' Dilemma

Figure 3: Empirical Expectations for the Stealing, Cheating, JoD, and PD tasks.

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C Experimental Protocols

I. Experiment I – Stealing task and JoD

II. Experiment II -Cheating

III. Experiment III – Prisoners' Dilemma

IV. Survey Experiment – Elicitation of Social Norms

V. Experiment IV – Rule Following Task

I. Experiment I – Stealing task and JoD

Note: This is a translation to English from the original protocol in Spanish.

[General Recomendations]

[The parts written in italics should NOT be read out loud.]

[The parts written in red are warnings. Be careful and check treatment order.]

[The text that is not in italics should be read out loud and exactly as it is.]

[Keep a neutral behavior: never raise your voice, and don't make any jokes.]

[Never and under no circumstances use the words "experiments", "games", "easy" or "steal", etc.]

[Don't reveal treatments or what we intent to measure.]

[Before starting the session]

[The information written in square brackets and italics must not be read to participants. These are the procedures to be followed by the experimenter.]

[Turn on computers. Start the session in each of them. Start in kiosk mode. Set up the cardboard divisions for each workstation.]


[Place a blank sheet of paper, a pen, and a die inside a plastic cup, in front of each computer. Open the google chrome shortcut. Check that every computer is connected to the room.]

[Before Starting the session, greet the participants and remind them that for them to participate they must have their ID with them. Align them into a line in order of arrival. Only 18 of them can participate in that session. Others are welcomed to participate in the next session. Give access to the lab by two at a time with the ID card. At the control cabin check if any one of them had participated before.]

[General Instructions]

[When the quota of participants is completed for the session or when it is time to start the session ask participants to log in with their university credentials. After everyone has logged in, start the session.]

[While the participants wait for the session to start, they will see the following screen]



[When the session is finally created, they will see the following screen]

Welcome

Please do not press the "next" button unless you are instructed to do so.

Please pay attention to all of the researcher's instructions.

Next

Good morning/ afternoon. Thank you very much for your participation. My name is [Name]. Today's activity is set in a study of how people make decisions. Depending on the decisions you make today, you could earn certain amount of money. Therefore, is very important that you pay attention to these instructions. Funding for this study have been completely provided by the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. I am at your disposal for any question.

Please, don't talk to anyone during this activity unless you are asked to do so. It is forbidden to use any electronic device. Please, turn off and put away your phones.

[Give participants a moment so they put away their devices.]

If anyone has any question at any point, please raise your hand and I will come closer. In front of you, there is a blank sheet of paper and a pen. Do not used them until we ask you to.

[If someone ask for the purpose of the study, don't tell them. You can always say that you are only assistants and that if they want more information, they can go to the project's director. Keep track if someone enters or leaves the room, receives a call or if there is a particular noise.]

You may ask yourselves why we give money in this activity. We use money because the activity requires people to take economic decisions. This means, decisions with consequences for your finances, just like it happens in real life. You will never lose any of the money that you came here with.

For your participation, you will receive whatever you earn as a consequence of your decisions and the decisions of the people you will be interacting with. Later, we will explain you how you will receive your payment.

You will never know the identity of the people you will be interacting with and neither will they, so that you feel more comfortable answering questions and making decisions. Furthermore, payments will also be completely anonymous. This means that other participants will never have this information under any circumstances.

It is important for you to know that you can walk away at any moment; however, only if you complete the activity and the final questionnaire you can receive the amount of money you earned.

[>--> Conditional begins. The following text, is conditional on the order of tasks]

[Order 1 (Appropriation Task – Joy of Destruction)]

This activity has three parts. In the first part, you will have to solve a mathematical operations task. In the second one, you will have to interact with a participant of the study who is not in this session. In

the third part, you will have to make a decision in which you will interact with a person who is in this same session.

For the third part, each one of you have, from this moment, 10 experimental coins where each coin equals 1000 COP.

[Order 2 (JoD - AT)]


This activity has three parts. In the first part, you will have to solve a mathematical operations task. In the second one, you will have to make a decision in which you will interact with a person who is in this same session. For the second part, each one of you have, from this moment, 10 experimental coins where each coin equals 1000 COP. In the third part, you will have to interact with a participant of the study who is not in this session.

[Conditional Ends] <--<

Now I am going to tell you how the earnings are established. Today, at the end of the session, we will pay you the earnings from the first part, that is, from the task of mathematical operations. The profits obtained in the second and third parts will be delivered to you in a new session that will take place in two or three weeks. In this new session, you will participate in a different study, where you can also earn money for their decisions. Keep in mind that your decisions today will not affect the earnings of the other study and vice versa. For this, we will send you an email informing you of all the sessions available so that you can indicate which one you can attend. If any of you cannot attend any of these, please inform us at the end of this session to agree on a date to pay you the result of the second and third parts of today.

To participate you must sign the informed consent. This document is the only one, together with the receipt, where you will indicate personal data, the other answers are completely anonymous. The informed consent includes the data of those responsible for the project in case you wish to communicate to resolve any concerns after the end of today's activity. Please click the "Start" button. After completing the informed consent, please follow the instructions on the screen.

[While the participants wait for the other participants to press the button, the following screen appears:]




[When all participants pressed the "next" button the following screen appears with the informed consent:]

[Read out loud the informed consent]

If you agree to participate in this study, please write your full name and your ID number in the space indicated. Once done, please press the "next" button. After filling out the informed consent please follow the on-screen instructions.

[While participants wait for other participants to fill out the informed consent, they will see the following screen:]



[Instructions. Part 1.]

[Addition task]

[When participants had filled the informed consent and clicked on the “next” button they will see the instructions for the addition task in the screen:]

First Part

The first part of the study has two stages.


In the first stage, you have to add five numbers of two digits. These sums were randomly generated by the computer. You must solve as many sums as you can in a 4 minute period. At the end of the period, you will see on the screen the number of correct answers. For each correct answer, you will be paid 1,000 experimental points. When the time is up, the second stage will begin. In the second stage one of two possible events can occur that could affect your profits:

1. Your accumulated earnings in the first stage will not be lost in any way.
2. 80% of your accumulated earnings in the first stage of this task will be destroyed.

To solve the operations, if you wish, you can write your calculations on the blank sheet of paper that lies in front of you. The better your performance, the greater your profit in this first part. The result obtained in this first part will be paid with certainty at the end of the study.

For each correct answer in this task, you received 1,000 experimental points. At the end of the activity, the points will be converted to Colombian pesos. Each point is equivalent to 1 Colombian peso.

Let's see the following example shown in the image below for clarity. Suppose you made a total of 10 correct sums in the first stage of this task and consequently earned a total of 10,000 experimental points (in the image each blue point represents 1,000 experimental points). In the second stage, you will face one of two previously mentioned events. If you experience the first event, your accumulated earnings in the first stage will not be altered, that is, you will have 10,000 experimental points. If you experience the second event, your accumulated earnings on the first stage will be reduced by 80% because they will be destroyed, that is, you will only have 2,000 experimental points because of the 10,000 experimental starting points, 8,000 points will be destroyed.



[Participants start the addition task until the time runs out. They will see the following screen (note that the numbers here are just an example):]

Let's add!

Time left to complete this page: **0:22**

$13 + 90 + 23 + 44 + 2 =$

The last round was number: 1.

Your last answer was: **correct**.

Number of correct answers so far: 1.

If you answer this question correctly you will earn 1000 points

Accumulated earnings so far: 1000 points

Next

[When the time runs out and depending on the experimental treatment the participant was randomly assigned to, they will see the following screen:]

[If participant is in the no-shock condition:]

Second Part

Your accumulated earnings have **NOT** have been affected.
Your final profit in this first part is **0 points**

Next

[If participant is in the shock condition:]

Second Part

Your accumulated earnings **have** been affected. 80% of your profits were destroyed.
You had accumulated **0 points** , now you have **0.0** points.

Next

[When they click on the “next” button, the second part of the exercise will start with the instructions of the first task]

[Instructions. Part 2]

Second part

This is the second part of the study.

In this session, you will be paired with another person who will participate in a later session. That is, your payment will depend on your decisions today and on those of the other participant in the other session. At no time, nor the other participant nor you will know the identity of each other.

For this part of the study, you have the opportunity to steal 80% of the other's participant earnings. Remember that the profits from this part will be paid in a new session, once we know how much the other participant's profit was.

Note that even if there are other people in this room, you will certainly NOT be paired with none of them. Furthermore, no participant in this session will know their identity or what decisions they made. For this part of the activity, the decisions of the other participants in this room will have no impact on you nor yours in them.

Remember that if you cannot attend the new session, please inform us at the end of this session to agree a date to pay you the result of the second and third part of today.

Do you wish to steal 80% of the other participant's earnings?

Yes ▼

Next

[Instructions. Part 3]

Third part

This is the third part of the study.

You will interact with another person from this session. Neither of you will know the identity of the other. However, it is someone among all of the participants who are currently in the room. The computer will determine who will it be later through a draw. The amount of money you can earn in this activity will depend of your decisions and the decisions of the person with whom you are paired with.

For this part, you and the person with whom you will interact will receive 10 experimental coins as an initial endowment. Each experimental coin equals COP 1,000. You have to decide whether to reduce the initial endowment of the other participant or whether to leave it as it is. Reducing the initial endowment of the other participant will cost you 1 experimental coin. By paying 1 experimental coin, you can reduce the other's initial endowment in 5 experimental coins. The other participant will incur the same cost (1 experimental coin) if he or she decides to reduce your initial endowment. Note that only four events can take place:

1. If both decide to leave the starting endowment as is, you will both win 10 experimental coins.
2. If you decide to reduce the other's initial endowment, but he or she decides to leave your initial endowment as it is, then you will win 9 experimental coins and the other person will win 5 experimental coins.
3. If you decide to leave the other's initial endowment as it is, but he or she decides to reduce your initial endowment, then you will win 5 experimental coins and the other person will win 9 experimental coins.
4. If both decide to reduce the other's initial endowment, they will both win 4 experimental coins.

Remember that if you cannot attend the new session, please inform us at the end of this session to agree a date to pay you for the results of the second and third parts of today.

Next

[After pressing “next” they will see a screen where they will have to make the decision.]

Third part

Please make your decision:

Your initial endowment in this activity is 10 experimental coins.

Do you want to pay 1 experimental coin to reduce the initial endowment of the person with whom you were paired? If you choose “YES”, you will incur in a cost of 1 experimental coin and the initial endowment of the person with the one that is interacting will be reduced by 5 experimental coins. The other person will simultaneously take the same decision.

Please, think carefully about your choice.

Next

[After pressing the “next” button, participants will be asked about the beliefs they had about the other player in this task]

Third part

Now we will give you the opportunity to earn some extra cash. We want you to state your expectations about the behavior of the person with whom you have been paired. For each correct answer, you will earn 1 experimental coin.

Which of the two possible events that could be faced in the first part of the activity do you think the participant you interacted with faced?

I think his/her accumulated earnings were not affe ▾

I expect :

that the other participant decided to reduce my ir ▾

Next

[After pressing the “next” button, participants will see a table that shows the results of today’s session.]

[Summary of the results]

SUMMARY OF TODAY'S ACTIVITY

Result of the first part	
Amount of correct sums	0
Number of experimental points earned for correct sums	0
Final amount of experimental points after being affected	0
Your belief about how the other player was affected was correct?:	Sí
Result of the second and third part	
He decided to steal from another player's earnings from another session:	No
He decided to destroy the other player's earnings:	Sí
The other player destroyed his winnings:	No
Your expectations about the other player's behavior in the third part were correct:	Sí
Your experimental coin earnings were	11 experimental coins
Your earnings in COP were (paid in the next session)	COP11000
Earn today	
Your profit today without counting the second and third activity is:	0

Next

[When participants press the “next” button, the demographics survey will appear]

[While participants answer the questionnaire, the assistant will give them the pay receipts and explain how they should be filled out. They will also be explained about how they will be paid.]

[Questionnaire]

Survey 1/1

What is your gender:

☐ Male ☐ Female ☐ Other

What is your age?

What is your marital status?

¿School?

Major:

How many times have you enrolled counting the current semester?

What is the highest level of education reached by your father?

What is the highest level of education attained by your mother?

According to your utility bills, what is the current housing stratum where you live in?

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6

What is the locality where you reside?

What is your weight in kilograms?

What is your height in centimeters?

Next

Survey 2/2

How do you consider yourself? Are you normally a person who is totally willing to take risks or tries to avoid taking risks? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "totally willing to take risks" and five "Completely contrary to taking risks." :

3

Are you normally fully willing to take financial risks or are you trying to avoid taking financial risks? Please answer using the following scale of one to five, where one indicates "totally willing to take risks" and five "Totally opposed to taking risks".

3

If you had to get COP 600,000 in a week to face an unplanned expense, how much difficulty do you think you would have in getting the money?

Have you been physically assaulted in the past twelve months?

Please indicate how many times:

Has a family member of yours been physically assaulted in the past twelve months?

Please, how many times:

Have you been in the midst of a confrontation involving the use of pistols or other firearms in the past five years?

Please indicate how many times:

Have you been subjected to direct violence (physical or psychological) in the last twelve months?

What do you think is your probability of being the victim of a robbery in the next 12 months? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "not very probable" and 5 indicates "very probable".

3

Do you agree with the statement "the neighborhood where I live is violent"? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "I totally disagree" and 5 indicates "I totally agree".

3

If you were to need help, would you go to someone unknown in your same neighborhood?

Do you feel safe while walking in the afternoon in your neighborhood?

What is the stratum of the house where you expect to live throughout your life?

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6

How often do you vote in political elections?

☐ Every time ☐ Almost always ☐ Rarely ☐ Never ☐ I have never voted

Imagine the following situation: you are shopping in a city that is unfamiliar to you and you realize you have lost your way. You decide to ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to drive you to your destination. The trip lasts about 20 minutes and costs the stranger 20,000 pesos. The stranger does not want money for carrying it. You carry six bottles of wine with you. The cheapest bottle costs 5,000 pesos, the most expensive bottle costs 30,000 pesos. You decide to give one of your bottles to the stranger as thanks for the favor. What bottle would you give him? :

- ☐ Bottle of 5,000 pesos
- ☐ Bottle of 10,000 pesos
- ☐ Bottle of 15,000 pesos
- ☐ Bottle of 20,000 pesos
- ☐ Bottle of 25,000 pesos
- ☐ Bottle of 30,000 pesos

How do you see yourself? Are you a person who is generally willing to punish unfair behaviors, even if this is costly to you? Please use a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means that you "are not willing to incur costs to punish unfair behaviors" and 10 means that you "are very willing to incur costs to punish unfair behaviors." You can also use the intermediate values to indicate where you are on the scale.

In the task where you had to decide whether or not to steal 80% of another participant's earnings, from another session, Regardless of whether or not you decided to steal, what do you think happens to the other participant's payment if they don't steal it?

If you decided to steal in the task described in the previous question, how much money do you think you will earn from the theft? (write a value in pesos) If you did not decide to steal write " NA " . :

Next

[Payment procedure]

[While participants answer the questionnaire, the session assistant hands out a receipt of payment (compulsory under university regulations) for participants to fill out]

[After completing the questionnaire, participants click on the “next” button and see an instruction to please remain seated until they are asked to come to the front desk as in the following screen:]

The end

We appreciate your participation in this study.

Please remain seated. We will call you by name to deliver the envelope with your payment and to give us the pen. Then you can leave.

If you want to participate in an activity similar to this, for which you can also earn some money, please write your email below to get information about it.

Email:

Have a great day.

Next

[After delivering the envelopes, check if the form has been filled correctly. Thank the participant and ask her to leave the room.]

II. Experiment II – Cheating

Verification

Welcome,
On behalf of UEC-CID we appreciate your participation.

In order to verify that you are eligible to participate in this study (or that you have not previously participated), we must first verify the following information (or that you have not previously participated), we must first verify the following data:

- ID number (Write down only the numbers, please):

- Institutional email address (@unal.edu.co):

Also, please remember that payment for participating in this study will be made through the Daviplata platform.
Please enter the phone number associated with your Daviplata account.

- Cellphone number (Daviplata):

Before proceeding to the next page, please carefully verify Daviplata's phone number to avoid problems with your payment.

When you are ready, please click the "Next" button.

Next

General Instructions

On behalf of UEC-CID we appreciate your participation.

Today's activity is part of a study on how people make decisions. Depending on the decisions you make today, you can earn a certain amount of money, so it is important that you pay close attention to these instructions. This study is part of an international project involving the National University of Colombia.

Before proceeding with this activity, make sure you are fully available for this activity for at least 30 minutes.

For your participation you will receive what you earn as a result of your decisions. In no case you will lose the money you have with you. The payment will be delivered to your Daviplata account. It is important to note that only if you complete all the activity and the survey at the end, you will be able to receive the amount of money you earn for your decisions.

Please note that your decisions, including payments, are completely anonymous, meaning that no other participant will know this information at any time.

This is a three-part task. In the first part you will have to solve a transcription task. In this task you will be presented with a series of texts and your task will be to transcribe them. In the second part you will have to make two decisions. Finally, in the third part, you will have to answer a questionnaire.

Your payoff is the result of the winnings you accumulate in the first and second parts. After a couple of couple of days we will deposit that amount in your Daviplata account.

To participate you must sign the informed consent form. This document is the only one where you will indicate personal data, the other answers are absolutely anonymous. The informed consent form includes the data of those responsible for the project in case you wish to contact us to resolve any questions after today's activity is over.

Please click on the "Start" button. After filling out the informed consent form, follow the instructions on the screen.

Start

INFORMED CONSENT

First part

Instructions - Transcription Task

The first part of the study consists of two stages.

In the first stage, your computer screen will display sentences, one at a time. Your task is to transcribe them in the box provided for this purpose. You must transcribe as many sentences as you can in a period of 4 minutes. For each sentence you transcribe correctly you will be paid 1 Experimental Currency Unit (UME). At the end of the time, the second stage will begin. In the second stage, one of two possible events may occur that could affect your earnings in this task:

1. Your accumulated earnings in the first stage will not be affected in any way.
2. You will lose 80% of your accumulated earnings from the first stage.

The probability of occurrence of each of these events is 50%, i.e., the same probability that, when a coin is tossed, it will come up heads.

At the end of the activity, the Experimental Monetary Units (UME) you have earned will be converted to Colombian pesos. Each UME is worth 2000 colombian pesos.

Let's look at the following example:

If at the end of the first part you transcribed 10 sentences, you will have earned 10 UME. However, if the event that occurred was that you lost 80% of your earnings, then you will gain 2 UME in this part. Conversely, if the event that occurred was that your earnings were not affected in any way, then you will earn 10 UME on this part.

When you are ready to start, click on the "Next" button..

Next

First Part

Time left to complete this page: **0:36**

Please transcribe the text below in the space provided. Be accurate and be sure that your transcription has all the characters and spaces as they appear in the text. When you are finished transcribing, click the "Next" button to continue to the next sentence.

This is round number: 1.
Your previous answer was:
The number of correct answers so far is: 0.
You have accumulated 0 UME so far.

Lah isang anak na lalakiarili angpo

Write your answer in this space.

Next

First Part - Second Stage

Second Stage - Transcription Task

Your accumulated earnings **have** been affected.
You had accumulated **0 UME**. Now you have **0,0 UME**.

The following table provides a summary of your performance:

Text number	Original text	Your text	¿Was it correct? 1=Yes, 0=No
1	Lah isang anak na lalakiarili angpo		0

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Next

Second part

Instructions

This is the second part of the study.

In this task you will determine your own payout by rolling one (1) virtual die twice when instructed to do so. Your first roll will determine how much you will receive in this task.

In the following link you will find a virtual die, however, you can use any virtual or physical die you like.

<https://www.dado-virtual.com/>

You can see in the following table the exact payout you will get in this task according to the draw you report:

Result of the draw	1	2	3	4	5	6
Payoff in UME	2 UME	4 UME	6 UME	8 UME	10 UME	0 UME

This table will remain on the screen until you have entered the value of your draw. Your second roll is only for the purpose of making sure that the die is working properly. You may, of course, roll the die more than twice, however, only the first roll is the one that counts. Note that your roll is totally private. On the next screen you will be asked to make your rolls.

At the end of the exercise, the Experimental Currency Units (EMUs) that constitute your payout will be converted to Colombian pesos. Each EMU is equivalent to 2000 Colombian pesos.

If you are ready to continue, please press the "Next" button.

Next

Second part

Draw

Result from the draw	1	2	3	4	5	6
Payoff in UME	2 UME	4 UME	6 UME	8 UME	10 UME	0 UME

Please use your virtual die and make your rolls (www.dado-virtual.com).

Please select the number of your first roll of the die in the box below:

Now, please select your payoff according to the table above in the following table:

If you already rolled, please press the "Next" button.

Next

Second Part

Results

You reported having drawn the number **2**.

Your payment for this task is **4 UME**.

[Next](#)

Survey 1/1

What is your gender:

☐ Male ☐ Female ☐ Other

What is your age?

What is your marital status?

¿School?

Major:

How many times have you enrolled counting the current semester?

What is the highest level of education reached by your father?

What is the highest level of education attained by your mother?

According to your utility bills, what is the current housing stratum where you live in?

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6

What is the locality where you reside?

What is your weight in kilograms?

What is your height in centimeters?

Next

Survey 2/2

How do you consider yourself? Are you normally a person who is totally willing to take risks or tries to avoid taking risks? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "totally willing to take risks" and five "Completely contrary to taking risks."

3

Are you normally fully willing to take financial risks or are you trying to avoid taking financial risks? Please answer using the following scale of one to five, where one indicates "totally willing to take risks" and five "Totally opposed to taking risks".

3

If you had to get COP 600,000 in a week to face an unplanned expense, how much difficulty do you think you would have in getting the money?

Have you been physically assaulted in the past twelve months?

Please indicate how many times:

Has a family member of yours been physically assaulted in the past twelve months?

Please, how many times:

Have you been in the midst of a confrontation involving the use of pistols or other firearms in the past five years?

Please indicate how many times:

Have you been subjected to direct violence (physical or psychological) in the last twelve months?

What do you think is your probability of being the victim of a robbery in the next 12 months? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "not very probable" and 5 indicates "very probable".

3

Do you agree with the statement "the neighborhood where I live is violent"? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "I totally disagree" and 5 indicates "I totally agree".

3

If you were to need help, would you go to someone unknown in your same neighborhood?

 ▼

Do you feel safe while walking in the afternoon in your neighborhood?

 ▼

What is the stratum of the house where you expect to live throughout your life?

- ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6

How often do you vote in political elections?

- ☐ Every time ☐ Almost always ☐ Rarely ☐ Never ☐ I have never voted

Imagine the following situation: you are shopping in a city that is unfamiliar to you and you realize you have lost your way. You decide to ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to drive you to your destination. The trip lasts about 20 minutes and costs the stranger 20,000 pesos. The stranger does not want money for carrying it. You carry six bottles of wine with you. The cheapest bottle costs 5,000 pesos, the most expensive bottle costs 30,000 pesos. You decide to give one of your bottles to the stranger as thanks for the favor. What bottle would you give him? :

- ☐ Bottle of 5,000 pesos
☐ Bottle of 10,000 pesos
☐ Bottle of 15,000 pesos
☐ Bottle of 20,000 pesos
☐ Bottle of 25,000 pesos
☐ Bottle of 30,000 pesos

Experiment III – Prisoners' Dilemma

General Instructions

Welcome:

Today's activity is part of a research project and has a maximum duration of 30 minutes. The instructions are simple and if you read them carefully and follow them, you can earn a considerable amount of money. For this reason, we ask you to be fully concentrated during the activity and avoid distractions.

This experiment consists of two parts.

Your payout is the result of the earnings you accumulate in the first and second part plus a fixed participation fee of 8000 Colombian pesos. Each part has initial instructions so please read them carefully before starting.

To participate you must sign the informed consent form. This document is the only one where you will indicate personal data, the other answers are absolutely anonymous. The informed consent includes the contact information of the project managers in case you wish to contact them to resolve any concerns after today's activity is over. You can only participate once in this study, if you participate more than once, your decisions will not be paid for additional participations.

To begin, please enter the initials of your first and last name followed by your date of birth. For example, if your name is Lina Rios and you were born on February 11, 1995, you would enter LR11021995. Write everything in capital letters. This label is important for making payments.

Informed consent

[Informed consent page]

First part

First stage

Instructions - Transcription task

The first part of the study consists of two stages.

In the first stage, sentences will appear on your computer screen, one at a time. Your task is to transcribe them in the box provided. You must transcribe as many sentences as you can in a period of 4 minutes. Your performance will be measured in points, where for

each sentence you transcribe correctly, you will earn one point. At the end of the four minutes, the second stage will begin.

In the second stage, your performance may be affected. At the end of this first stage, we will tell you specifically how your performance may be affected.

At the end of the activity, the points you have earned will be converted to Colombian pesos. Each point is equivalent to 2000 Colombian pesos.

When you are ready to start the first stage, click on the "Start" button.

Start

First part

Time available to complete this page:

Please transcribe the text below in the space below. Be accurate and be sure that your transcription includes all the characters and spaces as they appear in the text. When you are finished transcribing, click the "Next" button to continue to the next sentence.

This is round number:

Your previous answer was:

The number of correct answers so far is:

You have accumulated X "points" so far.

"Write your answer in this space."

Next

[...]

First part

Stage Two

In the second stage, one of two possible events may occur that could affect the final measurement of your performance on this task:

1. The measurement of your performance in the first stage will not be affected in any way.
2. The computer will remove 80% of the points earned for your correct answers.

The probability of each of these events occurring is 50%, i.e., the same probability that, when flipping a coin, heads will come up.

Let's look at the following example:

If at the end of the first part you correctly transcribed 10 sentences, you will have earned 10 points. However, if the event that occurred was that your performance was affected, then you will earn 2 points in this part. Conversely, if the event that occurred was that your performance was not affected in any way, then you will earn 10 points on this part.

When you are ready to start the second stage, click the "Start" button.

Start

First part

Results of the second stage:

{ If treatment no shock }

Your cumulative gains have NOT been affected. These are your gains for this task: xx points.

{ If shock treatment }

Your cumulative gains HAVE been affected. You now have:

These are your gains for this task: xx points.

In the following table you will find a summary of your performance in the first stage:

Text number	Original text	Your text	Was it correct?
1	Lah isang anak na llakiarili angpo	[Text]	No
.	.	.	Yes
.	.	.	.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Next

Second part

In this second part you will be paired with another person. This person is in the current session and will be chosen at random. Neither you nor the other person will know the identity of the other so you will feel comfortable making your decisions.

We will now explain the situation in which you will have to make the decision and the possible outcomes.

You and the other person have to choose between two colors: **green** and **blue**. What you will receive depends on the color you choose, and the color chosen by the person paired with you.

Only four things can happen:

1. if you both choose **green**, you both earn 4 Points.
2. If you both choose the color **blue**, you both earn 8 Points.
3. If you choose **green** and the other person chooses **blue**, you earn 11 Points, and the other person earns 1 Point.
4. If you choose the **blue** color and the other person chooses the **green** color, you earn 1 Point, and the other person earns 11 Points.

These four possible outcomes can be represented in the following table, where the first number in each cell corresponds to your payoff and the number after the semicolon corresponds to the other person's payoff. Please take some time to understand the table because you will use it later to make your decision.

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

Next, we will ask you four check questions about your understanding of the activity. These answers will not affect your payment in the activity.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Next

Control question #1

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

If the other person chose green, how much would you earn by choosing green? how much would the other person earn?

- ☐ 4 Points for you and 4 Points for the other person
- ☐ 11 Points for you and 1 Points for the other person
- ☐ 8 Points for you and 8 Points for the other person
- ☐ 1 Points for you and 11 Points for the other person

Next

Feedback control question #1

If the other person chose green, how much would you earn by choosing green? how much would the other person earn?

Feedback: **Correct/Incorrect.** If the other person chose green and you chose green, then you would each earn 4 points.

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

Next

Control question #2

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

If the other person chose green, how much would you earn by choosing blue? how much would the other person earn?

- ☐ 4 Points for you and 4 Points for the other person
- ☐ 11 Points for you and 1 Points for the other person
- ☐ 8 Points for you and 8 Points for the other person
- ☐ 1 Points for you and 11 Points for the other person

Next

Feedback control question #2

If the other person chose green, how much would you earn by choosing blue? how much would the other person earn?

Feedback: **Incorrect.** If the other person chose green and you chose blue, then you would earn 1 point and the other person would earn 11 points.

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

Next

Control question #3

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

If the other person chose blue, how much would you earn by choosing blue? how much would the other person earn?

- ☐ 4 Points for you and 4 Points for the other person
- ☐ 11 Points for you and 1 Points for the other person
- ☐ 8 Points for you and 8 Points for the other person
- ☐ 1 Points for you and 11 Points for the other person

Next

Feedback control question #3

If the other person chose blue, how much would you earn by choosing blue? how much would the other person earn?

Feedback: **Incorrect.** If the other person picked blue and you picked blue, then you would each earn 8 points.

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

Next

Control question #4

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

If the other person chose blue, how much would you earn by choosing green? how much would the other person earn?

- ☐ 4 Points for you and 4 Points for the other person
- ☐ 11 Points for you and 1 Points for the other person
- ☐ 8 Points for you and 8 Points for the other person
- ☐ 1 Points for you and 11 Points for the other person

Next

Feedback control question #4

If the other person chose blue, how much would you earn by choosing green, how much would the other person earn?

Feedback: Incorrect. If the other participant chose blue and you chose green, then you would earn 11 points and the other person would earn 1 point.

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

Next

Decision

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

[Random order]

1. If you were convinced that the other person would choose Blue (scenario "the other person chooses blue"), what would you choose?

☒ **Green**

☐ **Blue**

2. If you were convinced that the other person would choose Green (scenario "the other person chooses green"), what would you choose?

☐ **Green**

☐ **Blue**

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Next

Decision

		The other person	
		Green	Blue
You	Green	4 Points; 4 Points	11 Points; 1 Points
	Blue	1 Points; 11 Points	8 Points; 8 Points

Remember that just like you, the other person is also making a decision at this very moment. Depending on what you tell us now, your corresponding answer will be taken in the two scenarios above (scenario "the other person chooses green" or "the other person chooses blue") and this will be the decision that will determine your payout along with the other person's decision. If you believe that "green" and "blue" are equally likely, we will randomly select your answer for the "I believe the other chooses green" scenario or "I believe the other chooses blue" scenario.

Now tell us: What do you think the other person will choose: Green or Blue?

- I think he/she will choose Green [You indicated for this case the choice xxx].
- I think he/she will choose Blue [You indicated for this case the choice xxx].
- I think it is equally likely that the other person will choose Green or Blue [The computer randomly implements either your decision for the scenario "the other person chooses Green" or your decision for the scenario "the other person chooses Blue"].

Next

Results – Second Part

	Result
Your belief about the other person's decision	
Your decision	
The other person's decision	
Your payment in points	# Points
Your total payment in Colombian pesos	#### COP

Next

Summary of today's activity

Result of the first part	
Number of correct transcriptions	#
Number of points earned per correct transcription	# points
Final number of points after being affected	# points
Result of the second part	

Final number of points earned	## Points
Final payoff	
Your profit in points in the two parts	## Points
Your winnings in Colombian pesos in the two parts	#####
Fixed payment for participation in Colombian pesos	####

Final payment in Colombian pesos ####

Please click on the "Next" button to continue with the questionnaire.

Next

What is your gender?

Male

Female

Other

What is your age?

What is your marital status?

What major are you enrolled in?

How many tuition fees have you paid counting this semester's tuition?

According to your utility bills, what is the strata of the current home where you reside?

☐ 1

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 4

☐ 5

☐ 6

Next

Questionnaire (Page 2 of 2)

How do you consider yourself? Are you normally a person who is totally willing to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "totally willing to take risks" and five indicates "totally averse to taking risks":

How do you see yourself - are you a person who is generally willing to punish unfair behavior, even if it is costly to you? Please use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means that you are "not willing to incur costs to punish unfair behaviors" and 5 means that you are "very willing to incur costs to punish unfair behaviors." You can also use the values in between to indicate where you are on the scale.

Survey Experiment - Social norm elicitation experiment

Verification

Welcome,
On behalf of UEC-CID we appreciate your participation.

In order to verify that you are eligible to participate in this study (or that you have not previously participated), we must first verify the following information (or that you have not previously participated), we must first verify the following data:

- ID number (Write down only the numbers, please):

- Institutional email address (@unal.edu.co):

Also, please remember that payment for participating in this study will be made through the Daviplata platform.
Please enter the phone number associated with your Daviplata account.

- Cellphone number (Daviplata):

Before proceeding to the next page, please carefully verify Daviplata's phone number to avoid problems with your payment.

When you are ready, please click the "Next" button.

Next

Part One

Situation 1 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who is randomly paired with another person, Individual B, in a decision-making study. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired. For this decision, both A and B received COP 10,000. Both Individual A and Individual B have to decide whether to leave the other's endowment as it is (COP 10,000) or to reduce it by half (to COP 5,000). Reducing it costs COP 1,000. Four things can happen:

- If both decide to leave the initial endowment as is, both will earn COP 10,000.
- If individual A decides to reduce individual B's initial endowment, but individual B decides to leave A's initial endowment as is, then individual A will earn COP 9,000 and individual B will earn COP 5,000.
- If Individual A decides to leave Individual B's initial endowment as is, but Individual B decides to reduce Individual A's initial endowment, then Individual A will earn COP 5,000 and Individual B will earn COP 9,000.
- If both decide to reduce the initial endowment of the other, both will earn COP 4,000.

In this task 184 people participated, all undergraduate students at the National University enrolled in this lab.

For this situation we are going to ask you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action for individual A, selecting one of the following options:

- Leave the endowment of B as it is if B halves the endowment of A and halve the endowment of B if B leaves the endowment of A as is.
- Leave the endowment of B as it is if B leaves the endowment of A as it is and halve the endowment of B if B halves the endowment of A.
- Leave the endowment of B as it is, regardless of what B decides.
- Reduce the endowment of B by half, whatever B decides.

Part One

Situation 2 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who is randomly paired with another person, Individual B, in a decision-making study. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired. Both individuals receive COP 20,000 initial endowment and must choose an action simultaneously between blue or green. Only one of four situations can happen:

- If both choose green, both lose COP 6,000.
- If both choose blue, both lose COP 2,000.

- If individual A chooses green and individual B chooses blue, then individual A loses nothing and individual B loses COP 10,000.
- If individual A chooses blue and individual B chooses green, then individual A loses COP 10,000 and individual B loses nothing.

In this task 223 people participated, all of them young people from all urban localities of Bogota.

For this situation we are going to ask you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action for individual A, selecting one of the following options:

- Choose green if B chooses green and choose blue if B chooses blue
- Choose blue if B chooses green and choose green if B chooses blue
- Choose green, regardless of what B decides.
- Choose blue, whatever B decides.

Part One

Situation 3 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who is randomly paired with another person, Individual B, in a decision-making study. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired. For this decision, both A and B received COP 8,000. A decides first and makes the decision whether or not to send the COP 8,000 to B. If A decides not to send, they both keep COP 8,000. If he decides to send, B receives COP 24,000 in addition to what he already has (total COP 32,000), because those responsible for the study promised to triple the amount. In the latter case, B decides whether to keep all the COP 32,000 (and A is left with COP 0) or to transfer COP 16,000 to A (both are left with COP 16,000).

This task involved 150 people, all undergraduate students at the National University enrolled in this lab.

For this situation we are going to ask you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action for individual A, selecting one among the following options:

- Send money to B, regardless of what B decides.
- Do not send money to B, regardless of what B decides.
- Do not send money to B if B decides to transfer and send if B decides not to transfer.
- Send money to B if B decides to transfer and do not send money to B if B decides not to transfer.

Now, for the same situation we are going to ask you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action for individual B, selecting one among the following options:

- Do not transfer money to A.
- Transfer Money to A.

Part One

Situation 4 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who was assigned a die to roll anonymously without anyone being able to know the outcome of the draw. Individual A is paid according to the number reported as shown in the following table:

Result of the draw	1	2	3	4	5	6
Payment in COP	2.000	4.000	6.000	8.000	10.000	0

In this task 158 people participated, all undergraduate students at the National University enrolled in this laboratory.

For this situation we are going to ask you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action of individual A, selecting one among the following options:

- Report the number of the draw.
- Report 1, 2, 3 regardless of the draw.
- Report 4, 5 regardless of the draw.
- Report 6 regardless of the draw.
- Report the number of the draw or add/subtract maximum two, to his own benefit.
- Report the number of the draw or add/subtract maximum two, to his own detriment.

Part One

Situation 5 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who is randomly paired with another person, Individual B, in a decision-making study. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired. Individual B is not in the same room as Individual A so that they cannot see each other at any time. Individual A is offered the chance to steal 80% of Individual B's earnings. Individual B will never see Individual A (and vice versa) but will know that he has been robbed should this occur.

There were 184 participants in this task, all undergraduate students at the National University enrolled in this lab.

For this situation we are going to ask you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action of individual A, selecting one among the following options:

- Steal 80% of the earnings of individual B.
- Do not steal 80% of the earnings of individual B.

Part Two

In this second part we will ask you a series of questions. In each one, we will ask you to make a prediction about what the participants in the decision-making study described in each situation did and what the other respondents to the first part of this same questionnaire answered. For your information, this questionnaire was sent to a list of people in our database, undergraduate students at the National University of Colombia.

In this second part we will show you five situations. For each of these situations we will ask you two types of questions. The first type refers to the behavior of the people who participated in the decision-making study to which the situation refers. The second type refers to the responses of other participants to the first part of this study.

How are we going to determine your payoff? Of the five situations we will draw one and from the drawn situation, we will draw one of the questions. If you answer correctly, we will pay you COP 25,000 in addition to your participation fee (total COP 35,000), otherwise you will only receive a fixed payment of COP 10,000 for your participation. Since the drawing of which of the questions will be paid will occur after everyone has answered, please answer all questions with the utmost care and as if they are all going to be paid.

Part Two

Situation 1 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who is randomly paired with another person, Individual B, in a decision-making study. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired. For this decision, both A and B received COP 10,000. Both Individual A and Individual B have to decide whether to leave the other's endowment as it is (COP 10,000) or to reduce it by half (to COP 5,000). Reducing it costs COP 1,000. Four things can happen:

- If both decide to leave the initial endowment as is, both will earn COP 10,000.
- If individual A decides to reduce individual B's initial endowment, but individual B decides to leave A's initial endowment as is, then individual A will earn COP 9,000 and individual B will earn COP 5,000.
- If Individual A decides to leave Individual B's initial endowment as is, but Individual B decides to reduce Individual A's initial endowment, then Individual A will earn COP 5,000 and Individual B will earn COP 9,000.
- If both decide to reduce the initial endowment of the other, both will earn COP 4,000.

A total of 184 individuals participated in this task, all undergraduate students of the National University enrolled in this laboratory.

Question 1

What do you think was the most frequent choice among the people who participated in the decision-making study?

- Leave individual B's endowment as it is.
- Reduce individual B's endowment by half.

Question 2

Recall that in Part 1 we asked you to state your personal opinion as to what is the appropriate and morally correct action for individual B among:

- Leaving A's endowment as it is, regardless of what A decides.
- Reducing A's endowment by half, regardless of what A decides
- Leaving A's endowment as it is if A leaves B's endowment as it is and reducing A's endowment by half if A halves B's endowment .
- Leave A's endowment as it is if A halves B's endowment and halve A's endowment if A leaves B's endowment as it is.

Among all those who answered the question in Part 1, which of the following do you think was the option most often chosen as appropriate and morally correct?

- Leaving A's endowment as it is, regardless of what A decides
- Reducing A's endowment by half, regardless of what A decides
- Leaving A's endowment as it is if A leaves B's endowment as it is and reducing A's endowment by half if A halves B's endowment
- Leave A's endowment as it is if A halves B's endowment and halve A's endowment if A leaves B's endowment as it is

Part Two

Situation 2 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who is randomly paired with another person, Individual B, in a decision-making study. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired. Both individuals receive COP 20,000 initial endowment and must choose an action simultaneously between blue or green. Only one of four situations can happen:

- If both choose green, both lose COP 6,000.
- If both choose blue, both lose COP 2,000.
- If individual A chooses green and individual B chooses blue, then individual A loses nothing and individual B loses COP 10,000.
- If individual A chooses blue and individual B chooses green, then individual A loses COP 10,000 and individual B loses nothing.

A total of 223 people participated in this task, all of them young people from all urban localities of Bogotá.

Question 1

What do you think was the most frequent choice among the people who participated in the decision-making study and acted as individual B?

- Choose blue
- Choose green

Question 2

Remember that in the first part we asked you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action for individual B between:

- Choosing green, regardless of what A decides.
- Choosing blue, regardless of what A decides
- Choosing blue if A decides blue and choosing green if A decides green
- Choosing blue if A decides green and choosing green if A decides blue

Among all those who answered the question in Part 1, which of the following do you think was the option most often chosen as appropriate and morally correct?

- Choosing green, regardless of what A decides
- Choosing blue, regardless of what A decides
- Choosing blue if A decides blue and choosing green if A decides green
- Choosing blue if A decides green and choosing green if A decides blue

Part Two

Situation 3 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who is randomly paired with another person, Individual B, in a decision-making study. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired. For this decision, both A and B received COP 8,000. A decides first and makes the decision whether or not to send the COP 8,000 to B. If A decides not to send, they both keep COP 8,000. If he decides to send, B receives COP 24,000 in addition to what he already has (total COP 32,000), because those responsible for the study promised to triple the shipment. In the latter case, B decides whether to keep all the COP 32,000 (and A is left with COP 0) or to transfer COP 16,000 to A (both are left with COP 16,000).

This task involved 150 participants, all undergraduate students at the National University enrolled in this laboratory.

Question 1

What do you think was the most frequent choice among the people who participated in the decision making study and acted as individual A?

- Send money to B
- Do not send money to B

Question 2

What do you think was the most frequent choice among the people who participated in the decision making study and acted as individual B?

- Transfer money to A
- Do not transfer money to A

Question 3

Recall that in Part 1 we asked you to state your personal opinion as to what is the appropriate and morally correct action for Individual A between:

- Sending money to B, regardless of what B decides.
- Do not send money to B, regardless of what B decides.
- Sending money to B if B decides to transfer and not sending it if B decides not to transfer.
- Do not send money to B if B decides to transfer and send it if B decides not to transfer.

Among all those who answered the question in Part 1, which of the following do you think was the option most often chosen as appropriate and morally correct?

- Sending money to B, regardless of what B decides.
- Do not send money to B, regardless of what B decides.
- Sending money to B if B decides to transfer and not sending it if B decides not to transfer.
- Do not send money to B if B decides to transfer and send it if B decides not to transfer.

Question 4

Remember that in Part 1 we asked you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action for individual A between:

- Transferring the money to A.
- Not transferring the money to A.

Among all those who answered the question in Part 1, which of the following do you think was the option most often chosen as appropriate and morally right?

- Not transferring the money to A.
- Transferring the money to A.

Part Two

Situation 4 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who was assigned a die to roll anonymously without anyone being able to know the outcome of the draw. Individual A is paid according to the number reported as shown in the following table:

Result of the draw	1	2	3	4	5	6
Payment in COP	2.000	4.000	6.000	8.000	10.000	0

A total of 158 people participated in this task, all undergraduate students of the National University enrolled in this laboratory.

Question 1

What do you think was the most frequent choice among the people who participated in the decision-making study?

- Report 1
- Report 2
- Report 3
- Report 4
- Report 5
- Report 6

Question 2

Recall that in Part 1 we asked you to state your personal opinion as to what is the appropriate and morally correct action for Individual A between:

- Reporting the number resulting from the draw
- Report 1, 2, 3 regardless of the outcome of the draw
- Report 4, 5 regardless of the outcome of the draw.
- Report 6 regardless of the result of the draw.
- Report either the result number of the draw or add/subtract a maximum of two, to his own benefit.
- Report either the number resulting from the draw or add/subtract a maximum of two, to his own detriment.

Among all those who answered the question in the first part, which of the following options do you think was the option most chosen as appropriate and morally correct?

- Reporting the number resulting from the draw
- Report 1, 2, 3 regardless of the outcome of the draw
- Report 4, 5 regardless of the outcome of the draw.
- Report 6 regardless of the result of the draw.
- Report either the result number of the draw or add/subtract a maximum of two, to his own benefit.
- Report either the number resulting from the draw or add/subtract a maximum of two, to his own detriment.

Part Two

Situation 5 of 5

Next, we will describe a real situation in which a person, Individual A, must make a decision. The situation involves Individual A, who is randomly paired with another person, Individual B, in a decision-making study. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired. Individual B is not in the same room as Individual A so that they cannot see each other at any time. Individual A is offered the chance to steal 80% of Individual B's winnings. Individual B will never see Individual A (and vice versa) but will know that he has been robbed should this occur.

A total of 184 individuals participated in this task, all undergraduate students at the National University enrolled in this lab.

Question 1

What do you think was the most frequent choice among the people who participated in the decision-making study?

- Do not steal 80% of the earnings of individual B.
- Steal 80% of the earnings of individual B.

Question 2

Recall that in Part 1 we asked you to state your personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action of Individual A between:

- Stealing 80% of Individual B's earnings.
- Not stealing 80% of Individual B's earnings.

Among all those who answered the question in part one, which of the following do you think was the option most often chosen as appropriate and morally correct?

- Steal 80% of the earnings of individual B.
- Do not steal 80% of the earnings of individual B.

Survey 1/1

What is your gender:

☐ Male ☐ Female ☐ Other

What is your age?

What is your marital status?

¿School?

Major:

How many times have you enrolled counting the current semester?

What is the highest level of education reached by your father?

What is the highest level of education attained by your mother?

According to your utility bills, what is the current housing stratum where you live in?

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6

What is the locality where you reside?

What is your weight in kilograms?

What is your height in centimeters?

Next

Survey 2/2

How do you consider yourself? Are you normally a person who is totally willing to take risks or tries to avoid taking risks? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "totally willing to take risks" and five "Completely contrary to taking risks." :



A horizontal slider scale with a light gray track and a darker gray handle. The handle is positioned at the number 3 on the right side of the scale.

Are you normally fully willing to take financial risks or are you trying to avoid taking financial risks? Please answer using the following scale of one to five, where one indicates "totally willing to take risks" and five "Totally opposed to taking risks".



A horizontal slider scale with a light gray track and a darker gray handle. The handle is positioned at the number 3 on the right side of the scale.

If you had to get COP 600,000 in a week to face an unplanned expense, how much difficulty do you think you would have in getting the money?

Have you been physically assaulted in the past twelve months?

Please indicate how many times:

Has a family member of yours been physically assaulted in the past twelve months?

Please, how many times:

Have you been in the midst of a confrontation involving the use of pistols or other firearms in the past five years?

Please indicate how many times:

Have you been subjected to direct violence (physical or psychological) in the last twelve months?

What do you think is your probability of being the victim of a robbery in the next 12 months? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "not very probable" and 5 indicates "very probable".



A horizontal slider scale with a light gray track and a darker gray handle. The handle is positioned at the number 3 on the right side of the scale.

Do you agree with the statement "the neighborhood where I live is violent"? Please answer using the following scale from one to five, where one indicates "I totally disagree" and 5 indicates "I totally agree".



A horizontal slider scale with a light gray track and a darker gray handle. The handle is positioned at the number 3 on the right side of the scale.

Experiment IV – Rule following task

Verification

Welcome,
On behalf of UEC-CID we appreciate your participation.

In order to verify that you are eligible to participate in this study (or that you have not previously participated), we must first verify the following information (or that you have not previously participated), we must first verify the following data:

- ID number (Write down only the numbers, please):
- Institutional email address (@unal.edu.co):

Also, please remember that payment for participating in this study will be made through the Daviplata platform.
Please enter the phone number associated with your Daviplata account.

- Cellphone number (Daviplata):

Before proceeding to the next page, please carefully verify Daviplata's phone number to avoid problems with your payment.

When you are ready, please click the "Next" button.

[Next](#)

General Instructions

Welcome:

Today's activity is part of a research project and has a maximum duration of 30 minutes. The instructions are simple and if you read them carefully and follow them, you can earn a considerable amount of money. For this reason we ask you to be completely concentrated during the activity and avoid distractions.

The payment will be sent to your Daviplata or Nequi account within two weeks. It is important to note that only if you complete all the activity and the survey at the end, you will receive the amount of money you earn for your decisions, otherwise you will not receive the payment.

This is a three-part task. In the first part you will have to solve a task. In the second part you will have to make some decisions. In the third part you will have to answer some questions

Your payment is the result of the earnings you accumulate in the first and second part plus 4000 COP as a fixed participation payment.

To participate you have to sign the informed consent form. This document is the only one where you will indicate personal data, the other answers are absolutely anonymous. The informed consent includes the contact information of those responsible for the project in case you wish to contact us to resolve any concerns after today's activity is over. You can only participate once in this study, if you participate more than once your decisions will not be paid for additional participations.

Please click on the "Start" button. After completing the informed consent form follow the instructions on the screen.

“Start”

Part One

Instructions - Transcription Task

[NOT SHOWN IN TREATMENTS HIGH AND LOW] The first part of the study consists of two stages.

In this stage, sentences will appear on your computer screen, one at a time. Your task is to transcribe them in the box provided. You must transcribe as many sentences as you can in a period of 4 minutes. For each sentence you transcribe correctly, you will be paid 1 point [0.2 points in treatment LOW]. At the end of the activity, the points you have earned will be converted to Colombian pesos. Each point is equivalent to 1000 Colombian pesos.

[NOT SHOWN IN TREATMENTS HIGH AND LOW] Please note that what you receive in this first stage may be affected by what happens in the second stage of this first part. You will receive instructions on the second stage at the end of the first stage.

When you are ready to begin, click on the "Next" button.

“Next”

First Part

Time left to complete this page: 0:04

Please transcribe the text below in the space provided. Be accurate and be sure that your transcription has all the characters and spaces as they appear in the text. When you are finished transcribing, click the "Next" button to continue to the next sentence.

This is round number: 1.
Your previous answer was:
The number of correct answers so far is: 0.
You have accumulated 0 UME so far.

Lah isang anak na lalakiarili angpo

Write your answer in this space.

Next

[NOT SHOWN IN TREATMENTS HIGH AND LOW]

Part One - Second Stage

Stage Two - Transcription Task

In the second stage one of two possible events may occur that may affect the final measurement of your performance on this task:

1. Your cumulative earnings from the first stage will not be affected in any way.
2. You will lose 80% of your accumulated earnings from the first stage.

The probability of each of these events occurring is 50%, i.e., the same probability that, when flipping a coin, heads will come up.

Let's look at the following example:

If at the end of the first part you transcribed 10 sentences, you will have earned 10 Points. However, if the event that occurred was that you lost 80% of your earnings, then you will earn 2 Points in this part. Conversely, if the event that occurred was that your earnings were not affected in any way, then you will earn 10 Points in this part.

"Next"

Part 2

In the next screen, you will find a figure of a stick person and some traffic lights.


You will be able to control this figure by clicking on the "Walk" button at the bottom of the screen.

When you click on the "Walk" button, the figure will cross the traffic light and wait in front of the next one.

To make the figure move again, you will have to click the "Walk" button again. Thus, each time you click the "Walk" button, the figure will move to the next traffic light.

The rule is to wait at each traffic light until it changes to green. Your payout in this part will depend on the time it takes for your figure to pass five traffic lights. From this moment on, you have 30 points, corresponding to 30 seconds. Each second that passes, this amount will decrease by 1 point. At the end the remaining points will be converted to Colombian pesos at the exchange rate of 1 point to 1000 COP.

"Next"



SUMMARY OF TODAY'S ACTIVITY

Result of the first part	
Final number of experimental points.	0.0 points
Final amount of Colombian pesos	0 COP
Result of the second part	
Your earnings in Colombian pesos the second part were	0
Total profit	
Your total profit is:	0 COP

Please click the "Next" button to continue with the questionnaire.

Next

Results

Traffic Light	Time	Discount
1:	210.24 segundos	-210.24 puntos
2:	0.7 segundos	-0.7 puntos
3:	0.26 segundos	-0.26 puntos
4:	0.2 segundos	-0.2 puntos
5:	0.25 segundos	-0.25 puntos
Payment:	0	

Next

D Pre Registrations

I. NES and cooperation (#89448)

II. NES and the Compliance to Social Norms: Robustness Check (#80601)

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NES and cooperation (#89448)

Created: 02/28/2022 09:53 AM (PT)

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1) Have any data been collected for this study already?

No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

negative economic shocks induce less norm compliance

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.

The likelihood of cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game conditional on the belief of cooperation and the belief of non-cooperation

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

Two conditions, NES and control. NES is an 80% loss on the earnings from a Real Effort Task. Assignment is between subject with 50% chance
The real effort task is a transcription game.

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.

We will run OLS and we test that the level of cooperation (under the belief of cooperation) is lower in the shock treatment than under the control.
We will also run OLS and test that the level cooperation (under the belief of non cooperation) is lower in the shock treatment than under the control. This second effect should be much smaller (or non significant) because the social norm of unconditional cooperation is much less prevalent.
Since we have a prediction on the direction of the effect, tests will be one sided.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.

We won't exclude data but we will analyze robustness when we exclude data with more mistakes in the comprehension questions with feedback in the prisoners' dilemma

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.

200. We assume a cooperation level of 48% in the control, based on a previous experiment by Bogliacino and Gómez and a pooled standard deviation of 25%. A power twomeans in Stata® return 80% power for a 10pp effect, at 5%

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)

Nothing else to pre-register.

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NES and the Compliance to Social Norms: Robustness Check (#80601)

Created: 11/20/2021 04:01 PM (PT)

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1) Have any data been collected for this study already?

No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

A negative economic shock will reduce norm compliance. We test H_0 : Norm Compliance (NES) = Norm Compliance (Control), against the alternative H_a : Norm Compliance (NES) < Norm Compliance (Control).

A wealth effect will change norm compliance. We test H_0 : Norm Compliance (High Wealth) = Norm Compliance (Low Wealth), against the alternative H_a : Norm Compliance (High Wealth) is different from Norm Compliance (Low Wealth)

A negative economic shock will change norm compliance more than a wealth effect. We test H_0 : Delta Norm Compliance (NES)=Delta Norm Compliance (Wealth effect), against the alternative H_a : Delta Norm Compliance (NES) is negative and larger in absolute value than Delta Norm Compliance (Wealth effect)

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.

The time spent in the rule-following task.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

Participants are asked to solve transcriptions in a four minutes RET, after which they have to perform the rule-following task. This is a between-subject design with four conditions. Treatment one has 1 point per correct RET and no exposure to shock. Treatment two has 0.2 point per correct RET and no exposure to shock. Treatment three has 1 point per correct RET and a second phase where the participant will be exposed to a lottery with a potential loss of 80% on the accumulated earnings, but will not experience the shock. Treatment four has 1 point per correct RET and a second phase where the participant will be exposed to a lottery with a potential loss of 80% on the accumulated earnings, and will experience the shock.

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.

We will report the average outcome variable in treatment three and treatment four, and we will perform a t-test, controlling for unequal variance, one sided. We will then report the average outcome variable in treatment one and treatment two, and we will perform a t-test, controlling for unequal variance, two sided.

We will run an OLS regression with dummies for treatments 2, 3, 4 and we will test $\beta(d_2)=0$, $\beta(d_4)=\beta(d_3)$, $\beta(d_4)-\beta(d_3) - (\beta(d_2)-\beta(d_1))=0$

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.

we don't have ex ante exclusion criteria

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.

at least 300 observations. 70 in treatment one, 70 in treatment two, 80 in treatment three, 80 in treatment four. potentially 320, equally distributed

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)

This is an additional experiment in a project where similar experiments with the same logic (RET-shock-main task) have been performed. This is a robustness check where we use the rule following task by Kimbrough, Erik O. and Alexander Vostroknutov ("A portable method of eliciting re-spect for social norms,"Economics Letters, jul 2018,168, 147–150).