Online Appendix
Does Public Support for Judicial Power Depend on Who is in Political Power?
Testing a Theory of Partisan Alignment in Africa

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Contents

A   Indicators of Judicial Independence in Ghana (VDEM)

Judicial reform: Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority? [0: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was reduced via institutional reform. 1: There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review. 2: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was enhanced via institutional reform.]

Judicial purges: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year. [0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary. 1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals. 2: There were limited arbitrary removals. 3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary. 4: Judges were not removed from their posts.]

Judicial attacks: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public? [0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis. 1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year. 2: Attacks occurred more than once. 3: There were attacks, but they were rare. 4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.]

Court packing : The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year. Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among [0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary. 1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts. 2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships. 3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.]

Judicial independence: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record? [0: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half of the time. 3: Seldom. 4: Never.]

Judicial compiance: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees? [0: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always.]

Figure A.1: Ghana's Judicial Institutions During the Study Period

Note: All data come from the VDEM data. r1-r7 indicate the timing of Afrobarometer surveys. Vertical dashed lines indicate a transition in the party that controls the presidency.

B Afrobarometer Sample Countries by Round

Table B.1: Afrobarometer Sample Countries by Round

Country	R6 Sample	R6 Year	R5 Sample	R5 Year	R4 Sample	R4 Year	R3 Sample	R3 Year	R2 Sample	R2 Year	R1 Sample	R1 Year
Algeria	1	2015	1	2013	0		0		0		0	
Benin	1	2014	1	2011	1	2008	1	2005	0		0	
Botswana	1	2014	1	2012	1	2008	1	2005	1	2003	1	1999
Burkina Faso	1	2015	1	2012	1	2008	0		0		0	
Burundi	1	2014	1	2012	0		0		0		0	
Cameroon	1	2015	1	2013	0		0		0		0	
Cape Verde	1	2014	1	2011	1	2008	1	2005	1	2002	0	
Cote d'Ivoire	1	2014	1	2013	0		0		0		0	
Egypt	1	2015	1	2013	0		0		0		0	
Gabon	1	2015	0		0		0		0		0	
Ghana	1	2014	1	2012	1	2008	1	2005	1	2002	1	1999
Guinea	1	2015	1	2013	0		0		0		0	
Kenya	1	2014	1	2011	1	2008	1	2005	1	2003	0	
Lesotho	1	2014	1	2012	1	2008	1	2005	1	2003	1	2000
Liberia	1	2015	1	2012	1	2008	0		0		0	
Madagascar	1	2015	1	2013	1	2008	1	2005	0		0	
Malawi	1	2014	1	2012	1	2008	1	2005	1	2003	1	1999
Mali	1	2014	1	2013	1	2008	1	2005	1	2002	1	2001
Mauritius	1	2014	1	2012	0		0		0		0	
Mozambique	1	2015	1	2012	1	2008	1	2005	1	2002	0	
Namibia	1	2014	1	2012	1	2008	1	2005	1	2003	1	1999
Niger	1	2015	1	2013	0		0		0		0	
Nigeria	1	2015	1	2013	1	2008	1	2005	1	2003	1	2000
Sao Tome and Principe	1	2015	0		0		0		0		0	
Senegal	1	2014	1	2013	1	2008	1	2005	1	2002	0	
Sierra Leone	1	2015	1	2012	0		0		0		0	
South Africa	1	2015	1	2011	1	2008	1	2004	1	2002	1	2000
Sudan	1	2015	1	2013	0		0		0		0	
Tanzania	1	2014	1	2012	1	2008	1	2005	1	2003	1	2001
Togo	1	2014	1	2012	0		0		0		0	
Tunisia	1	2015	1	2013	0		0		0		0	
Uganda	1	2015	1	2012	1	2008	1	2005	1	2002	1	2000
Zambia	1	2014	1	2013	1	2009	1	2005	1	2003	1	1999
Zimbabwe	1	2014	1	2012	1	2009	1	2005	1	2004	1	1999

C   Question Wording and Coding of Control Variables

- *Support for democracy:* "Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have." Support for democracy is a dichotomous measure that takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees with Statement 1, and 0 otherwise.

- *Education:* Education is a variable with four values. 0=No formal schooling, 1=some or completed primary schooling, 2=some or completed secondary schooling, and 4= some or completed post-secondary schooling.

- *Poverty:* Coded from the following question. "Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough food to eat?" Response options are: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always

- *Age:* Coded directly from self report.

- *Rural:* Coded using Afrobarometer code.

D Complete Multi-Country Regression Results

Table D.1: Horizontal Power: Belief that President Should Obey the Courts, Continuous DV

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Close to President's Party	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.04**		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Independent	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)		
President Party Voter				-0.04**	
				(0.01)	
President Coethnic					-0.01
					(0.01)
Support for Democracy		0.06**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Primary Education		0.03**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary Education		0.04**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Secondary		0.06**	0.05**	0.05**	0.06**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (0-1 scale)		0.03**	0.02**	0.02*	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty		0.03**	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Rural		-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female		-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.69**	0.62**	0.64**	0.64**	0.63**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	146,439	132,135	132,135	132,135	132,135
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

All variables on 0-1 scale. Columns 3-5 include country and round fixed effects.

Table D.2: Horizontal Power: Belief that President Should Obey the Courts, Binary DV

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Close to President's Party	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Independent	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
President Party Voter				-0.05**	
				(0.01)	
President Coethnic					-0.01
					(0.01)
Support for Democracy		0.07**	0.06**	0.06**	0.06**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Primary Education		0.03**	0.02*	0.02*	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary Education		0.04**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Secondary		0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (0-1 scale)		0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty		0.04**	0.02*	0.02*	0.03*
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Rural		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female		-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.71**	0.63**	0.66**	0.66**	0.65**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	146,439	132,135	132,135	132,135	132,135
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

All variables on 0-1 scale. Columns 3-5 include country and round fixed effects.

Table D.3: Vertical Power, Continuous DV

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Close to President's Party	0.04**	0.03**	0.03**		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Independent	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00		
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		
President Party Voter				0.03**	
				(0.01)	
President Coethnic					0.01
					(0.01)
Support for Democracy		0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Primary Education		0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Secondary Education		-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Secondary		-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (0-1 scale)		0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty		-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.03**	-0.04**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Rural		0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.68**	0.67**	0.68**	0.68**	0.69**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	172,350	154,674	154,674	134,088	134,088
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
All variables on 0-1 scale. Columns 3-5 include country and round fixed effects.

Table D.4: Vertical Power, Binary DV

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Close to President's Party	0.06**	0.05**	0.04**		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Independent	-0.00	0.00	-0.00		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)		
President Party Voter				0.04**	
				(0.01)	
President Coethnic					0.01
					(0.01)
Support for Democracy		0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.05**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Primary Education		0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary Education		-0.02*	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.04**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Secondary		-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.05**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (0-1 scale)		0.04**	0.03**	0.03**	0.04**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty		-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.05**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Rural		0.02**	0.01**	0.02**	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Female		0.01*	0.01*	0.01	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.73**	0.69**	0.71**	0.72**	0.73**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	172,350	154,674	154,674	134,088	134,088
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

All variables on 0-1 scale. Columns 3-5 include country and round fixed effects.

Table D.5: Trust in the Courts, Continuous DV

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Close to President's Party	0.13**	0.12**	0.12**		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)		
Independent	-0.00	0.00	0.01		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
President Party Voter				0.12**	
				(0.01)	
President Coethnic					0.04**
					(0.01)
Support for Democracy		0.04**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Primary Education		-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary Education		-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.05**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Secondary		-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (0-1 scale)		0.00	0.01*	0.03**	0.04**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty		-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.07**	-0.08**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Rural		0.05**	0.04**	0.05**	0.05**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Female		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.54**	0.53**	0.52**	0.57**	0.61**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	189,511	169,053	169,053	131,644	131,644
R-squared	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.06

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

All variables on 0-1 scale. Columns 3-5 include country and round fixed effects.

Table D.6: Trust in the Courts, Binary DV

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Close to President's Party	0.16**	0.15**	0.15**		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Independent	0.00	0.00	0.01		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
President Party Voter				0.14**	
				(0.02)	
President Coethnic					0.05**
					(0.02)
Support for Democracy		0.04**	0.03**	0.02**	0.03**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Primary Education		-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary Education		-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Secondary		-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.07**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (0-1 scale)		0.01*	0.01*	0.05**	0.06**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty		-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.11**
		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Rural		0.06**	0.05**	0.05**	0.06**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.54**	0.54**	0.56**	0.58**	0.63**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	189,511	169,053	169,053	131,644	131,644
R-squared	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.05

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

All variables on 0-1 scale. Columns 3-5 include country and round fixed effects.

E Cross-National Round Specific Analysis

Table E.1: Horizontal Power

VARIABLES	(1) R3	(2) R4	(3) R5	(4) R6
Close to President's Party	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.63***	0.65***	0.61***	0.64***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	20,498	24,226	43,526	43,879
R-squared	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.05

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include individual controls and country fixed effects.

Table E.2: Vertical Power

VARIABLES	(1) R2	(2) R3	(3) R4	(4) R5	(5) R6
Close to President's Party	0.01*	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	0.69***	0.69***	0.65***	0.69***	0.66***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	20,586	20,330	24,657	44,908	44,187
R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.07

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include individual controls and country fixed effects.

Table E.3: Trust in the Courts

VARIABLES	(1) R1	(2) R2	(3) R3	(4) R4	(5) R5	(6) R6
Close to President's Party	0.07***	0.16***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.59***	0.45***	0.58***	0.57***	0.59***	0.51***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	16,701	20,465	20,173	24,063	43,858	43,544
R-squared	0.06	0.27	0.15	0.11	0.11	0.12

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include individual controls and country fixed effects.

F   Results Controlling for Perceptions of Judicial Corruption

In this section, we show that the main results are robust to controlling for perceptions of judicial corruption. We do not include this control in the main analyses in the paper because of endogeneity concerns and the potential for post-treatment bias: Views about judicial corruption are likely to be driven in least in part by co-partisanship with the president.

To measure attitudes about judicial corruption, we use the following AB survey question, which was included in Rounds 2-6 of the survey. *How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Judges and Magistrates?*. Response options are: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer. In the analyses below, we analyze an ordinal measure of judicial corruption perceptions that is rescaled to run from 0-1.

VARIABLES	(1) Horizontal Power Continuous	(2) Horizontal Power 0/1	(3) Vertical Power Continuous	(4) Vertical Power 0/1	(5) Trust Continuous	(6) Trust 0/1
Close to President's Party	-0.04**	-0.05**	0.02**	0.03**	0.10**	0.13**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Independent	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Judicial Corruption (0-1)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.10**	-0.15**	-0.34**	-0.39**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for Democracy	0.05**	0.07**	0.02**	0.04**	0.02**	0.03**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Primary Education	0.02**	0.02*	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary Education	0.03**	0.03**	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.06**	-0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Secondary	0.05**	0.05**	-0.03**	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (0-1 scale)	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.02*	0.00	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty	0.02*	0.02*	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Rural	-0.01	-0.00	0.01*	0.01*	0.04**	0.05**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Female	-0.02**	-0.02**	0.00	0.00	-0.01*	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.64**	0.67**	0.73**	0.78**	0.67**	0.67**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Observations	115,589	115,589	134,191	134,191	133,602	133,602
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.16	0.12

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

G   Results Controlling for Experience with the Courts

In this section, we show that the main results are robust to controlling for respondent's experience with the courts. We present these results in the Appendix because the relevant survey items were only included in Afrobarometer Round 6.

VARIABLES	(1) Horizontal Power Continuous	(2) Horizontal Power 0/1	(3) Vertical Power Continuous	(4) Vertical Power 0/1	(5) Trust Continuous	(6) Trust 0/1
Close to President's Party	-0.03**	-0.02	0.03**	0.04**	0.10**	0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Independent	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Contact with Court in Past Year	-0.04*	-0.04	-0.00	-0.00	0.15**	0.18**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Difficulty with Courts	0.01*	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.06**	-0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Had to Pay a Bribe at Court	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for Democracy	0.05**	0.06**	0.03**	0.05**	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Primary Education	0.02**	0.03*	0.01	0.01	-0.02**	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary Education	0.04**	0.05**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Secondary	0.06**	0.07**	-0.02*	-0.03**	-0.06**	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (0-1 scale)	-0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Poverty	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07**	-0.08**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Rural	-0.01**	-0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.02**	-0.02**	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Afrobarometer Round = 6, omitted	-	-	-	-	-	-
Constant	0.65**	0.66**	0.66**	0.70**	0.53**	0.53**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	43,669	43,669	43,976	43,976	43,340	43,340
R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.12	0.10

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

H   Country Specific Results

Table H.1: Horizontal Power: President Should Obey the Courts

	Algeria	Benin	Botswana	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Cote d'Ivoire	Egypt	Gabon	Ghana	Guinea
Close to President's Party	0.02	-0.00	-0.04***	0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03	-0.00	-0.04***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	0.56***	0.62***	0.63***	0.66***	0.66***	0.57***	0.61***	0.66***	0.63***	0.72***	0.65***	0.65***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Observations	2,032	4,410	3,446	3,131	2,314	2,075	4,089	2,229	1,960	1,169	6,425	2,305
R-squared	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mauritius	Mozambique	Namibia	Niger	Nigeria	STP
Close to President's Party	-0.09***	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.05***	-0.05**	-0.03**	-0.03***	-0.07***	0.01	0.22
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.32)
Constant	0.65***	0.72***	0.75***	0.60***	0.68***	0.62***	0.72***	0.55***	0.59***	0.63***	0.57***	0.64***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Observations	6,172	4,188	3,193	2,924	6,383	4,731	2,271	4,940	4,459	2,227	8,994	847
R-squared	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Senegal	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Togo	Tunisia	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Close to President's Party	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.03**	-0.03*	0.01	-0.06***	-0.01	-0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.66***	0.60***	0.56***	0.43***	0.56***	0.56***	0.69***	0.66***	0.60***	0.70***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	4,119	1,839	8,781	1,963	5,626	2,229	2,158	8,044	4,242	6,214
R-squared	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.06

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All models include controls and round fixed effects (not shown). Analyses for each country rely on as many AB survey rounds as possible.

Table H.2: Vertical Power

	Algeria	Benin	Botswana	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Cote d'Ivoire	Egypt	Gabon	Ghana	Guinea
Close to President's Party	0.06***	-0.03	0.03***	-0.01	0.03	0.10***	0.01	0.04***	0.00	0.11***	0.01	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.61***	0.59***	0.67***	0.65***	0.71***	0.51***	0.63***	0.57***	0.72***	0.56***	0.69***	0.69***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	2,199	4,362	3,441	3,163	2,303	2,126	4,317	2,219	1,997	1,170	6,436	2,288
R-squared	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.04

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mauritius	Mozambique	Namibia	Niger	Nigeria	STP
Close to President's Party	0.02**	0.01	-0.01	0.05***	0.00	-0.00	0.05**	0.08***	0.01*	-0.02	0.01	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.20)
Constant	0.69***	0.81***	0.62***	0.56***	0.77***	0.72***	0.75***	0.66***	0.72***	0.79***	0.63***	0.61***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Observations	6,103	4,198	3,188	3,887	6,308	4,708	2,303	5,212	4,512	2,212	9,011	923
R-squared	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Senegal	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Togo	Tunisia	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Close to President's Party	0.01	0.04***	0.04***	0.03**	0.03***	0.04**	0.03*	0.05***	0.03***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.65***	0.70***	0.69***	0.69***	0.71***	0.56***	0.83***	0.71***	0.67***	0.71***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Observations	4,573	2,242	9,357	2,323	7,105	2,336	2,370	9,367	4,709	6,879
R-squared	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All models include controls and round fixed effects (not shown). Analyses for each country rely on as many AB survey rounds as possible.

Table H.3: Trust in the Courts

	Algeria	Benin	Botswana	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Cote d'Ivoire	Egypt	Gabon	Ghana	Guinea
Close to President's Party	0.11***	0.04	0.08***	0.03*	0.13***	0.06**	0.06***	0.16***	0.09**	0.17***	0.10***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	0.40***	0.55***	0.64***	0.60***	0.65***	0.46***	0.47***	0.54***	0.54***	0.60***	0.48***	0.44***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Observations	2,156	4,300	3,341	3,033	2,336	2,084	4,158	2,214	1,974	1,169	6,317	2,266
R-squared	0.10	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.12	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.07	0.10

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mauritius	Mozambique	Namibia	Niger	Nigeria	STP
Close to President's Party	0.11***	0.07***	0.05***	0.07***	0.01	0.06***	0.09***	0.16***	0.07***	0.07***	0.03***	0.06
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.25)
Constant	0.57***	0.68***	0.50***	0.45***	0.70***	0.43***	0.53***	0.65***	0.65***	0.76***	0.44***	0.60***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Observations	6,060	4,044	3,162	3,729	6,259	4,612	2,272	5,065	4,418	2,206	8,956	897
R-squared	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.14	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	Senegal	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Togo	Tunisia	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Close to President's Party	0.08***	0.03*	0.08***	0.14***	0.09***	0.17***	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***	0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.66***	0.45***	0.55***	0.44***	0.63***	0.44***	0.47***	0.54***	0.61***	0.60***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	3,985	1,816	8,699	1,980	5,672	2,154	2,116	7,804	4,254	6,130
R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.13

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All models include controls and round fixed effects (not shown). Analyses for each country rely on as many AB survey rounds as possible.

I Effect of Supporting President's Party by Country Level of Democracy and Judicial Independence

I.1 Horizontal Power

Figure I.1: Impact of Supporting President's Party on Support for Horizontal Power, by VDEM Electoral Democracy Index

Electoral democracy index is from the VDEM data, measured as the country score at the time of each survey.

Figure I.2: Impact of Supporting President's Party on Horizontal Power, by VDEM Judicial Independence Index

Judicial Independence Index is from the VDEM data, measured as the country score at the time of each survey.

I.2   Vertical Power

Figure I.3: Impact of Supporting President's Party on Support for Vertical Power, by VDEM Electoral Democracy Index

Electoral democracy index is from the VDEM data, measured as the country score at the time of each survey.

Figure I.4: Impact of Supporting President's Party on Support for Vertical Power, by VDEM Judicial Independence Index

Judicial Independence Index is from the VDEM data, measured as the country score at the time of each survey.

I.3   Trust in Courts

Figure I.5: Impact of Supporting President's Party on *Trust in Courts*, by VDEM Electoral Democracy Index

Electoral democracy index is from the VDEM data, measured as the country score at the time of each survey.

Figure I.6: Impact of Supporting President's Party on *Trust in Courts*, by VDEM Judicial Independence Index

Judicial Independence Index is from the VDEM data, measured as the country score at the time of each survey.

J Ghana Robustness Tests

Table J.1: Ghana DiD Analyses with Standard Errors Clustered at Group/Round Level

VARIABLES	(1) Horizontal Power	(2) Vertical Power	(3) Trust
Close to President's Party	-0.10**	0.05**	0.08**
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Close to NPP	0.07**	-0.05**	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Close to NDC	0.05**	0.03**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Support for Democracy	0.09**	0.03*	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rural	-0.03**	0.00	0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01	-0.01*	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Poverty	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Female	-0.01	0.01	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.63**	0.67**	0.53**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	8,036	8,734	10,470
R-squared	0.02	0.01	0.07

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table J.2: Ghana DiD Analyses with Alternative Measure of Co-Partisanship
Would vote for president's party if election were held tomorrow.

VARIABLES	(1) Horizontal Power	(2) Vertical Power	(3) Trust
President Party Voter	-0.05**	-0.00	0.10**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
NPP Voter	0.03**	0.00	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
NDC Voter	0.03**	0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for Democracy	0.08**	0.02*	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rural	-0.03**	0.00	0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education = 1, Primary Education	-0.00	-0.01	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education = 2, Secondary Education	0.01	-0.02*	-0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education = 3, Post-Secondary Education	0.02	-0.03*	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Round = 4	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Round = 5	-0.01	0.01	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Round = 6	-0.03*	-0.02*	-0.16**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Round = 7	0.04**	0.00	-0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.64**	0.70**	0.57**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	8,747	8,751	8,605
R-squared	0.02	0.01	0.07

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table J.3: Ghana DiD Analyses with Region Fixed Effects

VARIABLES	(1) Horizontal Power	(2) Vertical Power	(3) Trust
Close to President's Party	-0.05**	-0.01	0.09**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Close to NPP	0.04**	0.01	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Close to NDC	0.03*	0.03**	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for Democracy	0.08**	0.02**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rural	-0.03**	0.01	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Poverty	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Round = 3			0.07**
			(0.02)
Round = 4	-0.05**	-0.06**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Round = 5	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Round = 6	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.10**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Round = 7	0.04**	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Region = 2	0.02	-0.03	0.11**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Region = 3	0.03	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Region = 4	-0.04*	-0.03	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Region = 5	0.05**	-0.06**	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Region = 6	-0.01	-0.04**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Region = 7	0.08**	-0.02	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Region = 8	0.02	-0.04*	0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Region = 9	-0.01	-0.01	0.10**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Region = 10	0.06*	0.03	0.20**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.61**	0.72**	0.46**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	8,732	8,734	10,487
R-squared	0.03	0.01	0.07

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table J.4: Ghana DiD Analyses with Interactions Between Round and Individual Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Horizontal Power	Vertical Power	Trust
Close to President's Party	-0.05**	-0.01	0.11**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Close to NPP	0.04**	0.00	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Close to NDC	0.02*	0.03**	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.64**	0.68**	0.54**
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Observations	8,732	9,452	11,204
R-squared	0.03	0.01	0.07

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Each model includes individual level controls, round fixed effects, and the interaction between the round fixed effects and the individual controls. They are omitted here because of the number of coefficients.

Table J.5: Support for Horizontal Power in Ghana: Round by Round

VARIABLES	(1) R3 NPP Pres.	(2) R4 NPP Pres.	(3) R5 NDC Pres.	(4) R6 NDC Pres.	(5) R7 NPP Pres.
Close to NPP	-0.07*	-0.02	0.05*	0.09**	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Swing Voter or Minor Party	-0.05	-0.05	0.01	0.05*	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rural	-0.00	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.02	-0.05*	0.00	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.70**	0.72**	0.70**	0.67**	0.70**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Observations	1,123	1,140	2,365	2,292	2,348
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01

Standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table J.6: Support for Vertical Power in Ghana: Round by Round

VARIABLES	(1) R2 NPP Pres.	(2) R3 NPP Pres.	(3) R4 NPP Pres.	(4) R5 NDC Pres.	(5) R6 NDC Pres.	(6) R7 NPP Pres.
Close to NPP	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.00	-0.05**	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Swing Voter or Minor Party	-0.00	-0.03	-0.00	-0.02	-0.07**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rural	-0.02	0.04*	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty	-0.00	0.01	-0.02*	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.71**	0.71**	0.73**	0.74**	0.72**	0.75**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,079	1,112	1,148	2,369	2,295	2,339
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses
** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table J.7: Trust in the Courts in Ghana: Round by Round

VARIABLES	(1) R1 NDC Pres.	(2) R2 NPP Pres.	(3) R3 NPP Pres.	(4) R4 NPP Pres.	(5) R5 NDC Pres.	(6) R6 NDC Pres.	(7) R7 NPP Pres.
Close to NPP	-0.12**	0.32**	0.06*	0.09**	-0.08**	-0.22**	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Swing Voter or Minor Party	-0.04*	0.13**	-0.01	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.12**	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.00	0.00**	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rural	0.02	-0.02	0.08**	0.04	0.02	0.07**	0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.02**	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Poverty	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02*	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.05**	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.61**	0.40**	0.65**	0.54**	0.60**	0.57**	0.47**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Observations	1,911	1,096	1,082	1,125	2,335	2,265	2,308
R-squared	0.03	0.18	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.04

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05