

Supplemental Information Appendix

This appendix describes how we collected the data on collective bargaining laws and individual state legislators' votes, and it also explains how we created our measures of district ideology and government employment. In the final sections, we present additional support for the results shown in the article.

Data collection: Collective bargaining laws and state legislators' votes

The first step in our data collection process was to determine when each state passed its collective bargaining laws for government employees. There is one well-known existing dataset that provides this information: the NBER Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set compiled by Valletta and Freeman (1988). That dataset contains information on the status of public-sector labor laws in every state and year from 1955 to 1985, separately for five categories of government employees: noncollege teachers, municipal firefighters, municipal police, other local government employees, and state government employees.¹ The Valletta and Freeman dataset assigns one of six codes to the bargaining rights for each category of employee: no bargaining provision, collective bargaining prohibited, employer authorized but not required to bargain with union, right to present proposals, right to meet and confer, duty to bargain (implied), and duty to bargain (explicit).

Our original intention was to use the Valletta and Freeman dataset to identify the years in which each state adopted its duty-to-bargain laws (defined as laws that require government employers to bargain with their employee unions), but we ultimately decided to compile our own dataset for a few reasons. First, Valletta and Freeman code the states according to the collective

¹ As we explain in the article, some laws apply to all categories of government employees; others apply only to particular categories.

bargaining laws in place that year, not according to the years in which those laws were enacted. (For example, they code California as having a duty-to-bargain law for teachers starting in 1977, even though the California legislature passed the law in 1975.) Second, some of the coding in the Valletta and Freeman dataset did not align with what we knew about particular cases; for example, state employees in California are coded as having a “meet and confer” law (which is not a duty-to-bargain law) up through 1985, even though the Dills Act granted California state employees collective bargaining rights in 1978. Third, the Valletta and Freeman dataset does not distinguish between laws enacted by legislatures and laws created by executive orders, court cases, or attorney general opinions—an important distinction for our purpose of studying the politics of adoption.

In the end, we consulted many of the sources that Valletta and Freeman used to compile their dataset, most importantly the U.S. Department of Labor’s *Summary of Public Sector Labor Relations* (1971, 1973, 1977, 1979, 1981). However, we also researched each state individually using LexisNexis State Capital, HeinOnline, and Westlaw, as well as various reports and case studies about collective bargaining law adoption in particular states. Westlaw was useful for gathering information about executive orders, court cases, and attorney general opinions; LexisNexis State Capital was the best source of information on state statutes. For LexisNexis State Capital, we used citation and keyword searches to pull up histories of each statute, including citations to all previous versions. We then located the original text of each bill using either LexisNexis State Capital or HeinOnline. Throughout, we focused on coding the status of collective bargaining rights for each type of employee in each state and year, using the same coding as Valletta and Freeman, except that we combined their two categories of duty-to-bargain laws (implied and explicit) into a single category.

At the end of this process, we had a complete map of the evolution of each state's collective bargaining laws for each of the five categories of government employees, updated through 2012. It is based on the years of enactment rather than the years the laws went into effect, and because we know how the laws came about, we can eliminate the few cases of legal changes that came about through non-legislative means. We also made corrections to the coding of a few states and years. For example:

- The Valletta and Freeman dataset codes Utah as never having a duty-to-bargain law, but Utah's legislature actually did pass a duty-to-bargain law for firefighters in 1975 (the Utah Fire Fighters Negotiation Act). In 1977, however, the Utah Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutional because of its binding arbitration provision, and the state never enacted another duty-to-bargain law to replace it.
- Oregon passed what looked like a duty-to-bargain law in 1969, and it is coded as such in the Valletta and Freeman dataset. However, a monograph published by the Labor Education and Research Center at the University of Oregon explains that this law did not actually require public employers to bargain with their unions, and that it was not until 1973 that bargaining was mandatory in Oregon (Widenor, 1989). We have corrected for this in our dataset of laws.

Once we had figured out when each state adopted its duty-to-bargain laws (for those that did), we set out to locate information on how individual state legislators voted on each of those bills. Because nearly all of the laws were passed between 1959 and 1985, almost none of that information was online. Instead, we had to contact the state legislatures one by one, provide the relevant bill or statute numbers and dates, and request the pages of the state legislative journals that documented which legislators voted "yes" and which legislators voted "no" on each bill.

For each bill and state legislative chamber, we used the votes on final passage (usually called the third reading).

We ultimately tracked down the individual state legislators' final passage votes for 42 of the bills in 31 states. In two cases—the Maine House of Representatives in 1969 and the New Hampshire House of Representatives in 1975—we had to recode the votes, because the final votes in those cases were on motions to table or postpone, and a “yes” vote in those cases should be interpreted as a vote against collective bargaining. We were unable to collect any votes for Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Vermont. We are also missing votes on some (but not all) of the bills in the following states: Connecticut (1965), Florida (1972), Maine (1965 and 1974), New Hampshire (1969), and Wisconsin (1966). We drop Nebraska because it has a nonpartisan legislature, and we also drop all votes that were not “yes” or “no” votes.

At the same time that we requested the final passage votes from the state legislatures, we also requested historical rosters of the state legislators who were in office at the time of those votes. We used those rosters to code the party affiliation and district name or number for each legislator. All of the information on state legislators' names, their party affiliations, their district numbers, and their votes on collective bargaining were hand-entered and checked by a team of research assistants.

Collecting data on state legislators' votes was much easier for the duty-to-bargain laws and collective bargaining retrenchment laws enacted in more recent years. Documents detailing the roll-call votes on the duty-to-bargain laws passed in New Mexico and Oklahoma were available on those state legislatures' websites. To compile the list of collective bargaining retrenchment bills enacted in 2011, we used the National Conference of State Legislatures' database on collective bargaining legislation; we included all laws that made significant changes

to government employees' bargaining rights. The roll-call votes for those laws were available on the state legislatures' websites.

We also collected data on all non-enacted collective bargaining bills considered in four states during the 1960s and 1970s: California, Iowa, Utah, and Kentucky. The reason we only pursued this for four states is that collecting this kind of data is extremely difficult in most states. In Montana, for example, one would have to visit the Montana Historical Society's archives to search through hard-copy files of bills and journals. For California, however, we were able to use a resource made available by the University of California, Berkeley, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment: a database of annual legislative reports compiled by the California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO. For Iowa and Kentucky, we located online House and Senate Journals, and for Utah, we searched a digital archive of bills maintained by the Utah Department of Administrative Services' Division of Archives and Records.

Constructing measures of state legislative district ideology and government employment

As we explain in the article, there are no existing measures of ideology or government employee strength at the level of state legislative districts during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In fact, getting any data—even basic U.S. Census data on demographics—at the state legislative district level for years prior to 2000 is extremely difficult and oftentimes not possible. However, it is common practice in political science to use county-level data to approximate characteristics of state legislative districts (see, e.g., Wright and Schaffner, 2002, 373; Shor and McCarty, 2011). Also, in the absence of more direct measures of citizen or legislator ideology at the substate level, many scholars rely on presidential election returns (e.g., Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002; Erikson and Wright, 1980; Shor and McCarty, 2011). Therefore, for our article,

we create measures of state legislative district ideology and government employee strength using county-level data on Democratic presidential vote and government employment.

Of course, we can only access data on Democratic presidential vote for every fourth year, and data from the U.S. Census of Population are only available every tenth year. As a result, we do not have data on county-level presidential vote or government employment for many of the years in which state legislatures actually voted on collective bargaining. That said, this a common problem in empirical research on American politics (especially when the analysis is at the substate level), and a standard way of handling it is to collect the data for the years that are available and then linearly interpolate values of the variables for the years in between. For example, in her study of historical city elections, Trounstein (2008, 115-116) interpolates a set of city-level demographic variables within cities between U.S. Census years. Another example is Smith (2001, 705), who interpolates the values of his education measure for years between the decennial U.S. Census years. In our article, we used this technique to create our measures of state legislative district ideology and government employment.

This was straightforward for our measure of government employment: we used U.S. Census data on government employment by county in 1970 and 1980, provided by the National Historical Geographic Information System,² and we linearly interpolated the percentage of workers in each county who were employed by government. For our measure of state legislative district ideology, we used county-level data on the percentage of the two-party vote won by the

² For Wisconsin, which voted on collective bargaining in 1959, we also used scanned reports of the 1960 county-level data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. We did the same for California and Kentucky because some of the votes on non-enacted bills in those states occurred during the early 1960s.

Democratic presidential candidate, but before interpolating within counties over time, we had to consider the fact that Democratic presidential vote share can vary dramatically from election to election depending on the particulars of the campaign and the candidates. We therefore chose two elections in which the national popular vote was closely divided between Republicans and Democrats: 1960 and 1976. Then, for all years between 1960 and 1976, as well as years before and after, we linearly interpolated the percentage of the vote going to the Democratic candidate within each county.

To match counties to the state legislative districts in our votes dataset, we first contacted state legislatures, state committees on reapportionment, state libraries, and secretaries of state to obtain either 1) lists of the counties included in each state legislative district in the year of each vote, or 2) maps of state legislative district and county boundaries in the year of each vote. For the state-years for which we acquired lists, we simply calculated the average of Democratic presidential vote and percent government employment over all counties in each state legislative district, weighted by county population.³ When we obtained maps instead of lists, we used the maps to identify which counties were encompassed by each state legislative district in our dataset. There were a few ways that counties could map to legislative districts:

- The district could be coterminous with one county, or it could be one of several districts within one county. In this situation, we used data from the single county contained in the legislative district.
- The district could be coterminous with multiple counties. In these cases, we averaged the data for all counties encompassed by the district, weighted by county population.

³ County population figures come from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 U.S. Censuses; we linearly interpolated within counties for years between, before, and after those census years.

- The district could span multiple counties, some of which were completely within the boundaries of the district, others of which were split between multiple districts. We used the following decision rule in these cases: We counted any county completely encompassed by the district as part of the district. In addition, if roughly 3/4 of a county was located within the legislative district, we also considered it part of the district. We then averaged Democratic presidential vote and percent government employment, weighted by population, for all counties deemed to be entirely or mostly (3/4) within the district.
- The district could be split between two counties, but not encompassing 3/4 of either one. In this situation, we calculated a weighted average of the data from both counties.
- The district could be split between multiple counties with no county composing a majority of the district and no county with 3/4 of its land area within the district. These cases were rare, but when we encountered them, we averaged the data (weighted by population) from the county or counties that made up the largest portion of the district.

We had to make two exceptions to this procedure for Alaska. First, because we were missing 1970 Census data on government employment for four Alaska boroughs, we could not interpolate the government employment variable, and so we used the data from 1980 instead. Second, our 1960 and 1976 presidential vote data are at the level of the election district in Alaska rather than at the level of the borough. Because Alaska election district boundaries changed twice between 1960 and 1976—once in the mid-1960s, and again in the early 1970s—we could not interpolate Democratic presidential vote within election districts. We instead used the 1976 presidential vote alone. Specifically, we determined which of the state’s election districts in 1976 were in the state legislative districts as of 1970 and 1972 (the years of Alaska’s collective

bargaining votes), and then we averaged Democratic presidential vote across those districts, weighted by election district population.

In the end, we were able to approximate state legislative district ideology and government employment for almost all of the legislators in our analysis. We are missing Democratic presidential vote for only one district-year in Nevada, and we are missing the government employment measure for four district-years in Alaska.

In our empirical analysis, we also use data on the incidence of government employee strikes in each state and year. These data come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which provides information on all government strikes between 1953 and 1981. See the ICPSR's "Work Stoppages Historical File, 1953-1981." Including the strikes variables in our analysis forces us to drop the collective bargaining votes from Illinois and Ohio during the 1980s, because the strike data are not available for those years.

Supplemental empirical analysis

In a footnote of the article, we explain that our results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects, which account for secular over-time changes in legislators' support for collective bargaining. We show these results in Table A1 below; column 1 presents the model without state fixed effects, and column 2 shows the model with state fixed effects. In both cases, we continue to find that ideology and government employment are strong predictors of Republican state legislators' votes on collective bargaining.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table A1 control for over-time change in collective bargaining support in a different way: with a linear time trend and its interaction with *Republican*. Again, we show these results with and without state fixed effects. The coefficient estimates of both models show no significant over-time change among Democrats. Republicans, however, did

become less supportive of collective bargaining as time went on. Finally, in column 5 of Table A1, we add a linear time trend (again interacted with *Republican*) to our model that includes the strike activity of government workers. We continue to find that certain Republicans were more likely to vote “yes”: those from moderate districts, those from districts with high government employment, and those who had reason to think that collective bargaining laws would slow the incidence of strikes.

Next we test the effect of strike incidence on legislators’ votes in a different way. Our reasoning here is that in the early years, when experts claimed that enacting collective bargaining laws would address the strike problem, more strike activity may well have led to greater Republican support for collective bargaining, whereas in the later years, as strike incidence continued to climb, more strike activity should have led to a decline in Republican support. We test this expectation in column 1 of Table A2 by adding government strikes and its square as predictors, interacted with *Republican*. In that model, we find a weaker effect of government employment than before (still positive for Republicans, but statistically insignificant). However, the effect of ideology remains strong and positive, and more importantly for this test, we find that for Republicans, the coefficients on *National strikes* and its square are both statistically significant at the 1% level—the first positive, and the second negative. In column 2 of Table A2, we show that these results are robust to the inclusion of a time trend interacted with *Republican*.

The predicted probabilities help to demonstrate the magnitude of the effect. (We use Clarify 2.0 to calculate all of the predicted probabilities presented here and in the article. See Tomz, Wittenberg, and King, 2003). Using the estimates from column 1, we calculate the predicted probabilities of a Republican “yes” vote at four different levels of strikes: the levels of 1963 (29 strikes), 1968 (253 strikes), 1973 (389 strikes), and 1978 (525 strikes). We set

Government employment at the median value among Republicans, which is 0.146. As strike activity increased from 1963 levels to 1968 levels, Republicans became much more likely to support collective bargaining: the probability of a “yes” vote for conservative Republicans (defined as in the article) increased from 42% to 78%, and for moderate Republicans it increased from 68% to 91%. But that support waned as strike activity reached 1973 levels—dropping to 68% for conservatives and 86% for moderates—and it dipped further still as strike activity achieved new highs in the late 1970s. At 525 strikes per year, the predicted probability of a “yes” vote is only 30% for conservative Republicans and 55% for moderate Republicans.

We mention in the article that the collective bargaining bills in our analysis differ at the margins, such as in their strike provisions, or in the public employee occupations they cover. In Table 3, we partial out the effects of these bill characteristics by including bill fixed effects, but our results in columns 1 and 2 are largely the same when we drop the bill fixed effects and add controls for specific provisions of the bills. Here, we present the results of those tests.

We first create several binary indicators. *Strikes banned* equals one if the bill banned strikes, left an existing strike ban in place, or harshened the penalties for strikes, while *Strikes allowed* equals one if the bill made strikes legal or weakened the penalties for strikes. The indicator *Agency fees allowed* equals one if the bill allowed or required agency fees,⁴ and *Agency fees banned* equals one for the single bill in our dataset that banned agency fees (Delaware). We also create indicators for whether the bill granted collective bargaining rights to police (*Police*=1), firefighters (*Firefighters*=1), or teachers (*Teachers*=1) in order to test whether

⁴ These provisions (often referred to as right to work) specify whether non-members can be required to pay “agency fees” to unions that represent them in collective bargaining. Only seven bills (out of the 42 in our dataset) allowed or required agency fees.

Republicans were more inclined to support collective bargaining bills when those particular categories of government employees were covered.

In columns 1 and 2 of Table A3, we run the models from columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 of the article, this time adding these indicators for strike provisions, agency fee provisions, and occupations covered, all interacted with party. In both models, we find strong, positive, and significant effects of ideology on Republicans' votes, as in the article (see the hypothesis tests at the bottom of the table).⁵ In column 1, the effect of government employment on Republican votes is weaker than in the article, but it remains positive, and in column 2 (which includes state fixed effects), it is statistically significant. Thus, our results from columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 are mostly the same when we control for these differences between collective bargaining bills.

To assess the effects of the bill provisions themselves, we focus our discussion on the estimates in column 1 (the model without state fixed effects) because so many of the bill indicators are constant within states. As a starting point, we find little evidence that the occupations covered by the bills significantly shaped Republican support. However, we do find that on the single bill that banned agency fees, Democrats were less likely vote “yes,” and Republicans were more likely to vote “yes.” Republicans were also less likely to support bills that allowed agency fees than bills that did not. The presence of a strike ban did not significantly affect votes, but that may be because most of the states did ban government strikes at that time. However, legalizing strikes or lessening the penalties for strikes effectively decreased support among Republicans and strengthened support among Democrats.

⁵ The effect of Democratic presidential vote is negative for Democrats here, but the negative sign is largely driven by unusual situations in New York and Montana, where some liberal Democrats voted “no” to protest features of the bills they saw as insufficiently union-friendly.

In column 3 of Table A3, we present an additional model of the votes on non-enacted bills in California, Iowa, and Utah—one that is not presented in the article. Specifically, we model legislators’ votes using our measures of ideology, government employee strength, and *Post-bargaining strikes*, all interacted with party, this time using state fixed effects rather than bill fixed effects. We find that both ideology and government employee strength have significant, positive effects for Republicans. The effect of *Post-bargaining strikes* is not statistically significant, but it is still negative, as in our main results.

Next, we return to our discussion in the article about the possibility that Republicans somehow did not know that collective bargaining would give rise to public-sector unions that support Democrats. We think this is highly unlikely, and our discussion of the historical evidence in the article (and below) strongly suggests that politicians were aware—early on—that the new government unions would align with the Democratic Party. Here, we provide one quantitative test of relevance: we ask whether Republicans in more professional legislatures—where legislators were likely to be sophisticated politicians who understood the political consequences of collective bargaining—were more likely to oppose collective bargaining. The data in Table 2 of the article already suggest that this is not the case: in states with the most professional legislatures like California, New York, and Michigan, Republicans voted “yes” at very high rates. But if we approach this matter statistically, interacting *Republican* with Squire’s index of legislative professionalism as of 1979 (Squire, 2007) in our usual model—see column 4 of Table A3—we find that legislative professionalism has no significant relationship with Republicans’ votes. Thus, even in the states where legislators were most likely to understand the political consequences of what they were doing, Republicans voted “yes”—and in large numbers.

Finally, we carry out tests summarized in the article: models of votes on non-enacted collective bargaining bills in Kentucky. For that state, we used electronic House and Senate journals to compile a list of the 16 collective bargaining bills that were introduced in the legislature during the 1960s and 1970s. We then collected the individual state legislators' votes on the 9 of those bills that received roll-call votes.

Our goal for these data is to test our expectation that even in the Southern states—which were dominated by Democrats, and most of which never adopted collective bargaining—legislators took positions that were consistent with their individual incentives. We expect, specifically, that liberal Democrats were more likely to vote “yes” on collective bargaining than conservative Democrats. Our main measure of ideology (Democratic presidential vote) is not very useful for such a test, simply because many conservative Democrats probably voted for Democratic presidential candidates. We therefore use a different measure here: the percentage of district population living in urban areas. (We used county-level U.S. Census data on urban population to create this measure, using the same procedure as above.) If Democrats in the South voted according to their individual interests, we should find that Democrats from urban districts were more likely to support collective bargaining than rural Democrats.

In column 1 of Table A3, we model the Kentucky votes using percent urban and our measure of government employment, both interacted with party. (As in column 1 of Table 5, we include bill fixed effects.) While we do not find that higher government employment had a positive association with Democrats' votes—in fact, that coefficient is negative here—we do find that Democrats from more urban districts were indeed more likely to vote “yes” than rural Democrats. Moreover, when we replace percent urban with two other proxies for state legislative district liberalism—percent of women in the labor force (column 2), and the median

years of education for men (column 3)—we find the same pattern: Democrats from districts with more women in the labor force were significantly more likely to vote “yes” on collective bargaining, as were Democrats from districts with higher education levels. As we explain in the article, these are not clear tests of our theory, because we cannot say for sure whether collective bargaining was a collective good (or bad) for the Southern wing of the Democratic Party, but these results are at least consistent with our argument that state legislators voted according to their individual incentives.

The final table below—Table A5—shows predicted probabilities discussed but not shown in the final empirical section of the article. The first row shows the predicted probabilities of a pro-bargaining vote for moderate and conservative Republicans in the modern period (i.e., using the data from 2003-2011 and the Shor-McCarty state legislator ideology scores). Even today, moderates are more likely than conservatives to take the pro-bargaining position. The second set of rows shows the predicted probabilities from model 2 of Table 7 of the article. (To calculate these, we set the government employment variable at its mean.) There, we show that in 1965, the gap in the probability of a “yes” vote between conservative and moderate Republicans was 23 points, whereas in 1980, it had shrunk to 16 points. Thus, as time went on, and the Republican Party became more homogenous, the effect of district ideology on legislators’ votes became weaker.

Supplement to the evidence on what politicians knew

As we said in the text of the article, there was overwhelming evidence readily available at the time—during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s—that the growth of public-sector unions, spurred on by newly adopted state labor laws, would work to favor the Democrats and disfavor the Republicans, and that this is what politicians of that era very likely expected. For reasons of

space, we could only provide so much documentation in the article itself. Here, we set out some additional evidence that helps provide a fuller, more detailed account of the connection between unions and parties during that early era.

There are doubtless many ways we might do this. But to keep the presentation as simple, brief, and to-the-point as possible, we will mainly be providing readers with a listing of excerpts and findings from relevant sources—almost all of them scholarly sources, except for AFSCME’s *Public Employee*—that speak to the question at hand. What follows, then, is not an essay or report on the subject, but a series of facts and empirical accounts that provide important evidence. We have organized this material under four basic headings: Democrats and labor during the 1950s and 1960s; public-sector unions as progressive-Democratic actors; AFSCME’s newsletter, *Public Employee*; and the political activism of the NEA and AFT.

Democrats and Labor during the 1950s and 1960s

With the passage of the NLRA in 1935 and the growth of private-sector unions, the alliance between the unions and the Democrats grew stronger during the late 1930s and 1940s, and became a core feature of American politics during the 1950s and 1960s. The unions, led by the AFL-CIO and its political action committee (COPE), would not say that they were committed to the Democratic Party. They claimed to be nonpartisan. For as Samuel Gompers, the founder of the AF of L, had famously announced many decades earlier, their strategic aim was to “reward their friends and punish their enemies,” not to support any particular party. But in the reality of American politics, given the parties’ very different policy agendas, the unions’ friends were almost always Democrats and their enemies were almost always Republicans—and that was widely known. Here are some scholarly accounts that add important details:

Mackenzie and Weisbrot (2008):

“The political parties channeled most of the influence of special interest groups through the middle decades of the century...and in the Democratic Party there were only a few that really mattered: the large labor unions, the NAACP on matters of race, the Americans for Democratic Action on the ideological left. Labor was the dominant force and the Democratic Party was its political outlet. Union members were the party’s foot soldiers, union leaders sat in the party’s war councils. The relationship was symbiotic and mutually beneficial” (pp.45-6).

Form (1995):

“Since World War II, labor has been the party’s largest financial supporter, and labor operates the largest electoral machine of any interest group” (p.264).

“Not until 1955, when the AFL and CIO merged, did labor create an integrated political organization, COPE, to support the party [the Democrats]. Although the AFL-CIO proclaimed nonpartisanship then, as today, COPE has never endorsed a Republican presidential candidate, and few Republicans take labor’s nonpartisan claim seriously...For most purposes, COPE may be thought of as a party operating parallel to the Democratic Party” (p.261).

McKeogh (1974):

“That labor contributions are directed almost exclusively to Democratic candidates is a fact of political life. In 1958, only two of the 34 senatorial candidates receiving labor contributions, and only six of the 199 labor-supported congressional candidates, were Republicans. In 1960, only about three percent of the total reported contributions of national level labor committees went to Republican candidates for the House and Senate; in 1964 this proportion was only two percent” (p.60).

Zieger (1986):

In the 1950s and 1960s, “conservatives began to fear and respect COPE’s ability to mobilize labor voters and its ability to provide funding for Democratic candidates on every level...Indeed, aside from the presidential races, the most notable political phenomenon of the decade was the tenacity of Democratic majorities in the states and the growing numbers of liberal congressmen, senators, governors, and state legislators. And many observers credited COPE with the lion’s share of this impressive success. ‘The skill and potency of this machine,’ wrote one conservative analyst, has ‘given organized labor its position as the most politically powerful economic bloc in America’” (p.183).

During the 1950s and 1960s, the unions “became ever more directly integrated into the structure of Democratic party politics” (p.184).

Johnson and Kotz (1972):

“Organized labor does not run the country politically, but it mounts what is probably the single best political operation in the nation. Without the power of union money, manpower, and know-how, for instance, the Democratic Party today would come close to being impotent” (p.73).

Alexander (1971):

Herbert Alexander’s classic book documents the leading role played by labor in the 1968 campaign, almost allowing Humphrey to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. He presents

data showing the unprecedented level of union activism during the campaign, and documenting that they spent almost all their money on Democratic candidates. He also argues that the unions' manpower contributions are probably more important than their money contributions.

Sabato (1984):

Sabato presents data on labor's money contributions to congressional candidates by party, 1972-1982, showing that labor never contributed less than 93% of its money to Democrats.

Public-Sector Unions as Progressive-Democratic Actors

The public-sector unions, although still small during the 1950s and early 1960s, were an integral part of this Democratic alliance. From the very beginning, virtually all of the important public-sector unions were *inside* the AFL-CIO, contributing actively to COPE and its nearly exclusive support of Democrats. The major exception was the NEA, which only became a union during the 1960s (more on that below). As we noted in the text, the public-sector unions were activists within the Walter Reuther wing of the AFL-CIO—the federation's progressive wing that fought against George Meany's "conservatism" and sought, by acting within the Democratic Party and joining hands with the New Left, to ensure that the party moved to the forefront of the nation's emerging progressive social movements: for civil rights, women's rights, and the environment. Public-sector unions weren't just allies of the Democratic Party. They were on the left of the party—and they were open and vocal about it. Their partisan leanings were there for all to see.

These leanings, moreover, were a reflection of the underlying nature of the public-sector unions' membership. Yes, some members were Republicans or conservatives, some were middle class, and some—police and prison guards, for instance—had agendas (law and order) that might prompt a measure of support for the Republican Party. But the major public-sector unions that carried the most weight in state and national politics—AFSCME, the NEA, the AFT, the SEIU (which today, just the four of them, enroll about three-fourths of all public workers

who belong to a union)—had memberships that, like the governments they organized, were increasingly filled women, blacks, and other minorities. These groups, long discriminated against, had strong reason to support a party that was fighting for their rights, as well as for an expansion of government, spending, taxing, public jobs, and job protections. It is worth noting, moreover, that the traditional private-sector unions associated with the AFL (construction unions, for example), as well as some industrial unions, were filled with mostly white men who often sought (through seniority rules, the exclusion of women and minorities, etc.) to protect their own jobs from the threats represented by the New Left—and this, too, helps explain why the public-sector unions were even more committed to the Democratic Party, and particularly to a socially liberal Democratic Party, than many of the traditional unions were.

Our treatment in the body of the article can only begin to cover all of this ground. Here are some brief excerpts and references to work that provides further documentation.

Battista (2008):

Reuther had major disagreements with Meany for many years, believing that the labor movement should be much more progressive, should put more effort into organizing new workers (especially public-sector workers), and so on. Finally, he pulled the UAW out of the federation in 1968. Not long after that, “a number of other industrial unions, joined by rising public employee unions, also followed the path of dissent and independence—though not disaffiliation—from the federation. Thus, a dissident or Reuther wing of organized labor was reborn in the late 1960s in opposition to the dominant or Meany wing. Following Reuther’s tragic death in an airplane crash in 1970, leadership of this wing of labor was assumed by Jerry Wurf, president of the (AFSCME)...and he was a key figure in efforts to preserve the labor-liberal coalition. Wurf’s leadership of the Reuther wing of labor symbolized the political alliance of rising public employee unions with older industrial unions and reflected the growing role and influence of public employee unionism in American labor” (pp.63-4).

“The dissident unions were a mix of industrial, public employee, and service-sector unions, the kinds of unions that are most dependent on a broad liberal coalition to accomplish their political objectives and meet the needs and interests of their members...[T]hey all tend to have relatively broad and diverse memberships whose well being depends on a wide range of public policies and services, from favorable macroeconomic policies through equal employment opportunity and sexual harassment laws to high levels of public expenditure on education and health care. Today as yesterday, these kinds of unions have been the strongest supporters of active government and of a liberal coalition to sustain it” (p.67).

Zieger (1986):

AFSCME “led the surge...It now functioned as a sort of ‘gray-collar’ industrial union, recruiting thousands of custodians, sanitation men, laborers, and clerical workers” (p.163).

Zieger notes that the craft and many industrial unions had miniscule black memberships, few women, and the influx of such workers (along with any effort to give them preferences) threatened the jobs of senior white workers—making their unions less supportive of the rights movements going on at the time. In the public sector, however, things were different. The rapid growth of state and local governments brought thousands of blacks and females into public jobs. These were groups, Zieger observes, who “often encountered long-entrenched patterns of racial and sexual discrimination with resultant lack of job security, making them particularly receptive to the union appeal. Moreover, the surge of public employment and of union activism coincided with the racial and sexual revolutions of the 1960s, putting the public employee unions near the center of important social crises in the turbulent decade” (p.164).

Brooks (1971):

He notes that roughly two-thirds of AFSCME’s membership was blue collar at the time, and that the union organized many blacks, who were increasingly filling many lower-level civil service jobs as city governments grew. Sanitation and street cleaning departments within cities were mostly black—as was the case in Memphis, where an AFSCME-supported strike by sanitation workers was the occasion for Martin Luther King’s fateful visit there in the spring of 1968, when he was killed (see p.317). Brooks also has a discussion of the SEIU, which organizes workers in both sectors, but in the public sector has members who are elevator operators, building repair and service employees, school custodians, lower-level hospital workers and the like—blue collar employees, often minorities.

Masters (1998):

Data on political spending by specific unions is difficult to get during those early decades. Here, in an unusual piece, Masters provides some data on AFSCME’s campaign contributions back to 1978. “Table 5 vividly demonstrates AFSCME’s support for Democratic candidates. In the nine election cycles between 1978 and 1994, the percentage of PAC money going to Democrats has well exceeded 90 percent...In 1977-78, the table shows that 98.5% of AFSCME’s PEOPLE contributions went to Democrats; only 1.1% to Republicans” (see pp.332-333). Based on AFSCME’s history, there is every reason to think that these patterns are good reflections of AFSCME’s prior contributions during the 1960s and early 1970s as well.

Stieber (1973):

Stieber notes AFSCME’s pervasive political activism at all levels of government, but specifically notes the activism of their councils, which are the organization’s state and local units. “All AFSCME councils engage in political action. Among their most common activities are the endorsement of candidates, distribution of voting records, contributions of manpower and occasionally funds in election campaigns, and invitations to candidates to address union meetings. All councils engage in some form of lobbying...” (p.198). “Of the public employee unions, AFSCME has the most elaborate political action program at the national and council levels” (p.211). We would add that, because all of this activity was out in the open, and because it was so pervasive and so stacked in favor of Democrats, politicians were likely to be aware of

where AFSCME stood and what a growing, expanding AFSCME would mean for partisan politics.

In addition to these scholarly sources, the written work of conservative commentator Ralph de Toledano suggests that many Republicans were well aware of public-sector unions' alignment with the Democratic Party. (De Toledano served in the Nixon administration, wrote for the *National Review* and many other publications, and in 1975 penned a widely-read book, *Let Our Cities Burn*, which harshly criticized public-sector unions and collective bargaining. That book had a forward by Jesse Helms and a blurb by Ronald Reagan.)

For example, in 1976, de Toledano wrote that “the millions [the National Education Association] has earmarked for political action will go mainly to the Democratic Party, even though an NEA survey shows that 35 percent of its members are Republicans. Their dues money is being used for Democratic candidates the Republicans oppose, and that’s called ‘union democracy’” (“Teachers Union Demands Billions,” *Ludington Daily News*, June 24, 1976).

Also, in 1968, he noted that if federal government employees were forced to pay dues (or other fees) to public-sector unions, they would be “compelled...to contribute to the financing of political campaigns,” and that “since the AFL-CIO has become a full partner of the Democratic Party,” that would effectively mean that Republican federal employees would be “contributing to [their] own future defeat” (from “Labor Leaders Demand Control of U.S. Workers,” *Free Choice* April 1968, also published in the *Indianapolis News* 17 April 1968). This is yet another bit of evidence, then, that even Republicans and conservatives were well aware of the alliance between public-sector unions and the Democratic Party.

AFSCME’s Newsletter, *Public Employee*

As we’ve said, Jerry Wurf, the president of AFSCME, was a major player within the AFL-CIO: he championed the progressive causes of the Reuther wing and became its leader in 1970 upon Reuther’s death. He had high national visibility and was intensely involved within the Democratic Party in seeking to move it in a more progressive direction. While he gave lip service on occasion to the “nonpartisan” nature of the union, his statements—and AFSCME’s official actions—left little doubt about where the union stood when it came to the two parties. It heavily favored the Democrats. A good place to see this is in the union’s newsletter, *Public Employee*, which was published every month and was the union leadership’s prime megaphone for getting the word out about the union, its organizing efforts, and its politics: the policy issues it cared about, the political battles it fought, its political allies and enemies, and its defeats and victories. Here are some snippets of what was published in *Public Employee* from 1969 through

1974. (The specific dates, below, indicate particular issues of the newsletter.) Again, it provides a good indication of what AFSCME was doing during that period of time, and how intimately and publicly the union was involved with the Democratic Party.

April-May 1969: Out of frustration with efforts to get the states to adopt collective bargaining laws for public-sector workers, AFSCME calls for a federal law would apply uniform requirements to all the states.

May 1970: An AFSCME drafted bill, The Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), is introduced in Congress by a New York Democratic member of the House, modeled after the private sector's NLRA.

August 1970: PERA's sponsors in the House are listed individually. They consist of 36 Democrats and no Republicans. Also, with regard to AFSCME's voter registration drive for the upcoming 1970 elections: "One of AFSCME's most concentrated and comprehensive voter registration campaigns is already underway in New York City and upstate New York. AFSCME Council 37 has endorsed the full Democratic slate...[T]he AFSCME council is also working hard to change the complexion of the New York state legislature in which the Republicans now control both bodies."

September 1970: There is a discussion of AFSCME's endorsements of 6 candidates for governor around the country. All were Democrats.

October 1970: "Public employees should run to the voting booth this Nov. 3—and they should run scared. On that day, the history of the 1970's will be written, and if public employees don't go to the polls, if they stay home and allow a Republican conservative sweep of governorships, then no new history will be written." In this same issue of *Public Employee*, there is a discussion of the union's endorsements of 22 candidates for U.S. Senate, all Democrats.

November 1970: "The 1970 elections are a milestone in AFSCME political history. This was the first year in which the union made an all-out effort to wield political clout nationwide. It was also—and not coincidentally—the first time public employee rights actually became a campaign issue. There were important victories at the state level. Democrats, mostly favorable to AFSCME, made a net gain of 11 governorships and 200 seats in the 45 states electing legislators. The union was an integral part of the grass roots campaigns producing these victories. AFSCME members can anticipate significant moves for collective bargaining legislation for public employees including new laws in some states and modifications of existing laws in others." There follows a long discussion of AFSCME-supported candidates who won in the various states (all Democrats), and often statements of how AFSCME worked on their behalf.

April 1971: At Wurf's initiative, AFSCME enters into a national coalition with the NEA (and a few other unions) to form the Coalition of Public Employee Organizations so that they can coordinate their political efforts behind progressive goals—and reach beyond the confines of the AFL-CIO to mobilize the resources and political clout of public-sector unions. Also in this issue

of *Public Employee*, there is a report on new efforts to push the PERA in Congress. The new bill has 74 sponsors: 70 Democrats and 4 Republicans.

September 1972: The issue includes a statement from Jerry Wurf about the upcoming elections and how members should view the two parties. “Speaking generally, the Democrats served us well, voting ‘right’ on most of the issues we cared about. And generally, but with some obvious exceptions, Republican members of Congress tended to vote against our best interests. This union is not in league with either political party...But we believe that in 1972, the interests of the men and women who are this union will best be served by retaining a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress...To do that, we must vote Democrat.”

March 1973: The coalition with the NEA is reconstituted and renamed—with much public fanfare and news coverage—the Coalition of American Public Employees (CAPE). This was a renewed effort to cement the political bond between AFSCME and the NEA, and to maximize the power of public-sector unions in promoting progressive political objectives.

November 1974: “AFSCME-backed candidates enjoyed their greatest election victories in the state legislature races—races of particular interest to the union. New Democratic majorities in these lawmaking bodies could result in favorable responses in several states to legislation...Democrats supported by AFSCME captured at least 11 previously GOP-dominated state Senates, some for the first time in this century. Field reports indicate that Democrats also won control of at least 10 lower houses...Approximately 400 Democrats won previously Republican-controlled seats in state legislatures throughout the country. Democrats now control a total of 41 lower houses and 39 senates.”

The Political Activism of the NEA and the AFT

Today, the NEA is the largest union of any kind in the country, with more than 3 million members nationwide. From the late 1800s until the 1960s, the NEA was the leading and most powerful force in public education, but it was a professional association controlled by educational administrators—superintendents mainly—even though most of its members were teachers. In the early 1960s, all that changed when the AFT launched a teacher strike in New York City under the leadership of Al Shanker: a move that helped spark the national drive for state-level labor laws for public workers generally, and set off a competition between the AFT and NEA to represent teachers in the public school system. In order to compete, the NEA transformed itself from a professional association into a union, eventually shedding the administrators entirely. In effect, the NEA was a union from the mid-1960s on—and a large one

at that. Indeed, it was already large and politically active before becoming a union, had long acted through lobbying organizations in all states, and had long been education's leading advocate for higher spending on education—which made it a natural ally of the Democrats. Its transformation into a union only reinforced and strengthened its early partisan inclinations. The AFT, meantime, had always been thoroughly Democratic, and remained so.

The result of their competition, which worked itself out during the 1960s and 1970s, was that the AFT won bargaining rights in most of the nation's large cities—New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Boston, Cleveland, Los Angeles (merged with NEA), and San Francisco (merged with NEA), among others—while the NEA won almost complete victories in the suburbs and rural areas, as well as in some cities. The NEA is now two times larger than the AFT and has a more thoroughly national reach, but the AFT, because of its prominence in large cities, is nonetheless quite large and extremely active in politics. Both teachers unions are important political forces in American politics and are core members of the Democratic coalition.

That this alliance with the Democrats would be the long-run outcome was apparent early on. Here are some scholarly references and excerpts to document that where the NEA and AFT stood politically was clear during those early decades.

West (1980):

Walter Reuther, through his Industrial Unions Department (started in 1955) in the AFL-CIO, poured money into the AFT's efforts to organize and win collective bargaining rights in the very early 1960s. For Reuther, the AFT was a "showcase for a nationwide effort to boost labor's sagging membership rolls. Reuther's plan was to organize teachers, other professionals, public employees, and white collar workers." "Reuther was obviously concerned about the failure of the AFL-CIO to maintain its membership. Between 1956 and 1962, total membership had dropped by 900,000..." (p.53 ff).

Even before it became a union, the NEA was a major force in congressional lobbying for increased federal spending on schools—which allied them with Democrats against Republicans (see 169 ff.). As an illustration, consider: "In the bitter battle for federal school support in the 87th Congress (1961-63), 77% of the Democrats in the Senate and 66% of the Democrats in the

House voted for the 1961 bill. Only 27% of the Republicans in the Senate and 4% in the House voted for it” (p.173). The NEA and the Democrats were fighting for the same goals and were on the same side.

West notes, “It is natural that conservative groups with a major interest in controlling public spending would be alarmed at the growing power of the NEA” (p.197).

More generally, the NEA also supported equalization of school spending across affluent and poor districts, a more progressive taxation of wealth, minority and women’s rights, and other central planks of the Democratic agenda (see p.31, for example).

During the 1970s, the NEA was a big supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment. In 1975 its assembly voted to refuse to hold meetings in states that hadn’t adopted it. In 1977, it voted not to endorse candidates who hadn’t supported the ERA (p.25). Its politics were liberal and Democratic.

Mackenzie & Weisbrot (2008):

In reference to the NEA and AFT, the authors say: “By the end of the 1960s...they had become two of the most powerful political forces in the country” (p.19, also quoted in the text of our article).

Vieira (1977):

“The NEA is the largest and most militant of contemporary public sector unions. Furthermore, abundant evidence in the public record establishes beyond peradventure that the NEA is engaged in every variety and form of political activism which we have heretofore surveyed, and that its involvement is both substantial and essential” (p.349).

Quote from the NEA president in 1970: “This year, the NEA was identified during a congressional debate as the second most powerful lobby in Washington, D.C. While this is the highest ranking ever given to our effectiveness, I will not be satisfied until we are the most powerful lobby.”

Quote from a different NEA president in 1975: the NEA is “now recognized as one of the most formidable forces in national politics. We are rivaling—and in some cases even surpassing—in political influence of other major national organizations which have been in this business a lot longer than teachers have” (p.350).

Quote from an NEA News Release in 1976: NEA members constitute “the largest bloc of delegates and alternates of any single organization in the nation” at the Democratic National Convention.

Regarding the NEA’s alliance with AFSCME: “The NEA’s organizing activities extend as well to coalitions with other groups. With AFSCME, for example, the NEA has established a policy of ‘reciprocal support...in organizing and concerted collective activities such as strikes or political campaigns,’ which calls for ‘coordinated legal activity,’ ‘coordinated political activity,’ and ‘cooperative public information programs.’ More ambitiously, the NEA was a moving force behind the formation of the Coalition of American Public Employees (CAPE), an alliance of public sector unions whose purpose is ‘to provide a means of marshalling and coordinating the legislative, legal, financial, and public relations resources of the member organizations in matters of common concern.’ We have seen firsthand, explained CAPE’s executive director, ‘the intensified clout, at both the national and state levels, that comes from pooling our legal, legislative, economic, and public relations resources behind a common cause through an organized, formalized arrangement’” (p.361).

Rehmus (1984):

“The NEA in a few short years has organized itself most effectively to campaign on such issues to the point at which some consider it the single most politically effective union today.”

Lieberman (1997):

The NEA had 10% of all delegates and alternates to the 1980 Democratic National Convention.

Murphy (1990):

About the Democratic National Convention in 1980, Daniel Moynihan quipped, “The Carter delegation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the NEA” (p.267).

Finn (1983):

He observes that, at the time and looking back at the past, both teacher unions were “firmly in the Democratic camp” (p.29).

“The political activism of America’s two major teachers unions is well known. The National Education Association (NEA), with 1.6 million members, and the American Federation of Teachers, now numbering 600,000, are among the largest, best organized, and most energetic interest groups in the United States...NEA and AFT support and endorsements nearly always go to the Democratic candidate in a general election” (p.29).

REFERENCES

- Alexander, Herbert. 1971. *Financing the 1968 Election*. Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books.
- Battista, Andrew. 2008. *The Revival of Labor Liberalism*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Brooks, Thomas R. 1971. *Toil and Trouble: A History of American Labor*. 2nd ed. New York: Delacorte Press.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting." *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 127-140.
- Erikson, Robert S., and Gerald C. Wright, Jr. 1980. "Policy Representation of Constituency Interests." *Political Behavior* 2(1): 91-106.
- Finn, Chester E. 1983. "Teacher Politics." *Commentary* 75(2): 29-41.
- Form, William. 1995. *Segmented Labor, Fractured Politics: Labor Politics in American Life*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Johnson, Haynes, and Nick Kotz. 1972. *The Unions*. New York: Pocket Books.
- Lieberman, Myron. 1997. *The Teacher Unions*. New York: Free Press.
- Mackenzie, G. Calvin, and Robert Weisbrot. 2008. *The Liberal Hour: Washington and the Politics of Change in the 1960s*. New York: The Penguin Press.
- Masters, Marick F. 1998. "AFSCME as a Political Union." *Journal of Labor Research* XIX(2): 313-349.
- McKeogh, Kevin L. 1974. "Financing Campaigns for Congress: Contribution Patterns of National-Level Party and Non-Party Committees, 1964." In Herbert Alexander, ed., *Studies in Money in Politics*, Volume III, Citizens Research Foundation.
- Murphy, Marjorie. 1990. *Blackboard Unions: The AFT & the NEA, 1900-1980*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Rehmus, Charles M. 1984. "Labor and Politics in the 1980s." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*: 40-51.
- Sabato, Larry J. 1984. *PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees*. New York: Norton.

- Shor, Boris, and Nolan McCarty. 2011. "The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 530-551.
- Smith, Mark A. 2001. "The Contingent Effects of Ballot Initiatives and Candidate Races on Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 700-706.
- Squire, Peverill. 2007. "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 7(2): 211-27.
- Stieber, Jack. 1973. *Public Employee Unionism: Structure, Growth, Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 2003. "Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results." *Journal of Statistical Software* 8(1).
- Trounstein, Jessica. 2008. *Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Management Services Administration. 1971, 1973, 1977, 1979, 1981. *Summary of Public Sector Labor Relations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Valletta, Robert G., and Richard B. Freeman. 1988. "Appendix B: The NBER Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set." In *When Public Sector Workers Unionize*, Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 399-419.
- Vieira, Edwin Jr. 1977. "Are Public Sector Unions Special Interest Political Parties?" *DePaul Law Review* 27: 293-381.
- West, Allen M. 1980. *The National Education Association: The Power Base for Education*. New York: Free Press.
- Widenor, Marcus R. 1989. *Public Sector Bargaining in Oregon: The Enactment of the PECBA*. Eugene, OR: Labor Education and Research Center, University of Oregon.
- Wright, Gerald C., and Brian F. Shaffner. 2002. "The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 96(2): 367-379.
- Zieger, Robert H. 1986. *American Workers, American Unions: 1920-1985*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Table A1: Year fixed effects and time trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Republican	-7.386*** (1.831)	-8.864*** (2.215)	-3.82** (1.741)	-5.84*** (1.715)	-5.889*** (2.157)
Democratic presidential vote	-4.686 (4.021)	-7.126 (5.115)	-3.161 (3.222)	-5.303 (3.681)	-3.197 (2.772)
Republican * Democratic presidential vote	9.712** (4.033)	11.567** (4.826)	9.306*** (3.461)	10.693*** (3.741)	9.043*** (3.181)
Government employment	-0.169 (1.863)	-1.441 (1.849)	0.564 (1.882)	-1.557 (1.848)	1.071 (2.200)
Republican * Government employment	3.566 (2.795)	6.307** (3.024)	2.974 (3.079)	7.157** (3.299)	1.976 (2.934)
Time			0.041 (0.046)	0.015 (0.044)	-0.17 (0.217)
Republican * Time			-0.214*** (0.078)	-0.186** (0.075)	0.283 (0.289)
Post-bargaining strikes					0.01 (0.015)
Republican * Post-bargaining strikes					-0.028 (0.019)
Constant			3.404*** (1.309)		4.538*** (1.590)
Observations	5,434	4,813	5,434	4,813	4,799
Pseudo R-squared	0.229	0.249	0.202	0.257	0.156
Fixed effects	Year	State, Year	None	State	None
Democratic presidential vote + (Republican * Dem. presidential vote)	5.026*** (1.641)	4.441*** (1.447)	6.145*** (1.643)	5.39*** (1.326)	5.846*** (2.080)
Government employment + (Republican * Govt. employment)	3.396* (1.785)	4.866** (1.910)	3.538* (2.094)	5.6*** (2.156)	3.047* (1.617)
Post-bargaining strikes + (Republican * Post-bargaining strikes)					-0.018* (0.010)

Notes: Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A2: Alternative strikes tests

	(1)	(2)
Republican	-6.243*** (1.544)	-6.6*** (1.747)
Democratic presidential vote	-2.233 (3.121)	-2.027 (3.136)
Republican * Democratic presidential vote	7.169** (3.154)	7.52** (3.275)
Government employment	1.271 (1.855)	1.359 (1.578)
Republican * Government employment	0.376 (2.539)	0.663 (2.713)
National strikes	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)
Republican * National strikes	0.022*** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.008)
National strikes squared	0.00001 (0.00001)	0.00001 (0.00001)
Republican * National strikes squared	-0.00004*** (0.00001)	-0.00004*** (0.00001)
Time		-0.207 (0.134)
Republican * Time		0.00006 (0.148)
Constant	3.62*** (1.385)	4.327*** (1.559)
Observations	4,799	4,799
Pseudo R-squared	0.179	0.195
Fixed effects	None	None
Democratic presidential vote + (Republican * Dem. presidential vote)	4.935*** (1.338)	5.493*** (1.324)
Government employment + (Republican * Govt. employment)	1.647 (1.598)	2.022 (1.888)

Notes: Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Bill characteristics, non-enacted bills, and legislative professionalism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Republican	-7.214*** (2.176)	-8.859*** (2.788)	-4.559 (3.092)	-5.925*** (2.290)
Democratic presidential vote	-5.951* (3.153)	-8.554* (4.554)	0.743 (6.886)	-3.638 (3.337)
Republican * Dem. presidential vote	11.383*** (3.243)	12.872*** (4.607)	4.967 (7.977)	8.455** (3.424)
Government employment	2.492 (1.542)	1.068 (1.375)	4.201*** (1.235)	0.755 (1.583)
Republican * Government employment	-0.411 (2.248)	2.563 (2.249)	-2.833 (1.992)	2.279 (2.104)
Agency fees banned	-2.719*** (0.478)	-3.728*** (0.700)		
Republican * Agency fees banned	3.572*** (0.577)	3.831*** (0.913)		
Agency fees allowed	0.263 (0.404)	-0.926* (0.550)		
Republican * Agency fees allowed	-2.109*** (0.526)	-1.987*** (0.769)		
Strikes banned	0.46 (0.516)	0.665 (0.679)		
Republican * Strikes banned	-0.565 (0.587)	-0.554 (0.701)		
Strikes allowed	2.451*** (0.820)	2.014* (1.080)		
Republican * Strikes allowed	-3.096*** (0.806)	-3.25*** (1.106)		
Police	-1.276** (0.540)	-0.335 (0.469)		
Republican * Police	1.373** (0.609)	0.932 (0.627)		
Firefighters	1.027* (0.551)	1.413** (0.684)		
Republicans * Firefighters	-1.23** (0.624)	-0.921 (0.791)		
Teachers	-1.14** (0.545)	-0.349 (0.641)		
Republicans * Teachers	1.226* (0.659)	1.391** (0.693)		
Post-bargaining strikes			-0.003 (0.007)	
Republican * Post-bargaining strikes			-0.005 (0.005)	
Squire index				0.658 (3.312)
Republican * Squire index				-1.287 (4.412)
Constant	5.482 (2.026)***			3.997* (2.090)
Observations	5,434	4,813	933	5,434
Pseudo R-squared	0.226	0.303	0.372	0.133
Fixed effects	None	State	State	None

Democratic presidential vote +	5.431***	4.318***	5.71***	4.817***
(Republican * Dem. presidential vote)	(1.550)	(1.369)	(1.821)	(1.690)
Government employment +	2.081	3.631**	1.368*	3.034*
(Republican * Govt. employment)	(1.637)	(1.594)	(0.758)	(1.561)
Post-bargaining strikes +			-0.008	
(Republican * Post-bargaining strikes)			(0.012)	
Squire index +				-0.629
(Republican * Squire index)				(2.097)
Agency fees banned +	0.853**	0.104		
(Republican * Agency fees banned)	(0.419)	(0.505)		
Agency fees allowed +	-1.845***	-2.913***		
(Republican * Agency fees allowed)	(0.389)	(0.438)		
Strikes banned +	-0.105	0.112		
(Republican * Strikes banned)	(0.460)	(0.369)		
Strikes allowed +	-0.645*	-1.236		
(Republican * Strikes allowed)	(0.340)	(0.917)		
Police +	0.097	0.597**		
(Republican * Police)	(0.477)	(0.300)		
Firefighters +	-0.203	0.492		
(Republican * Firefighters)	(0.414)	(0.304)		
Teachers +	0.086	1.042**		
(Republican * Teachers)	(0.529)	(0.408)		

Table A4: Votes on non-enacted bills in Kentucky

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Republican	-1.611** (0.768)	-3.175*** (1.178)	-2.165 (1.676)
Urban	0.022*** (0.004)		
Republican * Urban	-0.008 (0.006)		
Women in labor force		3.125** (1.420)	
Republican * Women in labor force		2.3 (2.370)	
Years of education			0.455*** (0.084)
Republican * Years of education			-0.013 (0.140)
Government employment	-3.854* (2.099)	-5.561*** (1.943)	-5.772*** (2.084)
Republican * Government employment	6.073 (3.940)	8.44** (3.913)	9.347** (4.229)
Observations	692	692	692
Pseudo R-squared	0.227	0.193	0.237
Fixed effects	Bill	Bill	Bill
Urban + (Republican * Urban)	0.014*** (0.004)		
Women in labor force + (Republican * Women in labor force)		5.424*** (1.984)	
Years of education + (Republican * Years of education)			0.442*** (0.112)
Government employment + (Republican * Government employment)	2.218 (3.340)	2.879 (3.400)	3.575 (3.685)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all votes on non-enacted duty-to-bargain bills in Kentucky. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A5: Predicted probabilities of a pro-bargaining vote, based on models in Table 7

		Conservative Republican	Moderate Republican
Model 1		0.009	0.350
Model 2	1965	0.714	0.943
	1980	0.236	0.400