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Table 4: Enforcement & Turnout

	State Capacity		Sanctions				
	(1) State Capacity	(2) Infant Mortality	(3) Fine	(4) Fine	(5) Maximal Fine	(6) Maximal Fine	(7) Other Sanctions
<i>Compulsory Voting & Sanctions</i>							
CV Sanctioned	14.49 (3.76)***	22.51 (5.59)***	21.30 (5.32)***	20.00 (4.78)***	19.83 (4.81)***	18.29 (4.80)***	19.29 (4.09)***
CV Unsanctioned	10.49 (5.11)*	8.56 (4.42) ⁺	10.59 (3.28)**	9.82 (3.07)**	9.81 (3.07)**	9.95 (3.09)**	10.28 (2.89)***
CV Sanctioned × State Capacity	5.30 (2.91) ⁺						
CV Unsanctioned × State Capacity	1.08 (3.39)						
State Capacity	1.20 (2.12)						
CV Sanctioned × Neonatal mortality		-0.42 (0.18)*					
CV Unsanctioned × Neonatal mortality		0.14 (0.16)					
Neonatal mortality		-0.00 (0.13)					
Fine (share of monthly salary)			-0.21 (10.37)				
Fine (share of GDP in \$1,000)				-3.16 (3.35)			
Max Fine (share of monthly salary)					-2.69 (3.57)		
Max Fine (share of GDP in \$1,000)						0.04 (0.05)	
Non-monetary sanction							-1.25 (2.79)
<i>Controls</i>							
Majority Status	-0.16 (0.06)**	-0.17 (0.06)**	-0.15 (0.06)*	-0.15 (0.06)**	-0.15 (0.06)**	-0.15 (0.06)**	-0.14 (0.06)*
Closeness	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Concurrent Election	6.47 (1.80)***	6.57 (2.00)**	7.27 (2.00)***	7.26 (2.00)***	7.26 (2.00)***	7.65 (1.94)***	7.37 (1.90)***
El. System: Majoritarian	-2.83 (1.95)	-2.47 (2.06)	-2.97 (1.99)	-3.45 (1.99) ⁺	-3.45 (1.99) ⁺	-3.31 (1.97) ⁺	-3.40 (1.96) ⁺
El. System: Mixed	-4.04 (1.82)*	-3.02 (1.69) ⁺	-3.63 (1.69)*	-3.96 (1.74)*	-3.96 (1.74)*	-3.92 (1.74)*	-4.19 (1.71)*
El. System: Other	-0.93 (2.35)	0.64 (1.99)	2.44 (2.05)	2.04 (2.08)	2.03 (2.08)	2.18 (2.06)	1.98 (2.05)
Presidential Election	-1.12 (1.03)	-1.29 (0.96)	-1.08 (1.00)	-1.46 (1.07)	-1.47 (1.07)	-1.45 (1.07)	-1.45 (1.03)
Electorate Size (ln)	0.62 (1.34)	1.10 (1.53)	0.82 (1.37)	0.81 (1.37)	0.81 (1.37)	0.91 (1.34)	0.98 (1.38)
Pre-1974 Democratization	0.25 (0.21)	0.43 (0.28)	0.26 (0.18)	0.26 (0.18)	0.26 (0.18)	0.23 (0.16)	0.17 (0.15)
Post-1974 Democratization	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)
Post-Communist Democratization	-0.24 (0.13) ⁺	-0.31 (0.12)*	-0.29 (0.12)*	-0.28 (0.12)*	-0.28 (0.12)*	-0.28 (0.12)*	-0.29 (0.12)*
1970s	7.15 (1.93)***	7.43 (1.99)***	6.69 (1.81)***	6.74 (1.76)***	6.75 (1.76)***	6.67 (1.73)***	6.66 (1.71)***
1980s	6.95 (1.48)***	7.30 (1.51)***	7.06 (1.46)***	7.17 (1.45)***	7.17 (1.45)***	7.00 (1.43)***	6.69 (1.42)***
1990s	4.38 (1.25)***	4.90 (1.27)***	5.22 (1.27)***	5.22 (1.27)***	5.23 (1.27)***	5.16 (1.27)***	4.92 (1.25)***
2000s	0.97 (0.74)	1.45 (0.76) ⁺	1.41 (0.77) ⁺	1.42 (0.77) ⁺	1.42 (0.77) ⁺	1.41 (0.77) ⁺	1.37 (0.76) ⁺
Constant	61.98 (3.99)***	62.84 (4.10)***	63.32 (3.17)***	64.03 (3.16)***	64.05 (3.16)***	63.68 (3.05)***	63.34 (3.16)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1187	1193	1309	1330	1330	1357	1393
R ²	0.23	0.18	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.17

Note: Significance levels: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. N varies depending on data availability.

Table 5: Over-Time Change by Voting Regime

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	No CV	CV Unsanctioned	CV Sanctioned
Year Since 1945	-0.19 (0.04)***	-0.17 (0.08) ⁺	0.07 (0.04) ⁺
Majority Status	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.36 (0.11)**	-0.11 (0.08)
Closeness	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.16 (0.04)**	0.12 (0.09)
Concurrent Election	8.60 (2.26)***	6.30 (3.61)	1.43 (2.11)
El. System: Majoritarian	-2.97 (2.03)	-9.34 (3.56)*	-5.45 (0.75)***
El. System: Mixed	-5.04 (1.92)*	-0.30 (2.06)	-2.83 (5.59)
El. System: Other	1.43 (2.22)		
Presidential Election	-1.53 (1.33)	0.94 (1.33)	-0.78 (1.06)
Electorate Size (ln)	2.49 (1.95)	2.09 (2.47)	-3.16 (3.29)
Pre-1974 Democratization	0.33 (0.18) ⁺	0.15 (0.29)	-0.38 (0.16)*
Post-1974 Democratization	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.14)
Post-Communist Democratization	-0.24 (0.13) ⁺		
Constant	74.14 (3.21)***	80.80 (2.44)***	88.67 (4.61)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1044	130	214
R2	0.18	0.45	0.15

Note: Significance levels: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Regression Diagnostics and Modelling Choices

We conducted the following tests on the full analysis of the 1421 elections (see Model 2 in Table 2): Hausman’s specification test (Hausman 1978, $H_0 =$ no systematic difference between the fixed and random model specifications, $p < 0.001$), the Wooldridge test for serial correlation (Wooldridge 2010, $H_0 =$ no first-order autocorrelation, $p < 0.05$), the Phillips-Perron unit-root test for non-stationarity (Baltagi 2008, $H_0 =$ panels are non-stationary, $p < 0.001$), and the Pesaran test for cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran 2004; $H_0 =$ no contemporaneous correlation, $p > 0.1$). These tests suggest that the main potential issues are unit effects, which we address through country fixed effects (FE) (Allison 2009), and serial correlation, which we tackle through clustered standard errors, as our data are cross-sectionally dominated (Wooldridge 2010, Section 13.8.2).

Robustness Checks

Table EA1: Robustness Checks and Replications of Table 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	FE - GDP p/c	OLS - Baseline	OLSE - Full Model	Italy alt. coding	Est. Dem. Only
CV Unsanctioned	10.68 (2.70)***	7.17 (3.20)*	6.89 (3.46)*	10.44 (3.18)**	7.75 (3.75)*
CV Sanctioned	18.36 (3.02)***	18.75 (2.75)***	16.66 (2.66)***	16.98 (3.67)***	15.35 (4.29)***
Majority Status	-0.17 (0.06)**		-0.12 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.06)**	-0.19 (0.06)**
Closeness	-0.05 (0.03)		-0.07 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.03)**
Concurrent Election	7.13 (1.84)***		-1.13 (1.83)	7.02 (1.86)***	8.29 (2.39)***
El. System: Majoritarian	-3.14 (1.87) ⁺		-2.47 (3.19)	-3.34 (1.98) ⁺	-4.48 (2.08)*
El. System: Mixed	-3.86 (1.81)*		-0.09 (3.43)	-3.73 (1.90) ⁺	-4.33 (2.07)*
El. System: Other	0.79 (2.29)		2.27 (4.25)	2.22 (2.23)	0.74 (2.39)
Presidential Election	-1.45 (1.01)		-3.18 (1.44)*	-1.42 (0.99)	-1.48 (1.27)
Electorate Size (ln)	0.86 (1.31)		-1.36 (0.79) ⁺	0.73 (1.41)	0.52 (1.70)
GDP p/c (ln)	-1.67 (1.88)				
Pre-1974 Democratization	0.14 (0.16)		0.25 (0.33)	0.12 (0.16)	
Post-1974 Democratization	-0.03 (0.12)		0.05 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.11)	
Post-Communist Democratization	-0.24 (0.13) ⁺		0.19 (0.24)	-0.29 (0.12)*	
1940s	2.61 (4.06)		9.35 (3.44)**	5.79 (2.04)**	5.29 (2.33)*
1950s	4.80 (3.50)		9.77 (2.73)***	7.47 (1.90)***	6.19 (2.01)**
1960s	5.94 (2.85)*		8.62 (2.15)***	8.16 (1.56)***	7.33 (1.67)***
1970s	5.12 (2.36)*		8.15 (2.26)***	6.59 (1.72)***	6.95 (1.69)***
1980s	5.30 (1.92)**		7.02 (1.96)***	6.51 (1.42)***	5.74 (1.50)***
1990s	3.39 (1.51)*		3.83 (1.77)*	4.64 (1.28)***	2.50 (1.23)*
2000s	0.76 (0.87)		0.94 (1.04)	1.50 (0.77) ⁺	0.92 (0.77)
Constant	80.25(18.51)***	67.53 (1.61)***	70.77 (2.72)***	64.17 (3.20)***	67.17 (3.91)***
Country FE	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	1363	1421	1421	1421	935
R ²	0.28	0.20	0.30	0.27	0.39

Note: Significance levels: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Model 1 shows that that the inclusion of GDP per capita has no bearing on the estimates from Model 2 in Table 2. Models 2 and 3 replicate the fixed effects analyses via OLS regressions, which do not model unit effects, and yield weaker estimates. Model 4 demonstrates that recoding pre-1993 Italian elections to have sanctioned compulsory voting does not substantively change the result from 2. Finally, Model 5 shows that the results remain substantively similar when the analysis is limited to established democracies that have conducted democratic elections for at least fifteen years.

Table EA2: Replication of Table 5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Interactions Trend X CV	CV Unsanctioned Italy alt. coding	CV Sanctioned Italy alt. coding	CV Unsanctioned Est. Dem. Only	CV Sanctioned Est. Dem. Only
Year Since 1945	-0.16 (0.04)***	-0.14 (0.10)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.16 (0.12)	0.04 (0.04)
Year Since 1945 × CV	0.04 (0.05)				
Year Since 1945 × CV Enforced	0.15 (0.06)*				
CV Unsanctioned	7.95 (3.86)*				
CV Sanctioned	13.24 (3.77)***				
Majority Status	-0.15 (0.06)**	-0.39 (0.10)**	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.40 (0.12)**	-0.28 (0.12)*
Closeness	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.19 (0.03)***	0.12 (0.08)	-0.19 (0.04)**	0.12 (0.09)
Concurrent Election	6.83 (1.92)***	5.84 (3.72)	1.47 (2.09)	6.91 (4.47)	5.25 (1.56)**
El. System: Majoritarian	-3.20 (1.82) ⁺	-9.90 (3.35)*	-5.45 (0.74)***	-8.55 (4.85)	-3.62 (1.29)*
El. System: Mixed	-4.02 (1.75)*	-1.02 (2.04)	-2.66 (4.69)	-4.85 (2.94)	-6.33 (5.27)
El. System: Other	2.03 (2.06)				
Presidential Election	-1.20 (0.93)	0.60 (1.29)	-0.77 (1.01)	0.69 (1.78)	-2.07 (2.36)
Electorate Size (ln)	1.28 (1.54)	1.73 (2.48)	-3.12 (3.33)	2.29 (3.02)	-3.04 (3.37)
Pre-1974 Democratization	0.17 (0.14)	-5.58 (1.55)**	-0.37 (0.16)*		
Post-1974 Democratization	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.07)*	-0.03 (0.14)		
Post-Communist Democratization	-0.30 (0.12)*				
Constant	74.34 (2.67)***	79.58 (2.21)***	89.39 (4.88)***	80.28 (3.25)***	91.74 (5.52)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1386	119	225	96	140
R ²	0.26	0.47	0.15	0.48	0.32

Note: Significance levels: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table EA4 demonstrates that the results from Table 5 in the manuscript are robust to the inclusion of all voting regimes in a single regression model. It shows that there was a negative trend in voter turnout both in countries with a liberal voting regime, and in countries that did not enforce compulsory voting. By contrast, voter turnout did not decline in countries that enforced compulsory voting.

Table EA3: Robustness Checks for Table 4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	State Capacity	Neonat. Mortality	State Capacity Control for GDPpc	Neonat. Mortality Control for GDPpc	State Capacity Italy Alt. Coding	Neonat. Mortality Italy Alt. Coding	State Capacity Est. Dem. Only	Neonat. Mortality Est. Dem. Only
Estimates of state capacity (Hanson/Sigman)	11.94 (2.60)***		8.57 (2.33)**		11.44 (2.59)***		9.90 (3.66)*	
Neonatal mortality		-0.61 (0.19)**		-0.51 (0.23)*		-0.58 (0.20)*		-0.57 (0.14)**
GDP p/c (ln)			8.43 (5.02)	6.59 (4.88)				
Majority Status	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.20 (0.09)*	-0.14 (0.08) ⁺
Closeness	0.12 (0.07) ⁺	0.09 (0.08)	0.11 (0.06) ⁺	0.08 (0.08)	0.12 (0.06) ⁺	0.10 (0.08)	0.14 (0.10)	0.06 (0.09)
Concurrent Election	2.32 (2.09)	-0.57 (2.54)	1.34 (2.44)	-0.71 (2.63)	2.37 (2.16)	-0.41 (2.54)	3.93 (1.15)**	0.23 (1.17)
El. System: Majoritarian	-2.08 (1.28)	-3.95 (1.65)*	-1.27 (1.43)	-3.06 (1.88)	-2.07 (1.28)	-3.81 (1.62)*	-1.44 (1.22)	-1.05 (0.80)
El. System: Mixed	-2.62 (2.98)	0.65 (2.44)	-2.37 (2.70)	0.36 (2.23)	-2.61 (3.00)	0.72 (2.40)	-3.81 (2.94)	0.12 (1.84)
El. System: Other								
Presidential Election	-0.71 (1.05)	-0.18 (0.96)	-0.60 (1.04)	-0.21 (0.98)	-0.73 (1.04)	-0.17 (0.96)	-1.28 (1.94)	0.39 (1.62)
Electorate Size (ln)	-0.65 (2.79)	-5.52 (4.88)	-1.55 (2.75)	-4.50 (4.66)	-0.54 (2.73)	-5.33 (4.89)	-2.24 (2.22)	-0.32 (3.15)
Pre-1974 Democratization	-0.54 (0.39)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.57 (0.34)	-0.12 (0.06) ⁺	-0.53 (0.38)	-0.04 (0.09)		
Post-1974 Democratization	-0.27 (0.18)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.25 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.21 (0.16)		
Post-Communist Democratization								
1970s	6.88 (2.19)**	6.24 (2.81)*	11.68 (4.16)*	11.02 (4.17)*	7.00 (2.24)**	6.06 (2.77)*	5.58 (2.71) ⁺	6.40 (3.02) ⁺
1980s	4.32 (1.54)*	4.38 (2.39) ⁺	9.03 (3.42)*	8.75 (3.36)*	3.95 (1.55)*	3.80 (2.29)	3.26 (2.10)	3.21 (2.10)
1990s	-2.17 (1.66)	-0.53 (2.22)	2.19 (2.62)	2.88 (2.00)	-2.34 (1.65)	-0.86 (2.15)	-2.50 (1.83)	1.53 (1.98)
2000s	0.41 (1.07)	0.74 (1.45)	3.46 (2.24)	3.14 (2.03)	0.37 (1.07)	0.66 (1.42)	0.71 (0.86)	1.79 (1.18)
Constant	71.56 (6.52)***	101.34 (9.76)***	-4.20 (48.90)	33.81 (53.40)	72.08 (6.76)***	101.12(10.37)***	77.77 (7.07)***	91.28 (5.88)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	173	166	173	165	181	174	118	115
R ²	0.56	0.19	0.60	0.37	0.55	0.17	0.61	0.43

Note: Significance levels: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

These analyses show that the negative effect of state capacity and neonatal mortality, shown in Table 4 in the manuscript, hold when we limit the analyzed sample to countries that sanction compulsory voting (models 1 and 2). Furthermore, the results hold when we control for GDP per capita (models 3 and 4), recode Italy as a case of sanctioned (instead of unsanctioned) CV (models 5 and 6), or analyze only established democracies (models 7 and 8)

Table EA4: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	1421	1992.102	18.957	1945	2017
Turnout	1421	71.1	15.112	21.3	97.5
1940s	1421	.024	.153	0	1
1950s	1421	.062	.241	0	1
1960s	1421	.075	.263	0	1
1970s	1421	.087	.281	0	1
1980s	1421	.11	.314	0	1
1990s	1421	.207	.405	0	1
2000s	1421	.24	.427	0	1
Pre-1974 Democratization	1421	-.581	2.346	-15	0
Post-1974 Democratization	1421	-1.405	3.54	-15	0
Post-Communist Democratization	1421	-.66	2.497	-15	0
Majority Status	1421	11.827	9.044	0	49.56
Closeness	1421	13.435	13.5	0	95.07
Concurrent Election	1421	.244	.43	0	1
El. System: Majoritarian	1421	.198	.399	0	1
El. System: Proportional	1421	.422	.494	0	1
El. System: Mixed	1421	.096	.295	0	1
El. System: Other	1421	.011	.106	0	1
Presidential Election	1421	.272	.445	0	1
Electorate Size (ln)	1421	1.871	1.618	-3.912	6.726
CV Sanctioned	1421	.156	.358	0	1
CV Unsanctioned	1421	.091	.288	0	1
GDP p/c (ln)	1363	9.196	.972	6.469	11.288
State Capacity	1187	.939	.859	-1.148	2.939
Neonatal mortality	1193	14.113	12.868	.9	93.7
Fine (share of monthly salary)	1309	.009	.061	0	1.385
Fine (share of GDP in \$ \, 000)	1330	.015	.103	0	2.771
Max Fine (share of monthly salary)	1330	.015	.103	0	2.771
Max Fine (share of GDP in \$ \, 000)	1357	1.144	5.69	0	89.428
Non-monetary sanction	1393	.048	.214	0	1

Table EA5: Decade-Averages in Voter Turnout

(1)	
Turnout by Decade	
1940s	7.43 (1.56)***
1950s	8.71 (1.10)***
1960s	9.22 (1.02)***
1970s	7.51 (0.97)***
1980s	8.16 (0.88)***
1990s	5.05 (0.72)***
2000s	1.66 (0.68)*
Constant	66.70 (0.53)***
Country FE	Yes
N	1421
R ²	0.09

Note: Significance levels: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table EA6 displays decade-averages in voter turnout. The reference decade is the 2010s. It demonstrates that voter turnout declined by 9.22 points between the 1960s and 2010s. The speed of the decline slowed down after the 2000s, the difference between the 2000s and 2010s not being statistically significant at the 0.05 threshold.

Discussion and Simulation of the Out-of-Sample Predictions

For the out-of-sample predictions (see Table 3 in the main text), we considered several estimation strategies and model specifications: a naive OLS model including only regional and decade dummies (Model 1); an OLS model with all predictors from the fixed effects analysis (Model 2); a random effects estimator including only regional and decade dummies (Model 3); and a random effects estimator with all predictors (Model 4). We expected that Model 4, taking into account unit effects and including a large number of predictors, would yield the most accurate estimates. To test this empirically, we conducted a simple simulation on countries that never used compulsory voting. In the first step, we randomly divided those countries into two groups. The first group contained 2/3 of the included countries (i.e., 60), and the other group the remaining third (30 countries). In the second step, we analysed voter turnout in the first group via each of the aforementioned types of regression models. In the third step, we employed the estimates from the second step to make out-of-sample predictions for the other group (i.e., the thirty countries non-included in the second-step estimations). We repeated the procedure 1,000 times and calculated the mean squared error and arithmetic error of the predictions for each type of regression model. The results are presented in Table EA6 and demonstrate that the full model specification of the random effects estimator (Model 4) yields smaller errors than any of the three alternatives. Using a naive OLS or leaving out the substantive variables would lead to less precise estimates and more bias.

Table EA6: Simulation Results

	Mean Squared Error	Arithmetic Error
OLS Dummies (Model 1)	217.44	2.94
OLS Full (Model 2)	207.06	2.66
RE Dummies (Model 3)	211.89	1.62
RE Full (Model 4)	196.45	1.60

Discussion of the Coding of Changes in Compulsory Voting

The following list provides information surrounding changes to and from compulsory voting and to and from enforced compulsory voting that took place in the countries and time period covered in our dataset.

Austria In Austria, compulsory voting was first introduced by constitutional amendment in 1929, which made voting in presidential elections mandatory nationwide (Article 60/1) but gave states the ability to determine the whether voting would be obligated in state-level and national parliamentary elections (Articles 26/1 and 95/1-2). Though democracy was suspended shortly thereafter, the democratic constitution was reinstated after World War II. A number of states began mandating turnout in state-level and parliamentary elections at that time. An amendment to the constitution in 1982 extended to the states the ability to decide whether or not to employ mandatory voting in presidential elections, at which point some states decided to eliminate compulsory presidential voting. In 1992, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment (Federal Constitutional Law BGBl No. 470/1992) abolishing compulsory voting in national parliamentary elections. Subsequently, the states began repealing compulsory voting in state and presidential elections. By 2007, no state employed compulsory voting for any type of election. For precise information about the years in which each state employed compulsory voting in state-level, parliamentary, and presidential elections, see Hoffman, León, and Lombardi (2017).

Bulgaria Bulgaria's National Assembly adopted mandatory voting in the spring of 2016. This was facilitated with an amendment to Article 3 of the electoral code. Compulsory voting was then put to the electorate in a referendum, alongside the November presidential election. While voting in the presidential contest was mandatory, partaking in the referendum remained voluntary. A majority of voters supported compulsory voting, but turnout was not high enough to meet the quorum. Nevertheless, voting remained compulsory due to the earlier legislation of the National Assembly. In early 2017, Bulgaria's Constitutional Court struck down the disenfranchisement penalty for nonvoting. As a result, voting remains compulsory, but without any sanctions for abstention.

Chile In Chile, voting was made mandatory by the Decree Law 542 (Art. 60) and voters' registration by Law 4554 from 1929 (Art. 23). Electoral compulsion

was constitutionalized in 1989 during the democratization process that came at the end of Augusto Pinochet's rule. Voluntary voting legislation was introduced in the Senate in late 2010 and passed a year later. The reform also proposed a system of automatic voter enrollment to replace the previous system of voluntary registration. Articles 15 and 18 of the constitution were modified to make way for the legislation, which was amended by the Chamber of Deputies and passed by the Senate a year later. The legislation was fully adopted in January of 2012 as Law 20.568.

Cyprus In Cyprus, voting became compulsory 1979, as provided in Article 37(1) of that year's election law. In 2001, Cyprus stopped sanctioning nonvoters (Christophorou 2012). Changes to Article 37(1) facilitated the end of compulsory voting in national elections in 2017 and European elections in 2018.

Czechoslovakia Compulsory voting was established in Czechoslovakia by Chamber of Deputies Act 123/1920, which passed the same day as that year's constitution. Czechoslovakia held the last free elections with compulsory voting in 1946 before it transitioned to communist rule. After re-democratization, it again held free elections in 1990, but under voluntary rules.

Greece Article 51(5) of Greece's 1911 constitution made way for compulsory voting, which was introduced in Election Law 3363 of 1926. Sanctions were removed from the electoral law in 1999. This was done via Presidential Decree 55/1999, Art. 108, Par. 4. A 2001 constitutional revision precluded future legislation from applying sanctions for abstention (Malkopoulou 2011, pp. 205, 264).

Honduras Compulsory voting is constitutionalized in Honduras (Article 44) and was mandated by Article 6 the Electoral and Political Organizations Laws of 1981. Article 224 of the same document specified a fine for abstention. The 2004 electoral law, established by Decree No. 44 of the National Congress, mentions an obligation to vote in Article 2 but does not stipulate fines for abstention.

Italy Article 48 Italy's 1947 constitution lists voting as a civic duty, and this was used to justify sanctioning nonvoters. Article 115 of Presidential Decree No. 361 in 1957 formalized these sanctions, which consisted in the display of abstainers' names in municipal registers and the insertion of the mention 'not voted' in

abstainers' certificates of good conduct (Hasen 1996, note 4). These mostly symbolic sanctions were never routinely enforced (Ciaurro 1977, p. 48; De Luca 1997, note 4). The "Mattarella Law," instituted in laws 276 and 277 of 1993, removed the obligation to vote, as defined by Decree 361.

Netherlands Compulsory voting was legislated and constitutionalized (Article 80/4) in the Netherlands from 1917-1922. While the constitutional requirement was removed in 1922, the mandatory voting legislation remained in force (Birch 2009, p. 39). A 1967 report of the *Adviescommissie Opkomstplicht* made several points against the requirement to vote. Subsequently, Parliament in 1970 passed legislation that ended compulsory voting (Irwin 1974, p. 293; Lijphart 1997, p. 2; Malkopoulou 2011, pp. 215, 264). This was executed as the 11th amendment to the 1951 electoral law.

Switzerland Swiss cantons are allowed to decide whether to use compulsory voting for national parliamentary elections per the 1848 Constitution (Tobler 1945), an area of autonomy that they still retain. As a result, the cantons have varied dramatically in the years in which they have used compulsory voting—and for which types of elections. As of 2021, only the canton of Schaffhausen still employs compulsory voting, which is employed in federal, cantonal, and municipal elections. For precise information about the years and types of elections in which each canton has used compulsory voting, see Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2016) and Schwegler (2009).

Thailand Thailand adopted compulsory voting in 1997 as part of a new constitution (Hicken 2007, pp. 153-154). The obligation to vote is specified in Article 68.

Turkey Turkey adopted compulsory voting in 1983. This was instituted in Article 63 of Parliamentary Elections Law No. 2839 (Çaylak and Kaçer 2017, p. 438; Taşkin 2015, p. 471).

Venezuela Venezuela's electoral law of 1958 established compulsory voting, which was confirmed by the Constitution of 1961 and remained in effect for another three decades (Molina 1991, p. 21-22). The Venezuelan National Assembly eliminated sanctions for abstention with the Organic Suffrage Law of 1993 (Carey and Horiuchi 2017; Molina and Baralt 1996). The Constitution of 1999 removed

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