Supplementary Materials

Utility of amending

We can think of the utility a cabinet party derives from amending the legislative proposals of their partners in government as a function of three parameters: the electoral benefit, the policy benefit, and the cost of drafting and proposing the amendment. Here, electoral rewards are a function of the benefit of differentiation from the bill's authoring party. As the perceived distance between the proposing party and the reviewing party closes (relative to their selected positions), the benefit of differentiation increases and therefore the probability of amending should increase in kind. We can write a simple utility function for a cabinet party a in the legislative review process as: $U_a = (v - m) + p - c$, where U_a is the utility a reviewing party derives from amending the legislative proposal before it. Here, p captures the policy benefit of amending (think of this as the distance between the a's ideal point and the policy proposal), c captures the cost of drafting and submitting the amendment, v is the distance between the reviewing party a and the party of the proposing minister as perceived by voters, and m is the distance between the two as staked out in their electoral manifestos. Holding p and c at zero, the utility of differentiating through amendment is positive when voters perceive the pair as more similar than their selected positions, and negative when voters perceive the pair as more dissimilar than their selected positions. As such, for any constant value of m, the utility of amending increases as v falls.

Pivotal opposition

The main text notes that every position of the opposition party relative to the ministerial and reviewing parties must result in one of the following: increase the minister's incentive to make an offer about the coalition compromise; increase the minister's incentive to make an offer about the reviewing party's ideal point; or decrease the reviewing party's incentive to amend. To understand this, consider a two-party coalition composed of m and r, the proposing ministerial party and reviewing party, respectively, where the coalition compromise position x, is located $m < x < r$, with some opposition party o. For an arrangement of the parties $m < r < o$ when the cabinet controls a majority and does not require the support of the opposition, our expectation is that m would propose some policy p about its ideal point ($m \leq p < x$) and r would be compelled to amend the policy to drag it back to the coalition compromise x; this is the intuition of the Martin and Vanberg (2011) model. In the case of a minority cabinet, o becomes pivotal and m is much more likely to make an initial offer closer to x or perhaps even greater ($p \geq x$) in order to maintain the support of o, therefore shrinking $|p - x|$ and reducing the number of amendments r must propose to monitor the coalition agreement. We should observe a similar reduction in amendments given the arrangement $o < m < r$. Again, when the coalition controls a majority of the legislature, we would expect m to propose about its ideal point and r to rein the proposal in to the compromise position by amending. When the cabinet is a minority however, m may propose about its ideal point and r is constrained in its ability to amend, as each amendment it offers to bring the policy back to the coalition compromise increases the likelihood that o will reject the policy and vote against it. Finally, for an arrangement $m < o < r$ (which is observed very rarely), the placement of o serves as de facto enforcement of the coalition compromise. Thus, for any ideological rank-ordering of cabinet and opposition parties, we should observe fewer amendments submitted by minority coalitions due to the cabinet's obligation to maintain pivotal opposition support.

Martin and Vanberg replication

Below, I replicate the **?** model of legislative review by collapsing the data from the party-bill level to bill level and summing all amendments offered by all cabinet parties for the dependent variable. The variables in these models are calculated following **?** and the models specification is the same less three exceptions. There is no opposition divisiveness variable here as opposition amendments have been omitted. There is also no variable indicating the number of committee referrals as in the original model. This is because multiple committee referrals are vanishingly rare in the countries analyzed here. Indeed, going back to the original data used by Martin and Vanberg, it appears that multiple referrals are effectively limited to Germany. In their data 99% of their German bills are referred to multiple committees, while only 3% of their Dutch bills are referred to more than one committee and, in this, sample, there are no bills in which a second committee issues an independent report. Finally, because there are several minority cabinets in my sample, I include a binary variable indicating such, and also estimate a second model including the identity of the committee chairs: ministerial party, opposition party or the baseline category, a partner party to the submitting minister. In both models, random intercepts are allowed at the level of the cabinet.

As Table 3 shows, Martin and Vanberg's primary finding — that amendment activity increases with the proposing minister's ideological distance from the coalition bargain — is manifest in this sample. This is good as it not only reaffirms support for their theoretical model in new data, but also suggests that the determinants of policy-motivated amendments in my sample are similar to the determinants in their original sample, even though the time periods are quite different and the countries are different: Germany and the Netherlands in **?** and Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands here. This means that the mechanics of legislative review are likely to be relatively common in parliamentary democracies with strong committee systems, thus, the conclusions that I draw from the main text analysis are likely to travel outside of the sample countries.

Table 3: Replication of Martin and Vanberg (2005)

	Without Chairs		With Chairs	
	Parameter	(SE)	Parameter	(SE)
Compromise Distance	0.954	(0.363)	0.980	(0.363)
Junior Minister	0.943	(0.263)	0.923	(0.266)
Minority	-3.661	(0.600)	-3.549	(0.615)
ln(Days in Review)	0.696	(0.126)	0.694	(0.126)
ln(Articles)	0.670	(0.100)	0.695	(0.101)
Plenary Expiration	-1.557	(0.944)	-1.546	(0.941)
Minister Chair			-0.321	(0.292)
Opposition Chair			-0.357	(0.276)
Intercept	-4.021	(0.613)	-3.874	(0.622)
$ln(\theta)$	2.247	(0.076)	2.240	(0.076)
var(Random Intercepts: Cabinet)	0.795	(0.423)	0.841	(0.447)
N	2209		2209	
ln(*likelihood*)	-1578.337		-1577.374	

Comparisons of focal measure

In Table 4, I present the results of models measuring the focal variables at different points in time. Either using the public opinion survey and policy manifesto issued about the time of the cabinet's formation, or the survey and manifesto administered/issued most recently to the bill being analyzed, or the survey and manifesto administered/issued most proximate to the bill being analyzed. The effect sizes are very consistent across the measures, with the most proximate measure yielding the largest effects.

Table 4: Comparisons of focal measure

	Cabinet		Recent		Proximate	
	Coef	(SE)	Coef	(SE)	Coef	(SE)
Voter Distance	-0.092	(0.028)	-0.117	(0.031)	-0.105	(0.030)
CMP Distance	-0.379	(0.077)	-0.387	(0.077)	-0.101	(0.065)
Compromise Distance	1.167	(0.321)	1.158	(0.322)	1.103	(0.325)
Minority Cabinet	-0.672	(0.578)	-0.686	(0.579)	-0.735	(0.575)
Junior Minister	-0.081	(0.062)	-0.087	(0.062)	0.006	(0.059)
Reviewer Chair	-0.092	(0.238)	-0.119	(0.237)	-0.191	(0.236)
Minister Chair	-0.259	(0.315)	-0.277	(0.315)	-0.326	(0.315)
Partner Chair	-0.299	(0.237)	-0.337	(0.238)	-0.332	(0.237)
Seat Share	2.294	(0.310)	2.332	(0.310)	2.163	(0.307)
ln(Cabinet Size)	-0.569	(0.786)	-0.536	(0.788)	-0.916	(0.773)
ln(Articles)	0.980	(0.096)	0.984	(0.096)	0.975	(0.096)
ln(Days in Review)	0.914	(0.130)	0.909	(0.131)	0.918	(0.130)
Plenary Expiration	-1.640	(1.497)	-1.645	(1.499)	-1.591	(1.490)
Denmark	-3.892	(0.713)	-3.841	(0.714)	-4.054	(0.704)
Netherlands	0.352	(0.418)	0.409	(0.418)	0.189	(0.412)
Intercept	-8.698	(1.374)	-8.718	(1.376)	-8.215	(1.356)
var(Random Intercepts: Bills)	9.607	(1.001)	9.626	(1.003)	9.378	(0.979)
N	4324		4327		4519	
$ln(likelihood)$	-2647.171		-2645.361		-2658.308	

Full model comparison for over-dispersion

In the main text, I present the results of a poisson model where error components are estimated at the bill-level. However, the data are overdispersed with zeroes, violating poisson assumptions of mean-variance equivalence and conditional independence. Typically, researchers turn to the negative binomial in this case, or, less frequently, zero-inflated or hurdle models. However, the hierarchical model presented in the main text more efficiently models out the over-dispersion and has the added benefit of capturing bill-level correlations in the data. Nonetheless, I present comparisons of poisson and negative binomial models, assessing pooled models, hierarchical models (like the one presented in the main text), and zero-inflated models. First, in Table 5, I compared standard pooled models. Both support the hypothesis, however, the poisson model provides substantially better fit, despite the $ln(\theta)$ estimate in the negative binomial showing that the data are clearly over dispersed. This over dispersion, however, is rooted in a preponderance of zero counts, rather than violation of independence assumption — which, in data like these, is easier to think of as the amount "effort" is take to increase the count by one unit; is the transition 1 to 2 as "difficult" or as likely as the transition from 10 to 11? This means that the real data issue to contend with is the zeroes.

Table 5: Comparison of pooled poisson and negative binomial

	Poisson		Negative Binomial	
	Parameter	(SE)	Parameter	(SE)
Voter Distance	-0.175	(0.023)	-0.212	(0.088)
CMP Distance	-0.045	(0.054)	0.324	(0.222)
Compromise Distance	0.561	(0.071)	0.296	(0.299)
Junior Minister	0.537	(0.048)	0.282	(0.228)
Reviewer Chair	0.234	(0.054)	0.084	(0.211)
Minister Chair	0.394	(0.054)	-0.151	(0.206)
Partner Chair	0.380	(0.049)	0.253	(0.202)
Seat Share	4.129	(0.280)	3.695	(0.995)
ln(Cabinet Size)	-0.031	(0.158)	-0.166	(0.504)
Minority Cabinet	-0.321	(0.140)	-0.118	(0.442)
ln(Articles)	0.519	(0.015)	0.696	(0.068)
ln(Days in Review)	0.532	(0.020)	0.538	(0.081)
Plenary Expiration	-0.474	(0.346)	-0.928	(0.568)
Country				
Denmark	-3.090	(0.249)	-3.151	(0.482)
Netherlands	0.228	(0.082)	0.723	(0.292)
Intercept	-4.223	(0.271)	-4.545	(0.928)
$ln(\theta)$			2.360	(0.059)
N	4519		4519	
$ln(likelihood)$	-7123.246		-2607.313	
Mean Deviance $\lvert\hat{y} - y\rvert$	1.049		1.130	

Next, I compare poisson and negative binomial zero-inflated models in table 6. There is very little difference in fit across the two specifications and both support the hypothesis, however, some of the estimates are odd (negative estimates on compromise distance, positive estimates on minority status, or positive estimate on having a junior minister are discordant with theory), implying that a zero-inflated model is not the correct choice.

Finally, I compare fit across hierarchical specifications, where random effects are allowed at the bill level in Table 7. Notice that the fit is improved dramatically over the standard pooled models

and zero-inflated specifications. Notice also that the recovered logged scaling parameter in the negative binomial model is is 0. This implies that the random effects has successfully modeled out the over-dispersion and estimation of a negative binomial, rather than poisson, is unnecessary and this is reflected in the quality of fit differences between the model. Indeed, if we merely compare the quality of the predicted values, the poisson outperforms the negative binomial 3824 to 695. As such, we should not be concerned that the hierarchical negative binomial does not support the hypothesis, but does produce odd estimates.

The final estimates are the results of a non-parametric bootstrap, modeling the error in the estimated independent variables (voter distance, CMP distance, and compromise distance), given in Table 8. The process imputes new values of the estimated covariates, estimates the model, records the results and repeats 1,000 times. The hypothesized results stand, however, the error in the CMP estimates (which can be fairly large) wash out the robustness of the compromise distance estimates.

Table 6: Comparison of poisson and negative binomial zero-inflated models

		Poisson		Negative Binomial	
		Parameter	(SE)	Parameter	(SE)
	Voter Distance	-0.190	(0.023)	-0.208	(0.092)
	CMP Distance	0.106	(0.056)	0.046	(0.211)
	Compromise Distance	-0.051	(0.080)	0.051	(0.290)
	Junior Minister	0.234	(0.048)	0.244	(0.244)
	Reviewer Chair	0.300	(0.055)	0.414	(0.234)
	Minister Chair	0.289	(0.056)	0.400	(0.245)
	Partner Chair	0.460	(0.051)	0.429	(0.231)
	Seat Share	1.149	(0.285)	0.877	(1.151)
Count	ln(Cabinet Size)	0.015	(0.168)	0.639	(0.683)
	Minority Cabinet	-0.198	(0.145)	0.027	(0.554)
	ln(Articles)	0.150	(0.017)	0.198	(0.077)
	ln(Days in Review)	0.216	(0.021)	0.412	(0.088)
	Plenary Expiration	0.216	(0.389)	0.543	(0.901)
	Denmark	-1.638	(0.409)	-1.616	(0.756)
	Netherlands	0.583	(0.088)	1.015	(0.376)
	Intercept	-0.019	(0.296)	-2.736	(1.280)
	$ln(\theta)$			1.332	(0.147)
	Voter Distance	-0.028	(0.065)	-0.093	(0.119)
	CMP Distance	0.103	(0.156)	0.007	(0.329)
	Compromise Distance	-0.778	(0.208)	-1.616	(0.619)
	Junior Minister	-0.412	(0.169)	-0.494	(0.277)
	Reviewer Chair	0.218	(0.160)	0.665	(0.297)
	Minister Chair	0.171	(0.160)	0.726	(0.302)
	Partner Chair	0.183	(0.146)	0.614	(0.279)
	Seat Share	-4.340	(0.886)	-5.784	(1.411)
Inflate	ln(Cabinet Size)	-0.076	(0.388)	0.858	(0.843)
	Minority Cabinet	-0.169	(0.350)	-0.039	(0.605)
	ln(Articles)	-0.578	(0.046)	-0.939	(0.140)
	ln(Days in Review)	-0.381	(0.065)	-0.326	(0.116)
	Plenary Expiration	0.981	(0.661)	1.752	(0.953)
	Denmark	1.810	(0.509)	2.447	(0.836)
	Netherlands	0.376	(0.212)	1.191	(0.485)
	Intercept	5.065	(0.690)	3.053	(1.546)
	N	4519		4519	
	$ln(likelihood)$	-4004.898		-2513.992	
	Mean Deviance $\lvert\hat{y} - y\rvert$	0.699		0.702	

Table 7: Comparison of hierarchical poisson and negative binomial

	Poisson		Negative Binomial	
	Parameter	(SE)	Parameter	(SE)
Voter Distance	-0.105	(0.030)	-0.024	(0.069)
CMP Distance	-0.101	(0.065)	-0.107	(0.158)
Compromise Distance	1.103	(0.325)	1.033	(0.389)
Junior Minister	0.006	(0.059)	0.340	(0.184)
Reviewer Chair	-0.191	(0.236)	-0.265	(0.279)
Minister Chair	-0.326	(0.315)	-0.346	(0.344)
Partner Chair	-0.332	(0.237)	-0.399	(0.280)
Seat Share	2.163	(0.307)	4.881	(0.905)
ln(Cabinet Size)	-0.916	(0.773)	-0.659	(0.863)
Minority Cabinet	-0.735	(0.575)	-0.450	(0.633)
ln(Articles)	0.975	(0.096)	1.020	(0.107)
ln(Days in Review)	0.918	(0.130)	0.923	(0.146)
Plenary Expiration	-1.591	(1.490)	-1.320	(1.498)
Country				
Denmark	-4.054	(0.704)	-3.749	(0.744)
Netherlands	0.189	(0.412)	0.084	(0.461)
Intercept	-8.215	(1.356)	-9.019	(1.501)
$ln(\theta)$			-0.006	(0.114)
var(Random Intercepts: Bills)	9.378	(0.979)	8.397	(0.965)
N	4519		4519	
$ln(likelihood)$	-2658.308		-2318.375	
Mean Deviance $\lvert\hat{y} - y\rvert$	0.332		0.395	
Better Fit	3834		685	

Table 8: Bootstrap results. Hierarchical poisson with random intercepts allowed at the bill level.

	Poisson		
	Parameter	(SE)	p
Voter Distance	-0.117	(0.033)	0.000
CMP Distance	-0.024	(0.110)	0.407
Junior Minister	0.016	(0.064)	0.404
Reviewer Chair	-0.236	(0.237)	0.161
Ministerial Chair	-0.290	(0.312)	0.176
Partner Chair	-0.377	(0.238)	0.058
Compromise Distance	0.062	(0.276)	0.410
Seat Share	2.171	(0.324)	0.000
Cabinet Size	-1.190	(0.768)	0.060
Minority Cabinet	-1.086	(0.569)	0.029
Articles	0.980	(0.096)	0.000
Days in Review	0.953	(0.131)	0.000
Plenary Expiration	-1.641	(1.500)	0.137
Country			
Denmark	-4.086	(0.710)	0.000
Netherlands	0.110	(0.411)	0.394
Intercept	-7.652	(1.337)	0.000
var(Random Intercepts: Bills)	9.625	(1.010)	
N	4519		
Average $ln(likelihood)$	-2660		

Stripped down and single-country models

In this section I show estimates from both stripped down and fully specified models, both within country and pooled. I begin with the stripped down models including only the covariate of interest, the exposure terms, and fixed and random effects (less Denmark which has too few governments of of three or more parties to efficiently estimate bill-level intercepts). These are given in Table9 and the estimates show that the focal variable is always signed in the correct direction, but fails to reach significance in the Netherlands model. To a degree, however, it is somewhat surprising that these uncontrolled models all produce at least the direction of the predicted effect. That is, there is a sufficiently large number of substantively and statistically significant predictors of amendment behavior (some of which are correlated with the covariate of interest) omitted from these models that the manifestation of the predicted effect is very encouraging.

Table 9: Stripped down by country

	Belgium		Denmark		Netherlands		All	
	Coef	(SE)	Coef	(SE)	Coef	(SE)	Coef	(SE)
Voter Distance	-0.077	(0.038)	-0.916	(0.449)	-0.032	(0.035)	-0.043	(0.025)
ln(Articles)	1.217	(0.168)	0.300	(0.232)	0.894	(0.124)	0.993	(0.096)
ln(Days in Review)	0.848	(0.202)	1.512	(0.362)	0.887	(0.179)	0.959	(0.130)
Plenary Expiration	-2.040	(1.709)					-1.683	(1.522)
Denmark							-4.198	(0.463)
Netherlands							0.567	(0.221)
Intercept	-9.510	(1.093)	-10.244	(1.574)	-8.458	(0.875)	-9.446	(0.681)
var(Random Intercepts: Bills)	9.605	(1.716)			10.286	(1.421)	9.825	(1.023)
N	1429		1693		1397		4324	
ln(*likelihood*)	-987.166		-106.135		-1620.355		-2697.726	

Table 10 displays the results of country-by-country regressions using all covariates as the full model in the main text. These models include fixed effects for the authoring ministers, rather than estimate random effects for bills, as in the main text specification. Differences in across countries in which submitting ministers/departments are included in the model are a function of which departments the countries have (for example, social affairs and labor exist within a single ministry in the Netherlands) and which departments are given spending/appropriating authority. Other covariates may be missing due to a lack of variation. For example, in the Denmark, nearly all observations are drawn from two-party cabinets. This makes the compromise distance and CMP distance variables collinear. Further, so-called "shadow chairs" are so common in Denmark, that bills almost never submitted to a committee chaired by the party of the authoring minister. Each of the models support the central hypothesis and it is encouraging to see that the hypothesized effect is manifest within each individual country as well as the pooled sample.

Table 10: Full model by country

	Belgium		Denmark		Netherlands	
	Coef	(SE)	Coef	(SE)	Coef	(SE)
Voter Distance	-0.152	(0.036)	-0.680	(0.574)	-0.081	(0.035)
CMP Distance	0.215	(0.069)			-0.149	(0.089)
Compromise Distance	-0.125	(0.103)	0.811	(1.382)	0.116	(0.143)
Junior Minister	-13.294	(456.648)			0.242	(0.053)
Reviewer Chair	0.127	(0.108)	-2.341	(1.055)	0.383	(0.069)
Minister Chair	0.454	(0.119)			0.678	(0.070)
Partner Chair	-0.149	(0.094)			0.576	(0.068)
Seat Share	1.127	(1.081)	5.525	(3.572)	3.965	(0.300)
ln(Cabinet Size)	-0.600	(0.248)			3.180	(0.708)
ln(Articles)	0.757	(0.028)	0.503	(0.299)	0.409	(0.018)
ln(Days in Review)	0.514	(0.038)	1.167	(0.375)	0.421	(0.027)
Plenary Expiration	-0.288	(0.373)				
Minority					0.843	(0.315)
Agriculture and Energy	base	base				
Commerce	0.824	(0.210)	base	base		
Defense	0.197	(0.211)				
Economy	1.071	(0.194)	0.246	(1.015)	base	base
Finance	-0.228	(0.198)	0.032	(1.252)	-1.720	(0.080)
Labor	0.503	(0.293)	-1.638	(1.249)		
Infrastructure/Regional	-0.016	(0.253)			-0.877	(0.217)
Social Welfare	-0.388	(0.296)	-1.950	(0.940)	-0.847	(0.050)
Intercept	-3.691	(0.513)	-9.413	(1.920)	-5.884	(0.789)
N	1429		1693		1397	
$ln(likelihood)$	-2039.848		-78.69064		-4467.500	

An anonymous reviewer raised the concern the three central measures of party distance (voter distance, CMP distance, and coalition compromise distance) may be sufficiently correlated to a) contribute to the main result or, b) induce the negative estimate on CMP distance. Tables 11 and 12 display diagnostics for the variables' collinearity and the results of models omitting coalition compromise and then CMP distance. The diagnostics suggest that we should be unconcerned with collinearity across these measures (quite low VIF and quite high tolerance estimates). However, the model results show instability in the CMP distance estimates — positive (though small) in pooled models and negative in hierarchical models. Meanwhile, the coalition compromise and voter distance estimates remain stable throughout specification. This leads to the conclusion that a) CMP distance is not a high quality predictor of amendment behavior (unlike voter distance and coalition compromise distance) and b) its relationship to amendments is dependent upon correlations in unmeasured characteristics within bill grouping in the data, though I cannot with any confidence conclude what those characteristics may be. It is worth noting that, of the three timings we could select for our measures — most proximate, most recent, measure at the time of cabinet formation — the most proximate measure of CMP distance comes closest to producing the robust positive relationship that one would expect, but only in the absence of random effects on bills.

Table 11: Collinearity diagnostics for central distance measures

Variable	VIF	Tolerance	R^2
Voter Distance	1.14	0.879	0.121
CMP Distance	1.17	0.858	0.142
Compromise Distance	1.03	0.973	0.027

Table 12: Stability of CMP and coalition compromise distance measures.

	CMP Distance		Compromise		All	
	Pooled	RE	Pooled	RE	Pooled	RE
Voter Distance	-0.082	-0.094	-0.075	-0.123	-0.075	-0.092
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.028)
CMP Distance	0.058	-0.360			0.002	-0.373
	(0.047)	(0.077)			(0.050)	(0.077)
Compromise Distance			0.228	0.715	0.228	0.881
			(0.062)	(0.340)	(0.066)	(0.340)
Junior Minister	0.567	-0.077	0.560	0.032	0.560	-0.081
	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.062)
Reviewer Chair	0.167	-0.159	0.195	-0.189	0.194	-0.115
	(0.053)	(0.236)	(0.053)	(0.237)	(0.054)	(0.238)
Minister Chair	0.345	-0.229	0.355	-0.340	0.354	-0.270
	(0.055)	(0.312)	(0.054)	(0.314)	(0.055)	(0.314)
Partner Chair	0.339	-0.362	0.361	-0.325	0.360	-0.320
	(0.048)	(0.236)	(0.048)	(0.237)	(0.048)	(0.238)
Seat Share	3.980	2.324	3.918	2.272	3.917	2.310
	(0.281)	(0.310)	(0.281)	(0.310)	(0.282)	(0.310)
ln(Cabinet Size)	-0.254	-0.912	-0.181	-0.923	-0.182	-0.693
	(0.155)	(0.774)	(0.154)	(0.778)	(0.157)	(0.783)
ln(Articles)	0.508	0.987	0.511	0.982	0.511	0.986
	(0.015)	(0.096)	(0.015)	(0.096)	(0.015)	(0.096)
ln(Days in Review)	0.542	0.962	0.539	0.937	0.539	0.937
	(0.020)	(0.131)	(0.020)	(0.130)	(0.020)	(0.130)
Plenary Expiration	-0.490	-1.650	-0.485	-1.602	-0.485	-1.624
	(0.345)	(1.516)	(0.345)	(1.504)	(0.345)	(1.515)
Minority	-0.478	-1.095	-0.449	-0.948	-0.449	-0.956
	(0.138)	(0.566)	(0.138)	(0.569)	(0.138)	(0.570)
Country						
Denmark	-3.016	-3.924	-2.978	-3.923	-2.979	-3.826
	(0.251)	(0.715)	(0.250)	(0.710)	(0.251)	(0.716)
Netherlands	0.076	0.247	0.104	0.175	0.103	0.309
	(0.082)	(0.414)	(0.081)	(0.414)	(0.082)	(0.417)
Intercept	-3.795	-8.014	-3.968	-8.218	-3.967	-8.554
	(0.265)	(1.335)	(0.268)	(1.359)	(0.271)	(1.368)
var(Random Intercepts: Bills)		9.871		9.491		9.708
		(1.029)		(0.991)		(1.013)
N	4324	4324	4324	4324	4324	4324
ln(*likelihood*)	-7193.404	-2651.798	-7187.626	-2660.856	-7187.626	-2649.403