Online Appendix:

The Effects of Combating Corruption on Institutional Trust and Political Engagement: Evidence from Latin America

Mathias Poertner and Nan Zhang

Table of Contents

S1. Description of Fieldwork Implementation

Argentina:

Fieldwork for the 2013 wave of the Latinobarómetro survey in Argentina was conducted between June 1 and 30. A stratified, multi-stage probability sampling strategy of the Argentine population was used: in a first step, a random probability sample of localities/cities was drawn. Then, a random sample of street blocks within these localities/cities was selected. Within these street blocks, a random walk protocol was used to select the households to be contacted for door-to-door interviews. Finally, block-level gender and age quotas were used to sample the specific individuals to be interviewed within each household.

Costa Rica:

Fieldwork for the 2009 wave of the Latinobarómetro survey in Costa Rica was conducted between September 30 and October 22. A stratified, multi-stage probability sampling strategy of the Costa Rican population was used: in a first step, a random probability sample of segments was drawn (with probability proportional to size). Then, a random sample of conglomerates/census tracks within these segments was selected. Within these conglomerates, a random walk protocol was used to select the households to be contacted for door-to-door interviews. Finally, conglomerate-level gender and age quotas were used to sample the specific individuals to be interviewed within each household.

S2. Selection of Cases

There are both methodological and substantive considerations to our selection of cases. Methodologically, we first searched for intersections between key junctures (e.g. convictions, sentencing, etc.) in high-profile prosecutions and fieldwork windows in cross-national public opinion surveys.

These intersections are critical in that they allow us to compare survey responses shortly before and after the announcement and judicial decisions, and thereby estimate the causal effect of prosecutions on public opinion.[1] Employing this strategy, we could identify two cases involving Menem and Calderón where judicial decisions were announced, respectively, during fieldwork on 2013 and 2009 waves of the Latinobarómetro public opinion survey.

Despite this limited number of cases, several substantive considerations are worth highlighting. First, we note that both countries are electoral democracies, which is important given our focus on voting and other forms of political participation. Second, Argentina and Costa Rica span the range for Latin American countries in international corruption rankings. While Argentina is often perceived as endemically corrupt, Costa Rica has – until recently – enjoyed a relatively positive reputation.[2] By testing our hypotheses across these two very different institutional settings, we are better able to gauge the generalizability of our findings across institutional contexts.

Third, considering the two cases in tandem allows us to address an important alternative explanation for our findings – namely, that popular reactions might be driven by the unique outcomes of each case rather than the broader symbolic nature of the prosecutions in question. That said, since many details relating to the outcomes of these cases also differ across the two prosecutions, a comparative analysis enables us to rule out their influence in the spirit of a "most different systems" design.

[1] Our identification strategy builds on research designs employed in Ares and Hernández (), Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa (), and Solaz, De Vries, and Geus (**solaz2018group**).

[2] Costa Rica's score of 5.3 on Transparency International's (TI) 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (not corrupt), was amongst the highest in Latin America, falling behind only Uruguay and Chile. In contrast, Argentina scored only 3.4 in TI's 2013 rankings, putting it in the company of Panama, Ecuador and Mexico.

S3. Summary of Menem Case History

The court's decision to sentence former President Carlos Menem to seven years in prison on June 13, 2013 represented the culmination of a legal battle stretching back almost two decades, as Menem had been in and out of court since the scandal first broke in 1995. The case began began with an initial investigation into the then-sitting President ordered by Judge Jorge Urso in 1995 (*La Nueva*, March 9, 2013). Menem was found guilty by Urso in 2001 and even served five and a half months of house arrest, but was subsequently freed as his trial continued under several appeals from both sides (*La Voz del Interior*, June 14, 2013). In 2011, Menem was formally declared innocent but this decision was overturned and the case re-opened in 2013. He was finally convicted on March 8 (*Tiempo Sur*, March 8, 2013) and sentenced on June 13, 2013.

Beyond the general features of the news coverage discussed in the paper, we also note that there were significant details pertaining to the legal disposition of Menem's case that might have affected public reactions. Specifically, doubts remained about whether Menem's sentence could actually be imposed since he enjoyed immunity from incarceration as a sitting Senator, and moreover could still appeal his sentence to the Supreme Court. In addition, Menem had by this time become a relatively insignificant figure on the political stage, and his prosecution could have been read as a particularly token gesture. For now, we simply flag these case-specific details as they may, in and of themselves, provide an alternative explanation for our results. We return to this issue in our discussion introducing the Costa Rica case.

S4. Descriptive Statistics

Table A1. **Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample (Argentina)**

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Median	Valid N
Progress on state corruption	0	3	0.957	1	1145
State's ability to solve corruption	0	3	1.596	2	1178
Prevalence of corruption	1	4	2.821	3	1132
Demonstrate	0	1	0.547	0.667	1185
Invalid vote	0	1	0.145	0	1114
Trust in judiciary	0	3	1.058	1	1175
Trust in parties	0	3	0.911	1	1188
Trust in congress	0	3	1.188	1	1174

Table A2. **Descriptive Statistics - Analytic Sample (Argentina)**

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Median	Valid N
Progress on state corruption	0	3	0.963	1	491
State's ability to solve corruption	0	3	1.594	2	503
Prevalence of corruption	1	4	2.811	3	491
Demonstrate	0	1	0.542	0.667	508
Invalid vote	0	1	0.131	0	482
Trust in judiciary	0	3	1.069	1	506
Trust in parties	0	3	0.980	1	504
Trust in congress	0	3	1.182	1	505

Table A3. **Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample (Costa Rica)**

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Median	Valid N
Progress on corruption	0	3	1.345	1	975
Inclination to vote or protest	0	1	0.849	1	935
Invalid vote	0	1	0.291	0	951
Trust in judiciary	0	3	1.48	1	961
Trust in parties	0	3	0.911	1	975
Trust in congress	0	3	1.716	2	979

Table A4. **Descriptive Statistics - Analytic Sample (Costa Rica)**

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Median	Valid N
Progress on corruption	0	3	1.437	1	158
Inclination to vote or protest	0	1	0.853	1	150
Invalid vote	0	1	0.265	0	155
Trust in judiciary	0	3	1.702	2	151
Trust in parties	0	3	0.981	1	154
Trust in congress	0	3	1.877	2	154

S5. Balance Statistics

Table A5. **Balance Statistics (Argentina)**

Variable	Control	Treatment	Diff. means	p-value	n	Analytic n
Age	44.878	44.467	-0.411	0.811	761	511
Male	0.462	0.505	0.044	0.379	761	511
Incomplete high school	0.478	0.424	-0.055	0.239	761	511
Complete high school	0.208	0.231	0.022	0.609	761	511
Studied at university	0.313	0.346	0.032	0.432	761	511
Part of labor force	0.693	0.686	-0.007	0.883	761	511
Poverty	0.406	0.375	-0.031	0.475	757	507
Voted in past election	0.724	0.703	-0.021	0.565	759	510

Notes: The table entries are estimated through ordinary least squares regressions with CIUDAD fixed effects. The sample is restricted to observations within +/- 7 days of the announcement. Respondents in treatment and control groups do not differ significantly on any observable characteristics.

Table A6. **Balance Statistics (Costa Rica)**

Variable	Control	Treatment	Diff. means	p-value	n	Analytic n
Age	40.188	39.472	-0.716	0.794	962	163
Male	0.502	0.553	0.050	0.560	962	163
Incomplete high school	0.708	0.641	-0.067	0.377	962	163
Complete high school	0.093	0.181	0.088	0.087	962	163
Studied at university	0.200	0.178	-0.022	0.739	962	163
Part of labor force	0.665	0.658	-0.006	0.937	962	163
Poverty	0.227	0.243	0.016	0.833	932	156
Voted in past election	0.677	0.621	-0.056	0.488	925	158

Notes: The table entries are estimated through ordinary least squares regressions with CIUDAD fixed effects. The sample is restricted to observations within +/- 14 days of the announcement. Respondents in treatment and control groups do not differ significantly on any observable characteristics.

S6. Results Presented in the Main Text

Table A7. **Results Presented in the Main Text - With Controls (Argentina)**

Variable	Effect	SE	p Value	N
Progress on state corruption	-0.232	0.091	0.011	729
State's ability to solve corruption	-0.180	0.104	0.082	748
Prevalence of corruption	0.124	0.072	0.085	729
Demonstrate	-0.086	0.034	0.013	755
Invalid vote	0.086	0.033	0.010	714
Trust in judiciary	-0.262	0.085	0.002	754
Trust in parties	-0.217	0.085	0.011	753
Trust in congress	-0.199	0.087	0.022	751

Note: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days.
Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.
Analytic sample: 428 (181 in control; 247 in treatment) responses from cities/localities that have observations on both sides of the threshold and no NAs on covariates.

Table A8. **Results Presented in the Main Text - Without Controls (Argentina)**

Variable	Effect	SE	p Value	N
Progress on state corruption	-0.200	0.091	0.028	729
State's ability to solve corruption	-0.163	0.103	0.114	748
Prevalence of corruption	0.094	0.072	0.189	729
Demonstrate	-0.083	0.035	0.018	755
Invalid vote	0.084	0.033	0.011	714
Trust in judiciary	-0.254	0.084	0.003	754
Trust in parties	-0.211	0.085	0.013	753
Trust in congress	-0.194	0.087	0.025	751

Note: Effects are estimated with city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days.
Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.
Analytic sample: 432 (183 in control; 249 in treatment) responses from cities/localities that have observations on both sides of the threshold.

Table A9. **Results Presented in the Main Text - With Controls (Costa Rica)**

Variable	Effect	SE	p Value	N
Progress on corruption	-0.067	0.174	0.700	937
Inclination to vote or protest	-0.134	0.062	0.031	897
Invalid vote	-0.038	0.077	0.623	913
Trust in judiciary	-0.627	0.163	0.001	926
Trust in parties	-0.355	0.149	0.018	938
Trust in congress	-0.459	0.162	0.005	941

Note: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days.
Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.
Analytic sample: 125 (68 in control; 57 in treatment) responses from cities/localities
that have observations on both sides of the threshold and no NAs on covariates.

Table A10. **Results Presented in the Main Text - Without Controls (Costa Rica)**

Variable	Effect	SE	p Value	N
Progress on corruption	-0.114	0.166	0.492	937
Inclination to vote or protest	-0.128	0.060	0.034	897
Invalid vote	-0.023	0.076	0.767	913
Trust in judiciary	-0.643	0.157	0.000	926
Trust in parties	-0.374	0.144	0.010	938
Trust in congress	-0.452	0.156	0.004	941

Note: Effects are estimated with city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days.
Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.
Analytic sample: 130 (71 in control; 59 in treatment) responses from cities/localities
that have observations on both sides of the threshold.

S7. Alternative Specifications

In this section we first present the results for the Argentina analysis, using alternative time windows. The variables are grouped in a way that facilitates comparisons, given the ways in which the outcomes are scaled. Then, we report the main results for Argentina and Costa Rica without PJ and PUSC supporters respectively.

Figure A1. **Alternative Specifications: Impact on Perceptions of Corruption (Argentina)**



Note: Effects are estimated with city fixed effects. The main error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means; the small whiskers represent additional 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are scaled on a 4-point scale.

Figure A2. **Alternative Specifications: Impact on Trust in Actors Involved in Anti-Corruption Measures (Argentina)**



Note: Effects are estimated with city fixed effects. The main error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means; the small whiskers represent additional 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are scaled on a 4-point scale.

Figure A3. **Alternative Specifications: Impact on Propensity to Vote and Demonstrate (Argentina)**



Note: Effects are estimated with city fixed effects. The main error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means; the small whiskers represent additional 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are scaled between 0 and 1.

Table A11. **Results for Argentina without PJ Supporters**

Variable	Effect	SE	p Value	N
Progress on state corruption	-0.154	0.084	0.066	884
State's ability to solve corruption	-0.179	0.093	0.054	914
Prevalence of corruption	0.177	0.066	0.007	877
Demonstrate	-0.065	0.031	0.036	920
Invalid vote	0.067	0.030	0.026	930
Trust in judiciary	-0.252	0.075	0.001	915
Trust in parties	-0.249	0.076	0.001	921
Trust in congress	-0.159	0.079	0.043	915

Note: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text. Analytic sample: 658 (234 in control; 424 in treatment) responses from cities/localities that have observations on both sides of the threshold and no NAs on covariates. Respondents who indicated that they support the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ) party are dropped from the sample.

Table A12. **Results for Costa Rica without PUSC Supporters**

Variable	Effect	SE	p Value	N
Progress on corruption	-0.093	0.176	0.596	915
Inclination to vote or protest	-0.124	0.063	0.049	875
Invalid vote	-0.042	0.078	0.589	891
Trust in judiciary	-0.678	0.164	0.000	904
Trust in parties	-0.364	0.152	0.017	916
Trust in congress	-0.478	0.165	0.004	920

Note: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text. Analytic sample: 125 (68 in control; 57 in treatment) responses from cities/localities that have observations on both sides of the threshold and no NAs on covariates. Respondents who indicated that they support the *Partido Unidad Social Cristiana* (PUSC) party are dropped from the sample.

S8. Sensitivity Analysis

Figure A4. **Sensitivity Tests (Argentina): Dropping Individual Provinces - Part 1**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days, when excluding observations from the listed region. The main error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means; the small whiskers represent additional 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Figure A5. **Sensitivity Tests (Argentina): Dropping Individual Provinces - Part 2**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days, when excluding observations from the listed region. The main error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means; the small whiskers represent additional 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Figure A6. **Sensitivity Tests (Costa Rica): Dropping Individual Provinces**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days, when excluding observations from the listed region. The main error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means; the small whiskers represent additional 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text. Given the extremely limited size of the analytic sample (33 observations) when dropping observations from San José, those estimates should be interpreted with caution.

S9. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Table A13. **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for the Different Outcomes by Region (Argentina)**

Outcome	Subgroup: Other Provinces	Subgroup: Conurbano	Interaction Term (Treatment * Conurbano)
Progress on state corruption	-0.283**	-0.226*	0.080
	(0.139)	(0.126)	(0.194)
State's ability to solve corruption	-0.168	-0.149	0.029
	(0.170)	(0.134)	(0.220)
Prevalence of corruption	0.187	0.082	-0.112
	(0.116)	(0.096)	(0.153)
Demonstrate	-0.056	-0.104**	-0.044
	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.073)
Invalid vote	0.106*	0.077*	-0.029
	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.071)
Trust in judiciary	-0.448***	-0.171	0.277
	(0.141)	(0.109)	(0.180)
Trust in parties	-0.449***	-0.117	0.349*
	(0.139)	(0.109)	(0.180)
Trust in congress	-0.238*	-0.195*	0.074
	(0.140)	(0.115)	(0.185)
Sample	Other Provinces	Conurbano	Full

Note: Effects are estimated separately for each outcome with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days. Conurbano contains the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Table A14. **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for the Different Outcomes by Gender (Argentina)**

Outcome	Subgroup: Women	Subgroup: Men	Interaction Term (Treatment * Men)
Progress on state corruption	-0.157	-0.284**	-0.098
	(0.128)	(0.134)	(0.141)
State's ability to solve corruption	-0.103	-0.280*	-0.125
	(0.145)	(0.156)	(0.162)
Prevalence of corruption	0.025	0.250**	0.225**
	(0.098)	(0.107)	(0.111)
Demonstrate	-0.080*	-0.102*	-0.043
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Invalid vote	0.067	0.109**	-0.021
	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Trust in judiciary	-0.209*	-0.289**	-0.131
	(0.114)	(0.129)	(0.132)
Trust in parties	-0.146	-0.285**	-0.221*
	(0.119)	(0.127)	(0.132)
Trust in congress	-0.178	-0.213	-0.066
	(0.113)	(0.137)	(0.135)
Sample	Women	Men	Full

Note: Effects are estimated separately for each outcome with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Table A15. **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for the Different Outcomes by Past Voting Status (Argentina)**

Outcome	Subgroup: Previous Non Voters	Subgroup: Previous Voters	Interaction Term (Treatment * Previous Voter)
Progress on state corruption	-0.328	-0.200*	0.125
	(0.216)	(0.103)	(0.189)
State's ability to solve corruption	-0.220	-0.167	-0.220
	(0.233)	(0.116)	(0.221)
Prevalence of corruption	0.241	0.095	0.011
	(0.178)	(0.080)	(0.152)
Demonstrate	-0.057	-0.089**	-0.051
	(0.080)	(0.039)	(0.072)
Invalid vote	0.021	0.093***	0.037
	(0.102)	(0.035)	(0.070)
Trust in judiciary	-0.250	-0.243**	0.150
	(0.206)	(0.094)	(0.177)
Trust in parties	-0.302	-0.200**	0.141
	(0.199)	(0.096)	(0.177)
Trust in congress	-0.096	-0.188*	0.115
	(0.197)	(0.098)	(0.181)
Sample	Previous Non Voters	Previous Voters	Full

Note: Effects are estimated separately for each outcome with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Table A16. **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for the Different Outcomes by Age (Argentina)**

Outcome	Subgroup: Young	Subgroup: Old	Interaction Term (Treatment * Age)
Progress on state corruption	-0.282**	-0.168	-0.001
	(0.132)	(0.129)	(0.004)
State's ability to solve corruption	0.032	-0.326**	-0.009*
	(0.144)	(0.153)	(0.005)
Prevalence of corruption	0.040	0.224**	0.004
	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.003)
Demonstrate	-0.100**	-0.071	0.001
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.002)
Invalid vote	0.072	0.099**	0.001
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.001)
Trust in judiciary	-0.237*	-0.286**	-0.001
	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.004)
Trust in parties	-0.192	-0.275**	-0.005
	(0.116)	(0.125)	(0.004)
Trust in congress	-0.265**	-0.130	0.003
	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.004)
Sample	Young	Old	Full

Note: Effects are estimated separately for each outcome with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days. 'Young' contains respondents up to 40 years of age; 'Old' contains respondents over 40 years of age. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Table A17. **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for the Different Outcomes by Region (Costa Rica)**

Outcome	Subgroup: Other Provinces	Subgroup: Conurbano	Interaction Term (Treatment * Conurbano)
Progress on corruption	1.037*	-0.168	0.027
	(0.541)	(0.186)	(0.229)
Inclination to vote or protest	-0.043	-0.146**	0.155**
	(0.218)	(0.062)	(0.078)
Invalid vote	-0.187	-0.016	0.011
	(0.249)	(0.081)	(0.100)
Trust in judiciary	0.179	-0.705***	-0.293
	(0.559)	(0.166)	(0.204)
Trust in parties	-0.225	-0.343**	0.228
	(0.487)	(0.158)	(0.190)
Trust in congress	-1.023	-0.400**	-0.184
	(0.626)	(0.162)	(0.207)
Sample	Other Provinces	Conurbano	Full

Note: Effects are estimated separately for each outcome with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days. Conurbano contains the metropolitan area of San José. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Table A18. **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for the Different Outcomes by Gender (Costa Rica)**

Outcome	Subgroup: Women	Subgroup: Men	Interaction Term (Treatment * Men)
Progress on corruption	-0.370	0.194	0.312
	(0.256)	(0.242)	(0.249)
Inclination to vote or protest	-0.078	-0.190**	0.275***
	(0.093)	(0.082)	(0.096)
Invalid vote	0.042	-0.090	0.116
	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.110)
Trust in judiciary	-0.403*	-0.891***	0.381*
	(0.225)	(0.237)	(0.229)
Trust in parties	-0.387*	-0.370*	0.156
	(0.215)	(0.214)	(0.212)
Trust in congress	-0.420*	-0.519**	0.438*
	(0.226)	(0.237)	(0.231)
Sample	Women	Men	Full

Note: Effects are estimated separately for each outcome with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Table A19. **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for the Different Outcomes by Past Voting Status (Costa Rica)**

Outcome	Subgroup: Previous Non Voters	Subgroup: Previous Voters	Interaction Term (Treatment * Previous Voter)
Progress on corruption	-0.040	-0.085	0.323
	(0.396)	(0.201)	(0.250)
Inclination to vote or protest	-0.397***	-0.075	0.275***
	(0.136)	(0.072)	(0.096)
Invalid vote	-0.178	0.006	0.107
	(0.188)	(0.082)	(0.110)
Trust in judiciary	-0.892**	-0.630***	0.368
	(0.355)	(0.190)	(0.229)
Trust in parties	-0.268	-0.368**	0.161
	(0.316)	(0.177)	(0.212)
Trust in congress	-0.363	-0.553***	0.447*
	(0.364)	(0.186)	(0.232)
Sample	Previous Non Voters	Previous Voters	Full

Note: Effects are estimated separately for each outcome with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

Table A20. **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for the Different Outcomes by Age (Costa Rica)**

Outcome	Subgroup: Young	Subgroup: Old	Interaction Term (Treatment * Age)
Progress on corruption	-0.004	-0.225	0.326
	(0.224)	(0.283)	(0.249)
Inclination to vote or protest	-0.099	-0.193**	0.278***
	(0.081)	(0.097)	(0.096)
Invalid vote	-0.147	0.231*	0.116
	(0.099)	(0.124)	(0.110)
Trust in judiciary	-0.552***	-0.807***	0.359
	(0.210)	(0.273)	(0.228)
Trust in parties	-0.429**	-0.338	0.148
	(0.188)	(0.251)	(0.212)
Trust in congress	-0.539***	-0.347	0.440*
	(0.204)	(0.279)	(0.231)
Sample	Young	Old	Full

Note: Effects are estimated separately for each outcome with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days. 'Young' contains respondents up to 40 years of age; 'Old' contains respondents over 40 years of age. Outcomes are scaled the same way as in the figures in the main text.

S10. Placebo Tests: Impact on Trust in Other Institutions

Table A21. **Impact on Trust in Other Institutions (Argentina)**

Variable	Effect	SE	p Value	N
Trust in armed forces	0.037	0.094	0.693	745
Trust in church	-0.083	0.097	0.395	754

Note: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days. Outcomes are scaled on a 4-point scale.

Table A22. **Impact on Trust in Other Institutions (Costa Rica)**

Variable	Effect	SE	p Value	N
Trust in church	-0.227	0.166	0.171	931
Trust in local government	-0.225	0.147	0.128	938

Note: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days. Outcomes are scaled on a 4-point scale. Question about trust in armed forces and was not asked in Costa Rica.

S11. Placebo Tests using Alternative Cut-off Dates

Figure A7. **Placebo Test (Argentina): Impact on All Outcomes for First Randomly Selected Cut-Off Date (June 23)**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days.
The error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means.
The randomly selected cut-off date was June 23, 2013.

Figure A8. **Placebo Test (Argentina): Impact on All Outcomes for Second Randomly Selected Cut-Off Date (June 27)**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days.
The error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means.
The randomly selected cut-off date was June 27, 2013.

Figure A9. **Placebo Test (Argentina): Impact on All Outcomes for Third Randomly Selected Cut-Off Date (June 29)**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 7 days.
The error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means.
The randomly selected cut-off date was June 29, 2013.

Figure A10. **Placebo Test (Argentina): Impact on All Outcomes for Median of the Control Group as Cut-Off Date (June 6)**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within control group.
The error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means.
The cut-off date was the empirical median of the control group (June 6, 2013) to test
for preexisting time trends within the control group (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández).

Figure A11. **Placebo Test (Costa Rica): Impact on All Outcomes for First Randomly Selected Cut-Off Date (October 19)**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days.
The error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means.
The randomly selected cut-off date was October 19, 2009.

Figure A12. **Placebo Test (Costa Rica): Impact on All Outcomes for Second Randomly Selected Cut-Off Date (October 17)**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days.
The error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means.
The randomly selected cut-off date was October 17, 2009.

Figure A13. **Placebo Test (Costa Rica): Impact on All Outcomes for Third Randomly Selected Cut-Off Date (October 3)**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within +/- 14 days.
The error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means.
The randomly selected cut-off date was October 3, 2009.

Figure A14. **Placebo Test (Costa Rica): Impact on All Outcomes for Median of the Control Group as Cut-Off Date (October 2)**



Notes: Effects are estimated with controls and city fixed effects, within control group.
The error bars present 95% confidence intervals for the means.
The cut-off date was the empirical median of the control group (October 2, 2009) to test for preexisting time trends within the control group (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández).

References

Ares, Macarena, and Enrique Hernández. "The Corrosive Effect of Corruption on Trust in Politicians: Evidence from a Natural Experiment". *Research & Politics* 4, no. 2 (2017): 1–8.

Balcells, Laia, and Gerard Torrats-Espinosa. "Using a Natural Experiment to Estimate the Electoral Consequences of Terrorist Attacks". *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 115, no. 42 (2018): 10624–10629.

Muñoz, Jordi, Albert Falcó-Gimeno, and Enrique Hernández. "Unexpected Event During Survey Design: Promise and Pitfalls for Causal Inference". *Political Analysis* 28, no. 2 (2020): 186–206.