

# **It's Not Just What You Have, but Who You Know**

## **Networks, Social Proximity to Elites, and Voting in State and Local Elections**

**MATTHEW T. PIETRYKA** Florida State University

**DONALD A. DEBATS** Flinders University

### **Online Appendices**

<b>Appendix A Patronage and Vote Buying in Nineteenth Century Elections</b>	<b>1</b>
A.1 Electoral Fraud . . . . .	1
A.2 Patronage . . . . .	5
<b>Appendix B Measurement</b>	<b>12</b>
B.1 Alexandria Measures . . . . .	12
B.2 Newport Measures . . . . .	17
B.3 Williamsburg Measures . . . . .	22
<b>Appendix C Additional Religion Controls</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Appendix D Selection Models of Vote Choice</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Appendix E Ordered Logistic Regressions of Vote Choice</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>Appendix F Details on Williamsburg Multiple Imputation</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Appendix G Placebo Analysis</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Appendix H Sensitivity Analysis</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Appendix I Additional Geography Controls</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Appendix J References for Online Appendices</b>	<b>54</b>

# A Patronage and Vote Buying in Nineteenth Century Elections

## A.1 Electoral Fraud

Anecdotes about vote buying and electoral fraud, particularly in the mid to late nineteenth century, are an inescapable and colorful part of American political history. As Howard W. Allen and Kate Warren Allen long ago noted:

Stories of fraudulent election practices color the political history of the United States, and anecdotes about vote buying, the dishonesty of election officials, and the like suggesting the widespread prevalence of election fraud in the American past are an integral part of the lore of American politics. (Allen and Allen 1981, 153)

The academic literature on vote-buying moved quickly from localized stories to considerations of aggregate systemic effects and speculation about their implications for US politics. One important vehicle for this transformation is an interpretation of US politics advanced by Walter Dean Burnham in an article published 50 years ago. “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe,” put the focus not on corruption, but on the vast number of Americans participating in the elections from the 1840s to the 1890s (Burnham 1965). Burnham’s argument was premised on the authenticity of those votes, not their tainted and corrupt status: this was America’s political “golden age,” its “Camelot.” In Burnham’s interpretation those votes were the sum of the very high levels of political participation by an enlightened electorate motivated by issues and engaged by a strong party organization.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Turnout was the most important of the five distinguishing features which Burnham identified in mid-nineteenth century mass politics, the others being split-ticket voting, roll-off (ballot fatigue within an election for multiple offices and referenda), drop off (lower levels of participation in Congressional and other elections which do not coincide with presidential contests), and extent of partisan swing between elections. Burnham’s point was that those other four indicators were low when turnout was high and rose as turnout fell and the system lost traction with the voters.

This was, as Burnham recently wrote in an article celebrating the success of his interpretation,

a strange lost world of democratic politics in the United States . . . [that] had come into being in the 1830's, vigorously survived across the whole of the nineteenth century, and then came to an abrupt end in the first decades of the twentieth century[:] . . . a preexisting democracy . . . sacrificed on the altar of a triumphant industrial-financial capitalism. (Burnham 2007, 505)

The world of nineteenth century voting that Burnham described was a world in which voting was a public act, not a private one, a world in which the secret ballot did not exist and in which all voting was accomplished either by depositing a party ticket or, as in the case of Alexandria and Newport, by calling out candidate names (See [sociallogic.iath.virginia.edu](http://sociallogic.iath.virginia.edu), Bourke and DeBats (1995, 1977, 1987)).

Critics were quick to point out the wide variety of structural reforms introduced into US electoral law beginning in the 1890s. These included registration systems, the Australian secret ballot, and women's suffrage, and they could all serve as explanatory variables for the proportionate decline in participation rates of the twentieth century.

It was inevitable that these alternative explanations for the decline in participation would mine the irresistible richness of that anecdotal evidence of voter corruption in order to deflate the legitimacy of high levels of voting prior to reform. In this fashion Lionel Fredman presented the case for the secret ballot in terms of an earlier history of electoral corruption; by the 1850s, he wrote, "it was obvious to many Americans that manipulation of the ballot [sic] had made voting a meaningless procedure" (Fredman 1968, ix). Philip Converse was one of the first to attack Burnham's thesis, using investigations by late nineteenth century reformers to suggest that in dense and transient city cores the level of fraud votes was vast and ranged from 30 to 60 to even 75 percent of the total vote, with perhaps 40 percent fraud rates the most likely figure (Converse 1972, 289-92). So great was this alleged level

of fraud that it was quite possible, as Howard Allen and Kay Allen put it, that the decline in turnout Burnham discerned, “merely reflected the decline of fraud brought about by the reforms in the election procedures” (Allen and Allen 1981, 155).

That theme continues in Glenn Altschuler and Stuart Blumin’s 2001 book *Rude Republic* which targets Burnham’s image of “the last six decades of the nineteenth century as an era of unprecedented and subsequently unequaled popular interest and participation in partisan political life” (Holt 2001, 164). Voting in this era was instead, they argue, devoid of meaning and was but a function of the floss and corruption that surrounded nineteenth century elections. Richard Bense’s 2004 study of electoral impropriety in 48 contested Congressional elections, largely in Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky between 1851 and 1868 presents a picture of almost unrelieved drunkenness, voter intimidation, and voters being marched by party organizers to the polls devoid of any understanding of their acts. This view of America’s past elections is the near-antithesis of Burnham’s:

[t]he American polling place was thus a kind of sorcerer’s workshop in which the minions of opposing parties turned money into whiskey and whiskey into votes. This alchemy transformed the great political interests of the nation, commanded by those with money, into the prevailing currency of the democratic masses. Whiskey, it seems, bought as many, and perhaps far more, votes than the planks in party platforms. (Bense 2004, 295)

However, as Joel Silbey 1994 reminds us, charges of vote-buying, corruption, and stolen elections are, and were, almost always self-serving. As is the case today, those who make the charge of vote fraud are often seeking to change the electoral rules and those who seek to change the rules often allege voter fraud. Silbey quotes a young Abraham Lincoln, defending viva voce election returns in the Illinois legislature in 1840, asserting that he “had every reason to believe that all this hue and cry about frauds was entirely groundless, and raised for other than honest reasons” (Silbey 1994, 148).

Silbey notes too that “[t]here were also some strong built-in checks in the nineteenth century system. Party workers were constantly on guard against the depredations of the other side and never hesitant about challenging potential voters on residence and other grounds” (Silbey 1994, 148). Burnham, in answering Converse, built upon Richard Jensen’s close work on mid-century elections, reasoning that, “traceable corruption, being a dangerous enterprise for practitioners, was at most a marginal phenomenon” (Burnham 1974). The fact that all of Bense’s evidence arises entirely from contested election cases, cases that are by their very nature highly exceptional, is in fact grist to Burnham’s and Sibley’s mill that voter fraud was a risky business and that real cases of it would be and were contested by interested parties.

Let us also note that almost all those cases arose in states using the ticket system of voting, a system seldom more secret than oral voting and equally open to vote purchase. Indeed, the very public nature of viva voce voting, used in Alexandria and Newport, as well as Lincoln’s Illinois, may have even more effectively militated against bribery than did the ticket system.<sup>2</sup>

Of the anecdotal evidence of voter fraud, Howard Allen and Kay Allen conclude, “[t]he unsystematic, undocumented, partisan, and emotional nature of most of the literature indicates that the charges of vote fraud were probably gross exaggerations” (Allen and Allen 1981, 179). Insofar as vote purchases may have occurred, they find the most likely cases were in poor urban populations, especially those where machine politics prevailed (Allen and Allen 1981, 180-1).<sup>3</sup> This is not the world of either Alexandria or Newport. In these two places ward-level poll books recorded 614 as the maximum number of voters appearing over a day of polling: a small number susceptible to close scrutiny by neighbors and party and candidate representatives. And finally, no charges or allegations of electoral bribery appeared in newspapers or court papers in the aftermath of the Alexandria or

---

<sup>2</sup>For evidence of vote buying in an oral voting system in a different political culture with weak rather than strong parties, see Emery (2012, 142-4, 170).

<sup>3</sup>And even here the meaning of “purchase” would be contestable.

Newport elections considered in this project. Until there is evidence to the contrary, the most appropriate adjudication to the charge of vote buying in these two case studies would seem to be that wise Scottish verdict of “not proven.”

## **A.2 Patronage**

Even if we dismiss the likelihood of widespread voter fraud in the nineteenth century data, we must also consider whether patronage was prevalent in these elections. The literature on patronage politics—the partisan use of public office to appoint individuals dedicated to the welfare of a political machine—also tends to focus on large cities in the mid- and late-nineteenth century. New York City’s Tammany Society became Tammany Hall and grew into the Tweed machine by mid-century; twentieth century variations included the Hague machine in New Jersey, the Pendergast machine in Kansas City, and the Daley machine in Chicago. Political appointees became the institutionalized and protected base from which lower-level ward heelers fanned out to bring in the vote to ensure the machine of its continued political monopoly.

Did patronage systems exist in smaller cities such as Alexandria, Virginia and Newport, Kentucky?

Alexandria and Newport in the mid-nineteenth century were small cities of fewer than 20,000 residents, with limited sources of revenue for personnel budgets. Most municipal officials were elected. Both cities were also closely contested, ensuring a wider knowledge of potential for the partisan misuse of authority. Neither city was characterized as being controlled by a political monopoly. While patronage networks can and did develop in almost any context, Alexandria and Newport were not promising places for the development of a partisan hierarchy capable of awarding jobs in exchange for votes (see e.g., [Lessoff and Connolly 2013](#)).

There were nevertheless potential patronage networks in both cities. We identified 53 non-elected occupations, reported in the relevant federal census and city directories, which could conceivably have been awarded on partisan grounds. These occupations are all in the public sector, the base upon which we would expect a patronage system to develop. The men in these positions were only a small fraction of the employed in either city (1.9 percent in Alexandria; 1.2 percent in Newport); employment in these two cities was overwhelmingly in the private sector.

One measure of whether they could be considered political appointees is their own record as voters in the elections under consideration in this project: the 1859 state election in Alexandria and the 1874 municipal election in Newport. Men in these positions did not turnout to vote at levels we would expect to find in patronage-based systems. In Alexandria, 45 of 60 (75%) men in these positions voted, compared to 45% of the other eligible voters. In Newport, 15 of 45 (39%) men in these positions voted compared to 34% of the other eligible voters. Even in Alexandria, these participation rates are much lower than we would expect for segments of the labor force whose jobs depended on voter mobilization.

The absence of patronage-related positions in city government does not preclude the possibility of top-down efforts to deliver citizens' votes by other means. The preservation of a daily newspaper in Alexandria (*The Alexandria Gazette*) allows us to locate charges of patronage-type behavior in both the private and public sectors and to evaluate those charges with some precision. Three such charges appeared in the *Gazette* in 1859. The first two were allegations of local businesses using their employment power to deliver the vote of employees: demanding that employees vote in a particular way or punishing them for not doing so.

On May 28, two days after the election, George H. Richards, a city grocer and holder of a license to operate as a carter, a transporter of goods throughout the city, inserted a notice in the *Gazette* to refute a charge that he has fired James Macfarlan and seven others,

“because they would not vote the Whig ticket.” Richards denied the allegation, saying only Macfarlane had been fired and that was, “. . . for drunkenness, and worthlessness, and for that alone. No one else was discharged.”

A more serious charge appeared earlier, before the election, also related to the use of private power over employment to influence the vote of employees. The Democratic Party was split over the nominee for the Congressional seat to be filled at the election, divided between Thomas Shackelford, who was on the Board of Directors of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and William Smith. The charge came in a letter to the *Gazette* on May 6 addressed to the President and Directors of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad Company. In the letter, a “Stockholder” wrote to ask for comment on a published allegation that, “EVERY MEANS is, *doubtless*, used, to urge, or if possible to constrain, men, connected with the road, to vote for Mr. Shackelford, who is a director.” The charge was, “that you permit *constraint* to be used upon your employees to vote for Mr. Shackelford – that you employ your official authority, or suffer others to do it, to interfere with the ‘freedom of elections.’”

This charge was never answered, but we can provide a partial test of the allegation by examining the votes of the 66 railroad employees who lived in Alexandria, employed as baggage masters (N = 8), brakemen (8), conductors (12), contractors (4), construction supervisor (1), engineers (15), firemen (14), and superintendents (4). The 1860 industrial census indicated that the Orange and Alexandria employed 60 hands in the city and we cannot be certain that all 66 men listed with railroad occupations were employed by the Orange and Alexandria line though it is likely that the great majority were. Once again there is little evidence that the suasive power of employment affected these votes. Of those 66 railroad men only 19 voted (29%) and they split in their vote eleven for the Opposition party and eight for the Democrats. Only one of the Democrats, conductor William Pauler, voted for Shackelford.



The one case of patronage politics which was discussed in the August 10 *Gazette* and does appear valid concerned not Alexandria-based efforts in the public or private sector to influence political outcomes, but the evidently much better organized and effective political machine of the national Democratic Party. William Smith won Virginia's seventh Congressional seat in the May of 1859. Beginning in June letters began appearing in the *Gazette* from John T. Johnston who had worked in the US Customs House in Alexandria and claimed he had been dismissed from office because, while a strong Democrat, and something of the core of the party in Alexandria, he had consistently opposed William Smith for office. James Fossett, also of Alexandria, had also been dismissed from the local Federal Customs office. And indeed both men had voted a Democratic ticket in the 1859 Congressional election, but voting for Shackelford for Congress rather than Smith. Johnston had abstained from voting in the House of Delegate election.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, the US Customs office in Alexandria stands out in a re-examination of the potential patronage positions in the city. Not only did the three remaining employees (Isaac Wood, S. King Shay, and John W. Campbell) vote Democratic and for Smith for Congress in 1859, but so did the Collector, Edward S. Hough.

Patronage politics did exist in Alexandria, but, the evidence we have suggests that it was rare. It arose more from outside the city as a virulent power within the US federal government rather than as an integral part of city politics.

If people in these positions, however rare, were more easily monitored by party elites, patronage may confound our estimates of social influence. We address this concern for studying turnout in Table A1.<sup>5</sup> The table replicates the turnout models from Table 1 of the main text, but adds variables to control for patronage. The first model from each city includes as an explanatory variable a dummy indicating whether the citizen holds a position that may have been allocated through patronage. This single dummy may overlook heterogeneity in the extent to which each occupation was actually filled through patronage. Perhaps a

---

<sup>4</sup>See also the June 29, July 1, July 4, and August 8, 1859 editions of the *Gazette*.

<sup>5</sup>Many of the tables in the appendices were typeset in L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X using the texreg package (Leifeld 2013).

patronage system in Alexandria filled most of the postal positions, but few of the police positions. To control for such possibilities, the second model in each city includes fixed effects for each occupation with the potential to be filled by patronage. In other words, the fixed effects models include a dummy for each unique occupation that may have been filled through patronage, indicating whether the individual holds that occupation.

All else equal, the first model in each city suggests people who held potential patronage positions were more likely to turnout, though the relationship is only statistically significant in Alexandria. The social proximity results from the main text are robust to these new specifications. The Table A1 coefficients associated with social proximity are almost identical to those in Table 1 of the main text. Table A2 adds the same controls to the vote choice models from Table 2 of the main text. Again, the social proximity estimates are largely unchanged from the main text estimates in both magnitude and statistical significance.

In summary, the tables in this section provide several means to control for the role of patronage. The controls are nonetheless imprecise. We cannot be sure which positions were truly allocated through patronage. And we cannot control for individuals who did not yet hold patronage positions, but had been promised them. Given the small role of patronage in these cities we do not believe these concerns present a large threat to the internal or external validity of our results. Controlling for potential patronage positions does not change our estimates associated with social proximity. While the role of networks may be magnified in cities with strong patronage systems, the apparent absence of a widespread patronage system in these cities suggests that this aspect of nineteenth century politics poses little threat to the external validity of our study.

**Table A1:** Reestimating the Table 1 Models while Controlling for Individuals With Potential Patronage Positions

Outcome Variable: Did citizen turnout to vote?				
	Alexandria		Newport	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	-0.010*	-0.010*	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ln(Household wealth)	0.040	0.042	-0.067*	-0.069*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mid-status occupation	0.268*	0.286*	0.182	0.164
	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.104)	(0.104)
High-status occupation	0.571*	0.581*	0.379	0.335
	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.201)	(0.205)
Owns home?	0.800*	0.792*	1.579*	1.575*
	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Age (years)	-0.098*	-0.098*	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)
ln(Age)	4.677*	4.638*	0.025	0.109
	(0.818)	(0.820)	(0.537)	(0.541)
Is church member?	0.549*	0.567*	—	—
	(0.125)	(0.127)	—	—
Is African American?	—	—	1.302*	1.308*
	—	—	(0.427)	(0.427)
Is U.S. born?	0.527*	0.530*	0.203*	0.200*
	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Holds potential patronage position?	1.093*	—	0.699	—
	(0.377)	—	(0.416)	—
Network centrality (Z score)	-0.240*	-0.232*	-0.011	-0.028
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Social proximity to elites (Z score)	0.606*	0.561*	0.736*	0.855*
	(0.126)	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.144)
Intercept	-14.082*	-13.952*	-1.395	-1.645
	(2.169)	(2.176)	(1.358)	(1.367)
Patronage Position Fixed Effects	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
N	2216	2216	3416	3416
Log Likelihood	-1312.938	-1305.588	-2097.470	-2080.748
AIC	2651.877	2701.176	4220.939	4227.496

\* $p < 0.05$

Note: Reported coefficients are from ordinary least squares regressions (with standard errors in parentheses). Models are restricted to voters. The outcome variable is equal to the proportion of votes cast for the majority party in the city (The Opposition Party in Alexandria; The Democratic Party in Newport). The omitted reference category for occupational status includes low-status occupations, the unemployed, and those lacking occupational data. To conserve space, the table omits the coefficients associated with patronage position fixed effects.

**Table A2:** Reestimating the Table 2 Models while Controlling for Individuals With Potential Patronage Positions

	Outcome Variable: Proportion of votes for the majority party			
	Alexandria		Newport	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
ln(Household wealth)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Mid-status occupation	0.012 (0.035)	0.029 (0.035)	0.038 (0.027)	0.035 (0.027)
High-status occupation	0.004 (0.047)	0.003 (0.048)	0.075 (0.051)	0.077 (0.052)
Owns home?	0.046 (0.036)	0.055 (0.036)	-0.046 (0.027)	-0.045 (0.027)
Age (years)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.008 (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)
ln(Age)	-0.080 (0.242)	-0.063 (0.241)	-0.277 (0.153)	-0.281 (0.154)
Is church member?	0.097* (0.034)	0.109* (0.034)	—	—
Is African American?	—	—	-0.368* (0.090)	-0.368* (0.089)
Is U.S. born?	0.200* (0.038)	0.208* (0.037)	-0.033 (0.023)	-0.030 (0.023)
Holds potential patronage position?	-0.065 (0.067)	—	0.153 (0.096)	—
Network centrality (Z score)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.014)	0.055* (0.009)	0.052* (0.009)
Social proximity to majority party elites (Z score)	0.223* (0.072)	0.218* (0.071)	0.308* (0.068)	0.308* (0.068)
Social proximity to minority party elites (Z score)	-0.305* (0.072)	-0.338* (0.073)	-0.207* (0.070)	-0.181* (0.070)
Intercept	0.614 (0.648)	0.587 (0.646)	1.131* (0.391)	1.128* (0.392)
Patronage Position Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	1128	1128	1381	1381
R <sup>2</sup>	0.070	0.112	0.097	0.106
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.059	0.080	0.089	0.091
RMSE	0.428	0.423	0.355	0.355

\* $p < 0.05$

Note: Reported coefficients are from ordinary least squares regressions (with standard errors in parentheses). Models are restricted to voters. The outcome variable is equal to the proportion of votes cast for the majority party in the city (The Opposition Party in Alexandria; The Democratic Party in Newport). The omitted reference category for occupational status includes low-status occupations, the unemployed, and those lacking occupational data. To conserve space, the table omits the coefficients associated with patronage position fixed effects.

## **B Measurement**

This appendix describes the source and provides summary statistics for all measures used in the analyses.

### **B.1 Alexandria Measures**

#### **Variables used in Alexandria Analysis**

`Cast vote?`: Collected from the May 1859 poll books. Equals 1 if the citizen's name appeared in the poll books and 0 otherwise.

`Proportion of votes for the Opposition`: Collected from the May 1859 poll books. Equal to the number of votes cast for Opposition Party candidates divided by the total number of votes cast across the five races for national or state government: U.S. Congress, VA House of Delegates, VA Governor, VA Lieutenant Governor, and VA Attorney General.

`Household wealth (thousands of dollars)`: Maximum personal assessed wealth (including income, real estate, and all other taxable assets) within an individual's household, obtained from the 1859 City Tax List. Before finding the maximum, we replace people absent from the tax list ( $n = 381$ ) with their self-reported wealth from the 1860 census. For those lacking records on residence ( $n = 284$ ) we use their personal wealth rather than the maximum in their household.

`Mid-status occupation`: Based on occupation, see below. Equals 1 if the individual holds a mid-status occupation and 0 otherwise. To classify status, we began by assigning each of the 573 occupations into an 18-part status hierarchy based on our assessment of skill required for the occupation, manual labor involved in the occupation, and autonomy associated with the occupation. Slave was lowest; professional was highest. Then we grouped those 18 hierarchic positions into three occupational statuses: High, Mid, and Low.

`High-status occupation`: Based on occupation, see below. Equals 1 if the individual

holds a high-status occupation and 0 otherwise.

`Owns home?`: Defined in the real estate section of the municipal tax lists. Equals 1 if the individual owns or is in the process of purchasing his home and 0 otherwise.

`Age (years)`: Measured using the 1860 census. Equal to years old at time of election.

`Is church member?`: Based on Church membership, see below. Equals 1 if the individual is on a church's membership list and 0 otherwise.

`Is U.S. born?`: Measured using the 1860 census. Equals 1 if the individual was born in the United States and 0 otherwise.

`Network centrality`: Weighted eigenvector centrality in the network. Scaled to hold a maximum score of 1.

`Network centrality (Z score)`: The network centrality measure standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1.

`Social distance to elites`: Discussed in detail in section entitled, "Constructing the Nineteenth Century Networks," and based on the affiliations described below. For this calculation, we first use the observable affiliations to create an  $n \times n$  matrix in which cell entries represent the number of shared connections between pairs of individuals. Dijkstra's algorithm searches for the shortest non-zero path and thus stronger ties must have lower values in the matrix than weaker ties, while non-existent ties are represented by zeros. Thus, pairs of individuals with no shared affiliations receive a score of 0; pairs with the maximum number of shared affiliations (Maximum = 4) receive a score of 1; pairs with 3, 2, and 1 shared connections receive scores of 2, 3, and 4. We apply Dijkstra's algorithm to this matrix, which calculates the sum of the path weights along the shortest path connecting each pair of individuals. `Social distance to elites` equals the average shortest path between an individual and each candidate running for local office. As an alternative to this weighted network, we have also replicated all analyses using a binary network where a direct link exists between a pair of individuals if they share one or more social connections. We then

measure distances using a power matrix approach (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 161). This alternative approach leads to the same substantive conclusions as those we present in the main text.

Social proximity to elites (Z score): A transformation of the social distance to elites measure. The measure is first standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1. It is then multiplied by  $-1$  so that larger values indicate greater proximity to elites.

Social distance to focal party elites: Discussed in detail in section entitled, “Constructing the Nineteenth Century Networks,” and based on the affiliations described below. Equal to the average weighted social distance between an individual and each Opposition Party candidate running for local office.

Social proximity to focal party elites (Z score): A transformation of the social distance to focal party elites measure. The measure is first standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1. It is then multiplied by  $-1$  so that larger values indicate greater proximity to Opposition elites.

Social distance to opposing party elites: Discussed in detail in section entitled, “Constructing the Nineteenth Century Networks,” and based on the affiliations described below. Equal to the average weighted social distance between an individual and each Democratic Party candidate running for local office.

Social proximity to opposing party elites (Z score): A transformation of the social distance to opposing party elites measure. The measure is first standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1. It is then multiplied by  $-1$  so that larger values indicate greater proximity to Democratic elites.

## **Affiliations used to Construct Alexandria Network**

**Family members:** Pairs of individuals sharing the same surname and living in the same residence. Residence was determined using historical analysis of the following sources: Corporation of Alexandria 1859 Tax Lists by ward, Corporation of Alexandria 1859 Tax Ledgers by ward, Corporation of Alexandria 1855 & 1862 Tax Assessments by Ward, US Bureau of the Census 1860 Census of Free Residents of Alexandria, and C. M. Hopkins' 1877 City Atlas of Alexandria. For a detailed description of this process see [DeBats \(2008\)](#).

**Neighbors:** Pairs of individuals who live on the same subblock and on the same side of the street. Subblocks are units within a block defined by alleys and their intersections.

**Confreres:** Pairs of individuals with the same occupation. Occupation was determined using historical analysis of the 1860 US Bureau of the Census, Census of Free Residents of Alexandria, and the 1860 Boyd's Washington and Georgetown Directory (Alexandria Section). Our occupational codes were influenced by the work of [Katz \(1975\)](#) and [Thernstrom \(2009\)](#). To develop these codes, we sought a procedure that would apply to both a commercial town (Alexandria) and an industrial town (Newport), directing us toward comparability rather than historic specificity (see [Hauser 1982](#)). We ultimately derived 573 specific occupations, private and public, reported by residents in 1) the 1860 (Alexandria) and 1870 (Newport) censuses; 2) the 1859 City of Alexandria License Tax and the City of Newport 1874 City Tax Lists; 3) the 1860 Boyd's Washington and Georgetown Directory; and 4) the William's Newport Directory for 1872-73. For a detailed description of this analysis see [DeBats and Lethbridge \(2005\)](#).

**Co-church members:** Pairs of individuals affiliated with the same church. Church membership was identified using historical analysis of each church's archived records of births, marriages, deaths, confirmations, baptisms, membership lists, cemetery records, graveyard inscriptions, and church registers.



**Table B1:** Descriptive statistics - Alexandria

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Cast vote?	2,590	0.46	0.50	0	1
Proportion of votes for the Opposition	1,190	0.61	0.44	0.00	1.00
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	2,216	3.69	14.05	0.00	204.45
ln(Household wealth)	2,216	-1.42	2.80	-6.91	5.32
Mid-status occupation	2,590	0.53	0.50	0	1
High-status occupation	2,590	0.08	0.28	0	1
Owens home?	2,590	0.16	0.36	0	1
Age (years)	2,590	37.56	13.20	21	98
ln(Age)	2,590	3.57	0.33	3.04	4.58
Is church member?	2,590	0.28	0.45	0	1
Is U.S. born?	2,590	0.77	0.42	0	1
Network centrality	2,590	0.17	0.35	0.00	1.00
Network centrality (Z score)	2,590	0.70	1.88	-0.24	5.13
Social distance to elites	2,590	9.92	2.15	6.86	22.62
Social proximity to elites (Z score)	2,590	0.54	0.68	-3.48	1.51
Social distance to focal party elites	2,590	9.93	2.14	6.58	22.47
Social proximity to focal party elites (Z score)	2,590	0.53	0.68	-3.46	1.60
Social distance to opposing party elites	2,590	9.80	2.25	6.57	22.86
Social proximity to opposing elites (Z score)	2,590	0.54	0.70	-3.50	1.54

Summary statistics are restricted to eligible voters (males over age 21), but Z scores are calculated on the full sample so the means and standard deviations are not exactly 0 and 1.

## B.2 Newport Measures

### Variables used in Newport Analysis

`Cast vote?`: Collected from the March 1874 poll books. Equals 1 if the citizen's name appeared in the poll books and 0 otherwise.

`Proportion of votes for Democrats`: Collected from the March 1874 poll books. Equal to the number of votes cast for Democratic Party candidates divided by the total number of votes cast across the the nine citywide positions contested by both parties: President of the Council, City Clerk, City Attorney, City Jailor, City Physician, Market Master, Wharf Master, Weights and Measures, and Street Commissioner.

`Household wealth (thousands of dollars)`: Maximum personal assessed wealth (including income, real estate, and all other taxable assets) within an individual's household, obtained from the 1874 City Tax List. Before finding the maximum, we replace people absent from the tax list ( $n = 953$ ) with their self-reported wealth from the 1870 census. For those lacking records on residence ( $n = 1,499$ ) we use their personal wealth rather than the maximum in their household.

`Mid-status occupation`: Based on occupation, see below. Equals 1 if the individual holds a mid-status occupation and 0 otherwise. For more details on classifying occupational status, see the discussion in the previous section.

`High-status occupation`: Based on occupation, see below. Equals 1 if the individual holds a high-status occupation and 0 otherwise.

`Owns home?`: Defined in the real estate section of the municipal tax lists. Equals 1 if the individual owns or is in the process of purchasing his home and 0 otherwise.

`Age (years)`: Measured using the 1870 census. Equal to years old at time of election.

`Is African American?`: Information on race comes from census lists, municipal tax lists, and poll books. Equals 1 if the individual is an African American and 0 otherwise.

Is U.S. born?: Measured using the 1870 census. Equals 1 if the individual was born in the United States and 0 otherwise.

Social distance to elites: Discussed in detail in section entitled, “Constructing the Nineteenth Century Networks,” and based on the affiliations described below. See also the discussion in Section B.1 of the Online Appendix. Equal to the average weighted social distance between an individual and each candidate running for local office.

Social proximity to elites (Z score): A transformation of the social distance to elites measure. The measure is first standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1. It is then multiplied by  $-1$  so that larger values indicate greater proximity to elites.

Social distance to focal party elites: Discussed in detail in section entitled, “Constructing the Nineteenth Century Networks,” and based on the affiliations described below. Equal to the average weighted social distance between an individual and each Democratic Party candidate running for local office.

Social proximity to focal party elites (Z score): A transformation of the social distance to focal party elites measure. The measure is first standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1. It is then multiplied by  $-1$  so that larger values indicate greater proximity to Democratic elites.

Social distance to opposing party elites: Discussed in detail in section entitled, “Constructing the Nineteenth Century Networks,” and based on the affiliations described below. Equal to the average weighted social distance between an individual and each Republican Party candidate running for local office.

Social proximity to opposing party elites (Z score): A transformation of the social distance to opposing party elites measure. The measure is first standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1. It is then multiplied by  $-1$  so that larger values indicate greater proximity to Republican elites.

Network centrality: Weighted eigenvector centrality in the network. Scaled to hold a

maximum score of 1.

**Network centrality (Z score):** The network centrality measure standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1.

### **Affiliations used to Construct Newport Network**

**Family members:** Pairs of individuals sharing the same surname and living in the same residence. Residence was determined using historical analysis of the following sources: City of Newport 1870 City Plat Map, US Bureau of the Census 1870 Census of Newport, Kentucky, Williams' Cincinnati Directory (Newport Section) for 1869, Williams' Newport Directory for 1873, Campbell County 1874 Tax Lists by Ward, and the 1886 Sanborn Fire Insurance Map. For a detailed description of this process see [DeBats \(2008\)](#).

**Neighbors:** Pairs of individuals who live on the same block and on the same side of the street. We use blocks to define neighbors rather than the subblocks we use in Alexandria because alleys were much rarer in Newport. Moreover, our work suggests Newport lacked the alley residential patterns seen in Alexandria; 14% of Alexandria residents lived in alleys compared to < 1% in Newport; Unlike Alexandria, Newport alleys seem to have been, by and large, alleys and not spaces in which separate residences unconnected to a street face developed.

**Confreres:** Pairs of individuals with the same occupation. Occupation was determined using historical analysis of the US Bureau of the Census 1870 Census of Newport, Kentucky, the Williams' 1869 Cincinnati Directory (Newport Section), and the 1873 Williams' Newport Directory. For more information, see the previous section and for a detailed description of this process see [DeBats and Lethbridge \(2005\)](#).

**Co-church members:** Pairs of individuals affiliated with the same church. Church membership was identified using historical analysis of each church's archived records of births,

marriages, deaths, confirmations, baptisms, membership lists, cemetery records, graveyard inscriptions, and church registers.

**Table B2:** Descriptive statistics - Newport

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Cast vote?	4, 213	0.34	0.47	0	1
Proportion of votes for Democrats	1, 418	0.49	0.37	0.00	1.00
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	3, 416	2.48	13.09	0.00	361.51
ln(Household wealth)	3, 416	-1.18	2.90	-6.91	5.89
Mid-status occupation	4, 213	0.53	0.50	0	1
High-status occupation	4, 213	0.04	0.19	0	1
Owens home?	4, 213	0.27	0.45	0	1
Age (years)	4, 213	34.51	13.14	16	87
ln(Age)	4, 213	3.47	0.38	2.77	4.47
Is African American?	4, 213	0.01	0.09	0	1
Is U.S. born?	4, 213	0.45	0.50	0	1
Network centrality	4, 213	0.14	0.30	0.00	1.00
Network centrality (Z score)	4, 213	0.48	1.61	-0.29	5.17
Social distance to elites	4, 213	10.98	1.99	7.68	26.53
Social proximity to elites (Z score)	4, 213	0.40	0.48	-3.36	1.19
Social distance to focal party elites	4, 213	11.17	1.98	7.38	26.38
Social proximity to focal party elites (Z score)	4, 213	0.40	0.48	-3.32	1.32
Social distance to opposing party elites	4, 213	10.84	2.04	7.40	26.60
Social proximity to opposing elites (Z score)	4, 213	0.39	0.49	-3.37	1.22

Summary statistics are restricted to eligible voters (white males over age 21), but Z scores are calculated on the full sample so the means and standard deviations are not exactly 0 and 1.

### **B.3 Williamsburg Measures**

#### **Variables used in Williamsburg analysis**

Voted in 2010: From the Williamsburg 2010 municipal election voter file. Equals 1 if the respondent's name was in the file and 0 otherwise.

Number of campaign activities in support of Foster: From the question on the postelection wave of the survey asking, "Whether or not you voted, did you do any of the following for Scott Foster's campaign in the week before the election?". The available options were:

- Tried to persuade someone to vote for him
- Worked with the campaign
- Attended meetings, events, or election rallies
- Wore a campaign button or put up a political yard sign or bumper sticker
- Gave money
- Wrote on a blog/participated in on-line forum or message board
- Became a fan of his Facebook page
- Wrote letter to newspaper/magazine
- Other

The measure equals the number of the above options the respondent chose.

Family income: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking "How would you describe your family's economic status?". The variable is coded 0 = "Working class", 1 = "Lower middle class", 2 = "Middle class", 3 = "Upper middle class", and 4 =

“Upper class”.

Is *Caucasian, non-Hispanic?*: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “What term best describes your race?”. The available options were Asian Black/African, American Latino/Hispanic, Native American, White, and Other. The variable equals 1 if the respondent chose White and did not choose Hispanic and 0 if he or she chose any other option.

Is *female?*: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “Are you male or female?”. The variable equals 1 if the respondent chose female and 0 if he chose male.

Is *sophomore?*: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “When do you expect to graduate from William & Mary?”. The available options were May 2010, December 2010, May 2011, May 2012, May 2013, May 2014, and Other. Respondents who chose Other were then given a followup prompt, “If you have chosen ‘other’, please specify:”. The variable equals 1 if the respondent chose a 2012 graduation date in either response and 0 if he or she chose any other option.

Is *junior?*: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “When do you expect to graduate from William & Mary?”. The available options were May 2010, December 2010, May 2011, May 2012, May 2013, May 2014, and Other. Respondents who chose Other were then given a followup prompt, “If you have chosen ‘other’, please specify:”. The variable equals 1 if the respondent chose a 2011 graduation date in either response and 0 if he or she chose any other option.

Is *senior?*: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “When do you expect to graduate from William & Mary?”. The available options were May 2010, December 2010, May 2011, May 2012, May 2013, May 2014, and Other. Respondents who chose Other were then given a followup prompt, “If you have chosen ‘other’, please specify:”. The variable equals 1 if the respondent chose a 2010 graduation date in either response and



0 if he or she chose any other option.

`Lives on campus?`: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “Where are you living this semester at William & Mary?”. The variable equals 1 if the respondent chose an on-campus location and 0 if he or she chose an off-campus option.

`Voted in 2008 primary`: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “Did you vote in a presidential primary in 2008?”. The variable equals 1 if the respondent chose “Yes” and 0 if he or she chose “No”.

`Voted in 2008 general election`: From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?”. The variable equals 1 if the respondent chose “Yes” and 0 if he or she chose “No”.

`Number of campaign activities, 2008-2009`: From two questions on the preelection wave of the survey asking, “Did you do any of the following activities during the 2008 presidential election (including the primaries and caucuses)?” and “Did you do any of the following activities for one of the 2009 gubernatorial candidates (either during primary or general election campaigns)?”. For each question, the available options were:

- Tried to persuade someone to vote for a particular candidate
- Worked on a campaign
- Attended meetings or election rallies
- Put up a political yard sign or bumper sticker or wore a campaign button
- Gave money to a candidate
- Wrote on a blog/participated in on-line forum or message board
- Wrote letter to newspaper/magazine
- Other

The measure equals the number of the above options the respondent chose across both questions.

**Interest in national politics:** From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “In general how interested are you in national politics?”. The variable is coded 0 = “Not interested at all”, 1 = “Not very interested”, 2 = “Somewhat interested”, and 3 = “Very interested”.

**Trust in government:** From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?”. The variable is coded 0 = “Just about always”, 1 = “Most of the time”, 2 = “Only some of the time”, and 3 = “Never”.

**Party ID:** From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “How would you describe your party affiliation?”. The variable is coded -3 = “Strong Democrat”, -2 = “Democrat, not so strong”, -1 = “Independent, closer to Democrats”, 0 = “Independent”, 1 = “Independent, closer to Republicans”, 2 = “Republican, not so strong”, and 3 = “Strong Republican.” Respondents choosing “other” were coded as missing to allow the multiple imputation procedure to classify their partisanship.

**Partisan strength:** A transformation of the party ID variable, above. The variable takes the absolute value of party ID and thus larger values indicate greater attachment to a political party.

**Ideology:** From the question on the preelection wave of the survey, asking “How would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is very liberal and 7 is very conservative?”. Respondents rate themselves on three dimensions: Overall, Economic issues, and Social issues. We use the respondent’s Overall placement. We center the variable on 0 and thus the variable ranges from -3 to +3 with larger values indicating greater conservatism.

**Network centrality:** Eigenvector centrality in the network. Scaled to hold a maximum score of 1.

Network centrality (Z score): The network centrality measure standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1.

Social distance to the elite: Discussed in detail in section entitled, "Constructing the Williamsburg 2010 Network." Equal to the social distance between an individual and Foster, the student running for city council.

Social proximity to the elite (Z score): A transformation of the social distance to the Elite measure. The measure is first standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1. It is then multiplied by  $-1$  so that larger values indicate greater proximity to the elite.

**Table B3:** Descriptive statistics - Williamsburg

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Voted in 2010	2,590	0.19	0.40	0	1
Number of campaign activities in support of Foster	1,004	0.80	1.33	0	9
Family income	2,298	2.49	0.86	0	4
Is Caucasian, non-Hispanic?	2,292	0.79	0.41	0	1
Is female?	2,558	0.60	0.49	0	1
Is sophomore?	2,560	0.26	0.44	0	1
Is junior?	2,560	0.24	0.42	0	1
Is senior?	2,560	0.25	0.43	0	1
Lives on campus?	2,565	0.81	0.39	0	1
Voted in 2008 primary	2,357	0.39	0.49	0	1
Voted in 2008 general election	2,363	0.71	0.45	0	1
Number of campaign activities, 2008-2009	2,590	1.60	2.22	0	14
Interest in national politics	2,357	2.14	0.77	0	3
Trust in government	1,725	1.15	0.56	0	3
Partisan strength	2,136	1.70	0.97	0	3
Party ID	2,136	-0.70	1.83	-3	3
Ideology	2,153	-0.62	1.53	-3	3
Network centrality	2,590	0.003	0.04	0.00	1.00
Network centrality (Z score)	2,590	0.03	1.22	-0.07	28.43
Social distance to the elite	2,590	6.18	1.78	0	12
Social proximity to the elite (Z score)	2,590	0.24	0.87	-2.61	3.27

Summary statistics do not include imputed data and are thus restricted to survey respondents age 18 years or older with at least one direct connection in the social network. The Z scores are calculated on all students in the data which also include non-respondents named as friends by a respondent and non-respondents sharing a room with a respondent. Thus the Z scores do not have means and standard deviations of exactly 0 and 1.

## C Additional Religion Controls

By identifying social networks in the nineteenth century data, in part, based on church membership, we leave open the possibility that the relationship between social proximity and turnout is actually due to citizens preferring to support members of their religion or their church. The relationship between social proximity and vote choice may also arise due to mobilization efforts organized at the church level. To address these concerns, in this appendix we reestimate our models from the nineteenth century data with the addition of fixed effects for religious affiliation or church membership. The religious affiliation fixed effects models include a dummy for each of the denominations in the data, grouping together members of different churches from the same denomination. This approach allows us to control for the tendency of members of certain religions to turnout and support specific parties. If Episcopalian citizens prefer to vote for Episcopalian candidates, these models will control for this tendency. The church membership fixed effects models include a dummy for each church, in case citizens only prefer candidates from their own church rather than their religion more broadly.<sup>6</sup> With these new controls, the coefficients associated with the social proximity measures represent the remaining relationship between social proximity and turnout/vote choice after controlling for heterogeneity associated with church members, but also controlling for any influence arising from sharing religions or church membership with elites.

Table C1 presents the fixed effects models with turnout as the outcome variable. The results are largely unchanged from those presented in Table 1 of the main text. Compared to the Table 1 estimates, here the coefficients associated with social proximity are slightly larger

---

<sup>6</sup>In Alexandria, the religious affiliation fixed effects include indicators of affiliation with each of the following groups: Baptist, Catholic, Episcopal, Jewish (Beth El Synagogue), Methodist, Presbyterian, and Quaker. In Newport, where the church membership data are limited, we have data only on affiliation with Catholics and Methodists. Both sets of fixed effects models account for all church members and we therefore no longer include as a separate explanatory variable the indicator of whether the citizen was a church member.

in the Alexandria models and slightly smaller in the Newport models. These differences are small substantively and the coefficients remain statistically significant. The table omits the coefficients associated with the religion and church fixed effects to save space, but the results are available from the authors on request.

Table C2 presents the fixed effects models with vote choice as the outcome variable. The Alexandria coefficients associated with social proximity to majority party elites are no longer statistically significant, but the coefficients associated with social proximity to minority party elites remain statistically significant under the one-tailed test implied by our hypothesis. The relationships between vote choice in Newport and social proximity remain strong and statistically significant with these additional controls.

**Table C1:** Reestimating the Table 1 Models with Fixed Effects for Individuals' Religion or Church

Outcome Variable:	Did citizen turnout to vote?			
	Alexandria		Newport	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	-0.011*	-0.011*	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ln(Household wealth)	0.042	0.043	-0.068*	-0.067*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mid-status occupation	0.231	0.224	0.181	0.201
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.104)	(0.104)
High-status occupation	0.527*	0.524*	0.373	0.391
	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.201)	(0.201)
Owns home?	0.768*	0.770*	1.583*	1.591*
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Age (years)	-0.099*	-0.099*	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)
ln(Age)	4.728*	4.704*	0.011	-0.038
	(0.820)	(0.821)	(0.537)	(0.540)
Is African American?	—	—	1.328*	1.334*
	—	—	(0.428)	(0.429)
Is U.S. born?	0.516*	0.524*	0.238*	0.230*
	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Network centrality (Z score)	-0.259*	-0.262*	-0.004	0.002
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Social proximity to elites (Z score)	0.749*	0.766*	0.546*	0.510*
	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.137)	(0.136)
Intercept	-14.196*	-14.147*	-1.399	-1.279
	(2.173)	(2.177)	(1.359)	(1.365)
Religion Fixed Effects	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Church Fixed Effects	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
N	2216	2216	3416	3416
Log Likelihood	-1315.481	-1313.134	-2091.360	-2084.584
AIC	2666.961	2672.269	4210.721	4207.168

\* $p < 0.05$ 

Note: Reported coefficients are from ordinary least squares regressions (with standard errors in parentheses). Models are restricted to voters. The outcome variable is equal to the proportion of votes cast for the majority party in the city (The Opposition Party in Alexandria; The Democratic Party in Newport). The omitted reference category for occupational status includes low-status occupations, the unemployed, and those lacking occupational data. To conserve space, the table omits the coefficients associated with religion and church fixed effects.

**Table C2:** Reestimating the Table 2 Models with Fixed Effects for Individuals' Religion or Church

Outcome Variable:	Support for majority party			
	Alexandria		Newport	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
ln(Household wealth)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Mid-status occupation	0.003 (0.035)	0.002 (0.035)	0.036 (0.026)	0.036 (0.026)
High-status occupation	-0.013 (0.047)	-0.013 (0.047)	0.057 (0.049)	0.056 (0.048)
Owns home?	0.045 (0.036)	0.045 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.026)	-0.049 (0.026)
Age (years)	0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.009* (0.004)	0.010* (0.004)
ln(Age)	-0.101 (0.240)	-0.089 (0.240)	-0.298* (0.148)	-0.317* (0.148)
Is African American?	—	—	-0.308* (0.087)	-0.286* (0.087)
Is U.S. born?	0.163* (0.039)	0.164* (0.039)	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.023)
Network centrality (Z score)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.053* (0.008)	0.052* (0.008)
Social proximity to majority party elites (Z score)	0.119 (0.078)	0.119 (0.079)	0.323* (0.065)	0.279* (0.066)
Social proximity to minority party elites (Z score)	-0.153 (0.080)	-0.149 (0.082)	-0.330* (0.068)	-0.298* (0.069)
Intercept	0.703 (0.642)	0.668 (0.644)	1.144* (0.378)	1.202* (0.377)
Religion Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Church Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	1128	1128	1381	1381
R <sup>2</sup>	0.084	0.087	0.157	0.171
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.069	0.068	0.148	0.159
RMSE	0.426	0.426	0.343	0.341

\* $p < 0.05$ 

Note: Reported coefficients are from ordinary least squares regressions (with standard errors in parentheses). Models are restricted to voters. The outcome variable is equal to the proportion of votes cast for the majority party in the city (The Opposition Party in Alexandria; The Democratic Party in Newport). The omitted reference category for occupational status includes low-status occupations, the unemployed, and those lacking occupational data. To conserve space, the table omits the coefficients associated with religion and church fixed effects.



## D Selection Models of Vote Choice

Table D1 in this appendix displays selection models (Heckman 1979) for Alexandria and Newport, estimated with maximum likelihood. To identify the models, we must omit some variables from the second equation (vote choice) that have explanatory power in the first equation (turnout). We thus omit the occupational status and home ownership indicators, which are statistically significant predictors in the turnout models (Table 1), but not the vote choice models in the main text (Table 2). Likelihood ratio tests for each set of equations fail to reject the null of no sample selection. We thus relegate the selection models to this appendix.

**Table D1:** Estimates from a Heckman Selection Model Predicting the Proportion of an Individual's Votes Cast for the Majority Party in the City (Based on the Statewide Election in 1859 Alexandria, VA and the Local Election in 1874 Newport, KY)

	Alexandria	Newport
<b>Turnout Equation</b>		
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	-0.006 (0.002)*	-0.001 (0.002)
ln(Household wealth)	0.027 (0.013)*	-0.040 (0.009)*
Mid-status occupation	0.179 (0.075)*	0.120 (0.062)
High-status occupation	0.356 (0.116)*	0.230 (0.123)
Owens home?	0.465 (0.090)*	0.978 (0.059)*
Age (years)	-0.059 (0.013)*	-0.003 (0.009)
ln(Age)	2.841 (0.497)*	-0.027 (0.325)
Is church member?	0.350 (0.076)*	
Is African American?		0.806 (0.262)*
Is U.S. born?	0.326 (0.075)*	0.127 (0.053)*
Network centrality (Z score)	-0.141 (0.024)*	0.002 (0.020)
Social proximity to elites (Z score)	0.335 (0.074)*	0.379 (0.070)*
Intercept	-8.555 (1.314)*	-0.732 (0.821)
<b>Vote Choice Equation</b>		
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
ln(Household wealth)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.001 (0.004)
Age (years)	0.004 (0.008)	0.006 (0.004)
ln(Age)	-0.155 (0.366)	-0.222 (0.153)
Is church member?	0.083 (0.042)*	
Is African American?		-0.343 (0.092)*
Is U.S. born?	0.184 (0.043)*	-0.019 (0.023)
Network centrality (Z score)	-0.004 (0.021)	0.048 (0.007)*
Social proximity to majority party elites (Z score)	0.220 (0.073)*	0.314 (0.067)*
Social proximity to minority party elites (Z score)	-0.305 (0.073)*	-0.197 (0.070)*
Intercept	0.888 (1.126)	0.920 (0.412)*
<b>Error Terms</b>		
$\sigma$	0.427 (0.013)*	0.359 (0.009)*
$\rho$	-0.118 (0.330)	0.204 (0.116)
N - Turnout equation	2216	3414
N - Did Not Vote	1088	2033
N - Vote choice equation	1128	1381
Log Likelihood	-1955.493	-2623.780
AIC	3958.986	5295.560

\* $p < 0.05$

Note: For the turnout equation, reported estimates are probit coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). For the vote choice equation, reported estimates are linear model coefficients. Models are restricted to eligible voters (In Alexandria, white males at least 21 years of age; in Newport, males at least 21 years of age). The outcome variable in the vote choice equations is equal to the proportion of votes cast for the majority party in the city (The Opposition Party in Alexandria; The Democratic Party in Newport). The omitted reference category for occupational status includes low-status occupations, the unemployed, and those lacking occupational data.

## **E Ordered Logistic Regressions of Vote Choice**

This appendix reestimates the models from Table 2 using ordered logistic regression to account for the limited number of categories in the outcome variables. For these analyses, the outcome variable is the number of votes an individual casts for the majority party in the city (The Opposition Party in Alexandria and The Democratic Party in Newport). Consistent with the Elite Proximity-Support Hypothesis I, the coefficient associated with proximity to the majority party is positive and statistically significant in each city. Likewise, the coefficient associated with proximity to the minority party is negative and statistically significant in each city, lending support to the Elite Proximity-Support Hypothesis II.

**Table E1:** Estimates from a Model Predicting the Number of an Individual’s Votes Cast for the Majority Party in the City (Based on the Statewide Election in 1859 Alexandria, VA and the Local Election in 1874 Newport, KY)

Explanatory Variables	Alexandria			Newport		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)
ln(Household wealth)	0.002 (0.028)	-0.009 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.010 (0.020)	0.011 (0.020)	0.011 (0.020)
Mid-status occupation	0.227 (0.135)	0.041 (0.152)	0.035 (0.155)	-0.325* (0.107)	0.252* (0.128)	0.159 (0.132)
High-status occupation	-0.041 (0.192)	-0.204 (0.202)	-0.192 (0.203)	-0.219 (0.234)	0.338 (0.244)	0.360 (0.243)
Owns home?	0.150 (0.156)	0.145 (0.156)	0.171 (0.157)	-0.286* (0.133)	-0.277* (0.134)	-0.279* (0.134)
Age (years)	0.010 (0.026)	0.004 (0.026)	0.006 (0.026)	0.026 (0.020)	0.036 (0.020)	0.036 (0.020)
ln(Age)	-0.381 (1.063)	-0.145 (1.064)	-0.251 (1.068)	-0.882 (0.739)	-1.252 (0.745)	-1.214 (0.751)
Is church member?	0.215 (0.119)	0.225 (0.120)	0.304* (0.147)			
Is African American?				-1.337* (0.389)	-1.888* (0.404)	-1.907* (0.404)
Is U.S. born?	0.909* (0.152)	0.807* (0.156)	0.792* (0.158)	-0.262* (0.112)	-0.124 (0.114)	-0.121 (0.115)
Network centrality (Z score)		-0.155* (0.056)	-0.080 (0.062)		0.308* (0.038)	0.259* (0.045)
Social proximity to majority party elites (Z score)			0.956* (0.313)			1.284* (0.324)
Social proximity to minority party elites (Z score)			-1.193* (0.319)			-0.779* (0.338)
<b>Thresholds</b>						
$\tau_1$	-1.136 (2.852)	-0.738 (2.851)	-1.132 (2.864)	-4.469* (1.882)	-4.870* (1.894)	-4.618* (1.917)
$\tau_2$	-0.347 (2.852)	0.057 (2.852)	-0.329 (2.864)	-3.612 (1.880)	-4.003* (1.892)	-3.745 (1.915)
$\tau_3$	-0.266 (2.852)	0.138 (2.852)	-0.246 (2.864)	-2.994 (1.879)	-3.374 (1.891)	-3.110 (1.914)
$\tau_4$	-0.231 (2.852)	0.172 (2.852)	-0.211 (2.864)	-2.552 (1.878)	-2.916 (1.890)	-2.645 (1.914)
$\tau_5$	0.156 (2.852)	0.560 (2.851)	0.182 (2.864)	-2.354 (1.878)	-2.706 (1.890)	-2.431 (1.913)
$\tau_6$				-2.195 (1.878)	-2.539 (1.889)	-2.261 (1.913)
$\tau_7$				-1.998 (1.877)	-2.332 (1.889)	-2.050 (1.913)
$\tau_8$				-1.708 (1.877)	-2.028 (1.889)	-1.742 (1.913)
$\tau_9$				-1.064 (1.878)	-1.360 (1.890)	-1.068 (1.914)
Num. obs.	1128	1128	1128	1381	1381	1381
Log Likelihood	-1464.402	-1460.588	-1453.533	-2997.554	-2964.636	-2953.734
AIC	2956.803	2951.176	2941.066	6031.109	5967.272	5949.468

\* $p < 0.05$


Note: Reported coefficients are from ordered logistic regressions (with standard errors in parentheses). Models are restricted to voters. The outcome variable is equal to the number of votes cast for the majority party in the city (The Opposition Party in Alexandria; The Democratic Party in Newport). The omitted reference category for occupational status includes low-status occupations, the unemployed, and those lacking occupational data.

## F Details on Williamsburg Multiple Imputation

This appendix discusses the multiple imputation used for the Williamsburg analyses. For the imputations, we use the Amelia II program ([Honaker et al. 2011](#)), implemented in R version 3.1.1. We conduct separate sets of five imputations for each outcome variable (turnout in the 2010 municipal election, participation for Foster in 2010, and the 2008 turnout placebo). In each imputation model, we use the outcome variable of interest along with all explanatory variables from the analyses except for partisan strength. We calculate partisan strength after the imputation because it is a transformation of the party ID variable included in the imputation. Turnout in 2010 does not need to be imputed because it comes from the voter file and thus has no missing data. We do not impute missing values for the 2010 Foster participation index because it is the lone variable from the postelection wave and would thus require imputing more observations ( $N = 1,586$ ) than we have observed ( $N = 1,004$ ). Those models are thus restricted to postelection respondents. The 2008-2009 participation index also does not need to be imputed because it was included on the shortened version of the preelection wave of the survey and thus has no missing values.


Figures [F1–F3](#) show the distributions of the observed and imputed values for each variable. In the figures, the imputed distributions appear quite similar to the observed distributions, except for the dichotomous variables. As [Honaker et al. \(2011, 17\)](#) recommend, we do not constrain these or ordinal variables to integer values, excepting voting in the 2008 general election for the 2008 participation placebo analysis. For that set of imputations, we constrain the variable to equal either 0 or 1 in order to allow for analysis by logistic regression. In addition, for all analyses, we impute academic year as a single variable and use this variable to construct dichotomous indicator variables for individual class years. This transformation is necessary because we do not expect students' academic year to produce linear effects.

**Figure F1:** Density plots of imputed variables for the turnout models.




Figures show the distributions of observed (black) and imputed (red) values. Following [Honaker et al. \(2011, 17\)](#), we do not restrict imputations of dichotomous or ordinal variables to integer values.

**Figure F2:** Density plots of imputed variables for the 2010 participation models.



Figures show the distributions of observed (black) and imputed (red) values. Following [Honaker et al. \(2011, 17\)](#), we do not restrict imputations of dichotomous or ordinal variables to integer values.

**Figure F3:** Density plots of imputed variables for the 2008 turnout placebo models.




Figures show the distributions of observed (black) and imputed (red) values. Following [Honaker et al. \(2011, 17\)](#), we do not restrict imputations of dichotomous or ordinal variables to integer values, with the exception of the 2008 turnout variable. We constrain this outcome variable to equal either 0 or 1 to allow for analysis by logistic regression.




Figures F4–F6 show an overimputation analysis for the imputed variables. In the analysis, each observed value in the data is iteratively treated as if it was missing. A large number of imputations are then run and the figures compare the observed values to the imputed values (Honaker et al. 2011, 29–33). The figures suggest that the imputation models perform well for all variables across almost all values.

**Figure F4:** The Imputation Model would Consistently Recover Observed Values from the Turnout Models had they been Missing.




Figures show how well the imputation model recovers observed values if they were instead missing. Dots show mean imputed values of the variable (Y) given the observed values (X). Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals of where the imputed values would fall if the observed data were missing at that value. With a perfect imputation model, all dots would fall on the diagonal line where  $y = x$ . When the confidence intervals fail to overlap this line, it indicates a poor model fit at that value of the variable (Honaker et al. 2011, 29–33). The colors of the confidence interval indicate the proportion of covariates missing for that imputation, as indicated in the key (lower values are based on more data and are thus expected to be better). Here, the figures suggest a good fit for all variables across almost all values, except when family income = 0, interest in national politics = 0, or trust in government = 3.

**Figure F5:** The Imputation Model would Consistently Recover Observed Values from the Participation Models had they been Missing.



Figures show how well the imputation model recovers observed values if they were instead missing. Dots show mean imputed values of the variable (Y) given the observed values (X). Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals of where the imputed values would fall if the observed data were missing at that value. With a perfect imputation model, all dots would fall on the diagonal line where  $y = x$ . When the confidence intervals fail to overlap this line, it indicates a poor model fit at that value of the variable (Honaker et al. 2011, 29–33). The colors of the confidence interval indicate the proportion of covariates missing for that imputation, as indicated in the key (lower values are based on more data and are thus expected to be better). Here, the figures suggest a good fit for all variables across almost all values, except when family income = 0, interest in national politics = 0, or trust in government = 3.

**Figure F6:** The Imputation Model would Consistently Recover Observed Values from the Placebo Models had they been Missing.



Figures show how well the imputation model recovers observed values if they were instead missing. Dots show mean imputed values of the variable (Y) given the observed values (X). Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals of where the imputed values would fall if the observed data were missing at that value. With a perfect imputation model, all dots would fall on the diagonal line where  $y = x$ . When the confidence intervals fail to overlap this line, it indicates a poor model fit at that value of the variable (Honaker et al. 2011, 29–33). The colors of the confidence interval indicate the proportion of covariates missing for that imputation, as indicated in the key (lower values are based on more data and are thus expected to be better). Here, the figures suggest a good fit for all variables across almost all values, except when family income = 0, interest in national politics = 0, or trust in government = 3.

## G Placebo Analysis

[Sekhon \(2009, 501\)](#) argues that all observational analyses should employ placebo tests as robustness checks:

In an observational placebo test, one attempts to find a stratum of data and an outcome for which the treatment effect is known with similar certainty. Then one tests to see if the observational method one is using is able to recover the result that is known a priori. In this fashion, one simultaneously checks both the selection-on-observables assumption and the estimator.

As an example of a placebo, he focuses on Gerber and Green's (2000) study of the effectiveness of get-out-the-vote (GOTV) messages delivered over the telephone. In this case, we know a priori that telephone GOTV messages should have no effect on turnout prior to receiving the message. Yet in their data, those who received the GOTV message were more likely to have voted in past elections than were those in the control group, even after accounting for other observable differences between these groups. This finding suggests that some confounds remain uncontrolled, biasing comparisons of turnout in the election following the GOTV message.

In our case, we have data for an analogous placebo test. While our theory suggests that social proximity to the elite should encourage turnout in the 2010 municipal election, it should have no effect on turnout in the 2008 election, which occurred two years before Foster ran for office and before many of the 2010 students arrived at William & Mary. Therefore, [Table G1](#) replicates Turnout Model 3 presented in [Table 3](#), but this time uses self-reported turnout in the 2008 election as the outcome measure (we therefore must omit it as an explanatory variable).<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup>We do not have access to statewide voter files and thus cannot use validated turnout.

If the coefficient on social proximity remains large, it contradicts our interpretation of the results, suggesting instead that people more proximate to the elite are more participatory for reasons other than their social proximity. As Table G1 demonstrates, however, the coefficient is almost zero, lending support to our approach. Setting other variables to their medians, the model predicts those who are at the mean proximity to the elite ( $Z$  score = 0) will have a .20 probability of voting in the 2008 general election. The model predicts someone one standard deviation closer to the elite socially will have only a .007 higher probability of voting (95% CI [-.01, .03]).

This null result may artificially arise because many freshmen and some sophomores were not yet eligible to vote in 2008. Omitting freshmen and rerunning the imputation process and model, this estimated difference in probabilities is only .006 (95% CI [-.01, .02]). Omitting freshmen and sophomores, the difference is .009 (95% CI [-.001, .02]). Across these three specifications, the lack of a substantively significant effect anywhere within the 95% confidence interval provides strong evidence of a negligible effect (Rainey 2014).

**Table G1:** Estimates from a Model Predicting an Individual’s Self-reported Turnout in the 2008 General Election Using her Social Proximity to the Elite and Other Variables (Based on the Local Election in 2010 Williamsburg, VA)

Outcome Variable: Did respondent report voting in 2008 general election?		
	Estimate	SE
Intercept	−3.89	(0.47)*
Family income	0.18	(0.08)*
Is Caucasian, non-Hispanic?	0.76	(0.15)*
Is female?	0.18	(0.14)
Is sophomore?	2.72	(0.21)*
Is junior?	3.20	(0.20)*
Is senior?	3.41	(0.21)*
Lives on campus?	0.33	(0.18)
Voted in 2008 primary	2.99	(0.32)*
Number of campaign activities, 2008-2009	0.07	(0.04)
Interest in national politics	0.29	(0.10)*
Trust in government	−0.14	(0.22)
Partisan strength	0.07	(0.07)
Social proximity to the elite (Z score)	0.05	(0.09)
Network centrality (Z score)	0.06	(0.16)
N	2590	
Log Likelihood	-862.59	
AIC	1755.19	

\* indicates  $p < .05$ . Estimates based on five imputations. The omitted reference category for academic year is freshman. The 2008 election occurred two years prior to the survey and thus social proximity to Foster should have little impact on 2008 turnout.

## H Sensitivity Analysis

This appendix implements sensitivity analysis, originally developed by VanderWeele (2011), to explore how robust our estimates are to bias emerging from sources such as the environments and interests people share with their associates. The analysis assumes there is some binary omitted variable  $U$ , which can be thought of as either a shared environmental influence, shared interest, or some combination of these factors. We then observe how the coefficients associated with our social proximity measures change under varying assumptions about the effect of  $U$  on our outcome variable of interest,  $Y$ , and the distribution of  $U$  across the range of our explanatory variable of interest.

Take for example, Table H1, which shows the sensitivity analysis for the effect of elite proximity on turnout in Alexandria, originally reported in Table 1, Model 3. In Table H1, we assume that  $U$  has a strong positive association with elite proximity. Specifically, we assume  $U = 1$  for 30% of individuals for whom elite proximity =  $m$  and 70% of individuals for whom elite proximity =  $m + 1$ , where  $m$  is some value of elite proximity. For example, since elite proximity is standardized with mean = 0 and SD = 1, if  $m = 0$  we are assuming that  $U = 1$  for 30% of individuals with the mean level of elite proximity and 70% of individuals for whom elite proximity is one standard deviation above the mean. In practice, the value of  $m$  does not matter because the effects are expressed as odds ratios which are invariant to the specific value of the explanatory variable (Long 1997, 81). We can then explore how the effect of elite proximity on turnout changes as  $\gamma$ , the effect of  $U$  on  $Y$ , increases. Since  $\gamma$  is expressed as an odds ratio, when  $\gamma = 1$ , there is no bias and we obtain the estimated effect from Table 1 ( $\exp(\hat{\beta}) = \exp(\sim 0.56) = 1.74$ ). As the table shows, our estimated effect attenuates as  $\gamma$  increases, but we would not conclude that the effect of social proximity is entirely spurious unless  $\gamma > 5$ . In other words, it would take very strong bias to explain away these results; people for whom  $U = 1$  would have to be five times more likely to vote



than people for whom  $U = 0$ . To put this magnitude into perspective, the effect of the omitted variable would need to be more than twice as strong as the estimated effect of home ownership.

**Table H1:** Estimated Odds Ratio for Effect of Social Proximity to Elites on Turnout, Depending on Magnitude of Bias,  $\gamma$  (Based on Statewide Election in 1859 Alexandria)

Explanatory variable	1	2	$\gamma$ 3	4	5
Social proximity to elites (Z score)	1.74	1.33	1.16	1.07	1.01

Cell entries represent the effect of the explanatory variable on turnout, expressed as an odds ratio.  $\gamma$  represents the magnitude of the bias, expressed as an odds ratio.

Table H2 corrects the elite proximity estimate from the Newport turnout model displayed in Table 1, Model 3. It shows that an omitted variable or set of variables would need to produce an effect with an odds ratio greater than 9 to explain away this elite proximity effect.

**Table H2:** Estimated Odds Ratio for Effect of Social Proximity to Elites on Turnout, Depending on Magnitude of Bias,  $\gamma$  (Based on Local Election in 1874 Newport, KY)

Explanatory variable	1	3	$\gamma$ 5	7	9
Social proximity to elites (Z score)	2.05	1.36	1.19	1.10	1.05

Cell entries represent the effect of the explanatory variable on turnout, expressed as an odds ratio.  $\gamma$  represents the magnitude of the bias, expressed as an odds ratio.

Table H3 corrects the estimates of social proximity effects on vote choice in Alexandria from Table 2, Model 3. Unlike the previous sensitivity analyses, which focus on logistic regressions, the models in Table 2 are linear regressions. For these analyses, we assume it is 40 percentage points less common for the omitted variable  $U = 1$  among individuals with social proximity =  $m$  than for individuals with social proximity =  $m + 1$ , where  $m$  is some value of social proximity. In these tables,  $\gamma$  represents a  $\beta$  coefficient summarizing the effect

of the omitted variable  $U$  on  $Y$ . For the correction of the social proximity to minority elites estimate, which is negative in the original model, we multiply  $\gamma \times -1$  because positive  $\gamma$  values would magnify rather than attenuate the social influence estimate. Table H3 shows that both estimates are robust to strong bias. The beta coefficient of the omitted variable would need to exceed 0.5 to explain away either of these social influence effects. In other words, its effect would need to produce more than a 50 percentage-point change in the proportion of offices in the election that individuals chose majority party candidates.

**Table H3:** Estimated Beta Coefficients for Effects of Social Proximity to Majority and Minority Party Elites on Vote Choice, Depending on Magnitude of Bias,  $\gamma$  (Based on Statewide Election in 1859 Alexandria)

Explanatory variable	$\gamma$						
	0	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60
Social proximity to majority party elites (Z score)	0.23	0.19	0.15	0.11	0.07	0.03	-0.01
Social proximity to minority party elites (Z score)	-0.30	-0.26	-0.22	-0.18	-0.14	-0.10	-0.06

Cell entries represent the effect of the explanatory variable on the proportion of votes cast for the majority party (The Opposition Party), expressed as a beta coefficient.  $\gamma$  represents the magnitude of the bias, expressed as a beta coefficient.

Table H4 corrects the Democratic proximity and Republican proximity estimates from Table 2, Newport Model 3. The table shows that the omitted variable would again need to exceed 0.5 to explain away either of these social influence effects. This potential effect would need to exceed greatly even the estimated effect of race in post-war Kentucky—all else equal, African Americans voted for Republicans only 37 percentage points (95% CI [.19, .55]) more than whites according to the estimate in Table 2.

**Table H4:** Estimated Beta Coefficients for Effects of Social Proximity to Majority and Minority Party Elites on Vote Choice, Depending on Magnitude of Bias,  $\gamma$  (Based on Local Election in 1874 Newport, KY)

Explanatory variable	$\gamma$					
	0	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50
Social proximity to majority party elites (Z score)	0.30	0.26	0.22	0.18	0.14	0.10
Social proximity to minority party elites (Z score)	-0.20	-0.16	-0.12	-0.08	-0.04	-0.004

Cell entries represent the effect of the explanatory variable on the proportion of votes cast for the majority party (The Democratic Party), expressed as a beta coefficient.  $\gamma$  represents the magnitude of the bias, expressed as a beta coefficient.

Table H5 shows sensitivity analysis for the estimated effects of proximity to the elite on turnout in Williamsburg (originally reported in Table 3, Turnout Model 3) and Table H6 shows this analysis for participation (originally reported in Table 3, Campaign Activities Model 3). The turnout model is a logistic regression and the participation model is a negative binomial regression. Therefore,  $\gamma$  in Tables H5 and H6 represents an odds ratio and we again assume  $U = 1$  for 30% of individuals for whom proximity to Foster =  $m$  and 70% of individuals for whom proximity =  $m + 1$ , where  $m$  is some value of proximity. In the analyses shown in Table 3, we include the typical controls for voting and thus we should expect less omitted variable bias than in the nineteenth century estimates. Thus, confidence in the estimates should not require as high a threshold for  $\gamma$ . Nonetheless, Tables H5 and H6 show that the estimates are robust to omitted variables with odds ratios greater than three.

**Table H5:** Estimated Odds Ratio for Effect of Social Proximity to the Elite on Turnout, Depending on Magnitude of Bias,  $\gamma$  (Based on the Local Election in 2010 Williamsburg, VA)

Explanatory variable	1	1.50	$\gamma$ 2	2.50	3	3.50
Social proximity to the Elite (Z score)	1.52	1.29	1.16	1.07	1.01	0.97

Cell entries represent the effect of the explanatory variable on turnout, expressed as an odds ratio.  $\gamma$  represents the magnitude of the bias, expressed as an odds ratio.

**Table H6:** Estimated Odds Ratio for Effect of Social Proximity to the Elite on the Number of Campaign Activities an Individual Will Complete in Support of the Elite, Depending on Magnitude of Bias,  $\gamma$  (Based on the Local Election in 2010 Williamsburg, VA)

Explanatory variable	1	1.50	$\gamma$ 2	2.50	3	3.50	4
Social proximity to the Elite (Z score)	1.60	1.37	1.23	1.14	1.07	1.02	0.98

Cell entries represent the effect of the explanatory variable on the number of campaign activities an individual will complete in support of the elite, expressed as an odds ratio.  $\gamma$  represents the magnitude of the bias, expressed as an odds ratio.

## I Additional Geography Controls

Scholars have long been aware of the tendency for individuals to prefer candidates from geographically proximate locations—a tendency [Key \(1949\)](#) dubs “friends-and-neighbors” voting. By Key’s definition, all candidates are local in the municipal elections under study. An extension of this logic would suggest voters should prefer candidates who reside on their block over the candidates’ less proximate opponents. In this section, we demonstrate that our social proximity measures improve model fit beyond this simpler geography-based measure of citizens’ connections to elites.

Table [I1](#) replicates the turnout models from Table [1](#), adding an explanatory variable counting the number of elites living on the individual’s block. Table [I2](#) replicates the vote choice models from Table [2](#), adding variables counting alternately the number of majority and minority party elites on the block. The tables present two models for each city: one omitting and one including the social network measures. In each table, the coefficients associated with social proximity remain statistically significant and similar in magnitude to those presented in the main text. In the note below each table, we show that including our social network measures provides a statistically significant improvement in model fit.

**Table I1:** Reestimating the Table 1 Turnout Models with controls for the number of elites on an individual's block.

Outcome Variable:	Did citizen turnout to vote?			
	Alexandria		Newport	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	-0.011*	-0.010*	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ln(Household wealth)	0.063*	0.044*	-0.072*	-0.067*
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mid-status occupation	0.687*	0.287*	0.144	0.191
	(0.103)	(0.123)	(0.082)	(0.104)
High-status occupation	0.864*	0.581*	0.240	0.403*
	(0.186)	(0.194)	(0.189)	(0.201)
Owns home?	0.765*	0.781*	1.639*	1.578*
	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.097)	(0.099)
Age (years)	-0.091*	-0.099*	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)
ln(Age)	4.380*	4.719*	-0.135	0.010
	(0.809)	(0.817)	(0.524)	(0.537)
Is church member?	0.881*	0.575*	—	—
	(0.106)	(0.126)	—	—
Is African American?	—	—	1.421*	1.294*
	—	—	(0.425)	(0.427)
Is U.S. born?	0.723*	0.546*	0.124	0.210*
	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Number of elites on block	0.011	-0.147	0.168	0.036
	(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.197)	(0.198)
Network centrality (Z score)	—	-0.239*	—	-0.007
	—	(0.041)	—	(0.035)
Social proximity to elites (Z score)	—	0.576*	—	0.713*
	—	(0.128)	—	(0.137)
Intercept	-13.505*	-14.187*	-0.580	-1.364
	(2.148)	(2.168)	(1.323)	(1.357)
N	2216	2216	3416	3416
Log Likelihood	-1338.752	-1317.386	-2121.092	-2098.867
AIC	2699.504	2660.772	4264.184	4223.734

\* $p < 0.05$

Note: Reported coefficients are from logistic regressions (with standard errors in parentheses). Models are restricted to eligible voters (In Alexandria, white males at least 21 years of age; in Newport, males at least 21 years of age). The omitted reference category for occupational status includes low-status occupations, the unemployed, and those lacking occupational data. In each city, a likelihood ratio test suggests that Model 2—which includes the social network measures—provides a better fit than does Model 1 (In Alexandria,  $\chi^2(DF = 2) = 42.7$ ;  $p < .001$ . In Newport,  $\chi^2(DF = 2) = 44.4$ ;  $p < .001$ ).

**Table I2:** Reestimating the Table 2 Vote Choice Models with controls for the number of elites on an individual's block.

Outcome Variable:	Support for majority party			
	Alexandria		Newport	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Household wealth (thousands of dollars)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
ln(Household wealth)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Mid-status occupation	0.041 (0.031)	0.011 (0.035)	-0.074* (0.022)	0.040 (0.027)
High-status occupation	0.029 (0.045)	0.004 (0.047)	-0.038 (0.050)	0.083 (0.050)
Owens home?	0.040 (0.036)	0.046 (0.036)	-0.056* (0.027)	-0.048 (0.027)
Age (years)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.006 (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)
ln(Age)	-0.065 (0.243)	-0.064 (0.242)	-0.194 (0.158)	-0.284 (0.153)
Is church member?	0.061* (0.027)	0.094* (0.034)	—	—
Is African American?	—	—	-0.276* (0.092)	-0.368* (0.090)
Is U.S. born?	0.222* (0.036)	0.197* (0.038)	-0.057* (0.024)	-0.028 (0.023)
Number of majority party elites on block	0.086 (0.062)	0.071 (0.062)	0.091 (0.107)	0.030 (0.104)
Number of minority party elites on block	-0.133 (0.093)	-0.097 (0.093)	-0.121* (0.060)	-0.088 (0.059)
Network centrality (Z score)	—	-0.008 (0.014)	—	0.055* (0.009)
Social proximity to majority party elites (Z score)	—	0.212* (0.072)	—	0.276* (0.069)
Social proximity to minority party elites (Z score)	—	-0.291* (0.073)	—	-0.179* (0.071)
Intercept	0.499 (0.653)	0.570 (0.649)	1.076* (0.402)	1.146* (0.391)
N	1128	1128	1381	1381
R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.071	0.033	0.097
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.044	0.059	0.025	0.088
RMSE	0.431	0.428	0.367	0.355

\* $p < 0.05$

Note: Reported coefficients are from ordinary least squares regressions (with standard errors in parentheses). Models are restricted to voters. The outcome variable is equal to the proportion of votes cast for the majority party in the city (The Opposition Party in Alexandria; The Democratic Party in Newport). The omitted reference category for occupational status includes low-status occupations, the unemployed, and those lacking occupational data. In each city, an F-test suggests that Model 2—which includes the social network measures—provides a better fit than does Model 1 (In Alexandria,  $F(DF = 3, 1113) = 3.9$ ;  $p < .001$ . In Newport,  $F(DF = 3, 1366) = 12.2$ ;  $p < .001$ ).

## J References for Online Appendices

- Allen, Howard W. and Kay Warren Allen. 1981. Vote Fraud and Data Validity. In *Analyzing Electoral History: A Guide to the Study of American Voter Behavior*, ed. Jerome Clubb, William Flanigan and Nancy Zingale. Sage Publications pp. 153–193.
- Bensel, Richard Franklin. 2004. *The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourke, Paul and Donald A. DeBats. 1995. *Washington County: Politics and Community in Antebellum America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bourke, Paul F. and Donald A. DeBats. 1977. “Identifiable Voting in Nineteenth-Century America: Toward a Comparison of Britain and the United States Before the Secret Ballot.” *Perspectives in American History* 11:259–88.
- Bourke, Paul F. and Donald A. DeBats. 1987. “The Structures of Political Involvement in the Nineteenth Century: A Frontier Case.” *Perspectives in American History* 3:207–238.
- Burnham, Walter Dean. 1965. “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe.” *American Political Science Review* 59:7–28.
- Burnham, Walter Dean. 1974. “Theory and Voting Research: Some Reflections on Converse’s “Change in the American Electorate”.” *American Political Science Review* 68(03):1002–1023.
- Burnham, Walter Dean. 2007. “Triumphs and Travails in the Study of American Voting Participation Rates, 1788-2006.” *Journal of The Historical Society* 7(4):505–519.
- Converse, Philip E. 1972. Change in the American Electorate. In *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, ed. Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse. New York: Russell Sage Foundation pp. 263–337.

- DeBats, Donald A. 2008. "A Tale of Two Cities: Using Tax Records to Develop GIS Files for Mapping and Understanding Nineteenth-Century U.S. Cities." *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History* 41(1):17–38.
- DeBats, Donald A. and Mark Lethbridge. 2005. "GIS and the City: Nineteenth-Century Residential Patterns." *Historical Geograph* 33:78–98.
- Emery, George. 2012. *Elections in Oxford County, 1837-1875: A Case Study of Democracy in Canada West and Early Ontario*. University of Toronto Press.
- Fredman, Lionel E. 1968. *The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State Univ Pr.
- Gerber, Alan S. and Donald P. Green. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." *The American Political Science Review* 94(3):653–663.
- Hauser, Robert M. 1982. "Occupational Status in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries." *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History* 15(3):111–126.
- Heckman, James A. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error." *Econometrica* 47(1):153–161.
- Holt, Michael F. 2001. "Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century (review)." *Civil War History* 47(2):164–167.
- Honaker, James, Gary King, Matthew Blackwell and others. 2011. "Amelia II: A program for missing data." *Journal of Statistical Software* 45(7):1–47.
- Katz, Michael B. 1975. *The People of Hamilton, Canada West: Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth-Century City*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Key, V. O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: A. Knopf.



- Leifeld, Philip. 2013. "texreg: Conversion of Statistical Model Output in R to  $\text{\LaTeX}$  and HTML Tables." *Journal of Statistical Software* 55(8):1–24.
- Lessoff, Alan and James J. Connolly. 2013. "From Political Insult to Political Theory: The Boss, the Machine, and the Pluralist City." *Journal of Policy History* 25(02):139–172.
- Long, J. Scott. 1997. *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Rainey, Carlisle. 2014. "Arguing for a Negligible Effect." *American Journal of Political Science* (58):1083–1091.
- Sekhon, Jasjeet S. 2009. "Opiates for the Matches: Matching Methods for Causal Inference." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(1):487–508.
- Silbey, Joel. 1994. *The American Political Nation: 1838 - 1893*. Stanford University Press.
- Thernstrom, Stephan. 2009. *Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City*. Harvard University Press.
- VanderWeele, Tyler J. 2011. "Sensitivity Analysis for Contagion Effects in Social Networks." *Sociological Methods & Research* 40(2):240–255.
- Wasserman, Stanley and Katherine Faust. 1994. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge University Press.