Appendices

A Power Calculation

The graph below illustrates the statistical power and Type S-error for a given number of observations. I add lines plotting sample sizes required to detect AMCE estimates of size: 0.05, 0.2, 0.35 for conjoint attributes with two and four feature levels. The vertical blue lines pinpoint the size of my smallest subgroup sample.



Figure A1: Power Calculation

Discussion on power: Concerns about the subgroup analyses being underpowered are important since subsetting observations by respondent characteristics limits group sizes to the uneven distribution of those characteristics in the Qualtrics sample pool. So the core challenge is to check that the subgroups for each conditional AMCE are not so small that I am making incorrect inferences about the positive impact of poll monitors on perceptions of fraud.

One way to evaluate the probability that the conditional AMCEs have the incorrect sign is to check the Type S-error, following similar work by Gelman and Carlin (2014). In the context of a conjoint experiment, the Type S-error is the probability that an estimate (the AMCE) generated via given experimental conditions (sample size, alpha-threshold, feature levels) has an incorrect sign. The cjpowR power analysis package in R provides a function that calculates Type S-error in addition to statistical power.

The S-error analysis shows a low probability (less than 0.1) that the conditional AMCEs are incorrectly estimating the positive effects of monitoring. Among the subgroup analyses, the estimates for partisan monitoring (a four-level attribute) are the least powered, with the smallest effect of 0.13 being estimated with 30% power (N = 253). Nonetheless, the S-error for this estimate is still small (0.000986). All other subgroup estimates are made with 2-level conjoint attributes, where a sample size of 250 provides power of 89% and S-errors below 0.1 for conditional AMCEs of 0.2 upwards.

Any clustering that occurs is at the individual level since one respondent produces six observations. The power simulation in Appendix A1 does not account for this clustering. However, the authors of the cjpowR package used to conduct the power analysis suggest that clustering does not affect the demands on statistical power: the randomisation of treatment occurs at the profile (tally sheet) level, not the individual (respondent) level, so standard errors for AMCE estimates do not need to be clustered (for simple causal estimates)(Schuessler and Freitag, 2020).

B Altered election forms

The top image provides an example of a real election form (from the Malawi 2019 election) where a part of the vote count has been crossed out and rewritten. The bottom image (that respondents see) is a simplified election form displaying the same type of error.





Figure A2: An altered vote count in practice (top) and in the context of the experiment (bottom). The simplified form is not an equivalent version of the real one, they have only been juxtaposed for comparison.

C Observations per estimate

For each hypothesis, the sample is split into sub-groups to be compared. The tables below list the number of observations in each of those sub-groups. Responses that were "Not Sure/Declined" were removed from the analysis.

Table A1: Sub-group analysis breakdown for trust in EMB.

Trust in EMB response	Number of Observations
"I do not trust them"	384
"I somewhat trust them"	1344
"I trust them a lot"	384
Not sure/ Declined	228

Table A2: Sub-group analysis breakdown for observer awareness.

Awareness Level	Number of Observations
High Awareness	1758
Low Awareness	582

Table A3: Sub-group analysis breakdown for party affiliations.

Party Affiliation	Number of Observations
DPP/Jubilee	450
ODM/MCP	606
Other (small parties, no affiliation)	1284
Not sure/ Declined	228

Table A4: Sub-group analysis breakdown for error analysis in A8.

Error Presence	Number of Observations
Errors present	1410
No errors present	930

D Sample Comparisons

The following plots compare the composition of the Qualtrics sample to AfroBarometer population estimates. In the Qualtrics sample, age and political affiliation are moderately

representative, while education is skewed toward more educated respondents.

D.1 Malawi: Qualtrics Sample vs. AfroBarometer





Figure A3: Party, Age Comparisons - Malawi



Figure A4: Education

D.2 Kenya: Qualtrics Sample vs. AfroBarometer



Figure A5: Party, Age Comparisons - Kenya



Figure A6: Education (Kenya)

E Example of simplified form (Kenya)

This is the simplified election form that is displayed in the survey sent to Kenyan respondents. As with Malawi, the design of this form closely mirrors that of an actual Kenyan election form.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS AT THE POLLING STATION

Name of Polling Station: BURBER PRIMARY SCHOOL ..... Code 01 - 1 of 1

Ward BURDER ..... Code 0185

Constituency WAJIR SOUTH ..... Code 038

County WAJIR ..... Code 008

Number of votes in favour of each candidate:

Name of Candidate	*No. of Valid Votes Obtained*
1. AUKOT JOHN EKJRU LONGOGGY	5
2. DIDA MOHAMED ABDUBA	7
3. JIRONGO SHAKHALAGO KHWA	40
4. KALUYU JAPHETH KAVINGA	12
5. KENYATTA UHURU	97
6. MWAURA MICHAEL WAINAINA	7
7. NYAGAH JOSEPH WILLIAM NTHIGA	7
8. ODINGA RAILA	300
9.	
10.	
11.	
Total number of valid votes cast	

Declaration

We, the undersigned, being present when the results of the count were announced, do hereby declare that the results shown above are true and accurate count of the ballots in BURDER PRIMARY SCHOOL Polling Station WAJIR SOUTH Constituency.

Presiding Officer: John Kamau ..... *Signature* KAMAU Date 8/08 /2017

Agents of Candidates (if present)

No.	*Name of Candidate or Agent*	*ID/Passport No.*	*Party Name/ Independent*	*Tel Contact.*	*Signature*	*Date*
1.						
2.						
3.	Patrick Ali	31447837	ELOG	07XXXXX	Ali	8/17
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						

Figure A7: This is the simplified election form - Kenya verison. In this case only the PO and non-partisan observer (ELOG) are present and there are no party agents.

F Error Analysis

This analysis explores whether presence of vote tally errors on the simplified election forms makes the presence of poll monitors more salient. However, there was no significant difference in the forced-choice outcomes for forms without errors and forms with errors.



Figure A8: There is no significant difference in the magnitude of preferences for poll supervision between tally sheets with errors and tally sheets without errors.

F.1 Vote Alteration and Vote Differences

In summary, the tally alterations subtract votes from the original vote count on the election form. This original vote count is assigned by me (in terms of the number of votes each candidate gets) and creates vote differences that allocate an electoral winner and loser at the station level. In the study of tally alterations, I evaluate the effects of altered vote counts on poll monitor salience and additionally explore the implications of my chosen original vote counts. This process is outlined in the steps below:

1. For the sake of simplicity, I first decided that no alterations would change the original outcome winner-loser outcome of the election form. I do this to focus on the impact of tally amendment alone, and not induce any new winner-loser effects.

2. Next, I considered which kinds of alterations – additions and/or subtraction – I would include. On the one hand, exploring both addition and subtraction examines the full range of vote alterations. However, doing so requires that I create a set of election forms (with all conjoint treatments) for each type of tally alteration (addition/subtraction/a combination of both). This raises the challenge of not having enough observations to effectively test the unique effects of each type of alteration. So I chose to only focus on the subtraction of votes (10% of the original vote count), which would allow me to simplify the analysis for the first iteration of this type of experiment. Figure A8 shows no significant difference in the salience of poll actors for forms with and without subtracted vote counts.

3. Thirdly, I check whether my choice of the vote counts for the original vote difference matters for subsequent AMCE estimates. To do so, I created forms with a large initial vote difference (pre-alteration) and small initial vote difference (each set having all poll monitor and vote alteration treatment combinations).[11] Table A5

[11] See figures A9 and A10 for examples of forms with a large and small initial vote difference.

provides a summary of all vote alterations, including vote differences. Figure A11 shows no significant difference in the responses to forms with a large vs. small initial vote difference across all conjoint treatments.

Summary of vote alterations.

Alteration	Small Vote Difference	Large Vote Difference
Addition of votes	+ to incumbent only + to opposition only + to both	+ to incumbent only + to opposition only + to both
Subtraction of votes	**- from the incumbent only** **- from the opposition only** **- from both**	**- from the incumbent only** **- from the opposition only** **- from both**

Table A5: Table on vote alterations

F.2 How the vote difference analysis affects number of images:

The vote difference analysis is a secondary check on whether my choices of the initial vote count numbers mattered for the final results. As mentioned in third bullet point of subsection F1, this leads to the creation of two sets of images with all the possible $2^6 = 64$ treatment combinations. For clarity these are outlined in Table A6 - in sum there are a total of 128 images created for each country.

	Clean	**Error**	**Total**
Small Vote Diff.	16	48	64
Large Vote Diff.	16	48	64
Total	32	96	128

Table A6: The vote difference analysis means that there are two sets of the 64 possible combinations of treatments, for each country.

Examples of forms with a large vs. small initial vote difference.



PRE06C2019A4

MZUZU CITY POST OFFICE POLLING STATION

	Total	S1	Total in Words
Chakwera (**MCP**)	~~97~~ 90	90 ~~97~~	~~NINETY SEVEN~~ NINETY
Chilima **(UTM)**	40	40	FORTY
Mutharika **(DPP)**	~~88~~ 80	80 ~~88~~	~~EIGHT EIGHT~~ EIGHTY
Muluzi **(UDF)**	12	12	TWELVE
Kaliya **(IND)**	5	5	FIVE
Kuwani **(MMD)**	~~7~~	~~7~~	SEVEN

Monitors

Name of party representative	*Party*	*Signature*
Gracious Phiri	DPP	Phiri
Anness Chirwa	MCP	Chirwa
Peter Kaunda	NICE	Kaunda

Presiding Officer John Banda

Date 21 /05 /19

Figure A9: This image shows the full range of possible subtractions on a form with a small initial difference between incumbent (DPP) and opposition (MCP).


PRE06C2019A4

MZUZU CITY POST OFFICE POLLING STATION

	Total	S1	Total in Words
Chakwera (MCP)	~~300~~ 270	270 ~~300~~	~~THREE HUNDRED~~ TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY
Chilima (UTM)	40	40	FORTY
Mutharika (DPP)	~~88~~ 80	80 ~~88~~	~~EIGHT EIGHT~~ EIGHTY
Muluzi (UDF)	12	12	TWELVE
Kaliya (IND)	5	5	FIVE
Kuwani (MMD)	7	~~7~~	SEVEN

Monitors

Name of party representative	*Party*	*Signature*
Gracious Phiri	DPP	Phiri
Anness Chirwa	MCP	Chirwa
Peter Kaunda	NICE	Kaunda

Presiding Officer John Banda

Date 21 /05 /19

Figure A10: This image shows range of possible subtractions on a form with a large initial difference between incumbent and opposition (which now starts at 300 votes).

Analysis on initial vote difference on forms.



Figure A11: There is no significant difference in the importance of poll monitors for tally sheets with a large vs. a small initial vote difference.

Overall AMCE estimates for forms that had no errors. I run the full AMCE (full sample, no subgroups) with error-free forms (N = 930), the main results still hold.



Figure A12: The general AMCE using the responses for forms that did not have any errors on them. All respondents nonetheless prefer forms with signatures and this holds for all poll actors.

G Experimental Setup and Randomisation

G.1 Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria

Inclusion Criteria

- People above the age of 18
- Malawian citizens.
- Kenyan citizens.

Exclusion Criteria:

- Being below the age of 18.
- If respondents were not from Malawi.
- If respondents were not from Kenya.

While this was not exclusion criteria the following respondents were not included in the final dataset:

- People who did not finish the entire survey.
- People who completed the survey in under half the median time that it took other respondents to complete the survey (a quality check).

G.2 Randomisation

Procedure used to generate the assignment sequence (e.g., randomisation procedures).

- I created all election form images listed in Table A6 and then uploaded the images into each country's respective Qualtrics survey.
- I used a Qualtrics randomisation tool (a 'Randomiser') to randomly select six images at the beginning of the survey to be used in the forced-choice tasks. The randomiser sampled these images from the given pool of images with equal probability.

Caveat 1: I have two classes of election form images. The first class is election forms without any vote tally errors ('clean' forms) - so the only possible treatments are related to poll monitors. The second class of images adds vote tally errors to the existing poll monitor treatments. More images produced in this second case because the addition of treatments increases the total number of possible treatment combinations (that had to be drawn). Here random sampling with equal probability means that images with errors are more likely to appear than those without. To ensure that there were enough observations

for both the 'clean' and the 'error' forms, I uploaded two sets of the 'clean' form images to the randomisers sampling pool to somewhat equalise the probability of selection.

Caveat 2: Allowing images to be selected with equal probability means there is a chance the same image might be selected twice. This occurred in 21 of the 1170 total rounds of the experiment (42 individual observations), which were dropped from the dataset. The breakdown of sub-group characteristics among the dropped observations is:

- ODM/MCP supporters(10), Jubilee/DPP supporters (8), Other party supporters (10), Don't Know/Preferred not to say (14).
- Low trust(8), moderate trust (28), high trust (2), preferred not to say (4).
- Low observer awareness (8), high observer awareness(34).

Removing these observations has now impact on the results, since dropping an observation has the same effect as some respondents seeing only two rounds of the experiment as opposed to three.

G.3 Randomisation outcomes

	Present	**Absent**
Presiding Officer	1153	1187
Jubilee/DPP (incumbent) Agent	1196	1144
ODM/MCP (opposition) Agent	1175	1165
Observers	1157	1183
	No Alteration/Clean	**Errors Present**
Jubilee/DPP (tally amendment)	1407	933
ODM/MCP (tally amendment)	1383	957
	Small	**Large**
Vote Difference	1190	1150

Table A7: Distribution of treatments in the combined country final dataset.

H Country Level Results

Presiding Officers: The estimates for the effect of presiding officers are positive for both countries. The main difference lies in the statistically insignificant estimate for Malawian voters with high trust in the EMB, in comparison to a significant result for Kenyan voters in the same group. It may be that Malawian voters that already trust the EMB are not particularly moved by the fact that the officer is present and could be more of an expectation for these respondents (ceiling effects) than it is for the other Malawian and Kenyan respondents.



Figure A13: Country level comparison of Presiding Officers.

Party Agent: The estimates for partisan monitoring in both countries show respondent preferences for forms with a copartisan agent and a combination of copartisan and nonpartisan agents. However, Kenyan respondents found non-copartisan agent presence

(only) salient, more so than Malawian counterparts. When evaluating why Malawian respondents did not find non-partisan agent presence salient, one reason may be stronger polarisation around poll monitoring. The 2019 Malawi Presidential election that centred public attention on altered tally sheets specifically (with some alterations involving tippex) and not just the general vote count may mean that Malawian respondents are (relatively) more sensitive to unequal partisan representation that is not in their favour. Alternatively, Kenyan respondents may relate to non-copartisan monitors in a less adversarial, more flexible way - one that also sees non-copartisan agents as sources of electoral accountability.



Figure A14: Country level comparison of partisan monitoring.

Non-partisan Observers: We see similar outcomes in observer awareness for both countries, where respondents with both high and low awareness of observer groups find observer presence salient. For both countries, there is an uneven split of subgroup observa-

tions. This is likely the reason for the barely significant estimates for the "low awareness" subgroup. Nonetheless, the direction (and also the magnitude) of the AMCEs are similar across contexts.



Figure A15: Country level comparison of non-partisan observers.

I Marginal Means vs. AMCE



Figure A16: Comparison of AMCE and MM for the presiding officer analysis.



Figure A17: Comparison of AMCE and MM for the partisan monitor analysis.



Figure A18: Comparison of AMCE and MM for the domestic observer analysis.

J Further partisan monitoring analysis



Figure A19: Respondents preferred tally sheets that had a copartisan agent's signature relative to those that did not.



Figure A20: This is an initial iteration of the political party analysis, comparing the outcomes by party identification. The graph similarly highlights that respondents preferred sheets with both co-partisan and non-copartisan agent signatures present.

K Presenting ACIE results



Figure A21: ACIE evaluating if voters are more suspicious of an altered form when a party agent signature is absent vs. when it is present.

L Winner vs. Loser effects



Figure A22: There is no significant difference in the magnitude of preferences for poll supervision between electoral winners and losers, when looking at only the major parties (MCP, ODM, Jubilee and DPP).



Figure A23: There is no significant difference in the magnitude of preferences for poll supervision between electoral winners and losers, when looking at the full sample.

M Full Survey PDF

See Online Appendix.

Survey Outline

You have been invited to take part in a research study exploring which organizations should be present at a polling station to monitor voting. Topic: Evaluating election integrity at polling stations. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without penalty. Privacy of your research records will be strictly maintained by assigning you a numeric code that will be tied to your responses. No one will be able to trace your individual identity from the number code. Participation in this study will involve 15 minutes of your time. ----------	
If you agree to be in this study, you will first be asked to provide a some background information. After this, you will be shown vote tally sheets, also called election forms. During elections, these tally sheets /election forms are used to summarize the votes at an individual polling station. You will: 1. Be shown two vote tally sheets from different polling stations. 2. Between the two vote tally sheets, pick the (one) tally sheet that you believe is most reliable. 3. Afterwards you'll answer some questions about the two tally sheets on why you think there may be a problem with the results. 4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 for three pairs of vote tally sheets. I consent to participating in the research study as described above:	YES/NO

The below outline is from the Malawian version of the survey, with edits from the Kenya version added for comparison.

Question Text	Answer Options
What age are you	Dropdown of numbers 18 – 70+
What is your highest level of education?	No formal schooling Some primary school Primary school complete Some secondary school Post-secondary training but not university Some university University Complete
What is your gender	Male Female Prefer not to say
What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?	Drop-down list of region-specific ethnic categories taken from AfroBarometer.
Have you ever been registered to vote	Yes

	No Don't Remember Prefer not to say
Did you vote in the 2019 general elections (Malawi)? Did you vote in the 2017 general elections (Kenya)?	Yes No Don't Remember Prefer not to say
Do you feel close to any particular political party?	Yes No
Which party is that?	Drop-down list of region-specific political parties taken from AfroBarometer.
How much do you trust the Malawi Electoral Commission? (Malawi) How much do you trust the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission? (Kenya)	I do not trust them I somewhat trust them I trust them a lot Not sure Rather not say
Political knowledge question (*Malawi*): Who was the chairperson of MEC after Judge Jane Ansah stepped down?	Martha Chizuma Gospel Kazako Patricia Kaliati Chifundo Kachale Saulos Chilima
Political knowledge question (*Kenya*): Who was the Chief Justice of Kenya in 2017?	Charles Rubia David Maraga Halakhe Waqo Willy Mutunga
Which of these civic organizations monitors elections in Malawi? Or Which of these civic organizations monitors elections in Kenya?	1. Malawi Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) 2. National Democratic Institute of Malawi (NDI-M) 3. National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) 4. Centre for Democracy and Economic Development. 5. Malawi Electoral Support Network (MESN)
	1. National Democratic Institute Kenya 2. Elections Observation Group (ELOG) 3. East African Institute 4. Centre for Economic Governance
For each role please pick the group (between MEC/IEBC, party agents, domestic monitors) that you think is most responsible for carrying it out.	
Record mishaps that occurred at the polling station.	MEC/IEBC

Direct voters and supervise polling stations.	Political Parties Domestic Observers
Counts votes and records vote totals.	
Protects the interests of a candidate or party.	

I will now briefly discuss election forms (also called vote tally sheets). These sheets tell you:
(1) how many people voted for each candidate
(2) the names and signatures of the people authorised to be at the station to oversee voting including: a polling station manager from MEC/IEBC (called the Presiding officer), agents from political parties and local/international election observers.

The picture below is of an actual vote tally sheet.



- The number of votes for each candidate is highlighted in yellow.
- The details of political party agents and civic observers are highlighted in blue.
- The presiding officer (the election official from MEC/IEBC) is circled in red.

These important details help to provide a proper record of the witnesses present during the vote counting and the final vote count at a given polling station.

In this survey you will examine vote tally sheets which look like the one above, but with a simpler design. The simplified vote tally sheets that you will see look like the one below. They contain similar details to an actual sheet, which I have also highlighted using the same colors:



PRE06C2019A4

MZUZU CITY POST OFFICE POLLING STATION

	Total	S1	Total in Words
Chakwera (MCP)	97	97	NINETY SEVEN
Chilima (UTM)	40	40	FORTY
Mutharika (DPP)	88	88	EIGHT EIGHT
Muluzi (UDF)	12	12	TWELVE
Kaliya (IND)	5	5	FIVE
Kuwani (MMD)	7	7	SEVEN

Monitors

Name of party representative	*Party*	*Signature*
Gracious Phiri	DPP	Phiri
Anness Chirwa	MCP	Chirwa
Peter Kaunda	NICE	Kaunda

Presiding Officer John Banda

Date 21 /05 /19

- The number of votes for each candidate is highlighted in yellow.
- The details of party agents and civic observers are highlighted in blue.
- The presiding officer (the election official from MEC/IEBC) is circled in red.

In the next part of this survey you will see **3 pairs** of tally sheets. After every pair there will be 5 simple follow up questions on the tally sheets that you saw.

start forced choice

FORM A



PRE06C2019A4

MZUZU CITY POST OFFICE POLLING STATION

	Total	S1	Total in Words
Chakwera (MCP)	97	97	NINETY SEVEN
Chilima (UTM)	40	40	FORTY
Mutharika (DPP)	88	88	EIGHT EIGHT
Muluzi (UDF)	12	12	TWELVE
Kaliya (IND)	5	5	FIVE
Kuwani (MMD)	7	7	SEVEN

Monitors

Name of party representative	*Party*	*Signature*
Anness Chirwa	MCP	Chirwa

Presiding Officer John Banda

Date 21 /05 /19

FORM B



PRE06C2019R4

MZUZU CITY POST OFFICE POLLING STATION

	Total	S1	Total in Words
Chakwera (**MCP**)	97	97	NINETY SEVEN
Chilima (**UTM**)	40	40	FORTY
Mutharika (**DPP**)	88	88	EIGHT EIGHT
Muluzi (**UDF**)	12	12	TWELVE
Kaliya (**IND**)	5	5	FIVE
Kuwani (**MMD**)	7	7	SEVEN

Monitors

Name of party representative	*Party*	*Signature*

Presiding Officer _____ Date 21 /05 /19

Between these two vote tally sheets, click on the one that you believe has more reliable information about the vote outcomes at its polling station?	Form A Form B



PRE06C2019R4

MZUZU CITY POST OFFICE POLLING STATION

	Total	S1	Total in Words
Chakwera (**MCP**)	97	97	NINETY SEVEN
Chilima (**UTM**)	40	40	FORTY
Mutharika (**DPP**)	88	88	EIGHT EIGHT
Muluzi (**UDF**)	12	12	TWELVE
Kaliya (**IND**)	5	5	FIVE
Kuwani (**MMD**)	7	7	SEVEN

Monitors

Name of party representative	*Party*	*Signature*
Anness Chirwa	MCP	Chirwa

Presiding Officer John Banda Date 21 /05 /19

This is top tally sheet (**Form A**) from the comparison question

In your opinion, what is the likelihood that electoral misconduct occurred at this polling station?	Very unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither likely nor unlikely Somewhat likely Very likely

Looking at the form, to what extent do you agree with the following statements:	
The vote tallies may have been changed in favour of a specific candidate.	Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat agree Strongly Agree
The interests of political parties were not protected at this station	
It is very possible that a political party had too much influence at this polling station.	
The presiding officer may have been put under pressure from other groups in the polling station.	



PRE06C2019A4

MZUZU CITY POST OFFICE POLLING STATION

	Total	*S1*	*Total in Words*
Chakwera **(MCP)**	97	97	NINETY SEVEN
Chilima **(UTM)**	40	40	FORTY
Mutharika **(DPP)**	88	88	EIGHT EIGHT
Muluzi **(UDF)**	12	12	TWELVE
Kaliya **(IND)**	5	5	FIVE
Kuwani **(MMD)**	7	7	SEVEN

Monitors

Name of party representative	*Party*	*Signature*

Presiding Officer _____ Date 21 /05 /19

This is bottom tally sheet (**Form B**) from the comparison question

In your opinion, what is the likelihood that electoral misconduct occurred at this polling station?	Very unlikely Somewhat unlikely Neither likely nor unlikely Somewhat likely Very likely
Looking at the form, to what extent do you agree with the following statements:	
The vote tallies may have been changed in favour of a specific candidate.	Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat agree Strongly Agree
The interests of political parties were not protected at this station.	
It is very possible that a political party had too much influence at this polling station.	
The presiding officer may have been put under pressure from other groups in the polling station.	

Click the arrow to see the next comparison pictures. [moves onto next force choice task]
To submit the survey please click on the arrow.