**Online Appendix for**

**Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow of UNCLOS**

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**Appendix A. Foundational Descriptive Statistics**

In this appendix, we first present the maritime cases handled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the World Court, and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (including pending cases). We then list the countries that have signed UNCLOS, ratified UNCLOS, registered Article 287 declarations (including a breakdown of their preference ordering over the various binding forums), registered Article 298 declarations, and/or joined the Convention via accession.

**Table A1. Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Cases Involving Maritime Issues**

Under UNCLOS, maritime issues need not be arbitrated through the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Indeed, many such arbitrations occur outside the PCA (e.g., British arbitration of the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and Argentina). We therefore intend the list that follows to be illustrative—but not exhaustive—of arbitration under UNCLOS, as recorded through an institution to which states parties regularly turn, the PCA.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Cases with Awards*** | | | | | |
| **Award Year** | **Claimants** | **Subject** | **Article 287 Declarations** | **Instituted Under UNCLOS** | **Issue** |
| 2019 | Malta / Sao Tome & Principe | Duzgit Integrity Arbitration |  | Yes | Maritime |
| 2018 | East Timor / Australia | Timor Sea Conciliation | East Timor (ITLOS-1/ICJ-1/Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1); Australia (ITLOS-1; ICJ-1) | No | Maritime |
| 2017 | Netherlands / Russia | Arctic Sunrise Arbitration | Netherlands (ICJ-1/ITLOS-1); Russia (ITLOS-1/Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2017\* | East Timor /Australia | Timor Sea Treaty Arbitration | East Timor (ITLOS-1/ICJ-1/Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1); Australia (ITLOS-1; ICJ-1) | No | Maritime |
| 2017 | Croatia / Slovenia | Territorial/Maritime Border | Croatia (ITLOS-1; ICJ-2); Slovenia (Arb VII-1) | Yes | Maritime/  Territorial |
| 2016 | Philippines / China | The South China Sea Arbitration |  | Yes | Maritime |
| 2015 | Mauritius / United Kingdom | Chagos Archipelago | United Kingdom (ICJ) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2014 | Bangladesh / India | [Bay](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&code=nicol&case=124&k=e2) of Bengal | Bangladesh (ITLOS) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2014 | Denmark / European Union | Atlanto-Scandian Herring | Denmark (ICJ) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2013 | Argentina / Ghana | ARA Libertad | Argentina (ITLOS-1/Arb VIII-2) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2008 | Ireland / United Kingdom | MOX Plant | United Kingdom (ICJ) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2007 | Guyana / Suriname | Maritime Boundary Delimitation |  | Yes | Maritime |
| 2006 | Barbados / Trinidad & Tobago | EEZ/Continental Shelf Delimitation | Trinidad & Tobago (ITLOS-1/ICJ-1) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2005 | Malaysia / Singapore | Land Reclamation/Straits of Johor |  | Yes | Maritime |
| 1999 | Eritrea / Yemen | Red Sea Territorial/Maritime Border |  | No | Territorial/  Maritime |
| 1928 | United States / Netherlands | Island of Palmas | N/A | N/A | Territorial |
| 1914 | Netherlands / Portugal | Boundaries/Island of Timor | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1913 | France / Italy | The Manouba | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1913 | France / Italy | The Carthage | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1910 | United Kingdom / United States | North Atlantic Fisheries | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1909 | Norway / Sweden | Grisbadarna | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1905 | France / United Kingdom | Muscat Dhows | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
|  | | | | | |
| ***Pending Cases*** | | | | | |
| **Case Filed** | **Claimants** | **Subject** | **Article 287 Declarations** | **Instituted Under UNCLOS**  **Annex VII** | **Issue** |
| 2019 | Ukraine / Russia | Detention of Ukrainian Navy | Ukraine (Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1/ITLOS); Russia (Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1/ITLOS) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2016 | Ukraine / Russia | Coastal State Rights in Black Sea | Ukraine (Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1/ITLOS); Russia (Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1/ITLOS) | Yes | Maritime |
| 2015 | Italy / India | Enrica Lexie Incident | Italy (ITLOS-1/ICJ-1) | Yes | Maritime |

*Notes*: \* The PCA reports that East Timor filed a second case regarding the Timor Sea Treaty in 2015. This entry contains no documents other than the Rules for Procedure, so we combined the two entries in our accounting. Note also that this entry lists a termination, rather than award, date. No award exists in this case, as the claimants terminated the proceedings in 2017, during their compulsory conciliation case that the PCA also heard (the latter with an award date in 2018).

**Table A2. World Court (PCIJ/ICJ) Rulings Involving Maritime Issues**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Cases with Awards*** | | | | | |
| **Award Year** | **Claimants** | **Subject** | **Article 287 Declarations** | **Instituted Under UNCLOS** | **Issue** |
| 2018 | Bolivia / Chile | Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean | Chile (ITLOS-1/Arb VIII-2) | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 2018 | Costa Rica / Nicaragua | Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean | Nicaragua (ICJ-1) | No | Maritime |
| 2014 | Peru / Chile | Maritime Dispute | Chile (ITLOS-1/Arb VIII-2) | No | Maritime |
| 2012 | Nicaragua / Colombia | [Territorial and Maritime Dispute](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&code=nicol&case=124&k=e2) | Nicaragua (ICJ-1) | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 2009 | Romania / Ukraine | [Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&code=ru&case=132&k=95) | Ukraine (Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1/ITLOS) | No | Maritime |
| 2008 | Malaysia / Singapore | [Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&code=masi&case=130&k=2b) |  | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 2007 | Nicaragua / Honduras | [Territorial and Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&code=&case=120&k=14) | Nicaragua (ICJ-1); Honduras (ICJ-1) | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 2002 | Indonesia / Malaysia | [Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=inma&case=102&k=df) |  | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 2002 | Nigeria / Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea intervening | Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria |  | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 2001 | Qatar / Bahrain | [Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=qb&case=87&k=61) |  | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 1999 | Botswana / Namibia | [Kasikili / Sedudu Island](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=bona&case=98&k=b7) |  | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 1993 | Denmark / Norway | [Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=gjm&case=78&k=e0) |  | No | Maritime |
| 1992 | El Salvador / Honduras, Nicaragua intervening | Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute |  | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 1991 | Guinea-Bissau / Senegal | Maritime Award (subsequent Maritime Delimitation between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal case ended by 11/1995 discontinuance of proceedings) | Guinea-Bissau (rejects ICJ) | No | Maritime |
| 1985 | Libya / Malta | [Continental Shelf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=lm&case=68&k=a8) |  | No | Maritime |
| 1984 | Canada / United States | [Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=cigm&case=67&k=6f) | N/A | N/A\* | Maritime |
| 1982 | Tunisia / Libya | Continental Shelf (subsequent Application for Revision and Interpretation rejected in 12/1985) | N/A | N/A\* | Maritime |
| 1974 | UK / Iceland | [Fisheries Jurisdiction](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=ai&case=55&k=9d) | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1974 | West Germany / Iceland | [Fisheries Jurisdiction](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=bi&case=56&k=f9) | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1969 | West Germany / Denmark | [North Sea Continental Shelf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=cs&case=51&k=e2) | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1969 | West Germany / Netherlands | [North Sea Continental Shelf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=cs2&case=52&k=cc) | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1953 | France / United Kingdom | [Minquiers and Ecrehos](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=fuk&case=17&k=19) | N/A | N/A | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 1951 | UK / Norway | [Fisheries](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=ukn&case=5&k=a6) | N/A | N/A | Maritime |
| 1933 | Norway / Denmark | Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (see also Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland) | N/A | N/A | Territorial/ Maritime |
|  | | | | | |
| ***Pending Cases*** | | | | | |
| **Case Filed** | **Claimants** | **Subject** | **Article 287 Declarations** | **Instituted Under UNCLOS**  **Annex VII** | **Issue** |
| 2019 | Guatemala / Belize | Guatemala’s Territorial, Insular, and Maritime Claim |  | No | Territorial/ Maritime |
| 2014 | Somalia / Kenya | Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean |  | No | Maritime |
| 2013 | Nicaragua / Colombia | Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia | Nicaragua (ICJ-1) | No | Maritime |
| 2013 | Nicaragua / Colombia | Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea | Nicaragua (ICJ-1) | No | Maritime |

*Notes:* \*Both states had not signed UNCLOS before the case appeared on the ICJ docket.

**Table A3. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) Cases**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Cases with Awards*** | | | | |
| **Award Year** | **Claimants** | **Subject** | **Article 287 Declarations** | **Instituted Under UNCLOS** |
| 2019 | Switzerland / Nigeria | The M/T “San Padre Pio” Case II | Switzerland (ITLOS-1) | N/A\* |
| 2019 | Switzerland / Nigeria | The M/T “San Padre Pio” Case | Switzerland (ITLOS-1) | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 2019 | Ukraine / Russia | Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels | Ukraine (ITLOS-1; Arb VII-1, Arb VIII-1); Russia (ITLOS-1/Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1) | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 2015 | Italy / India | The “Enrica Lexie” Incident | Italy (ITLOS-1; ICJ-1) | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 2015 | Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission | Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) |  | Article 138 Rules, Advisory Opinion |
| 2014 | Panama / Guinea-Bissau | The M/V “Virginia G” Case | Guinea-Bissau (rejects ICJ) | Article 55, Special Agreement |
| 2013 | Netherlands / Russia | The “Arctic Sunrise” Case | Netherlands (ICJ); Russia (ITLOS-1/Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1) | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 2013 | St. Vincent & Grenadines / Spain | The M/V "Louisa" Case | St. Vincent & Grenadines (ITLOS); Spain (ITLOS-1; ICJ-1) | Articles 287 & 290, Provision Measures |
| 2012 | Bangladesh / Myanmar | Bay of Bengal Maritime/Territorial Dispute | Bangladesh (ITLOS) | Annex VII |
| 2012 | Argentina / Ghana | The “ARA Libertad” Case | Argentina (ITLOS-1/Arb VIII-2) | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 2011 | International Seabed Authority | Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area |  | Article 191, Advisory Opinion |
| 2009 | Chile / European Union | Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean | Chile (ITLOS-1/Arb VIII-2) | Article 287 |
| 2007 | Japan / Russia | The “Tomimaru” Case | Russia (ITLOS-1/Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1) | Article 292, Prompt Release |
| 2007 | Japan / Russia | The “Hoshinmaru” Case | Russia (ITLOS-1/Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1) | Article 292, Prompt Release |
| 2004 | St. Vincent & Grenadines / Guinea-Bissau | The “Juno Trader” Case | St. Vincent & Grenadines (ITLOS) | Article 292; Prompt Release |
| 2003 | Malaysia / Singapore | Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor |  | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 2002 | Russia / Australia | The “Volga” Case | Russia (ITLOS-1/Arb VII-1/Arb VIII-1); Australia (ITLOS-1; ICJ-1) | Article 292, Prompt Release |
| 2001 | Ireland / United Kingdom | The MOX Plant Case | United Kingdom (ICJ) | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 2001 | Panama / Yemen | The “Chaisiri Reefer 2” Case |  | Article 292, Prompt Release |
| 2001 | Belize / France | The “Grand Prince” Case |  | Article 292, Prompt Release |
| 2000 | Seychelles / France | The “Monte Confurco” Case |  | Article 292, Prompt Release |
| 2000 | Panama / France | The “Camouco” Case |  | Article 292, Prompt Release |
| 1999 | New Zealand / Japan | Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases |  | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 1999 | Australia / Japan | Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases | Australia (ITLOS-1; ICJ-1) | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 1999 | St. Vincent & Grenadines/Guinea | The M/V "SAIGA" (No. 2) Case | St. Vincent & Grenadines (ITLOS) | Article 290, Provisional Measures |
| 1997 | St. Vincent & Grenadines/Guinea | The M/V "SAIGA" Case | St. Vincent & Grenadines (ITLOS) | Article 292, Prompt Release |
|  | | | | |
| ***Pending Cases*** | | | | |
| **Case Filed** | **Claimants** | **Subject** | **Article 287 Declarations** | **Instituted Under UNCLOS** |
| 2019 | Mauritius / Maldives | Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Mauritius and Maldives in the Indian Ocean |  | N/A\*\* |
| 2015 | Panama / Italy | The MV “Norstar” Case | Italy (ITLOS-1; ICJ-1) / Panama (ITLOS-for this case) | Article 287 |
| 2014 | Ghana / Côte d'Ivoire | Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean |  | Article 15, Delimitation;  Article 290, Provisional Measures |

*Notes*: \* Special Agreement, which replaced the arbitral proceedings that Switzerland initiated under Annex VII seven months earlier. \*\*Special Agreement, which replaced the arbitral proceedings that Mauritius initiated under Annex VII three months earlier.

**Table A4. UNCLOS Signatures, Ratifications, and Article 287 & 298 Declarations**

This table lists states in order of their country code numbers, as assigned by the Correlates of War Project. Summary statistics appear at the bottom of the table.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country |  | State Party via | State Party Declarations | | | | | State Party via |
| Preferences Under Article 287 | | | | Under Article 298 |
| Signature Year | Ratification Year | ITLOS | ICJ | Arb. VII | Arb. VIII | Accession |
| United States of America | 1994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Canada | 1982 | 2003 | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
| Bahamas | 1982 | 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cuba | 1982 | 1984 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Haiti | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dominican Republic | 1982 | 2009 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jamaica | 1982 | 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trindad and Tobago | 1982 | 2007 | 1 | 2 |  |  | 1 |  |
| Barbados | 1982 | 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dominica | 1983 | 1991 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Grenada | 1982 | 1991 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| St. Lucia | 1982 | 1985 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| St. Vincent & Grenadines | 1982 | 2010 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Antigua & Barbuda | 1983 | 1989 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| St. Kitts & Nevis | 1984 | 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mexico | 1982 | 2003 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  |
| Belize | 1982 | 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Guatemala | 1983 | 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Honduras | 1982 | 2002 |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| El Salvador | 1984 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nicaragua | 1984 | 2000 |  | 1 |  |  | 1 |  |
| Costa Rica | 1982 | 1992 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Panama | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Colombia | 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Venezuela |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Guyana | 1982 | 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Suriname | 1982 | 1998 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ecuador | 2012 | 2012 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Peru |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Brazil | 1982 | 1988 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bolivia | 1984 | 1995 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paraguay | 1982 | 1986 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chile | 1982 | 1997 | 1 |  |  | 2 | 1 |  |
| Argentina | 1984 | 1995 | 1 |  |  | 2 | 1 |  |
| Uruguay | 1982 | 1982 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| United Kingdom | 1994 | 1997 |  | 1 |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| Ireland | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Netherlands | 1982 | 1996 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Belgium | 1984 | 1998 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Luxembourg | 1984 | 2000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| France | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Monaco | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liechtenstein | 1984 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Switzerland | 1984 | 2009 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Spain | 1984 | 1997 | 1 | 1 |  |  | 1 |  |
| Andorra |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Portugal | 1982 | 1997 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| Germany | 1994 | 1994 | 1 | 3 | 2 |  |  |  |
| Poland | 1982 | 1998 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Austria | 1982 | 1995 | 1 | 3 |  | 2 |  |  |
| Hungary | 1982 | 2002 | 1 | 2 |  | 3 |  |  |
| Czech Republic | 1993 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Slovakia | 1993 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Italy | 1984 | 1995 | 1 | 1 |  |  | 1 |  |
| San Marino |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Malta | 1982 | 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Albania | 2003 | 2003 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Montenegro | 2006 | 2006 | 1 | 2 |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| Macedonia | 1994 | 1994 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Croatia | 1995 | 1995 | 1 | 2 |  |  |  | 1 |
| Serbia | 1995 | 1995 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 1994 | 1994 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Slovenia | 1995 | 2001 |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
| Greece | 1982 | 1995 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cyprus | 1982 | 1988 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bulgaria | 1982 | 1996 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Moldova | 2007 | 2007 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Romania | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Russia | 1982 | 1997 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| Estonia | 2005 | 2005 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |
| Latvia | 2004 | 2005 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |
| Lithuania | 2003 | 2003 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |
| Ukraine | 1982 | 1999 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| Belarus | 1982 | 2006 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| Armenia | 2002 | 2002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Georgia | 1996 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Azerbaijan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Finland | 1982 | 1996 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Sweden | 1982 | 1996 |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Norway | 1982 | 1996 |  | 1 |  |  | 1 |  |
| Denmark | 1982 | 2004 |  | 1 |  |  | 1 |  |
| Iceland | 1982 | 1985 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Cape Verde | 1982 | 1987 | 1 | 2 |  |  | 1 |  |
| Sao Tome & Principe | 1983 | 1987 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1982 | 1986 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Equatorial Guinea | 1984 | 1997 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Gambia | 1982 | 1984 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mali | 1983 | 1985 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Senegal | 1982 | 1984 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Benin | 1983 | 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mauritania | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Niger | 1982 | 2013 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ivory Coast | 1982 | 1984 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Guinea | 1984 | 1985 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Burkina Faso | 1982 | 2005 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberia | 1982 | 2008 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sierra Leone | 1982 | 1994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ghana | 1982 | 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Togo | 1982 | 1985 | 1 | 1 |  |  | 1 |  |
| Cameroon | 1982 | 1985 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nigeria | 1982 | 1986 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gabon | 1982 | 1998 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Central African Republic | 1984 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chad | 1982 | 2009 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Congo | 1982 | 2008 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 1983 | 1989 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Uganda | 1982 | 1990 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kenya | 1982 | 1989 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Tanzania | 1982 | 1985 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Burundi | 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rwanda | 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Somalia | 1982 | 1989 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Djibouti | 1982 | 1991 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ethiopia | 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eritrea |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Angola | 1982 | 1990 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Mozambique | 1982 | 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Zambia | 1982 | 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Zimbabwe | 1982 | 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Malawi | 1984 | 2010 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South Africa | 1984 | 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Namibia | 1982 | 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lesotho | 1982 | 2007 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Botswana | 1984 | 1990 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Swaziland | 1984 | 2012 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Madagascar | 1983 | 2001 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Comoros | 1984 | 1994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mauritius | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Seychelles | 1982 | 1991 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Morocco | 1982 | 2007 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Algeria | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tunisia | 1982 | 1985 | 1 |  | 2 |  | 1 |  |
| Libya | 1984 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sudan | 1982 | 1985 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Iran | 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Turkey |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Iraq | 1982 | 1985 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Egypt | 1982 | 1983 |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
| Syria |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lebanon | 1984 | 1995 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jordan | 1995 | 1995 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Israel |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Saudi Arabia | 1984 | 1996 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Yemen Arab Republic | 1982 | 1987 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Yemen People's Republic | 1982 | 1987 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kuwait | 1982 | 1986 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bahrain | 1982 | 1985 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Qatar | 1984 | 2002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| United Arab Emirates | 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oman | 1983 | 1989 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Afghanistan | 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Turkmenistan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tajikistan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kyrgyzstan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uzbekistan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kazakhstan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| China | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Mongolia | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Taiwan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North Korea | 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South Korea | 1983 | 1996 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Japan | 1983 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| India | 1982 | 1995 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bhutan | 1981 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pakistan | 1981 | 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bangladesh | 1982 | 2001 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Myanmar | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sri Lanka | 1982 | 1994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maldives | 1982 | 2000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nepal | 1982 | 1998 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Thailand | 1982 | 2011 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Cambodia | 1983 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Laos | 1982 | 1998 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vietnam | 1982 | 1994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Malaysia | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Singapore | 1982 | 1994 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Brunei | 1984 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Philippines | 1982 | 1984 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |
| Indonesia | 1982 | 1986 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| East Timor | 2013 | 2013 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |
| Australia | 1982 | 1994 | 1 | 1 |  |  | 1 |  |
| Papua New Guinea | 1982 | 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| New Zealand | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vanuatu | 1982 | 1999 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Solomon Islands | 1982 | 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kiribati | 2003 | 2003 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Tuvalu | 1982 | 2002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fiji | 1982 | 1982 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tonga | 1995 | 1995 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Nauru | 1982 | 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Marshall Islands | 1991 | 1991 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Palau | 1996 | 1996 |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| Federated States of Micronesia | 1991 | 1995 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |
| Samoa | 1984 | 1995 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 179 | 164 | 39 | 28 | 10 | 11 | 41 | 19 |
| % of State Parties |  |  | 23.78% | 17.07% | 6.10% | 6.71% | 25.00% | 11.59% |

**Table A5. Active Article 287 and Article 298 Declarations (as of 31 December 2020)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | First Preference | Second Preference | Third Preference | Objection | Total |
| *Article 287 Declarations* |  |  |  |  |  |
| ITLOS | 39 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 39 |
| ICJ | 21 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 31 |
| Annex VII Arbitration | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Annex VII Arbitration | 7 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 11 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 47\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Article 298 Declarations* | - | - | - | - | 41 |

Note: Sub-total does not add to 100% in column because some states make multiple Article 287 declarations.

**Appendix B. Detailed Results from the Analyses Presented in the Main Text**

This appendix contains the details underlying the empirical results that we present in the text. We begin with a list of the control variables used throughout our various analyses. Then, we present the logistic regression models on which our figures—both coefficient plots and marginal effects—rest. Each figure that appears in the main manuscript cross-references the appropriate, corresponding table in this appendix (and visa versa; see table of contents to the online appendix).

**Table B1. Control Variables for Regression Analyses**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Variable* | *Form* | *Description* | *Sources*: |
| Civil law dyad | Dichotomous | Both dyad members have civil law tradition | Mitchell and Powell (2011) |
| Common law dyad | Dichotomous | Both dyad members have common law tradition | Mitchell and Powell (2011) |
| Islamic law dyad | Dichotomous | Both dyad members have Islamic law tradition | Mitchell and Powell (2011) |
| Jurisdictional acceptance of the PCIJ/ICJ | Dichotomous | Both states accept compulsory jurisdiction of PCIJ/ICJ | Mitchell and Powell (2011) |
| Democratic dyad | Dichotomous | Both states score +6 or higher on the Polity autocracy-democracy index | Bennett and Stam (2000); Mitchell and Powell (2011); Marshall and Jaggers (2010) |
| Relative capabilities | Continuous | Challenger’s CINC score/Dyad’s total CINC score | Bennett and Stam (2000); Mitchell and Powell (2011); Singer et al. (1972) |
| Distance (capitals) | Continuous | Miles between dyad members’ capital cities | Bennett and Stam (2000); Mitchell and Powell (2011) |
| Peace years | Continuous | Years since last MID | Bennett and Stam (2000); Mitchell and Powell (2011) |
| World Foreign Direct Investment | Continuous | Millions of current $USD (logged) | Lee and Mitchell (2012);  World Bank (2009) |
| Development | Continuous | Claim challenger GDP/capita (logged $USD) | Lee and Mitchell (2012);  World Bank (2009) |
| Alliance | Dichotomous | Dyad members have defense, entente, or neutrality pact | Gibler and Sarkees (2004);  Lee and Mitchell (2012) |
| Openness | Continuous | Claim challenger: (exports + imports)/GDP | Gleditsch (2002);  Lee and Mitchell (2012) |
| Bilateral trade | Continuous | Sum of all dyadic imports (A to B and B to A; logged $USD) | Gleditsch (2002);  Lee and Mitchell (2012) |
| Claim salience | Integer  (0=none to 12=high) | Claim salience (e.g., resource, historical, or strategic value) | Hensel et al. (2008) |
| Previous MIDs | Continuous | Number of MIDs over claim in previous ten years (weighted) | Hensel et al. (2008) |
| Failed peaceful attempts | Continuous | Number of peaceful conflict management attempts over claim in previous ten years (weighted) | Hensel et al. (2008) |
| Relative capabilities (stronger) | Continuous | Stronger state’s CINC score/Dyad’s total CINC score | Hensel et al. (2008);  Singer et al. (1972). |
| Claim duration | Integer/count | Year of claim’s existence | Hensel et al. (2008) |

**Table B2. Logistic Regression of ICOW Maritime Claims (Directed, Politically Relevant Dyads, 1970-2001)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member signed UNCLOS | -0.203\*\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.088) |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members signed UNCLOS | -0.533\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.082) |  |  |  |  |
| One dyad member ratified UNCLOS |  | -0.598\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.082) |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members ratified UNCLOS |  | -1.268\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.154) |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime exists |  |  | -0.269\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.090) |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime in force |  |  |  | -0.003 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.083) |  |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) |  |  |  |  | 0.405\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.062) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) |  |  |  |  | 1.036\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.233) |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | -0.546\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.273) |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 1.271\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.138) |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | -1.480\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.208) |
| World FDI (t-1) | -0.061\*\* | -0.012 | -0.093\*\*\* | -0.160\*\*\* | -0.213\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.025) | (0.030) | (0.029) | (0.021) |
| Capability ratio (chal., t-1) | -0.370\*\*\* | -0.252\*\*\* | -0.355\*\*\* | -0.314\*\*\* | -0.342\*\*\* |
| (0.087) | (0.088) | (0.087) | (0.086) | (0.085) |
| Democratic Dyad  (t-1) | 0.438\*\*\* | 0.418\*\*\* | 0.455\*\*\* | 0.450\*\*\* | 0.489\*\*\* |
| (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) |
| Development (chal., t-1) | 0.358\*\*\* | 0.278\*\*\* | 0.336\*\*\* | 0.313\*\*\* | 0.332\*\*\* |
| (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.037) |
| Alliance (t-1) | 1.276\*\*\* | 1.255\*\*\* | 1.227\*\*\* | 1.228\*\*\* | 1.264\*\*\* |
|  | (0.061) | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.062) |
| Openness  (chal, t-1) | -4.330\*\*\* | -3.893\*\*\* | -4.232\*\*\* | -4.108\*\*\* | -4.444\*\*\* |
| (0.236) | (0.225) | (0.232) | (0.229) | (0.242) |
| Bilateral trade (t-1) | 0.096\*\*\* | 0.093\*\*\* | 0.094\*\*\* | 0.099\*\*\* | 0.078\*\*\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.016) |
| Distance  (capitals; t-1) | -0.263\*\*\* | -0.245\*\*\* | -0.263\*\*\* | -0.254\*\*\* | -0.245\*\*\* |
| (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.028) |
| Peace years | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | -2.456\*\*\* | -2.697\*\*\* | -1.961\*\*\* | -1.312\*\*\* | -0.871\*\*\* |
|  | (0.363) | (0.329) | (0.375) | (0.366) | (0.314) |
| N | 23,737 | 23,737 | 23,737 | 23,737 | 23,737 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline model: Lee and Mitchell (2012).

**Figure B1. Alternative Explanations of ICOW Maritime Claims (Controls from Table B2)**

**Table B3. Logistic Regression of Militarized Dispute Onset (Politically Relevant Dyads, 1920-2001)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member signed UNCLOS | -0.363\*\*\* (0.088) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members signed UNCLOS | 0.109 (0.071) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| One dyad member ratified UNCLOS |  | -0.201\*\* (0.088) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members ratified UNCLOS |  | -0.417\*\*\* (0.118) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime exists |  |  | -0.095\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.057) |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime in force |  |  |  | -0.174\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.070) |  |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) |  |  |  |  | -0.214\* (0.116) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) |  |  |  |  | -1.581\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.305) |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.489 (0.552) |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 1.074\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.343) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil law dyad | -0.263\*\*\* | -0.285\*\*\* | -0.280\*\*\* | -0.270\*\*\* | -0.236\*\*\* |
|  | (0.058) | (0.058) | (0.058) | (0.058) | (0.059) |
| Common law dyad | -0.898\*\*\* | -0.833\*\*\* | -0.847\*\*\* | -0.860\*\*\* | -0.881\*\*\* |
|  | (0.149) | (0.148) | (0.148) | (0.148) | (0.147) |
| Islamic law dyad | 0.041 | 0.071 | 0.069 | 0.062 | 0.058 |
|  | (0.096) | (0.097) | (0.096) | (0.096) | (0.096) |
| Jurisdictional acceptance of PCIJ/ICJ | 0.248\*\*\* (0.084) | 0.263\*\*\* (0.085) | 0.252\*\*\* (0.085) | 0.258\*\*\* (0.084) | 0.206\*\* (0.085) |
| Democratic dyad | -0.922\*\*\* | -0.980\*\*\* | -0.946\*\*\* | -0.962\*\*\* | -0.966\*\*\* |
|  | (0.108) | (0.108) | (0.108) | (0.108) | (0.108) |
| Relative capabilities | -0.107\* | -0.119\*\* | -0.116\* | -0.113\* | -0.083 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.060) |
| Distance (capitals) | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Peace years | -0.053\*\*\* | -0.051\*\*\* | -0.051\*\*\* | -0.051\*\*\* | -0.052\*\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Constant | -2.049\*\*\* | -2.022\*\*\* | -2.033\*\*\* | -2.042\*\*\* | -2.066\*\*\* |
|  | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.073) |
| N | 70,511 | 70,511 | 70,511 | 70,511 | 70,511 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *ITLOS 287 declaration (joint)* perfectly predicts failure (MID=0) and is therefore excluded from the models. Baseline model: Mitchell and Powell (2011).

**Figure B2. Alternative Explanations of Militarized Dispute Onset (Controls from Table B3)**

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**Table B4. Logistic Regression of Peaceful Settlement Attempts in Maritime Claims (1900-2001)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member signed UNCLOS | 0.402\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.187) |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members signed UNCLOS | 0.266\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.155) |  |  |  |  |
| One dyad member ratified UNCLOS |  | -0.006 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.219) |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members ratified UNCLOS |  | 0.283 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.344) |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime exists |  |  | 0.329\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.132) |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime in force |  |  |  | 0.612\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.153) |  |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) |  |  |  |  | 0.457\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.166) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.791 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.581) |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.583 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.742) |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.812\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.482) |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | -0.185  (0.790) |
| Claim salience | 0.026 | 0.027 | 0.025 | 0.024 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.027) |
| Previous MIDs | 0.455\*\*\* | 0.478\*\*\* | 0.472\*\*\* | 0.507\*\*\* | 0.478\*\*\* |
|  | (0.138) | (0.139) | (0.137) | (0.134) | (0.135) |
| Failed peaceful attempts | 0.528\*\*\* | 0.536\*\*\* | 0.521\*\*\* | 0.505\*\*\* | 0.490\*\*\* |
| (0.067) | (0.070) | (0.068) | (0.069) | (0.067) |
| Democratic dyad | 0.035 | 0.087 | 0.034 | 0.052 | 0.038 |
|  | (0.132) | (0.128) | (0.131) | (0.131) | (0.134) |
| Relative capabilities | -1.152 \*\*\* | -1.039\*\*\* | -1.096\*\*\* | -1.106\*\*\* | -0.968\*\* |
| (stronger) | (0.392) | (0.393) | (0.388) | (0.389) | (0.406) |
| Claim duration | -0.019\*\*\* | -0.017\*\*\* | -0.018\*\*\* | -0.019\*\*\* | -0.019\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Constant | -1.395\*\*\* | -1.448\*\*\* | -1.459\*\*\* | -1.429\*\*\* | -1.560\*\*\* |
|  | (0.425) | (0.431) | (0.422) | (0.427) | (0.436) |
| N | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline model: Hensel et al (2008).

**Figure B3. Alternative Explanations of Peaceful Settlement Attempts in Maritime Claims  
 (Controls from Table B4).**

**Table B5. Logistic Regression of Conflict Management within Maritime Claims**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent Variable | Binding | Non-Binding | Bilateral | MID (ICOW) |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) | -0.620 | -0.244 | 0.578\*\*\* | -0.273 | |
| (0.781) | (0.290) | (0.182) | (0.353) | |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | Perfect | 1.560\*\* | 0.580 | -0.097 | |
|  | Failure | (0.684) | (0.633) | (0.764) | |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) | Perfect | Perfect | 1.487\* | 0.843 | |
| Failure | Failure | (0.760) | (1.431) | |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) | 1.458 | 0.568 | 0.547 | 1.440\*\* | |
|  | (1.038) | (0.978) | (0.473) | (0.647) | |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint) | Perfect | 0.346 | -0.940 | -0.238 | |
| Failure | (1.769) | (0.853) | (1.703) | |
| Claim salience | 0.123 | 0.014 | 0.017 | 0.139\*\*\* | |
|  | (0.142) | (0.040) | (0.033) | (0.049) | |
| Previous MIDs | 0.006 | 0.751\*\*\* | 0.058 | 0.985\*\*\* | |
|  | (0.419) | (0.163) | (0.149) | (0.155) | |
| Failed peaceful attempts | 0.171\* | 0.378\*\*\* | 0.505\*\*\* | 0.156\* | |
|  | (0.100) | (0.065) | (0.067) | (0.081) | |
| Democratic dyad | 0.909\* | -0.428\*\* | 0.026 | -0.261 | |
|  | (0.528) | (0.213) | (0.156) | (0.238) | |
| Relative capabilities | -1.722 | 0.937 | -1.282\*\*\* | -0.081 | |
| (stronger) | (1.637) | (0.717) | (0.469) | (0.806) | |
| Constant | -5.219\*\*\* | -4.340\*\*\* | -2.024\*\*\* | -4.785\*\*\* | |
|  | (1.752) | (0.715) | (0.508) | (0.833) | |
| N | 3,112 | 3,149 | 3,161 | 3,161 | |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline model: Hensel et al (2008).

**Figure B4. Alternative Explanations of Conflict Management in Maritime Claims  
 (Controls from Table B5)**

**Table B6. Marginal Effects (on Maritime Claims, Table B2, Models 1-4)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent Variable |  | Maritime Claim Onset |
| One signed UNCLOS | No | 0.081  (0.077-0.086) |
| Yes | 0.069  (0.061-0.077) |
| Both signed UNCLOS | No | 0.093  (0.087-0.099) |
|  | Yes | 0.060  (0.054-0.065) |
| One ratified UNCLOS | No | 0.085  (0.081-0.089) |
| Yes | 0.051  (0.044-0.057) |
| Both ratified UNCLOS | No | 0.083  (0.079-0.086) |
|  | Yes | 0.027  (0.020-0.034) |
| UNCLOS exists (1982-) | No | 0.091  (0.081-0.101) |
| Yes | 0.073  (0.068-0.077) |
| UNCLOS in force (1994-) | No | 0.078  (0.074-0.082) |
| Yes | 0.078  (0.070-0.086) |

**Table B7. Marginal Effects (on MID Onset, Table B3, Models 1-4)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent Variable |  | MID Onset |
| One signed UNCLOS | No | 0.025  (0.023-0.026) |
| Yes | 0.017  (0.015-0.020) |
| Both signed UNCLOS | No | 0.023  (0.022-0.024) |
|  | Yes | 0.026  (0.023-0.029) |
| One ratified UNCLOS | No | 0.024  (0.023-0.025) |
| Yes | 0.020  (0.017-0.023) |
| Both ratified UNCLOS | No | 0.024  (0.023-0.025) |
|  | Yes | 0.016  (0.013-0.020) |
| UNCLOS exists (1982-) | No | 0.024  (0.023-0.026) |
| Yes | 0.022  (0.020-0.024) |
| UNCLOS in force (1994-) | No | 0.024  (0.023-0.026) |
| Yes | 0.021  (0.018-0.023) |

**Table B8. Marginal Effects (on Peaceful Settlement Attempts, Table B4, Models 1-4)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent Variable |  | Peaceful Attempts |
| One signed UNCLOS | No | 0.102  (0.091-0.113) |
| Yes | 0.140  (0.104-0.176) |
| Both signed UNCLOS | No | 0.102  (0.090-0.113) |
|  | Yes | 0.125  (0.010-0.151) |
| One ratified UNCLOS | No | 0.107  (0.096-0.117) |
| Yes | 0.106  (0.072-0.141) |
| Both ratified UNCLOS | No | 0.106  (0.023-0.025) |
|  | Yes | 0.132  (0.064-0.200) |
| UNCLOS exists (1982-) | No | 0.095  (0.082-0.108) |
| Yes | 0.124  (0.106-0.142) |
| UNCLOS in force (1994-) | No | 0.097  (0.086-0.108) |
| Yes | 0.157  (0.126-0.187) |

**Table B9. Marginal Effects of Article 287 Declarations**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent Variable |  | Maritime Claim Onset (Table B2, Model 5) | MID  Onset (Table B3, Model 5) | Peaceful Attempts (Table B4, Model 5) |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) | No | 0.072  (0.068-0.075) | 0.024  (0.023-0.025) | 0.100  (0.088-0.110) |
| Yes | 0.100  (0.092-0.108) | 0.020  (0.015-0.024) | 0.142  (0.111-0.173) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | No | 0.077  (0.074-0.080) | 0.024  (0.023-0.025) | 0.105  (0.095-0.115) |
|  | Yes | 0.170  (0.117-0.224) | 0.005  (0.002-0.008) | 0.193  (0.034 -0.351) |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) | No | 0.078  (0.075-0.082) | 0.024  (0.023-0.025) | 0.106  (0.096-0.116) |
| Yes | 0.049  (0.026-0.072) | 0.037  (0.000-0.075) | 0.166  (-0.012 -0.345) |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) | No | 0.076  (0.073-0.079) | 0.024  (0.022-0.025) | 0.105  (0.095-0.115) |
|  | Yes | 0.197  (0.162-0.231) | 0.063  (0.026-0.100) | 0.195  (0.064-0.325) |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint)\* | No | 0.080  (0.077-0.084) | - | 0.107  (0.097-0.117) |
| Yes | 0.022  (0.014-0.030) | - | 0.092  (-0.021 -0.206) |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent Variable |  | Binding Attempt (Table B5, Model 1) | Nonbinding Attempt  (Table B5, Model 2) | Bilateral Attempt (Table B5, Model 3) |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) | No | 0.006  (0.003-0.008) | 0.040  (0.032-0.048) | 0.066  (0.057-0.076) |
| Yes | 0.003  (-0.001-0.008) | 0.032  (0.017-0.047) | 0.108  (0.081-0.134) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | No | - | 0.038  (0.031-0.044) | 0.073  (0.065-0.082) |
|  | Yes | - | 0.142  (-0.007-0.292) | 0.118  (0.001-0.236) |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) | No | - | - | 0.073  (0.064-0.082) |
| Yes | - | - | 0.236  (-0.011-0.483) |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) | No | 0.005  (0.002-0.008) | 0.038  (0.031-0.045) | 0.074  (0.065-0.082) |
|  | Yes | 0.022  (-0.019-0.063) | 0.063  (-0.039-0.165) | 0.115  (0.031-0.199) |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint) | No | - | 0.038  (0.032-0.045) | 0.075  (0.066-0.084) |
| Yes | - | 0.052  (-0.106-0.210) | 0.034  (-0.015-0.082) |

*Notes:* Calculations for each cell performed separately, with all other variables held at their mean values.

**Table B10. Conflict Management Among Dyads with ICOW Maritime Claims.**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Negotiation  (Mean/Year) | Third-Party Non-Binding  (Mean/Year) | Third-Party Binding  (Mean/Year) | Militarized Dispute  (Mean/Year) | Fatal Militarized Dispute (Mean/Year) | Total  (Mean/Year) |
| Both Not State Party | 0.0930 | 0.0458 | 0.0070 | 0.0276 | 0.0024 | 0.1734 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| One State Party | 0.0876 | 0.0620 | 0.0036 | 0.0401 | 0.0000 | 0.1934 |
| Default | 0.0278 | 0.0463 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0741 |
| Article 287 | 0.1265 | 0.0723 | 0.0060 | 0.0663 | 0.0000 | 0.2711 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Two State Parties | 0.2000 | 0.1579 | 0.0000 | 0.0316 | 0.0000 | 0.3895 |
| Default | 0.1667 | 0.2143 | 0.0000 | 0.0238 | 0.0000 | 0.4048 |
| Article 287 | 0.2264 | 0.1132 | 0.0000 | 0.0377 | 0.0000 | 0.3776 |

*Notes:* The ICOW data currently cover Europe and the Americas.

**Table B11. Characteristics of State Parties and Nonparties to UNCLOS**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | State-level Characteristics | | | Maritime Claim Characteristics | |
|  | Capabilities  (Mean) | Major States  (Mean) | Democracy  (Mean) | Claim salience  (Mean) | Challenger claim salience only  (Mean) |
| Not State Party | 0.0079 | 0.0333 | -1.2692 | 6.7246 | 2.2029 |
| State Party | 0.0048 | 0.0366 | 2.3582 | 8.600 | 2.4000 |
| Difference  (t-value) | 0.9095 | -0.0874 | -2.3157\*\* | -1.7417\* | -0.6079 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| State Parties |  |  |  |  |  |
| Default | 0.0044 | 0.0256 | 0.8652 | 8.600 | 2.4000 |
| Article 287 | 0.0057 | 0.0638 | 5.3111 | No observations | No observations |
| Difference  (t-value) | -0.5053 | -1.1756 | -3.4126\*\*\* | Not applicable | Not applicable |

Note: This data covers the challenger’s UNCLOS status at maritime claim onset. None of the 5 challengers after 1982 have Article 287 declarations when they initiate the claim.

**Table B12. Probability of Bilateral Negotiations in ICOW Maritime Claims**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Time Period | | |
| Any Article 287 Declaration | 1983-1994 | 1995-2001 | Total  (1983-2001) |
| No | 0.0828 | 0.0926 | 0.0658 |
| Yes | 0.0844 | 0.1561 | 0.0990 |

Note: 95% Confidence intervals overlap for the 1995-2001 period, but not the larger period.

**Appendix C. Supplemental Paper Analysis: Selection Effects**

This appendix presents seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models, in which we account for potential selection effects. Critics might argue that the statistics effects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that we uncover more appropriately derive from (i) dyad members’ signing UNCLOS, (ii) dyad members ratifying UNCLOS, (iii) the UNCLOS regime’s existence, (iv) the UNCLOS regime entering into force, or (v) dyad members jointly signing similar Article 287 declarations. The modeling that follows accounts for these possible selection effects. We find that the results we present in the main text hold. Where deviations occur—and as appropriate—we reference this appendix in the main text for readers who might be interested in these models as well.

**Table C1. Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression of Maritime Claims (Table B2 Models)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dep Var 1* | Both signed UNCLOS | Both ratified UNCLOS | UNCLOS regime exists | UNCLOS in force | Joint 287 declarations |
| Maritime claim | 1.595 | -1.852 | -1.848 | -1.528 | 1.972 |
|  | (0.032)\*\*\* | (0.043)\*\*\* | (0.023)\*\*\* | (0.024)\*\*\* | (0.047)\*\*\* |
| Landlocked dyad member | 0.056 | 0.080 | 0.083 | 0.200 | 0.280 |
| (0.024)\*\* | (0.020)\*\*\* | (0.027)\*\*\* | (0.019)\*\*\* | (0.040)\*\*\* |
| Common dom. Legal system | 0.219 | 0.152 | 0.079 | 0.102 | 0.515 |
| (0.016)\*\*\* | (0.012)\*\*\* | (0.016)\*\*\* | (0.016)\*\*\* | (0.032)\*\*\* |
| Capability ratio (chal., t-1) | -0.086 | 0.062 | -0.013 | 0.006 | -0.117 |
| (0.021)\*\*\* | (0.026)\*\* | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.039)\*\*\* |
| Joint democracy (t-1) | 0.091 | 0.355 | 0.509 | 0.426 | 0.433 |
| (0.016)\*\*\* | (0.020)\*\*\* | (0.017)\*\*\* | (0.016)\*\*\* | (0.027)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -0.461 | -1.320 | 0.357 | -0.549 | -2.358 |
|  | (0.018)\*\*\* | (0.020)\*\*\* | (0.017)\*\*\* | (0.019)\*\*\* | (0.038)\*\*\* |
|  |  | | | | |
| *Dep Var 2* | Maritime Claims | | | | |
| Multiple 287 decl. (one/both) | 0.494 | 0.093 | 0.006 | 0.134 | 0.220 |
| (0.026)\*\*\* | (0.018)\*\*\* | (0.025) | (0.028)\*\*\* | (0.033)\*\*\* |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | 0.068 | 0.015 | 0.734 | 0.228 | 0.719 |
| (0.096) | (0.029) | (0.094)\*\*\* | (0.106)\*\* | (0.112)\*\*\* |
| Annex VIII decl. (joint) | 0.675 | 0.203 | -0.395 | -0.190 | 1.377 |
| (0.087)\*\*\* | (0.047)\*\*\* | (0.093)\*\*\* | (0.122) | (0.121)\*\*\* |
| ICJ 287 decl. (joint) | 1.162 | 0.200 | 0.178 | 0.383 | 1.974 |
| (0.057)\*\*\* | (0.047)\*\*\* | (0.057)\*\*\* | (0.068)\*\*\* | (0.067)\*\*\* |
| ITLOS 287 decl. (joint) | -0.546 | -0.356 | -0.344 | -0.315 | -0.127 |
| (0.078)\*\*\* | (0.043)\*\*\* | (0.089)\*\*\* | (0.108)\*\*\* | (0.131) |
| Any 298 decl. | -0.208 | -0.754 | 0.125 | -0.286 | -0.124 |
|  | (0.039)\*\*\* | (0.034)\*\*\* | (0.039)\*\*\* | (0.038)\*\*\* | (0.043)\*\*\* |
| World FDI (t-1) | 0.114 | -0.162 | -0.500 | -0.445 | -0.091 |
|  | (0.010)\*\*\* | (0.007)\*\*\* | (0.014)\*\*\* | (0.009)\*\*\* | (0.010)\*\*\* |
| Capability ratio (chal., t-1) | -0.094 | -0.095 | 0.214 | -0.086 | -0.165 |
| (0.037)\*\* | (0.032)\*\*\* | (0.041)\*\*\* | (0.039)\*\* | (0.040)\*\*\* |
| Joint democracy (t-1) | 0.069 | 0.355 | 0.475 | 0.439 | 0.209 |
| (0.025)\*\*\* | (0.022)\*\*\* | (0.026)\*\*\* | (0.027)\*\*\* | (0.029)\*\*\* |
| Development (chal., t-1) | 0.140 | 0.104 | -0.112 | 0.087 | 0.128 |
| (0.017)\*\*\* | (0.012)\*\*\* | (0.016)\*\*\* | (0.016)\*\*\* | (0.016)\*\*\* |
| Alliance (t-1) | 0.702 | 0.187 | 0.361 | 0.315 | 0.627 |
|  | (0.027)\*\*\* | (0.015)\*\*\* | (0.025)\*\*\* | (0.021)\*\*\* | (0.029)\*\*\* |
| Openness  (chal, t-1) | -1.659 | -1.200 | -0.507 | -0.902 | -1.784 |
| (0.103)\*\*\* | (0.063)\*\*\* | (0.092)\*\*\* | (0.066)\*\*\* | (0.091)\*\*\* |
| Bilateral trade (t-1) | 0.004 | 0.033 | 0.060 | 0.012 | 0.018 |
| (0.006) | (0.004)\*\*\* | (0.006)\*\*\* | (0.006)\*\* | (0.007)\*\*\* |
| Distance (t-1) | -0.025 | -0.048 | -0.008 | -0.050 | -0.064 |
|  | (0.012)\*\* | (0.009)\*\*\* | (0.011) | (0.013)\*\*\* | (0.013)\*\*\* |
| Peace years | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.001 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.000)\*\* | (0.000)\*\*\* | (0.000)\*\*\* | (0.000) | (0.001)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -3.641 | 0.168 | 4.832 | 3.509 | -0.916 |
| (0.138)\*\*\* | (0.090)\* | (0.184)\*\*\* | (0.132)\*\*\* | (0.158)\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Arc-Hyperbolic | -2.075 | 13.218 | 2.482 | 13.590 | -13.860 |
| Tangent | (0.131)\*\*\* | (78.725) | (0.119)\*\*\* | (181.940)\* | (21.374) |
| Obs | 23,737 | 23,737 | 23,737 | 23,737 | 23,737 |

*Notes:* \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table C2. Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression of Peaceful Settlement Attempts in Maritime Claims   
(Table B4 Models)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dep Var 1* | Both signed UNCLOS | Both ratified UNCLOS | UNCLOS regime exists | UNCLOS in force | Joint 287 declarations |
| Common dom. Legal system | 0.144 | 0.167 | 0.160 | 0.181 | 0.795 |
| (0.052)\*\*\* | (0.088)\* | (0.048)\*\*\* | (0.056)\*\*\* | (0.167)\*\*\* |
| Capability ratio (stronger:weaker) | 0.471 | 0.091 | 0.535 | 0.604 | -2.436 |
| (0.172)\*\*\* | (0.245) | (0.150)\*\*\* | (0.175)\*\*\* | (0.344)\*\*\* |
| Joint democracy | 0.298 | -0.160 | 0.436 | 0.301 | 0.580 |
| (0.050)\*\*\* | (0.093)\* | (0.047)\*\*\* | (0.055)\*\*\* | (0.134)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -1.365 | -1.979 | -1.002 | -1.728 | -1.047 |
|  | (0.158)\*\*\* | (0.208)\*\*\* | (0.135)\*\*\* | (0.157)\*\*\* | (0.261)\*\*\* |
|  |  | | | | |
| *Dep Var 2* | Peaceful Management Attempts in Maritime Claims | | | | |
| Multiple 287 decl. (one/both) | 0.324 | 0.262 | 0.242 | 0.197 | 0.264 |
| (0.104)\*\*\* | (0.089)\*\*\* | (0.105)\*\* | (0.092)\*\* | (0.089)\*\*\* |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | 0.479 | 0.449 | 0.469 | 0.245 | 0.480 |
| (0.323) | (0.369) | (0.329) | (0.331) | (0.325) |
| Annex VIII decl. (joint) | 0.439 | 0.423 | 0.410 | 0.540 | 0.834 |
| (0.434) | (0.449) | (0.434) | (0.426) | (0.900) |
| ICJ 287 decl. (joint) | 0.511 | 0.420 | 0.404 | 0.360 | 0.696 |
| (0.275)\* | (0.260) | (0.264) | (0.254) | (0.587) |
| ITLOS 287 decl. (joint) | -0.205 | -0.168 | -0.151 | -0.112 | -0.025 |
| (0.438) | (0.432) | (0.433) | (0.416) | (0.407) |
| Any 298 decl. | -0.141 | -0.167 | -0.162 | -0.322 | -0.157 |
|  | (0.139) | (0.141) | (0.136) | (0.141)\*\* | (0.135) |
| Claim salience | 0.014 | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.014 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| MIDs over issue (10 yrs/weighted) | 0.262 | 0.266 | 0.264 | 0.268 | 0.265 |
| (0.074)\*\*\* | (0.075)\*\*\* | (0.075)\*\*\* | (0.074)\*\*\* | (0.074)\*\*\* |
| Peaceful attempts (10 yrs/weighted) | 0.285 | 0.288 | 0.289 | 0.285 | 0.287 |
| (0.036)\*\*\* | (0.036)\*\*\* | (0.036)\*\*\* | (0.037)\*\*\* | (0.036)\*\*\* |
| Joint democracy | 0.009 | 0.019 | 0.022 | 0.032 | 0.011 |
| (0.068) | (0.068) | (0.069) | (0.068) | (0.069) |
| Capability ratio (stronger:weaker) | -0.504 | -0.496 | -0.490 | -0.470 | -0.464 |
| (0.209)\*\* | (0.209)\*\* | (0.207)\*\* | (0.207)\*\* | (0.217)\*\* |
| Duration | -0.009 | -0.009 | -0.009 | -0.009 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.002)\*\*\* | (0.002)\*\*\* | (0.002)\*\*\* | (0.002)\*\*\* | (0.002)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -0.966 | -0.967 | -0.969 | -0.964 | -0.994 |
| (0.224)\*\*\* | (0.224)\*\*\* | (0.224)\*\*\* | (0.224)\*\*\* | (0.229)\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Arc-Hyperbolic | -0.064 | 0.020 | 0.019 | 0.159 | -0.166 |
| Tangent | (0.055) | (0.094) | (0.052) | (0.054)\*\*\* | (0.281) |
| Obs | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 |

*Notes:* \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table C3. Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression of Binding Conflict Management in Maritime Claims (Table B5, Model 1)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dep Var 1* | Both signed UNCLOS | Both ratified UNCLOS | UNCLOS regime exists | UNCLOS in force | Joint 287 declarations |
| Common dom. Legal system | 0.140 | 0.167 | 0.158 | 0.194 | 0.803 |
| (0.052)\*\*\* | (0.088)\* | (0.048)\*\*\* | (0.056)\*\*\* | (0.170)\*\*\* |
| Capability ratio (stronger:weaker) | 0.471 | 0.093 | 0.530 | 0.608 | -2.413 |
| (0.172)\*\*\* | (0.245) | (0.150)\*\*\* | (0.175)\*\*\* | (0.335)\*\*\* |
| Joint democracy | 0.299 | -0.160 | 0.436 | 0.298 | 0.561 |
| (0.050)\*\*\* | (0.093)\* | (0.046)\*\*\* | (0.055)\*\*\* | (0.131)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -1.363 | -1.980 | -0.997 | -1.736 | -1.061 |
|  | (0.158)\*\*\* | (0.208)\*\*\* | (0.135)\*\*\* | (0.157)\*\*\* | (0.258)\*\*\* |
|  |  | | | | |
| *Dep Var 2* | Binding Conflict Management in Maritime Claims | | | | |
| Multiple 287 decl. (one/both) | -0.282 | -0.200 | 0.249 | -0.158 | -0.220 |
| (0.249) | (0.262) | (0.387) | (0.268) | (0.223) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | -4.232 | -2.967 | -3.686 | -3.475 | -4.966 |
| (0.161)\*\*\* | (0.798)\*\*\* | (0.498)\*\*\* | (0.471)\*\*\* | (1.923)\*\*\* |
| Annex VIII decl. (joint) | -3.232 | -3.218 | -2.959 | -2.963 | -6.258 |
| (0.321)\*\*\* | (0.319)\*\*\* | (0.390)\*\*\* | (0.324)\*\*\* | (0.276)\*\*\* |
| ICJ 287 decl. (joint) | 0.632 | 0.735 | 1.150 | 0.892 | -0.535 |
| (0.511) | (0.432)\* | (0.527)\*\* | (0.398)\*\* | (0.538) |
| ITLOS 287 decl. (joint) | -4.624 | -4.724 | -5.040 | -4.660 | -6.711 |
| (0.558)\*\*\* | (0.526)\*\*\* | (0.548)\*\*\* | (0.513)\*\*\* | (0.528)\*\*\* |
| Any 298 decl. | -4.742 | -4.539 | -4.617 | -4.073 | -6.647 |
|  | (0.356)\*\*\* | (0.360)\*\*\* | (0.371)\*\*\* | (0.596)\*\*\* | (0.307)\*\*\* |
| Claim salience | 0.037 | 0.036 | 0.033 | 0.035 | 0.044 |
|  | (0.046) | (0.045) | (0.042) | (0.044) | (0.038) |
| MIDs over issue (10 yrs/weighted) | 0.033 | 0.028 | 0.026 | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| (0.158) | (0.157) | (0.167) | (0.158) | (0.133) |
| Peaceful attempts (10 yrs/weighted) | 0.096 | 0.094 | 0.117 | 0.118 | 0.084 |
| (0.051)\* | (0.051)\* | (0.055)\*\* | (0.054)\*\* | (0.046)\* |
| Joint democracy | 0.316 | 0.307 | 0.275 | 0.296 | 0.458 |
| (0.187)\* | (0.181)\* | (0.184) | (0.180)\* | (0.203)\*\* |
| Capability ratio (stronger:weaker) | -0.548 | -0.563 | -0.698 | -0.597 | -1.268 |
| (0.550) | (0.568) | (0.552) | (0.563) | (0.744)\* |
| Duration | -2.523 | -2.521 | -2.437 | -2.507 | -1.880 |
|  | (0.590)\*\*\* | (0.591)\*\*\* | (0.557)\*\*\* | (0.579)\*\*\* | (0.696)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -0.282 | -0.200 | 0.249 | -0.158 | -0.220 |
| (0.249) | (0.262) | (0.387) | (0.268) | (0.223) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Arc-Hyperbolic | 0.069 | -0.435 | -0.351 | -0.299 | 1.032 |
| Tangent | (0.131) | (0.184)\*\* | (0.201)\* | (0.173)\* | (0.573)\* |
| Obs | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 |

*Notes:* \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table C4. Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression of Nonbinding Settlement Attempts in Maritime Claims (Table B5, Model 2)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dep Var 1* | Both signed UNCLOS | Both ratified UNCLOS | UNCLOS regime exists | UNCLOS in force | Joint 287 declarations |
| Common dom. Legal system | 0.144 | 0.157 | 0.161 | 0.188 | 0.794 |
| (0.052)\*\*\* | (0.088)\* | (0.048)\*\*\* | (0.056)\*\*\* | (0.168)\*\*\* |
| Capability ratio (stronger:weaker) | 0.470 | 0.087 | 0.535 | 0.613 | -2.402 |
| (0.172)\*\*\* | (0.242) | (0.149)\*\*\* | (0.175)\*\*\* | (0.339)\*\*\* |
| Joint democracy | 0.298 | -0.156 | 0.435 | 0.299 | 0.566 |
| (0.050)\*\*\* | (0.093)\* | (0.047)\*\*\* | (0.055)\*\*\* | (0.132)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -1.363 | -1.971 | -1.003 | -1.738 | -1.067 |
|  | (0.158)\*\*\* | (0.206)\*\*\* | (0.135)\*\*\* | (0.157)\*\*\* | (0.256)\*\*\* |
|  |  | | | | |
| *Dep Var 2* | Non-Binding Conflict Management in Maritime Claims | | | | |
| Multiple 287 decl. (one/both) | -0.059 | -0.154 | -0.154 | -0.213 | -0.161 |
| (0.151) | (0.133) | (0.151) | (0.136) | (0.133) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | 0.767 | 0.429 | 0.789 | 0.548 | 0.783 |
| (0.366)\*\* | (0.435) | (0.380)\*\* | (0.383) | (0.368)\*\* |
| Annex VIII decl. (joint) | -4.972 | -4.684 | -5.177 | -4.888 | -5.419 |
| (0.409)\*\*\* | (0.437)\*\*\* | (0.402)\*\*\* | (0.377)\*\*\* | (0.573)\*\*\* |
| ICJ 287 decl. (joint) | 0.392 | 0.194 | 0.222 | 0.147 | -0.034 |
| (0.468) | (0.440) | (0.441) | (0.431) | (0.604) |
| ITLOS 287 decl. (joint) | 0.231 | 0.269 | 0.289 | 0.336 | 0.145 |
| (0.780) | (0.751) | (0.755) | (0.710) | (0.579) |
| Any 298 decl. | 0.161 | -0.014 | 0.118 | -0.050 | 0.117 |
|  | (0.173) | (0.189) | (0.171) | (0.170) | (0.164) |
| Claim salience | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.003 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| MIDs over issue (10 yrs/weighted) | 0.380 | 0.392 | 0.386 | 0.398 | 0.384 |
| (0.082)\*\*\* | (0.083)\*\*\* | (0.083)\*\*\* | (0.082)\*\*\* | (0.082)\*\*\* |
| Peaceful attempts (10 yrs/weighted) | 0.194 | 0.199 | 0.202 | 0.197 | 0.204 |
| (0.035)\*\*\* | (0.035)\*\*\* | (0.035)\*\*\* | (0.035)\*\*\* | (0.035)\*\*\* |
| Joint democracy | -0.215 | -0.195 | -0.198 | -0.190 | -0.187 |
| (0.093)\*\* | (0.094)\*\* | (0.094)\*\* | (0.094)\*\* | (0.096)\* |
| Capability ratio (stronger:weaker) | 0.380 | 0.401 | 0.397 | 0.456 | 0.358 |
| (0.305) | (0.303) | (0.297) | (0.296) | (0.319) |
| Duration | -2.225 | -2.241 | -2.242 | -2.269 | -2.204 |
|  | (0.307)\*\*\* | (0.306)\*\*\* | (0.303)\*\*\* | (0.305)\*\*\* | (0.317)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -0.059 | -0.154 | -0.154 | -0.213 | -0.161 |
| (0.151) | (0.133) | (0.151) | (0.136) | (0.133) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Arc-Hyperbolic | -0.123 | 0.170 | -0.005 | 0.159 | 0.162 |
| Tangent | (0.077) | (0.119) | (0.070) | (0.073)\*\* | (0.232) |
| Obs | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 |

*Notes:* \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table C5. Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression of Bilateral Negotiations in Maritime Claims   
(Table 5, Model 3)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dep Var 1* | Both signed UNCLOS | Both ratified UNCLOS | UNCLOS regime exists | UNCLOS in force | Joint 287 declarations |
| Common dom. Legal system | 0.141 | 0.167 | 0.159 | 0.185 | 0.814 |
| (0.052)\*\*\* | (0.088)\* | (0.048)\*\*\* | (0.055)\*\*\* | (0.165)\*\*\* |
| Capability ratio (stronger:weaker) | 0.470 | 0.091 | 0.534 | 0.608 | -2.416 |
| (0.172)\*\*\* | (0.246) | (0.150)\*\*\* | (0.175)\*\*\* | (0.351)\*\*\* |
| Joint democracy | 0.299 | -0.160 | 0.436 | 0.301 | 0.597 |
| (0.050)\*\*\* | (0.093)\* | (0.047)\*\*\* | (0.055)\*\*\* | (0.134)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -1.363 | -1.978 | -1.001 | -1.733 | -1.088 |
|  | (0.158)\*\*\* | (0.209)\*\*\* | (0.135)\*\*\* | (0.157)\*\*\* | (0.260)\*\*\* |
|  |  | | | | |
| *Dep Var 2* | Bilateral Negotiations in Maritime Claims | | | | |
| Multiple 287 decl. (one/both) | 0.345 | 0.321 | 0.273 | 0.255 | (0.092)\*\*\* |
| (0.110)\*\*\* | (0.092)\*\*\* | (0.110)\*\* | (0.096)\*\*\* | 0.319 |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | 0.354 | 0.577 | 0.313 | 0.108 | (0.336) |
| (0.342) | (0.402) | (0.345) | (0.348) | 2.666 |
| Annex VIII decl. (joint) | 0.931 | 0.755 | 0.948 | 1.057 | (0.683)\*\*\* |
| (0.444)\*\* | (0.465) | (0.442)\*\* | (0.436)\*\* | 1.615 |
| ICJ 287 decl. (joint) | 0.361 | 0.325 | 0.287 | 0.251 | (0.518)\*\*\* |
| (0.269) | (0.253) | (0.260) | (0.250) | -0.143 |
| ITLOS 287 decl. (joint) | -0.583 | -0.540 | -0.530 | -0.471 | (0.417) |
| (0.451) | (0.448) | (0.452) | (0.441) | -0.260 |
| Any 298 decl. | -0.240 | -0.181 | -0.257 | -0.417 | (0.142)\* |
|  | (0.147) | (0.156) | (0.145)\* | (0.152)\*\*\* | 0.006 |
| Claim salience | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | (0.016) |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) | 0.027 |
| MIDs over issue (10 yrs/weighted) | 0.024 | 0.021 | 0.022 | 0.030 | (0.077) |
| (0.079) | (0.079) | (0.079) | (0.079) | 0.282 |
| Peaceful attempts (10 yrs/weighted) | 0.293 | 0.297 | 0.294 | 0.291 | (0.036)\*\*\* |
| (0.036)\*\*\* | (0.036)\*\*\* | (0.036)\*\*\* | (0.036)\*\*\* | -0.010 |
| Joint democracy | 0.010 | 0.016 | 0.020 | 0.026 | (0.074) |
| (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.075) | -0.518 |
| Capability ratio (stronger:weaker) | -0.614 | -0.614 | -0.597 | -0.589 | (0.224)\*\* |
| (0.226)\*\*\* | (0.225)\*\*\* | (0.223)\*\*\* | (0.225)\*\*\* | -1.280 |
| Duration | -1.211 | -1.212 | -1.216 | -1.204 | (0.241)\*\*\* |
|  | (0.242)\*\*\* | (0.241)\*\*\* | (0.242)\*\*\* | (0.243)\*\*\* | (0.092)\*\*\* |
| Constant | 0.345 | 0.321 | 0.273 | 0.255 | 0.319 |
| (0.110)\*\*\* | (0.092)\*\*\* | (0.110)\*\* | (0.096)\*\*\* | (0.336) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Arc-Hyperbolic | -0.023 | -0.112 | 0.044 | 0.166 | -0.779 |
| Tangent | (0.060) | (0.112) | (0.057) | (0.058)\*\*\* | (0.339)\*\* |
| Obs | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 | 3,161 |

*Notes:* \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Appendix D. Supplemental Paper Analysis: Issue Linkage and Sub-period Analysis**

In this appendix, we explore two broader questions. First, we consider whether UNCLOS commitments have an effect on *non*-maritime issue claims—namely, territorial issues. Scholars find that states disproportionately escalate territorial, as opposed to non-territorial, issues (e.g., greater militarization and hostility). Exploring issue linkage therefore will be interest to a wide(r) audience, although a full treatment of it requires an additional study. Then, we re-reconsider our results with attention given to two prominent sub-periods (1982-1993 and 1994-2001, before and after UNCLOS entered into force). The chief question is: do the effects of UNCLOS change over time (e.g., increase/strengthen, or decrease/weaken; see also Table B10).

**Table D1. Logistic Regression of Conflict Management within Territorial Claims (1816-2001)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Territorial Claims (1816-2001) | | | | |
| Dependent Variable | Binding | Non-Binding | | Bilateral |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) | -13.031  (0.540)\*\*\* | 0.451  (0.434) | | 0.288  (0.270) |
|  |  |  | |  |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | - | - | | - |
|  |  |  | |  |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) | 15.382  (1.028)\*\*\* | Perfect  Failure | | 0.622  (0.636) |
|  |  |  |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) | Perfect | Perfect | | Perfect |
|  | Failure | Failure | | Failure |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint) | - | - | | - |
|  |  |  | |  |
| Claim salience | -0.105 | 0.227 | | 0.090 |
|  | (0.065) | (0.042)\*\*\* | | (0.020)\*\*\* |
| Previous MIDs | 0.480 | 0.558 | | 0.049 |
|  | (0.185)\*\*\* | (0.087)\*\*\* | | (0.080) |
| Failed peaceful attempts | 0.196 | 0.384 | | 0.383 |
|  | (0.150) | (0.059)\*\*\* | | (0.041)\*\*\* |
| Democratic dyad | 0.409 | -0.075 | | 0.460 |
|  | (0.358) | (0.266) | | (0.112)\*\*\* |
| Relative capabilities | -4.254 | -2.141 | | -0.516 |
| (stronger) | (0.985)\*\*\* | (0.597)\*\*\* | | (0.312)\* |
| Constant | -1.367 | -3.871 | | -2.651 |
|  | (0.880) | (0.659)\*\*\* | | (0.330)\*\*\* |
| N | 6,017 | 6,002 | | 6,017 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table D2. Logistic Regression of Maritime Claims   
(Directed, Politically Relevant Dyads, 1982-1993; Re-analysis of Table B2)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member  signed  UNCLOS | -0.150  (0.140) |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad  members  signed  UNCLOS | -0.518\*\*\*  (0.133) |  |  |  |  |
| World FDI (t-1) | -0.238\*\*\* | -0.206\*\* | -0.313\*\*\* | -0.313\*\*\* | -0.339\*\*\* |
|  | (0.081) | (0.081) | (0.079) | (0.079) | (0.079) |
| Capability ratio  (chal., t-1) | -0.572\*\*\*  (0.142) | -0.509\*\*\*  (0.146) | -0.542\*\*\*  (0.142) | -0.542\*\*\*  (0.142) | -0.556\*\*\*  (0.141) |
| Joint democracy  (t-1) | 0.574\*\*\*  (0.104) | 0.549\*\*\*  (0.105) | 0.643\*\*\*  (0.102) | 0.643\*\*\*  (0.102) | 0.645\*\*\*  (0.101) |
| Development  (chal., t-1) | 0.603\*\*\*  (0.066) | 0.540\*\*\*  (0.066) | 0.559\*\*\*  (0.064) | 0.559\*\*\*  (0.064) | 0.578\*\*\*  (0.067) |
| Alliance (t-1) | 1.406\*\*\* | 1.369\*\*\* | 1.322\*\*\* | 1.322\*\*\* | 1.356\*\*\* |
|  | (0.109) | (0.112) | (0.111) | (0.111) | (0.114) |
| Openness  (chal, t-1) | -5.285\*\*\*  (0.391) | -4.994\*\*\*  (0.387) | -5.094\*\*\*  (0.383) | -5.094\*\*\*  (0.383) | -5.552\*\*\*  (0.402) |
| Bilateral trade  (t-1) | -0.008  (0.023) | -0.018  (0.024) | -0.008  (0.023) | -0.008  (0.023) | -0.030  (0.023) |
| Distance (t-1) | -0.337\*\*\* | -0.317\*\*\* | -0.336\*\*\* | -0.336\*\*\* | -0.334\*\*\* |
|  | (0.044) | (0.043) | (0.044) | (0.044) | (0.046) |
| Peace years | -0.011\*\*\* | -0.012\*\*\* | -0.012\*\*\* | -0.012\*\*\* | -0.011\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| One dyad member  ratified  UNCLOS |  | -0.732\*\*\*  (0.154) |  |  |  |
| Both dyad  members  ratified  UNCLOS |  | PF |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime  exists |  |  | PF |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime  in force |  |  |  | PF |  |
| Multiple 287  declarations  (one/both) |  |  |  |  | 0.449\*\*\*  (0.089) |
| Annex VII applies  (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.287  (0.870) |
| Annex VIII  declaration  (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.134  (0.540) |
| ICJ 287  declaration  (joint) |  |  |  |  | 1.178\*\*\*  (0.196) |
| ITLOS 287  declaration  (joint) |  |  |  |  | -1.846\*\*\*  (0.301) |
| Constant | -1.137 | -1.336 | -0.269 | -0.269 | -0.077 |
|  | (1.008) | (1.000) | (0.989) | (0.989) | (0.994) |
| N | 8,588 | 8,491 | 8,588 | 8,588 | 8,588 |

*Notes:* \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses; PF= Perfect Failure.

**Table D3. Logistic Regression of Maritime Claims   
(Directed, Politically Relevant Dyads, 1994-2001; Re-analysis of Table B2)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member  signed  UNCLOS | -0.460\*\*  (0.196) |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad  members  signed  UNCLOS | -0.730\*\*\*  (0.200) |  |  |  |  |
| World FDI (t-1) | -0.159\*\* | 0.174\*\* | -0.150\*\* | -0.150\*\* | -0.144\*\* |
|  | (0.073) | (0.078) | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.073) |
| Capability ratio  (chal., t-1) | -0.018  (0.174) | -0.015  (0.181) | -0.056  (0.172) | -0.056  (0.172) | -0.257  (0.169) |
| Joint democracy  (t-1) | 0.613\*\*\*  (0.115) | 0.576\*\*\*  (0.118) | 0.584\*\*\*  (0.115) | 0.584\*\*\*  (0.115) | 0.677\*\*\*  (0.121) |
| Development  (chal., t-1) | 0.082  (0.070) | 0.074  (0.069) | 0.093  (0.068) | 0.093  (0.068) | 0.198\*\*\*  (0.071) |
| Alliance (t-1) | 1.193\*\*\*  (0.110) | 1.155\*\*\*  (0.114) | 1.129\*\*\*  (0.112) | 1.129\*\*\*  (0.112) | 1.206\*\*\*  (0.115) |
| Openness  (chal, t-1) | -3.634\*\*\*  (0.500) | -3.310\*\*\*  (0.475) | -3.650\*\*\*  (0.485) | -3.650\*\*\*  (0.485) | -4.977\*\*\*  (0.560) |
| Bilateral trade  (t-1) | 0.248\*\*\*  (0.032) | 0.210\*\*\*  (0.031) | 0.229\*\*\*  (0.030) | 0.229\*\*\*  (0.030) | 0.180\*\*\*  (0.032) |
| Distance (t-1) | -0.087\*  (0.052) | -0.136\*\*  (0.053) | -0.109\*\*  (0.053) | -0.109\*\*  (0.053) | -0.098\*  (0.056) |
| Peace years | -0.019\*\*\*  (0.004) | -0.018\*\*\*  (0.003) | -0.020\*\*\*  (0.003) | -0.020\*\*\*  (0.003) | -0.021\*\*\*  (0.004) |
| One dyad member  ratified  UNCLOS |  | -0.514\*\*\*  (0.113) |  |  |  |
| Both dyad  members  ratified  UNCLOS |  | -1.330\*\*\*  (0.175) |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime  Exists |  |  | PF |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime  in force |  |  |  | PF |  |
| Multiple 287  declarations  (one/both) |  |  |  |  | 0.482\*\*\*  (0.097) |
| Annex VII applies  (joint) |  |  |  |  | 1.176\*\*\*  (0.252) |
| Annex VIII  declaration  (joint) |  |  |  |  | -1.049\*\*\*  (0.318) |
| ICJ 287 declaration  (joint) |  |  |  |  | 2.103\*\*\*  (0.238) |
| ITLOS 287  declaration  (joint) |  |  |  |  | -1.398\*\*\*  (0.296) |
| Constant | -1.064 | -5.001\*\*\* | -1.472 | -1.472 | -2.126\*\* |
|  | (1.053) | (1.048) | (1.041) | (1.041) | (1.064) |
| N | 8,021 | 8,021 | 8,021 | 8,021 | 8,021 |

*Notes:* \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses; PF=Perfect Failure.

**Table D4. Logistic Regression of Militarized Disputes   
(Politically Relevant Dyads, 1982-1993; Re-analysis of Table B3)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member signed UNCLOS | -0.292  (0.198) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members signed UNCLOS | 0.213  (0.173) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| One dyad member ratified UNCLOS |  | -0.184  (0.158) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members ratified UNCLOS |  | -0.474  (0.322) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime exists |  |  | PF |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime in force |  |  |  | PF |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) |  |  |  |  | -0.437\*\*  (0.186) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Annex VII applies (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.651  (0.679) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | -0.656  (0.684) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.499  (0.546) |
| Civil law dyad | -0.184 | -0.243 | -0.205 | -0.205 | -0.134 |
|  | (0.144) | (0.149) | (0.145) | (0.145) | (0.150) |
| Common law dyad | -1.320\*\*\* | -1.251\*\*\* | -1.245\*\*\* | -1.245\*\*\* | -1.252\*\*\* |
|  | (0.292) | (0.293) | (0.293) | (0.293) | (0.293) |
| Islamic law dyad | 0.199 | 0.262 | 0.239 | 0.239 | 0.245 |
|  | (0.182) | (0.182) | (0.181) | (0.181) | (0.182) |
| Jurisdictional acceptance of PCIJ/ICJ | 0.572\*\*\*  (0.202) | 0.658\*\*\*  (0.201) | 0.623\*\*\*  (0.201) | 0.623\*\*\*  (0.201) | 0.531\*\*  (0.208) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democratic dyad | -0.362\* | -0.494\*\* | -0.474\*\* | -0.474\*\* | -0.460\*\* |
|  | (0.200) | (0.198) | (0.197) | (0.197) | (0.201) |
| Relative capabilities | 0.422\*\*\* | 0.401\*\*\* | 0.414\*\*\* | 0.414\*\*\* | 0.430\*\*\* |
|  | (0.141) | (0.139) | (0.139) | (0.139) | (0.141) |
| Distance (capitals) | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Peace years | -0.084\*\*\* | -0.080\*\*\* | -0.080\*\*\* | -0.080\*\*\* | -0.079\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Constant | -2.169\*\*\* | -2.049\*\*\* | -2.121\*\*\* | -2.121\*\*\* | -2.103\*\*\* |
|  | (0.200) | (0.157) | (0.151) | (0.151) | (0.150) |
| N | 15,738 | 15,738 | 15,738 | 15,738 | 15,738 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses; PF=Perfect Failure.

**Table D5. Logistic Regression of Militarized Disputes   
(Politically Relevant Dyads, 1994-2001; Re-analysis of Table B3)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member signed UNCLOS | 0.405  (0.278) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members signed UNCLOS | 1.039\*\*\*  (0.271) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| One dyad member ratified UNCLOS |  | -0.128  (0.162) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members ratified UNCLOS |  | -0.390\*\*  (0.181) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime exists |  |  | PF |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime in force |  |  |  | PF |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) |  |  |  |  | 0.080  (0.181) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Annex VII applies (joint) |  |  |  |  | -1.533\*\*\*  (0.339) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.700  (0.625) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 1.159\*\*  (0.520) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil law dyad | -0.473\*\*\* | -0.602\*\*\* | -0.579\*\*\* | -0.579\*\*\* | -0.494\*\*\* |
|  | (0.149) | (0.151) | (0.150) | (0.150) | (0.168) |
| Common law dyad | -1.161\*\*\* | -0.892\*\* | -0.983\*\*\* | -0.983\*\*\* | -1.046\*\*\* |
|  | (0.353) | (0.359) | (0.353) | (0.353) | (0.351) |
| Islamic law dyad | -0.501 | -0.287 | -0.294 | -0.294 | -0.358 |
|  | (0.262) | (0.267) | (0.264) | (0.264) | (0.265) |
| Jurisdictional acceptance of PCIJ/ICJ | 0.351\*  (0.203) | 0.574\*\*\*  (0.207) | 0.513\*\*  (0.206) | 0.513\*\*  (0.206) | 0.311  (0.215) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democratic dyad | -0.175 | -0.316 | -0.178 | -0.178 | -0.360 |
|  | (0.337) | (0.344) | (0.336) | (0.336) | (0.343) |
| Relative capabilities | -0.187 | -0.240 | -0.248\* | -0.248\* | -0.131 |
|  | (0.150) | (0.143) | (0.142) | (0.142) | (0.148) |
| Distance (capitals) | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Peace years | -0.070\*\*\* | -0.062\*\*\* | -0.063\*\*\* | -0.063\*\*\* | -0.067\*\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Constant | -2.355\*\*\* | -1.484\*\*\* | -1.634\*\*\* | -1.634\*\*\* | -1.633\*\*\* |
|  | (0.317) | (0.197) | (0.193) | (0.193) | (0.189) |
| N | 13,976 | 13,976 | 13,976 | 13,976 | 13,976 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses; PF=Perfect Failure.

**Table D6. Logistic Regression of Peaceful Settlement Attempts in Maritime Claims   
(1982-1993; Re-analysis of Table 3)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member signed UNCLOS | 0.659 |  |  |  |  |
| (0.492) |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members signed UNCLOS | 0.352 |  |  |  |  |
| (0.462) |  |  |  |  |
| One dyad member ratified UNCLOS |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | -0.097  (0.503) |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members ratified UNCLOS |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | PF |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime exists |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | N/A |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime in force |  |  |  | N/A |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 0.484\*  (0.282) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | PF |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | PF |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | -0.141  (0.813) |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  | 0.644  (1.239) |
| Claim salience | 0.067 | 0.055 | 0.059 | 0.059 | 0.067 |
|  | (0.064) | (0.061) | (0.061) | (0.061) | (0.059) |
| Previous MIDs | -0.237 | -0.194 | -0.200 | -0.200 | -0.082 |
|  | (0.268) | (0.275) | (0.276) | (0.276) | (0.267) |
| Failed peaceful attempts | 0.646\*\*\* | 0.648\*\*\* | 0.651\*\*\* | 0.651\*\*\* | 0.567\*\*\* |
| (0.125) | (0.125) | (0.126) | (0.126) | (0.132) |
| Democratic dyad | 0.150 | 0.167 | 0.194 | 0.194 | 0.133 |
|  | (0.294) | (0.303) | (0.289) | (0.289) | (0.294) |
| Relative capabilities | -2.806\*\*\* | -2.572\*\*\* | -2.663\*\*\* | -2.663\*\*\* | -3.006\*\*\* |
| (stronger) | (0.856) | (0.853) | (0.810) | (0.810) | (0.851) |
| Claim duration | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Constant | -0.913 | -0.636 | -0.624 | -0.624 | -0.500 |
|  | (0.847) | (0.007) | (0.822) | (0.822) | (0.798) |
| N | 719 | 710 | 719 | 719 | 715 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses; PF=Perfect Failure; N/A=UNCLOS regime exists and in force are always constant because of the time period restriction (i.e., 1 and 0 respectively).

**Table D7. Logistic Regression of Peaceful Settlement Attempts in Maritime Claims   
(1994-2001; Re-analysis of Table B3)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| One dyad member signed UNCLOS | 0.188 |  |  |  |  |
| (0.522) |  |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members signed UNCLOS | 0.154 |  |  |  |  |
| (0.501) |  |  |  |  |
| One dyad member ratified UNCLOS |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | -0.778\*\*  (0.324) |  |  |  |
| Both dyad members ratified UNCLOS |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | -0.547  (0.402) |  |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime exists |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | N/A |  |  |
| UNCLOS regime in force |  |  |  | N/A |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Multiple 287 declarations (one/both) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 0.281  (0.303) |
| Annex VII applies (joint) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | -0.161  (0.658) |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 1.537\*  (1.129) |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 0.881  (0.772) |
| ITLOS 287 declaration  (joint) |  |  |  |  | -0.337  (1.095) |
| Claim salience | 0.076 | 0.068 | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.086 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.061) |
| Previous MIDs | 0.669\*\* | 0.848\*\*\* | 0.692\*\*\* | 0.692\*\*\* | 0.515\* |
|  | (0.274) | (0.272) | (0.257) | (0.257) | (0.267) |
| Failed peaceful attempts | 0.390\*\*\* | 0.415\*\*\* | 0.389\*\*\* | 0.389\*\*\* | 0.372\*\*\* |
| (0.091) | (0.098) | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.090) |
| Democratic dyad | -0.349 | -0.469 | -0.336 | -0.336 | -0.304\*\* |
|  | (0.302) | (0.306) | (0.291) | (0.291) | (0.313) |
| Relative capabilities | -3.287\*\*\* | -2.875\*\*\* | -3.098\*\*\* | -3.098\*\*\* | -3.135\*\*\* |
| (stronger) | (0.971) | (0.917) | (0.878) | (0.878) | (0.950) |
| Claim duration | -0.033\*\*\* | -0.032\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.100) |
| Constant | 1.022 | 1.238 | 1.030 | 1.030 | 0.790 |
|  | (0.906) | (0.917) | (0.886) | (0.886) | (0.962) |
| N | 517 | 517 | 517 | 517 | 517 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses; PF=Perfect Failure; N/A=UNCLOS regime exists and in force are always constant because of the time period restriction (i.e., 1 and 0 respectively).

**Table D8. Logistic Regression of Conflict Management in Maritime Claims   
(1982-1993; Re-analysis of Table B5)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Maritime Claims (1982-1993) | | |
| Dependent Variable | Binding | Non-Binding | Bilateral |
| Multiple 287 declarations  (one/both) | 1.618 | -0.076 | 0.477 |
| (1.443) | (0.613) | (0.308) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | PF | PF | PF |
|  |  |  |  |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) | PF | PF | PF |
|  |  |  |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) | 1.505 | 1.257 | -0.914 |
|  | (1.789) | (1.320) | (1.118) |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint) | PF | PF | 1.523 |
|  |  | (1.479) |
| Claim salience | 0.198\* | -0.084 | 0.077 |
|  | (0.112) | (0.095) | (0.072) |
| Previous MIDs | -1.234 | 0.491 | -0.253 |
|  | (1.061) | (0.449) | (0.301) |
| Failed peaceful attempts | 0.398 | 0.616\*\*\* | 0.410\*\*\* |
|  | (0.305) | (0.195) | (0.132) |
| Democratic dyad | PF | -0.448 | 0.219 |
|  |  | (0.573) | (0.312) |
| Relative capabilities | -12.216\*\*\* | 0.432 | -3.213\*\*\* |
| (stronger) | (2.231) | (1.692) | (0.921) |
| Constant | 1.671 | -3.777\*\* | -0.900 |
|  | (1.295) | (1.697) | (0.892) |
| N | 377 | 706 | 715 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses; PF=Perfect Failure.

**Table D9. Logistic Regression of Conflict Management in Maritime Claims   
(1994-2001; Re-analysis of Table B5)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Maritime Claims (1994-2001) | | |
| Dependent Variable | Binding | Non-Binding | Bilateral |
| Multiple 287 declarations  (one/both) | - | -0.378 | 0.578\* |
|  | (0.452) | (0.330) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Annex VII applies (joint) | - | 0.507 | 0.507 |
|  |  | (0.685) | (0.685) |
| Annex VIII declaration (joint) | - | PF | 2.454 |
|  |  | (1.246) |
| ICJ 287 declaration (joint) | - | 0.294 | 0.260 |
|  |  | (0.970) | (0.735) |
| ITLOS 287 declaration (joint) | - | 0.869 | PF |
|  | (1.389) |  |
| Claim salience | 0.478 | 0.066 | 0.089 |
|  | (0.388) | (0.088) | (0.070) |
| Previous MIDs | PF | -0.121 | 0.125 |
|  |  | (0.480) | (0.269) |
| Failed peaceful attempts | PF | 0.162\* | 0.445\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.092) | (0.092) |
| Democratic dyad | PF | -0.564 | -0.667\*\* |
|  |  | (0.427) | (0.325) |
| Relative capabilities | -21.593\*\*\* | -3.766\*\*\* | -3.521\*\*\* |
| (stronger) | (4.761) | (1.324) | (1.074) |
| Constant | 5.750 | 0.139 | -0.010 |
|  | (4.432) | (1.336) | (1.050) |
| N | 167 | 509 | 507 |

Notes: \* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses; PF=Perfect Failure.

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