Philipp Rehm
Jacob S. Hacker
Mark Schlesinger

**Insecure Alliances:
Risk, Inequality, and Support for the Welfare State**

Additional material

The following pages contain additional results and robustness checks we mention in the article.[1]
We start with material relating to the cross-national analysis, and then present additional results
for the cross-domain analysis.

Table of content

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1   Cross-national analysis
1.1   Different operationalization of dependent variable in Table 3

Table 3 in the article uses latent mean support for unemployment benefits as dependent variable. The following Tables 3.1 and 3.2 display results for alternative dependent variables, namely: share least supportive (Table 3.1) and coefficient of variation on survey item (Table 3.2).

Table 3.1: Predicting support for unemployment benefits (cross-national) – dependent variable is share opposed, not average latent support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Share of respondents who think it "definitely should not be" the government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (ISSP)					
Corr(market income, unempl. risk)	-0.488** (0.145)	-0.561** (0.129)	-0.552** (0.120)	-0.508** (0.135)	-0.521** (0.145)	-0.448* (0.184)
Economy-wide unemployment rate		-0.008# (0.004)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.008)
Gini, HH market income (ages 18-65)			0.301 (0.183)			
Total public social expenditure (%GDP)				-0.003 (0.002)		
Type of unemployment system: Assistance system					Ref cat	
Mixed system					-0.031 (0.032)	
Insurance system					-0.023 (0.033)	
Dummy for "liberal welfare world"						0.016 (0.042)
Dummy for "Scand. welfare world"						-0.015 (0.032)
Constant	-0.071# (0.038)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.147# (0.071)	0.009 (0.057)	-0.018 (0.054)	-0.025 (0.050)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.461	0.602	0.660	0.615	0.554	0.639

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.2: Predicting support for unemployment benefits (cross-national) – dependent variable is coefficient of variation, not average latent support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coefficient of variation of item: government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (ISSP)					
Corr(market income, unempl. risk)	-0.603* (0.196)	-0.708** (0.169)	-0.696** (0.160)	-0.664** (0.185)	-0.685** (0.199)	-0.609# (0.269)
Economy-wide unemployment rate		-0.011* (0.005)	-0.014* (0.005)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.011)
Gini, HH market income (ages 18-65)			0.362 (0.245)			
Total public social expenditure (%GDP)				-0.002 (0.003)		
Type of unemployment system: Assistance system					Ref cat	
Mixed system					-0.014 (0.044)	
Insurance system					-0.015 (0.045)	
Dummy for "liberal welfare world"						0.016 (0.061)
Dummy for "Scand. welfare world"						-0.009 (0.046)
Constant	0.108# (0.052)	0.146** (0.046)	0.022 (0.095)	0.189* (0.078)	0.164# (0.073)	0.158# (0.073)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.413	0.592	0.635	0.570	0.498	0.540

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

1.2 Different survey item as dependent variable in Table 3

The ISSP Role of Government module contains another survey item which taps into attitudes towards support for the unemployed (see FN 9). It reads:

> "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to: Provide a job for everyone who wants one?" (Answer categories: 1 "definitely should not be"; 2 "probably should not be"; 3 "probably should be"; 4 "definitely should be").

The following Table 3.3 mirrors Table 3 in the paper. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 mirror Tables 3.1 and Table 3.2 above, respectively.

Table 3.3: Predicting support for government responsibility for *job provision* (cross-national) – dependent is average latent support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Popular support (latent means) for government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (ISSP)					
Corr(market income, unempl. risk)	0.384* (0.151)	0.450* (0.142)	0.456* (0.144)	0.554** (0.122)	0.463* (0.158)	0.402* (0.142)
Economy-wide unemployment rate		0.007 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.013** (0.004)	0.010# (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)
Gini, HH market income (ages 18-65)			0.188 (0.221)			
Total public social expenditure (%GDP)				-0.005* (0.002)		
Type of unemployment system: Assistance system					Ref cat	
Mixed system					-0.022 (0.035)	
Insurance system					0.001 (0.036)	
Dummy for "liberal welfare world"						-0.047 (0.032)
Dummy for "Scand. welfare world"						-0.072* (0.024)
Constant	0.420** (0.040)	0.395** (0.039)	0.331** (0.086)	0.498** (0.051)	0.392** (0.058)	0.481** (0.039)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.314	0.430	0.414	0.629	0.371	0.748

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # $p<0.1$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 3.4: Predicting support for government responsibility for *job provision* (cross-national) – dependent variable is share opposed, not average latent support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Share of respondents who think it "definitely should not be" the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (ISSP)					
Corr(market income, unempl. risk)	-0.625*	-0.783**	-0.777**	-0.745*	-0.743*	-0.559
	(0.273)	(0.223)	(0.231)	(0.246)	(0.252)	(0.349)
Economy-wide unemployment rate		-0.017*	-0.018*	-0.015#	-0.020*	-0.004
		(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Gini, HH market income (ages 18-65)			0.189			
			(0.354)			
Total public social expenditure (%GDP)				-0.002		
				(0.004)		
Type of unemployment system: Assistance system					Ref cat	
Mixed system					-0.009	
					(0.056)	
Insurance system					-0.038	
					(0.057)	
Dummy for "liberal welfare world"						0.079
						(0.079)
Dummy for "Scand. welfare world"						0.063
						(0.060)
Constant	-0.033	0.026	-0.040	0.064	0.072	-0.049
	(0.072)	(0.061)	(0.137)	(0.104)	(0.093)	(0.095)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.261	0.541	0.506	0.502	0.476	0.498

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # $p<0.1$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 3.5: Predicting support for government responsibility for *job provision* (cross-national) – dependent variable is coefficient of variation, not average latent support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coefficient of variation of item: government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (ISSP)					
Corr(market income, unempl. risk)	-0.593* (0.233)	-0.721** (0.197)	-0.723** (0.208)	-0.750** (0.219)	-0.708* (0.226)	-0.494 (0.277)
Economy-wide unemployment rate		-0.014* (0.005)	-0.013# (0.006)	-0.015# (0.007)	-0.017# (0.008)	0.002 (0.011)
Gini, HH market income (ages 18-65)			-0.044 (0.317)			
Total public social expenditure (%GDP)				0.001 (0.003)		
Type of unemployment system: Assistance system					Ref cat	
Mixed system					0.005 (0.050)	
Insurance system					-0.019 (0.051)	
Dummy for "liberal welfare world"						0.092 (0.063)
Dummy for "Scand. welfare world"						0.086 (0.047)
Constant	0.194** (0.062)	0.241** (0.054)	0.256# (0.123)	0.213* (0.092)	0.265* (0.083)	0.140 (0.075)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.312	0.543	0.493	0.500	0.463	0.598

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # $p<0.1$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

1.3 Additional control variables in Table 3

In the article, we mention that we checked the robustness of the reported results with respect to additional control variables (FN 21). The following two tables display these robustness checks, for each of the two types of attitudinal items.

Table 3.6: Alternative control variables (unemployment benefits)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Popular support (latent means) for government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (ISSP)								
Corr(Market income, unemployment risk)	0.619**	0.705**	0.683**	0.627**	0.629**	0.613**	0.656**	0.683**	0.800**
	(0.170)	(0.141)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.174)	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.170)	(0.135)
Economy-wide unemployment rate	0.007	0.008#	0.008#	0.008#	0.007	0.005	0.008	0.009	0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Mean of Shayo's national identity variable [Shayo 2009]	0.004								
	(0.006)								
Inflows of foreign population, % of pop [OECD]		0.025							
		(0.014)							
Ethnic fractionalization [a]			0.063						
			(0.050)						
Linguistic fractionalization [b]				0.063					
				(0.049)					
Religious fractionalization [c]					-0.018				
					(0.038)				
cumulative Right-wing parties in % of total cabinet posts [d]						-0.000			
						(0.000)			
Openness (imports+exports)/gdp [OECD2]							0.000		
							(0.000)		
GDP, per head, US$, current prices, current PPPs [OECD2]								0.000	
								(0.000)	
GDP growth [OECD2]									1.922*
									(0.769)
Constant	0.470**	0.516**	0.522**	0.504**	0.533**	0.551**	0.525**	0.505**	0.494**
	(0.100)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.088)	(0.037)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.569	0.664	0.615	0.618	0.559	0.584	0.549	0.554	0.733

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
[Shayo 2009] Country-mean values of Shayo's national identity variable, based on ISSP National Identity module (ISSP 2005).
[OECD1] http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=MIG
[OECD2] http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=SNA_TABLE1
[a], [b], [c] Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly and Sergio Kurlat, Roman Wacziarg - Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 8, no. 2, June 2003, pp. 155-194. Data downloaded from http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html
[d] This is the cumulative value since 1990 of variable gov_right1 (right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days), calculated from Klaus Armingeon et al., Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2007 (Berne, Switzerland: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne, 2009).

Table 3.7: Alternative control variables (job for everyone)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Popular support (latent means) for government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (ISSP)								
Corr(Market income, unemployment risk)	0.526**	0.480**	0.475**	0.443*	0.491*	0.446*	0.522**	0.449*	0.369*
	(0.150)	(0.141)	(0.129)	(0.152)	(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.131)	(0.159)	(0.150)
Economy-wide unemployment rate	0.008#	0.008#	0.007#	0.007	0.008#	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Mean of Shayo's national identity variable [Shayo 2009]	-0.007								
	(0.005)								
Inflows of foreign population, % of pop [OECD]		0.017							
		(0.014)							
Ethnic fractionalization [a]			0.079						
			(0.043)						
Linguistic fractionalization [b]				0.012					
				(0.049)					
Religious fractionalization [c]					0.022				
					(0.035)				
cumulative Right-wing parties in % of total cabinet posts [d]						-0.000			
						(0.000)			
Openness (imports+exports)/gdp [OECD2]							-0.000#		
							(0.000)		
GDP, per head, US$, current prices, current PPPs [OECD2]								-0.000	
								(0.000)	
GDP growth [OECD2]									-1.138
									(0.855)
Constant	0.498**	0.385**	0.385**	0.390**	0.393**	0.397**	0.454**	0.397**	0.417**
	(0.088)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.083)	(0.041)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.467	0.459	0.539	0.371	0.393	0.367	0.557	0.367	0.471

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
[Shayo 2009] Country-mean values of Shayo's national identity variable, based on ISSP National Identity module (ISSP 2005).
[OECD1] http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=MIG
[OECD2] http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=SNA_TABLE1
[a], [b], [c] Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly and Sergio Kurlat, Roman Wacziarg - Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 8, no. 2, June 2003, pp. 155-194. Data downloaded from http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html
[d] This is the cumulative value since 1990 of variable gov_right1 (right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days), calculated from Klaus Armingeon et al., Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2007 (Berne, Switzerland: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne, 2009).

1.4 Different operationalization of joint distribution of income and risk

1.4.1 Share of cross-pressured respondents

In the article, we measure the overlap between income and risk by their correlation. Figure 1 and Table 1 in the article suggest an alternative operationalization: the share of cross-pressured respondents (share of respondents in the off-diagonal boxes, i.e., high-income & high-risk + low-income & low-risk). We do not employ this measure since deciding the cut-off points between low and high is arbitrary. However, we checked the robustness of the results reported in the article with two reasonable cut-off points, namely medians and tertiles. The following two figures show a close relationship between our income-risk correlation measure and the cross-pressured measure.

**Figure: Income-risk correlations vs. share cross-pressure (above/below medians)**

Coef=.335, SE=.105, t=3.19, adj. R2=.435

Figure: Income-risk correlations vs. share cross-pressured (extreme tertiles)

Coef=.269, SE=.077, t=3.49, adj. R2=.482

The following two tables mirror Table 3 in the article, except that the income-risk overlap is measured by the share of cross-pressured respondents. In Table 3.8, these are defined by medians; in Table 3.9, they are defined by the extreme tertiles.

Table 3.8: Predicting support for unemployment benefits (cross-national) – income-risk correlations = cross-pressured respondents (medians are cut-off points)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Popular support (latent means) for government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (ISSP)					
Share cross-pressured [medians] Poor & low risk + Rich & high risk	1.075* (0.380)	1.115* (0.386)	0.903* (0.392)	1.037* (0.451)	1.261* (0.434)	1.012# (0.537)
Economy-wide unemployment rate		0.005 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.003 (0.010)
Gini, HH market income (ages 18-65)			-0.438 (0.298)			
Total public social expenditure (%GDP)				0.001 (0.004)		
Type of unemployment system: Assistance system					Ref cat	
Mixed system					0.055 (0.044)	
Insurance system					0.024 (0.045)	
Dummy for "liberal welfare world"						-0.012 (0.059)
Dummy for "Scand. welfare world"						-0.000 (0.048)
Constant	-0.019 (0.150)	-0.062 (0.158)	0.177 (0.221)	-0.053 (0.167)	-0.133 (0.170)	-0.008 (0.270)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.368	0.358	0.425	0.299	0.348	0.210

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.9: Predicting support for unemployment benefits (cross-national) – income-risk correlations = cross-pressured respondents (tertiles are cut-off points)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Popular support (latent means) for government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (ISSP)					
Share cross-pressured [tertiles] Poor & low risk + Rich & high risk	1.787** (0.362)	1.789** (0.368)	1.624** (0.445)	1.711** (0.408)	1.866** (0.450)	1.862** (0.511)
Economy-wide unemployment rate		0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.008)
Gini, HH market income (ages 18-65)			-0.182 (0.262)			
Total public social expenditure (%GDP)				0.001 (0.003)		
Type of unemployment system: Assistance system					Ref cat	
Mixed system					-0.005 (0.037)	
Insurance system					-0.015 (0.039)	
Dummy for "liberal welfare world"						0.016 (0.044)
Dummy for "Scand. welfare world"						0.014 (0.035)
Constant	0.155* (0.051)	0.136* (0.056)	0.224 (0.138)	0.125# (0.062)	0.140# (0.063)	0.101 (0.121)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.660	0.650	0.631	0.624	0.573	0.571

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

1.4.2 Standardized risk variable

In the article, we standardize the income variable into 99 centiles. We do not standardize the risk of unemployment variable, for two reasons. First, we explicitly control for levels of risk in all multivariate models. Second, the risk of unemployment variable is measured at the ISCO88-2d level and as such only has 27 different values (Australia is at ISCO88-1d and only has 9 different values).

We ran a robustness check, calculating the income-risk correlations with standardized risk values by converting them into five quintiles (by country-year). Here is a replication of Table 3, using these slightly different income-risk correlations.

Table 3.10: Predicting support for unemployment benefits (cross-national) – income-risk correlations with risk in quintiles

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Popular support (latent means) for government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (ISSP)					
Corr(market income, unempl. Risk [**in quintiles**])	0.422**	0.444**	0.439**	0.415**	0.443*	0.651**
	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.064)	(0.124)	(0.133)	(0.188)
Economy-wide unemployment rate		0.006	0.011**	0.003	0.004	0.020#
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Gini, HH market income (ages 18-65)			-0.674**			
			(0.140)			
Total public social expenditure (%GDP)				0.002		
				(0.003)		
Type of unemployment system: Assistance system					Ref cat	
Mixed system					0.025	
					(0.041)	
Insurance system					0.013	
					(0.042)	
Dummy for "liberal welfare world"						0.091
						(0.060)
Dummy for "Scand. welfare world"						0.065
						(0.043)
Constant	0.519**	0.492**	0.728**	0.451**	0.484**	0.405**
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.068)
N. of countries	13	13	13	13	13	13
Adjusted R2	0.501	0.527	0.852	0.505	0.439	0.545

Notes: OLS regressions, coefficients above standard errors in parentheses. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

2 Cross-Domain

2.1 Analysis by type of question

In Table 5 in the article, we pool three types of questions together:

- Government responsibility
  "Now we're going to ask about your assessment of and support for various roles for government in American society. On some issues people have two very different viewpoints. Some people agree entirely with the first position, others entirely with the second position. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between" [7 categories]
- Spending for existing programs
  "Consider a list of existing federal programs. If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, should federal spending be increased or decreased for ___" [7 categories]:
- Support for new programs:
  "How much would you support or oppose each of the following new ways of having government address social issues? This would increase your taxes by $50 per year" [5 categories]

Here are the results when we estimate separate models for each question type (we estimate robust regressions to account for potential outliers).

Table 5.1: Government responsibility items

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Share least supportive	Coefficient of variation	Average support
Correlation(income,risk)	-1.163**	-1.225**	11.772**
	(0.346)	(0.368)	(3.407)
Dummy for risk=worry	0.127*	0.140*	-1.680**
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.493)
Dummy for wave 21	-0.022	-0.026	0.451
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.296)
Constant	-0.082	0.226*	6.430**
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.717)
N	14	14	14
Adj. R2	0.398	0.392	0.438

Note: Standard errors in parentheses (robust regressions). # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.2: Spending for existing programs

	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
	Share least supportive	Coefficient of variation	Average support
Correlation(income,risk)	-0.123	-0.509*	4.536**
	(0.106)	(0.225)	(0.927)
Dummy for risk=worry	0.013	0.047	-0.354*
	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.124)
Dummy for wave 21	-0.006	-0.002	-0.084
	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.083)
Constant	0.010	0.213**	5.689**
	(0.023)	(0.048)	(0.198)
N	17	17	17
Adj. R2	-0.100	0.121	0.604

Note: Standard errors in parentheses (robust regressions). # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.3: Support for hypothetical programs

	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
	Share least supportive	Coefficient of variation	Average support
Correlation(income,risk)	-0.628**	-0.591**	2.392*
	(0.138)	(0.149)	(0.829)
Dummy for risk=worry	0.047**	0.042*	-0.203*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.087)
Dummy for wave 21	0.011	0.006	-0.056
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.069)
Constant	-0.011	0.245**	3.796**
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.180)
N	17	17	17
Adj. R2	0.561	0.459	0.324

Note: Standard errors in parentheses (robust regressions). # p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

2.2 Analysis by survey wave

In the article, we mention that our findings also hold up if we estimate the regressions for each survey wave separately. Here are the results:

Table 5.4: Predicting support for U.S. social polices (by wave)

	(1)	(1')	(2)	(2')	(3)	(3')
	Share in least supportive category		Coefficient of Variation		Mean support	
	Wave 15	**Wave 21**	**Wave 15**	**Wave 21**	**Wave 15**	**Wave 21**
Corr(income,risk)	-0.647**	-0.682#	-0.737**	-0.737*	5.060**	4.936*
	(0.220)	(0.345)	(0.182)	(0.253)	(1.418)	(2.142)
Dummy for risk=worry	0.056*	n.a.	0.064**	n.a.	-0.427*	n.a.
	(0.026)		(0.021)		(0.165)	
Type of questions						
Government responsibility [a]	ref cat	ref cat	ref cat	ref cat	ref cat	ref cat
Spending for existing programs [b]	-0.112**	-0.112**	-0.161**	-0.163**	0.793**	0.815**
	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.127)	(0.202)
Support for new programs [c]	-0.022	-0.008	-0.108**	-0.110**	-0.750**	-0.698**
	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.136)	(0.212)
Constant	0.026	0.077	0.331**	0.395**	5.015**	4.485**
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.287)	(0.288)
N. of cases	33	15	33	15	33	15
adj. R2	0.604	0.576	0.764	0.791	0.871	0.835

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. # $p<0.1$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

2.3 Question wording for variables in Table 4

Table 4.1: Question wording for variables mapped in Table 4

Social policy domain	Risk = worry: Are you very worried, fairly worried, slightly worried, or not worried at all about:	Risk = probability: Out of 100 people like you, how many will …
"Consider a list of existing federal programs. If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, should federal spending be increased or decreased for ___" [7 categories]		
Health and Financial Benefits for the Disabled [w15p2f, w21p2c]	Becoming unable to work for the rest of your life as the result of a disability [w15m2r, w21m2s]	lose a couple of months from work due to serious illness during the next year? [w15m3f]
Aid the Poor [w15p2c]	Getting by without your spouses' / partners' income if they were no longer around due to death, divorce or other circumstances [w15m2p, w21m2q]	how many will need to start getting by with less money because their spouse/partner is no longer there during the next year, due to death, divorce or some other circumstance? [w15m3e]
Health Insurance for Working-Age Adults [w15p2h, w21p2e]	Losing your healthcare coverage [w15m2k, w21m2l]	have a serious illness in their immediate family that creates major out-of-pocket medical expenses during the next year? [w15m3d]
Health Insurance for Children [w15p2i, w21p2f]	Needing to help out a member of your extended family if they get in financial trouble [w15m2e, w21m2e]	
Public Schools [w15p2a]	Paying for your children's education [w15m2i, w21m2i]	
Social Security [w15p2b, w21p2a]	Having enough money to retire on [w15m2d, w21m2d]	will need to help out someone in their extended family with a substantial amount of money during the next year? [w15m3b]
Unemployment Benefits [w15p2g, w21p2d]	Losing your job (employed) [w15m2f, w21m2f]	lose their jobs during the next year? [w15m3c]

Social policy domain	Risk = worry: Are you very worried, fairly worried, slightly worried, or not worried at all about:	Risk = probability: Out of 100 people like you, how many will …
'How much would you support or oppose each of the following new ways of having government address social issues? This would increase your taxes by $50 per year.' [5 categories]		
Providing free access to a trained patient advocate who can help you navigate the health care system and assist you in disputes with health insurers (this would increase your taxes by $50 per year) [w15p3f]	Getting seriously ill and not being able to figure out what your insurance will cover [w15m2u]	
Providing short-term financial support for people whose incomes drop substantially following a divorce or other family dissolution (this would increase your taxes by $50 per year) [w15p3c, w21p3c]	Getting by without your spouses' / partners' income if they were no longer around due to death, divorce or other circumstances [w15m2p, w21m2q]	need to start getting by with less money because their spouse/partner is no longer there during the next year, due to death, divorce or some other circumstance? [w15m3e]
Offering tax breaks to people who financially support or personally care for family members not living with them, such as an elder parent (this would increase your taxes by $50 per year) [w15p3a, w21p3a]	Needing to help out a member of your extended family if they get in financial trouble [w15m2e, w21m2e]	will need to help out someone in their extended family with a substantial amount of money during the next year? [w15m3b]
Protecting homeowners against financial practices or circumstances that might threaten their credit or cause them to lose their home (this would increase your taxes by $50 per year) [w15p3e, w21p3e]	Paying your mortgage [w15m2b, w21m2b]	lose their homes during the next year because they won't be able to pay their mortgages? [w15m3a]
Providing short-term financial support for people whose incomes drop substantially because of unexpected events and who don't have other help (this would increase your taxes by $50 per year) [w15p3b, w21p3b]	Getting out of debt [w15m2c, w21m2c]	have a serious illness in their immediate family that creates major out-of-pocket medical expenses during the next year? [w15m3d]
Allowing all Americans to buy coverage from Medicare at a premium that is set based on their age (this would increase your taxes by $50 per year) [w15p3d, w21p3d]	Having a serious illness in your immediate family that creates major out-of-pocket medical expenses [w15m2m, w21m2n]	
Providing up to two years of job retraining or support for higher education for people who have been laid-off from work (this would increase your taxes by $50 per year) [w15p3g]	Losing your job (employed) [w15m2f, w21m2f]	lose their jobs during the next year? [w15m3c]

Social policy domain	Risk = worry: Are you very worried, fairly worried, slightly worried, or not worried at all about:	Risk = probability: Out of 100 people like you, how many will …
"Now we're going to ask about your assessment of and support for various roles for government in American society. On some issues people have two very different viewpoints. Some people agree entirely with the first position, others entirely with the second position. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between" [7 categories]		
Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone. Others feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans [w15p1a, w21p1a]	Losing your healthcare coverage [w15m2k, w21m2l]	lose a couple of months from work due to serious illness during the next year? [w15m3f]
Some people feel that there should be a government insurance plan that would cover nursing home and home health care expenses for the elderly and disabled. Others feel that all nursing home and home health expenses should be paid by individuals through their own savings or private insurance [w15p1c, w21p1c]	Needing to help out a member of your extended family if they get in financial trouble [w15m2e, w21m2e]	will need to help out someone in their extended family with a substantial amount of money during the next year? [w15m3b]
Some people think that government should encourage each person to invest their retirement savings so that they can seek the highest retirement income, even if its riskier. Other people think that government needs to guarantee an adequate retirement income to its citizens. [w15p1d, w21p1d]	Having enough money to retire on [w15m2d, w21m2d]	
Some people think that government should play a large role in helping people feel economically secure. Other people think that if government provides too much security, people will lose their initiative and capacity to help themselves. [w15p1e, w21p1e]	Overall, how worried are you about your economic security? [a] [w15m1, w21m1]	lose their homes during the next year because they won't be able to pay their mortgages? [w15m3a]
Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own [w15p1b, w21p1b]	Overall, how worried are you about your economic security? [a] [w15m1, w21m1]	need to start getting by with less money because their spouse/partner is no longer there during the next year, due to death, divorce or some other circumstance? [w15m3e]