Online Appendix 1.   Question wording

We present all survey items used in the research note in their English translations as well as their German originals. Answer options are given in parentheses.

Introduction to the experiment: English translation

Let us now turn to a different topic. In the following, we will show you ten times information on two made-up parties that compete against one another in an election. Please read the displayed information carefully and then decide which party you would rather vote for.

We will also ask you to rate the parties individually twice.

There are no wrong or correct answers to these questions. Only your assessment matters.

(Continue)

Introduction to the experiment: German original

Kommen wir nun zu einem anderen Thema. Im Folgenden zeigen wir Ihnen zehn Mal jeweils Informationen zu zwei ausgedachten Parteien, die gegeneinander bei einer Wahl antreten. Bitte lesen Sie sich die angezeigten Informationen aufmerksam durch und entscheiden Sie sich dann bitte, welche Partei Sie eher wählen würden.

Zwei Mal werden wir Sie zusätzlich bitten, die Parteien einzeln zu bewerten.

Es gibt bei diesen Fragen keine falschen oder richtigen Antworten, es geht ausschließlich um Ihre Einschätzungen.

(Weiter)

Experiment: English translation

	Party A	**Party B**
Party Ideology	Right	Left
Critique of Party Leadership	Party factions	None
Parliamentary Voting Behavior	United	United
Behavior at Party Congress	United	Divided
Clarity of Reform Proposals	High	Low
Party Role	Opposition party	PM party
Candidate's gender	Female	Male
Candidate's age	56 years	38 years
Candidate's occupation	Entrepreneur	Lawyer

If you had to choose between party A and B, which party would you choose?

(Party A, Party B)

All attribute levels are presented in Tables A1 and A2, respectively.

Table A1. Attributes and attribute levels

Dimension & Attribute	Levels
Ideology	
Ideological distance	0, 1, 2, 3, 4
Unity	
Critique of party leadership	None, Rank-and-file members, Former party leader, Party factions
Parliamentary voting behavior	United, Divided
Behavior at party congress	United, Neither united nor divided, Divided
Ambiguity	
Reform clarity	High, Low
Party	
Party role	Junior coalition partner, PM party, Opposition party
Candidate	
Gender	Female, Male
Age	38 years, 56 years, 74 years
Occupation	Employee, Employee (retired), Entrepreneur, Lawyer, Politician , Activist

Experiment: German original

	Partei A	Partei B
Politische Ausrichtung der Partei	rechts	links
Kritik an der Parteiführung	durch innerparteiliche Flügel	keine
Abstimmungsverhalten im Parlament	einheitlich	einheitlich
Verhalten auf dem Parteitag	geschlossen	zerstritten
Klarheit der Reformvorhaben	klar	unklar
Rolle der Partei im Parlament	Oppositionspartei	Partei des Regierungschefs
Geschlecht des Spitzenkandidaten	weiblich	männlich
Alter des Spitzenkandidaten	56 Jahre	38 Jahre
Berufliche Erfahrung des Spitzenkandidaten	Unternehmerin	Anwalt

Wenn Sie sich zwischen Partei A und B entscheiden müssten, welche Partei würden Sie wählen?

(Partei A, Partei B)

Table A2. Attributes and attribute levels

Dimension & Attribute	Levels
Ideology	
Ideologische Distanz	0, 1, 2, 3, 4
Unity	
Kritik an der Parteiführung	keine, durch die Parteibasis, durch ehemaligen Parteivorsitzenden, durch innerparteiliche Flügel
Abstimmungsverhalten im Parlament	einheitlich, uneinheitlich
Verhalten auf dem Parteitag	geschlossen, weder geschlossen noch zerstritten, zerstritten
Ambiguity	
Klarheit der Reformvorhaben	klar, unklar
Party	
Rolle der Partei im Parlament	Regierungspartei, Partei des Regierungschefs, Oppositionspartei
Candidate	
Geschlecht des Spitzenkandidaten	weiblich, männlich
Alter des Spitzenkandidaten	38 Jahre, 56 Jahre, 74 Jahre
Berufliche Erfahrung des Spitzenkandidaten [Exact specification depends on candidate gender]	Angestellte[r] , Angestellte[r] (im Ruhestand), Unternehmer[in], Anwalt [Anwältin], Politiker[in] , Aktivist[in]

Party rating: English translation

Now let's look at Party A. How do you rate Party A overall?

(1 = very negative, 2, 3, 4 = neither negative nor positive, 5, 6, 7 = very positive)

Party rating: German original

Betrachten wir nun Partei A. Wie bewerten Sie Partei A insgesamt?

(1 = sehr negativ, 2, 3, 4 = weder negativ noch positiv, 5, 6, 7 = sehr positiv)

Left-right self-placement: English translation

In politics, people often talk about "left" and "right." Using this scale here, where would you classify yourself if 1 is "left" and 11 is "right"?

Please indicate the value that applies to you personally.

(1 = left, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 = right, don't know)

Left-right self-placement: German original

In der Politik reden die Leute häufig von „links" und „rechts". Wenn Sie diese Skala hier benutzen, wo würden Sie sich selbst einordnen, wenn 1 „links" und 11 „rechts" ist?

Bitte geben Sie den Wert an, der auf Sie persönlich zutrifft.

(1 = links, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 = rechts, weiß ich nicht)

Online Appendix 2.   Regression output

Table A3. Estimated coefficients from the conditional logistic model

	coefficient	robust s.e.
Ideological distance (reference: 0)		
1	-0.417***	0.029
2	-1.443***	0.037
3	-2.747***	0.072
4	-3.823***	0.215
Intra-Party Critique (reference: None)		
Rank-and-file members	0.011	0.029
Former party leader	-0.059*	0.029
Party factions	-0.072*	0.029
Parliamentary voting (reference: United)		
Divided	-0.228***	0.021
Behavior at Party Congress (reference: United)		
Neither united nor divided	-0.168***	0.025
Divided	-0.607***	0.028
Reform clarity (reference: High)		
Low	-0.658***	0.023
Party role (reference: PM party)		
Opposition party	-0.026	0.025
Junior coalition partner	0.014	0.024
Candidate's gender (reference: Female)		
Male	-0.094***	0.021
Candidate's age (reference: 38 years)		
56 years	-0.092***	0.025
74 years	-0.645***	0.03
Candidate's occupation (reference: Employee)		
Activist	-0.292***	0.038
Lawyer	-0.056	0.037
Politician	-0.107**	0.037
Entrepreneur	-0.045	0.037
Employee (retired)	-0.206***	0.053
Log Likelihood	-14418.627	
N (observations)	53522	
N (choices)	26761	
N (respondents)	3687	

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05

Online Appendix 3.   Comparison linear regression and conditional logit regression

In the research note's regression analysis, we opt for a conditional logit model because our survey experiment is based on random utility theory, and may be labelled a discrete choice experiment according to Louviere, Flynn, and Carson (2010). Hence, we compute conditional logistic regression models which are also based on random utility theory (McFadden 1974; Train 2009). Many scholars, however, follow Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) and estimate AMCEs in conjoint experiments using linear models. Below, we show that our conclusions do not depend on which of the two estimators is used.

In Figure A1, we plot the AMCEs as obtained from the conditional logit model (squares) and as derived from the Conjoint AMCE Estimator which Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) use (points). While the AMCEs of some attributes are show some statistically significant differences between the two estimators, these differences are substantially small. Therefore, we conclude that the conclusions we draw from the conditional logit model are also supported by the linear estimation procedure.

Figure A1. Comparison of AMCE's from our approach using conditional logistic regression to the approach using linear regression as implemented in Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014).

Online Appendix 4.   Analysis excluding respondents who give inconsistent answers

To increase our confidence that respondents actually execute the experimental design correctly, we implemented a quality check in it. In particular, in two of the ten choice situations presented to them, respondents were asked to not only choose a party but also to rate them on a seven-point scale. While every respondent was asked to rate the first pair of parties, it was randomized in which of the remaining choice situations a respond was asked to provide another pair of party ratings.

We find that 94 % of all choices for which ratings are available as well are consistent, i.e., the respondent rates the party she chooses as least as well as she rates the party she does not choose. In the most conservative interpretation of this quality check, one may argue that a respondent whose ratings are inconsistent with her party choices at least once did not correctly follow the experiment instructions and hence biases the results. Taking that perspective, we restrict the sample to respondents whose choice–rating pairs are always consistent and re-estimate the conditional logit model as desrcibed in the main text.

Figure A2 reports the estimated AMCEs from the full sample (squares) as well as from the consistency–restricted sample (dots). We find that results are virtually identical. In particular, each model's confidence intervals cover the other model's point estimates. We, thus, conclude that our findings are not biased by respondents who did not conduct the experiment as expected.

Figure A2. Comparison of AMCE's when using answers from all respondents (Full sample) to results when excluding respondents who gave at least one inconsistent party rating, i.e. who rated the not chosen party better than the chosen party (Consistent ratings).

Online Appendix 5.   Analysis excluding respondents who do not know all intra-party critique attributes

Not all party unity dimension in the experiment need to be equally easy to understand:[1] This is because of the three party unity dimension included in the experiment, two are ordinal scaled (Parliamentary voting behavior: United, Divided; Behavior at party congress: United, Neither united nor divided, Divided), and one is nominal scaled (Critique of party leadership: None, Rank-and-file members, Former party leader, Party factions). Further, recall that when facing the first choice situation, respondents see (at most) two of the levels of each attribute. One may argue that this allows them to understand whether a given party scores rather high or low on the ordinal scales, but that a corresponding understanding of the nominal scale is less likely. If this line of argument is true, respondents likely make inconsistent choices with respect to the Critique of the party leadership attribute because they adjust their understanding of the attribute significantly once they learn about its other levels. Overall, this would bias our results.

In the following, we present empirical evidence that our substantial results remain unchanged when eliminating the (potential) aforementioned bias. More precisely, we exploit the fact that respondents made up to ten choices, and restrict our sample to choices that were made after a respondent had seen all levels of the Critique of the party leadership attribute. As a consequence, a respondent who previously contributed ten choice situations to the sample may now contribute any number between and zero and eight observations to the sample depending on how soon the randomly generated profile sets included all four levels on the Critique of the party leadership attribute. Overall, the restricted sample draws on $10,967$ choices (40.98 % of the full sample) from 3033 respondents (82.26 %). Other than the restricted sample, our analysis strategy follows the description in the research note.

Figure A3 shows the coefficients and 95 % confidence intervals of both the analysis based on the full sample as presented in the research note (boxes) as well as the analysis based on the restricted sample (circles). A first glance reveals that that any differences that exist between the models' coefficients are rather small. A closer inspection shows that the point estimates obtained from the model based on the full sample are covered by the confidence intervals the model on the restricted sample returns. Further, the latter model estimates wider confidence intervals because it draws on

---

1. We thank Reviewer 1 for pointing this out to us.

fewer data points. This, however, does not affect any conclusions on whether a given coefficient is statistically significant or not. Overall, these results provide evidence that learning about the full set of levels on the Critique of the party leadership attribute does not substantially alter the conclusion we draw in the main text.


Figure A3. Comparison of AMCE's when using answers from all respondents (full sample) to results when excluding respondents who have not seen all attributes of the Intra-Party Critique dimension.

Online Appendix 6.   Comparing effect sizes of party unity to ideological distance

Online Appendix 6.1   Individual effects of party unity attributes

To better understand party unity's substantive importance and their substantive limitations, we compare the effect sizes of different manifestations of party unity and ideological distance. The panels of Figure A4 display predicted vote probabilities as ideological distance and a party unity dimensions vary. The other attributes are set to their reference levels and in particular the party unity attributes to their most united levels. The top panel shows that at any level of ideological distance a party with united voting behavior in parliament (indicated by the dots) is more likely to be chosen than a party with divided parliamentary voting patterns (triangles). Further, the effect of ideological distance is stronger than the effect of a party's voting behavior in parliament. In fact, it is so much stronger that an ideologically less distant party is always more likely to be chosen irrespective of its voting pattern in parliament. Similar to the findings on parliamentary behavior, the center panel reports that dividedness at party congresses harms parties at any level of ideological distance. Interestingly, however, we find that unified behavior at the party congress is so important that it makes a respondent more likely to vote for a united but not ideologically congruent party rather than for a divided party that is ideologically congruent. This suggests that party unity at party congresses alone can make up for ideological distance. Finally, the bottom panel in Figure A4 confirms the results that intra–party critique has a negligible independent effect on vote choice.

The plots also reveal an interaction effect: When ideological distance is small, unity in parliamentary voting and congress behavior make significant and substantially important differences by themselves, but for larger ideological distances, these effects shrink considerably. When a party is located at the other end of the ideological spectrum, party unity makes no difference. For closer races, however, party unity may be the decisive factor.

### *Online Appendix 6.2   Joint effects of party unity attributes*

Above, we established that united behavior in parliament and absence of critique toward the party leadership do not suffice individually to compensate for a single unit of ideological distance. By contrast, united behavior at party congresses can compensate for a single unit of ideological distance by itself, yet, not for more.

In the main text, we further demonstrated that the different party unity attributes' joint effects

can, if combined in the right way, compensate for a unit ideological distance. Here, we show that even the strongest joint effect has only a limited impact on vote choice in comparison to ideological distances.

The table in Figure A5 shows the characteristics of two parties. Please note that Party 1 positions at the voter's positions and is internally fully divided. In particular, all party unity attributes are set to their most divided levels. By contrast, Party 6 positions two units away from the voter and its party unity attributes are as united as possible. Otherwise, the two parties are identical.

As the plot in Figure A5 shows, despite its absolute disunity and Party 6's absolute unity, Party 1 is favored over Party 6. Since all other characteristics are identical, this is due to its smaller ideological distance. Together with the evidence presented in the main text, i.e., that a single unit of policy distance can be compensated for by party unity, we conclude that depending on its joint effect party unity can compensate for a single unit of ideological distance, yet, not for more.

(a) Voting Behavior in Parliament

(b) Behavior at Party Congress

(c) Intra-Party Critique

Figure A4. Predicted vote probabilities based on different dimensions of party unity and ideological distance. All other variables are set to their reference categories (see Figure 1 in the main text).

	Party 1	Party 6
Ideological Distance	0	2
Critique of Party Leadership	Party factions	None
Parliamentary Voting	Divided	United
Behavior at Party Congress	Divided	United
Clarity of Reform Proposals	High	High
Party Role	PM party	PM party
Candidate's gender	Female	Female
Candidate's age	38 years	38 years
Candidate's occupation	Employee	Employee

Party 1   63:37   **Party 6**

100:0   75:25   50:50   25:75   0:100

Figure A5. Hypothetical competition scenarios.

References

Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller, Daniel J. Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2018. The Number of Choice Tasks and Survey Satisficing in Conjoint Experiments. *Political Analysis* 26 (1): 112–119. ISSN: 1476-4989. https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.40.

Ben-Akiva, Moshe, Daniel McFadden, and Kenneth Train. 2019. Foundations of Stated Preference Elicitation: Consumer Behavior and Choice-based Conjoint Analysis. *Foundations and Trends in Econometrics* 10 (1–2): 1–144. ISSN: 1551-3084. https://doi.org/10.1561/0800000036.

Blom, Annelies G., Marina Fikel, Sabine Friedel, Jan Karem Höhne, Ulrich Krieger, Tobias Rettig, Alexander Wenz, and SFB 884 ′Political Economy Of Reforms′, Universität Mannheim. 2020. German Internet Panel, Welle 44 (November 2019), https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13614.

———. 2021. German Internet Panel, Welle 43 – Core Study (September 2019), https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13673.

Blom, Annelies G., Christina Gathmann, and Ulrich Krieger. 2015. Setting Up an Online Panel Representative of the General Population. *Field Methods* 27 (4): 391–408. ISSN: 1525-822X. https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X15574494.

Carey, John M. 2007. Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 92–107. ISSN: 1540-5907.

Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. 2016. Do voters dislike working-class candidates? Voter biases and the descriptive underrepresentation of the working class. *The American Political Science Review* 110 (4): 832. ISSN: 00030554.

Ceron, Andrea. 2012. Bounded oligarchy: how and when factions constrain leaders in party position-taking. *Electoral Studies* 31 (4): 689–701.

———. 2015a. Brave rebels stay home. *Party Politics* 21 (2): 246–258. ISSN: 1354-0688. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812472581.

———. 2015b. The politics of fission: an analysis of faction breakaways among italian parties (1946–2011). *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (1): 121–139.

———. 2017. Intra-party politics in 140 characters. *Party Politics* 23 (1): 7–17. ISSN: 1354-0688. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068816654325.

Ceron, Andrea, and Zachary Greene. 2019. Verba volant, scripta manent? intra-party politics, party conferences, and issue salience in france. *Party Politics* 25 (5): 701–711.

Close, Caroline, and Sergiu Gherghina. 2019. Rethinking intra-party cohesion: towards a conceptual and analytical framework. *Party Politics* 25 (5): 652–663.

Debus, Marc, Mary Stegmaier, and Jale Tosun. 2014. Economic voting under coalition governments: evidence from germany. *Political Science Research and Methods* 2 (1): 49–67.

Franchino, Fabio, and Francesco Zucchini. 2015. Voting in a multi-dimensional space: A conjoint analysis employing valence and ideology attributes of candidates. *Political Science Research and Methods* 3 (2): 221. ISSN: 2049-8489.

Greene, Zachary, and Matthias Haber. 2015. The consequences of appearing divided: An analysis of party evaluations and vote choice. *Electoral Studies* 37:15–27. ISSN: 0261-3794. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.11.002.

———. 2016. Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses. *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 611–632. ISSN: 0007-1234. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000283.

Hainmueller, Jens, Dominik Hangartner, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2015. Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112 (8): 2395–2400. ISSN: 1091-6490. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1416587112.

Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J. Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments. *Political Analysis* 22 (1): 1–30. ISSN: 1476-4989. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpt024.

Jung, Jae-Hee, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2020. United we stand, divided we fall? The effects of parties' Brexit rhetoric on voters' perceptions of party positions. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties,* 1–19. ISSN: 1745-7289. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2020.1839470.

Lehrer, Roni, and Nick Lin. 2020. Everything to everyone? Not when you are internally divided. *Party Politics* 26 (6): 783–794. ISSN: 1354-0688. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068818812222.

Lim, Claire S. H., and James M. Snyder Jr. 2015. Is more information always better? party cues and candidate quality in us judicial elections. *Journal of public Economics* 128:107–123.

McFadden, Daniel. 1974. *Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior.* Vol. Frontiers in econometrics. New York: Academic Press.

Plescia, Carolina, Sylvia Kritzinger, and Jakob-Moritz Eberl. 2020. 'The enemy within': Campaign attention and motivated reasoning in voter perceptions of intra-party conflict. *Party Politics,* 135406882090640. ISSN: 1354-0688. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068820906407.

Sältzer, Marius. 2020. Finding the bird's wings: Dimensions of factional conflict on Twitter. *Party Politics,* 135406882095796. ISSN: 1354-0688. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068820957960.

Sieberer, Ulrich. 2006. Party unity in parliamentary democracies: a comparative analysis. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 12 (2): 150–178.

Somer-Topcu, Zeynep, Margit Tavits, and Markus Baumann. 2020. Does party rhetoric affect voter perceptions of party positions? *Electoral Studies* 65:102153. ISSN: 0261-3794.

Wolkenstein, Fabio. 2016. A Deliberative Model of Intra-Party Democracy. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 24 (3): 297–320. ISSN: 09638016. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12064.