

## Supplementary Materials

Public Responses to Unilateral Policymaking

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
# A Public evaluations survey information

## A.1 Power calculations

We adopted a conservative approach to estimating the statistical power of our research design. In summary, our approach followed the following steps:




1. Wave 1:
  - (a) Generate  $N$  respondents with either Republican, Democrat, or Independent partisan identification. (The probability of each identification was 0.39, 0.47, and 0.14 respectively, based on a distributions reported by Lowande and Rogowski (2020), who also use Lucid.)
  - (b) Randomly assign president, topic, and treatment condition (position, Congress, or executive order).
  - (c) Simulate dependent variable:
    - i. Draw error term and topic-level effects from a standard normal distribution.
    - ii. Assume that presidential copartisans have more favorable assessments, while opposite-party respondents have less favorable views. Given findings reported in past research, this effect is also assumed to be strictly greater than the treatment effect, but is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution.
    - iii. Generate latent dependent variable as a linear function of treatment effect, treatment condition, partisan identification and president interaction, topic intercept shifts, and and error term.
    - iv. Generate observed dependent variables (binomial distributed 1-7 or 0-1) from latent dependent variable.
  - (d) Regress simulated dependent variable on observed treatment with covariates, with appropriate generalized linear model (logit or ordinal logit).
2. Wave 2:
  - (a) Randomly assign treatment condition (success or failure).
  - (b) Simulate dependent variable:
    - i. Generate latent dependent variable as a linear function of treatment effect and an AR(1) process.
    - ii. Generate observed dependent variables (binomial distributed 1-7 or 0-1) from latent dependent variable.
  - (c) Regress simulated dependent variable on observed treatment with covariates, with appropriate generalized linear model (logit or ordinal logit).
3. Repeat steps 1-2 1,000 times to obtain true positive rate.
4. Repeat step 3 for each effect size (0.1–0.4 sd) and sample size (500-3500). We summarize these results in Figure A.1.




For hypotheses 1A, 2A, and 3A, the simulation suggests that with  $n = 3100$ , we should be able to detect effects of 0.12 sd at the conventional power threshold 80% for Wave 1 and Wave 2 likert outcomes. Dichotomous outcomes, by contrast, will be detectable at roughly 0.25 sd with the same sample. Hypotheses 1B, 2B, and 3B, imply CATEs by partisan identification. To investigate these effects, we repeated the procedure above, assuming an interactive effect between (co)partisan identification and treatment condition in each wave. The simulation suggested that with with  $n = 3100$ , we should be capable of detecting heterogeneous treatment effects by partisan identification with magnitude 0.35-0.4 sd. This analysis is relatively conservative, because it assumes a “true positive” is a simulation in which the treatment effects for non-copartisans are jointly distinguishable from zero with  $p < 0.05$  and distinguishable from the treatment effect for copartisans. Nonetheless, it should be noted that though this design is less suited to addressing heterogeneous treatment effects across partisans. If large effects are detected, a follow-up replication experiment would be appropriate.






**Figure A.1 – Power Analysis Results.** Plots true positive rates by simulated effect size, sample size, and dependent variable. Plots Wave 1 (upper) and Wave 2 (lower), along with likert (left) and dichotomous (right) dependent variables.

Table A.1 – Interventions by Issue Area


Issue	Issue Description	Issue Photos	Position Prompt	Congress Prompt	Executive Order Prompt
Public lands	We are about to ask you about land the government owns. Designating public land a federally protected area is somewhat controversial. Some say this increases tourism and protects the environment, while others say that it hinders job growth and economic development.		President Obama (Trump) supported expanding (reducing) protected areas to save (open) more land from (for) development. He wanted to create (eliminate) new protected lands and expand (contract) old ones.	President Obama (Trump) supported expanding (reducing) protected areas to save (open) more land from (for) development. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would create (eliminate) new protected lands and expand (contract) old ones.	President Obama (Trump) supported expanding (reducing) protected areas to save (open) more land from (for) development. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would create (eliminate) new protected lands and expand (contract) old ones.
Military surplus	We are about to ask you about what to do with extra weapons, vehicles, and equipment not needed by the military. Giving military surplus to local police is somewhat controversial. Some say this protects police officers and helps keep the public safe, while others say it leads to more violence and hurts the police's reputation.		President Obama (Trump) supported releasing less (more) military surplus to local police. He wanted to place (eliminate) restrictions on what weapons and equipment are available to police.	President Obama (Trump) supported releasing less (more) military surplus to local police. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would place (eliminate) restrictions on what weapons and equipment are available to police.	President Obama (Trump) supported releasing less (more) military surplus to local police. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would place (eliminate) restrictions on what weapons and equipment are available to police.
Trade	We are about to ask you about international trade. Taxing goods imported to the United States is somewhat controversial. Some say this protects American jobs from being lost overseas, while others say it raises the prices of what everyday Americans buy.		President Obama (Trump) supported reducing (increasing) barriers to international trade. He wanted to lower (raise) taxes on goods imported to the United States.	President Obama (Trump) supported reducing (increasing) barriers to international trade. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would lower (raise) taxes on goods imported to the United States.	President Obama (Trump) supported reducing (increasing) barriers to international trade. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would lower (raise) taxes on goods imported to the United States.

<p>Waterways</p> <p>We are about to ask you about water rules. Allowing the government to make rules for waterways is somewhat controversial. Some say this protects drinking water and the environment, while others say it hurts job growth and economic development.</p>		<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) water rules. He wanted to make more (fewer) waterways subject to water quality and pollution rules.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) water rules. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would make more (fewer) waterways subject to water quality and pollution rules.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) water rules. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would make more (fewer) waterways subject to water quality and pollution rules.</p>
<p>Student loans</p> <p>We are about to ask you about student loan policy. Relaxing rules on student loan debt to for-profit schools is somewhat controversial. Some say this helps students who were misled by for-profit schools, while others say it drives up the cost of college for everyone.</p>		<p>President Obama (Trump) supported less (more) strict rules for paying back loans to for-profit schools. He wanted to give more (less) flexibility to students who owed money they'd borrowed for college.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported less (more) strict rules for paying back loans to for-profit schools. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would give more (less) flexibility to students who owed money they'd borrowed for college.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported less (more) strict rules for paying back loans to for-profit schools. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would give more (less) flexibility to students who owed money they'd borrowed for college.</p>
<p>Gun research</p> <p>We are about to ask you about gun violence research. Funding gun violence research is somewhat controversial. Some say this helps policymakers learn how to reduce gun violence, while others say it is using public funds to promote gun control.</p>		<p>President Obama (Trump) supported increasing (reducing) funding for gun violence research. He wanted to increase (reduce) gun violence research by telling the government to reduce (increase) funding in other areas.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported increasing (reducing) funding for gun violence research. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would increase (reduce) gun violence research by telling the government to reduce (increase) funding in other areas.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported increasing (reducing) funding for gun violence research. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would increase (reduce) gun violence research by telling the government to reduce (increase) funding in other areas.</p>

<p>Climate change</p> <p>We are about to ask you about greenhouse gas rules. Cutting carbon emissions is somewhat controversial. Some say this will protect the environment and prevent climate change, while others say it hurts energy production and job growth.</p>		<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) greenhouse gas rules. He wanted to require (allow) power plants to emit less (more) carbon.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) greenhouse gas rules. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would require (allow) power plants to emit less (more) carbon.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) greenhouse gas rules. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would require (allow) power plants to emit less (more) carbon.</p>
<p>Abortion</p> <p>We are about to ask you about foreign aid rules. Stopping aid from going to organizations that provide abortion services is somewhat controversial. Some say this increases the number of unsafe abortions abroad, while others say no taxpayer dollars should be connected with abortion.</p>		<p>President Obama (Trump) supported foreign aid rules allowing (restricting) abortions. He wanted to allow (stop) organizations that provide abortion services to receive (from receiving) funds.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported foreign aid rules allowing (restricting) abortions. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would allow (stop) organizations that provide abortion services to receive (from receiving) funds.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported foreign aid rules allowing (restricting) abortions. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would allow (stop) organizations that provide abortion services to receive (from receiving) funds.</p>
<p>Wildlife</p> <p>We are about to ask you about protecting endangered wildlife. Adding more animals to the endangered list is somewhat controversial. Some say this protects the environment and encourages tourism, while others say that it burdens ranchers and slows economic growth.</p>		<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) protections for endangered wildlife. He wanted to strengthen (end) protections for some animals and add (prevent) new protections.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) protections for endangered wildlife. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would strengthen (end) protections for some animals and add (prevent) new protections.</p>	<p>President Obama (Trump) supported strengthening (weakening) protections for endangered wildlife. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would strengthen (end) protections for some animals and add (prevent) new protections.</p>

Farm subsidies

We are about to ask you about the government giving payments to farmers. Farm payments are somewhat controversial. Some say they support small family farms and encourage farming in the United States, while others say they mostly benefit large corporations and raise the price everyone pays for food.




President Obama (Trump) supported reducing (expanding) government payments to farmers. He wanted to decrease (increase) existing payments and prohibit (add) new ones.

President Obama (Trump) supported reducing (expanding) government payments to farmers. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would decrease (increase) existing payments and prevent (add) new ones.

President Obama (Trump) supported reducing (expanding) government payments to farmers. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would decrease (increase) existing payments and prohibit (add) new ones.

Russian sanctions

Remember, we asked you about economic sanctions against Russia for interfering in European elections. Sanctioning Russia for interfering in European elections is somewhat controversial. Some say that sanctioning Russia will prevent future election interference, while others say the sanctions are ineffective and only harm diplomatic negotiations. [We made a mistake and included the wave 2 Russia prompt in wave 1.]



President Trump (Obama) supported weaker (stronger) sanctions against Russia for interfering in European elections. He wanted to weaken (strengthen) enforcement of sanctions against Russia.

President Trump (Obama) supported weaker (stronger) sanctions against Russia for interfering in European elections. He endorsed a bill and lobbied Congress. The bill would weaken (strengthen) enforcement of sanctions against Russia.

President Trump (Obama) supported weaker (stronger) sanctions against Russia for interfering in European elections. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would weaken (strengthen) enforcement of sanctions against Russia.

LGBT protections

We are about to ask you about workplace protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) employees. Protecting LGBT employees from workplace discrimination is somewhat controversial. Some say no one should be fired because of their sexual orientation, while others say these protections force employers to go against their religious beliefs.



President Obama (Trump) supported (opposed) protecting LGBT employees from workplace discrimination. He wanted to forbid (allow) employers from not hiring (to not hire) LGBT workers because it is against their religious beliefs.

President Obama (Trump) supported (opposed) protecting LGBT employees from workplace discrimination. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would forbid (allow) employers from not hiring (to not hire) LGBT workers because it is against their religious beliefs.

President Obama (Trump) supported (opposed) protecting LGBT employees from workplace discrimination. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would forbid (allow) employers from not hiring (to not hire) LGBT workers because it is against their religious beliefs.



Saudi Arabia weapons

We are about to ask you about the United States providing weapons and equipment to Saudi Arabia. Rules about how Saudi Arabia uses military hardware provided by the United States are somewhat controversial. Some say these rules will prevent the weapons from being used against civilians, while others say they will reduce how much money the U.S. makes from selling weapons to Saudi Arabia.




President Trump (Obama) supported weaker (stronger) rules on how Saudi Arabia uses military hardware provided by the United States. He wanted to give Saudi Arabia more (less) flexibility in using weapons and equipment purchased from the United States.

President Trump (Obama) supported weaker (stronger) rules on how Saudi Arabia uses military hardware provided by the United States. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would give Saudi Arabia more (less) flexibility in using weapons and equipment purchased from the United States.

President Trump (Obama) supported weaker (stronger) rules on how Saudi Arabia uses military hardware provided by the United States. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would give Saudi Arabia more (less) flexibility in using weapons and equipment purchased from the United States.

H1B visas

We are about to ask you about allowing U.S. companies to hire temporary, foreign workers. This kind of immigration is somewhat controversial. Some say this supports the U.S. economy and helps companies find workers with the skills they need, while others say this lowers the wages of U.S. workers.



President Obama (Trump) supported expanding (freezing) new applications for foreign workers. He wanted to allow more (fewer) U.S. companies to hire skilled workers from other countries.

President Obama (Trump) supported expanding (freezing) new applications for foreign workers. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would allow more (fewer) U.S. companies to hire skilled workers from other countries.

President Obama (Trump) supported expanding (freezing) new applications for foreign workers. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would allow more (fewer) U.S. companies to hire skilled workers from other countries.

Minimum wage

We are about to ask you about pay for government contractors. Raising the minimum wage for government contractors is somewhat controversial. Some say the minimum wage is not enough to raise a family on, while others say this drives up the cost of government.



President Obama (Trump) supported raising (freezing) the minimum wage for government contractors. He wanted to raise (freeze) the minimum wage for government contractors.

President Obama (Trump) supported raising (freezing) the minimum wage for government contractors. He endorsed a bill and worked with Congress. The bill would raise (freeze) the minimum wage for government contractors.

President Obama (Trump) supported raising (freezing) the minimum wage for government contractors. He acted alone by signing an executive order. The order would raise (freeze) the minimum wage for government contractors.

**Table A.2 – Wave 2, Failure and Success by Issue Area**

Issue	Failure Prompt	Success Prompt
Public lands	Despite this, during his time in office, most protected lands stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, many new lands were opened for development (protected). The president got the result he wanted.
Military surplus	Despite this, during his time in office, the weapons and equipment given to police departments stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, many weapons and equipment were given to (returned by) police departments. The president got the result he wanted.
Trade	Despite this, during his time in office, taxes on imported goods stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, taxes on imported goods went up (down). The president got the result he wanted.
Waterways	Despite this, during his time in office, the number of waterways subject to water quality and pollution rules remained the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, the number of waterways subject to water quality and pollution rules went down (up). The president got the result he wanted.
Student loans	Despite this, during his time in office, rules for repaying student loans stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, rules for repaying student loans were tightened (relaxed). The president got the result he wanted.
Gun research	Despite this, during his time in office, federal funding for gun violence research stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, federal funding for gun violence research went down (up). The president got the result he wanted.
Climate change	Despite this, during his time in office, greenhouse gas rules stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, greenhouse gas rules were weakened (strengthened). The president got the result he wanted.
Abortion	Despite this, during his time in office, most organizations that provide abortions received about the same amount of funding. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, most organizations that provide abortions received less (more) funding. The president got the result he wanted.
Wildlife	Despite this, during his time in office, most endangered wildlife protections stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, many endangered wildlife protections were weakened (strengthened). The president got the result he wanted.
Farm subsidies	Despite this, during his time in office, most payments to farmers stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, many payments to farmers went up (down). The president got the result he wanted.
Russian sanctions	Despite this, during his time in office, enforcement of sanctions against Russia stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, enforcement of sanctions against Russia was weakened (strengthened). The president got the result he wanted.
LGBT protections	Despite this, during his time in office, workplace discrimination protections for LGBT employees stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, workplace discrimination protections were not granted (granted) to LGBT employees. The president got the result he wanted.
Saudi Arabia weapons	Despite this, during his time in office, rules for weapons and equipment sales to Saudi Arabia stayed the same. The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, rules for weapons and equipment sales to Saudi Arabia weakened (strengthened). The president got the result he wanted.
H1B visas	Despite this, during his time in office, the number of foreign workers U.S. companies were allowed to hire went up (down). The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, the number of foreign workers U.S. companies were allowed to hire went down (up). The president got the result he wanted.
Minimum wage	Despite this, during his time in office, the minimum wage for federal contractors went up (stayed the same). The president was not able to get the result he wanted.	Because of this, during his time in office, the minimum wage for federal contractors stayed the same (went up). The president got the result he wanted.

This study was granted an exemption by the institutional review board of the University of Michigan (ID# HUM00186307). A pre-analysis plan was registered at the Open Science Framework August 24, 2020, and submitted to colleagues for comment prior to registration. A version of this registration can be accessed <https://osf.io/e5p8g/here>.

## A.2 Covariate balance

Table A.3 and Table A.4 show the share of respondents in each combination of treatment conditions by demographic variables in waves 1 and 2. As expected, respondents are fairly equally distributed across treatment

**Table A.3 – Covariate balance in wave 1.** Displays the share of respondents in each treatment condition by demographic variable.

Covariates	Position, Obama	Position, Trump	Congress, Obama	Congress, Trump	Order, Obama	Order, Trump
<b>Sex</b>						
Male	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.16
Female	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.17
<b>Education</b>						
High school or less	0.18	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.17
Some College or Vocational	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.16
B.A. or B.S.	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.15
Post-grad or Higher	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.13	0.18	0.18
<b>Ethnicity</b>						
Asian/Pacific Islander	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.16	0.15	0.18
Black	0.18	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.16	0.15
Native American	0.12	0.14	0.19	0.16	0.21	0.19
Other/Decline to State	0.19	0.17	0.14	0.18	0.17	0.15
White	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.17
<b>Income</b>						
Less than \$25,000	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16
\$25,000 to \$50,000	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.17
\$50,001 to \$75,000	0.19	0.18	0.14	0.17	0.14	0.16
\$75,001 to \$100,000	0.18	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.18
More than \$100,001	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.18	0.16
<b>Partisanship</b>						
Democrat	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.16
Republican	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.18	0.17
Independent	0.18	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.19
<b>Region</b>						
Northeast	0.17	0.16	0.14	0.18	0.17	0.18
Midwest	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17
South	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.16	0.17
West	0.19	0.18	0.16	0.15	0.17	0.15
Mean age	40.70	40.80	41.30	41.10	41.50	40.50

conditions in wave 1. The demographic groups that do show some variation across treatment conditions have relatively few respondents (e.g. only 43 respondents identify as Native American in wave 1). Due to variation in recontact rates (see Table A.5), covariates are less balanced in wave 2 than wave 1. The imbalances are especially pronounced across ethnicity categories and the “Post-grad or Higher” education category. This is likely due to a combination of small sample sizes in some demographic groups and variation in the likelihood of being successfully recontacted.

### A.3 Analysis of attrition between waves

We successfully recontacted 45.4% of our wave 1 survey respondents for wave 2. Table A.5 displays coefficients from an OLS model regressing a variable indicating whether a respondent was successfully recontacted against our experimental treatments and respondents’ demographics. In terms of demographics, women and older people were more likely to be successfully recontacted ( $p < .01$ ). Likewise, compared to respondents who identify as Asian or Pacific Islander, Black respondents ( $p < .05$ ) and respondents who identify as other or did not provide their ethnicity ( $p < .01$ ) were more likely to be successfully recontacted.

Table A.5 provides weak evidence that two treatment conditions affected the likelihood of recontact. Respondents shown the executive order treatment were 3.7 percentage points less likely to be recontacted ( $p < .1$ ) and respondents shown the issue area concerning weapon sales to Saudi Arabia were 7.3 percentage points more likely to be recontacted ( $p < .1$ , not pictured in Table A.5). Although correlation between treatment and recontact is concerning, the fact that the p-values on both coefficients are above conventional levels of statistical significance is reassuring. Moreover, in terms of the correlation between weapon sales to Saudi Arabia and recontact, our main hypothesis tests above are calculated across all 14 issue area conditions, rendering a

**Table A.4 – Covariate balance in wave 2.** Displays the share of respondents in each treatment condition by demographic variable.

Covariates	Position, Obama	Position, Trump	Congress, Obama	Congress, Trump	Order, Obama	Order, Trump
<b>Sex</b>						
Male	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.14
Female	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.16
<b>Education</b>						
High school or less	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.15	0.16
Some College or Vocational	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.18	0.17	0.15
B.A. or B.S.	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.13	0.15
Post-grad or Higher	0.19	0.21	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.15
<b>Ethnicity</b>						
Asian/Pacific Islander	0.12	0.21	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.20
Black	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.22	0.13	0.14
Native American	0.18	0.18	0.12	0.18	0.24	0.12
Other/Decline to State	0.19	0.21	0.13	0.18	0.15	0.12
White	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.16	0.15
<b>Income</b>						
Less than \$25,000	0.15	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.14
\$25,000 to \$50,000	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.17
\$50,001 to \$75,000	0.20	0.20	0.14	0.18	0.14	0.14
\$75,001 to \$100,000	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
More than \$100,001	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.16	0.15
<b>Partisanship</b>						
Democrat	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.13
Republican	0.16	0.19	0.17	0.15	0.18	0.15
Independent	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.14	0.19
<b>Region</b>						
Northeast	0.16	0.17	0.13	0.19	0.17	0.17
Midwest	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.14	0.15
South	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.16	0.15	0.15
West	0.19	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.13
Mean age	42.20	41.40	42.90	42.10	42.70	41.20

correlation between one condition and recontact fairly insignificant.

**Table A.5 – Correlates of Recontact.** Reports OLS coefficients and conventional standard errors from models measuring the correlation between treatment conditions, demographic controls, and a binary dependent variable indicating whether the participant was successfully recontacted. The issue area treatment conditions are included in the model but excluded from the table (all topic coefficients have p-values greater than .05).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Recontacted
Congress treatment	-0.008 (0.019)
Order treatment	-0.037 (0.019)
Trump treatment	0.015 (0.016)
Age	0.003 (0.001)
Female	0.098 (0.016)
Some college or vocational training	0.011 (0.021)
B.A. or B.S.	0.031 (0.024)
Post-graduate or higher	-0.037 (0.028)
Black	0.091 (0.043)
Native American	0.021 (0.088)
Other/Decline to state	0.131 (0.047)
White	0.056 (0.037)
\$25,000 to \$50,000	-0.026 (0.022)
\$50,001 to \$75,000	0.018 (0.025)
\$75,001 to \$100,000	0.036 (0.029)
More than \$100,001	-0.005 (0.027)
Democrat	0.032 (0.021)
Republican	0.027 (0.021)
Midwest	-0.018 (0.025)
South	-0.011 (0.022)
West	-0.012 (0.026)
Observations	4,057

## A.4 Respondent attention

We inserted two attention checks into the second wave of the survey. The first occurred at the beginning of the wave 2 survey and asks respondents:

About a week ago, we asked you what you thought about the policies of American presidents. We want to give you some follow up information about how these policies turned out.

It is very important that you read the survey, so **we want to first test whether you read questions.** To show that you do, please select **both** “Extremely interested” **and** “Very interested” from the options below.

- Extremely interested
- Very interested
- Moderately interested
- Slightly interested
- Not interested at all

The second attention check occurred at the end of the survey before respondents were debriefed. It reads:

To ensure that you read this survey, please select the policy topic of this survey.

- COVID-19
- Affirmative action
- Actual policy topic
- Iranian nuclear program

Table A.6 shows the share of respondents who passed the attention checks. Eighty-four percent of respondents in wave 2 correctly selected both “Extremely interested” and “Very interested” in the first attention check. A higher share (91%) of respondents were able to successfully recall the policy topic in their survey. Overall, 79% of respondents successfully passed both attention checks. This attentiveness rate compares favorably to recent findings of increased inattentiveness among Lucid respondents (Aronow et al. 2020). In a preliminary memo, Aronow et al. (2020) present attentiveness rates from five surveys fielded between January and May 2020. The share of respondents who consented to the survey and passed two included attention checks (one of which is very similar to our first attention check) declined from 79.9% in January to 69.8% in May. While we cannot speak to why our respondents were more attentive than respondents a few months prior, it is a good sign that our attentiveness rate is similar to that found by Aronow et al. (2020) in January 2020 before the decline in attentiveness.

Aronow et al. (2020) also present some evidence that Lucid respondents who fail attention checks differ from those who pass. A simple comparison of proportions in their memo suggests that, compared to respondents who passed the checks, respondents who failed were more likely to be young, male, low-income, not college educated, and not members of the Democratic party. Table A.7, which presents the output from an OLS model regressing an indicator of respondent attentiveness on various demographic characteristics, provides mixed evidence in support of these findings. For instance, a one year increase in age correlates with a .3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of passing both attention checks ( $p < .01$ ) and respondents who identify as female are 8.7 percentage points more likely to pass both attention checks than respondents who identify as male ( $p < .01$ ). However, the most highly educated respondents in our survey were, on average, 13.5 percentage points less likely to be attentive than respondents with a high school education or less ( $p < .01$ ). Other findings from Table A.7 were not discussed in Aronow et al. (2020). Respondents in our survey who identify as white or live in the Midwest, for instance, were significantly more likely to pass both attention checks.


Overall, much like in Aronow et al. (2020), attentive respondents in our study differ from non-attentive respondents in politically meaningful ways. While somewhat concerning, correlations between attention and demographic characteristics are not limited to recent Lucid samples (Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014). We follow the advice of Berinsky, Margolis and Sances (2014) and do not drop non-attentive respondents from the models and figures displayed in the main text. However, we do reproduce our findings that use wave 2 data in Figure A.2 for completeness. On the whole, our results remain the same. No coefficients switch signs and only a handful change confidence levels.

**Table A.6 – Attentive Respondents.** Displays the share of recontacted respondents who passed the attention checks in wave 2.

Attention check	Proportion
First attention check	0.84
Second attention check	0.91
Both attention checks	0.79

**Table A.7 – Correlates of Attentiveness** Reports OLS coefficients and conventional standard errors from models measuring the correlation between treatment conditions, demographic controls, and a binary dependent variable indicating whether the participant passed attention checks in both waves.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Attentive
Age	0.003 (0.001)
Female	0.087 (0.020)
Some college or vocational training	0.038 (0.025)
B.A. or B.S.	0.042 (0.028)
Post-graduate or higher	-0.135 (0.034)
Black	-0.036 (0.054)
Native American	0.100 (0.111)
Other/Decline to state	0.045 (0.058)
White	0.109 (0.049)
\$25,000 to \$50,000	0.022 (0.026)
\$50,001 to \$75,000	0.004 (0.029)
\$75,001 to \$100,000	0.048 (0.034)
More than \$100,001	-0.029 (0.033)
Democrat	0.032 (0.025)
Republican	-0.014 (0.026)
Midwest	0.078 (0.030)
South	0.007 (0.026)
West	0.021 (0.031)
Constant	0.458 (0.062)
Observations	1,961



**Figure A.2 – The public punishes presidents for failing to deliver (attentive respondents).** Plots simulated marginal effect of estimates failure relative to success, using an observed case approach, based on logistic regressions that include condition and demographic controls; error bars indicate conventional 95% and Bonferroni-adjusted confidence intervals; sample restricted to respondents who pass both attention checks included in wave 2; see Tables A.13 and A.10 for full results.


## A.5 Additional results

**Table A.8 – Simple Means of Dependent Variables, by Experimental Condition and Wave Shows,** for each experimental condition and wave, the mean and standard deviation of the outcome variable. The number of respondents is also reported.


Wave	Outcome	Action	Status	Mean	Sd	N
		Position	Failure	0.583	0.494	367
		Position	Success	0.551	0.498	350
		Position	Could not recontact	0.596	0.491	755
	Approve of president	Congress	Failure	0.579	0.494	342
		Congress	Success	0.536	0.499	338
		Congress	Could not recontact	0.539	0.499	751
		Order	Failure	0.543	0.499	317
		Order	Success	0.540	0.499	309
		Order	Could not recontact	0.578	0.494	819




1	Approve of president's handling of topic	Position	Failure	0.548	0.498	367
		Position	Success	0.523	0.500	350
		Position	Could not recontact	0.574	0.495	754
		Congress	Failure	0.585	0.493	342
		Congress	Success	0.530	0.500	338
		Congress	Could not recontact	0.552	0.498	752
		Order	Failure	0.511	0.501	317
		Order	Success	0.515	0.501	309
		Order	Could not recontact	0.531	0.499	819
Intend to vote for Trump in 2020	Position	Failure	0.384	0.487	367	
	Position	Success	0.386	0.487	350	
	Position	Could not recontact	0.380	0.486	755	
	Congress	Failure	0.389	0.488	342	
	Congress	Success	0.379	0.486	338	
	Congress	Could not recontact	0.398	0.490	752	
	Order	Failure	0.451	0.498	317	
	Order	Success	0.424	0.495	309	
	Order	Could not recontact	0.438	0.496	818	
Approve of president	Position	Failure	0.583	0.494	367	
	Position	Success	0.566	0.496	350	
	Congress	Failure	0.579	0.494	342	
	Congress	Success	0.533	0.500	338	
	Order	Failure	0.565	0.497	317	
	Order	Success	0.550	0.498	309	
2	Approve of president's handling of topic	Position	Failure	0.471	0.500	367
		Position	Success	0.540	0.499	350
		Congress	Failure	0.532	0.500	342
		Congress	Success	0.559	0.497	338
		Order	Failure	0.517	0.500	317
		Order	Success	0.534	0.500	309
	Intend to vote for Trump in 2020	Position	Failure	0.395	0.490	367
		Position	Success	0.397	0.490	350
		Congress	Failure	0.409	0.492	342
Congress		Success	0.370	0.483	338	
Order		Failure	0.445	0.498	317	
Order	Success	0.424	0.495	309		



**Figure A.3 – Mixed Evaluations of Unilateralism by the Public, Agreement Measures.** Plots simulated marginal effect estimates using an observed case approach, based on logistic regressions that include condition and demographic controls; error bars indicate conventional 95% and Bonferroni-adjusted confidence intervals; see Tables A.9 and A.10.



**Figure A.4 – The public is mostly indifferent to the way policy is made.** Plots simulated marginal effect estimates, based on logistic regressions that include demographic controls; error bars indicate conventional CIs; “Same-Party Vote” is a binary outcome that indicates the respondent said they would vote for 2020 presidential candidate of the same party as the president shown in their treatment condition.



**Figure A.5 – The public punishes presidents for failing.** Plots simulated marginal effect of estimates of failure relative to success; “Same-Party Vote” is a binary outcome that indicates the respondent said they would vote for 2020 presidential candidate of the same party as the president shown in their treatment condition.

**Table A.9 – Mixed Evaluations of Unilateralism by the Public.** Reports logistic regression coefficients and conventional standard errors with binary dependent variables indicating either approval, voting for incumbent, or positive agreement with questions; simulated marginal effect estimates based on observed case approach from these models are reported in the leftmost panel of Figures 2 and A.3; all models include topic and president factor variables, along with partisanship, age, income, sex, ethnicity, and education.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Topic Approval	Job Approval	Trump Vote	Works w/ Congress	Gets things Done	Cares about Law
Congress	0.028 (0.081)	-0.125 (0.081)	0.020 (0.116)	-0.019 (0.081)	-0.102 (0.080)	-0.106 (0.081)
Executive Order	-0.101 (0.081)	-0.072 (0.081)	0.250** (0.115)	-0.178** (0.081)	-0.097 (0.081)	-0.168** (0.081)
Observations	4,056	4,055	4,055	4,037	4,036	4,034

**Table A.10 – Mixed Evaluations of Unilateralism by Copartisans, the Opposition, and Independents.** Reports logistic regression coefficients and conventional standard errors with binary dependent variables indicating either approval, voting for incumbent, or positive agreement with questions; simulated marginal effect estimates based on observed case approach from these models are reported in the right three panels of Figures 2 and A.3; all models include topic and president factor variables, along with age, income, sex, ethnicity, and education.


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Topic Approval	Job Approval	Trump Vote	Works w/ Congress	Gets things Done	Cares about Law
Copartisan	1.290*** (0.164)	2.285*** (0.194)	0.989*** (0.169)	2.091*** (0.186)	2.148*** (0.196)	1.970*** (0.185)
Opposition	-0.964*** (0.158)	-1.262*** (0.163)	1.067*** (0.171)	-1.107*** (0.161)	-1.348*** (0.159)	-1.292*** (0.162)
Congress	-0.351** (0.174)	-0.305* (0.175)	0.196 (0.200)	-0.041 (0.173)	-0.277 (0.170)	-0.268 (0.174)
Exec. Order	-0.260 (0.171)	-0.090 (0.171)	0.455** (0.191)	-0.174 (0.172)	-0.164 (0.168)	-0.306* (0.171)
Copartisan X Congress	0.429* (0.235)	0.119 (0.270)	-0.186 (0.240)	-0.002 (0.262)	-0.013 (0.270)	0.246 (0.262)
Opposition X Congress	0.719*** (0.222)	0.376 (0.230)	-0.112 (0.240)	0.191 (0.225)	0.429* (0.223)	0.293 (0.228)
Copartisan X Exec. Order	0.274 (0.232)	-0.083 (0.270)	-0.259 (0.233)	-0.171 (0.255)	0.112 (0.277)	0.168 (0.259)
Opposition X Exec. Order	0.298 (0.222)	0.237 (0.227)	-0.265 (0.233)	0.166 (0.226)	0.241 (0.222)	0.298 (0.227)
Observations	4,056	4,055	4,055	4,037	4,036	4,034

**Table A.11 – Mixed Evaluations of Unilateralism by the Public (Ordered Logits).** Reports ordered logistic regression coefficients and conventional standard errors with 7-point Likert dependent variables indicating “Strongly disagree,” “Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree;” all models include topic and president factor variables, along with partisanship, age, income, sex, ethnicity, and education.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Topic Approval	Job Approval	Works w/ Congress	Gets things Done	Cares about Law
Congress	0.008 (0.068)	-0.043 (0.069)	-0.022 (0.068)	-0.033 (0.068)	-0.059 (0.069)
Executive Order	-0.022 (0.069)	-0.028 (0.069)	-0.134* (0.069)	0.010 (0.069)	-0.098 (0.069)
Observations	4,056	4,055	4,037	4,036	4,034

**Table A.12 – Mixed Evaluations of Unilateralism by Copartisans, the Opposition, and Independents (Ordered Logits).** Reports ordered logistic regression coefficients and conventional standard errors with 7-point Likert dependent variables indicating “Strongly disagree,” “Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree;” all models include topic and president factor variables, along with age, income, sex, ethnicity, and education.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Topic Approval	Job Approval	Works w/ Congress	Gets things Done	Cares about Law
Copartisan	1.203*** (0.127)	1.758*** (0.131)	1.701*** (0.130)	1.703*** (0.131)	1.770*** (0.131)
Opposition	-1.025*** (0.129)	-1.256*** (0.132)	-1.108*** (0.130)	-1.290*** (0.131)	-1.261*** (0.131)
Congress	-0.301** (0.142)	-0.160 (0.144)	-0.046 (0.143)	-0.112 (0.144)	-0.140 (0.144)
Exec. Order	-0.102 (0.140)	-0.023 (0.143)	-0.053 (0.142)	-0.010 (0.142)	-0.117 (0.141)
Copartisan X Congress	0.344* (0.180)	0.177 (0.185)	0.108 (0.184)	0.104 (0.184)	0.107 (0.185)
Opposition X Congress	0.614*** (0.180)	0.303* (0.184)	0.146 (0.182)	0.255 (0.183)	0.216 (0.184)
Copartisan X Exec. Order	0.175 (0.180)	0.062 (0.184)	-0.064 (0.183)	0.178 (0.184)	0.076 (0.184)
Opposition X Exec. Order	0.212 (0.180)	0.161 (0.184)	0.002 (0.182)	0.182 (0.182)	0.164 (0.182)
Observations	4,056	4,055	4,037	4,036	4,034



**Figure A.6 – The public punishes presidents for failing to “get it done.”** Plots simulated marginal effect of estimates failure relative to success by respondent type, using an observed case approach, based on logistic regressions that include condition and demographic controls; error bars indicate conventional 95% and Bonferroni-adjusted confidence intervals; see Tables A.13 and A.14 for full results.

**Table A.13 – The public punishes presidents for failing to deliver.** Reports logistic regression coefficients and conventional standard errors with binary dependent variables indicating either approval, voting for incumbent, or positive agreement with question; simulated marginal effect estimates based on observed case approach from these models are reported in the leftmost panel of Figure 3, and in Figure A.6; all models condition on Wave 1 value of dependent variable, and also include topic and president factor variables, along with partisanship, age, income, sex, ethnicity, and education.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Topic	Job	Trump	Gets things
	Approval	Approval	Vote	Done
Congress	0.278* (0.158)	-0.235 (0.223)	-0.123 (0.283)	-0.057 (0.185)
Executive Order	0.300* (0.161)	0.002 (0.227)	-0.184 (0.293)	0.162 (0.191)
Failure	-0.467*** (0.132)	0.112 (0.182)	0.171 (0.233)	-0.437*** (0.156)
Observations	1,940	1,939	1,936	1,927

**Table A.14 – Copartisans, the Opposition, and Independents punish presidents for failing to deliver.** Reports logistic regression coefficients and conventional standard errors with binary dependent variables indicating either approval, voting for incumbent, or positive agreement with question; simulated marginal effect estimates based on observed case approach from these models are reported in the right three panels of Figures 3 and A.6; all models condition on Wave 1 value of dependent variable and also include topic and president factor variables, along with age, income, sex, ethnicity, and education.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Topic	Job	Trump	Gets things
	Approval	Approval	Vote	Done
Congress	0.306* (0.159)	-0.226 (0.225)	-0.131 (0.278)	-0.056 (0.189)
Exec. Order	0.332** (0.163)	-0.017 (0.227)	-0.186 (0.284)	0.205 (0.195)
Copartisan	1.150*** (0.247)	0.902*** (0.347)	-0.919** (0.427)	1.269*** (0.319)
Opposition	-0.194 (0.234)	-0.412 (0.316)	-0.859** (0.414)	-0.440* (0.255)
Failure	-0.396 (0.262)	-0.077 (0.336)	-1.002** (0.498)	-0.298 (0.284)
Copartisan X Failure	-0.143 (0.342)	0.119 (0.478)	1.478** (0.632)	-0.408 (0.425)
Opposition X Failure	-0.202 (0.335)	0.329 (0.443)	1.504** (0.621)	-0.218 (0.370)
Observations	2,027	2,026	1,936	2,013

**Table A.15 – The public punishes presidents for failing to deliver (Ordered Logits).** Reports ordered logistic regression coefficients and conventional standard errors with 7-point Likert dependent variables indicating “Strongly disagree,” “Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree;” all models condition on Wave 1 value of dependent variable, and also include topic and president factor variables, along with partisanship, age, income, sex, ethnicity, and education.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Topic	Job	Gets things
	Approval	Approval	Done
Congress	0.174* (0.104)	0.013 (0.115)	0.036 (0.107)
Executive Order	0.250** (0.106)	0.010 (0.118)	0.060 (0.110)
Failure	-0.339*** (0.086)	-0.148 (0.095)	-0.335*** (0.089)
Observations	1,940	1,939	1,927

**Table A.16 – Copartisans, the Opposition, and Independents punish presidents for failing to deliver (Ordered Logits).** Reports ordered logistic regression coefficients and conventional standard errors with 7-point Likert dependent variables indicating “Strongly disagree,” “Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree;” all models condition on Wave 1 value of dependent variable and also include topic and president factor variables, along with age, income, sex, ethnicity, and education.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Topic	Job	Gets things
	Approval	Approval	Done
Congress	0.189* (0.105)	0.008 (0.115)	0.027 (0.108)
Exec. Order	0.281*** (0.107)	-0.003 (0.119)	0.071 (0.110)
Copartisan	1.061*** (0.166)	0.687*** (0.182)	1.047*** (0.177)
Opposition	-0.363** (0.160)	-0.422** (0.177)	-0.252 (0.167)
Failure	-0.083 (0.180)	-0.185 (0.189)	-0.035 (0.182)
Copartisan X Failure	-0.627*** (0.228)	-0.079 (0.245)	-0.570** (0.235)
Opposition X Failure	-0.143 (0.228)	0.140 (0.246)	-0.373 (0.232)
Observations	1,940	1,939	1,927



