Supplemental Analysis

To ensure that the results from the full specification reported in Table 3 are robust to other specifications, Tables A1 (females) and A2 (males) present models that successively add each contextual variable. In both tables, column 1 begins with GDP as the only country-level variable. Column 2 adds female labor force participation, and column 3 introduces female professionals and the cross-level interaction between respondent's professional status and the contextual measure of female professionals. Column 4 incorporates the share of women in the legislature, and column 5 adds women in the cabinet and the cross-level interaction between trust in government and women in the cabinet. The findings generated by these models largely parallel those found in Tables 1, 2, and 3 in the main text. Among female respondents, we observe no significant contextual effects across any of the model specifications, the interaction term between individual professional status and the country-level female professionals measure is uniformly positive and significant, and the cross-level interaction between trust and women in the cabinet is consistently positive, oscillating back and forth from barely achieving significance to just falling short. Among males, we consistently find positive and significant coefficients for GDP, the share of women in the cabinet, and the interaction between trust and women in the cabinet, and the effect of female professionals is uniformly negative. The individual-level effects for men and women are highly consistent regardless of the model specification.

Table A1. Female Support for Women as Political Leaders: Additional Preliminary Models

	(1) Coef	SE	(2) Coef	SE	(3) Coef	SE	(4) Coef	SE	(5) Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.17***	.04	-.18***	.03	-.18***	.03	-.18***	.04	-.32***	.09
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01
Tolerance	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	.18***	.06	.19***	.06	.18***	.06	.18***	.06	.18***	.06
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.02	.05
Student	.22***	.08	.19**	.08	.22***	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08
Retired	.09	.10	.14	.11	.10	.10	.14	.11	.14	.11
Does not work	-.05	.13	-.04	.13	-.05	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13
Professional Occupation	.09	.08	.10	.08	-.71	.39	-.71	.39	-.68	.40
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.05	.05	-.06	.05	-.05	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05
Parent	.01	.06	.04	.06	.01	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06
Church Attendance	-.03	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02
Race: White[c]	-.14**	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05
Age	-.06***	.01	-.08***	.02	-.06***	.01	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
GDP per capita index	.63	1.07	.82	1.12	.71	1.17	.63	1.24	.81	1.27
Female Labor Force Participation			-.63	.86	-.63	.89	-.49	.95	-.54	.97
Female Professionals					-.09	1.22	-.13	1.26	-.45	1.38
Women in the Legislature							.42	1.13	-.05	1.35
Women in the Cabinet									.96	1.33
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet									.64*	.36
Professional*Female Professional					1.71**	.81	1.72**	.82	1.65**	.84
Cut-point 1	-2.47***	.73	-2.22**	.79	-2.13**	.94	-2.18***	.98	-2.25**	1.01
Cut-point 2	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04
Country Variance Component	.15[d]		.15[e]		.16[f]		.17[g]		.18[h]	
Number of Individuals	9358		9358		9358		9358		9358	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-22769		-22776		-22785		-22788		-22785	

$* p < 0.10$; $** p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual variables where the N is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.
[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See supplemental data appendix for more details.

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See supplemental data appendix for more details.

Table B presents models without the cross-level interaction terms and random slopes. For female respondents, the results in Table B mirror those found in Table 3 in the text almost exactly, and among male respondents, the individual-level results are substantively equivalent. The contextual results for men are also quite similar across the two specifications. The effect of female cabinet ministers remains positive and statistically significant even without the cross-level interaction with trust, and the signs for the other contextual variables are also the same. The only difference we observe is that the coefficients for GDP and female professionals fall short of statistical significance (with each having a p-value of .13) when the cross-level interaction terms and random slopes are removed from the model. However, given the statistical and substantive significance of the cross-level interaction terms, we believe that their inclusion in the analysis is theoretically important and empirically justified. Moreover, the contextual-level findings are otherwise highly consistent across a wide variety of specifications (discussed above and below) despite the limitations inherent to a relatively small number of country cases, making us confident in the empirical results discussed in the paper.

Table B. Latin American Support for Women as Political Leaders: Final Models without Random Slopes or Cross-level Interactions

	Women		Men	
	Coef.	SE	Estimate	S. E.
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL				
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO				
Trust in Government	-.18***	.02	-.13***	.02
DEMOCRATIC VALUES				
Democracy is best	.08***	.01	.03***	.01
Tolerance	.04***	.01	.07***	.01
IDEOLOGY				
Left Ideology	.02	.01	.03***	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	.21***	.06	-.07	.05
SOCIALIZATION				
Education	.04***	.01	.01	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]				
Work in the home	.01	.05	.09	.15
Student	.18**	.08	.14	.08
Retired	.15	.11	.04	.08
Does not work	-.04	.13	-.09	.11
Professional Occupation	.11	.07	.09	.06
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.06	.05	-.01	.05
Parent	.03	.06	-.07	.06
Church Attendance	-.02	.02	.02	.01
Race: White[c]	-.14***	.05	-.03	.05
Age	-.08***	.02	-.00	.01
COUNTRY-LEVEL				
GDP per capita index	.84	1.32	1.74	1.08
Female Labor Force Participation	-1.06	1.02	-.71	.83
Female Professionals	-.21	1.36	-1.83	1.11
Women in the Legislature	-.12	1.41	-.98	1.15
Women in the Cabinet	.20	1.45	2.11*	1.18
Left Leader	.22	.25	.31	.20
Cut-point 1	-1.99*	1.02	-2.95***	.83
Cut-point 2	2.24***	.03	2.22***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.67***	.04	3.76***	.04
Country-Level Variance Component	.18[d]		.11[e]	
Number of Individuals	9358		10510	
Number of Countries	19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-22780		-25521	

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual variables where the *N* is

much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce; [b] Reference Category: Not married; [c] Reference Category: Non-white.

[d] χ^2 12 df = 322.7, p < .01; [e] χ^2 12 df = 237.1, p < .01

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data.

We also considered the potential effect of quotas employing a series of different model specifications presented in Tables C1a, C1b, C2a, and C2b. In none of these models and in many others not shown here, we found no significant effects for gender quotas. The analyses in Tables C1a and C1b include a measure of gender quotas in which countries without quota laws score zero, countries with a quota law that makes stipulations about the placement of women in electable positions on the ballot score two, and countries that have quota laws without such requirements score one. In the analysis in these two tables, we consider the following model specifications: quotas as the only contextual variable in the model (column 1), quotas and GDP (column 2), quotas with GDP and the measures of women's economic advancement (column 3), quotas with GDP and the measures of women in the legislature and the Cabinet (column 4), and quotas with GDP and the left leader measure. In none of these models do we observe any statistically significant effect for quotas among female or male respondents. In Tables C2a and C2b, we consider alternative operationalizations of the quota measure. In column 1, the measure is a dichotomous one in which countries with quota laws score one and those without a quota law score zero. The second column measures quotas as the proportion of ballot spots that are to be reserved for women, with countries that have no quota rules scoring zero. In the final column, we consider the effect of having a quota law that requires placement of women in electable position on the ballot compared to all other countries. We observe no effect for quotas employing any of these measures either. We also conducted analysis considering an array of other model specifications, and only in the rarest of circumstances did we observe any significant effects for quotas. Moreover, in the few models where some measure of quotas attained statistical significance, the coefficient was occasionally negative and occasionally positive. Given this inconsistency together with the overwhelming pattern of insignificant coefficients for the various quota measures, we are confident in the conclusion that the presence of quota laws was not playing an

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important role in shaping Latin American attitudes about women in politics at the time that these data were collected in 2008.

In light of previous research suggesting the potential importance of quotas in shaping public attitudes (e.g. Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012), these null results were somewhat unexpected. But upon further reflection, we believe the finding to be less surprising than at first blush. Allow us to elaborate. Previous research suggests that quotas may influence mass attitudes through two primary mechanisms – elite cues generated by the process of quota implementation itself and public responses to the increased presence of women in politics as a result of the quota's effects. The first mechanism is probably not relevant in our analysis here given the timing of quota law implementation in most Latin American and Caribbean countries. Most of the gender quotas in our data were passed between 1996 and 2001.[1] Therefore, any cuing effect resulting specifically from the elite decision to establish quotas likely dissipated before the survey was conducted in 2008. The second mechanism for quotas to shape mass attitudes is an indirect one, occurring via increased political representation for women. Any such effect through this mechanism would be more effectively captured using specific measures of such representation, for which we find some effects in our analysis. Thus, given that most gender quotas were implemented in Latin America approximately a decade before the 2008 survey, the finding that the quota law itself (as opposed to its impacts via women's political empowerment) has no effect on mass attitudes about women in politics is entirely plausible. Moreover, the finding aligns with other analysis finding similar null results for the influence of quotas on other political attitudes and behaviors in Latin America (Zetterberg 2009).

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[1] Aside from Mexico , which altered the provisions of its quota law in 2008, and Uruguay, which passed a quota law in 2009, all the quota laws in the countries we analyze here were implemented within this time frame.

Table C1a. Female Support for Women as Political Leaders: Gender Quota Models

	(1) Coef	(1) SE	(2) Coef	(2) SE	(3) Coef	(3) SE	(4) Coef	(4) SE	(5) Coef	(5) SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.18***	.04	-.18***	.04	-.18***	.04	-.33***	.09	-.18***	.04
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01
Tolerance	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01	.02	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05
Student	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08
Retired	.14	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11
Does not work	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13
Professional Occupation	.10	.08	.10	.08	-.71	.39	.09	.09	.10	.08
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.06	.05	-.06	.04	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05
Parent	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06
Church Attendance	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02
Race: White[c]	-.13**	.05	-.14**	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05
Age	.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
Gender Quotas[d]	.14	.10	.13	.11	.14	.11	.23	.14	.13	.11
GDP per capita index			.41	1.08	.48	1.18	.65	1.07	.45	1.11
Female Labor Force Participation					-.65	.88				
Female Professionals					-.16	1.21				
Women in the Legislature							-1.57	1.49		
Women in the Cabinet							1.77	1.17		
Left Leader									.10	.20
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.70*	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					1.71**	.81				
Cut-point 1	-2.13***	.18	-2.40***	.72	-2.02**	.94	-2.76***	.74	-2.44***	.74
Cut-point 2	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04
Country Variance Component	.14[e]		.15[f]		.16[g]		.16[h]		.15[i]	
Number of Individuals	9358		9358		9358		9358		9358	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-22773		-22776		-22790		-22776		-22778	

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual

variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white.

[d] Countries without quota laws score zero. Countries with a quota law that requires women be placed in electable positions on the ballot score two, and those with a quota law that does not make such ranking requirements score one.

[e] χ^2 17 df = 288.6, p < .01, [f] χ^2 16 df = 287.8, p<.01 [g] χ^2 14 df = 274.6, p<.01, [h] χ^2 14 df = 266.4, p<.01, [i] χ^2 15 df = 274.3, p<.01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

Table C1b. Female Support for Women as Political Leaders: Gender Quota Models

	(1)[d]		(2)[e]		(3)[f]	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO						
Trust in Government	-.17***	.04	-.18***	.04	-.18***	.03
DEMOCRATIC VALUES						
Democracy is best	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01
Tolerance	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
IDEOLOGY						
Left Ideology	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06
SOCIALIZATION						
Education	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]						
Work in the home	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05
Student	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08
Retired	.14	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11
Does not work	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13
Professional Occupation	.10	.08	.10	.08	.10	.08
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05
Parent	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06
Church Attendance	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02
Race: White[c]	-.14**	.05	-.14**	.05	-.13**	.05
Age	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Gender Quotas	.19	.17	.60	.50	.23	.19
Cut-point 1	-2.13***	.18	-2.13***	.18	-2.08***	.16
Cut-point 2	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04
Country Variance Component	.14[g]		.14[h]		.14[i]	
Number of Individuals	9358		9358		9358	
Number of Countries	19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-22773		-22771		-22773	

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white.

[d] Countries without quota laws score zero. Countries with a quota law score one.

[e] Quota measure is the proportion of ballot spots that are to be reserved for women; countries without quota laws score zero.

[f] Countries with a quota law score one that requires women be placed in electable positions

of the ballot score one; all other countries score zero.
[g] χ^2 17 df = 305.8, p<.01, [h] χ^2 17 df = 299.3, p<.01, [i] χ^2 17 df = 288.6, p<.01
Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

Table C2a. Male Support for Women as Political Leaders: Gender Quota Models

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.12***	.03	-.12***	.03	-.13***	.04	-.28***	.09	-.12***	.03
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Tolerance	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15
Student	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08
Retired	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08
Does not work	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.09	.11	-.10	.11	-.09	.11
Professional Occupation	.08	.06	.08	.06	.36	.38	.08	.06	.08	.06
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05
Parent	-.09	.06	-.09	.06	-.09	.06	-.09	.06	-.09	.06
Church Attendance	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Race: White[c]	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.03	.05
Age	-.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
Gender Quotas[d]	-.02	.10	-.10	.10	-.12	.08	-.09	.12	-.10	.09
GDP per capita index			2.23**	.92	3.20***	.88	2.10**	.96	2.22**	.92
Female Labor Force Participation					-1.06	.63				
Female Professionals					-1.69*	.88				
Women in the Legislature							-.07	1.34		
Women in the Cabinet							1.70	1.18		
Left Leader									.17	.16
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.68	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					-.58	.79				
Cut-point 1	-2.66***	.16	-4.07***	.61	-3.34***	.71	-4.37***	.67	-4.11***	.61
Cut-point 2	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04
Country Variance Component	.14[e]		.15[f]		.19[g]		.14[h]		.14[i]	
Number of Individuals	10510		10510		10510		10510		10510	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-25478		-25481		-25491		-25483		-25480	

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual

variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white.

[d] Countries without quota laws score zero. Countries with a quota law that requires women be placed in electable positions on the ballot score two, and those with a quota law that does not make such ranking requirements score one.

[e] χ^2 17 df = 395.6, p < .01, [f] χ^2 16 df = 432.1, p<.01 [g] χ^2 14 df = 483.3, p<.01, [h] χ^2 14 df = 366.1, p<.01, [i] χ^2 15 df = 363.2, p<.01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

Table C2b. Male Support for Women as Political Leaders: Gender Quota Models

	(1)[d]		(2)[e]		(3)[f]	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO						
Trust in Government	-.12***	.03	-.12***	.03	-.12***	.03
DEMOCRATIC VALUES						
Democracy is best	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Tolerance	.08***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01
IDEOLOGY						
Left Ideology	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05
SOCIALIZATION						
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]						
Work in the home	.06	.15	.06	.15	.07	.15
Student	.15**	.08	.16**	.08	.15**	.08
Retired	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08
Does not work	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11
Professional Occupation	.08	.06	.08	.06	.08	.06
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05
Parent	-.09	.06	-.09	.06	-.08	.06
Church Attendance	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Race: White[c]	-.02	.05	-.02	.05	-.02	.05
Age	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Gender Quotas	-.18	.15	-.37	.46	.15	.17
Cut-point 1	-2.57***	.17	-2.61***	.16	-2.71***	.14
Cut-point 2	2.22**	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.76**	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04
Country Variance Component	.14[g]		.14[h]		.13[i]	
Number of Individuals	10510		10510		10510	
Number of Countries	19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-25478		-25477		-25474	

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white.

[d] Countries without quota laws score zero. Countries with a quota law score one.

[e] Quota measure is the proportion of ballot spots that are to be reserved for women; countries without quota laws score zero.

[f] Countries with a quota law score one that requires women be placed in electable

positions of the ballot score one; all other countries score zero.
[g] χ^2 17 df = 394.1, p<.01, [h] χ^2 17 df = 396.5, p<.01, [i] χ^2 17 df = 350.4, p<.01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

The set of models in Tables D1 and D2 explore the possibility of a curvilinear effect for the share of women in the legislature using a squared term. The results provide no evidence for such an effect.

Table D1. Female Support for Women as Political Leaders: Models containing Women in the Legislature Squared

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.18***	.03	-.18***	.04	-.18***	.03	-.34***	.09	-.18***	.04
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01
Tolerance	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.02	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05
Student	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08
Retired	.14	.11	.14	.11	.15	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11
Does not work	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13
Professional Occupation	.10	.08	.10	.08	-.71	.39	.09	.09	.10	.08
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05
Parent	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06
Church Attendance	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02
Race: White[c]	-.14**	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05
Age	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
GDP per capita index			.52	1.14	.58	1.29	.71	1.14	.54	1.15
Female Labor Force Participation					-.45	.99				
Female Professionals					-.13	1.31				
Women in the Legislature	-.93	3.98	-.71	4.09	-.45	4.39	-.74	4.32	-1.24	4.27
Women in the Legislature^2	4.27	10.1	3.56	10.4	2.33	11.3	2.30	10.7	5.07	10.9
Women in the Cabinet							1.16	1.20		
Left Leader									.16	.22
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.71**	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					1.72**	.82				
Cut-point 1	-2.01***	.37	-2.37**	.83	-2.11*	1.05	-2.71***	.85	-2.39**	.85

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Cut-point 2	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.68***	.04	3.67***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04
Country Variance Component	.16[d]		.17[e]		.18[f]		.18[g]		.17[h]	
Number of Individuals	9358		9358		9358		9358		9358	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-22771		-22773		-22788		-22770		-22774	

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual variables where the N is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white.

[d] χ^2 16 df = 331.3, p < .01, [e] χ^2 15 df = 327.8, p < .01, [f] χ^2 13 df = 317.2, p<.01 [g] χ^2 14 df = 324.7, p<.01, [h] χ^2 14 df = 300.9, p<.01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

Table D2. Male Support for Women as Political Leaders: Models containing Women in the Legislature Squared

	(1) Coef	SE	(2) Coef	SE	(3) Coef	SE	(4) Coef	SE	(5) Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.12***	.03	-.12***	.03	-.13***	.04	-.28***	.09	-.12*	.03
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Tolerance	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01	.00	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15
Student	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08
Retired	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08
Does not work	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11
Professional Occupation	.08	.06	.08	.06	.34	.38	.08	.06	.08	.06
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05
Parent	-.09	.06	-.08	.06	-.09	.06	-.08	.06	-.08	.06
Church Attendance	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Race: White[c]	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.03	.05
Age	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
GDP per capita index			1.95*	.96	3.10***	.92	1.88*	.95	1.90*	.96
Female Labor Force Participation					-1.25*	.68				
Female Professionals					-1.64*	.93				
Women in the Legislature	.08	3.61	-.03	3.42	.60	3.21	-1.05	3.56	-.92	3.54
Women in the Legislature^2	.14	9.22	-.43	8.75	-3.38	8.25	.89	8.80	2.17	9.11
Women in the Cabinet							1.95*	1.11		
Left Leader									.17	.18
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.68*	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					-.56	.78				
Cut-point 1	-2.70***	.33	-3.95***	.69	-3.26***	.76	-4.21***	.71	-3.90***	.69
Cut-point 2	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04
Country Variance Component	.15[d]		.15[e]		.18[f]		.13[g]		.14[h]	
Number of Individuals	10510		10510		10510		10510		10510	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-25475		-25474		-25484		-25478		-25476	

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance

on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual variables where the N is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed. [a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white.

[d] χ^2 16 df = 390.7, p < .01 [e] χ^2 15 df = 389.9, p < .01, [f] χ^2 13 df = 427.3, p<.01 [g] χ^2 14 df = 318.2, p<.01, [h] χ^2 14 df = 328.8, p<.01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

Because our data unfortunately exclude Argentina and Chile, none of the countries in our analysis had female executives at the time of the survey in 2008, but we have considered other ways to capture the effect of women in national leadership. Tables E1 and E2 examine how a history of female executive leadership might affect public attitudes toward women in politics. We operationalize this idea by creating a dichotomous measure on which countries score a one if they had a female national executive at any point in the 50 years preceding the survey. In the tables, we analyze a series of models for women and men respectively. The first models incorporate the measure of having a past female executive as the only level-2 variable. Then we essentially add this measure to each of the specifications employed in Tables 2 and 3: GDP only, GDP plus measures of female economic empowerment, GDP plus measures of female representation, and GDP plus left leader. In all these models, the only place we observe a significant effect for past female executive is in column 1 of Table E2, which shows a negative coefficient among male respondents when the analysis does not control for any other contextual factor. However, once we add GDP to the model in column 2, this negative coefficient disappears and does not reemerge under any other specification. Thus it seems that there is a negative bivariate correlation between having had a past female executive and current attitudes toward women in politics, but this effect is not robust to basic controls.

Table E1. Female Support for Women as Political Leaders: Female Executive Models

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.18***	.03	-.18***	.03	-.18***	.03	-.33***	.09	-.18***	.03
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01
Tolerance	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01	.02	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.18***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05
Student	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08
Retired	.14	.11	.14	.11	.15	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11
Does not work	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13
Professional Occupation	.10	.08	.10	.08	-.70	.40	.10	.09	.10	.08
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05
Parent	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06
Church Attendance	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02
Race: White[c]	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05
Age	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
Past Female Executive	-.24	.17	-.29	.22	-.26	.25	-.36	.24	-.34	.24
GDP per capita index			-.40	1.36	-.21	1.47	-.62	1.44	-.49	1.39
Female Labor Force Participation					-.54	.90				
Female Professionals					-.44	1.29				
Women in the Legislature							.34	1.20		
Women in the Cabinet							1.48	1.15		
Left Leader									.19	.20
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.66*	.37		
Professional*Female Professional					1.70**	.82				
Cut-point 1	-1.93***	.17	-1.64	.97	-1.29	1.25	-1.85*	1.01	-1.62	.98
Cut-point 2	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.68***	.04	3.67***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04
Country Variance Component	.15[d]		.16[e]		.17[f]		.19[g]		.16[h]	
Number of Individuals	9358		9358		9358		9358		9358	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-22771		-22774		-22786		-22770		-22772	

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual

variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white

[d] χ^2 17 df = 340.0, p < .01

[e] χ^2 16 df = 345.7, p < .01

[f] χ^2 14 df = 328.5, p < .01

[g] χ^2 14 df = 362.4, p < .01

[h] χ^2 15 df = 310.7, p < .01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

Table E2. Male Support for Women as Political Leaders: Female Executive Models

	(1) Coef	SE	(2) Coef	SE	(3) Coef	SE	(4) Coef	SE	(5) Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.12***	.03	-.12***	.03	-.13***	.03	-.28***	.09	-.12***	.03
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.0****	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Tolerance	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15
Student	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08
Retired	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08
Does not work	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11
Professional Occupation	.08	.06	.08	.06	.32	.37	.08	.06	.08	.06
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05
Parent	-.08	.06	-.08	.06	-.09	.06	-.08	.06	-.08	.06
Church Attendance	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Race: White[c]	-.03	.05	-.03	.05	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.03	.05
Age	.01	.05	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
Past Female Executive	-.29*	.15	-.18	.19	-.26	.17	-.18	.19	-.27	.19
GDP per capita index			1.21	1.12	1.91*	1.02	1.13	1.18	.80	1.09
Female Labor Force Participation					-1.17*	.61				
Female Professionals					-1.85**	.86				
Women in the Legislature							-.59	1.01		
Women in the Cabinet							1.99*	1.07		
Left Leader									.26	.17
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.67*	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					-.51	.78				
Cut-point 1	-2.57***	.15	-3.42***	.80	-2.35**	.87	-3.70***	.83	-3.17***	.77
Cut-point 2	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22*	.03
Cut-point 3	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76*	.04
Country Variance Component	.13[d]		.14[e]		.17[f]		.12[g]		.11[h]	
Number of Individuals	10510		10510		10510		10510		10510	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-25478		-25479		-25486		-25483			

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual

variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white

[d] χ^2 17 df = 377.6, p < .01

[e] χ^2 16 df = 384.3, p < .01

[f] χ^2 14 df = 421.1, p < .01

[g] χ^2 14 df = 308.7, p < .01

[h] χ^2 15 df = 287.3, p < .01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

We consider a second measure of female national leadership – the presence of a female candidate for chief executive in the most recent election. Models containing this measure can be found in Tables F1 and F2. As above, we include this measure as the only contextual variable in the first column in each table. Then in the subsequent models, we add this measure to each of the specifications employed in Tables 2 and 3. We observe no statistically significant effects for the presence of a female candidate in any of this analysis.

Table F1. Female Support for Women as Political Leaders: Female Candidate Models

	(1) Coef	SE	(2) Coef	SE	(3) Coef	SE	(4) Coef	SE	(5) Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.18***	.03	-.18***	.03	-.18***	.03	-.34***	.09	-.18***	.04
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01
Tolerance	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.02	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	.19***	.06	.19***	.06	.18***	.06	.19***	.06	.19***	.06
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04*	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05
Student	.19***	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08	.19**	.08
Retired	.14	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11
Does not work	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13	-.04	.13
Professional Occupation	.10	.08	.10	.08	-.73	.40	.09	.09	.10	.08
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05	-.06	.05
Parent	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06	.04	.06
Church Attendance	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.02	.02
Race: White[c]	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05	-.14***	.05
Age	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.08***	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
Female Executive Candidate	.02	.19	.01	.19	.15	.22	.04	.20	.01	.20
GDP per capita index			.64	1.10	.77	1.20	.75	1.14	.68	1.13
Female Labor Force Participation					-.91	1.00				
Female Professionals					.07	1.26				
Women in the Legislature							.13	1.23		

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Women in the Cabinet							1.17	1.24		
Left Leader									.13	.21
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.72**	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					1.77**	.82				
Cut-point 1	-2.02***	.17	-2.44***	.75	-2.12**	.96	-2.81***	.81	-2.50***	.77
Cut-point 2	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.68***	.04	3.67***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04
Country Variance Component	.15[d]		.16[e]		.16[f]		.17[g]		.16[h]	
Number of Individuals	9358		9358		9358		9358		9358	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-22773		-22776		-22788		-22774		-22777	

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white

[d] χ^2 17 df = 324.6, p < .01, [e] χ^2 16 df = 322.4, p < .01, [f] χ^2 14 df = 301.0, p<.01, [g] χ^2 14 df = 318.0, p<.01, [h] χ^2 15 df = 300.5, p<.01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.12***	.03	-.12***	.03	-.13***	.03	-.28***	.09	-.12***	.03
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Tolerance	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.06	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15	.07	.15
Student	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08	.16**	.08
Retired	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08	.02	.08
Does not work	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11	-.10	.11
Professional Occupation	.08	.06	.08	.06	.34	.37	.08	.06	.08	.06
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05
Parent	-.09	.06	-.08	.06	-.09	.06	-.08	.06	-.08	.06
Church Attendance	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Race: White[c]	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.03	.05
Age	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
Female Executive Candidate	-.07	.17	-.05	.16	-.01	.16	.06	.17	-.04	.16
GDP per capita index			1.87*	.92	2.83***	.90	1.88*	.95	1.85*	.92
Female Labor Force Participation					-1.03	.74				
Female Professionals					-1.58	.94				
Women in the Legislature							-.76	1.03		
Women in the Cabinet							2.06*	1.12		
Left Leader									.16	.17
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.68*	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					-.56	.78				
Cut-point 1	-2.65***	.15	-3.90***	.62	-3.24***	.73	-4.27***	.68	-3.93***	.63
Cut-point 2	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04
Country Variance Component	.14[d]		.15[e]		.17[f]		.13[g]		.13[h]	
Number of Individuals	10510		10510		10510		10510		10510	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-25478		-25479		-25484		-25481		-25479	

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual

variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white

[d] χ^2 17 df = 400.8, p < .01, [e] χ^2 16 df = 396.2, p < .01, [f] χ^2 14 df = 415.9, p<.01 [g] χ^2 14 df = 307.4, p<.01, [h] χ^2 15 df = 333.6, p<.01

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

We also conducted a series of analyses, presented in Tables G1 and G2, designed to assess whether a country's overall democratic environment might shape gender egalitarian norms. The analysis finds no evidence of such a relationship.

Table G1. Female Support for Women as Political Leaders: Democracy Models

	(1) Coef	(1) SE	(2) Coef	(2) SE	(3) Coef	(3) SE	(4) Coef	(4) SE	(5) Coef	(5) SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.17***	.03	-.17***	.04	-.17***	.04	-.34***	.09	-.17***	.04
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01	.08***	.01
Tolerance	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	.18***	.06	.18***	.06	.18***	.06	.18***	.06	.18***	.06
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.05
Student	.22***	.08	.22***	.08	.22***	.08	.22***	.08	.22***	.08
Retired	.09	.10	.09	.10	.10	.10	.10	.10	.09	.10
Does not work	-.05	.13	-.05	.13	-.05	.13	-.05	.13	-.05	.13
Professional Occupation	.09	.08	.10	.08	-.72	.39	.09	.09	.10	.09
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.05	.05	-.05	.05	-.05	.05	-.05	.05	-.05	.05
Parent	.01	.06	.01	.06	.01	.06	.01	.06	.01	.06
Church Attendance	-.02	.02	-.02	.02	-.03	.02	-.03	.02	-.03	.02
Race: White[c]	-.13**	.05	-.13**	.05	-.14**	.05	-.13**	.05	-.14***	.05
Age	-.06***	.01	-.06***	.01	-.06***	.01	-.06***	.01	-.06***	.01
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
Level of Democracy[1]	.02	.10	.18	.17	.19	.18	.26	.18	.20	.17
GDP per capita index			2.03	1.76	2.20	1.87	2.78	1.79	2.29	1.80
Female Labor Force Participation					-.65	.89				
Female Professionals					-.02	1.21				
Women in the Legislature							.33	1.16		
Women in the Cabinet							1.53	1.15		
Left Leader									.18	.20
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.74**	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					1.73**	.81				
Cut-point 1	-2.10***	.31	-3.84***	1.53	-3.61*	1.7	-4.94**	1.7	-4.12***	1.6
Cut-point 2	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03	2.25***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.68***	.04	3.67***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04	3.68***	.04

Country Variance Component	.15[d]	.15[e]	.16[f]	.16[g]	.14[h]
Number of Individuals	9358	9358	9358	9358	9358
Number of Countries	19	19	19	19	19
Log Restricted Likelihood	-22771	-22772	-22786	-22770	-22772

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.

[a] Reference Category: In the workforce

[b] Reference Category: Not married

[c] Reference Category: Non-white

[d] χ^2 17 df = 324.3, p < .01, [e] χ^2 16 df = 300.9, p < .01, [f] χ^2 14 df = 291.9, p<.01, [g] χ^2 14 df = 287.7, p<.01, [h] χ^2 15 df = 266.5, p<.01

[i] The measure of democracy is from Freedom House. We would have liked to also consider alternative measures, such as the Polity data, but the data were not available for all the countries in our analysis.

Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.

Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

Table G2. Male Support for Women as Political Leaders: Democracy Models

	(1) Coef	SE	(2) Coef	SE	(3) Coef	SE	(4) Coef	SE	(5) Coef	SE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL										
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO										
Trust in Government	-.12***	.03	-.12***	.03	-.12***	.04	-.28***	.09	-.12***	.03
DEMOCRATIC VALUES										
Democracy is best	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01
Tolerance	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01	.07***	.01
IDEOLOGY										
Left Ideology	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01	.03***	.01
Left Party Sympathizer	-.08	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05	-.09	.05
SOCIALIZATION										
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Material Wealth	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Employment Status[a]										
Work in the home	.07	.15	.08	.15	.08	.15	.08	.15	.08	.15
Student	.15**	.08	.15**	.08	.15**	.08	.15**	.08	.15**	.08
Retired	.04	.08	.04	.08	.04	.08	.04	.08	.04	.08
Does not work	-.09	.11	-.09	.11	-.09	.11	-.09	.11	-.09	.11
Professional Occupation	.08	.06	.08	.06	.35	.38	.08	.06	.08	.06
Marital Status: Casado/Unido[b]	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05	-.00	.05
Parent	-.07	.06	-.07	.06	-.07	.06	-.07	.06	-.07	.06
Church Attendance	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Race: White[c]	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.02	.05	-.03	.05	-.03	.05
Age	-.00	.01	-.00	.01	-.00	.01	-.00	.01	-.00	.01
COUNTRY-LEVEL										
Level of Democracy[1]	-.07	.09	.18	.14	.17	.14	.24	.15	.21	.14
GDP per capita index			3.47**	1.46	4.17***	1.38	3.88**	1.49	3.75**	1.44
Female Labor Force Participation					-1.02	.63				
Female Professionals					-1.47	.89				
Women in the Legislature							-.60	.96		
Women in the Cabinet							2.37**	1.06		
Left Leader									.21	.16
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS										
Trust*Women in Cabinet							.68*	.36		
Professional*Female Professional					-.57	.79				
Cut-point 1	-2.47***	.27	-5.41***	1.28	-4.62***	1.3	-6.26***	1.4	-5.74***	1.3
Cut-point 2	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03	2.22***	.03
Cut-point 3	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04	3.76***	.04
Country Variance Component	.14[d]		.14[e]		.17[f]		.12[g]		.12[h]	
Number of Individuals	10510		10510		10510		10510		10510	
Number of Countries	19		19		19		19		19	
Log Restricted Likelihood	-25478		-25474		-25481		-25478		-25473	

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$. Given the large number of respondents, 0.05 is the cut-point for significance on individual-level indicators. The 0.10-level of significance is only employed for contextual

variables where the *N* is much smaller. All tests are two-tailed.
[a] Reference Category: In the workforce
[b] Reference Category: Not married
[c] Reference Category: Non-white
[d] χ^2 17 df = 397.1, p < .01, [e] χ^2 16 df = 379.3, p < .01, [f] χ^2 14 df = 409.4, p<.01, [g] χ^2 14 df = 285.7, p<.01, [h] χ^2 15 df = 299.7, p<.01
[i] The measure of democracy is from Freedom House. We would have liked to also consider alternative measures, such as the Polity data, but the data were not available for all the countries in our analysis.
Note: Models also include random slopes for the individual-level variables that are components of cross-level interactions: Trust and Professional Occupation. Random slopes not shown.
Analysis conducted in HLM 6.06. HLM's ordered logit procedure estimates the likelihood of being in the lower category, which reverses typical coefficient signs. To make interpretation more straightforward, we reversed the coding of the dependent variable so that positive coefficients indicate more support for women as political leaders. Individual-level data are from the 2008 AmericasBarometer conducted by LAPOP; the authors compiled the country-level data. See the supplemental data appendix for additional details.

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