

ONLINE APPENDIX:
INFORMATION PROVISION, VOTER COORDINATION, AND
ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM MEXICAN
SOCIAL NETWORKS

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A1 Main variable definitions

A1.1 Experimental data

Information provision is an indicator for precincts receiving the information treatment.

Malfasant spending is the share of funds spent either on projects not benefiting the poor or on unauthorized projects, as reported in the information treatment. Note that the treatment only reported one of these two shares.

Shared received is the share of voters to whom we delivered a leaflet. In control precincts, we use the share of leaflets delivered to the average treated precinct within a block.

A1.2 Electoral returns data

Incumbent party vote share (as a share of turnout) in 2012 and 2015 was calculated using official precinct-level electoral returns obtained from each state's electoral institute (through freedom of information requests).

Incumbent party vote share (as a share of registered voters) in 2012 and 2015 was calculated using official precinct-level electoral returns obtained from each state's electoral institute (through freedom of information requests).

Turnout in 2012 and 2015 was calculated using official precinct-level electoral returns obtained from each state's electoral institute (through freedom of information requests).

A1.3 2010 Census data

The **index of socioeconomic development** is a standardized summative rating scale combining the following precinct-level measures of socioeconomic development: average number of children per woman, share indigenous speakers, average years of schooling, share illiterate, share no schooling, share incomplete primary schooling, share higher education, share without health insurance,

average occupants per dwelling, average occupants per room, share non-dirt floor, share toilet at home, share running water, share drainage, share electricity, share fridge, share washing machine, and share computer. Cronbach's alpha is 0.81.

A1.4 Post-election survey data

Index of voters' engagement with the information is a standardized summative rating scale combining four (standardized) indicators. One, whether voters report remembering receiving the leaflet. Two, whether they report having read the leaflet. Three, whether they correctly recalled the types of spending the leaflet pertained to. To elicit this, respondents were given as options both types of spending (i.e., non-authorized and not-spent on the poor) as well as options related to unemployment, and public safety information; and the outcome variable takes a value of 1 only where respondents were correct, 0 otherwise. Finally, fourth, whether respondents declared that the leaflet influenced their vote.

Index of voters' coordination around the information is a standardized summative rating scale combining four (standardized) indicators. One, whether voters report believing that a large fraction of their community also received the information. To measure this, we asked respondents their beliefs about how many people in their community received the leaflet, with 5-scale options ranging from 'very few' to 'almost everybody'. We define responses in the upper 3-scales (i.e., 'about half', 'more than half', 'almost everybody') as a large fraction and code them as 1, 0 otherwise. Two, whether voters report having discussed the leaflet with others. Three, whether respondents declared coordinating their vote for a particular party during such discussion. Fourth, whether respondents acknowledged changing their vote due to this discussion. Finally, fifth, whether they reported having changed their vote because this discussion led them to think that other voters would change their vote as well.

Voters' posterior beliefs about incumbent and challenger party malfeasance follow from asking respondents to rate, on a five-point scale from very low (-2) to very high (2), each major party's

level of corruption or level of interest in supporting the poor (depending on the measure of malfeasance we focused on in that municipality). We then match those perceptions about each major party to each of the incumbents, as well as each of the challengers depending on the definition we consider (see main article for more details). We did not ask explicitly about the MC party, which was the incumbent party only in Apaseo el Alto. Consequently, the 19 precincts from this municipality are dropped from analyses examining posterior beliefs.

Prior is the prior belief about incumbent malfeasance, defined at the municipal level as the average posterior belief among the voters surveyed in the control precincts within the same municipality. This was required to deal with the lack of a baseline survey; [Arias et al. \(2018\)](#) defend this approach in detail.

Negative updating is the average change in perceptions about incumbent malfeasance before and after showing the informational leaflets to respondents in a municipality's control precincts.

Self-reported 2012 turnout is an individual's self-reported turnout in the previous municipal election in 2012.

Interest in politics is an indicator for voters who respond that they are, in general, interested in acquiring information about politics.

Media consumption index is an index based on asking respondents how often they follow electoral news over TV, radio, newspapers, and internet and social media, respectively, with possible responses ranging from "never" (1) to "daily" (5). We then took the mean of these four responses to create a standardized individual-level measure of overall media consumption.

A1.5 2006 and 2011 National Social Capital Surveys (ENCAS)

Participation in social organizations is available for all respondents. The survey question asks: "Which of the following organizations do you belong to?" The options include: participation in neighborhood associations, participation in religious associations, participation in self-help groups, and participation in other associations. Our indicator variable takes the value 1 if a person partici-

pates at least in one of these organizations and 0 if they participate in none.

Participation in social activities with other Prospera beneficiaries is only available for beneficiaries of Prospera. The survey question asks: “During this year, have you organized with other Prospera beneficiaries to organize the following activities?” The answers capture organization with other beneficiaries to perform a host of activities: attend municipal offices to file a complaint about a problem, ask for the intervention of a politician, participate in political activities, contact newspapers, perform a denunciation, and demand the right to high-quality education. Our indicator variable takes the value 1 if a person participates at least in one of these activities and 0 if they participate in none.

Informal transactions with other Prospera beneficiaries is only available for beneficiaries of Prospera. The survey question asks: “Please tell me which of the following activities you perform with other Prospera beneficiaries.” The answers include a host of everyday situations in which beneficiaries interact with each other: talking about the household’s problems, telling others about discounts at the marketplace, taking care of other people’s children, giving clothes or goods as a gift, lending money, giving food, inviting others to parties, asking someone to be the godfather of their children, helping with the harvest, helping to prepare food, telling the family if someone is sick, helping if someone is moving out, and giving someone a ride. Our indicator variable takes the value 1 if a person participates at least in one of these activities and 0 if they participate in none.

Perceived influence measures respondents’ perception of their influence in solving problems in the locality. The survey question asks: “How much do you think you and your neighbors can influence authorities so that they do something about the problems of your locality?” The response options are: a lot, much, a little, and nothing.

Cooperation measures the perceived likelihood of cooperation in the respondent’s locality. The survey question asks: “If there is a problem in your locality, how likely is that people cooperate to solve it?” The response options are: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, and not likely at all.

Problem-solving involvement is only available for beneficiaries of Prospera. The survey question asks: “In your opinion, what are the three activities that happen more often as a consequence of you being a Prospera beneficiary?” The options include: learning about the problems in the locality, learning how to solve a problem, experiencing support from other beneficiaries, and making demands. Our indicator variable takes the value 1 if a person lists at least one of these activities (as their first, second, or third choice) and 0 if they list none.

Problem-solving experience is a dummy variable measuring whether a respondent participated in solving a problem in the locality in the past 12 months. The survey question reads: “In the last twelve months, did you or a family member participate in solving the problems of your locality?”

Participation index is a standardized summative rating scale combining three items: participation in social organizations, participation in social activities with other Prospera beneficiaries, and informal transactions with other Prospera beneficiaries.

Efficacy index is a standardized summative rating scale combining four items: perceived influence, cooperation, problem-solving involvement, and problem-solving experience.

Overall community connectedness index is a standardized summative rating scale combining the two topic-indexes, namely the Participation index and the Efficacy index.

A2 Linking Prospera beneficiaries to electoral precincts

To link the localities of Prospera beneficiaries to electoral precincts, we use 2010 Census data on the spatial distribution of all individuals living in each locality and the boundaries of electoral precincts. If at least 90% of citizens in a locality are located within an electoral precinct, we assign the locality to that precinct. Where this restriction fails to hold, our approach depends on the locality’s size: if an unassigned locality represents less than 10% of the precinct population, we exclude Prospera beneficiaries located in the locality from that precinct’s network; if an unassigned locality represents more than 10% of the precinct population, as in most urban areas, we exclude

the precinct from our sample. This procedure ensures that Prospera beneficiaries are only used to characterize social networks when their locality primarily lies inside a given electoral precinct. Ultimately, this procedure yielded maps of linked individuals for 296 precincts containing 95,199 beneficiaries. This entailed dropping 382 predominantly urban precincts from the experimental sample due to a lack of reliable network data. Only one precinct in our final sample is classified by INEGI as urban (i.e. contains at least 2,500 inhabitants).

A3 Construction of precinct-level measures of network connectedness

To define precinct-level measures of network connectedness, let \mathbf{g} be the graph of a precinct network G containing N individuals, and let \mathbf{A} be the $N \times N$ adjacency matrix capturing pairwise links between each individual $j \in G$.

The degree of a node j is defined as the number of neighboring nodes connected to that particular node:

$$n_j(\mathbf{g}) = \#\{k \in G : g_{kj} = 1\} = \#N_j(\mathbf{g}), \tag{A1}$$

where $\#N_j$ is the cardinality of j 's neighborhood. Intuitively, the average degree of network G —given by $\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N n_j(\mathbf{g})$ —is simply the number of other beneficiaries to which the average individual beneficiary in a precinct is connected to. Figure A1 provides an example of two similarly sized networks that vary significantly in their average degree.

The largest eigenvalue of \mathbf{A} is the largest scalar λ that satisfies:

$$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{v} = \lambda\mathbf{v}, \tag{A2}$$

where v is the first corresponding eigenvector of A ; in the networks literature, this defines eigenvector centrality (see e.g. Jackson 2010). The largest eigenvalue λ approximates (but strictly exceeds) the network's average degree, and captures the extent to which the average individual is central in the sense that they are connected to other individuals recursively deemed to also be highly central. This measure contrasts with degree by recursively relying on the connectedness of connections. Figure A2 provides an example of two similarly sized networks that vary significantly in their largest eigenvalue.

Both measures are ultimately standardized in our sample.

A4 Balance tests

Table A1 reports balance tests for information provision in our final sample, based on equation (9), but excluding the interactions. The results demonstrate that, even after restricting the sample to precincts for which reliable network data are available, information provision is well-balanced across predetermined covariates. This suggests that random assignment continues to hold, which is not surprising since treatment assignment was designed to be orthogonal to precinct characteristics, such as population density and the extent of Prospera coverage, which determine the availability of reliable network measures.

A5 Failure to validate alternative measures of network connectedness

As noted in the main text, we also considered a variety of precinct-level measures of network connectedness other than average degree and the largest eigenvalue. Table A2 demonstrates that other common measures of aggregated network connectedness do not predict community connectedness, and are thus unlikely to be good proxies for a precinct's capacity to coordinate around information




Figure A1: Two networks with individual names as nodes. Top panel: Guanajuato, precinct 1981 (Number of nodes=38, Average Degree = 5.05). Bottom panel: Guanajuato, precinct 884 (Number of nodes=38, Average Degree = 9.26)




Figure A2: Two networks with individual names as nodes. Top panel: México, precinct 438 (Number of nodes=52, Largest Eigenvalue = 5.08). Bottom panel: México, precinct 454 (Number of nodes=53, Largest Eigenvalue = 15.22)

Table A1: Effect of information provision on 40 precinct-level and 8 individual-level pre-treatment variables

	Control mean	Treatment mean	Treatment effect	Standard error	Observations
Precinct-level covariates					
Area	20.8	20.8	-1.797	(1.508)	296
Population	1,235	1,257	13.471	(45.656)	296
Population density	178	149	6.936	(23.450)	296
Distance from municipal centroid	11,572	12,999	871.429*	(484.852)	296
Number of households	279	285	6.103	(9.122)	296
Number of private dwellings	349	354	4.879	(11.027)	296
Average occupants dwelling	4.40	4.39	-0.038	(0.037)	296
Average occupants per room	1.35	1.35	-0.011	(0.014)	296
Share of homes with 2+ rooms	0.61	0.61	0.006	(0.006)	296
Share of homes with 3+ rooms	0.71	0.71	0.004	(0.008)	296
Average years of schooling	6.04	5.82	-0.067	(0.063)	296
Share married	0.57	0.57	-0.002	(0.004)	296
Share working age	0.58	0.58	0.002	(0.003)	296
Share economically active	0.32	0.32	0.002	(0.005)	296
Share without health care	0.28	0.28	0.012	(0.010)	296
Share with state workers health care	0.02	0.01	-0.001	(0.002)	296
Share old	0.08	0.08	0.001	(0.002)	296
Average children per woman	3.01	3.09	0.065**	(0.028)	296
Share of households with male head	0.80	0.80	-0.002	(0.005)	296
Share born out of state	0.04	0.05	0.008	(0.007)	296
Share indigenous speakers	0.11	0.10	0.017	(0.013)	296
Share of homes without a dirt floor	0.87	0.86	-0.010	(0.012)	296
Share of homes with a toilet	0.78	0.76	0.002	(0.011)	296
Share of homes with water	0.69	0.73	0.023	(0.022)	296
Share of homes with drainage	0.66	0.65	-0.008	(0.014)	296
Share of homes with electricity	0.91	0.92	0.009	(0.009)	296
Share of homes with water, drainage, and electricity	0.52	0.52	-0.002	(0.016)	296
Share of homes with a washing machine	0.39	0.40	0.008	(0.014)	296
Share of homes with a landline telephone	0.18	0.15	-0.027**	(0.011)	296
Share of homes with a radio	0.74	0.75	0.002	(0.007)	296
Share of homes with a fridge	0.61	0.62	0.012	(0.019)	296
Share of homes with a cell phone	0.33	0.36	0.012	(0.011)	296
Share of homes with a television	0.81	0.81	-0.007	(0.009)	296
Number of local media stations	2.09	2.06	-0.024	(0.022)	296
Share of homes with a car	0.33	0.33	-0.008	(0.007)	296
Share of homes with a computer	0.05	0.05	0.001	(0.004)	296
Share of homes with internet	0.02	0.01	0.001	(0.003)	296
Turnout in 2012	0.62	0.62	0.007	(0.005)	296
Incumbent party vote margin in 2012	-0.21	-0.22	-0.015	(0.011)	296
Incumbent party vote share in 2012	0.43	0.43	0.008	(0.011)	296
Survey-level covariates					
Female	0.63	0.67	0.038	(0.024)	2,218
Age	44.18	44.09	0.044	(0.725)	2,176
Education	6.64	6.39	-0.258	(0.207)	2,215
Income	2.03	1.82	-0.202**	(0.082)	2,010
Employed	0.40	0.39	-0.002	(0.024)	2,216
Turnout in 2012	0.62	0.61	-0.010	(0.020)	2,218
Incumbent vote in 2012	0.56	0.52	-0.036	(0.026)	1,367
Political knowledge Index	2.39	2.47	0.056	(0.041)	2,218

Notes: Specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Precinct-level specifications are weighted by the share of the precinct that was treated, whereas survey-level specifications are unweighted. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2: Correlation between other network connectedness measures and community connectedness

	Overall community connectedness index			
Closeness	0.002 (0.017)			
Link density	0.003 (0.014)			
Average clustering	-0.008 (0.014)			
Average Path Length	0.010 (0.014)			
Observations	2,267	2,267	2,267	2,267
Outcome mean	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74
Outcome std. dev.	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32

Notes: All specifications estimated using OLS. All measures of network connectedness are standardized. Standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

provision.

A6 No discernible effects on voter turnout

Table A3 shows that neither information provision, nor its interaction with network connectedness, affects precinct-level electoral turnout. This suggests that our results for incumbent vote share (as a share of turnout) are driven by changes primarily in the numerator rather than the denominator. This also implies that voters either shifted from challenger to incumbent, or that the number of voters that shifted from challenger to abstention is similar to the number of voters that shifted from abstention to incumbent.

Table A3: Effect of information provision on turnout across precincts with varying network connectedness

	Weighted by share of population that received leaflets					Unweighted				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Information provision	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.044 (0.029)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.028 (0.023)
× Average Degree		0.005 (0.004)	0.008 (0.010)				0.006 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.039)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.006 (0.005)	0.011 (0.009)				0.002 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.040)
× Share Received							0.012 (0.013)	0.119* (0.065)	0.013 (0.013)	0.038 (0.029)
× Average Degree × Share Received							0.001 (0.014)	0.015 (0.045)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received									0.005 (0.013)	0.029 (0.049)
Observations	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296
Control outcome mean	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53
Control outcome std. dev.	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Network measure mean		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Network measure std. dev.		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean						0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Share Received std. dev.						0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
Controls			✓		✓			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Columns 1-5 are weighted by the share of the precinct that received a leaflet (or would have received a leaflet, for control precincts). Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3), (5) and (8) and (10) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A7 Effect of information provision, by engagement and coordination indexes subitems

Tables A4 and A5 break our four-item index of voter engagement into its separate components. Tables A6 and A7 break our five-item index of voter coordination into its separate components. The results provide evidence that both tacit coordination (through common knowledge of information provision and higher-order beliefs) and explicit coordination (through interpersonal agreements) could be driving our coordination findings.

A8 Lack of differential effects by local and benchmark treatment variants

Tables A8-A12 show our estimates when separating information provision into local information (i.e. own incumbent) and benchmark information (i.e. own incumbent and average of other incumbent parties within the state). At the foot of each panel, we report tests for differential effects between the two types of treatment. Although there are some statistically significant differences between the coefficients, they are rare and not consistent across outcomes. Moreover, where differences occur (principally in Table A9), they are primarily on the level, rather than with respect to the interaction coefficients that represent the main estimates of the article. In sum, the results suggest that the benchmark treatment did not substantively alter voters' response to incumbent performance information provision, and thus support our decision to pool across modes of information provision.

Table A4: Effect of information provision on engagement components, by network connectedness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Report remembering receiving the leaflet					
Information provision	1.276*** (0.105)	1.290*** (0.102)	1.273*** (0.081)	1.290*** (0.102)	1.271*** (0.083)
× Average Degree		0.200 (0.128)	0.132 (0.160)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.204 (0.122)	0.166 (0.141)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel B: Report remembering reading the leaflet					
Information provision	1.321*** (0.111)	1.341*** (0.101)	1.287*** (0.083)	1.339*** (0.103)	1.285*** (0.086)
× Average Degree		0.363*** (0.127)	0.267 (0.160)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.348** (0.133)	0.283* (0.149)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel C: Correctly recalled the types of spending the leaflet pertained to					
Information provision	0.982*** (0.099)	0.997*** (0.077)	0.980*** (0.060)	0.996*** (0.081)	0.979*** (0.062)
× Average Degree		0.316*** (0.093)	0.217* (0.118)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.296*** (0.106)	0.202 (0.119)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel D: Declared that the leaflet influenced their vote					
Information provision	0.620*** (0.123)	0.642*** (0.103)	0.623*** (0.092)	0.639*** (0.108)	0.626*** (0.093)
× Average Degree		0.400*** (0.124)	0.305** (0.143)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.362** (0.141)	0.237 (0.148)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Effect of information provision on engagement components, by network connectedness and share received

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Report remembering receiving the leaflet					
Information provision	1.276*** (0.105)	1.058*** (0.229)	0.912*** (0.235)	1.036*** (0.220)	0.905*** (0.232)
× Share Received		0.303 (0.244)	0.422 (0.404)	0.338 (0.232)	0.429 (0.395)
× Average Degree		-0.125 (0.211)	-0.692* (0.372)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.409* (0.226)	1.261*** (0.439)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.136 (0.210)	-0.553 (0.383)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.440* (0.224)	1.079** (0.442)
Panel B: Report remembering reading the leaflet					
Information provision	1.321*** (0.111)	1.079*** (0.217)	0.753** (0.292)	1.050*** (0.210)	0.762** (0.281)
× Share Received		0.338 (0.264)	0.643 (0.490)	0.379 (0.254)	0.620 (0.470)
× Average Degree		0.093 (0.254)	-0.571 (0.415)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.338 (0.258)	1.257** (0.530)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.035 (0.273)	-0.544 (0.420)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.401 (0.271)	1.194** (0.520)
Panel C: Correctly recalled the types of spending the leaflet pertained to					
Information provision	0.982*** (0.099)	0.648*** (0.185)	0.273 (0.265)	0.629*** (0.183)	0.301 (0.259)
× Share Received		0.460* (0.229)	0.909** (0.419)	0.486** (0.221)	0.863** (0.411)
× Average Degree		0.279 (0.212)	-0.334 (0.281)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.030 (0.209)	0.743** (0.326)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.214 (0.235)	-0.445 (0.303)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.095 (0.220)	0.838** (0.339)
Panel D: Declared that the leaflet influenced their vote					
Information provision	0.620*** (0.123)	0.311** (0.120)	0.370 (0.302)	0.259** (0.123)	0.359 (0.297)
× Share Received		0.433*** (0.117)	0.205 (0.416)	0.510*** (0.111)	0.215 (0.404)
× Average Degree		0.044 (0.176)	0.001 (0.262)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.440** (0.177)	0.309 (0.318)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.085 (0.208)	-0.256 (0.264)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.582*** (0.191)	0.603* (0.313)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Effect of information provision on coordination components, by network connectedness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Correctly identify that a large fraction of their community received a leaflet					
Information provision	0.735*** (0.045)	0.738*** (0.043)	0.757*** (0.039)	0.739*** (0.043)	0.753*** (0.041)
× Average Degree		0.115 (0.076)	0.163* (0.092)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.117* (0.066)	0.190** (0.073)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel B: Engaged in discussion of leaflet					
Information provision	0.793*** (0.086)	0.806*** (0.073)	0.792*** (0.048)	0.804*** (0.073)	0.793*** (0.049)
× Average Degree		0.237* (0.118)	0.175 (0.124)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.228* (0.119)	0.165 (0.116)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel C: Social coordination around leaflet					
Information provision	0.278*** (0.083)	0.293*** (0.070)	0.262*** (0.067)	0.291*** (0.071)	0.262*** (0.068)
× Average Degree		0.221*** (0.077)	0.121 (0.102)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.226** (0.083)	0.153* (0.086)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel D: Discussion of leaflet changed own vote					
Information provision	0.360*** (0.105)	0.375*** (0.095)	0.377*** (0.093)	0.372*** (0.096)	0.382*** (0.095)
× Average Degree		0.243** (0.116)	0.221* (0.115)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.219* (0.120)	0.163 (0.114)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Panel E: Discussion of leaflet changed others' vote					
Information provision	0.243** (0.102)	0.261*** (0.086)	0.215*** (0.086)	0.258*** (0.090)	0.219** (0.089)
× Average Degree		0.252*** (0.084)	0.088 (0.167)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.227** (0.097)	0.039 (0.144)
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Effect of information provision on coordination components, by network connectedness and share received

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Correctly identify that a large fraction of their community received a leaflet					
Information provision	0.735*** (0.045)	0.413*** (0.105)	0.403*** (0.145)	0.396*** (0.101)	0.395** (0.146)
× Share Received		0.419*** (0.131)	0.360 (0.231)	0.449*** (0.124)	0.375 (0.230)
× Average Degree		-0.088 (0.133)	-0.579*** (0.207)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.247 (0.149)	1.024*** (0.232)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.076 (0.126)	-0.422** (0.196)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.243* (0.138)	0.806*** (0.213)
Panel B: Engaged in social discussion of leaflet					
Information provision	0.793*** (0.086)	0.358** (0.170)	0.192 (0.236)	0.319* (0.163)	0.170 (0.228)
× Share Received		0.579*** (0.200)	0.827** (0.356)	0.636*** (0.189)	0.852** (0.342)
× Average Degree		-0.060 (0.180)	-0.281 (0.272)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.363* (0.179)	0.708** (0.322)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.111 (0.184)	-0.294 (0.270)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.431** (0.179)	0.730** (0.324)
Panel C: Social coordination around leaflet					
Information provision	0.278*** (0.083)	0.073 (0.111)	0.103 (0.229)	0.038 (0.103)	0.047 (0.213)
× Share Received		0.288** (0.117)	0.179 (0.310)	0.336*** (0.105)	0.256 (0.287)
× Average Degree		0.140 (0.141)	-0.007 (0.220)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.091 (0.171)	0.109 (0.199)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.068 (0.129)	-0.114 (0.230)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.202 (0.136)	0.309 (0.223)
Panel D: Discussion of leaflet changed own vote					
Information provision	0.360*** (0.105)	-0.042 (0.118)	-0.112 (0.281)	-0.094 (0.113)	-0.148 (0.259)
× Share Received		0.548*** (0.121)	0.603 (0.401)	0.622*** (0.114)	0.647* (0.362)
× Average Degree		-0.023 (0.149)	0.229 (0.187)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.319* (0.160)	-0.068 (0.234)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.142 (0.143)	-0.020 (0.183)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.466*** (0.140)	0.262 (0.217)
Panel E: Discussion of leaflet changed others' vote					
Information provision	0.243** (0.102)	-0.094 (0.116)	-0.375 (0.223)	-0.139 (0.118)	-0.412** (0.194)
× Share Received		0.467*** (0.146)	0.707** (0.276)	0.529*** (0.145)	0.761*** (0.231)
× Average Degree		0.103 (0.183)	0.370 (0.275)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.172 (0.187)	-0.631** (0.251)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.017 (0.202)	0.150 (0.270)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.313* (0.181)	-0.333 (0.236)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Effect of local and benchmark information provision on incumbent party vote, by network connectedness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)					
Local information provision	0.031*** (0.010)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.013)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.013)
Benchmark information provision	0.045*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.011)
Local × Average Degree		-0.020* (0.011)	-0.030* (0.016)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		-0.027** (0.011)	-0.015 (0.019)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.022** (0.009)	-0.035** (0.014)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.031 (0.019)
Outcome range	[0.06,0.71]	[0.06,0.71]	[0.06,0.71]	[0.06,0.71]	[0.06,0.71]
Control outcome mean	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Control outcome std. dev.	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.40	0.37	0.88	0.36	0.90
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.62	0.57	0.40	0.87
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)					
Local information provision	0.018*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.009)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.009)
Benchmark information provision	0.024*** (0.007)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.006)
Local × Average Degree		-0.006 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.011)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.011 (0.008)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.007 (0.006)	-0.016* (0.009)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.018** (0.009)
Outcome range	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.55	0.51	0.99	0.50	0.97
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.20	0.81	0.12	0.90
Observations	296	296	296	296	296
Share Received mean	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Share Received std. dev.	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
Controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS, and are weighted by the share of the precinct that received a leaflet (or would have received a leaflet, for control precincts). Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9: Effect of local and benchmark information provision on voters' engagement with the information, by network connectedness

	Index of voters' engagement with the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Local information provision	1.266*** (0.127)	1.291*** (0.112)	1.198*** (0.107)	1.288*** (0.116)	1.199*** (0.109)
Benchmark information provision	1.458*** (0.140)	1.484*** (0.119)	1.456*** (0.105)	1.480*** (0.121)	1.454*** (0.107)
Local × Average Degree		0.348** (0.144)	0.206 (0.160)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		0.509*** (0.159)	0.372* (0.205)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				0.333** (0.154)	0.210 (0.145)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				0.473*** (0.159)	0.309 (0.187)
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.22	0.40	0.21	0.55
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Local information provision	1.266*** (0.127)	0.613** (0.254)	0.223 (0.325)	0.569** (0.252)	0.214 (0.322)
Benchmark information provision	1.458*** (0.140)	1.380*** (0.323)	1.269*** (0.422)	1.334*** (0.318)	1.342*** (0.428)
Local × Share Received		0.890*** (0.282)	1.224** (0.510)	0.958*** (0.276)	1.235** (0.494)
Benchmark × Share Received		0.148 (0.347)	0.130 (0.637)	0.211 (0.341)	0.012 (0.634)
Local × Average Degree		-0.081 (0.211)	-0.448 (0.382)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		0.266 (0.359)	-0.613 (0.533)		
Local × Average Degree × Share Received		0.575** (0.215)	1.196*** (0.414)		
Benchmark × Average Degree × Share Received		0.314 (0.356)	1.267 (0.931)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.193 (0.253)	-0.527 (0.389)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				0.189 (0.328)	-0.542 (0.485)
Local × Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.721*** (0.254)	1.261*** (0.406)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.385 (0.323)	0.999 (0.802)
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.03	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.01
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.32	0.74	0.23	0.97
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.46	0.93	0.30	0.72
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28 , 6.41]	[-0.28 , 6.41]	[-0.28 , 6.41]	[-0.28 , 6.41]	[-0.28 , 6.41]
Control outcome mean	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interaction mean		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Interaction std. dev.		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Effect of local and benchmark information provision on voters' coordination around the information, by network connectedness

	Index of voters' coordination around the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Local information provision	0.639*** (0.110)	0.659*** (0.097)	0.624*** (0.089)	0.656*** (0.099)	0.624*** (0.091)
Benchmark information provision	0.740*** (0.122)	0.760*** (0.103)	0.750*** (0.094)	0.756*** (0.103)	0.752*** (0.095)
Local × Average Degree		0.263** (0.110)	0.115 (0.123)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		0.365** (0.151)	0.276* (0.146)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				0.243** (0.114)	0.089 (0.108)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				0.355** (0.157)	0.264** (0.127)
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.13	0.14	0.06	0.14	0.06
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.33	0.15	0.31	0.07
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Local information provision	0.639*** (0.110)	0.026 (0.148)	-0.204 (0.231)	-0.031 (0.141)	-0.200 (0.222)
Benchmark information provision	0.740*** (0.122)	0.391* (0.207)	0.375 (0.369)	0.341* (0.201)	0.321 (0.344)
Local × Share Received		0.822*** (0.183)	0.993** (0.372)	0.904*** (0.168)	0.986*** (0.352)
Benchmark × Share Received		0.481** (0.228)	0.463 (0.523)	0.550** (0.222)	0.536 (0.488)
Local × Average Degree		0.080 (0.179)	0.162 (0.249)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		-0.032 (0.221)	-0.806*** (0.256)		
Local × Average Degree × Share Received		0.225 (0.218)	-0.012 (0.300)		
Benchmark × Average Degree × Share Received		0.475** (0.232)	1.369** (0.580)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.026 (0.186)	-0.030 (0.249)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.117 (0.212)	-0.915*** (0.253)
Local × Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.359* (0.205)	0.233 (0.282)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.594*** (0.206)	1.562*** (0.461)
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.13	0.14	0.06	0.14	0.08
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.54	0.00	0.64	0.00
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.23	0.01	0.27	0.00
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28 , 9.77]	[-0.28 , 9.77]	[-0.28 , 9.77]	[-0.28 , 9.77]	[-0.28 , 9.77]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interaction mean		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Interaction std. dev.		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: Effect of local and benchmark information provision on posterior beliefs, by information content, prior beliefs, and network connectedness—part 1

	Posterior beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Network connectedness only					
Local information provision	0.025 (0.060)	0.008 (0.054)	0.035 (0.037)	0.009 (0.053)	0.037 (0.037)
Benchmark information provision	-0.029 (0.060)	-0.035 (0.053)	-0.030 (0.043)	-0.033 (0.051)	-0.029 (0.043)
Local × Average Degree		-0.016 (0.060)	-0.060 (0.078)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		-0.133* (0.071)	-0.075 (0.079)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.014 (0.056)	-0.035 (0.074)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.156** (0.065)	-0.112 (0.070)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.39	0.47	0.25	0.48	0.25
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.11	0.85	0.05	0.30
Panel B: Prior and network connectedness					
Local information provision	0.025 (0.060)	0.001 (0.053)	0.188*** (0.057)	0.003 (0.051)	0.188*** (0.055)
Benchmark information provision	-0.029 (0.060)	-0.037 (0.052)	0.137*** (0.045)	-0.031 (0.050)	0.135*** (0.045)
Local × Prior		0.042 (0.070)	0.111 (0.096)	0.039 (0.068)	0.115 (0.096)
Benchmark × Prior		-0.100 (0.075)	0.032 (0.088)	-0.102 (0.072)	0.025 (0.088)
Local × Average Degree		-0.044 (0.056)	-0.015 (0.077)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		-0.130** (0.052)	0.092 (0.108)		
Local × Average Degree × Prior		0.088 (0.090)	0.051 (0.105)		
Benchmark × Average Degree × Prior		-0.012 (0.096)	-0.121 (0.157)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.037 (0.049)	0.012 (0.076)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.131*** (0.046)	0.092 (0.108)
Local × Largest Eigenvalue × Prior				0.088 (0.091)	0.075 (0.114)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue × Prior				-0.018 (0.097)	-0.150 (0.189)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.39	0.39	0.29	0.45	0.30
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.07	0.25	0.06	0.45
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.05	0.26	0.08	0.24
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Control outcome std. dev.	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. The smaller sample in columns (2)-(5) of panel B reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A12: Effect of local and benchmark information provision on posterior beliefs, by information content, prior beliefs, and network connectedness—part 2

	Posterior beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel C: Negative updating and network connectedness					
Local information provision	0.025 (0.060)	0.045 (0.070)	0.268*** (0.077)	0.047 (0.069)	0.273*** (0.074)
Benchmark information provision	-0.029 (0.060)	-0.113* (0.063)	0.174** (0.077)	-0.109* (0.062)	0.158* (0.077)
Local × Negative updating		-0.046 (0.049)	-0.111 (0.076)	-0.047 (0.047)	-0.111 (0.076)
Benchmark × Negative updating		0.089 (0.056)	-0.056 (0.074)	0.090 (0.053)	-0.043 (0.079)
Local × Average Degree		0.021 (0.086)	0.123 (0.127)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		-0.161* (0.085)	0.049 (0.149)		
Local × Average Degree × Negative updating		-0.060 (0.075)	-0.113 (0.117)		
Benchmark × Average Degree × Negative updating		0.033 (0.081)	0.111 (0.151)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				0.028 (0.088)	0.156 (0.139)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.168* (0.087)	0.011 (0.147)
Local × Largest Eigenvalue × Negative updating				-0.064 (0.077)	-0.122 (0.122)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue × Negative updating				0.036 (0.084)	0.150 (0.175)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.39	0.01	0.13	0.02	0.08
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.01	0.47	0.00	0.17
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.02	0.08	0.04	0.08
Panel D: Malfeasance spending and network connectedness					
Local information provision	0.025 (0.060)	0.036 (0.103)	-0.042 (0.125)	0.042 (0.099)	-0.012 (0.125)
Benchmark information provision	-0.029 (0.060)	-0.049 (0.100)	-0.184 (0.142)	-0.049 (0.096)	-0.181 (0.138)
Local × Malfeasance spending		-0.153 (0.293)	0.785 (0.665)	-0.184 (0.278)	0.611 (0.644)
Benchmark × Malfeasance spending		0.037 (0.329)	0.915 (0.843)	0.041 (0.310)	0.959 (0.783)
Local × Average Degree		0.120 (0.096)	0.153 (0.152)		
Benchmark × Average Degree		-0.082 (0.122)	0.079 (0.206)		
Local × Average Degree × Malfeasance spending		-0.949** (0.397)	-1.904** (0.756)		
Benchmark × Average Degree × Malfeasance spending		-0.503 (0.578)	-1.202 (1.146)		
Local × Largest Eigenvalue				0.113 (0.092)	0.194 (0.140)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.118 (0.113)	-0.061 (0.159)
Local × Largest Eigenvalue × Malfeasance spending				-0.891** (0.388)	-2.077*** (0.699)
Benchmark × Largest Eigenvalue × Malfeasance spending				-0.426 (0.568)	-0.671 (0.946)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.39	0.35	0.43	0.34	0.33
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.06	0.74	0.03	0.16
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.26	0.62	0.28	0.27
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Control outcome std. dev.	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. The smaller sample in columns (2)-(5) of panel C reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A9 Lack of differential effects by private and public treatment variants

Tables A13-A17 show our estimates when separating information provision into private information dissemination (i.e. just a leaflet) and public information dissemination (i.e. a leaflet and a loud speaker announcing the delivery of the leaflets). At the foot of each panel, we report tests for differential effects between the two types of treatment. Although there are some statistically significant differences between the coefficients, they are rare and not consistent across outcomes. Moreover, where differences occur (principally in Table A13), they are primarily on the level, rather than with respect to the interaction coefficients that represent the main estimates of the article. The exception is panel B of Tables A14 and Table A15, where although the triple interaction has the same sign it is somewhat larger for the private treatment. Nevertheless, in sum, the results again suggest that the public treatment did not substantively alter voters' response to incumbent performance information provision, and thus support our decision to pool across modes of information provision.

A10 Robustness to defining engagement and coordination indexes using inverse covariance weighting

Tables A18 and A19 show results analogous to those in Tables 4 and 5 for outcome indexes created using inverse covariance weighting (ICW).

Table A13: Effect of private and public information provision on incumbent party vote share, by network connectedness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)					
Private information provision	0.043*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.013)
Public information provision	0.032*** (0.012)	0.033*** (0.011)	0.037*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.009)
Private × Average Degree		-0.018 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.015)		
Public × Average Degree		-0.030*** (0.010)	-0.027* (0.016)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.021** (0.010)	-0.020 (0.014)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.039*** (0.014)
Control outcome mean	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Control outcome std. dev.	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.52	0.55	0.43	0.56	0.44
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.44	0.55	0.43	0.39
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)					
Private information provision	0.031*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)
Public information provision	0.012 (0.008)	0.012 (0.007)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.012 (0.008)	0.017*** (0.006)
Private × Average Degree		-0.011 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.009)		
Public × Average Degree		-0.012 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.014)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.012* (0.007)	-0.013 (0.008)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.013* (0.007)	-0.016 (0.013)
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.17	0.19	0.10	0.18	0.10
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.94	0.94	0.96	0.84
Observations	296	296	296	296	296
Network measure mean		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Network measure std. dev.		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS, and are weighted by the share of the precinct that received a leaflet (or would have received a leaflet, for control precincts). Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A14: Effect of private and public information provision on voters' engagement with the information, by network connectedness

	Index of voters' engagement with the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Private information provision	1.341*** (0.146)	1.356*** (0.123)	1.208*** (0.116)	1.352*** (0.126)	1.209*** (0.118)
Public information provision	1.379*** (0.134)	1.405*** (0.121)	1.358*** (0.101)	1.404*** (0.124)	1.357*** (0.104)
Private × Average Degree		0.447** (0.183)	0.338* (0.192)		
Public × Average Degree		0.376** (0.162)	0.326 (0.207)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				0.438** (0.195)	0.341* (0.188)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				0.342** (0.164)	0.260 (0.195)
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.75	0.66	0.23	0.63	0.23
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.71	0.96	0.60	0.71
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Private information provision	1.341*** (0.146)	0.954*** (0.203)	0.646* (0.343)	0.909*** (0.200)	0.651* (0.329)
Public information provision	1.379*** (0.134)	1.001*** (0.264)	0.532 (0.418)	0.951*** (0.256)	0.519 (0.427)
Private × Share Received		0.553** (0.229)	0.726 (0.536)	0.623*** (0.223)	0.734 (0.514)
Public × Share Received		0.543* (0.269)	1.013* (0.563)	0.607** (0.257)	0.999* (0.581)
Private × Average Degree		-0.101 (0.255)	-1.192** (0.488)		
Public × Average Degree		0.416 (0.424)	0.888 (0.657)		
Private × Average Degree × Share Received		0.758*** (0.249)	2.601*** (0.746)		
Public × Average Degree × Share Received		-0.025 (0.371)	-0.491 (0.773)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.207 (0.285)	-1.362** (0.527)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				0.276 (0.415)	0.545 (0.691)
Private × Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.923*** (0.278)	2.880*** (0.825)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.122 (0.355)	-0.155 (0.785)
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.75	0.84	0.79	0.85	0.76
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.25	0.01	0.27	0.02
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28 , 6.41]	[-0.28 , 6.41]	[-0.28 , 6.41]	[-0.28 , 6.41]	[-0.28 , 6.41]
Control outcome mean	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interaction mean		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Interaction std. dev.		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A15: Effect of private and public information provision on voters' coordination around the information, by network connectedness

	Index of voters' coordination around the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Private information provision	0.670*** (0.118)	0.683*** (0.100)	0.621*** (0.092)	0.678*** (0.102)	0.621*** (0.095)
Public information provision	0.707*** (0.118)	0.724*** (0.106)	0.671*** (0.095)	0.724*** (0.108)	0.676*** (0.099)
Private × Average Degree		0.347** (0.135)	0.276** (0.133)		
Public × Average Degree		0.255* (0.134)	0.136 (0.186)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				0.334** (0.142)	0.252* (0.134)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				0.244* (0.136)	0.116 (0.160)
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.64	0.58	0.49	0.52	0.46
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.40	0.54	0.40	0.51
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Private information provision	0.670*** (0.118)	0.188 (0.125)	0.008 (0.195)	0.134 (0.123)	-0.034 (0.184)
Public information provision	0.707*** (0.118)	0.180 (0.175)	-0.044 (0.318)	0.118 (0.161)	-0.093 (0.286)
Private × Share Received		0.659*** (0.142)	0.743** (0.318)	0.738*** (0.141)	0.835*** (0.294)
Public × Share Received		0.713*** (0.193)	0.888** (0.412)	0.797*** (0.174)	0.943** (0.363)
Private × Average Degree		-0.052 (0.172)	-0.706* (0.374)		
Public × Average Degree		0.116 (0.240)	0.492 (0.430)		
Private × Average Degree × Share Received		0.503** (0.223)	1.596*** (0.554)		
Public × Average Degree × Share Received		0.183 (0.241)	-0.436 (0.473)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.153 (0.182)	-0.981** (0.412)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.027 (0.209)	0.100 (0.382)
Private × Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.662*** (0.228)	2.063*** (0.620)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.353* (0.189)	0.020 (0.412)
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.64	0.96	0.85	0.91	0.82
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.35	0.03	0.44	0.02
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.06	0.01	0.09	0.01
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28 , 9.77]	[-0.28 , 9.77]	[-0.28 , 9.77]	[-0.28 , 9.77]	[-0.28 , 9.77]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interaction mean		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Interaction std. dev.		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A16: Effect of private and public information provision on posterior beliefs, by information content, prior beliefs, and network connectedness—part 1

	Posterior beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Network connectedness only					
Private information provision	0.059 (0.062)	0.040 (0.057)	0.046 (0.046)	0.042 (0.054)	0.047 (0.045)
Public information provision	-0.060 (0.058)	-0.065 (0.054)	-0.009 (0.047)	-0.065 (0.052)	-0.009 (0.046)
Private × Average Degree		-0.044 (0.057)	-0.097 (0.074)		
Public × Average Degree		-0.105* (0.061)	-0.143 (0.095)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.053 (0.053)	-0.095 (0.069)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.113** (0.052)	-0.135 (0.088)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.07	0.12	0.46	0.10	0.45
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.24	0.64	0.22	0.67
Panel B: Prior and network connectedness					
Private information provision	0.059 (0.062)	0.025 (0.059)	0.212*** (0.075)	0.029 (0.055)	0.200** (0.075)
Public information provision	-0.060 (0.058)	-0.050 (0.066)	0.170** (0.063)	-0.051 (0.059)	0.164** (0.064)
Private × Prior		0.016 (0.082)	0.158 (0.125)	0.010 (0.078)	0.145 (0.126)
Public × Prior		-0.072 (0.089)	0.035 (0.097)	-0.070 (0.081)	0.014 (0.101)
Private × Average Degree		-0.075 (0.046)	-0.042 (0.089)		
Public × Average Degree		-0.093 (0.079)	-0.133 (0.115)		
Private × Average Degree × Prior		0.089 (0.103)	-0.072 (0.142)		
Public × Average Degree × Prior		-0.018 (0.127)	0.099 (0.206)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.078* (0.040)	-0.042 (0.080)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.097 (0.059)	-0.110 (0.091)
Private × Largest Eigenvalue × Prior				0.089 (0.103)	-0.016 (0.137)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue × Prior				-0.012 (0.103)	0.025 (0.165)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.07	0.37	0.61	0.31	0.66
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.81	0.31	0.73	0.41
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.40	0.27	0.30	0.74
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Control outcome std. dev.	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. The smaller sample in columns (2)-(5) of panel B reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A17: Effect of private and public information provision on posterior beliefs, by information content, prior beliefs, and network connectedness—part 2

	Posterior beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel C: Negative updating and network connectedness					
Private information provision	0.059 (0.062)	0.033 (0.058)	0.326*** (0.113)	0.034 (0.056)	0.309** (0.118)
Public information provision	-0.060 (0.058)	-0.092 (0.068)	0.175** (0.079)	-0.090 (0.065)	0.161* (0.084)
Private × Negative Updating		-0.004 (0.067)	-0.187 (0.127)	-0.001 (0.064)	-0.184 (0.128)
Public × Negative Updating		0.042 (0.075)	-0.037 (0.078)	0.039 (0.068)	-0.025 (0.084)
Private × Average Degree		-0.019 (0.088)	0.006 (0.192)		
Public × Average Degree		-0.113 (0.089)	0.027 (0.169)		
Private × Average Degree × Negative Updating		-0.054 (0.086)	0.014 (0.161)		
Public × Average Degree × Negative Updating		0.008 (0.105)	-0.134 (0.167)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.023 (0.093)	0.030 (0.190)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.116 (0.085)	-0.023 (0.145)
Private × Largest Eigenvalue × Negative Updating				-0.060 (0.088)	-0.025 (0.159)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue × Negative Updating				0.005 (0.087)	-0.052 (0.150)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.07	0.03	0.12	0.02	0.11
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.26	0.87	0.22	0.68
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.53	0.20	0.36	0.77
Panel D: Malfeasance spending and network connectedness					
Private information provision	0.059 (0.062)	0.016 (0.108)	-0.137 (0.150)	0.014 (0.102)	-0.114 (0.152)
Public information provision	-0.060 (0.058)	-0.019 (0.104)	-0.032 (0.111)	-0.022 (0.101)	-0.028 (0.112)
Private × Malfeasant spending		0.113 (0.357)	1.289 (1.111)	0.126 (0.335)	1.049 (1.093)
Public × Malfeasant spending		-0.271 (0.324)	0.296 (0.568)	-0.279 (0.313)	0.220 (0.586)
Private × Average Degree		0.058 (0.101)	0.100 (0.129)		
Public × Average Degree		0.011 (0.115)	0.242 (0.163)		
Private × Average Degree × Malfeasant spending		-0.803 (0.480)	-1.499** (0.685)		
Public × Average Degree × Malfeasant spending		-0.794* (0.454)	-2.199*** (0.681)		
Private × Largest Eigenvalue				0.039 (0.097)	0.127 (0.115)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue				-0.034 (0.111)	0.163 (0.162)
Private × Largest Eigenvalue × Malfeasant spending				-0.762 (0.501)	-1.770*** (0.554)
Public × Largest Eigenvalue × Malfeasant spending				-0.597 (0.447)	-1.869** (0.682)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Test: same treatment effect (<i>p</i> value)	0.07	0.75	0.57	0.74	0.63
Test: same interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.71	0.41	0.57	0.83
Test: same triple interaction effect (<i>p</i> value)		0.98	0.32	0.73	0.87
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Control outcome std. dev.	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. The smaller sample in columns (2)-(5) of panel C reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A18: Effect of information provision on voters' engagement with the information, by network connectedness

	ICW index of voters' engagement with the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Information provision	1.211*** (0.117)	1.232*** (0.101)	1.220*** (0.074)	1.230*** (0.104)	1.220*** (0.076)
× Average Degree		0.335** (0.138)	0.231 (0.158)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.318** (0.144)	0.218 (0.149)
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Information provision	1.211*** (0.117)	0.855*** (0.200)	0.715** (0.266)	0.818*** (0.195)	0.712*** (0.255)
× Share Received		0.494** (0.218)	0.581 (0.426)	0.551** (0.208)	0.580 (0.408)
× Average Degree		0.008 (0.215)	-0.481 (0.311)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.403* (0.217)	0.997** (0.373)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.063 (0.228)	-0.535 (0.335)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.493** (0.220)	1.038** (0.388)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-.31,7.27]	[-.31,7.27]	[-.31,7.27]	[-.31,7.27]	[-.31,7.27]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Share Received std. dev.		0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A19: Effect of information provision on voters' coordination around the information, by network connectedness

	ICW index of voters' coordination around the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Information provision	0.745*** (0.093)	0.760*** (0.082)	0.752*** (0.077)	0.758*** (0.083)	0.751*** (0.080)
× Average Degree		0.259** (0.107)	0.213** (0.099)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.253** (0.106)	0.224*** (0.080)
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Information provision	0.745*** (0.093)	0.298** (0.116)	0.223 (0.211)	0.254** (0.106)	0.182 (0.200)
× Share Received		0.602*** (0.138)	0.588* (0.307)	0.668*** (0.123)	0.647** (0.288)
× Average Degree		0.004 (0.155)	-0.301 (0.204)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.306 (0.187)	0.623*** (0.211)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.059 (0.144)	-0.313 (0.210)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.399** (0.157)	0.656*** (0.212)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-.37,8.52]	[-.37,8.52]	[-.37,8.52]	[-.37,8.52]	[-.37,8.52]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Share Received std. dev.		0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A11 Robustness to controlling for interactive individual-level controls

Tables [A20-A22](#) show the full results when simultaneously controlling interactively for the following individual-level controls: age, gender, education, and income.

A12 Robustness to defining families as nodes in networks

When denoting a node as a family name, we connect nodes within and then between beneficiaries. A beneficiary Juan Lopez Fernandez directly connects family names Lopez and Fernandez, while Maria Medina Lopez directly connects family names Lopez and Medina. As a consequence, the Lopez family node is directly connected to the family nodes Fernandez and Medina, and nodes Fernandez and Medina are indirectly connected to each other.

Table [A23](#) first demonstrates that our two measures of network connectedness are again correlated with community connectedness outcomes. Tables [A24-A27](#) show the full results when network connectedness measures are computed where families, as opposed to individuals, are defined as the nodes of our networks of Prospera beneficiaries.

A13 Robustness to controlling for the precinct share of popular last names

Tables [A28-A31](#) show the full results when simultaneously controlling interactively for the share of individuals with high-frequency last names (see main text for details).

Table A20: Effect of information provision on voters' engagement with the information, by network connectedness and including individual-level interactive controls

	Index of voters' engagement with the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Information provision	1.360*** (0.127)	1.384*** (0.108)	1.389*** (0.116)	1.381*** (0.112)	1.386*** (0.119)
× Average Degree		0.415*** (0.144)	0.384** (0.148)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.392** (0.154)	0.357** (0.158)
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Information provision	1.360*** (0.127)	1.003*** (0.214)	0.886*** (0.224)	0.963*** (0.208)	0.841*** (0.224)
× Share Received		0.497* (0.247)	0.676*** (0.234)	0.555** (0.236)	0.744*** (0.231)
× Average Degree		0.094 (0.254)	-0.108 (0.283)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.394 (0.252)	0.642** (0.274)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.009 (0.277)	-0.204 (0.315)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.492* (0.265)	0.747** (0.302)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Share Received std. dev.		0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Interactive individual-level controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Individual-level controls include age, gender, education and income interacted with the treatment. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A21: Effect of information provision on voters' coordination around the information, by network connectedness and including individual-level interactive controls

	Index of voters' coordination				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Information provision	0.689*** (0.112)	0.707*** (0.096)	0.705*** (0.094)	0.705*** (0.098)	0.702*** (0.096)
× Average Degree		0.305** (0.122)	0.279** (0.115)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.291** (0.127)	0.264** (0.120)
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Information provision	0.689*** (0.112)	0.203 (0.130)	0.145 (0.134)	0.149 (0.120)	0.090 (0.128)
× Share Received		0.658*** (0.146)	0.743*** (0.144)	0.736*** (0.132)	0.824*** (0.133)
× Average Degree		0.020 (0.174)	-0.101 (0.189)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.341* (0.196)	0.491** (0.203)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.080 (0.171)	-0.207 (0.191)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.473** (0.172)	0.629*** (0.188)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Share Received std. dev.		0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Interactive individual-level controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Individual-level controls include age, gender, education and income interacted with the treatment. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A22: Effect of information provision on posterior beliefs, by network connectedness and including individual-level interactive controls

	Posterior beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Network connectedness measures					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.012 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.050)	-0.011 (0.043)	-0.011 (0.047)
× Average Degree		-0.066 (0.054)	-0.074 (0.053)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.076 (0.048)	-0.084* (0.046)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Panel B: Prior and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.018 (0.049)	-0.001 (0.052)	-0.016 (0.045)	0.001 (0.048)
× Average Degree × Prior		0.044 (0.093)	0.055 (0.089)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Prior				0.040 (0.091)	0.049 (0.087)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Prior mean		0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Prior std. dev.		0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Panel C: Negative updating and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.032 (0.060)	-0.016 (0.058)	-0.032 (0.057)	-0.016 (0.055)
× Average Degree × Negative updating		-0.021 (0.078)	-0.021 (0.076)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Negative updating				-0.022 (0.080)	-0.022 (0.078)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Negative updating mean		0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Negative updating std. dev.		0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81
Panel D: Malfeasance spending and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.001 (0.092)	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.002 (0.086)	-0.011 (0.093)
× Average Degree × Malfeasant spending		-0.832* (0.413)	-0.781** (0.380)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Malfeasant spending				-0.742* (0.392)	-0.672* (0.350)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Malfeasant spending mean		0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Malfeasant spending std. dev.		0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Control outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Control outcome std. dev.	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35
Interactive individual-level controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Individual-level controls include age, gender, education and income interacted with the treatment. The smaller sample in columns (2)-(5) of panels B and C reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A23: Correlation between locality-level network connectedness measures and locality-level community connectedness outcomes, defining families as network nodes

	Overall community connectedness index		Participation Index		Efficacy index	
Average Degree	0.043*** (0.013)		0.048*** (0.011)		0.054*** (0.019)	
Largest Eigenvalue	0.043*** (0.015)		0.045** (0.017)		0.053*** (0.018)	
Observations	2,267	2,267	2,206	2,206	2,267	2,267
Outcome range	[0 , 2.25]	[0 , 2.25]	[0 , 1]	[0 , 1]	[0 , 3]	[0 , 3]
Outcome mean	0.74	0.74	0.13	0.13	1.32	1.32
Outcome std. dev.	0.32	0.32	0.28	0.28	0.49	0.49
Network mean	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
Network std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.00

Notes: All specifications estimated using OLS. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A14 Robustness of Table 8 to considering incumbent party vote share (over turnout) as an outcome

Table A32 shows precinct-level results analogous to those in Table 8 for individual-level beliefs.

Table A24: Effect of information provision on incumbent party vote share across precincts with varying network connectedness, family names as nodes

	Weighted by share of population that received leaflets					Unweighted				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)										
Information provision	0.038*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.009)	0.037*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.017)	0.092 (0.072)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.026 (0.028)
× Average Degree		-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.036*** (0.013)				0.056** (0.023)	0.001 (0.053)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.036*** (0.009)				0.055*** (0.019)	-0.007 (0.038)
× Share Received							0.026 (0.018)	-0.154 (0.195)	0.036* (0.018)	0.005 (0.038)
× Average Degree × Share Received							-0.090*** (0.023)	-0.043 (0.062)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received									-0.088*** (0.019)	-0.039 (0.044)
Control outcome mean	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Control outcome std. dev.	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)										
Information provision	0.021*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.003)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.057 (0.039)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.000 (0.016)
× Average Degree		-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.018** (0.007)				0.034*** (0.011)	0.011 (0.025)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.006)				0.031*** (0.008)	0.012 (0.016)
× Share Received							0.025** (0.010)	-0.138 (0.108)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.021 (0.019)
× Average Degree × Share Received							-0.052*** (0.011)	-0.038 (0.029)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received									-0.047*** (0.009)	-0.036** (0.017)
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Observations	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296
Share Received mean	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Share Received std. dev.	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
Interactive controls			√		√			√		√

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Observations in columns (1)-(5) are weighted by the share of the precinct that received a leaflet (or would have received a leaflet, for control precincts); observations in columns (6)-(10) are unweighted. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3), (5), (8) and (10) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A25: Effect of information provision on voters' engagement with the information across precincts with varying network connectedness, family names as nodes

	Index of voters' engagement with the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Information provision	1.360*** (0.127)	1.409*** (0.130)	1.365*** (0.087)	1.400*** (0.116)	1.366*** (0.085)
× Average Degree		0.369** (0.161)	-0.049 (0.157)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.431*** (0.154)	0.275 (0.164)
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Information provision	1.360*** (0.127)	0.828*** (0.208)	0.699** (0.340)	0.937*** (0.203)	0.625** (0.296)
× Share Received		0.804*** (0.269)	0.856 (0.530)	0.621** (0.228)	0.908* (0.485)
× Average Degree		0.048 (0.254)	-0.740** (0.352)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.456 (0.270)	0.981* (0.481)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.023 (0.241)	-0.576 (0.401)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.540** (0.247)	1.267** (0.539)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Share Received std. dev.		0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A26: Effect of information provision on voters' coordination across precincts with varying network connectedness, family names as nodes

	Index of voters' coordination				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Information provision	0.689*** (0.112)	0.718*** (0.123)	0.698*** (0.091)	0.719*** (0.105)	0.703*** (0.092)
× Average Degree		0.213 (0.129)	-0.138 (0.086)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.306** (0.131)	0.178 (0.116)
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Information provision	0.689*** (0.112)	-0.022 (0.131)	0.064 (0.189)	0.122 (0.120)	-0.031 (0.226)
× Share Received		1.026*** (0.200)	0.826*** (0.272)	0.802*** (0.133)	0.919*** (0.323)
× Average Degree		-0.208 (0.156)	-0.226 (0.316)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.588** (0.213)	0.205 (0.430)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.096 (0.158)	-0.186 (0.292)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.533*** (0.172)	0.512 (0.315)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Share Received std. dev.		0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A27: Effect of treatment on posterior beliefs across precincts with varying priors and network connectedness, family names as nodes

	Posterior beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Network connectedness measures					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.028 (0.052)	-0.008 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.047)	-0.013 (0.030)
× Average Degree		-0.044 (0.058)	0.077 (0.084)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.073 (0.062)	-0.070 (0.087)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Panel B: Prior and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.026 (0.051)	0.155** (0.056)	-0.027 (0.049)	0.129*** (0.045)
× Average Degree × Prior		-0.029 (0.106)	0.376 (0.234)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Prior				0.057 (0.113)	0.135 (0.158)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Prior mean		0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Prior std. dev.		0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Panel C: Negative updating and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.075 (0.060)	0.229** (0.102)	-0.040 (0.061)	0.180** (0.077)
× Average Degree × Negative updating		0.052 (0.071)	-0.381* (0.187)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Negative updating				-0.026 (0.090)	-0.141 (0.169)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Negative updating mean		0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Negative updating std. dev.		0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81
Panel D: Malfeasance spending and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.080 (0.099)	-0.061 (0.072)	-0.007 (0.093)	-0.100 (0.078)
× Average Degree × Malfeasance spending		-0.303 (0.299)	-0.630 (0.978)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Malfeasance Spending				-0.967* (0.481)	-2.224*** (0.766)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Malfeasant spending mean		0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Malfeasant spending std. dev.		0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Control outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Control outcome std. dev.	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include: precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PAN, PRD, PRI, and incumbent vote shares in 2012. The smaller sample in columns (2)-(5) of panels B and C reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A28: Effect of information provision on incumbent party vote share across precincts with varying network connectedness, controlling for the share of individuals with high-frequency last names

	Weighted by share of population that received leaflets					Unweighted				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)										
Information provision	0.038*** (0.007)	0.038*** (0.005)	0.044*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.005)	0.044*** (0.009)	0.029*** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.115** (0.044)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.037 (0.030)
× Average Degree			-0.023*** (0.008)	-0.022* (0.012)			0.052** (0.020)	0.066 (0.040)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.027*** (0.006)	-0.031** (0.011)				0.048** (0.019)	0.047 (0.039)
× Share Received							0.041** (0.019)	-0.237** (0.102)	0.040** (0.018)	-0.009 (0.039)
× Average Degree × Share Received							-0.079*** (0.019)	-0.095** (0.046)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received									-0.079*** (0.018)	-0.084* (0.047)
Control outcome mean	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Control outcome std. dev.	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)										
Information provision	0.021*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.003)	-0.015* (0.008)	0.044** (0.019)	-0.015* (0.007)	0.004 (0.016)
× Average Degree			-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.010 (0.007)			0.030*** (0.009)	0.035 (0.025)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.014* (0.007)				0.029*** (0.009)	0.032 (0.022)
× Share Received							0.034*** (0.010)	-0.091* (0.045)	0.034*** (0.010)	0.014 (0.018)
× Average Degree × Share Received							-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.050* (0.027)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received									-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.049** (0.023)
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Observations	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	296
Share Received mean	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Share Received std. dev.	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
Interactive controls			✓	✓	✓			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Observations in columns (1)-(5) are weighted by the share of the precinct that received a leaflet (or would have received a leaflet, for control precincts); observations in columns (6)-(10) are unweighted. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3), (5), (8) and (10) include precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, the PRI, PAN, PRD and incumbent vote shares in 2012, and share of individuals with popular names. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A29: Effect of information provision on voters' engagement with the information across precincts with varying network connectedness, controlling for the share of individuals with high-frequency last names

	Index of voters' engagement with the information				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Information provision	1.360*** (0.127)	1.384*** (0.108)	1.352*** (0.075)	1.381*** (0.112)	1.353*** (0.077)
× Average Degree		0.415*** (0.144)	0.251* (0.142)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.392** (0.154)	0.224* (0.128)
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Information provision	1.360*** (0.127)	1.003*** (0.214)	0.720** (0.272)	0.963*** (0.208)	0.791*** (0.271)
× Share Received		0.497* (0.247)	0.800* (0.452)	0.555** (0.236)	0.717 (0.444)
× Average Degree		0.094 (0.254)	-1.030** (0.384)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.394 (0.252)	1.675*** (0.437)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.009 (0.277)	-1.038*** (0.366)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.492* (0.265)	1.605*** (0.419)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]	[-0.28,6.41]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Share Received std. dev.		0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, the PRI, PAN, PRD and incumbent vote shares in 2012, and share of individuals with popular names. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A30: Effect of information provision on voters' coordination across precincts with varying network connectedness, controlling for the share of individuals with high-frequency last names

	Index of voters' coordination				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Variation across precincts with different network connectedness					
Information provision	0.689*** (0.112)	0.707*** (0.096)	0.693*** (0.081)	0.705*** (0.098)	0.697*** (0.082)
× Average Degree		0.305** (0.122)	0.129 (0.124)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				0.291** (0.127)	0.101 (0.096)
Panel B: Variation across precincts by population shares receiving the treatment					
Information provision	0.689*** (0.112)	0.203 (0.130)	-0.099 (0.254)	0.149 (0.120)	-0.089 (0.244)
× Share Received		0.658*** (0.146)	0.974** (0.375)	0.736*** (0.132)	0.979*** (0.352)
× Average Degree		0.020 (0.174)	-0.100 (0.287)		
× Average Degree × Share Received		0.341* (0.196)	0.470* (0.260)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.080 (0.171)	-0.288 (0.248)
× Largest Eigenvalue × Share Received				0.473** (0.172)	0.653** (0.243)
Observations	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218	2,218
Outcome range	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]	[-0.28,9.77]
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control outcome std. dev.	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Share Received mean		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Share Received std. dev.		0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, the PRI, PAN, PRD and incumbent vote shares in 2012, and share of individuals with popular names. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A31: Effect of treatment on posterior beliefs across precincts with varying priors and network connectedness, controlling for the share of individuals with high-frequency last names

	Posterior beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Network connectedness measures					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.012 (0.046)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.011 (0.043)	-0.005 (0.030)
× Average Degree		-0.067 (0.054)	-0.028 (0.090)		
× Largest Eigenvalue				-0.076 (0.048)	-0.033 (0.071)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Panel B: Prior and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.018 (0.049)	0.099** (0.044)	-0.016 (0.045)	0.095** (0.044)
× Average Degree × Prior		0.044 (0.093)	0.226 (0.160)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Prior				0.040 (0.091)	0.189 (0.157)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Prior mean		0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Prior std. dev.		0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Panel C: Negative updating and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.032 (0.060)	0.132 (0.091)	-0.032 (0.057)	0.130 (0.093)
× Average Degree × Negative updating		-0.021 (0.078)	-0.175 (0.174)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Negative updating				-0.022 (0.080)	-0.150 (0.178)
Observations	1,969	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910
Negative updating mean		0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79
Negative updating std. dev.		0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81
Panel D: Malfeasance spending and network connectedness					
Information provision	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.001 (0.092)	-0.061 (0.093)	-0.002 (0.086)	-0.055 (0.089)
× Average Degree × Malfeasance spending		-0.832* (0.413)	-0.796 (0.890)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Malfeasance Spending				-0.742* (0.392)	-0.925 (0.689)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Malfeasant spending mean		0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Malfeasant spending std. dev.		0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Control outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Control outcome std. dev.	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, the PRI, PAN, PRD and incumbent vote shares in 2012, and share of individuals with popular names. The smaller sample in columns (2)-(5) of panels B and C reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A32: Effect of information provision on incumbent party vote share (over turnout) across precincts with varying prior, updating, spending, and network connectedness

	Incumbent party vote share (over turnout)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Interaction with prior					
Information provision	0.038*** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.006)
× Average Degree × Prior		0.017 (0.014)	0.048** (0.020)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Prior				0.010 (0.013)	0.033* (0.018)
Observations	296	277	277	277	277
Prior mean		0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Prior std. dev.		0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69
Panel B: Interaction with negative updating					
Information provision	0.038*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.005)	0.036*** (0.007)
× Average Degree × Negative updating		-0.023 (0.014)	-0.045** (0.020)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Negative updating				-0.018 (0.013)	-0.033* (0.017)
Observations	296	277	277	277	277
Negative updating mean		0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76
Negative updating std. dev.		0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
Panel C: Interaction with Malfeasance spending					
Information provision	0.038*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.045*** (0.014)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.046*** (0.014)
× Average Degree × Malfeasance spending		-0.123 (0.086)	0.168* (0.085)		
× Largest Eigenvalue × Malfeasance Spending				-0.131* (0.077)	0.178* (0.089)
Observations	296	296	296	296	296
Malfeasance spending mean		0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Malfeasance spending std. dev.		0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Control outcome mean	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
Control outcome std. dev.	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Interactive controls			✓		✓

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weighted by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are omitted. Both measures of network connectedness are standardized. Controls interacted with the treatment in columns (3) and (5) include precinct population density, urban indicator, level of development, distance to the municipality center, share of Prospera beneficiaries, and the PRI, PAN, PRD and incumbent vote shares in 2012. The smaller sample in columns (2)-(5) of panels A and B reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

References

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