

Supplementary Materials

“The Democratic Effect of Direct Democracy”

American Political Science Review

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
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A1 Formal Analysis

A1.1 Supplements to the Theoretical Analysis

Figure 1 illustrates the setup of the model discussed in the theory section of the article, where we analyze the following status quo (s.q.): there is no law and the government either proposes a new law or takes no action (see gray part of Figure 1). The next subsection shows the mirror equilibrium analysis for the case that the law exists and the government either takes no action or abolishes the law (see black part of Figure 1).



Notes: L = a law is present, \underline{L} = there is no law; DD = an initiative or a referendum is used, \underline{DD} = there is no use of direct democratic institutions; $s.q.$ = status quo.

Figure 1: Theoretical Model: Extensive Form

The theory section discusses condition 3, which formalizes the government's decision to propose a new law, without providing the formal derivation of the inequality condition. Condition 3 is derived from the government's expected utilities as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 E[U_G(\text{proposing } L)] &\geq E[U_G(\text{no action})] \\
 p_{\text{ref}} \cdot U_G(\underline{L}DD) + (1 - p_{\text{ref}}) \cdot U_G(L\underline{DD}) &\geq p_{\text{ini}} \cdot U_G(LDD) + (1 - p_{\text{ini}}) \cdot U_G(\underline{L}\underline{DD}) \\
 p_{\text{ref}} \cdot (-|0 - x_G| - c_G) + (1 - p_{\text{ref}}) \cdot (-|1 - x_G|) &\geq p_{\text{ini}} \cdot (-|1 - x_G| - c_G) + (1 - p_{\text{ini}}) \cdot (-|0 - x_G|) \\
 x_G &\geq \frac{p_{\text{ref}} \cdot (c_G - 1) - p_{\text{ini}} \cdot (c_G + 1) + 1}{2(1 - p_{\text{ref}} - p_{\text{ini}})}
 \end{aligned}$$

A1.2 Mirror Equilibrium

We explore in the following the mirror equilibrium analysis for the case that the law exists (see black part of Figure 1), assuming that the government does not change the status quo and that the voters can either accept the law or launch an initiative. To find the conditions for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we again start with the last node in the game tree. The voters launch an initiative, if the following condition 4 holds (equivalent to condition 2 in the theory section):

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_V(\underline{L}|DD) &\geq U_V(L|\underline{DD}) \\
 -|0 - x_V| - c_V &\geq -|1 - x_V| && \text{Note: } 0 \leq x_G, x_V \leq 1 \\
 -x_V - c_V &\geq x_V - 1 \\
 x_V &\leq \frac{1 - c_V}{2}
 \end{aligned}$$

In case the government decides to abolish the law, the voters call for a referendum, if condition 5 holds (equivalent to condition 2 in the theory section):


$$\begin{aligned}
 U_V(L|DD) &\geq U_V(\underline{L}|\underline{DD}) \\
 -|1 - x_V| - c_V &\geq -|0 - x_V| && \text{Note: } 0 \leq x_G, x_V \leq 1 \\
 x_V - 1 - c_V &\geq -x_V \\
 x_V &\geq \frac{1 + c_V}{2}
 \end{aligned}$$

The government can either propose to change the law or stick with the status quo. Either way, the government has to take into account the possibility that the electorate will overturn its decision with the use of direct democratic rights. For both actions (keeping or abolishing the law) the government forms expected utilities with some uncertainty about the exact position of the median voter's ideal point. Based on these expected utilities, we derive the following condition 6, which formalizes the government's decision (and is equivalent to condition 3, see Subsection A1.1):

$$\begin{aligned}
 E[U_G(\text{keeping } L)] &\geq E[U_G(\text{abolishing } L)] \\
 p_{\text{ini}} \cdot U_G(\underline{L}|DD) + (1 - p_{\text{init}}) \cdot U_G(L|\underline{DD}) &\geq p_{\text{ref}} \cdot U_G(L|DD) + (1 - p_{\text{ref}}) \cdot U_G(\underline{L}|\underline{DD}) \\
 p_{\text{ini}} \cdot (-|0 - x_G| - c_G) + (1 - p_{\text{ini}}) \cdot (-|1 - x_G|) &\geq p_{\text{ref}} \cdot (-|1 - x_G| - c_G) + (1 - p_{\text{ref}}) \cdot (-|0 - x_G|) \\
 x_G &\geq \frac{p_{\text{ini}} \cdot (c_G - 1) - p_{\text{ref}} \cdot (c_G + 1) + 1}{2(1 - p_{\text{ref}} - p_{\text{init}})}
 \end{aligned}$$

A2 Comparative Statics

Figure 2 plots comparative statics based on the theoretical model, illustrating how the costs of direct democratic action affect each player's decisions. Let us start with the left plot. The y -axis shows the government's support for a new law and the x -axis voters' costs to launch a campaign. The government's decision to propose a new law is a function of its own support for the reform and the direct democratic usage costs for voters. When the electorate can easily call for a referendum (i.e., the costs of using direct democratic rights for voters are small), the government will only enact new laws that it strongly supports. But as the costs for the voters increase, the government will propose a law that is supported by only a small majority within the government. Another way to illustrate the effect of direct democratic institutions is shown in the right plot. The y -axis plots again the government support for a new law and the x -axis the median voter's preference. The stronger the electorate's supports for a bill (although overall still rejecting it, as $x_P < 0.5$), the more inclined the government is to pass the law. The comparison between the solid and the dashed line shows that the government is more responsive to the median voter's preference, if the usage costs for direct democracy are lower (see comparison between solid and dashed lines).



Notes: Parameter values: Left: $x_P = 0.1$, $c_G = 0.02$. Right: $c_P = 0.1/0.3$, $c_G = 0.05$.

Figure 2: Comparative Statics Illustrating How Direct Democracy Affects Player's Decisions.

A3 Policy Items and Responses (our translation)

Tax Policies

Policy 1 The canton grants special tax cuts for wealthy foreigners.

Survey question wording: “Do you support or oppose special tax rules for foreigners?” (German: In den meisten Kantonen profitieren vermögende Ausländerinnen und Ausländer von vorteilhaften Steuerkonditionen in der Form der Pauschalbesteuerung. Sind Sie für oder gegen die Pauschalbesteuerung von Ausländern?)

Policy 2 The canton has an above-average tax progressivity.

Survey question wording: “Do you prefer living in a canton with above- or below-average tax progressivity?” (German: Personen mit hohem Einkommen versteuern einen höheren Anteil des Einkommens als Personen mit tieferen Einkommen. Die Steuerprogression zwischen den Kantonen ist dabei sehr unterschiedlich. Möchten Sie persönlich in einem Kanton leben mit überdurchschnittlich starker Steuerprogression oder lieber in einem Kanton mit vergleichsweise schwacher Steuerprogression?)

Policy 3 The canton has an income tax for single persons with CHF 100k income of 12% or more.

Survey question wording: “Do you think that a single person with a gross annual income of CHF 100k should pay more or less than 12% sub-national income taxes?” (German: Finden Sie eine ledige Person mit einem Bruttoeinkommen von 100'000 Schweizer Franken sollte mehr oder weniger als 12% Einkommenssteuer an den Kanton und die Gemeinde bezahlen?)

Immigration and Foreigners

Policy 4 The canton grants foreigners voting rights in municipal matters.

Survey question wording: “Do you think that foreigners should have the right to vote on municipal referendums?” (German: Sollten Ausländerinnen und Ausländer an Abstimmungen auf Gemeindeebene teilnehmen dürfen?)

Policy 5 The canton allows naturalization decisions to be made in town hall meetings.

Survey question wording: “Do you think that naturalizations should be decided at town hall meetings or by municipal governments?” (German: Sind Sie der Meinung das Einbürgerungsverfahren an Gemeindeversammlungen entschieden werden sollen oder sollen Fachgremien beziehungsweise der Gemeinderat über Einbürgerungen entscheiden.)

Education and Family Policies

Policy 6 The canton grants those with children tax credits of 5,000 CHF or more.

Survey question wording: “Do you think that a tax credit for children of CHF 5k is too high or too low?” (German: Familien können pro Kind einen fixen Betrag vom steuerbaren Einkommen abziehen. Finden Sie 5'000 Schweizer Franken als Kinderabzug zu viel oder zu wenig?)

Policy 7 The teaching of a second foreign language starts in 5th grade or later.

Survey question wording: “What is the best point in time to start teaching a second foreign language – fifth grade or later?” (German: Wann finden Sie, ist der richtige Zeitpunkt eine zweite Fremdsprache zu unterrichten? Im 5. Schuljahr oder später?)

Health-Care Policies

Policy 8 Cantonal administrations automatically contact all people eligible for health-care subsidies.

Survey question wording: “Do you think that public authorities should contact people who are eligible for health-care subsidies by themselves?” (German: Finden Sie es richtig, wenn die Verwaltung automatisch all jene kontaktiert, die gemäss Steuererklärung berechtigt sind Prämienverbilligungen zu erhalten?)

Policy 9 The canton grants health-care subsidies to families with two children and an annual income of CHF 90k.

Survey question wording: “Do you think that a family with two children and an annual income of CHF 90k should receive health-care subsidies?” (German: Finden Sie eine Familie mit zwei Kindern und einem Jahreseinkommen von 90'000 Schweizer Franken, soll Prämienverbilligung erhalten?)

Policy 10 The canton allows physicians to sell prescription medicine directly to patients.

Survey question wording: “Should physicians be allowed to sell medication (or only pharmacists)?” (German: Sind Sie dafür dass Ärztinnen und Ärzte in ihrer Praxis Medikamente abgeben dürfen?)

A4 Multilevel Regression with Post-Stratification (MRP)

The following discusses in more detail the applied MRP model specifications and further investigates the elite preference measures.

A4.1 Response

Each hierarchical response model has a number of fixed and random effects. The models used to estimate voters preferences include six random effects: sex, education, domicile type, age, canton, and region. The response models for the elite have three random effects (party, canton, region). The difference in specifications reflects the distinct weighting in the post-stratification step. In case of the voter survey, we rely on a number of individual-level variables such as age and gender that are reported in the census data. In case of the elite measure, the “population” for which we post-stratify is the political power structure of the elite. Accordingly, we use data based on party strength in the government as weights in the post-stratification of the elite measure. As fixed effects in the hierarchical model, we relied in both MRP applications on six cantonal explanatory variables: the shares of German speakers (BfS, 2012), of Roman-Catholics (BfS, 2012), of university degree holders (BfS, 2012), of left party voters in the 2011 national elections (BfS, 2013), of right party voters in the 2011 election (BfS, 2013), and GDP per capita (BAK Basel Economics).

A4.2 Model Selection

The models were selected based on data fit determined by AIC and BIC. We rely on AIC and BIC because these measures allow us to evaluate the trade-off between data fit and model complexity. Since we are interested in predictions, over-fitting is a problem (Babyak, 2004). Relying on model quality measures that punish complexity provides a possible remedy for over-fitting. The following overview lists the variables used for the different survey questions:

- $x_{2.1}$ = % of German speakers
- $x_{2.2}$ = % of Roman Catholics
- $x_{2.3}$ = GDP per capita
- $x_{2.4}$ = % of university degree holders
- $x_{2.5}$ = % of left party voters
- $x_{2.6}$ = % of right party voters

Selected Response Models (Voters)

1. $y_1 \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
2. $y_2 \sim x_{2.5} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
3. $y_3 \sim x_{2.4} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
4. $y_4 \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
5. $y_5 \sim x_{2.5} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
6. $y_6 \sim \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
7. $y_7 \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
8. $y_8 \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
9. $y_9 \sim x_{2.4} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
10. $y_{10} \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{sex} + \alpha_{education} + \alpha_{age} + \alpha_{domicile} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$

Selected Response Models (Elite)

1. $y_1 \sim x_{2.2} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
2. $y_2 \sim x_{2.4} + x_{2.6} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
3. $y_3 \sim x_{2.6} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
4. $y_4 \sim x_{2.6} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
5. $y_5 \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
6. $y_6 \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
7. $y_7 \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
8. $y_8 \sim x_{2.1} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
9. $y_9 \sim x_{2.2} + x_{2.4} + \alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$
10. $y_{10} \sim x_{2.1} + x_{2.5}\alpha_{party} + \alpha_{canton} + \alpha_{region}$

A4.3 Exogeneity of Elite Responses

One concern is that politicians do not answer the questions sincerely, but give answers that they believe are in line with their constituency. If that were the case, the validity of the model estimates would be questioned. We show this is most likely not the case by comparing the estimates with respect to their constituency and their party. The analysis presented below investigates the extent to which politicians' responses are a function of their party affiliation and the position of their constituency. Table A4 reports the results for policy question 1 (the results are robust for all 10 policy questions).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	0.86*** (0.03)	0.30*** (0.10)	0.60*** (0.07)
FE PARTIES	✓	X	✓
FE CANTONS	X	✓	✓
R ²	0.63	0.10	0.67
BIC	257.7	740.3	357.8

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A4: Exogeneity of Elite Preferences

If politicians' answers were to a certain degree endogenous, they should vary by constituency and not by party. However, the model with the best BIC value only includes the party indicators (Model 1), which shows that party affiliation is a very strong predictor of a cantonal politician's policy preferences. This result is in line with more recent research showing that politicians might be ill-equipped to estimate their constituency's preferences. Broockman and Skovron (2015, 1) document with a large survey of 2,000 legislative candidates that "actual district opinion explains only a modest share of the variation in politicians' perceptions of their districts' views." Of relevance in that regard may be that the elite survey was carried out anonymously, which should increase the chances that the politicians state their true preferences.

A5 The Direct Democracy Measure

The presented empirical analyses rely on a widely used direct democracy index measuring how difficult it is to use direct democratic rights (Stutzer, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2000). The index is in line with the theoretical models, as it approximates quite precisely the costs of citizens to use direct democratic instruments (for an alternative measure, see Appendix A6). Figure 3 shows the substantial variation in direct democracy across Swiss cantons, ranging from a value of 1.75 (low direct democracy) in the canton of Geneva to 5.5 in the canton of Glarus. The map also shows that direct democracy is more comprehensive in the German speaking part of Switzerland.

For putting the findings into context, an important question is how direct democratic the Swiss cantons are in comparative perspective. If we apply the calculation of the direct democracy index to California, we calculate a rather low value of 2.33. However, the applied index is tailored to the Swiss version of direct democracy, which biases this comparison. For example, California is much more direct democratic in the sense that the government is neutral in the campaign, political representatives have to implement successful initiatives, and citizens can ask for recall elections. In the Swiss case, however, the governments and parliaments are quite heavily involved in the initiative process: they can draft counterproposals, are active in campaigns, and finally, in case of successful initiatives, they interact with the authors of the initiative for the elaboration of implementation laws.

In sum, taking the comparison (and the caveats) into account, the variation in direct democracy among Swiss cantons is very substantial and it spans from limited direct democracy to very comprehensive participatory rights.




Figure 3: Direct Democracy Index Values for Swiss Cantons

A6 Robustness Checks

As an alternative to the Stutzer (1999) index of direct democracy, we check the robustness of the results with new data on direct democratic institutions in the Swiss cantons from Vatter et al. (2010). The findings presented in Table A6 are robust.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
DIRECT DEMOCRACY (ALT.)	0.79** (0.37)		0.51 (0.42)	-1.05 (0.76)
GOVERNMENT-VOTER PREFERENCE DEVIATION		-2.57** (1.00)	-10.34*** (3.65)	-11.49*** (3.86)
DD (ALT.) x PREFERENCE DEVIATION			10.75** (4.84)	13.35*** (5.07)
VOTER OPINION CLARITY				3.72** (1.55)
GOVERNMENT OPINION CLARITY				-2.32** (1.11)
GDP (PER CAPITA IN 100K)				0.04 (0.59)
ELECTORAL THRESHOLD				-0.01 (0.01)
% GERMAN SPEAKERS				1.22** (0.58)
LEGISLATIVE POWER				0.01 (1.12)
POPULATION SIZE (IN 100K)				-0.02 (0.04)
SVP VOTE SHARE				-0.01 (0.02)
DD IN USE (PAST 3 YEARS)				-0.27 (0.27)
CONSTANT	-0.50 (0.31)	0.14 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.32)	0.15 (1.15)
BIC	360.59	359.21	359.12	392.25
$\ell\ell$	-169.17	-168.48	-162.88	-154.42
<i>N</i>	260	260	260	260
Groups: Cantons	26	26	26	26
Groups: Policies	10	10	10	10
Variance: Canton	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.02
Variance: Policy	0.33	0.25	0.26	0.29

CPC: Correctly predicted cases; baseline is 51%. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A6: Robustness Check With Alternative Direct Democracy Measure.

As an additional robustness check, we use an alternative measure of the citizen-government preference deviation. In the main analysis, we set the government-voter preference gap equal to 0 when the government and voters share the same majority opinion. The alternative preference deviation measure also differentiates between the sizes of the gaps in that case. Concretely, we estimate the absolute difference of the preference gap and, when the government and voters hold opposing majority views, we add the value of 50 to the absolute deviation. With this coding, we derive a gap variable that theoretically ranges between 0 and 150 and differentiates between congruent (0 to 50) and incongruent (51 to 150) majority preferences. The smaller the values of the variable, the closer are the positions of the government and voters. The presented findings are robust.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
DIRECT DEMOCRACY	0.19** (0.09)		0.09 (0.11)	-0.19 (0.19)
GOVERNMENT-VOTER PREFERENCE DEVIATION (ALT.)		-0.93*** (0.36)	-3.65** (1.52)	-4.04** (1.58)
DD X PREFERENCE DEVIATION (ALT.)			0.60* (0.33)	0.73** (0.34)
VOTER OPINION CLARITY				4.01** (1.57)
GOVERNMENT OPINION CLARITY				-2.55** (1.09)
GDP (PPC IN 100K)				0.07 (0.60)
ELECTORAL THRESHOLD				-0.01 (0.01)
% GERMAN SPEAKERS				0.99* (0.59)
LEGISLATIVE POWER				0.10 (1.13)
POPULATION SIZE (IN 100K)				-0.01 (0.04)
SVP VOTE SHARE				-0.00 (0.02)
DD USED (PAST 3 YEARS)				-0.26 (0.28)
CONSTANT	-0.81* (0.41)	0.24 (0.21)	-0.12 (0.51)	0.31 (1.31)
BIC	360.19	358.99	360.35	394.23
$\ell\ell$	-168.97	-168.37	-163.49	-155.41

N	260	260	260	260
Groups: Cantons	26	26	26	26
Groups: Policies	10	10	10	10

Variance: Canton	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.03
Variance: Policy	0.33	0.26	0.27	0.33

CPC: Correctly predicted cases; baseline is 51%. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A6: Robustness Check With Alternative Preference Deviation Measure.

A7 Policy Dimensionality Analysis

The finding that direct democracy is most effective when the elite-voter gap is largest raises the question of when we would expect that gap to be large and thus direct democracy to be an effective democratic corrective. While representation scholars emphasize that elections are powerful for minimizing the elite-voter preference gap (Schumpeter, 1942; Mansbridge, 2009), the advantage of direct democracy is that referendums and initiatives allow it to unbundle policy issues (Kriesi, 2005; Besley and Coate, 2008).

The analysis of this study, the insights of the representation literature, and the unbundling argument all suggest that the effectiveness of direct democracy on policy congruence depends on the dimensionality of the political conflict structure. Accordingly, we should expect that elections are powerful in democratically accommodating the main political conflict dimension and that direct democratic institutions are particularly effective in aligning policies on second-ordered dimensions with the majority will of the electorate. If that is correct, both the citizen-elite preference gap and the effect of direct democracy on policy congruence should increase as we move away from questions of the dominant (first) to other policy dimensions. The first dimension usually covers classic left-right distributional questions, while the second dimensions include cultural, identity, and residual issues (Kriesi et al., 2008; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014).

In the following, we present an empirical policy dimensionality investigation. Before we present the analysis, however, we would like to emphasize that our data does not allow us to analyze the dimensionality of the political conflict structure for each canton separately. To conduct the comparative analysis, we thus have to make simplifying assumptions based on the findings of the literature. We assume that there are two dimensions plus a residual category. Concretely, we code the questions on the tax rate, the progression, and the subsidies for health-care as distinctive left-right distributional policies; we group all the three policies targeted at foreigners in the second dimension category; and the remaining policies (education, family, and health) form the a residual category.

Figure 4 and Table A7 show how the absolute preference gaps between the elite and the citizens vary in the three categories and whether the effect of direct democracy varies across the policy dimensions. The box plots of Figure 4 show that the elite-voter gap is smallest in the policies of the first dimension. The estimates in Table A7 show a positive interaction effect between the policy dimension variable and direct democracy, which suggests that the effect of direct democracy is driven by policies not covered by the first dimension. The findings support the argument that the effect of direct democracy depends on the dimensionality of the political conflict structure.

However, we would like to emphasize that this analysis comes with limitations. Thus, the findings should be interpreted carefully. Most importantly, we assume that the political conflict structure is constant across cantons—despite the heterogeneity among the cantonal polities. Some cantons are dominated by one or two parties, while we find in others a more fragmented party system with many parties and consociational multiparty governments. Our data do not




Figure 4: Preference Gap of Policy Dimensions (1st Quartile, Mean, 3rd Quartile)

	Model 1	Model 2
DIRECT DEMOCRACY	0.22** (0.09)	-0.23 (0.21)
GOV.-VOT. PREF. GAP	-2.95*** (0.98)	-3.13*** (0.99)
POLICY DIMENSION	0.32* (0.18)	-0.58 (0.43)
DD x POLICY DIM.		0.21** (0.09)
CONSTANT	-1.42*** (0.55)	0.45 (0.99)
BIC	360.52	361.18
$\ell\ell$	-163.58	-161.13

N	260	260
Groups: Cantons	26	26
Groups: Policies	10	10

Variance: Canton	0.04	0.04
Variance: Policies	0.15	0.16

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A7: The Direct Democracy Effect on Policy Congruence Conditional on Policy Dimensions

allow us to make a fine-grained dimensionality analysis for each canton. In that sense, our findings provide a broader macro picture on the question of how direct democracy interacts with the political conflict structure in Swiss cantons. Given the limitations, the findings of the dimensionality analysis are suggestive. More empirical research is needed to further disentangle the link between political conflict structure, policy dimensionality, and the effectiveness of direct democracy on policy congruence.

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