Supplementary Appendix

This appendix contains additional information relevant to the primary manuscript, "Outside the wire: U.S. military deployments and public opinion in host states." This appendix includes items such as survey questions, a full table of our primary models, robustness tests of the models within the manuscript, figures for clarity, and additional information on how we conducted and executed our survey.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

A Variable codebook

Below we provide a list of all of the variables included in our models and the coding schemes for each.

A.1 Country Information

1 - Country Abbreviation (iso3c)
Uses the ISO3C abbreviation format.
Values:

AUS - Australia
BEL - Belgium
GMY - Germany
ITA - Italy
JPN - Japan
KUW - Kuwait
NTH - Netherlands
PHI - Philippines
POL - Poland
POR - Portugal
ROK - South Korea
SPN - Spain
TUR - Turkey
UKG - United Kingdom

2 - Language
The language the respondent took the survey in.
Values:

1 - English
2 - Dutch
3 - French
4 - German
5 - Italian
6 - Japanese
7 - Arabic
8 - Tagalog
9 - Polish
10 - Portuguese
11 - Korean

12 - Spanish
13 - Turkish

A.2 Dependent Variables

This subsection shows the available responses for the three questions that serve as the basis for our dependent variables. Please note that we recode these variables when we estimate our categorical logit models. For our primary models we collapse the six original categories down into four: 1) Positive views, 2) Negative views, 3) Neutral views, and 4) Don't know/Decline to answer. This approach has a couple of advantages. First, while we prefer to collect data at a fine-grained level, we have little empirical or theoretical basis for evaluating the substantive difference between the "Somewhat" and "Very" categories. However, there is a clearer and more meaningful distinction between positive and negative views. Second, the simpler saves us a considerable amount of time given the computational intensity of the multilevel categorical models, which we discuss more below.

3 - Question: US Military Presence (troops_1)
"In general, what is your opinion of the presence of American military forces in (respondent's country)?"
Values:
1 - Don't know/decline to answer
2 - Very favorable
3 - Somewhat favorable
4 - Neutral
5 - Somewhat unfavorable
6 - Very unfavorable

4 - Question: American Government (american_gov)
"In general, what is your opinion of the American government?"
Values:
1 - Don't know/decline to answer
2 - Very favorable
3 - Somewhat favorable
4 - Neutral
5 - Somewhat unfavorable
6 - Very unfavorable

5 - Question: American People (american_people)
"In general, what is your opinion of the American people?"
Values:
1 - Don't know/decline to answer
2 - Very favorable
3 - Somewhat favorable
4 - Neutral
5 - Somewhat unfavorable
6 - Very unfavorable

A.3 Independent Variables

These variables represent either data coded automatically by our survey services or questions we asked the respondents. Note that almost all of these variables are treated as categorical/factor variables when estimating the models, and that the category numbers do not denote treatment as a continuous measure.

6 - Question: Direct Contact with US Military (contact_pers)
"Have you personally had direct contact with a member of the American military in (respondent's country)?"
Values:
1 - Yes
2 - No
3 - Don't know/Decline to answer

7 - Question: Family Contact with US Military (contact_nonpers)
"Has a member of your family or close friend had direct contact with a member of the American military stationed in (respondent's country)?"
Values:
1 - Yes
2 - No
3 - Don't know/Decline to answer

8 - Question: Economic benefit US Military (benefit_pers)
"Have you personally received a direct economic benefit from the American military presence in (respondent's country)? Examples include employment by the US military, employment by a contractor that does business with the US military, or

ownership/employment at a business that frequently serves US military personnel."
Values:
1 - Yes
2 - No
3 - Don't know/Decline to answer

9 - Question: Family Economic Benefit US Military (benefit_nonpers)
"Has a member of your family or close friend received a direct economic benefit from the American military presence in (respondent's country)? Examples include employment by the US military, employment by a contractor that does business with the US military, or ownership/employment at a business that frequently serves US military personnel."
Values:
1 - Yes
2 - No
3 - Don't know/Decline to answer

10 - Question: Gender
What is your gender?
Values:
1 - Male
2 - Female
3 - Non-binary
4 - None of the above

11 - Question: Minority
Do you identify as a racial, ethnic, or religious minority?
Values:
1 - Yes
2 - No
3 - Decline to Answer

12 - Question: Education
How many years of formal education have you completed?
Values: 0-99999

Note: Given a number of extreme outliers resulting from the open form/self-coding process we used in our surveys, we truncate the education variable at 25 years when

we estimate our models to eliminate extreme outliers. This covers up to 9 years of graduate education.

13 - Question: Age
What is your age?
Values: 0-99999

14 - Question: Income - Schmeidl (incomesm)
What is your total household income during the past 12 months?
This question had six response categories for each of the six countries, which is the following. All categories are combined as 1-6 in the data. We recommend combining categories 5 and 6 to represent the upper income bracket to match the quintile distributions from the Qualtrics survey.
Values:

1 - Bottom Bracket
2 - 2nd Bracket
3 - 3rd Bracket
4 - 4th Bracket
5 - 5th Bracket
6 - Top Bracket

United Kingdom:
1 - <£20,000
2 - £20,000 - <£35,000
3 - £35,000 - <£50,000
4 - £50,000 - <£75,000
5 - £75,000 - <£100,000
6 - >£100,000

Germany:
1 - <20.000€
2 - 20.000€ - 29.999€
3 - 30.000€ - 39.999€
4 - 40.000€ - 49.999€
5 - 50.000€ - 59.000€
6 - >60.000€

Italy:

1 - <20.000€
2 - 20.000€ - 29.999€
3 - 30.000€ - 39.999€
4 - 40.000€ - 49.999€
5 - 50.000€ - 59.000€
6 - >60.000€

Kuwait:
1 - <3000 KWD
2 - 3 000 - less than 6 000 KWD
3 - 6 000 - less than 12 000 KWD
4 - 12 000 - less than 18 000 KWD
5 - 18 000 - less than 24000 KWD
6 - >24000 KWD

Japan:
1 - <2 million yen
2 - 2 million yen - less than 4 million yen
3 - 4 million yen - less than 7 million yen
4 - 7 million yen - less than 10 million yen
5 - 10 million yen - less than 15 million yen
6 - >15 million yen

South Korea
1 - <25 million KRW
2 - 25 million - less than 35 million KRW
3 - 35 million - less than 45 million KRW
4 - 45 million - less than 60 million KRW
5 - 60 million - less than 80 million KRW
6 - >80 million KRW

15 - Question: Religion
What is your religion, if any?
Values:
1 - Christianity (Protestant)
2 - Catholicism
3 - Islam
4 - Agnostic/Atheist

5 - Hinduism
6 - Buddhism
7 - Shinto
8 - Judaism
9 - Mormonism
10 - Local religion
11 - Other:
12 - Decline to Answer

16 - Question: Religion Other (religionother)
Open text responses for the Other bracket option in the previous question.
Value Range: Free-form text.

17 - Question: Political Views (ideology)
"People often talk about political issues and views in terms of a "left" and "right" spectrum. Using the following scale, where would you place yourself in terms of political views?"
Values:
1 - 1 - LEFT
2 - 2
3 - 3
4 - 4
5 - 5
6 - 6
7 - 7
8 - 8
9 - 9
10 - 10 - RIGHT

18 - Question: Favor Democracy (demgov)
"In general, how important is it to you that you live under a democratic government?"
Values:
1 - Very important
2 - Somewhat important
3 - Neutral
4 - Not important
5 - Don't know/decline to answer

19 - Question: US Influence (Amount) (american_inf_1)
" In your opinion, how much influence does the United States have in (respondent's country)?"
Values:

1 - A lot
2 - Some
3 - A little
4 - None
5 - Don't know/Decline to answer

20 - Question: US Influence (Quality) (american_inf_2)
"In your opinion, the influence that the United States has in (respondent's country) is. . . "
Values:

1 - Very positive
2 - Positive
3 - Neither Positive nor Negative
4 - Negative
5 - Very Negative
6 - Don't know/Decline to answer



Figure A1: Map of survey coverage. Country shading represents the firm conducting the survey in that particular country.

B Survey Coverage

Figure A1 and Table A1 show the countries included in our analysis and help to illustrate the geographic coverage of our survey. Our initial rules for inclusion were based on a count of the countries that had an average of $\geq$ 100 U.S. military personnel per year deployed within their borders since 1990. This yielded a fairly large initial sample of 34 countries. From this list we further identified the countries that had average annual deployment levels $\geq$ 10,000 U.S. military personnel (the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and Japan). We added Kuwait to this list as the value fell just below the 10,000 threshold. From there we proceeded to include other countries where the U.S. military presence was likely to be large enough to elicit a reaction from the public, thereby providing the variation we need the conduct our survey. We also focused on countries where the U.S. military had a

Table A1: Survey coverage table

	Country	Survey Firm	Observations
1	Australia	Qualtrics	989
2	Belgium	Qualtrics	995
3	Germany	Schlesinger	1014
4	Spain	Qualtrics	1005
5	United Kingdom	Schlesinger	1015
6	Italy	Schlesinger	1014
7	Japan	Schlesinger	1010
8	South Korea	Schlesinger	1010
9	Kuwait	Schlesinger	1012
10	Netherlands	Qualtrics	999
11	Philippines	Qualtrics	1004
12	Poland	Qualtrics	1009
13	Portugal	Qualtrics	1004
14	Turkey	Qualtrics	1007

historically notable presence, or cases that were of contemporary relevance.

For example, the average value for the Philippines is only 1,042 but the the long historical presence of U.S. military facilities in the Philippines, as well as that country's status as a former colony, makes it an attractive case. Alternatively, Poland has an average score of 28 U.S. personnel since 1990, but with recent Russian aggression and the increase in U.S. personnel deployed to Poland, this is a case that is of great contemporary relevance for our analysis as it will help us to look at attitudes towards U.S. military personnel in a country that does not have a long-term history of hosting such deployments.

Other cases, like Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, and Portugal allow us to assess variation in attitudes among countries that share a relatively similar geographic and political history, as well as countries who all belong to NATO. Further, countries like Portugal provide us with an opportunity to explore how variation in the type of U.S. military personnel affects attitudes, as it receives mostly Navy personnel as compared to the Army-heavy deployments in countries Germany.

Finally, there is a notable lack of countries represented in Africa and South America. This is for a couple of reasons. First, the only country in South America with a notable history of hosting U.S. military personnel is Panama. However, this is largely due to a brief spike in deployments following the U.S. invasion. In general,

most Latin American countries have not played host to large long-term deployments in the way that countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region have. Those deployments that do occur in Latin America are generally short-term military exercises that tend to occur outside of the public's view. Though there is some limited interaction with the public during some of these deployments, it is not of the same frequency or intensity as in other cases. Members of our team have addressed the effects of these types of deployments in other work, but we have opted to exclude them from our current survey effort so as to focus on other cases with a history of hosting larger deployments over long periods of time.

However, we have conducted fieldwork in two Latin American countries as a part of this project—Panama and Peru. Panama is of clear historic importance given both the Canal and the U.S. invasion in 1989; Peru has hosted multiple rounds of military exercises conducted by the U.S. military in conjunction with other partner countries throughout Latin American on an annual basis. In each case we interviewed U.S. military personnel, local politicians, journalists, and policymakers in an effort to better understand the nature of the U.S. military's activities in these countries, as well as how the U.S. military relates to the host-state public. Given the smaller and more episodic nature of the deployments, we believe these interviews were a more effective approach for covering Latin America than the use of large-N surveys.

Similarly, U.S. longer-term deployments in Africa are relatively new, but most are still relatively small in scale. None of the countries on our base list counting those that averaged ≥ 100 personnel per year were in Africa. Furthermore, those that are currently in Africa tend to be oriented towards military training and counter-terror operations. Unlike the larger deployments in Western Europe, these deployments are smaller and more focused in purpose, and do not tend to interact with the host-state population in the ways that deployments in other regions historically have.

C Extended Control Variable Discussion

Due to space limitations and less theoretical interest in the control variables, our descriptions of the variables and their motivations are brief within the manuscript. This section contains a fuller discussion about the role each control variable plays relative to our dependent variables.

The independent variables of interest should be strong predictors of the dependent variables, but there are multiple confounding factors that could limit our inferences if we did not account for them.[1] Certainly, there is a substantial research on demographic trends in survey research and how demographic-based attributes correlate with individuals perceptions of political, security, and economic policies and actors. To try and control for these factors that may motivate the dependent variable distinctly from our independent variables of interest, we included a series of questions to capture the demographic attributes of the respondents. In particular, we included demographic attributes that can influence perceptions of the U.S. and its military. By including these variables, we can better control for how much contact and economic benefits (both direct and indirect) uniquely and independently account for a respondent's perception of the three dependent variables. Not including these controls would cause our models to over-estimate the effect each independent variable has on the dependent variable.

We include the respondent's age as measured by a six-point ordinal scale, starting with a 18–24 bracket, increasing in ten year increments up to $\geq$65. Age can be a strong determinant of attitudes as there has been a long and intense debate as to how age correlates with political attitudes (Cutler and Kaufman 1975; Oxley et al. 2008); conventional research suggests that older respondents/cohorts tend to be more conservative than younger respondents as older cohorts are just more conservative or people become more conservative over time. However, more nuanced research suggests that the mortality of poorer seniors (who tend to be more liberal) plays a large role in older cohorts seeming more conservative (Rodriguez 2018). Regardless of the mechanism, there is clear statistical evidence that age plays a role in predicting respondent attitudes. More germane to the context of our survey, across the several qualitative interviews we conducted, one recurring comment was that students were the most likely to mobilize against the presence of U.S. forces (Interview with Panamanian journalist 2018; Interview with Panamanian journalist and

[1] Appendix Tables A5–A7 demonstrate the variable performance of interest when we don't control for any other variables. Generally, our inferences about our hypothesis remain consistent across multiple model specifications.

former government official 2018) which tracts with the American politics research that younger cohorts are more likely to be opposed to the status quo than older cohorts. Given that students tend to belong to younger age cohorts, we expect that age will positively correlate with positive perceptions of the United States.

Unique to states that experienced a previous U.S. invasion (Germany and Japan), one possibility is that the older groups that experienced the invasion may be more likely to oppose the U.S. At the same time, one of our interview subjects in Germany noted very explicitly that they had experienced the opposite reaction. The subject, a government relations officer at a U.S. Army base in Germany noted that the older generation in Germany loved the American military. They noted that older adults actually remembered American soldiers doing good things for them after the end of the war and helping to rebuild the country under the Marshall Plan (Government Relations Officer Interview 2019). They found that this actually led older people to have more positive perceptions of the U.S. military. Further, one of our interview subjects noted that because humanitarian deployments often recur, older people will remember that U.S. troops have visited before and were not there to spy or invade neighboring countries, whereas younger people may have no personal memory of these previous deployments and thus will be more likely to be suspicious of humanitarian deployments (Interview with Embassy Staff #4 2018). Thus, overall we maintain that age will be positively related to positive perceptions of the U.S. military.

We also adjust for the respondent's self-identified gender. We asked respondents "What is your gender?", providing four response options, including "Male", "Female", "Non-binary", and "None of the above".[2] Given previous findings on women's attitudes towards militarism, the greater negative effects that conflict can have on women, and the disproportionate way in which negative externalizes fall upon women in hosting foreign troops (such as gender-based violence, intimate partner violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking) we expect those who self-identify as female are less likely to be supportive of a U.S. military presence (Moon 1997; Akibayashi and Takazato 2009; Enloe 2014; Hudson and Leidl 2015).

We asked for the respondent's left-right ideological orientation by priming them on what the left-right spectrum is, and then asking them to place themselves on a left-right political spectrum that ranged from 1 (far-left) to 10 (far-right). Generally, we expect that respondents on the left will be more critical of the presence of the United States while respondents on the right will be more receptive to it. This ties in with the historical roots of the US presence within the country, the framing

[2]Six of the countries did not receive the "none of the above" option due to the firm requiring an answer to fulfill inclusion criteria.

of the debate over the provision of security domestically, and the view of security forces presently. Additionally, if there are particular kinds of activities that mobilize individuals against the U.S. or national military, this may create an enduring impression of the U.S. presence within that country. We interviewed a member of parliament in Great Britain that identified the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the 1980s as being the locus of activity against the US presence (Interview with British Member of Parliament #2 2019). Similar, but more contemporary, a German peace activist argued that the drone-based strikes out of Ramstein Air Force Base have mobilized German opposition to U.S. military forces to historic highs (Interview with German Peace Activist 2019). Across qualitative interview subjects, many mentioned that those most likely to mobilize against a U.S. presence, or to generally have negative perceptions of the U.S. military, were individuals who identified as leftist (Interview with former President 2018; Interview with Panamanian journalist 2018; Public Affairs Officer Interview 2018; Interview with Embassy Staff 2018).[3]

We asked respondents to self-report their annual income by placing themselves in income percentile brackets for their country.[4] Given competing narratives about the relationship between income and support for the United States and the cross-cutting nature of different types of U.S. economic activity in host states, we remain agnostic about our expectations here. Our interview subjects consistently noted that upper classes are more likely to hold business interests that improve with positive relations with the United States and are more likely to be part of the elites that actually negotiate the military agreements with the U.S. government (Interview with Panamanian journalist 2018; Interview with Panamanian journalist and former government official 2018). There is also limited evidence from American politics research that people in higher income brackets support the status quo in terms of defense policy (Eismeier 1982; Ferris 1983). They are also more likely to have to traveled to, or studied in, the United States and formed more positive views of the United States.

At the same time, there is also a competing expectation that the lower classes may be most supportive of the U.S. Across our interview subjects, one common view was that those at the lowest income levels were most likely to benefit from the U.S. military's humanitarian efforts. One embassy official noted that when the USNS

[3]Alternatively, it is also possible for some respondents to identify as right-leaning nationalists that would favor removing the U.S. presence and relying exclusively on a national army. However, nothing that we heard in our qualitative interviews in four different countries does not seem to identify a large trend towards that view in aggregate.

[4]Because we used two different survey firms, one firm used quintiles while the other used sextiles. While this is not ideal, it still provides us with a linear measure of income. We adjusted income quintiles or sextiles for each country.

Comfort carried out a mission in Colombia in 2007, locals treated it as a festive occasion and came out to welcome the Americans who were bringing aid (the interview subject noted that the locals knew that these were members of the American military and attributed the aid to the U.S. military) (Interview with Embassy Staff #4 2018). This line of theoretical development, however, contradicts the expectation that the poorest individuals in a society bear the costs of U.S. basing. Often, bases are located in economically poorer or underdeveloped areas and those that become involved in black- or grey-market activities are more likely to be from those most in need to garner revenue (Bryant 1979; Moon 1997; Akibayashi and Takazato 2009). Given the cross-cutting causal relationships, we understand that income may be important but are unsure about how it affects attitudes towards the U.S. and the military presence.

We also adjust for respondents' educational attainment. We gave respondents an open prompt to fill in the number of years of formal education they had completed. Previous surveys indicate that further education tends to lead individuals to become more leftist in their political orientation (Pew Research Center 2016; Gouldner 1979). Whether education has its own independent effect on views of the U.S. is thus unclear, and the results will shed some light on this connection between education and political leanings.[5] For example, an interview subject in Panama noted that recipients of humanitarian aid were not suspicious of the Americans in the way that middle class students would be. He noted that this was due to a lack of education and argued that this made them less likely to critically analyze the troop presences (Interview with Panamanian journalist 2018). Though the idea that education leads people to oppose a U.S. military presence was likely influenced by this particular individual's own leftist leanings, this is not unfounded.[6]

We include the respondent's religion. We asked "What is your religion, if any?" The options available were Christianity (Protestant), Catholicism, Islam, Agnostic/Atheist, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, Judaism, Mormonism, Local Religion, Decline to Answer, and "Other," which allowed a free form box to explain. We expect some religious affiliations to affect individuals' attitudes, particularly where they tap into aspects of social conservatism or political cleavages that elicit anti-American sentiment. For example, we expect that Muslims will have more negative perceptions of the United States, given recent history of U.S. foreign policy and the multiple on-

[5]We omit a small number of responses indicating over 25 years of formal education. Given the broader distribution of responses, we treat these as erroneous responses.

[6]We note that this individual made clear to us that he had leftist tendencies and had even participated in the annual marches to commemorate the American invasion of Panama.

going wars in predominantly Muslim countries (Nisbet et al. 2004; Berger 2014). We also expect Agnostics/Atheists to have a more negative view of the United States as they tend to be more left-leaning in their politics, and we also expect left-leaning individuals to have more negative perceptions of the US role within their country. However, we still expect Agnostics/Atheists to be more negative toward the U.S. after controlling for ideology, given that the United States is a highly religious country and religious tones are often part of official government messages. This likely will lead to more negative perceptions among this non-religious group.

We also include a series of attitudinal responses. Attitudes regarding the U.S. military presence in a country, as well as the U.S. government and people, may reflect more general views held by individual respondents. First, we include a question asking respondents "In general, how important is it to you that you live under a democratic government?" Given the long history of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, we expect the responses to this question to be positively correlated with perceptions of the United States. Second, we include two questions that capture respondent attitudes toward U.S. influence in their country. We asked respondents to judge the amount of influence the United States has on their country. We also asked respondents to evaluate whether that influence was good or bad.[7] While this question relates to those that comprise the dependent variables, it is different enough to warrant inclusion in the model. It is possible for individuals to have a negative evaluation of the American influence in their specific country but to generally view the U.S. military (as well as the U.S. government and population) in a positive or benign way.[8]

Next, we asked about respondents' minority status: "Do you identify as a racial, ethnic, or religious minority?" This question prompted the individual for a "yes", "no", or "decline to answer" response. We expect that because of the historical U.S. promotion of human rights, minority groups (which may be at greater risk for repression), will be more supportive of a U.S. military presence in their country, which respondents may see as protecting them against repression by the host government (Bell, Clay and Martinez Machain 2017). Further, U.S. military bases are often located in communities with high minority populations, and members of these

[7]See the supplementary appendix for more details. This variable is similar to the one used by the LAPOP (2014) survey when asking about American influence.

[8]Notably, several of our variables may correlate with our measure of political ideology. While these variable measures some concepts that may be orthogonal to a normal left-right dimension (e.g. security) or capture nuanced views, we also examine models that remove all variables that conceptually correlate with ideology and our results remain consistent. These robustness checks are in our online appendix.

populations often work on or near military bases and receive economic benefits from the presence. This dynamic may lead minority populations to have more positive perceptions of the U.S., because of positive contractual relationships. There is of course the possibility that minority groups, under some settings, feel less positively towards the U.S. military. Even in democratic countries, minority groups may see themselves at odds with the majority groups that control the government and view a U.S. military presence as supporting the majority and not them. When meeting with a panel of U.S. servicemembers stationed at RAF Lakenheath, we found that very few of them had interacted with members of local minority communities, and that they mostly held positive but vague views of them (Interview at RAF Lakenheath #5 2019). In our interview with a government relations officer at a U.S. base in Germany, the interview subject noted, regarding minority groups, that "They are not my priority to reach out to." (Government Relations Officer Interview 2019).

Finally, we include a series of variables measured at the country-level and subnational level (province or region) that may affect individuals' attitudes. Many of these variables were suggested by our Editor and Reviewers for this manuscript, so we appreciate their insight in thinking about the ways in which we can better control for country variation beyond just traditional fixed effects. Of note, these variables are at a higher level of aggregation than the individual responses and only vary across the 14 countries (or the subset of provinces when specified) and do not vary for each individual respondent.

First, we expect some individuals to have greater opportunities to interact with and/or benefit from a U.S. military presence. To help adjust for variation in opportunities to interact with U.S. personnel we also include a binary variable indicating whether or not there is a U.S. military facility located within a given province/region $(1 = Yes; 0 = No)$.[9]

Using publicly available data on U.S. military construction spending at overseas locations, we constructed a spatially-weighted province/region-level indicator of US military spending within each country.[10] This variable is the spatially weighted sum of all U.S. military construction spending within a country, combining the total amount of spending within a given province/region with the inverse distance weighted sum of spending in all other provinces/regions. This provides us with a more objective measure of the economic benefits that accompany a U.S. military presence,

[9]This variable was coded using data originally collected by Vine (2015) and we supplemented with independent research.

[10]This measure is based on total obligational authority (TOA). This represents monies that have been actually committed to spending projects

while also allowing us to address the possibilities that 1) not all sub-national units are equally exposed to the capital flows accompanying U.S. deployments, and 2) that there may be spillover effects from such spending on attitudes in neighboring provinces/regions.[11] We use the log of this variable in our models.

We expect such capital flows to create economic constituencies that support U.S. deployments, and that these capital flows generate support in ways that are similar to trade, investment, and aid. As we mentioned in the theoretical section of the manuscript, Fordham and Kleinberg (2011) show that trade affects individuals' attitudes on foreign policy issues; individuals who benefit from economic exchange with a country tend to express more positive attitudes towards that country. This is similar to how foreign aid can form positive perceptions about the donor among the recipient state's population, a military presence, by providing benefits to the population, can improve perceptions of the U.S. (Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Wood 2014). Studies of foreign aid have examined how donor states use aid to gain influence in the recipient state (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Milner and Tingley 2013; Milner, Nielson and Findley 2016).

We include a variable measuring the total number of U.S. military and civilian DOD personnel deployed to the respondent's country as of December 2017 (Defense Manpower Data Center 2019). We expect overall deployment size to affect opportunities for interaction, but also to serve as an indirect indicator of overall U.S. military spending in a country. Additional opportunities for interaction will condition the effect of the contact variables that we include. Someone that interacts with troops but does not live in proximity to the base may have a different baseline view of the service-members, U.S., and the U.S. people as a whole when compared to someone that frequently interacts with military personnel and assets. More notably, a person not living on a base may be able to choose their level of interaction with American military forces as they can more easily choose to be near or away from a base while someone living in the same region as a base has less freedom to do so. Given that this variable may affect both the baseline level of contact as well as have a conditional effect upon attitudes, we also run a model that only includes respondents that are not proximate to U.S. installations. We find that our results do not vary from the core models presented in the main manuscript. We use the log of this variable in our models.

Related to this, we also adjust for economic conditions and relationships between the U.S. and the respondent's country. We include a measure of each country's GDP in constant 2017 dollars. This variable was obtained from the World Bank's World

[11] We obtained these data from the United States Department of Defense (Various Years).

Development Indicators (World Bank 2018). We also adjust for the level of total bilateral trade (imports + exports) between the U.S. and the respondent's country in 2017. These data were obtained from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (International Monetary Fund 2018). We use the log of both GDP and trade in our models.

We expect states facing more challenging security environments to be more favorably disposed to the U.S. presence, in general. We include a measure of each state's "threat environment" as a means of assessing differences in baseline opinions across countries. Using the measure developed by (Leeds and Savun 2007) as a rough guide, we used United Nations' ideal point data for all dyads in 2017. We begin with UN ideal point distance data for each state in our sample and all possible dyad pairings with those states (Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey 2009, v21.0). We then calculate the median absolute distance in ideal points for all dyads. We then drop all dyads where 1) the ideal point distance is $\geq$ the median value, and 2) the two states belong to a mutual defense pact. Finally, we sum the 2017 military expenditures values for all remaining states to provide a picture of the total military expenditures for non-allied states that are not aligned with the referent state, according to the UN voting data (Stockholm International Peace Research Institite (SIPRI) 2019). We use the log of this variable in our models.[12]

We also expect political institutions to affect attitudes towards the U.S. We adjust for two such institutions herein. First, we include a binary variable indicating whether a the country in which the respondent resides is in an active defense pact with the United States ($1 = Yes; 0 = No$) (Leeds et al. 2002, v4.01). Our expectation is that if the countries have formally recognized a joint security interest publicly, citizens within that state may be more likely to positively associate a U.S. presence with that national goal. Countries that do not have this joint defense pact may have more questions as to the purpose fo the United States' presence within their territory. Second, we adjust for the respondent's country's level of democracy using the Polity 21-point regime type indicator (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011, v2017). This relates back to the individual question we ask about the importance of living in a democratic state; we expect citizens in more consolidated democracies to favor the U.S. over respondents that live in less democratic states.

We include a variable measuring the number of U.S. students studying abroad in each country in 2017 (Institute for International Education 2018). It is possible that contact with U.S. personnel reflects the likelihood that individuals come into contact

[12]We cannot fully replicate the Leeds and Savun (2007) measure as we lack up-to-date data used in the original metric.

with American citizens, more broadly. Not all countries experience the same amount of exposure to contact between their citizens. Countries that do more business with the U.S., host most U.S. tourists, host more U.S. military or government personnel, or host more exchange students, may have higher or lower baselines for positive and negative attitudes towards the referent groups. To help address some of this between-country variation, we include the log of U.S. students studying abroad in 2017. Though this does not represent all possible forms of contact, these data represent some of the most complete and up-to-date data, as compared to broader tourism data, for example. Further, the variation in this variable intuitively matches what one might expect regarding countries that have more exposure to U.S. citizens in genera. For example, the United Kingdom has one of the higher reported levels of exchange students.

D Supplementary Tables and Figures

This section includes tables containing supplementary information on our data and models.

D.1 Correlation among variables of interest:

Figures A2, A3, A4 show the correlation coefficients for the three separate models using the three dependent variables. Generally speaking the correlations between pairs of variables are quite small. Given the repetition of variables in the categorical models, we present the correlation matrices from the multilevel Bayesian binary logistic regressions below. We constructed each correlation matrix by taking the variance-covariance matrix from each model and running it through the `cov2cor` function in R.

In general the correlation coefficients tend to be small. One point we would like to highlight is that the correlations tend to be strongest between the country-level variables, and between the country-level variables and the intercept. This is to be expected—since we only have one year of observations for each of the country-level indicators they tend to behave similar to country indicators.



Figure A2: Correlation matrix for independent variables used in the multilevel Bayesian binary logistic regressions. Note that we use the binary models to ease visualization of the correlation matrix as the categorical models contain several redundancies.



Figure A3: Correlation matrix for independent variables used in the multilevel Bayesian binary logistic regressions. Note that we use the binary models to ease visualization of the correlation matrix as the categorical models contain several redundancies.



Figure A4: Correlation matrix for independent variables used in the multilevel Bayesian binary logistic regressions. Note that we use the binary models to ease visualization of the correlation matrix as the categorical models contain several redundancies.

D.2 Descriptive Figures

This section is intended to provide readers with a better understanding of how the models' observations are distributed across the categories/levels of the different independent variables. Below we provide two figures. Figure A5 shows the distribution of the various categorical variables in our primary choice models. Each facet panel represents one of the variables, while the X axis shows the specific categories associated with that variable. The Y axis shows the count for each category/level. The second figure—Figure A6—shows the distribution of the numerical variables in the mode, with each facet panel representing an individual variable.



Figure A5: This figure provides information on the distribution of the categorical variables in our primary choice models. Each facet header represents a given independent variable, and the X axis values represent the categories associated with that variable.



Figure A6: This figure provides information on the distribution of the numerical variables in our primary choice models. The X axis corresponds with the values of each variable while the Y axis corresponds with the density of each distribution.



Figure A7: Figure showing the country-level distribution of the responses to the primary independent variables used in the models.



Figure A8: Total U.S. active duty, guard, reserve, and civilian DOD personnel deployed to each country in our sample.



Figure A9: Map showing the locations of known US military facilities. Data based on those collected by David Vine (Vine 2015) and updated by our research assistants using publicly available data.

D.3 Categorical Models

In this section we present the results of a series of categorical models predicting respondent attitudes towards the U.S. military presence in a state, the U.S. government, and the American people in general. First we present the full tables for the multilevel Bayesian logistic regressions that we use in the main text. We estimate these models using the `brms` package in R. Second, we also include a series of categorical logistic regressions using country fixed effects as a robustness check on the multilevel models. We estimate these models using the `multinom` function from the `nnet` package in R. Last, we also include a series of robustness checks on the primary multilevel models.

For each of our outcome variables of interest (i.e., attitudes towards U.S. military personnel, the U.S. government, and the U.S. people) we collapsed the original seven response categories into 4 unordered categories: 1) Neutral, 2) Positive, 3)Negative, and 4) Don't know/Decline to answer. Given the relatively limited set of options for fitting multilevel categorical choice models, we chose to fit these models using the `brms` package in R. In each model we use weak/non-informative priors for the coefficients where $beta \sim N(0, 100)$.

Tables A2, A3, and A4 show the results for the models using U.S. troops, U.S. government, and U.S. people outcome variables, respectively. Each table contains three columns of coefficients, with each column representing the coefficients predicting the "Positive", "Negative", and "Don't know/Decline to answer" responses. For each model the "Neutral" category represents the omitted baseline category. Please note that these tables simply show the full output corresponding to the tables discussed in the main document's results section.

To assist in drawing out the substantive implications of our findings, Figures A10–A21 use our primary models to plot the predicted probability of observing each outcome response for each country in our estimation sample. Each figure represents the predicted probabilities associated with one of the four contact/benefit variables of interest (see X axis title). Within each figure, each facet panel represents the values associated with each country in our sample. Please note that for each prediction the remaining contact/benefit variables are set to "No", while the remaining control variables are set to their country-specific mean, median, or modal value. Accordingly, for a given country in a given figure, the predicted values shown for a given value on the X axis represent the predicted probability of observing a certain type of respondent attitude (e.g. a positive or negative assessment) if the respondent reported no personal contact with U.S. military personnel? We plot the point prediction and 95% credible intervals around each point.

As a further check on our primary results, we include a series of additional models

all based on our primary multilevel models contained in the main text. The central takeaway from these robustness checks is that our primary models present a fairly conservative set of results regarding the possible effect of contact and benefits on individual attitudes.

Tables A5, A6, and A7 show the results of the multilevel models using only the four primary variables of interest: 1) Personal contact, 2) Network contact, 3) Personal benefits, and 4) Network benefits. In general these results mirror our primary results, but we find clearer correlations between some of the independent variables of interest and attitudes than in our primary models. For example, here we find a clearer positive correlation between personal contact and both positive and negative attitudes towards the U.S. government, whereas our primary models find a correlation closer to 0. Similarly, these models yield a clearer positive correlation between network benefits and positive attitudes towards the U.S. government, where our primary models indicate a weaker correlation closer to 0. These models also yield stronger correlations between personal benefits and both positive and negative attitudes towards the three outcome groups. Last, in general the errors on the coefficients in these models are also smaller than in our primary models.

One reviewer commented that many of our control variables may simply serve as multiple proxies for respondent ideology. Tables A8, A9, and A10 replicate our primary models, but exclude many of these variables that may be proxies for respondent ideology. The coefficient plot for these models is shown in Figure A23. Specifically, we exclude the questions focusing on evaluations of American influence, the importance of democratic government, Religious self-identification, and minority self-identification. These results again look very similar to our primary models. Personal contact correlates with a higher probability of expressing both positive and negative attitudes towards all three of the groups of interest. In these models we find some evidence of a small positive correlation in the U.S. government model, whereas our primary models suggest a smaller coefficient closer to 0. The results from the network contact model largely mirror our primary findings. As with the stripped down models that include only the contact and benefits variables, we find the coefficients from this set of robustness checks tend to be larger and have smaller errors than our primary models.

Lastly, we include an additional set of robustness checks wherein we limit our estimation sample to only those observations where the respondent *does not* live in a province/region where there is a U.S. military facility. One question we have received is whether or not individuals attitudes may lead them to self-select into situations where they are more or less likely to interact with U.S. personnel. While we address this more fully in our primary manuscript, this robustness check helps us to address

this question. Specifically, by removing observations of individuals who live within areas that house U.S. military facilities, we are limiting the sample to individuals for whom the possibility of coming into contact with U.S. service personnel should be lower than for those who do reside in areas that host U.S. personnel. If some individuals actually are choosing their geographic location on the basis of an affinity for, or aversion to, U.S. personnel, this model should generally limit our sample to a pool of people who have either a negative baseline affinity, or a neutral/ambivalent affinity. These models are presented in tables A11, A12, A13. The coefficient plot for these models is shown in Figure A24. Overall these results look nearly identical to our primary models, with some fairly minor differences.

As an additional robustness check, tables A17, A18, and A19 present the results of multinomial logistic regressions using binary variables for each country. These models produce results that are nearly identical to the primary multilevel Bayesian logistic regressions. Though the multilevel modeling approach used in the primary document is more computationally complex, it offers a number of advantages over the more basic multinomial model using country fixed effects. Still, these models help to illustrate the robustness of our findings to different modeling strategies.

Table A2: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US troops deployed within the host country. Neutral attitudes are the reference category.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.401 [−0.793; −0.013]*	−0.097 [−0.535; 0.332]	0.558 [−0.027; 1.129]
PC: Yes	0.578 [0.389; 0.769]*	0.255 [0.022; 0.489]*	−0.715 [−1.474; −0.032]*
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.126 [−0.137; 0.384]	0.036 [−0.278; 0.345]	−0.702 [−1.257; −0.171]*
NC: Yes	0.210 [0.031; 0.395]*	0.158 [−0.069; 0.383]	−0.663 [−1.287; −0.082]*
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.260 [−0.590; 0.077]	−0.323 [−0.714; 0.066]	0.442 [−0.033; 0.911]
PB: Yes	−0.093 [−0.339; 0.155]	−0.439 [−0.814; −0.077]*	−0.432 [−1.322; 0.359]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.199 [−0.484; 0.089]	−0.384 [−0.745; −0.031]*	0.336 [−0.116; 0.779]
NB: Yes	0.538 [0.298; 0.783]*	−0.464 [−0.813; −0.118]*	−0.466 [−1.422; 0.371]
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.289 [−0.733; 0.161]	−0.992 [−1.484; −0.507]*	0.553 [−0.059; 1.180]
American influence (Degree): A little	0.018 [−0.320; 0.358]	−0.512 [−0.854; −0.165]*	−0.558 [−1.145; 0.052]
American influence (Degree): Some	0.145 [−0.185; 0.481]	−0.343 [−0.672; −0.009]*	−0.125 [−0.672; 0.457]
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.497 [0.161; 0.840]*	−0.041 [−0.375; 0.301]	−0.252 [−0.836; 0.353]
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.176 [−0.500; 0.146]	0.418 [0.077; 0.755]*	2.116 [1.761; 2.473]*
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	−0.609 [−0.946; −0.284]*	1.962 [1.717; 2.213]*	0.639 [0.071; 1.163]*
American influence (Quality): Negative	−0.403 [−0.547; −0.260]*	1.150 [1.012; 1.288]*	0.328 [0.032; 0.621]*
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.167 [1.047; 1.289]*	−0.282 [−0.469; −0.095]*	0.240 [−0.110; 0.579]
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	1.798 [1.526; 2.081]*	−0.200 [−0.664; 0.259]	0.479 [−0.378; 1.233]
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.512 [−0.995; −0.022]*	−0.154 [−0.712; 0.424]	−1.492 [−2.035; −0.946]*
Democratic Government: Not Important	0.612 [−0.045; 1.289]	1.056 [0.334; 1.800]*	−0.655 [−1.707; 0.319]
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	0.128 [−0.341; 0.607]	0.210 [−0.337; 0.778]	−1.306 [−1.829; −0.770]*
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.386 [−0.074; 0.861]	0.365 [−0.176; 0.925]	−1.035 [−1.538; −0.526]*
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	−0.050 [−0.145; 0.044]	−0.098 [−0.212; 0.014]	0.076 [−0.133; 0.287]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.415 [−1.204; 0.421]	−0.618 [−2.199; 0.810]	−79.981 [−223.779; −3.425]*
Gender: None of the above	−1.463 [−2.882; −0.126]*	−0.368 [−1.975; 1.004]	0.085 [−2.019; 1.801]
Education			
Education	0.007 [−0.003; 0.018]	0.010 [−0.002; 0.023]	−0.027 [−0.048; −0.005]*
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.081 [−0.253; 0.092]	0.212 [0.011; 0.410]*	−0.164 [−0.501; 0.167]
Age: 35-44 years	−0.062 [−0.228; 0.106]	0.026 [−0.173; 0.226]	−0.412 [−0.751; −0.071]*
Age: 45-54 years	−0.153 [−0.327; 0.019]	−0.185 [−0.390; 0.022]	−0.357 [−0.702; −0.017]*
Age: 55-64 years	0.058 [−0.117; 0.233]	−0.197 [−0.402; 0.006]	−0.754 [−1.135; −0.375]*
Age: 65 or older	0.216 [0.029; 0.406]*	−0.080 [−0.309; 0.148]	−0.981 [−1.446; −0.528]*
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.167 [−0.312; −0.023]*	−0.178 [−0.355; 0.000]	−0.202 [−0.500; 0.096]
Income Percentile: 35-50	−0.205 [−0.359; −0.051]*	−0.146 [−0.326; 0.036]	−0.021 [−0.334; 0.289]
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.187 [−0.339; −0.035]*	−0.307 [−0.494; −0.121]*	−0.307 [−0.646; 0.025]
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.189 [−0.357; −0.023]*	−0.157 [−0.354; 0.042]	−0.351 [−0.730; 0.019]
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.072 [−0.337; 0.194]	−0.184 [−0.506; 0.139]	−0.836 [−1.801; 0.011]
Ideology			
Ideology	0.082 [0.055; 0.108]*	−0.071 [−0.102; −0.041]*	−0.047 [−0.103; 0.010]
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.035 [−0.228; 0.301]	−0.518 [−0.834; −0.199]*	0.057 [−0.713; 0.798]
Catholicism	0.125 [−0.047; 0.298]	−0.445 [−0.631; −0.256]*	0.253 [−0.110; 0.629]
Islam	−0.149 [−0.374; 0.077]	−0.326 [−0.566; −0.086]*	0.066 [−0.358; 0.488]
Judaism	−0.114 [−0.623; 0.413]	−0.215 [−1.186; 0.679]	0.239 [−1.331; 1.561]
Shinto	−0.252 [−0.543; 0.043]	0.338 [−0.007; 0.685]	0.213 [−0.394; 0.826]
Buddhism	0.058 [−0.427; 0.553]	−0.643 [−1.942; 0.467]	1.055 [−0.208; 2.169]
Hinduism	−0.157 [−0.668; 0.362]	−0.357 [−0.938; 0.221]	−0.659 [−2.162; 0.552]
Local	0.155 [−1.226; 1.669]	0.019 [−1.638; 1.671]	−80.739 [−225.876; −2.634]*
Mormonism	−0.120 [−0.328; 0.086]	−0.150 [−0.364; 0.066]	−0.020 [−0.452; 0.407]
Decline to answer	0.191 [0.007; 0.377]*	−0.406 [−0.622; −0.189]*	0.090 [−0.323; 0.511]
Other	−0.099 [−0.875; 0.701]	−0.389 [−1.355; 0.551]	−79.931 [−228.064; −2.904]*
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.083 [−0.204; 0.378]	0.102 [−0.223; 0.433]	0.004 [−0.451; 0.469]
Minority: No	0.042 [−0.264; 0.351]	0.101 [−0.246; 0.455]	−0.280 [−0.821; 0.262]
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.037 [0.007; 0.065]*	−0.019 [−0.052; 0.014]	0.011 [−0.040; 0.071]
Base in Respondent's Province	−0.079 [−0.213; 0.054]	−0.018 [−0.177; 0.143]	−0.320 [−0.601; −0.045]*
US Defense Pact	−0.849 [−2.911; 1.121]	1.957 [−0.893; 4.709]	0.228 [−2.299; 3.040]
Threat Environment	−0.045 [−0.348; 0.268]	−0.134 [−0.556; 0.305]	0.321 [−0.115; 0.753]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.195 [−0.446; 0.050]	0.115 [−0.230; 0.467]	−0.133 [−0.464; 0.160]
Polity Score	0.009 [−0.125; 0.144]	0.020 [−0.163; 0.206]	−0.109 [−0.292; 0.050]
log(GDP)	0.043 [−0.638; 0.746]	0.725 [−0.207; 1.686]	−0.043 [−0.940; 0.802]
log(Total Trade with US)	0.042 [−0.504; 0.587]	−0.746 [−1.491; 0.015]	0.063 [−0.622; 0.723]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.053 [−0.365; 0.258]	−0.023 [−0.454; 0.404]	0.198 [−0.177; 0.610]
Random Effects			
N	12287	12287	12287
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.402	0.555	0.432

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.

Table A3: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US government. Neutral attitudes are the reference category.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.514 [−0.925; −0.112]*	−0.699 [−1.099; −0.296]*	−0.276 [−1.043; 0.480]
PC: Yes	0.107 [−0.105; 0.321]	0.065 [−0.157; 0.287]	0.000 [−0.769; 0.716]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.176 [−0.120; 0.474]	−0.102 [−0.396; 0.191]	0.288 [−0.375; 0.937]
NC: Yes	0.232 [0.027; 0.439]*	0.321 [0.109; 0.539]*	0.053 [−0.695; 0.754]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.035 [−0.312; 0.379]	−0.520 [−0.876; −0.170]*	0.239 [−0.398; 0.858]
PB: Yes	0.319 [0.060; 0.581]*	−0.208 [−0.520; 0.102]	0.441 [−0.371; 1.209]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.058 [−0.375; 0.256]	−0.121 [−0.431; 0.188]	0.066 [−0.535; 0.641]
NB: Yes	0.077 [−0.172; 0.325]	−0.304 [−0.594; −0.013]*	−0.569 [−1.570; 0.350]
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.836 [−1.407; −0.276]*	−0.719 [−1.149; −0.289]*	0.136 [−0.588; 0.900]
American influence (Degree): A little	0.272 [−0.122; 0.674]	−0.120 [−0.466; 0.222]	−1.627 [−2.428; −0.802]*
American influence (Degree): Some	0.098 [−0.289; 0.492]	−0.087 [−0.425; 0.243]	−0.817 [−1.487; −0.103]*
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.562 [0.166; 0.959]*	0.083 [−0.262; 0.426]	−0.978 [−1.714; −0.215]*
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.262 [−0.668; 0.129]	0.277 [−0.010; 0.566]	2.051 [1.570; 2.531]*
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	0.284 [−0.234; 0.808]	2.785 [2.400; 3.191]*	1.489 [0.534; 2.379]*
American influence (Quality): Negative	−0.006 [−0.213; 0.206]	1.576 [1.422; 1.735]*	0.378 [−0.218; 0.941]
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.389 [1.259; 1.520]*	−0.397 [−0.541; −0.252]*	−0.054 [−0.594; 0.466]
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	2.279 [2.009; 2.559]*	−0.611 [−1.022; −0.204]*	1.013 [0.061; 1.866]*
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.795 [−1.394; −0.188]*	−0.911 [−1.399; −0.434]*	−2.323 [−2.995; −1.659]*
Democratic Government: Not Important	0.287 [−0.493; 1.074]	0.154 [−0.527; 0.839]	−1.316 [−2.590; −0.144]*
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	0.030 [−0.558; 0.627]	−0.409 [−0.885; 0.059]	−1.892 [−2.543; −1.250]*
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.242 [−0.342; 0.831]	−0.033 [−0.503; 0.429]	−1.795 [−2.393; −1.198]*
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.027 [−0.081; 0.134]	0.024 [−0.084; 0.132]	−0.101 [−0.411; 0.201]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.141 [−1.078; 0.869]	0.442 [−0.721; 1.637]	1.702 [−0.303; 3.368]
Gender: None of the above	−0.791 [−2.272; 0.624]	−0.031 [−1.298; 1.254]	−79.927 [−222.571; −3.612]*
Education			
Education	0.008 [−0.004; 0.019]	0.006 [−0.005; 0.018]	−0.028 [−0.059; 0.003]
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.057 [−0.243; 0.129]	−0.193 [−0.382; −0.007]*	−0.169 [−0.673; 0.325]
Age: 35-44 years	0.064 [−0.123; 0.253]	−0.154 [−0.342; 0.037]	0.093 [−0.394; 0.584]
Age: 45-54 years	−0.030 [−0.227; 0.168]	−0.121 [−0.313; 0.073]	0.098 [−0.415; 0.607]
Age: 55-64 years	0.039 [−0.162; 0.244]	0.011 [−0.185; 0.209]	0.046 [−0.503; 0.574]
Age: 65 or older	0.152 [−0.068; 0.372]	0.169 [−0.042; 0.381]	−0.169 [−0.864; 0.502]
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	0.059 [−0.105; 0.225]	0.065 [−0.096; 0.227]	−0.111 [−0.536; 0.306]
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.098 [−0.079; 0.274]	0.275 [0.103; 0.446]*	−0.016 [−0.474; 0.432]
Income Percentile: 51-67	0.087 [−0.088; 0.262]	0.225 [0.053; 0.399]*	−0.114 [−0.596; 0.363]
Income Percentile: 65-83	0.126 [−0.065; 0.317]	0.304 [0.115; 0.492]*	−0.290 [−0.864; 0.272]
Income Percentile: 84-100	0.222 [−0.082; 0.532]	0.235 [−0.094; 0.563]	−0.926 [−2.797; 0.470]
Ideology			
Ideology	0.115 [0.085; 0.145]*	−0.136 [−0.166; −0.106]*	−0.136 [−0.217; −0.055]*
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.040 [−0.250; 0.334]	−0.552 [−0.867; −0.234]*	0.135 [−0.991; 1.198]
Catholicism	−0.047 [−0.256; 0.162]	−0.344 [−0.534; −0.154]*	0.564 [−0.063; 1.233]
Islam	−0.189 [−0.467; 0.088]	−0.483 [−0.720; −0.242]*	0.857 [0.205; 1.550]*
Judaism	−0.319 [−0.838; 0.217]	−0.710 [−1.529; 0.081]	0.625 [−1.067; 2.110]
Shinto	−0.312 [−0.631; 0.011]	0.347 [−0.004; 0.703]	0.517 [−0.331; 1.386]
Buddhism	0.088 [−0.423; 0.612]	−1.430 [−2.551; −0.393]*	1.802 [0.474; 3.049]*
Hinduism	0.012 [−0.559; 0.575]	−1.030 [−1.616; −0.444]*	1.426 [0.162; 2.573]*
Local	1.968 [−0.233; 5.231]	2.304 [−0.011; 5.639]	−77.405 [−222.408; 0.513]
Mormonism	−0.007 [−0.264; 0.248]	−0.118 [−0.341; 0.104]	0.379 [−0.381; 1.153]
Decline to answer	0.008 [−0.215; 0.231]	−0.461 [−0.670; −0.255]*	0.188 [−0.539; 0.931]
Other	0.060 [−0.736; 0.886]	−1.406 [−2.606; −0.316]*	1.960 [−0.089; 3.665]
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.271 [−0.059; 0.599]	0.075 [−0.218; 0.370]	−0.103 [−0.646; 0.454]
Minority: No	0.270 [−0.075; 0.612]	−0.070 [−0.386; 0.252]	−0.261 [−0.921; 0.406]
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.016 [−0.017; 0.049]	−0.000 [−0.033; 0.032]	0.016 [−0.043; 0.078]
Base in Respondent's Province	0.012 [−0.141; 0.166]	−0.005 [−0.157; 0.147]	0.000 [−0.393; 0.395]
US Defense Pact	−0.585 [−2.951; 1.746]	0.603 [−4.438; 5.602]	−0.027 [−2.184; 2.140]
Threat Environment	0.029 [−0.319; 0.383]	0.277 [−0.497; 1.042]	0.153 [−0.193; 0.504]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	0.018 [−0.278; 0.311]	−0.002 [−0.633; 0.628]	−0.030 [−0.286; 0.225]
Polity Score	−0.030 [−0.184; 0.123]	0.011 [−0.317; 0.347]	−0.071 [−0.208; 0.064]
log(GDP)	0.016 [−0.796; 0.838]	−0.196 [−1.918; 1.547]	−0.131 [−0.821; 0.563]
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.354 [−0.983; 0.290]	−0.187 [−1.580; 1.223]	−0.192 [−0.748; 0.332]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	0.031 [−0.332; 0.400]	0.243 [−0.548; 1.025]	0.141 [−0.172; 0.457]
Random Effects			
N	12287	12287	12287
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.47	1.054	0.253

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.

Table A4: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US people. Neutral attitudes are the reference category.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.484 [−0.833; −0.136]*	−0.310 [−0.758; 0.132]	0.282 [−0.481; 1.030]
PC: Yes	0.208 [0.034; 0.384]*	0.037 [−0.214; 0.283]	−0.271 [−1.171; 0.529]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.037 [−0.282; 0.208]	0.073 [−0.255; 0.397]	0.427 [−0.242; 1.073]
NC: Yes	0.235 [0.062; 0.406]*	0.294 [0.058; 0.530]*	−0.049 [−0.883; 0.721]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.119 [−0.419; 0.187]	−0.411 [−0.840; 0.002]	0.103 [−0.572; 0.756]
PB: Yes	0.041 [−0.195; 0.278]	−0.127 [−0.502; 0.239]	0.809 [−0.044; 1.587]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.223 [−0.046; 0.497]	0.263 [−0.104; 0.631]	0.225 [−0.405; 0.826]
NB: Yes	0.099 [−0.124; 0.323]	0.036 [−0.296; 0.366]	−0.864 [−2.093; 0.214]
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.698 [−1.093; −0.299]*	−0.868 [−1.372; −0.371]*	0.099 [−0.713; 0.964]
American influence (Degree): A little	−0.271 [−0.581; 0.036]	−0.438 [−0.782; −0.090]*	−1.061 [−1.883; −0.189]*
American influence (Degree): Some	−0.057 [−0.359; 0.244]	−0.648 [−0.982; −0.313]*	−0.745 [−1.486; 0.067]
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.376 [0.067; 0.683]*	−0.382 [−0.723; −0.038]*	−0.935 [−1.745; −0.071]*
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.121 [−0.386; 0.144]	−0.138 [−0.548; 0.256]	1.811 [1.304; 2.314]*
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	−0.961 [−1.204; −0.720]*	1.757 [1.527; 1.991]*	0.144 [−0.759; 0.945]
American influence (Quality): Negative	−0.535 [−0.664; −0.409]*	1.148 [0.994; 1.302]*	−0.388 [−0.995; 0.186]
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.250 [1.129; 1.372]*	−0.281 [−0.531; −0.034]*	0.337 [−0.229; 0.871]
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	2.141 [1.853; 2.443]*	0.363 [−0.205; 0.900]	1.301 [0.162; 2.288]*
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.550 [−0.991; −0.113]*	−0.413 [−0.976; 0.168]	−1.952 [−2.617; −1.293]*
Democratic Government: Not Important	0.103 [−0.490; 0.698]	0.690 [−0.005; 1.397]	−0.368 [−1.380; 0.587]
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−0.010 [−0.440; 0.419]	−0.002 [−0.556; 0.574]	−1.764 [−2.418; −1.115]*
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.319 [−0.108; 0.736]	−0.019 [−0.563; 0.545]	−1.881 [−2.480; −1.285]*
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.077 [−0.010; 0.166]	−0.013 [−0.138; 0.111]	0.164 [−0.159; 0.486]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.528 [−1.320; 0.270]	−0.112 [−1.474; 1.091]	−79.439 [−224.578; −2.901]*
Gender: None of the above	1.757 [0.242; 3.750]*	0.234 [−3.192; 2.997]	1.176 [−2.355; 4.134]
Education			
Education	0.021 [0.011; 0.030]*	0.014 [0.001; 0.028]*	0.007 [−0.025; 0.039]
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.005 [−0.150; 0.160]	−0.118 [−0.323; 0.085]	0.287 [−0.228; 0.809]
Age: 35-44 years	0.077 [−0.077; 0.230]	−0.434 [−0.644; −0.224]*	−0.011 [−0.552; 0.541]
Age: 45-54 years	0.115 [−0.046; 0.276]	−0.361 [−0.576; −0.147]*	0.290 [−0.259; 0.840]
Age: 55-64 years	0.262 [0.099; 0.424]*	−0.692 [−0.921; −0.466]*	0.294 [−0.288; 0.876]
Age: 65 or older	0.371 [0.191; 0.549]*	−0.413 [−0.664; −0.165]*	0.120 [−0.599; 0.817]
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.094 [−0.226; 0.040]	−0.037 [−0.229; 0.157]	−0.143 [−0.604; 0.312]
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.042 [−0.098; 0.184]	0.098 [−0.102; 0.296]	0.069 [−0.412; 0.545]
Income Percentile: 51-67	0.103 [−0.040; 0.245]	0.063 [−0.139; 0.265]	−0.153 [−0.684; 0.365]
Income Percentile: 65-83	0.109 [−0.046; 0.263]	0.143 [−0.068; 0.357]	−0.294 [−0.912; 0.299]
Income Percentile: 84-100	0.072 [−0.179; 0.320]	0.070 [−0.311; 0.442]	−0.455 [−1.930; 0.721]
Ideology			
Ideology	0.051 [0.027; 0.075]*	−0.000 [−0.032; 0.033]	−0.060 [−0.147; 0.026]
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.245 [−0.004; 0.494]	−0.250 [−0.656; 0.148]	−0.115 [−1.142; 0.856]
Catholicism	0.067 [−0.092; 0.224]	−0.290 [−0.491; −0.085]*	−0.192 [−0.787; 0.423]
Islam	−0.117 [−0.321; 0.088]	−0.344 [−0.615; −0.081]*	0.319 [−0.292; 0.949]
Judaism	0.071 [−0.393; 0.539]	−0.999 [−2.262; 0.069]	−0.008 [−2.125; 1.682]
Shinto	−0.128 [−0.384; 0.130]	−0.079 [−0.429; 0.276]	0.223 [−0.626; 1.088]
Buddhism	0.092 [−0.343; 0.535]	−2.539 [−5.698; −0.583]*	−1.019 [−4.239; 1.152]
Hinduism	−0.044 [−0.524; 0.437]	−0.527 [−1.217; 0.134]	0.925 [−0.399; 2.081]
Local	−0.053 [−1.276; 1.211]	−1.085 [−3.212; 0.699]	−78.480 [−222.340; −1.637]*
Mormonism	0.175 [−0.012; 0.362]	−0.107 [−0.344; 0.129]	−0.117 [−0.843; 0.601]
Decline to answer	0.134 [−0.039; 0.306]	−0.190 [−0.422; 0.039]	0.098 [−0.567; 0.787]
Other	0.025 [−0.744; 0.822]	0.182 [−1.080; 1.341]	−79.179 [−224.024; −2.582]*
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.005 [−0.264; 0.267]	−0.302 [−0.640; 0.041]	−0.441 [−0.990; 0.128]
Minority: No	0.063 [−0.221; 0.343]	−0.089 [−0.457; 0.282]	−0.639 [−1.340; 0.050]
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.006 [−0.022; 0.033]	0.000 [−0.034; 0.034]	−0.003 [−0.080; 0.074]
Base in Respondent's Province	0.079 [−0.042; 0.200]	0.163 [−0.008; 0.335]	0.241 [−0.194; 0.673]
US Defense Pact	−0.315 [−2.947; 2.329]	−0.128 [−2.095; 1.897]	−0.133 [−3.406; 3.237]
Threat Environment	0.185 [−0.222; 0.595]	0.404 [0.090; 0.713]*	0.033 [−0.489; 0.551]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.133 [−0.472; 0.205]	−0.043 [−0.284; 0.196]	0.154 [−0.239; 0.564]
Polity Score	−0.047 [−0.233; 0.129]	0.030 [−0.103; 0.154]	0.077 [−0.129; 0.291]
log(GDP)	0.297 [−0.621; 1.186]	−0.137 [−0.825; 0.524]	0.283 [−0.776; 1.374]
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.210 [−0.942; 0.540]	−0.197 [−0.716; 0.323]	−0.567 [−1.419; 0.246]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	0.051 [−0.351; 0.473]	0.035 [−0.257; 0.339]	−0.176 [−0.676; 0.295]
Random Effects			
N	12287	12287	12287
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.552	0.376	0.528

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.



Figure A10: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards US military personnel. Personal contact varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A11: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards US military personnel. Network contact varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A12: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards US military personnel. Personal benefit varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A13: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards US military personnel. Network benefit varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A14: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards US government. Personal contact varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A15: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards US government. Network contact varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A16: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards US government. Personal benefit varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A17: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards US government. Network benefit varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A18: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards American people. Personal contact varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A19: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards American people. Network contact varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A20: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards American government. Personal benefit varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.



Figure A21: Predicted probability of respondent attitude towards American government. Network benefit varies. Other contact and benefit variables set to "No". All other variables held at their country-specific mean, median, or modal values. 95% credible intervals shown.

Table A5: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US Troops. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model contains contact and benefits variables only.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.446 [−0.756; −0.134]*	−0.060 [−0.425; 0.304]	0.882 [0.459; 1.290]*
PC: Yes	0.756 [0.589; 0.923]*	0.401 [0.194; 0.608]*	−0.849 [−1.479; −0.271]*
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.067 [−0.163; 0.295]	0.178 [−0.092; 0.448]	−0.148 [−0.544; 0.241]
NC: Yes	0.364 [0.207; 0.524]*	0.200 [0.004; 0.400]*	−0.676 [−1.192; −0.193]*
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.420 [−0.684; −0.155]*	−0.509 [−0.838; −0.188]*	0.896 [0.535; 1.245]*
PB: Yes	0.203 [−0.010; 0.415]	−0.778 [−1.105; −0.448]*	−0.432 [−1.173; 0.227]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.237 [−0.472; −0.003]*	−0.688 [−0.997; −0.381]*	0.543 [0.198; 0.883]*
NB: Yes	0.574 [0.362; 0.788]*	−0.332 [−0.638; −0.028]*	−0.994 [−1.887; −0.215]*
Random Effects			
N	14087	14087	14087
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.68	0.868	0.52

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.

Table A6: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US Government. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model contains contact and benefits variables only.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.451 [−0.766; −0.141]*	−0.627 [−0.956; −0.299]*	0.490 [0.017; 0.955]*
PC: Yes	0.495 [0.315; 0.674]*	0.298 [0.109; 0.489]*	−0.271 [−0.849; 0.273]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.030 [−0.213; 0.275]	0.044 [−0.200; 0.293]	0.359 [−0.080; 0.792]
NC: Yes	0.423 [0.250; 0.599]*	0.323 [0.138; 0.509]*	−0.214 [−0.764; 0.304]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.379 [−0.650; −0.108]*	−0.741 [−1.022; −0.463]*	0.989 [0.572; 1.396]*
PB: Yes	0.485 [0.269; 0.705]*	−0.732 [−1.001; −0.467]*	0.380 [−0.258; 0.973]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.167 [−0.417; 0.086]	−0.379 [−0.634; −0.121]*	0.559 [0.161; 0.953]*
NB: Yes	0.266 [0.055; 0.477]*	−0.402 [−0.654; −0.153]*	−0.688 [−1.444; 0.002]
Random Effects			
N	14087	14087	14087
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.5	1.139	0.485

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.

Table A7: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US People. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model contains contact and benefits variables only.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.662 [−0.942; −0.380]*	−0.258 [−0.654; 0.125]	0.666 [0.188; 1.147]*
PC: Yes	0.441 [0.290; 0.596]*	0.241 [0.020; 0.461]*	−0.598 [−1.286; 0.028]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.063 [−0.274; 0.148]	0.095 [−0.199; 0.385]	0.276 [−0.183; 0.729]
NC: Yes	0.392 [0.246; 0.538]*	0.298 [0.088; 0.510]*	−0.261 [−0.878; 0.306]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.374 [−0.615; −0.134]*	−0.626 [−0.998; −0.265]*	1.059 [0.619; 1.482]*
PB: Yes	0.342 [0.142; 0.543]*	−0.109 [−0.426; 0.204]	0.613 [−0.067; 1.239]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.014 [−0.205; 0.239]	0.021 [−0.299; 0.339]	0.804 [0.388; 1.223]*
NB: Yes	0.275 [0.085; 0.468]*	0.065 [−0.232; 0.361]	−0.354 [−1.158; 0.374]
Random Effects			
N	14087	14087	14087
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.466	0.721	0.42

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.



Figure A22: Coefficients from multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models. Models contain only the contact and benefits variables.

Table A8: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US Troops. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model removes variables that may theoretically inform ideology.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.605 [−0.963; −0.252]*	−0.083 [−0.490; 0.321]	0.567 [0.074; 1.058]*
PC: Yes	0.676 [0.497; 0.856]*	0.379 [0.154; 0.601]*	−0.835 [−1.568; −0.190]*
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.036 [−0.210; 0.285]	0.118 [−0.176; 0.406]	−0.240 [−0.706; 0.213]
NC: Yes	0.315 [0.142; 0.491]*	0.180 [−0.032; 0.391]	−0.726 [−1.323; −0.180]*
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.309 [−0.611; −0.006]*	−0.493 [−0.857; −0.127]*	1.009 [0.607; 1.410]*
PB: Yes	0.133 [−0.104; 0.366]	−0.688 [−1.053; −0.332]*	−0.444 [−1.311; 0.313]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.242 [−0.508; 0.017]	−0.557 [−0.894; −0.224]*	0.342 [−0.052; 0.732]
NB: Yes	0.652 [0.419; 0.886]*	−0.375 [−0.711; −0.044]*	−0.782 [−1.689; 0.004]
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	−0.047 [−0.136; 0.042]	−0.089 [−0.197; 0.018]	0.008 [−0.185; 0.202]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.168 [−0.931; 0.636]	−0.591 [−1.988; 0.660]	−79.560 [−224.978; −4.081]*
Gender: None of the above	−1.218 [−2.611; 0.040]	−0.602 [−2.180; 0.768]	0.163 [−1.840; 1.807]
Education			
Education	0.008 [−0.001; 0.018]	0.015 [0.004; 0.027]*	−0.024 [−0.043; −0.004]*
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.028 [−0.135; 0.189]	0.218 [0.031; 0.406]*	−0.066 [−0.370; 0.235]
Age: 35-44 years	0.049 [−0.110; 0.207]	0.015 [−0.173; 0.203]	−0.314 [−0.625; 0.002]
Age: 45-54 years	0.038 [−0.123; 0.201]	−0.143 [−0.333; 0.050]	−0.262 [−0.570; 0.046]
Age: 55-64 years	0.283 [0.120; 0.447]*	−0.103 [−0.296; 0.088]	−0.599 [−0.946; −0.258]*
Age: 65 or older	0.527 [0.350; 0.704]*	−0.008 [−0.221; 0.206]	−0.839 [−1.270; −0.427]*
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.133 [−0.271; 0.004]	−0.199 [−0.367; −0.035]*	−0.352 [−0.629; −0.078]*
Income Percentile: 35-50	−0.094 [−0.238; 0.051]	−0.151 [−0.322; 0.021]	−0.199 [−0.484; 0.085]
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.064 [−0.209; 0.082]	−0.251 [−0.424; −0.077]*	−0.573 [−0.883; −0.262]*
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.043 [−0.200; 0.114]	−0.057 [−0.240; 0.128]	−0.524 [−0.872; −0.185]*
Income Percentile: 84-100	0.056 [−0.198; 0.313]	−0.084 [−0.386; 0.218]	−1.031 [−1.998; −0.191]*
Ideology			
Ideology	0.136 [0.112; 0.159]*	−0.125 [−0.152; −0.097]*	−0.077 [−0.126; −0.029]*
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.035 [0.006; 0.063]*	−0.006 [−0.037; 0.024]	0.004 [−0.045; 0.056]
Base in Respondent's Province	−0.096 [−0.221; 0.030]	0.007 [−0.145; 0.159]	−0.170 [−0.430; 0.086]
US Defense Pact	−0.421 [−3.526; 2.603]	3.175 [1.234; 4.993]*	0.318 [−2.305; 3.019]
Threat Environment	−0.241 [−0.705; 0.224]	−0.028 [−0.307; 0.262]	0.394 [−0.032; 0.819]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.129 [−0.505; 0.260]	0.041 [−0.177; 0.268]	−0.175 [−0.499; 0.128]
Polity Score	0.059 [−0.138; 0.255]	−0.099 [−0.217; 0.022]	−0.110 [−0.276; 0.051]
log(GDP)	0.224 [−0.806; 1.255]	0.633 [0.034; 1.270]*	0.081 [−0.775; 0.939]
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.196 [−1.032; 0.644]	−0.607 [−1.111; −0.119]*	−0.007 [−0.701; 0.651]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.091 [−0.550; 0.372]	0.052 [−0.228; 0.332]	0.150 [−0.223; 0.545]
Random Effects			
N	12287	12287	12287
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.623	0.356	0.458

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.

Table A9: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US Government. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model removes variables that may theoretically inform ideology.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.621 [−0.986; −0.259]*	−0.570 [−0.936; −0.202]*	0.026 [−0.582; 0.626]
PC: Yes	0.342 [0.144; 0.539]*	0.179 [−0.025; 0.385]	−0.226 [−0.920; 0.414]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.026 [−0.246; 0.304]	0.005 [−0.266; 0.278]	0.623 [0.088; 1.140]*
NC: Yes	0.379 [0.189; 0.572]*	0.317 [0.119; 0.517]*	−0.102 [−0.784; 0.523]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.175 [−0.484; 0.134]	−0.722 [−1.048; −0.402]*	1.126 [0.627; 1.615]*
PB: Yes	0.498 [0.255; 0.744]*	−0.529 [−0.822; −0.233]*	0.515 [−0.244; 1.204]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.145 [−0.435; 0.150]	−0.352 [−0.641; −0.064]*	0.233 [−0.251; 0.714]
NB: Yes	0.284 [0.052; 0.520]*	−0.326 [−0.597; −0.054]*	−0.733 [−1.641; 0.086]
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.029 [−0.071; 0.128]	0.032 [−0.067; 0.131]	−0.090 [−0.351; 0.173]
Gender: Non-Binary	0.073 [−0.830; 1.071]	0.237 [−0.846; 1.388]	1.038 [−0.969; 2.634]
Gender: None of the above	−0.696 [−2.101; 0.652]	−0.207 [−1.437; 1.049]	−79.707 [−223.731; −3.429]*
Education			
Education	0.007 [−0.004; 0.017]	0.012 [0.001; 0.022]*	−0.029 [−0.055; −0.002]*
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.038 [−0.133; 0.208]	−0.150 [−0.326; 0.025]	−0.201 [−0.629; 0.227]
Age: 35-44 years	0.141 [−0.029; 0.313]	−0.124 [−0.296; 0.051]	−0.022 [−0.438; 0.396]
Age: 45-54 years	0.178 [−0.003; 0.360]	−0.022 [−0.199; 0.154]	−0.040 [−0.489; 0.405]
Age: 55-64 years	0.315 [0.132; 0.499]*	0.129 [−0.049; 0.305]	−0.041 [−0.511; 0.416]
Age: 65 or older	0.544 [0.342; 0.749]*	0.270 [0.074; 0.465]*	−0.343 [−0.954; 0.229]
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	0.095 [−0.054; 0.247]	0.045 [−0.107; 0.193]	−0.308 [−0.683; 0.063]
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.232 [0.071; 0.390]*	0.258 [0.100; 0.417]*	−0.241 [−0.640; 0.152]
Income Percentile: 51-67	0.252 [0.092; 0.414]*	0.249 [0.091; 0.409]*	−0.496 [−0.929; −0.076]*
Income Percentile: 65-83	0.308 [0.133; 0.486]*	0.425 [0.251; 0.599]*	−0.584 [−1.105; −0.085]*
Income Percentile: 84-100	0.366 [0.073; 0.659]*	0.367 [0.060; 0.674]*	−1.376 [−3.263; −0.012]*
Ideology			
Ideology	0.159 [0.132; 0.186]*	−0.171 [−0.197; −0.144]*	−0.147 [−0.216; −0.077]*
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.020 [−0.012; 0.051]	0.007 [−0.023; 0.037]	−0.005 [−0.069; 0.063]
Base in Respondent's Province	−0.022 [−0.164; 0.119]	0.034 [−0.107; 0.172]	0.090 [−0.265; 0.443]
US Defense Pact	−0.228 [−2.823; 2.254]	2.224 [−3.407; 7.927]	−0.135 [−3.194; 3.039]
Threat Environment	−0.149 [−0.532; 0.241]	0.368 [−0.486; 1.239]	0.338 [−0.148; 0.812]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	0.039 [−0.276; 0.357]	−0.027 [−0.732; 0.680]	−0.108 [−0.504; 0.276]
Polity Score	0.017 [−0.147; 0.185]	−0.131 [−0.499; 0.235]	−0.080 [−0.285; 0.115]
log(GDP)	0.184 [−0.677; 1.039]	−0.224 [−2.195; 1.688]	0.009 [−1.024; 1.056]
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.507 [−1.187; 0.187]	−0.159 [−1.665; 1.365]	−0.150 [−0.990; 0.650]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.003 [−0.392; 0.381]	0.299 [−0.578; 1.170]	0.090 [−0.370; 0.580]
Random Effects			
N	12287	12287	12287
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.512	1.175	0.552

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.

Table A10: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US people. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model removes variables that may theoretically inform ideology.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.640 [−0.963; −0.319]*	−0.193 [−0.630; 0.236]	0.498 [−0.123; 1.119]
PC: Yes	0.346 [0.181; 0.511]*	0.184 [−0.055; 0.425]	−0.443 [−1.267; 0.299]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.088 [−0.317; 0.144]	0.092 [−0.220; 0.400]	0.640 [0.074; 1.178]*
NC: Yes	0.371 [0.209; 0.532]*	0.316 [0.091; 0.539]*	−0.212 [−1.000; 0.498]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.233 [−0.504; 0.038]	−0.584 [−0.995; −0.180]*	1.130 [0.593; 1.656]*
PB: Yes	0.312 [0.090; 0.536]*	−0.287 [−0.647; 0.068]	0.846 [0.042; 1.569]*
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.155 [−0.096; 0.408]	0.091 [−0.259; 0.434]	0.445 [−0.074; 0.953]
NB: Yes	0.324 [0.115; 0.538]*	0.080 [−0.245; 0.398]	−0.879 [−1.999; 0.084]
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.065 [−0.017; 0.147]	0.009 [−0.110; 0.127]	0.096 [−0.193; 0.383]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.260 [−1.000; 0.495]	−0.204 [−1.523; 0.933]	−79.932 [−222.395; −3.174]*
Gender: None of the above	1.752 [0.317; 3.686]*	0.031 [−3.349; 2.700]	1.307 [−2.146; 4.116]
Education			
Education	0.016 [0.007; 0.024]*	0.016 [0.004; 0.029]*	−0.004 [−0.033; 0.025]
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.096 [−0.051; 0.243]	−0.062 [−0.255; 0.132]	0.186 [−0.266; 0.638]
Age: 35-44 years	0.127 [−0.015; 0.269]	−0.389 [−0.590; −0.190]*	−0.197 [−0.678; 0.276]
Age: 45-54 years	0.250 [0.099; 0.399]*	−0.301 [−0.501; −0.101]*	−0.010 [−0.497; 0.477]
Age: 55-64 years	0.429 [0.281; 0.577]*	−0.540 [−0.755; −0.328]*	−0.015 [−0.518; 0.492]
Age: 65 or older	0.635 [0.471; 0.799]*	−0.308 [−0.538; −0.077]*	−0.245 [−0.891; 0.365]
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.041 [−0.165; 0.083]	−0.061 [−0.241; 0.121]	−0.392 [−0.809; 0.005]
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.151 [0.018; 0.283]*	0.089 [−0.099; 0.280]	−0.261 [−0.680; 0.158]
Income Percentile: 51-67	0.222 [0.090; 0.355]*	0.087 [−0.102; 0.281]	−0.631 [−1.120; −0.162]*
Income Percentile: 65-83	0.217 [0.076; 0.361]*	0.220 [0.019; 0.420]*	−0.751 [−1.318; −0.209]*
Income Percentile: 84-100	0.178 [−0.056; 0.414]	0.126 [−0.233; 0.477]	−0.953 [−2.411; 0.202]
Ideology			
Ideology	0.113 [0.092; 0.135]*	−0.044 [−0.074; −0.013]*	−0.077 [−0.150; −0.003]*
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.005 [−0.021; 0.031]	0.001 [−0.032; 0.035]	−0.024 [−0.099; 0.046]
Base in Respondent's Province	0.054 [−0.061; 0.168]	0.172 [0.009; 0.337]*	0.340 [−0.057; 0.736]
US Defense Pact	−0.177 [−3.147; 2.709]	1.040 [−1.223; 3.332]	−0.834 [−4.119; 2.342]
Threat Environment	−0.044 [−0.487; 0.407]	0.434 [0.086; 0.784]*	0.241 [−0.253; 0.746]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.075 [−0.430; 0.289]	−0.083 [−0.364; 0.190]	−0.015 [−0.418; 0.392]
Polity Score	0.036 [−0.157; 0.225]	−0.060 [−0.212; 0.086]	0.082 [−0.125; 0.297]
log(GDP)	0.453 [−0.584; 1.477]	−0.103 [−0.883; 0.672]	0.482 [−0.581; 1.599]
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.369 [−1.155; 0.430]	−0.143 [−0.758; 0.474]	−0.394 [−1.283; 0.457]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.051 [−0.503; 0.405]	0.105 [−0.241; 0.464]	−0.230 [−0.731; 0.258]
Random Effects			
N	12287	12287	12287
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.601	0.449	0.573

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.



Figure A23: Coefficients from multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models. Model removes variables that may theoretically inform ideology.

Table A11: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US Troops. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model excludes observations where respondent lives in province containing US military facility.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.374 [−0.861; 0.102]	−0.004 [−0.543; 0.540]	0.300 [−0.435; 1.008]
PC: Yes	0.812 [0.518; 1.109]*	0.379 [0.016; 0.745]*	−0.357 [−1.303; 0.487]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.352 [−0.001; 0.707]	−0.114 [−0.567; 0.323]	−0.883 [−1.587; −0.213]*
NC: Yes	0.203 [−0.055; 0.463]	−0.013 [−0.338; 0.314]	−0.541 [−1.300; 0.143]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.465 [−0.890; −0.045]*	−0.378 [−0.906; 0.133]	0.614 [0.040; 1.182]*
PB: Yes	−0.093 [−0.444; 0.267]	−0.244 [−0.737; 0.249]	−0.091 [−1.016; 0.762]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.171 [−0.530; 0.184]	−0.412 [−0.885; 0.046]	0.246 [−0.298; 0.780]
NB: Yes	0.730 [0.368; 1.099]*	−0.322 [−0.827; 0.176]	−0.559 [−1.749; 0.479]
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.664 [−1.234; −0.094]*	−0.905 [−1.532; −0.291]*	0.406 [−0.358; 1.220]
American influence (Degree): A little	−0.111 [−0.545; 0.327]	−0.573 [−1.006; −0.144]*	−0.520 [−1.244; 0.262]
American influence (Degree): Some	0.046 [−0.375; 0.481]	−0.379 [−0.794; 0.040]	−0.072 [−0.756; 0.672]
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.374 [−0.061; 0.811]	−0.083 [−0.515; 0.345]	0.023 [−0.693; 0.791]
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.032 [−0.452; 0.391]	0.174 [−0.293; 0.635]	2.191 [1.738; 2.646]*
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	−0.304 [−0.766; 0.156]	2.213 [1.865; 2.574]*	0.882 [0.183; 1.531]*
American influence (Quality): Negative	−0.351 [−0.546; −0.154]*	1.206 [1.020; 1.392]*	0.372 [0.001; 0.743]*
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.202 [1.038; 1.371]*	−0.320 [−0.579; −0.065]*	0.361 [−0.056; 0.770]
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	1.968 [1.581; 2.379]*	−0.053 [−0.676; 0.547]	0.769 [−0.194; 1.638]
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.463 [−1.049; 0.133]	0.500 [−0.252; 1.294]	−1.040 [−1.706; −0.363]*
Democratic Government: Not Important	1.054 [0.127; 2.030]*	1.646 [0.583; 2.755]*	−0.297 [−1.818; 1.095]
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	0.117 [−0.457; 0.695]	0.725 [−0.007; 1.501]	−0.931 [−1.589; −0.272]*
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.395 [−0.166; 0.964]	0.901 [0.179; 1.665]*	−0.703 [−1.321; −0.077]*
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	−0.048 [−0.177; 0.082]	−0.181 [−0.334; −0.027]*	0.118 [−0.140; 0.376]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.494 [−1.608; 0.678]	−0.168 [−2.108; 1.553]	−79.813 [−223.721; −3.089]*
Gender: None of the above	−1.246 [−2.768; 0.205]	−1.667 [−4.838; 0.515]	0.420 [−1.701; 2.199]
Education			
Education	0.006 [−0.007; 0.020]	0.015 [−0.000; 0.031]	−0.036 [−0.062; −0.010]*
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.001 [−0.225; 0.232]	0.178 [−0.082; 0.439]	−0.319 [−0.720; 0.081]
Age: 35-44 years	0.067 [−0.161; 0.294]	0.039 [−0.223; 0.306]	−0.425 [−0.835; −0.019]*
Age: 45-54 years	0.034 [−0.206; 0.268]	0.053 [−0.221; 0.324]	−0.260 [−0.680; 0.152]
Age: 55-64 years	0.220 [−0.020; 0.461]	−0.075 [−0.361; 0.207]	−0.901 [−1.389; −0.427]*
Age: 65 or older	0.426 [0.165; 0.685]*	0.092 [−0.219; 0.402]	−1.109 [−1.724; −0.528]*
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.025 [−0.223; 0.174]	−0.252 [−0.492; −0.017]*	−0.350 [−0.745; 0.035]
Income Percentile: 35-50	−0.161 [−0.373; 0.049]	−0.218 [−0.462; 0.026]	−0.012 [−0.392; 0.372]
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.116 [−0.321; 0.089]	−0.374 [−0.620; −0.131]*	−0.337 [−0.748; 0.074]
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.037 [−0.257; 0.186]	−0.167 [−0.424; 0.093]	−0.446 [−0.918; 0.008]
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.260 [−0.905; 0.376]	−0.238 [−0.935; 0.456]	−1.653 [−4.830; 0.366]
Ideology			
Ideology	0.092 [0.057; 0.126]*	−0.046 [−0.085; −0.007]*	−0.052 [−0.122; 0.018]
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.436 [−0.196; 1.077]	−0.030 [−0.800; 0.734]	0.608 [−0.787; 1.823]
Catholicism	0.085 [−0.135; 0.308]	−0.513 [−0.754; −0.276]*	0.213 [−0.245; 0.681]
Islam	−0.058 [−0.358; 0.241]	−0.400 [−0.729; −0.075]*	0.391 [−0.129; 0.922]
Judaism	0.707 [−0.179; 1.698]	−1.330 [−4.546; 0.978]	1.250 [−0.880; 3.056]
Shinto	0.058 [−0.351; 0.470]	0.252 [−0.213; 0.704]	0.591 [−0.156; 1.330]
Buddhism	−0.351 [−1.141; 0.437]	−0.500 [−2.586; 1.209]	1.406 [−0.166; 2.874]
Hinduism	−0.202 [−0.846; 0.455]	−0.410 [−1.163; 0.325]	−0.880 [−2.819; 0.622]
Local	0.576 [−1.318; 2.744]	0.372 [−2.035; 2.812]	−78.457 [−222.941; −1.066]*
Mormonism	−0.056 [−0.334; 0.223]	−0.139 [−0.431; 0.150]	0.032 [−0.519; 0.583]
Decline to answer	0.216 [−0.035; 0.471]	−0.462 [−0.755; −0.166]*	0.174 [−0.351; 0.704]
Other	−0.468 [−2.638; 1.839]	−0.287 [−3.714; 2.500]	−79.968 [−226.060; −1.852]*
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.074 [−0.292; 0.435]	0.394 [−0.038; 0.830]	−0.056 [−0.573; 0.483]
Minority: No	−0.011 [−0.404; 0.380]	0.389 [−0.076; 0.865]	−0.389 [−1.012; 0.241]
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.052 [0.014; 0.089]*	−0.016 [−0.064; 0.030]	0.022 [−0.039; 0.101]
US Defense Pact	−0.860 [−3.644; 1.888]	2.295 [−1.130; 5.431]	0.721 [−2.134; 4.912]
Threat Environment	−0.121 [−0.518; 0.287]	−0.209 [−0.672; 0.269]	0.327 [−0.168; 0.868]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.203 [−0.554; 0.141]	0.087 [−0.312; 0.489]	−0.080 [−0.513; 0.277]
Polity Score	0.029 [−0.152; 0.211]	0.023 [−0.181; 0.242]	−0.119 [−0.434; 0.076]
log(GDP)	0.122 [−0.970; 1.228]	0.916 [−0.293; 2.228]	−0.445 [−2.254; 0.639]
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.062 [−0.836; 0.698]	−0.861 [−1.757; −0.017]*	0.191 [−0.596; 1.192]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.035 [−0.463; 0.394]	−0.021 [−0.530; 0.465]	0.247 [−0.209; 0.984]
Random Effects			
N	7009	7009	7009
Groups	13	13	13
Std. Dev.	0.502	0.557	0.448

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.

Table A12: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US Government. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model excludes observations where respondent lives in province containing US military facility.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.403 [−0.909; 0.098]	−0.602 [−1.103; −0.099]*	0.156 [−0.762; 1.053]
PC: Yes	0.111 [−0.194; 0.416]	−0.095 [−0.414; 0.227]	−0.211 [−1.256; 0.738]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.173 [−0.238; 0.585]	−0.031 [−0.426; 0.361]	0.303 [−0.510; 1.097]
NC: Yes	0.330 [0.045; 0.617]*	0.445 [0.149; 0.746]*	0.137 [−0.831; 1.025]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.047 [−0.497; 0.400]	−0.660 [−1.101; −0.217]*	−0.236 [−1.101; 0.595]
PB: Yes	0.440 [0.086; 0.796]*	−0.215 [−0.643; 0.204]	0.474 [−0.516; 1.403]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.219 [−0.181; 0.614]	−0.042 [−0.441; 0.360]	0.270 [−0.462; 0.972]
NB: Yes	−0.008 [−0.363; 0.349]	−0.188 [−0.601; 0.226]	−0.482 [−1.680; 0.602]
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.648 [−1.373; 0.072]	−0.662 [−1.193; −0.139]*	0.645 [−0.313; 1.665]
American influence (Degree): A little	0.508 [−0.019; 1.035]	0.001 [−0.421; 0.411]	−1.643 [−2.762; −0.509]*
American influence (Degree): Some	0.396 [−0.115; 0.914]	−0.020 [−0.433; 0.383]	−0.608 [−1.506; 0.361]
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.848 [0.333; 1.380]*	0.203 [−0.224; 0.623]	−0.678 [−1.647; 0.348]
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.268 [−0.806; 0.261]	0.341 [−0.034; 0.725]	1.675 [1.050; 2.308]*
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	0.216 [−0.439; 0.877]	2.654 [2.171; 3.180]*	1.369 [0.204; 2.448]*
American influence (Quality): Negative	0.163 [−0.130; 0.453]	1.675 [1.453; 1.901]*	0.395 [−0.376; 1.123]
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.203 [1.027; 1.380]*	−0.563 [−0.753; −0.374]*	0.156 [−0.470; 0.759]
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	2.218 [1.865; 2.591]*	−0.653 [−1.177; −0.131]*	1.201 [0.092; 2.181]*
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.897 [−1.637; −0.121]*	−1.098 [−1.694; −0.518]*	−2.191 [−3.124; −1.269]*
Democratic Government: Not Important	0.808 [−0.275; 1.926]	0.009 [−0.948; 1.026]	−0.536 [−2.429; 1.177]
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	0.165 [−0.553; 0.919]	−0.512 [−1.102; 0.068]	−1.194 [−2.052; −0.327]*
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.306 [−0.408; 1.054]	−0.093 [−0.675; 0.474]	−1.123 [−1.908; −0.330]*
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.053 [−0.094; 0.201]	−0.020 [−0.163; 0.124]	0.167 [−0.222; 0.559]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.166 [−1.439; 1.220]	0.201 [−1.317; 1.765]	1.130 [−2.159; 3.554]
Gender: None of the above	−0.177 [−1.830; 1.588]	0.255 [−1.333; 1.987]	−78.564 [−221.861; −2.094]*
Education			
Education	0.001 [−0.014; 0.017]	0.000 [−0.015; 0.015]	−0.047 [−0.086; −0.007]*
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.091 [−0.153; 0.337]	−0.046 [−0.285; 0.193]	−0.256 [−0.910; 0.387]
Age: 35-44 years	0.072 [−0.177; 0.324]	−0.017 [−0.265; 0.231]	0.124 [−0.479; 0.732]
Age: 45-54 years	−0.001 [−0.265; 0.260]	0.023 [−0.227; 0.272]	0.227 [−0.431; 0.883]
Age: 55-64 years	0.186 [−0.089; 0.468]	0.116 [−0.150; 0.383]	0.087 [−0.578; 0.754]
Age: 65 or older	0.064 [−0.236; 0.362]	0.250 [−0.034; 0.531]	−0.372 [−1.282; 0.483]
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	0.070 [−0.152; 0.291]	0.003 [−0.216; 0.218]	−0.403 [−0.959; 0.141]
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.212 [−0.025; 0.448]	0.194 [−0.031; 0.424]	−0.434 [−1.040; 0.155]
Income Percentile: 51-67	0.225 [−0.012; 0.464]	0.334 [0.110; 0.564]*	−0.146 [−0.744; 0.435]
Income Percentile: 65-83	0.279 [0.028; 0.534]*	0.325 [0.081; 0.568]*	−0.624 [−1.388; 0.093]
Income Percentile: 84-100	0.957 [0.061; 1.926]*	1.075 [0.195; 2.056]*	0.481 [−2.753; 2.685]
Ideology			
Ideology	0.081 [0.041; 0.121]*	−0.119 [−0.158; −0.080]*	−0.207 [−0.310; −0.103]*
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.428 [−0.284; 1.156]	−0.395 [−1.153; 0.379]	−80.973 [−227.323; −3.982]*
Catholicism	−0.118 [−0.408; 0.166]	−0.515 [−0.765; −0.270]*	0.602 [−0.239; 1.516]
Islam	−0.269 [−0.659; 0.114]	−0.592 [−0.910; −0.279]*	1.077 [0.199; 2.036]*
Judaism	0.194 [−0.629; 1.072]	−0.918 [−2.556; 0.506]	−0.049 [−3.406; 2.435]
Shinto	−0.221 [−0.665; 0.222]	0.460 [0.004; 0.919]*	0.385 [−0.713; 1.519]
Buddhism	0.081 [−0.769; 0.978]	−1.807 [−4.095; 0.187]	2.538 [0.794; 4.273]*
Hinduism	0.268 [−0.443; 0.990]	−0.765 [−1.527; −0.008]*	1.451 [−0.075; 2.879]
Local	64.195 [4.860; 166.976]*	64.251 [4.874; 167.160]*	−44.967 [−207.637; 85.147]
Mormonism	0.041 [−0.324; 0.410]	−0.208 [−0.514; 0.099]	0.200 [−0.861; 1.270]
Decline to answer	0.112 [−0.205; 0.425]	−0.557 [−0.839; −0.276]*	0.327 [−0.630; 1.332]
Other	−0.970 [−2.885; 0.982]	−82.567 [−224.701; −6.389]*	−79.605 [−225.452; −1.587]*
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.174 [−0.230; 0.585]	0.016 [−0.359; 0.392]	−0.336 [−1.008; 0.352]
Minority: No	0.161 [−0.270; 0.598]	−0.181 [−0.586; 0.227]	−0.392 [−1.185; 0.418]
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.036 [−0.004; 0.077]	0.010 [−0.031; 0.052]	0.046 [−0.040; 0.143]
US Defense Pact	−0.387 [−3.453; 2.853]	2.366 [−1.321; 6.307]	−0.202 [−4.586; 3.933]
Threat Environment	−0.005 [−0.470; 0.456]	0.346 [−0.218; 0.909]	0.129 [−0.576; 0.716]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	0.013 [−0.372; 0.409]	0.186 [−0.292; 0.676]	0.040 [−0.463; 0.601]
Polity Score	−0.035 [−0.251; 0.165]	0.013 [−0.244; 0.256]	0.003 [−0.276; 0.359]
log(GDP)	0.039 [−1.237; 1.231]	−0.922 [−2.472; 0.502]	0.019 [−1.510; 1.989]
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.456 [−1.327; 0.404]	0.168 [−0.879; 1.241]	−0.104 [−1.359; 0.988]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	0.066 [−0.401; 0.576]	0.210 [−0.365; 0.806]	−0.124 [−1.001; 0.537]
Random Effects			
N	7009	7009	7009
Groups	13	13	13
Std. Dev.	0.572	0.709	0.609

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.

Table A13: Multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US people. Neutral attitudes are the reference category. Model excludes observations where respondent lives in province containing US military facility.

	Response: Positive	Response: Negative	Response: Don't know/Decline
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.644 [−1.089; −0.197]*	−0.193 [−0.734; 0.341]	0.065 [−0.912; 1.023]
PC: Yes	0.195 [−0.062; 0.453]	0.036 [−0.326; 0.397]	−0.220 [−1.445; 0.869]
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.104 [−0.439; 0.228]	−0.019 [−0.457; 0.408]	0.616 [−0.222; 1.432]
NC: Yes	0.399 [0.157; 0.645]*	0.448 [0.114; 0.781]*	−0.102 [−1.265; 0.963]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.089 [−0.301; 0.479]	−0.416 [−0.966; 0.116]	−0.087 [−1.033; 0.820]
PB: Yes	0.238 [−0.091; 0.570]	−0.348 [−0.863; 0.158]	1.073 [0.024; 2.067]*
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.441 [0.096; 0.788]*	0.131 [−0.350; 0.596]	0.204 [−0.606; 0.966]
NB: Yes	−0.007 [−0.329; 0.315]	0.115 [−0.358; 0.578]	−0.478 [−1.873; 0.781]
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.706 [−1.221; −0.194]*	−0.911 [−1.550; −0.294]*	0.216 [−0.762; 1.267]
American influence (Degree): A little	−0.154 [−0.551; 0.238]	−0.240 [−0.665; 0.181]	−1.235 [−2.299; −0.145]*
American influence (Degree): Some	0.078 [−0.305; 0.462]	−0.659 [−1.077; −0.248]*	−0.937 [−1.837; 0.048]
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.466 [0.073; 0.854]*	−0.408 [−0.837; 0.008]	−1.235 [−2.250; −0.170]*
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.314 [−0.669; 0.037]	−0.219 [−0.727; 0.270]	1.666 [0.969; 2.363]*
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	−0.894 [−1.219; −0.578]*	1.617 [1.309; 1.928]*	0.579 [−0.473; 1.539]
American influence (Quality): Negative	−0.613 [−0.785; −0.442]*	1.077 [0.877; 1.278]*	0.039 [−0.705; 0.756]
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.139 [0.980; 1.298]*	−0.510 [−0.836; −0.195]*	0.138 [−0.691; 0.913]
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	2.218 [1.829; 2.635]*	0.381 [−0.357; 1.074]	1.834 [0.474; 3.033]*
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.818 [−1.367; −0.263]*	−0.413 [−1.116; 0.323]	−2.118 [−3.075; −1.187]*
Democratic Government: Not Important	0.241 [−0.584; 1.079]	0.663 [−0.271; 1.617]	−0.580 [−2.365; 1.012]
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−0.156 [−0.691; 0.387]	0.051 [−0.637; 0.765]	−1.350 [−2.221; −0.482]*
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.130 [−0.393; 0.664]	0.102 [−0.569; 0.804]	−1.654 [−2.453; −0.849]*
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.054 [−0.065; 0.173]	−0.085 [−0.250; 0.078]	0.046 [−0.386; 0.478]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.964 [−2.040; 0.103]	−1.754 [−4.897; 0.375]	−79.257 [−225.389; −1.978]*
Gender: None of the above	2.580 [0.499; 5.740]*	−79.176 [−224.455; −2.144]*	3.105 [−0.777; 6.917]
Education			
Education	0.018 [0.006; 0.030]*	0.014 [−0.003; 0.031]	−0.026 [−0.069; 0.016]
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.124 [−0.082; 0.329]	−0.052 [−0.313; 0.205]	0.190 [−0.524; 0.894]
Age: 35-44 years	0.319 [0.113; 0.522]*	−0.339 [−0.614; −0.066]*	0.171 [−0.562; 0.900]
Age: 45-54 years	0.313 [0.097; 0.524]*	−0.319 [−0.601; −0.040]*	0.321 [−0.442; 1.073]
Age: 55-64 years	0.453 [0.230; 0.673]*	−0.592 [−0.889; −0.296]*	0.551 [−0.182; 1.289]
Age: 65 or older	0.573 [0.334; 0.815]*	−0.481 [−0.820; −0.149]*	0.192 [−0.818; 1.156]
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.019 [−0.198; 0.161]	−0.086 [−0.334; 0.165]	−0.103 [−0.728; 0.529]
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.188 [−0.002; 0.381]	0.088 [−0.172; 0.347]	0.151 [−0.487; 0.781]
Income Percentile: 51-67	0.112 [−0.080; 0.300]	−0.030 [−0.288; 0.229]	−0.267 [−0.986; 0.420]
Income Percentile: 65-83	0.155 [−0.044; 0.357]	0.007 [−0.257; 0.275]	−0.378 [−1.192; 0.388]
Income Percentile: 84-100	0.403 [−0.168; 0.997]	0.072 [−0.876; 0.956]	0.838 [−2.424; 3.072]
Ideology			
Ideology	0.041 [0.009; 0.073]*	0.031 [−0.011; 0.074]	−0.093 [−0.209; 0.021]
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.225 [−0.342; 0.798]	−0.353 [−1.183; 0.423]	−79.699 [−225.648; −2.910]*
Catholicism	0.018 [−0.186; 0.223]	−0.465 [−0.717; −0.209]*	0.083 [−0.754; 0.985]
Islam	−0.115 [−0.394; 0.162]	−0.429 [−0.766; −0.095]*	1.079 [0.216; 2.000]*
Judaism	0.118 [−0.584; 0.842]	−81.248 [−225.166; −4.602]*	0.909 [−2.599; 3.516]
Shinto	−0.199 [−0.552; 0.151]	−0.156 [−0.625; 0.313]	0.596 [−0.627; 1.848]
Buddhism	0.251 [−0.490; 0.989]	−1.158 [−4.387; 0.993]	1.597 [−1.916; 4.439]
Hinduism	0.082 [−0.524; 0.700]	−0.567 [−1.436; 0.250]	1.322 [−0.397; 2.839]
Local	0.016 [−1.539; 1.614]	−1.303 [−4.623; 1.157]	−78.496 [−222.508; −0.912]*
Mormonism	0.070 [−0.186; 0.323]	−0.240 [−0.543; 0.066]	−0.031 [−1.129; 1.050]
Decline to answer	0.142 [−0.093; 0.377]	−0.321 [−0.628; −0.015]*	0.491 [−0.469; 1.491]
Other	−0.254 [−2.443; 2.068]	−0.531 [−4.066; 2.443]	−77.472 [−221.157; 0.204]
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.116 [−0.223; 0.454]	−0.347 [−0.759; 0.063]	−0.233 [−0.941; 0.501]
Minority: No	0.222 [−0.141; 0.583]	−0.074 [−0.521; 0.373]	−0.663 [−1.599; 0.273]
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.041 [0.007; 0.074]*	0.011 [−0.022; 0.042]	0.017 [−0.100; 0.131]
US Defense Pact	0.273 [−2.428; 3.109]	0.441 [−0.961; 1.951]	2.168 [−6.124; 12.710]
Threat Environment	0.198 [−0.199; 0.608]	0.429 [0.236; 0.636]*	0.141 [−1.183; 1.559]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.112 [−0.463; 0.228]	0.001 [−0.144; 0.135]	−0.066 [−1.232; 1.068]
Polity Score	−0.043 [−0.244; 0.128]	0.085 [−0.020; 0.172]	−0.059 [−0.822; 0.559]
log(GDP)	0.131 [−1.020; 1.164]	0.016 [−0.548; 0.490]	−0.347 [−4.856; 3.107]
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.116 [−0.873; 0.656]	−0.162 [−0.447; 0.148]	−0.492 [−3.010; 1.922]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	0.004 [−0.392; 0.470]	−0.144 [−0.346; 0.102]	0.111 [−1.397; 1.923]
Random Effects			
N	7009	7009	7009
Groups	13	13	13
Std. Dev.	0.495	0.131	1.342

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0. Model diagnostics can be found in a separate diagnostic appendix.



Figure A24: Coefficients from multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic regression models. Models exclude observations where respondent live sin province containing US military facility.

Table A14: Categorical logistic regressions predicting attitudes towards US troop presence.

	dk	neg	pos
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.56 (0.29)	−0.10 (0.22)	−0.40 (0.20)*
PC: Yes	−0.68 (0.36)	0.26 (0.12)*	0.58 (0.10)**
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.70 (0.27)*	0.04 (0.16)	0.13 (0.13)
NC: Yes	−0.65 (0.30)*	0.16 (0.11)	0.21 (0.09)*
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.44 (0.24)	−0.32 (0.20)	−0.26 (0.17)
PB: Yes	−0.36 (0.41)	−0.44 (0.19)*	−0.10 (0.13)
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.34 (0.23)	−0.37 (0.18)*	−0.20 (0.14)
NB: Yes	−0.40 (0.45)	−0.46 (0.18)**	0.53 (0.12)**
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	0.53 (0.31)	−0.99 (0.25)**	−0.29 (0.23)
American influence (Degree): A little	−0.57 (0.30)	−0.51 (0.17)**	0.02 (0.17)
American influence (Degree): Some	−0.14 (0.28)	−0.34 (0.17)*	0.15 (0.17)
American influence (Degree): A lot	−0.23 (0.30)	−0.04 (0.17)	0.50 (0.17)**
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	2.07 (0.18)**	0.41 (0.17)*	−0.18 (0.16)
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	0.62 (0.27)*	1.94 (0.13)**	−0.60 (0.17)**
American influence (Quality): Negative	0.31 (0.15)*	1.14 (0.07)**	−0.40 (0.07)**
American influence (Quality): Positive	0.25 (0.17)	−0.28 (0.10)**	1.16 (0.06)**
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	0.53 (0.40)	−0.19 (0.23)	1.78 (0.14)**
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−1.47 (0.27)**	−0.16 (0.29)	−0.51 (0.25)*
Democratic Government: Not Important	−0.62 (0.50)	1.03 (0.37)**	0.60 (0.34)
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−1.29 (0.27)**	0.20 (0.28)	0.13 (0.24)
Democratic Government: Very Important	−1.04 (0.25)**	0.36 (0.28)	0.39 (0.24)
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.08 (0.11)	−0.10 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.05)
Gender: Non-Binary	−7.19 (0.00)**	−0.55 (0.75)	−0.44 (0.41)
Gender: None of the above	0.31 (0.88)	−0.26 (0.71)	−1.40 (0.66)*
Education			
Education	−0.03 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.16 (0.17)	0.21 (0.10)*	−0.08 (0.09)
Age: 35-44 years	−0.41 (0.17)*	0.03 (0.10)	−0.06 (0.09)
Age: 45-54 years	−0.36 (0.17)*	−0.18 (0.10)	−0.15 (0.09)
Age: 55-64 years	−0.75 (0.19)**	−0.20 (0.11)	0.06 (0.09)
Age: 65 or older	−0.97 (0.23)**	−0.08 (0.12)	0.21 (0.10)*
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.19 (0.15)	−0.18 (0.09)*	−0.17 (0.07)*
Income Percentile: 35-50	−0.01 (0.16)	−0.14 (0.09)	−0.20 (0.08)**
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.29 (0.17)	−0.31 (0.09)**	−0.19 (0.08)*
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.33 (0.19)	−0.16 (0.10)	−0.19 (0.09)*
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.75 (0.45)	−0.18 (0.16)	−0.07 (0.14)
Ideology			
Ideology	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.07 (0.02)**	0.08 (0.01)**
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.07 (0.21)	−0.40 (0.11)**	0.19 (0.09)*
Catholicism	0.23 (0.19)	−0.45 (0.10)**	0.12 (0.09)
Islam	0.17 (0.31)	0.34 (0.18)	−0.25 (0.15)
Judaism	1.07 (0.59)	−0.53 (0.58)	0.05 (0.25)
Shinto	−6.70 (0.00)**	−0.37 (0.48)	−0.12 (0.40)
Buddhism	0.20 (0.38)	−0.51 (0.16)**	0.04 (0.14)
Hinduism	0.33 (0.69)	−0.16 (0.46)	−0.12 (0.26)
Local	−0.53 (0.64)	−0.34 (0.29)	−0.15 (0.26)
Mormonism	−5.90 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.79)	0.09 (0.71)
Decline to answer	0.06 (0.21)	−0.32 (0.12)**	−0.15 (0.11)
Other	−0.02 (0.22)	−0.14 (0.11)	−0.12 (0.10)
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	−0.00 (0.23)	0.10 (0.16)	0.08 (0.15)
Minority: No	−0.27 (0.27)	0.10 (0.18)	0.04 (0.16)
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Base in Respondent's Province	−0.32 (0.15)*	−0.00 (0.08)	−0.07 (0.07)
US Defense Pact	0.25 (0.14)	0.55 (0.08)**	−0.20 (0.06)**
log(Threat Environment)	0.21 (0.09)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.03)
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.07 (0.06)	0.10 (0.03)**	−0.12 (0.03)**
Polity Score	−0.09 (0.04)*	0.05 (0.02)*	0.01 (0.02)
log(GDP)	−0.19 (0.11)	0.29 (0.05)**	0.07 (0.04)
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.11 (0.09)	−0.53 (0.05)**	0.03 (0.04)
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	0.23 (0.10)*	0.05 (0.05)	−0.12 (0.04)**
Country Fixed Effects			
Belgium	−0.02 (0.18)	0.04 (0.10)	−0.00 (0.08)
Germany	0.62 (0.19)**	−0.28 (0.10)**	−0.43 (0.09)**
Italy	−0.11 (0.23)	0.28 (0.11)*	0.26 (0.10)*
Japan	−0.09 (0.28)	0.49 (0.12)**	−0.13 (0.11)
Kuwait	−0.39 (0.15)**	−0.73 (0.10)**	0.30 (0.07)**
Netherlands	0.54 (0.29)	−0.68 (0.17)**	0.07 (0.14)
Philippines	−0.18 (0.25)	0.03 (0.12)	0.09 (0.10)
Poland	−0.36 (0.27)	0.55 (0.14)**	0.65 (0.12)**
Portugal	0.01 (0.20)	−0.69 (0.11)**	−0.23 (0.09)*
South Korea	−0.60 (0.27)*	0.10 (0.11)	0.06 (0.09)
Spain	−0.21 (0.22)	0.13 (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)
Turkey	0.49 (0.16)**	0.73 (0.10)**	−0.32 (0.07)**
United Kingdom	0.23 (0.19)	−0.31 (0.11)**	0.20 (0.09)*
Intercept	−0.14 (0.07)*	−0.18 (0.04)**	0.10 (0.03)**
AIC	22513.90	22513.90	22513.90
BIC	23960.08	23960.08	23960.08
Log Likelihood	-11061.95	-11061.95	-11061.95
Deviance	22123.90	22123.90	22123.90
Num. obs.	12287	12287	12287

$^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A15: Categorical logistic regressions predicting attitudes towards the US government.

	dk	neg	pos
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.27 (0.38)	−0.69 (0.21)**	−0.51 (0.21)*
PC: Yes	0.02 (0.37)	0.06 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.30 (0.33)	−0.10 (0.15)	0.17 (0.15)
NC: Yes	0.08 (0.37)	0.32 (0.11)**	0.23 (0.10)*
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.24 (0.32)	−0.51 (0.18)**	0.04 (0.18)
PB: Yes	0.45 (0.40)	−0.21 (0.16)	0.31 (0.13)*
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.06 (0.30)	−0.12 (0.16)	−0.06 (0.16)
NB: Yes	−0.52 (0.48)	−0.30 (0.15)*	0.08 (0.13)
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	0.06 (0.37)	−0.71 (0.22)**	−0.83 (0.29)**
American influence (Degree): A little	−1.63 (0.41)**	−0.12 (0.17)	0.26 (0.20)
American influence (Degree): Some	−0.85 (0.35)*	−0.09 (0.17)	0.09 (0.20)
American influence (Degree): A lot	−0.96 (0.38)*	0.09 (0.17)	0.55 (0.20)**
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	1.98 (0.24)**	0.27 (0.15)	−0.25 (0.20)
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	1.50 (0.46)**	2.75 (0.20)**	0.28 (0.26)
American influence (Quality): Negative	0.38 (0.29)	1.56 (0.08)**	−0.01 (0.11)
American influence (Quality): Positive	−0.04 (0.26)	−0.39 (0.07)**	1.38 (0.07)**
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	1.07 (0.44)*	−0.60 (0.21)**	2.26 (0.14)**
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−2.22 (0.33)**	−0.90 (0.24)**	−0.79 (0.30)**
Democratic Government: Not Important	−1.22 (0.61)*	0.14 (0.35)	0.27 (0.40)
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−1.83 (0.32)**	−0.40 (0.24)	0.03 (0.30)
Democratic Government: Very Important	−1.73 (0.30)**	−0.03 (0.23)	0.24 (0.29)
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	−0.09 (0.15)	0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Gender: Non-Binary	1.83 (0.85)*	0.41 (0.59)	−0.19 (0.48)
Gender: None of the above	−10.40 (0.00)**	−0.05 (0.63)	−0.76 (0.70)
Education			
Education	−0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.15 (0.25)	−0.19 (0.10)*	−0.05 (0.09)
Age: 35-44 years	0.09 (0.25)	−0.15 (0.10)	0.06 (0.09)
Age: 45-54 years	0.10 (0.26)	−0.12 (0.10)	−0.03 (0.10)
Age: 55-64 years	0.03 (0.27)	0.01 (0.10)	0.04 (0.10)
Age: 65 or older	−0.15 (0.34)	0.17 (0.11)	0.15 (0.11)
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.10 (0.21)	0.07 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)
Income Percentile: 35-50	−0.02 (0.23)	0.28 (0.09)**	0.10 (0.09)
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.09 (0.24)	0.23 (0.09)**	0.09 (0.09)
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.24 (0.28)	0.31 (0.10)**	0.13 (0.10)
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.67 (0.75)	0.23 (0.17)	0.21 (0.16)
Ideology			
Ideology	−0.13 (0.04)**	−0.14 (0.02)**	0.11 (0.02)**
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.18 (0.37)	−0.46 (0.11)**	0.01 (0.11)
Catholicism	0.47 (0.33)	−0.35 (0.10)**	−0.05 (0.11)
Islam	0.45 (0.43)	0.33 (0.18)	−0.31 (0.16)
Judaism	1.76 (0.64)**	−1.39 (0.54)**	0.08 (0.26)
Shinto	2.01 (0.87)*	−1.36 (0.56)*	0.05 (0.40)
Buddhism	0.16 (0.55)	−0.54 (0.16)**	0.04 (0.15)
Hinduism	0.70 (0.78)	−0.70 (0.41)	−0.33 (0.27)
Local	1.41 (0.59)*	−1.03 (0.30)**	0.01 (0.28)
Mormonism	−5.73 (0.00)**	1.80 (1.15)	1.43 (1.11)
Decline to answer	0.80 (0.34)*	−0.48 (0.12)**	−0.19 (0.14)
Other	0.37 (0.38)	−0.12 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.13)
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	−0.10 (0.28)	0.07 (0.15)	0.26 (0.17)
Minority: No	−0.24 (0.33)	−0.07 (0.16)	0.26 (0.17)
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Base in Respondent's Province	−0.03 (0.20)	−0.01 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)
US Defense Pact	−0.03 (0.16)	0.18 (0.07)*	−0.17 (0.06)**
log(Threat Environment)	0.14 (0.09)	0.26 (0.03)**	0.04 (0.03)
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.06 (0.09)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Polity Score	−0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.02)*	−0.04 (0.02)*
log(GDP)	0.04 (0.13)	−0.15 (0.05)**	0.04 (0.05)
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.19 (0.13)	−0.21 (0.04)**	−0.25 (0.05)**
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	0.04 (0.13)	0.18 (0.05)**	−0.01 (0.05)
Country Fixed Effects			
Belgium	0.16 (0.25)	0.59 (0.09)**	−0.31 (0.11)**
Germany	−0.02 (0.37)	0.96 (0.10)**	−0.13 (0.13)
Italy	0.61 (0.31)	0.03 (0.11)	0.69 (0.12)**
Japan	−0.14 (0.34)	−0.24 (0.12)*	−0.22 (0.12)
Kuwait	0.11 (0.17)	−0.21 (0.09)*	0.26 (0.07)**
Netherlands	0.23 (0.44)	0.38 (0.16)*	−0.03 (0.17)
Philippines	0.16 (0.31)	0.02 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)
Poland	−0.26 (0.32)	−0.87 (0.13)**	0.25 (0.12)*
Portugal	0.35 (0.27)	0.48 (0.11)**	0.28 (0.11)**
South Korea	−0.54 (0.36)	−1.28 (0.10)**	−0.03 (0.10)
Spain	−0.05 (0.33)	−0.05 (0.11)	−0.40 (0.12)**
Turkey	−0.04 (0.19)	0.33 (0.09)**	−0.21 (0.08)**
United Kingdom	−0.05 (0.31)	0.13 (0.10)	0.14 (0.11)
Intercept	0.08 (0.08)	−0.04 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)*
AIC	20150.19	20150.19	20150.19
BIC	21596.37	21596.37	21596.37
Log Likelihood	-9880.10	-9880.10	-9880.10
Deviance	19760.19	19760.19	19760.19
Num. obs.	12287	12287	12287

$^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A16: Categorical logistic regressions predicting attitudes towards the US people.

	dk	neg	pos
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.26 (0.38)	−0.30 (0.23)	−0.48 (0.18)**
PC: Yes	−0.23 (0.43)	0.03 (0.13)	0.21 (0.09)*
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.44 (0.33)	0.07 (0.17)	−0.04 (0.12)
NC: Yes	−0.00 (0.40)	0.29 (0.12)*	0.23 (0.09)**
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.07 (0.34)	−0.39 (0.22)	−0.12 (0.15)
PB: Yes	0.81 (0.41)*	−0.13 (0.19)	0.04 (0.12)
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.25 (0.31)	0.26 (0.19)	0.22 (0.14)
NB: Yes	−0.78 (0.57)	0.04 (0.17)	0.10 (0.11)
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	0.03 (0.41)	−0.86 (0.25)**	−0.70 (0.20)**
American influence (Degree): A little	−1.07 (0.42)*	−0.43 (0.18)*	−0.27 (0.16)
American influence (Degree): Some	−0.78 (0.39)*	−0.65 (0.17)**	−0.06 (0.15)
American influence (Degree): A lot	−0.96 (0.42)*	−0.37 (0.17)*	0.38 (0.16)*
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	1.75 (0.26)**	−0.13 (0.20)	−0.12 (0.13)
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	0.18 (0.42)	1.73 (0.12)**	−0.96 (0.13)**
American influence (Quality): Negative	−0.37 (0.30)	1.13 (0.08)**	−0.53 (0.06)**
American influence (Quality): Positive	0.35 (0.28)	−0.27 (0.13)*	1.24 (0.06)**
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	1.38 (0.52)**	0.38 (0.28)	2.12 (0.15)**
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−1.91 (0.33)**	−0.42 (0.29)	−0.55 (0.22)*
Democratic Government: Not Important	−0.36 (0.49)	0.67 (0.36)	0.10 (0.30)
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−1.75 (0.33)**	−0.02 (0.28)	−0.01 (0.22)
Democratic Government: Very Important	−1.87 (0.30)**	−0.04 (0.28)	0.31 (0.21)
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.16 (0.16)	−0.01 (0.06)	0.08 (0.04)
Gender: Non-Binary	−6.43 (0.00)**	−0.03 (0.62)	−0.54 (0.40)
Gender: None of the above	1.37 (1.42)	0.52 (1.27)	1.53 (0.79)
Education			
Education	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)*	0.02 (0.00)**
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.30 (0.26)	−0.12 (0.10)	0.01 (0.08)
Age: 35-44 years	0.00 (0.28)	−0.43 (0.11)**	0.08 (0.08)
Age: 45-54 years	0.32 (0.28)	−0.35 (0.11)**	0.12 (0.08)
Age: 55-64 years	0.29 (0.29)	−0.68 (0.12)**	0.26 (0.08)**
Age: 65 or older	0.14 (0.36)	−0.40 (0.13)**	0.37 (0.09)**
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.15 (0.23)	−0.03 (0.10)	−0.09 (0.07)
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.04 (0.24)	0.11 (0.10)	0.05 (0.07)
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.16 (0.26)	0.07 (0.10)	0.11 (0.07)
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.28 (0.30)	0.15 (0.11)	0.11 (0.08)
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.34 (0.63)	0.07 (0.19)	0.07 (0.13)
Ideology			
Ideology	−0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)**
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.11 (0.34)	−0.20 (0.12)	0.13 (0.09)
Catholicism	−0.27 (0.30)	−0.31 (0.10)**	0.06 (0.08)
Islam	0.20 (0.43)	−0.10 (0.18)	−0.13 (0.13)
Judaism	−0.51 (1.12)	−2.00 (1.03)	0.09 (0.22)
Shinto	−6.95 (0.00)**	0.30 (0.61)	0.02 (0.40)
Buddhism	−0.13 (0.49)	−0.19 (0.20)	0.26 (0.13)*
Hinduism	0.23 (0.88)	−0.92 (0.57)	0.06 (0.24)
Local	1.00 (0.60)	−0.51 (0.34)	−0.04 (0.24)
Mormonism	−5.57 (0.00)**	−0.95 (0.91)	−0.09 (0.61)
Decline to answer	0.27 (0.31)	−0.34 (0.13)*	−0.12 (0.10)
Other	−0.12 (0.36)	−0.11 (0.12)	0.17 (0.10)
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	−0.42 (0.28)	−0.31 (0.17)	0.00 (0.13)
Minority: No	−0.58 (0.35)	−0.09 (0.19)	0.06 (0.14)
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.01 (0.05)	−0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Base in Respondent's Province	0.24 (0.23)	0.17 (0.09)	0.09 (0.06)
US Defense Pact	−0.01 (0.17)	0.05 (0.08)	0.10 (0.05)
log(Threat Environment)	0.08 (0.10)	0.34 (0.04)**	0.13 (0.02)**
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	0.12 (0.11)	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.03)
Polity Score	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.01)**
log(GDP)	0.18 (0.13)	−0.21 (0.06)**	−0.01 (0.04)
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.40 (0.13)**	−0.24 (0.05)**	−0.25 (0.04)**
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.19 (0.15)	0.05 (0.06)	0.08 (0.04)*
Country Fixed Effects			
Belgium	0.14 (0.26)	0.04 (0.10)	0.12 (0.08)
Germany	−0.23 (0.35)	0.49 (0.11)**	0.10 (0.08)
Italy	0.66 (0.35)	0.24 (0.13)	0.43 (0.09)**
Japan	0.21 (0.33)	−0.32 (0.16)*	−0.00 (0.10)
Kuwait	0.06 (0.18)	−0.10 (0.09)	−0.20 (0.06)**
Netherlands	0.08 (0.48)	0.07 (0.18)	−0.08 (0.14)
Philippines	0.08 (0.33)	−0.18 (0.14)	−0.20 (0.09)*
Poland	0.20 (0.36)	0.25 (0.16)	0.74 (0.11)**
Portugal	−0.16 (0.28)	−0.10 (0.12)	−0.50 (0.09)**
South Korea	−0.22 (0.35)	−0.29 (0.12)*	−0.46 (0.08)**
Spain	0.50 (0.34)	−0.27 (0.13)*	−0.37 (0.10)**
Turkey	−0.04 (0.20)	0.15 (0.10)	0.25 (0.06)**
United Kingdom	−0.94 (0.43)*	0.09 (0.12)	0.37 (0.09)**
Intercept	0.05 (0.09)	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.10 (0.03)**
AIC	21104.66	21104.66	21104.66
BIC	22550.84	22550.84	22550.84
Log Likelihood	-10357.33	-10357.33	-10357.33
Deviance	20714.66	20714.66	20714.66
Num. obs.	12287	12287	12287

$^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A17: Categorical logistic regressions predicting attitudes towards US troop presence. Models contain question about security benefits.

	dk	neg	pos
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.36 (0.34)	−0.33 (0.23)	−0.22 (0.21)
PC: Yes	−0.60 (0.39)	0.21 (0.13)	0.51 (0.10)**
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.71 (0.30)*	0.03 (0.16)	0.05 (0.14)
NC: Yes	−0.58 (0.33)	0.12 (0.12)	0.11 (0.10)
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.64 (0.26)*	−0.17 (0.21)	−0.20 (0.18)
PB: Yes	−0.00 (0.42)	−0.36 (0.19)	−0.18 (0.13)
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.19 (0.26)	−0.32 (0.19)	−0.20 (0.15)
NB: Yes	−0.33 (0.46)	−0.41 (0.18)*	0.55 (0.13)**
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	0.30 (0.35)	−0.77 (0.26)**	−0.27 (0.24)
American influence (Degree): A little	−0.45 (0.33)	−0.36 (0.19)	−0.02 (0.18)
American influence (Degree): Some	−0.11 (0.31)	−0.16 (0.18)	0.01 (0.18)
American influence (Degree): A lot	−0.20 (0.33)	0.14 (0.18)	0.15 (0.18)
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	1.17 (0.20)**	0.30 (0.18)	−0.14 (0.18)
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	0.41 (0.30)	1.48 (0.13)**	−0.45 (0.18)*
American influence (Quality): Negative	0.30 (0.17)	0.98 (0.07)**	−0.36 (0.08)**
American influence (Quality): Positive	0.44 (0.19)*	−0.12 (0.10)	0.89 (0.07)**
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	0.57 (0.44)	−0.01 (0.24)	1.27 (0.15)**
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−1.16 (0.31)**	−0.03 (0.30)	−0.42 (0.26)
Democratic Government: Not Important	−0.18 (0.56)	1.01 (0.39)**	0.52 (0.35)
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−0.97 (0.30)**	0.29 (0.29)	0.08 (0.25)
Democratic Government: Very Important	−0.71 (0.29)*	0.50 (0.29)	0.17 (0.25)
Security Benefits			
Security: Don't know/Decline to answer	3.37 (0.17)**	0.55 (0.13)**	0.26 (0.13)*
Security: Very Unhelpful	0.86 (0.40)*	2.05 (0.15)**	0.39 (0.20)
Security: Somewhat Unhelpful	0.84 (0.25)**	1.16 (0.09)**	0.11 (0.11)
Security: Somewhat Helpful	0.43 (0.20)*	−0.17 (0.08)*	1.25 (0.06)**
Security: Very Helpful	0.11 (0.44)	−0.54 (0.17)**	2.36 (0.10)**
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.12 (0.12)	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.05)
Gender: Non-Binary	−9.21 (0.00)**	−0.50 (0.78)	−0.55 (0.44)
Gender: None of the above	0.26 (1.06)	−0.36 (0.71)	−1.06 (0.70)
Education			
Education	−0.04 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.06 (0.19)	0.18 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.09)
Age: 35-44 years	−0.32 (0.19)	0.00 (0.11)	0.04 (0.09)
Age: 45-54 years	−0.24 (0.19)	−0.24 (0.11)*	−0.11 (0.09)
Age: 55-64 years	−0.69 (0.21)**	−0.23 (0.11)*	0.08 (0.09)
Age: 65 or older	−0.91 (0.26)**	−0.10 (0.12)	0.17 (0.10)
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	0.04 (0.17)	−0.18 (0.09)	−0.11 (0.08)
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.16 (0.18)	−0.12 (0.10)	−0.16 (0.08)*
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.06 (0.19)	−0.26 (0.10)**	−0.17 (0.08)*
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.08 (0.22)	−0.15 (0.11)	−0.17 (0.09)
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.49 (0.49)	−0.13 (0.17)	−0.07 (0.14)
Ideology			
Ideology	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.07 (0.02)**	0.05 (0.01)**
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.22 (0.23)	−0.39 (0.11)**	0.22 (0.10)*
Catholicism	0.25 (0.21)	−0.40 (0.10)**	0.17 (0.09)
Islam	0.70 (0.34)*	0.31 (0.19)	−0.22 (0.16)
Judaism	0.40 (0.67)	−0.64 (0.65)	0.04 (0.26)
Shinto	−8.55 (0.00)**	−0.42 (0.50)	−0.35 (0.42)
Buddhism	0.18 (0.43)	−0.51 (0.17)**	0.07 (0.14)
Hinduism	0.48 (0.76)	−0.07 (0.48)	−0.06 (0.27)
Local	−0.01 (0.67)	−0.44 (0.31)	−0.09 (0.28)
Mormonism	−6.41 (0.00)**	0.02 (0.86)	−0.07 (0.77)
Decline to answer	0.13 (0.24)	−0.32 (0.13)*	−0.01 (0.12)
Other	−0.08 (0.24)	−0.14 (0.11)	−0.05 (0.11)
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	−0.12 (0.26)	0.02 (0.17)	0.10 (0.15)
Minority: No	−0.41 (0.31)	0.03 (0.19)	0.05 (0.16)
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.05 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Base in Respondent's Province	−0.42 (0.16)**	−0.02 (0.09)	−0.09 (0.07)
US Defense Pact	0.12 (0.15)	0.35 (0.09)**	−0.12 (0.06)*
log(Threat Environment)	0.11 (0.09)	−0.08 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.02 (0.07)	0.11 (0.04)**	−0.12 (0.03)**
Polity Score	−0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.02)*	0.00 (0.02)
log(GDP)	−0.24 (0.12)*	0.22 (0.05)**	0.00 (0.04)
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.07 (0.10)	−0.43 (0.05)**	0.00 (0.04)
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	0.13 (0.11)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.09 (0.04)*
Country Fixed Effects			
Belgium	−0.19 (0.20)	−0.01 (0.10)	0.12 (0.09)
Germany	0.45 (0.22)*	−0.18 (0.10)	−0.38 (0.09)**
Italy	0.09 (0.25)	0.21 (0.12)	0.32 (0.11)**
Japan	−0.23 (0.31)	0.52 (0.13)**	−0.25 (0.11)*
Kuwait	−0.20 (0.16)	−0.53 (0.10)**	0.23 (0.07)**
Netherlands	0.60 (0.33)	−0.68 (0.18)**	0.24 (0.15)
Philippines	−0.12 (0.27)	−0.12 (0.13)	0.18 (0.10)
Poland	−0.12 (0.30)	0.46 (0.15)**	0.53 (0.12)**
Portugal	−0.04 (0.23)	−0.59 (0.12)**	−0.16 (0.10)
South Korea	−0.30 (0.29)	0.18 (0.11)	−0.18 (0.09)
Spain	−0.14 (0.25)	−0.01 (0.12)	0.21 (0.11)
Turkey	0.28 (0.17)	0.51 (0.11)**	−0.22 (0.08)**
United Kingdom	0.06 (0.21)	−0.41 (0.12)**	0.33 (0.10)**
Intercept	−0.08 (0.07)	−0.17 (0.04)**	0.11 (0.03)**
AIC	19977.48	19977.48	19977.48
BIC	21534.90	21534.90	21534.90
Log Likelihood	-9778.74	-9778.74	-9778.74
Deviance	19557.48	19557.48	19557.48
Num. obs.	12287	12287	12287

$^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A18: Categorical logistic regressions predicting attitudes towards the US government. Models contain question about security benefits.

	dk	neg	pos
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.53 (0.39)	−0.76 (0.21)**	−0.45 (0.21)*
PC: Yes	0.02 (0.38)	0.06 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.39 (0.33)	−0.11 (0.15)	0.15 (0.15)
NC: Yes	0.12 (0.38)	0.30 (0.11)**	0.18 (0.11)
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.42 (0.32)	−0.49 (0.18)**	0.08 (0.18)
PB: Yes	0.67 (0.40)	−0.20 (0.16)	0.30 (0.13)*
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.08 (0.30)	−0.10 (0.16)	−0.06 (0.16)
NB: Yes	−0.50 (0.48)	−0.27 (0.15)	0.06 (0.13)
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.06 (0.38)	−0.66 (0.22)**	−0.80 (0.29)**
American influence (Degree): A little	−1.58 (0.41)**	−0.07 (0.17)	0.27 (0.20)
American influence (Degree): Some	−0.85 (0.35)*	−0.05 (0.17)	0.06 (0.20)
American influence (Degree): A lot	−0.91 (0.38)*	0.11 (0.17)	0.45 (0.20)*
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	1.43 (0.25)**	0.20 (0.15)	−0.20 (0.21)
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	1.32 (0.47)**	2.52 (0.20)**	0.35 (0.27)
American influence (Quality): Negative	0.27 (0.29)	1.50 (0.08)**	0.06 (0.11)
American influence (Quality): Positive	0.09 (0.27)	−0.38 (0.08)**	1.26 (0.07)**
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	1.28 (0.45)**	−0.57 (0.21)**	2.06 (0.14)**
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−2.10 (0.34)**	−0.83 (0.24)**	−0.74 (0.31)*
Democratic Government: Not Important	−1.13 (0.61)	0.16 (0.35)	0.26 (0.40)
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−1.67 (0.33)**	−0.38 (0.24)	0.02 (0.30)
Democratic Government: Very Important	−1.58 (0.31)**	0.00 (0.24)	0.16 (0.30)
Security Benefits			
Security: Don't know/Decline to answer	1.66 (0.22)**	0.41 (0.12)**	−0.01 (0.15)
Security: Very Unhelpful	0.74 (0.42)	0.91 (0.16)**	0.30 (0.20)
Security: Somewhat Unhelpful	0.77 (0.31)*	0.57 (0.10)**	−0.18 (0.13)
Security: Somewhat Helpful	0.01 (0.25)	0.23 (0.07)**	0.42 (0.07)**
Security: Very Helpful	−0.54 (0.42)	0.15 (0.10)	0.78 (0.09)**
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	−0.10 (0.16)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)
Gender: Non-Binary	1.84 (0.86)*	0.44 (0.59)	−0.24 (0.48)
Gender: None of the above	−4.52 (0.00)**	−0.03 (0.63)	−0.52 (0.70)
Education			
Education	−0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.17 (0.25)	−0.20 (0.10)*	−0.03 (0.10)
Age: 35-44 years	0.11 (0.25)	−0.15 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)
Age: 45-54 years	0.12 (0.26)	−0.12 (0.10)	−0.02 (0.10)
Age: 55-64 years	0.07 (0.28)	0.01 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)
Age: 65 or older	−0.11 (0.35)	0.16 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.00 (0.22)	0.07 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.03 (0.23)	0.29 (0.09)**	0.11 (0.09)
Income Percentile: 51-67	0.06 (0.25)	0.25 (0.09)**	0.10 (0.09)
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.17 (0.29)	0.32 (0.10)**	0.14 (0.10)
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.43 (0.75)	0.25 (0.17)	0.21 (0.16)
Ideology			
Ideology	−0.12 (0.04)**	−0.14 (0.02)**	0.10 (0.02)**
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.28 (0.38)	−0.44 (0.11)**	0.01 (0.11)
Catholicism	0.48 (0.34)	−0.33 (0.10)**	−0.05 (0.11)
Islam	0.63 (0.45)	0.33 (0.18)	−0.28 (0.16)
Judaism	1.54 (0.67)*	−1.45 (0.55)**	0.08 (0.26)
Shinto	2.14 (0.88)*	−1.38 (0.57)*	−0.01 (0.41)
Buddhism	0.11 (0.58)	−0.52 (0.16)**	0.06 (0.15)
Hinduism	0.73 (0.77)	−0.67 (0.41)	−0.28 (0.27)
Local	1.64 (0.60)**	−1.03 (0.30)**	0.02 (0.29)
Mormonism	−0.12 (0.04)**	1.97 (1.17)	1.45 (1.12)
Decline to answer	0.86 (0.35)*	−0.46 (0.12)**	−0.14 (0.14)
Other	0.40 (0.39)	−0.10 (0.11)	0.02 (0.13)
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	−0.15 (0.29)	0.06 (0.15)	0.27 (0.17)
Minority: No	−0.31 (0.34)	−0.09 (0.16)	0.26 (0.18)
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Base in Respondent's Province	0.01 (0.21)	−0.02 (0.08)	−0.00 (0.08)
US Defense Pact	−0.14 (0.17)	0.12 (0.08)	−0.13 (0.06)*
log(Threat Environment)	0.08 (0.09)	0.24 (0.03)**	0.06 (0.03)*
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.06 (0.09)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Polity Score	−0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.02)*	−0.04 (0.02)*
log(GDP)	0.05 (0.13)	−0.19 (0.05)**	0.01 (0.05)
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.17 (0.13)	−0.19 (0.04)**	−0.26 (0.05)**
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.01 (0.13)	0.19 (0.05)**	0.00 (0.05)
Country Fixed Effects			
Belgium	0.05 (0.26)	0.57 (0.09)**	−0.26 (0.11)*
Germany	−0.08 (0.37)	0.99 (0.10)**	−0.10 (0.13)
Italy	0.73 (0.32)*	0.01 (0.11)	0.71 (0.12)**
Japan	−0.24 (0.35)	−0.25 (0.12)*	−0.25 (0.12)*
Kuwait	0.27 (0.17)	−0.15 (0.09)	0.21 (0.07)**
Netherlands	0.25 (0.45)	0.41 (0.16)**	0.01 (0.17)
Philippines	0.19 (0.32)	−0.02 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)
Poland	−0.07 (0.33)	−0.92 (0.13)**	0.20 (0.12)
Portugal	0.35 (0.27)	0.53 (0.11)**	0.30 (0.11)**
South Korea	−0.42 (0.36)	−1.28 (0.10)**	−0.11 (0.10)
Spain	−0.04 (0.34)	−0.08 (0.11)	−0.40 (0.13)**
Turkey	−0.21 (0.19)	0.26 (0.09)**	−0.16 (0.08)*
United Kingdom	−0.11 (0.31)	0.11 (0.10)	0.17 (0.11)
Intercept	0.13 (0.09)	−0.03 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)*
AIC	19894.66	19894.66	19894.66
BIC	21452.08	21452.08	21452.08
Log Likelihood	-9737.33	-9737.33	-9737.33
Deviance	19474.66	19474.66	19474.66
Num. obs.	12287	12287	12287

$^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A19: Categorical logistic regressions predicting attitudes towards the US people. Models contain question about security benefits.

	dk	neg	pos
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.05 (0.39)	−0.33 (0.23)	−0.42 (0.18)*
PC: Yes	−0.22 (0.43)	0.01 (0.13)	0.17 (0.09)
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.52 (0.33)	0.05 (0.17)	−0.07 (0.13)
NC: Yes	0.01 (0.41)	0.26 (0.12)*	0.19 (0.09)*
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.27 (0.34)	−0.37 (0.22)	−0.08 (0.15)
PB: Yes	1.00 (0.40)*	−0.13 (0.19)	0.01 (0.12)
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.12 (0.31)	0.28 (0.19)	0.23 (0.14)
NB: Yes	−0.75 (0.56)	0.06 (0.17)	0.08 (0.11)
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.06 (0.42)	−0.81 (0.26)**	−0.68 (0.20)**
American influence (Degree): A little	−1.06 (0.43)*	−0.39 (0.18)*	−0.28 (0.16)
American influence (Degree): Some	−0.80 (0.39)*	−0.62 (0.17)**	−0.11 (0.15)
American influence (Degree): A lot	−0.95 (0.42)*	−0.39 (0.18)*	0.26 (0.16)
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	1.19 (0.27)**	−0.16 (0.21)	−0.06 (0.14)
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	0.03 (0.44)	1.63 (0.12)**	−0.84 (0.13)**
American influence (Quality): Negative	−0.46 (0.30)	1.09 (0.08)**	−0.48 (0.07)**
American influence (Quality): Positive	0.40 (0.28)	−0.30 (0.13)*	1.11 (0.06)**
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	1.41 (0.53)**	0.36 (0.28)	1.91 (0.15)**
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−1.79 (0.34)**	−0.37 (0.29)	−0.50 (0.22)*
Democratic Government: Not Important	−0.29 (0.50)	0.64 (0.36)	0.06 (0.31)
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−1.60 (0.33)**	−0.02 (0.28)	−0.04 (0.22)
Democratic Government: Very Important	−1.77 (0.31)**	−0.05 (0.28)	0.22 (0.22)
Security Benefits			
Security: Don't know/Decline to answer	1.56 (0.24)**	0.31 (0.13)*	0.08 (0.10)
Security: Very Unhelpful	0.74 (0.41)	0.60 (0.13)**	0.18 (0.12)
Security: Somewhat Unhelpful	0.67 (0.32)*	0.50 (0.10)**	0.15 (0.09)
Security: Somewhat Helpful	0.27 (0.27)	0.37 (0.09)**	0.60 (0.06)**
Security: Very Helpful	−0.08 (0.43)	0.38 (0.14)**	0.91 (0.08)**
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.15 (0.16)	−0.00 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)
Gender: Non-Binary	−2.81 (0.00)**	−0.02 (0.62)	−0.57 (0.41)
Gender: None of the above	1.01 (1.52)	0.56 (1.28)	1.66 (0.79)*
Education			
Education	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)*	0.02 (0.00)**
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	0.29 (0.26)	−0.12 (0.10)	0.03 (0.08)
Age: 35-44 years	0.03 (0.28)	−0.42 (0.11)**	0.12 (0.08)
Age: 45-54 years	0.35 (0.28)	−0.35 (0.11)**	0.13 (0.08)
Age: 55-64 years	0.34 (0.29)	−0.68 (0.12)**	0.26 (0.08)**
Age: 65 or older	0.18 (0.37)	−0.42 (0.13)**	0.35 (0.09)**
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.08 (0.23)	−0.02 (0.10)	−0.07 (0.07)
Income Percentile: 35-50	0.10 (0.24)	0.12 (0.10)	0.07 (0.07)
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.05 (0.27)	0.10 (0.10)	0.12 (0.07)
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.22 (0.31)	0.17 (0.11)	0.13 (0.08)
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.18 (0.64)	0.10 (0.19)	0.08 (0.13)
Ideology			
Ideology	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)**
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.16 (0.35)	−0.19 (0.12)	0.12 (0.09)
Catholicism	−0.30 (0.31)	−0.30 (0.10)**	0.05 (0.08)
Islam	0.40 (0.44)	−0.11 (0.18)	−0.11 (0.13)
Judaism	−0.80 (1.16)	−2.08 (1.04)*	0.07 (0.23)
Shinto	−2.93 (0.01)**	0.30 (0.61)	0.01 (0.40)
Buddhism	−0.19 (0.51)	−0.18 (0.20)	0.27 (0.13)*
Hinduism	0.29 (0.88)	−0.90 (0.57)	0.09 (0.24)
Local	1.06 (0.62)	−0.53 (0.34)	−0.04 (0.25)
Mormonism	−1.83 (0.01)**	−1.03 (0.92)	−0.12 (0.62)
Decline to answer	0.31 (0.32)	−0.31 (0.13)*	−0.07 (0.11)
Other	−0.09 (0.36)	−0.09 (0.12)	0.20 (0.10)*
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	−0.44 (0.29)	−0.32 (0.18)	0.00 (0.14)
Minority: No	−0.65 (0.36)	−0.10 (0.19)	0.06 (0.14)
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.01 (0.05)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.01)
Base in Respondent's Province	0.24 (0.23)	0.16 (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)
US Defense Pact	−0.08 (0.18)	0.03 (0.08)	0.15 (0.05)**
log(Threat Environment)	0.01 (0.10)	0.33 (0.04)**	0.15 (0.02)**
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	0.13 (0.11)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
Polity Score	0.10 (0.06)	0.04 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.02)**
log(GDP)	0.20 (0.13)	−0.25 (0.06)**	−0.04 (0.04)
log(Total Trade with US)	−0.40 (0.13)**	−0.22 (0.05)**	−0.27 (0.04)**
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.25 (0.15)	0.06 (0.06)	0.10 (0.04)*
Country Fixed Effects			
Belgium	0.07 (0.27)	0.04 (0.10)	0.17 (0.08)*
Germany	−0.30 (0.36)	0.54 (0.11)**	0.15 (0.08)
Italy	0.78 (0.35)*	0.23 (0.13)	0.45 (0.09)**
Japan	0.14 (0.34)	−0.34 (0.16)*	−0.04 (0.10)
Kuwait	0.17 (0.18)	−0.09 (0.09)	−0.26 (0.06)**
Netherlands	0.08 (0.49)	0.11 (0.18)	−0.04 (0.14)
Philippines	0.12 (0.34)	−0.19 (0.14)	−0.18 (0.09)*
Poland	0.37 (0.37)	0.19 (0.16)	0.69 (0.11)**
Portugal	−0.19 (0.29)	−0.06 (0.12)	−0.49 (0.09)**
South Korea	−0.14 (0.36)	−0.32 (0.12)**	−0.56 (0.08)**
Spain	0.53 (0.35)	−0.30 (0.13)*	−0.37 (0.10)**
Turkey	−0.15 (0.21)	0.13 (0.10)	0.32 (0.06)**
United Kingdom	−0.97 (0.43)*	0.10 (0.12)	0.41 (0.09)**
Intercept	0.09 (0.09)	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.11 (0.03)**
AIC	20867.08	20867.08	20867.08
BIC	22424.50	22424.50	22424.50
Log Likelihood	-10223.54	-10223.54	-10223.54
Deviance	20447.08	20447.08	20447.08
Num. obs.	12287	12287	12287

$^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

D.4 Binary Response Models

This section presents the results of a series of multilevel Bayesian binary logistic regressions. For these models we took the three outcome variables of interest and collapsed the original seven response categories down into a binary response variable coded "1" if the respondent expressed a "Somewhat favorable" or "Very favorable" opinion towards the U.S. troops, U.S. government, or U.S. people, and "0" otherwise. In each model we use weak/non-informative priors for the coefficients where $beta \sim N(0, 100)$. Figure A25 plots the coefficients from the models in Table A20 for ease of comparison.

Though the coding scheme for the outcome variable is different, the results roughly support the findings from our primary models. Personal and network contact appears to correlate with an increase in the probability of a positive assessment of U.S. military personnel stationed within a country, as well as of the American people. alternatively, personal benefits and network benefits primarily correlate with more positive views of the U.S. government and the U.S. military presence (in the case of network benefits only).

The advantage of the Bayesian models in this particular case arises from the fact that the distribution of 0's and 1's in our dependent variable exhibits a substantial amount of overlap between categories of the independent variables. In this particular case, the high number of covariates in each model, combined with the relatively flat gradient curve, combine to make convergence more challenging in the traditional models.

Table A20: Multilevel binary logistic regression models predicting positive attitudes towards US entities.

	US Troops	US Government	US People
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.44 [−0.81; −0.07]*	−0.28 [−0.68; 0.10]	−0.46 [−0.80; −0.13]*
PC: Yes	0.51 [0.35; 0.68]*	0.06 [−0.11; 0.24]	0.20 [0.04; 0.36]*
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.15 [−0.09; 0.40]	0.19 [−0.08; 0.46]	−0.09 [−0.32; 0.15]
NC: Yes	0.18 [0.02; 0.34]*	0.06 [−0.11; 0.23]	0.15 [−0.01; 0.31]
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.27 [−0.57; 0.04]	0.18 [−0.16; 0.52]	−0.07 [−0.36; 0.21]
PB: Yes	0.03 [−0.20; 0.27]	0.39 [0.16; 0.63]*	0.05 [−0.17; 0.27]
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.13 [−0.40; 0.13]	−0.01 [−0.31; 0.29]	0.14 [−0.12; 0.39]
NB: Yes	0.70 [0.48; 0.92]*	0.23 [0.01; 0.46]*	0.11 [−0.10; 0.32]
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.23 [−0.64; 0.18]	−0.74 [−1.27; −0.21]*	−0.58 [−0.95; −0.22]*
American influence (Degree): A little	0.19 [−0.11; 0.50]	0.34 [−0.01; 0.70]	−0.10 [−0.38; 0.17]
American influence (Degree): Some	0.26 [−0.03; 0.56]	0.12 [−0.23; 0.47]	0.16 [−0.11; 0.43]
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.50 [0.20; 0.80]*	0.50 [0.16; 0.86]*	0.52 [0.25; 0.80]*
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.70 [−0.99; −0.41]*	−0.62 [−1.00; −0.24]*	−0.27 [−0.52; −0.03]*
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	−1.70 [−1.98; −1.42]*	−1.78 [−2.17; −1.42]*	−1.64 [−1.86; −1.42]*
American influence (Quality): Negative	−0.89 [−1.02; −0.77]*	−1.06 [−1.24; −0.89]*	−0.89 [−1.01; −0.77]*
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.24 [1.13; 1.34]*	1.57 [1.46; 1.69]*	1.29 [1.18; 1.40]*
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	1.84 [1.61; 2.08]*	2.49 [2.26; 2.72]*	2.02 [1.77; 2.28]*
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.19 [−0.62; 0.26]	−0.23 [−0.75; 0.33]	−0.21 [−0.60; 0.20]
Democratic Government: Not Important	0.46 [−0.10; 1.04]	0.40 [−0.25; 1.09]	0.03 [−0.51; 0.56]
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	0.35 [−0.07; 0.79]	0.42 [−0.09; 0.96]	0.24 [−0.15; 0.63]
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.55 [0.13; 0.98]*	0.46 [−0.05; 0.99]	0.58 [0.19; 0.97]*
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	−0.02 [−0.11; 0.07]	0.02 [−0.07; 0.11]	0.08 [−0.01; 0.16]
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.30 [−1.09; 0.50]	−0.45 [−1.26; 0.36]	−0.49 [−1.26; 0.26]
Gender: None of the above	−1.43 [−2.81; −0.19]*	−0.78 [−2.19; 0.50]	1.29 [0.10; 2.64]*
Education			
Education	0.01 [−0.00; 0.02]	0.01 [−0.00; 0.02]	0.02 [0.01; 0.03]*
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.13 [−0.29; 0.02]	0.02 [−0.14; 0.19]	0.02 [−0.12; 0.17]
Age: 35-44 years	−0.04 [−0.20; 0.11]	0.13 [−0.04; 0.29]	0.18 [0.04; 0.32]*
Age: 45-54 years	−0.06 [−0.22; 0.09]	0.02 [−0.16; 0.19]	0.20 [0.05; 0.35]*
Age: 55-64 years	0.18 [0.02; 0.34]*	0.01 [−0.17; 0.19]	0.42 [0.27; 0.57]*
Age: 65 or older	0.30 [0.13; 0.47]*	0.04 [−0.15; 0.24]	0.47 [0.30; 0.63]*
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.10 [−0.24; 0.03]	0.03 [−0.12; 0.18]	−0.08 [−0.21; 0.05]
Income Percentile: 35-50	−0.17 [−0.31; −0.03]*	−0.04 [−0.20; 0.12]	0.01 [−0.12; 0.15]
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.08 [−0.22; 0.06]	−0.02 [−0.18; 0.14]	0.09 [−0.04; 0.23]
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.14 [−0.29; 0.01]	−0.02 [−0.19; 0.15]	0.08 [−0.07; 0.22]
Income Percentile: 84-100	0.01 [−0.24; 0.25]	0.13 [−0.13; 0.40]	0.07 [−0.16; 0.30]
Ideology			
Ideology	0.11 [0.09; 0.13]*	0.19 [0.16; 0.21]*	0.05 [0.03; 0.08]*
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.33 [0.17; 0.49]*	0.26 [0.07; 0.45]*	0.19 [0.03; 0.35]*
Catholicism	0.28 [0.13; 0.43]*	0.16 [−0.02; 0.34]	0.16 [0.01; 0.30]*
Islam	−0.27 [−0.54; −0.01]*	−0.31 [−0.59; −0.02]*	−0.09 [−0.33; 0.14]
Judaism	0.09 [−0.37; 0.56]	0.28 [−0.20; 0.77]	0.24 [−0.18; 0.66]
Shinto	0.07 [−0.64; 0.77]	0.45 [−0.30; 1.20]	0.03 [−0.70; 0.77]
Buddhism	0.21 [−0.03; 0.45]	0.31 [0.04; 0.57]*	0.31 [0.07; 0.55]*
Hinduism	−0.07 [−0.56; 0.42]	−0.14 [−0.63; 0.36]	0.19 [−0.25; 0.65]
Local	0.01 [−0.46; 0.49]	0.47 [−0.06; 0.97]	0.04 [−0.41; 0.48]
Mormonism	0.13 [−1.16; 1.43]	0.38 [−0.89; 1.66]	0.11 [−1.08; 1.30]
Other	−0.04 [−0.23; 0.14]	0.08 [−0.14; 0.30]	0.22 [0.04; 0.39]*
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.05 [−0.21; 0.32]	0.25 [−0.05; 0.56]	0.13 [−0.11; 0.37]
Minority: No	0.02 [−0.26; 0.30]	0.32 [0.00; 0.64]*	0.14 [−0.12; 0.40]
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.04 [0.02; 0.07]*	0.02 [−0.01; 0.05]	0.01 [−0.02; 0.03]
Base in Respondent's Province	−0.05 [−0.17; 0.07]	0.01 [−0.13; 0.15]	0.03 [−0.08; 0.15]
US Defense Pact	−1.38 [−2.92; 0.15]	−0.69 [−4.43; 3.01]	−0.22 [−2.72; 2.22]
Threat Environment	−0.02 [−0.27; 0.22]	−0.08 [−0.67; 0.52]	0.11 [−0.28; 0.50]
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.22 [−0.40; −0.03]*	−0.01 [−0.48; 0.46]	−0.13 [−0.44; 0.19]
Polity Score	0.02 [−0.08; 0.13]	−0.03 [−0.28; 0.22]	−0.06 [−0.22; 0.11]
log(GDP)	−0.21 [−0.74; 0.31]	0.16 [−1.17; 1.45]	0.31 [−0.54; 1.19]
log(Total Trade with US)	0.29 [−0.13; 0.71]	−0.25 [−1.30; 0.81]	−0.14 [−0.83; 0.55]
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.06 [−0.29; 0.18]	−0.09 [−0.67; 0.49]	0.05 [−0.33; 0.44]
Random Effects			
N	12287	12287	12287
Groups	14	14	14
Std. Dev.	0.302	0.773	0.507

Note: Asterisks indicate that 95% credible intervals do not overlap with 0.



Figure A25: Coefficient plot for multilevel Bayesian logistic regression. 95% credible intervals shown around point predictions.

D.5 Model Diagnostics

This section contains some basic diagnostic information for the categorical Bayesian logistic regressions and the binary Bayesian logistic regressions. More detailed information is available in a larger supplemental diagnostic appendix, which contains more in-depth figures to aid in assessing Markov Chain convergence (e.g. traceplots, etc.). However, here we want highlight a few important pieces of diagnostic information concerning the convergence of the Markov Chains. For general guidance in assessing model convergence we follow Gelman et al. (2014), Gill (2015), and Kruschke (2015).

First, the categorical models were run with 4 chains set to 10,000 iterations with a warmup period of 3,000, yielding a total of 28,000 post-warmup samples.

Second, the binary models were run with 4 chains set to 10,000 iterations with a warmup period of 4,000, yielding a total of 24,000 post-warmup samples.

Third, the potential scale reduction factor/Gelman-Rubin-Brooks $\hat{R}$ statistic is ≈ 1.0 for every variable in both the binary and categorical models. The individual $\hat{R}$ statistics can be found in the supplementary diagnostic appendices.

Fourth, the effective sample sizes (ESS) for the individual covariates vary from approximately 4,000 to approximately 55,000 depending on the specific model. The figures on the following pages show the ESS values for each covariate for the categorical and binary logistic models.

Please note that following figures are intended to demonstrate the relative magnitude of the ESS values across models and variables. Due to the large number of outcome category-variable combinations, the Y axis for the second graph showing the ESS for the categorical models may be difficult to read using a printed version of the appendix. We recommend using a PDF reader to magnify specific rows of interest if reviewers have questions about a specific variable.



Figure A26: Effective Sample Size for multilevel categorical Bayesian logistic models featured in the main paper.



Figure A27: Effective Sample Size for multilevel binary Bayesian logistic models.

D.6 Ordered Models

In this section we provide the results from a set of multilevel ordered logistic regressions. These models use a five-point ordered scale as the dependent variable, excluding the "Don't know/Decline to answer" category. These models represent the original approach to modeling respondents attitudes from the first draft of the paper. After discussing the reviewers' comments we decided to use the categorical models as our primary set of analyses. Figure A28 shows the coefficients from our original base model (left panel) and an updated version that includes the country-level variables we include in our updated categorical models.

Overall the results from these models indicate that contact and benefits tend to correlate with more positive/favorable attitudes towards the U.S. actors of interest. Personal contact correlates with more positive attitudes towards U.S. troops and the American people. Network contact correlates with more positive attitudes towards U.S. military personnel only. Personal benefits correlate with more positive attitudes towards the U.S. government, specifically. Network benefits correlate with more positive attitudes towards the U.S. government and U.S. military presence.

Table A21: Ordered multilevel logit models predicting attitudes towards various United States actors

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.274 (0.138)*	0.007 (0.132)	−0.136 (0.133)
PC: Yes	0.348 (0.065)**	0.059 (0.066)	0.187 (0.066)**
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.050 (0.094)	0.103 (0.095)	−0.040 (0.095)
NC: Yes	0.142 (0.064)*	−0.076 (0.065)	0.136 (0.064)*
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.092 (0.116)	0.294 (0.115)*	0.074 (0.114)
PB: Yes	0.168 (0.087)	0.424 (0.088)**	0.142 (0.088)
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.042 (0.104)	0.150 (0.101)	0.053 (0.102)
NB: Yes	0.512 (0.084)**	0.356 (0.084)**	0.004 (0.083)
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	0.268 (0.158)	0.228 (0.153)	0.061 (0.153)
American influence (Degree): A little	0.339 (0.117)**	0.223 (0.117)	0.158 (0.116)
American influence (Degree): Some	0.241 (0.114)*	0.085 (0.114)	0.338 (0.114)**
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.382 (0.116)**	0.310 (0.116)**	0.646 (0.116)**
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.405 (0.115)**	−0.274 (0.108)*	−0.078 (0.107)
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	−2.601 (0.093)**	−2.968 (0.107)**	−2.181 (0.089)**
American influence (Quality): Negative	−1.152 (0.050)**	−1.356 (0.050)**	−1.094 (0.051)**
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.073 (0.046)**	1.319 (0.047)**	1.135 (0.046)**
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	2.423 (0.089)**	3.163 (0.091)**	2.656 (0.089)**
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.106 (0.176)	0.018 (0.172)	−0.318 (0.172)
Democratic Government: Not Important	−0.159 (0.226)	−0.128 (0.228)	−0.333 (0.227)
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	0.032 (0.172)	0.040 (0.168)	−0.216 (0.169)
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.263 (0.170)	−0.061 (0.166)	0.172 (0.167)
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.037 (0.034)	0.016 (0.034)	0.041 (0.034)
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.367 (0.310)	−0.208 (0.310)	−0.340 (0.297)
Gender: None of the above	−0.331 (0.471)	−0.040 (0.445)	0.715 (0.458)
Education			
Education	0.007 (0.004)*	0.003 (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)*
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.233 (0.061)**	0.072 (0.060)	0.012 (0.060)
Age: 35-44 years	−0.048 (0.060)	0.090 (0.059)	0.217 (0.059)**
Age: 45-54 years	−0.005 (0.062)	0.022 (0.062)	0.235 (0.062)**
Age: 55-64 years	0.160 (0.063)*	0.061 (0.062)	0.487 (0.062)**
Age: 65 or older	0.195 (0.068)**	0.046 (0.068)	0.448 (0.068)**
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.074 (0.053)	0.030 (0.052)	−0.066 (0.052)
Income Percentile: 35-50	−0.139 (0.055)*	−0.056 (0.055)	−0.013 (0.055)
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.031 (0.055)	−0.019 (0.055)	0.088 (0.055)
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.214 (0.059)**	−0.122 (0.059)*	−0.011 (0.059)
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.037 (0.097)	−0.013 (0.098)	0.040 (0.097)
Ideology			
Ideology	0.109 (0.009)**	0.183 (0.009)**	0.037 (0.009)**
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.266 (0.097)**	0.369 (0.095)**	0.196 (0.096)*
Catholicism	0.391 (0.060)**	0.321 (0.061)**	0.203 (0.060)**
Islam	0.101 (0.079)	0.299 (0.080)**	0.046 (0.079)
Judaism	−0.447 (0.187)*	0.169 (0.187)	0.144 (0.178)
Shinto	−0.178 (0.100)	−0.191 (0.102)	0.037 (0.099)
Buddhism	0.883 (0.205)**	0.509 (0.187)**	0.342 (0.185)
Hinduism	0.243 (0.178)	0.975 (0.180)**	0.152 (0.177)
Local	−0.026 (0.456)	0.628 (0.490)	0.678 (0.472)
Mormonism	0.016 (0.072)	0.120 (0.073)	0.229 (0.072)**
Decline to answer	0.343 (0.066)**	0.317 (0.066)**	0.225 (0.066)**
Other	0.150 (0.290)	0.389 (0.285)	−0.235 (0.301)
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.087 (0.103)	0.214 (0.101)*	0.183 (0.102)
Minority: No	0.017 (0.109)	0.291 (0.108)**	0.185 (0.109)
Very unfavorable—Somewhat unfavorable	−1.508 (0.269)**	−0.238 (0.300)	−2.522 (0.247)**
Somewhat unfavorable—Neutral	−0.107 (0.268)	1.325 (0.300)**	−0.782 (0.244)**
Neutral—Somewhat favorable	1.720 (0.269)**	2.844 (0.301)**	1.296 (0.243)**
Somewhat favorable—Very favorable	3.714 (0.270)**	5.191 (0.304)**	3.580 (0.246)**
Log Likelihood	-15431.285	-15446.573	-14986.902
AIC	30970.570	31001.146	30081.804
BIC	31370.883	31402.628	30483.470
Num. obs.	12249	12517	12560
Groups (country)	14	14	14
Variance: country: (Intercept)	0.250	0.509	0.089

$^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A22: Ordered multilevel logit models predicting attitudes towards various United States actors

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Personal Contact			
PC: Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.293 (0.140)*	0.035 (0.134)	−0.157 (0.136)
PC: Yes	0.358 (0.066)**	0.047 (0.068)	0.211 (0.067)**
Network Contact			
NC: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.015 (0.096)	0.087 (0.096)	−0.057 (0.096)
NC: Yes	0.129 (0.065)*	−0.092 (0.066)	0.099 (0.066)
Personal Benefit			
PB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.061 (0.120)	0.328 (0.119)**	0.053 (0.117)
PB: Yes	0.147 (0.090)	0.392 (0.091)**	0.143 (0.090)
Network Benefit			
NB: Don't know/Decline to answer	0.041 (0.106)	0.144 (0.104)	0.085 (0.105)
NB: Yes	0.519 (0.085)**	0.376 (0.085)**	0.030 (0.085)
American Influence (Degree)			
American influence (Degree): Don't know/Decline to answer	0.363 (0.164)*	0.320 (0.159)*	0.081 (0.159)
American influence (Degree): A little	0.386 (0.123)**	0.224 (0.123)	0.158 (0.122)
American influence (Degree): Some	0.281 (0.120)*	0.085 (0.120)	0.338 (0.119)**
American influence (Degree): A lot	0.413 (0.122)**	0.320 (0.122)**	0.652 (0.121)**
American Influence (Quality)			
American influence (Quality): Don't know/Decline to answer	−0.410 (0.118)**	−0.351 (0.111)**	−0.094 (0.110)
American influence (Quality): Very Negative	−2.586 (0.095)**	−2.943 (0.109)**	−2.197 (0.092)**
American influence (Quality): Negative	−1.151 (0.051)**	−1.367 (0.051)**	−1.096 (0.052)**
American influence (Quality): Positive	1.068 (0.047)**	1.333 (0.048)**	1.151 (0.047)**
American influence (Quality): Very Positive	2.412 (0.091)**	3.157 (0.093)**	2.678 (0.091)**
Democratic Government			
Democratic Government: Neutral	−0.197 (0.181)	0.029 (0.176)	−0.358 (0.177)*
Democratic Government: Not Important	−0.265 (0.233)	−0.101 (0.236)	−0.338 (0.233)
Democratic Government: Somewhat Important	−0.066 (0.177)	0.059 (0.172)	−0.227 (0.174)
Democratic Government: Very Important	0.183 (0.175)	−0.040 (0.170)	0.141 (0.171)
Gender Self-Identification			
Gender: Female	0.036 (0.035)	0.020 (0.034)	0.045 (0.035)
Gender: Non-Binary	−0.277 (0.317)	−0.128 (0.320)	−0.320 (0.304)
Gender: None of the above	−0.334 (0.470)	−0.029 (0.446)	0.720 (0.459)
Education			
Education	0.008 (0.004)*	0.003 (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)*
Age Bracket			
Age: 25-34 years	−0.233 (0.062)**	0.068 (0.061)	0.051 (0.061)
Age: 35-44 years	−0.060 (0.061)	0.089 (0.061)	0.225 (0.061)**
Age: 45-54 years	−0.011 (0.064)	0.030 (0.063)	0.247 (0.063)**
Age: 55-64 years	0.145 (0.064)*	0.063 (0.064)	0.503 (0.064)**
Age: 65 or older	0.169 (0.070)*	0.035 (0.069)	0.471 (0.069)**
Income Percentile			
Income Percentile: 17-34	−0.078 (0.054)	0.029 (0.053)	−0.063 (0.053)
Income Percentile: 35-50	−0.160 (0.056)**	−0.062 (0.056)	−0.025 (0.056)
Income Percentile: 51-67	−0.029 (0.056)	−0.028 (0.056)	0.082 (0.057)
Income Percentile: 65-83	−0.201 (0.060)**	−0.116 (0.060)	−0.007 (0.060)
Income Percentile: 84-100	−0.046 (0.097)	−0.013 (0.098)	0.044 (0.097)
Ideology			
Ideology	0.110 (0.010)**	0.187 (0.010)**	0.040 (0.010)**
Religious Self-Identification			
Protestant	0.253 (0.097)**	0.377 (0.096)**	0.197 (0.097)*
Catholicism	0.384 (0.061)**	0.321 (0.062)**	0.191 (0.062)**
Islam	0.094 (0.081)	0.286 (0.082)**	0.044 (0.081)
Judaism	−0.456 (0.189)*	0.151 (0.189)	0.134 (0.180)
Shinto	−0.171 (0.103)	−0.216 (0.104)*	0.005 (0.102)
Buddhism	0.860 (0.206)**	0.473 (0.188)*	0.327 (0.187)
Hinduism	0.224 (0.184)	0.914 (0.187)**	0.122 (0.183)
Local	−0.043 (0.464)	0.580 (0.494)	0.866 (0.483)
Mormonism	0.041 (0.073)	0.115 (0.074)	0.216 (0.074)**
Decline to answer	0.357 (0.067)**	0.310 (0.068)**	0.212 (0.067)**
Other	0.144 (0.289)	0.391 (0.285)	−0.238 (0.303)
Minority Self-Identification			
Minority: Yes	0.065 (0.105)	0.197 (0.104)	0.153 (0.105)
Minority: No	−0.002 (0.112)	0.265 (0.111)*	0.143 (0.112)
Country-Level Variables			
log(US Military Spending)	0.043 (0.008)**	0.002 (0.011)	0.010 (0.009)
Base in Respondent's Province	−0.046 (0.047)	0.027 (0.049)	0.008 (0.048)
US Defense Pact	−1.470 (0.287)**	−0.029 (0.973)	0.223 (0.400)
log(Threat Environment)	0.031 (0.044)	−0.148 (0.155)	0.061 (0.061)
log(US Troops in Country, 2017)	−0.214 (0.035)**	−0.000 (0.122)	−0.098 (0.049)*
Polity Score	0.036 (0.019)	−0.051 (0.068)	−0.072 (0.027)**
log(GDP)	−0.322 (0.094)**	0.084 (0.328)	0.263 (0.134)*
log(Total Trade with US	0.433 (0.075)**	−0.003 (0.281)	−0.172 (0.108)
log(US Students in Respondent Country, 2017)	−0.075 (0.042)	−0.096 (0.154)	0.069 (0.061)
Very unfavorable—Somewhat unfavorable	−4.075 (0.859)**	−2.098 (2.376)	−0.436 (1.140)
Somewhat unfavorable—Neutral	−2.672 (0.859)**	−0.526 (2.376)	1.325 (1.139)
Neutral—Somewhat favorable	−0.829 (0.858)	0.997 (2.376)	3.426 (1.139)**
Somewhat favorable—Very favorable	1.164 (0.858)	3.347 (2.376)	5.722 (1.140)**
Log Likelihood	-14820.453	-14831.233	-14349.681
AIC	29766.907	29788.465	28825.362
BIC	30231.446	30254.376	29291.492
Num. obs.	11774	12033	12075
Groups (country)	14	14	14
Variance: country: (Intercept)	0.010	0.210	0.026

$^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$



Figure A28: Coefficient plot showing coefficients from base ordered models (left panel) and ordered models containing country-level variables (right panel).

E R Session Information

The table below provides information on the R packages used in our analysis.

Table A23: Session Information

	package	loadedversion	date	source
1	abind	1.4-5	2016-07-21	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
2	arm	1.10-1	2018-04-13	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
3	arrayhelpers	1.0-20160527	2016-05-28	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
4	assertthat	0.2.1	2019-03-21	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
5	backports	1.1.4	2019-04-10	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
6	base64enc	0.1-3	2015-07-28	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
7	bayesplot	1.7.0	2019-05-23	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
8	BayesPostEst	0.1.0	2019-10-06	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
9	bibtex	0.4.2	2017-06-30	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
10	bitops	1.0-6	2013-08-17	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
11	blme	1.0-4	2015-06-14	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
12	boot	1.3-22	2019-04-02	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
13	brant	0.2-0	2018-01-10	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
14	bridgesampling	0.7-2	2019-07-21	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
15	brms	2.10.0	2019-08-29	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
16	Brobdingnag	1.2-6	2018-08-13	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
17	broom	0.5.2	2019-04-07	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
18	callr	3.3.1	2019-07-18	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
19	caTools	1.17.1.2	2019-03-06	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
20	cellranger	1.1.0	2016-07-27	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
21	checkmate	1.9.4	2019-07-04	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
22	class	7.3-15	2019-01-01	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
23	classInt	0.4-1	2019-08-06	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
24	cli	1.1.0	2019-03-19	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
25	coda	0.19-3	2019-07-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
26	codetools	0.2-16	2018-12-24	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
27	colorspace	1.4-1	2019-03-18	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
28	colourpicker	1.0	2017-09-27	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
29	commonmark	1.7	2018-12-01	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
30	corrplot	0.84	2017-10-16	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
31	countrycode	1.1.0	2018-10-27	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
32	crayon	1.3.4	2017-09-16	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
33	crosstalk	1.0.0	2016-12-21	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
34	data.table	1.12.2	2019-04-07	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
35	DBI	1.0.0	2018-05-02	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
36	desc	1.2.0	2018-05-01	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
37	devtools	2.2.0	2019-09-07	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
38	dfoptim	2018.2-1	2018-04-02	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
39	digest	0.6.20	2019-07-04	CRAN (R 3.6.1)

40	dotwhisker	0.5.0	2018-06-27	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
41	dplyr	0.8.3	2019-07-04	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
42	DT	0.9	2019-09-17	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
43	dygraphs	1.1.1.6	2018-07-11	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
44	e1071	1.7-2	2019-06-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
45	ellipsis	0.2.0.1	2019-07-02	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
46	facetscales	0.1.0.9000	2019-09-05	Github (zeehio/facetscales@cadf648)
47	forcats	0.4.0	2019-02-17	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
48	foreach	1.4.7	2019-07-27	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
49	foreign	0.8-71	2018-07-20	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
50	Formula	1.2-3	2018-05-03	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
51	fs	1.3.1	2019-05-06	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
52	gbRd	0.4-11	2012-10-01	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
53	generics	0.0.2	2018-11-29	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
54	GGally	1.4.0	2018-05-17	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
55	ggcorrplot	0.1.3	2019-05-19	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
56	ggmcmc	1.3	2019-07-03	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
57	ggplot2	3.2.1	2019-08-10	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
58	ggpubr	0.2.3	2019-09-03	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
59	ggridges	0.5.1	2018-09-27	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
60	ggsignif	0.6.0	2019-08-08	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
61	ggstance	0.3.3	2019-08-19	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
62	glue	1.3.1	2019-03-12	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
63	gridExtra	2.3	2017-09-09	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
64	gt	0.1.0	2019-09-05	Github (vincentarelbundock/gt@eff3be7)
65	gtable	0.3.0	2019-03-25	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
66	gtools	3.8.1	2018-06-26	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
67	haven	2.1.1	2019-07-04	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
68	here	0.1	2017-05-28	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
69	hms	0.5.1	2019-08-23	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
70	htmltools	0.3.6	2017-04-28	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
71	htmlwidgets	1.3	2018-09-30	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
72	httpuv	1.5.1	2019-04-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
73	httr	1.4.1	2019-08-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
74	igraph	1.2.4.1	2019-04-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
75	inline	0.3.15	2018-05-18	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
76	iterators	1.0.12	2019-07-26	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
77	jsonlite	1.6	2018-12-07	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
78	KernSmooth	2.23-15	2015-06-29	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
79	later	0.8.0	2019-02-11	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
80	lattice	0.20-38	2018-11-04	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
81	lazyeval	0.2.2	2019-03-15	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
82	lifecycle	0.1.0	2019-08-01	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
83	lme4	1.1-21	2019-03-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
84	lmtest	0.9-37	2019-04-30	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
85	loo	2.1.0	2019-03-13	CRAN (R 3.6.1)

86	lubridate	1.7.4	2018-04-11	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
87	magrittr	1.5	2014-11-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
88	margins	0.3.23	2018-05-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
89	markdown	1.1	2019-08-07	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
90	MASS	7.3-51.4	2019-03-31	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
91	Matrix	1.2-17	2019-03-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
92	matrixStats	0.55.0	2019-09-07	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
93	memoise	1.1.0	2017-04-21	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
94	merTools	0.5.0	2019-05-13	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
95	mime	0.7	2019-06-11	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
96	miniUI	0.1.1.1	2018-05-18	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
97	minqa	1.2.4	2014-10-09	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
98	mlogit	1.0-1	2019-07-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
99	mnormt	1.5-5	2016-10-15	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
100	modelr	0.1.5	2019-08-08	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
101	modelsummary	0.1.0	2019-07-15	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
102	munsell	0.5.0	2018-06-12	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
103	mvtnorm	1.0-11	2019-06-19	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
104	nlme	3.1-140	2019-05-12	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
105	nloptr	1.2.1	2018-10-03	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
106	nnet	7.3-12	2016-02-02	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
107	numDeriv	2016.8-1.1	2019-06-06	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
108	optimx	2018-7.10	2018-09-30	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
109	ordinal	2019.4-25	2019-04-25	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
110	packrat	0.5.0	2018-11-14	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
111	pillar	1.4.2	2019-06-29	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
112	pkgbuild	1.0.5	2019-08-26	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
113	pkgconfig	2.0.2	2018-08-16	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
114	pkgload	1.0.2	2018-10-29	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
115	plyr	1.8.4	2016-06-08	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
116	prediction	0.3.14	2019-06-17	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
117	prettyunits	1.0.2	2015-07-13	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
118	processx	3.4.1	2019-07-18	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
119	promises	1.0.1	2018-04-13	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
120	ps	1.3.0	2018-12-21	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
121	psych	1.8.12	2019-01-12	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
122	purrr	0.3.2	2019-03-15	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
123	R2jags	0.5-7	2015-08-23	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
124	R2WinBUGS	2.1-21	2015-07-30	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
125	R6	2.4.0	2019-02-14	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
126	raster	3.0-2	2019-08-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
127	RColorBrewer	1.1-2	2014-12-07	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
128	Rcpp	1.0.2	2019-07-25	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
129	RCurl	1.95-4.12	2019-03-04	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
130	Rdpack	0.11-0	2019-04-14	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
131	readr	1.3.1	2018-12-21	CRAN (R 3.6.1)

132	readtext	0.75	2019-06-26	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
133	readxl	1.3.1	2019-03-13	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
134	remotes	2.1.0	2019-06-24	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
135	reporttools	1.1.2	2015-07-04	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
136	reshape	0.8.8	2018-10-23	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
137	reshape2	1.4.3	2017-12-11	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
138	rjags	4-9	2019-08-19	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
139	rlang	0.4.0	2019-06-25	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
140	rprojroot	1.3-2	2018-01-03	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
141	rsconnect	0.8.15	2019-07-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
142	rstan	2.19.2	2019-07-09	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
143	rstanarm	2.18.2	2018-11-10	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
144	rstantools	2.0.0	2019-09-15	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
145	rstudioapi	0.10	2019-03-19	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
146	rvest	0.3.4	2019-05-15	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
147	RWmisc	0.0.1	2019-09-09	Github (jayrobwilliams/RWmisc@5f9c180)
148	sass	0.1.2.1	2019-09-05	Github (rstudio/sass@4f3d406)
149	scales	1.0.0	2018-08-09	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
150	sessioninfo	1.1.1	2018-11-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
151	sf	0.8-0	2019-09-17	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
152	shiny	1.3.2	2019-04-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
153	shinyjs	1.0	2018-01-08	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
154	shinystan	2.5.0	2018-05-01	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
155	shinythemes	1.1.2	2018-11-06	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
156	sp	1.3-1	2018-06-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
157	StanHeaders	2.19.0	2019-09-07	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
158	stargazer	5.2.2	2018-05-30	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
159	statmod	1.4.32	2019-05-29	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
160	stringi	1.4.3	2019-03-12	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
161	stringr	1.4.0	2019-02-10	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
162	survival	2.44-1.1	2019-04-01	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
163	svUnit	0.7-12	2014-03-02	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
164	testthat	2.2.1	2019-07-25	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
165	texreg	1.36.23	2017-03-03	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
166	threejs	0.3.1	2017-08-13	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
167	tibble	2.1.3	2019-06-06	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
168	tidybayes	1.1.0	2019-06-02	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
169	tidyr	1.0.0	2019-09-11	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
170	tidyselect	0.2.5	2018-10-11	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
171	tidyverse	1.2.1	2017-11-14	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
172	ucminf	1.1-4	2016-08-18	CRAN (R 3.6.0)
173	units	0.6-4	2019-08-22	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
174	usethis	1.5.1	2019-07-04	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
175	vctrs	0.2.0	2019-07-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
176	withr	2.1.2	2018-03-15	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
177	xml2	1.2.2	2019-08-09	CRAN (R 3.6.1)

178	xtable	1.8-4	2019-04-21	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
179	xts	0.11-2	2018-11-05	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
180	zeallot	0.1.0	2018-01-28	CRAN (R 3.6.1)
181	zoo	1.8-6	2019-05-28	CRAN (R 3.6.1)

References

Akibayashi, Kozue and Suzuyo Takazato. 2009. "Okinawa: Women's struggle for demilitarization." *The bases of empire: The global struggle against US military posts* pp. 243–269.

Bell, Sam R, K Chad Clay and Carla Martinez Machain. 2017. "The effect of US troop deployments on human rights." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(10):2020–2042.

Berger, Lars. 2014. "Foreign policies or culture: What shapes Muslim public opinion on political violence against the United States?" *Journal of Peace Research* 51(6):782–796.

Bryant, Clifton D. 1979. *Khaki-collar crime: Deviant behavior in the military context*. Free Press New York.

Cutler, Stephen J and Robert L Kaufman. 1975. "Cohort changes in political attitudes: Tolerance of ideological non conformity." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 39(1):69–81.

Defense Manpower Data Center. 2019. Number of Military and DoD Appropriated Fund (APF) Civilian Personnel Permanently Assigned. Technical report U.S. Department of Defense.

Eismeier, Theodore J. 1982. "Public preferences about government spending: Partisan, social, and attitudinal sources of policy differences." *Political Behavior* 4(2):133–145.

Enloe, Cynthia. 2014. *Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics*. Univ of California Press.

Ferris, James M. 1983. "Demands for public spending: An attitudinal approach." *Public Choice* 40(2):135–154.

Fordham, Benjamin O and Katja B Kleinberg. 2011. "International trade and US relations with China." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7(3):217–236.

Gelman, Andrew, John B. Carlin, Hal S. Stern, David B. Dunson, Aki Vehtari and Donald B. Rubin. 2014. *Bayesian Data Analysis*. Third ed. New York, NY: CRC Press.

Gill, Jeff. 2015. *Bayesian Methods*. Third ed. New York, NY: CRC Press.

Goldsmith, Benjamin E, Yusaku Horiuchi and Terence Wood. 2014. "Doing well by doing good: The impact of foreign aid on foreign public opinion." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9:87–114.

Gouldner, Alvin. 1979. *The future of intellectuals and the rise of the new class*. New York: Macmillan.

Government Relations Officer Interview. 2019. "Interview with Government Relations Officer at Clay Kaserne Army Base in Wiesbadenm, Germany, 2019-07-25.".

Hudson, Valerie M and Patricia Leidl. 2015. *The Hillary doctrine: Sex and American foreign policy*. Columbia University Press.

Institute for International Education. 2018. Host regions and destinations of U.S. study abroad students. Technical report Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange.
URL: *https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Open-Doors/Data/US-Study-Abroad/Destinations*

International Monetary Fund. 2018. Direction of trade statistics. Technical report International Monetary Fund.
URL: *http://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85*

Interview at RAF Lakenheath #5. 2019. "Interview with USAF NCO at RAF Lakenheath, 2019-07-19.".

Interview with British Member of Parliament #2. 2019. "Interview with British Member of Parliament with a Scottish Constituency, in London, 2019-07-17.".

Interview with Embassy Staff. 2018. "Interview with US Embassy intern in Panama, 2018-07-12.".

Interview with Embassy Staff #4. 2018. "Interview with US Embassy staff in Peru #4, 2018-07-19.".

Interview with former President. 2018. "Interview with former Panamanian President, 2018-07-14.".

Interview with German Peace Activist. 2019. "Interview with German Peace Activist in Berlin, 2019-07-23.".

Interview with Panamanian journalist. 2018. "Interview with Panamanian journalist, 2018-07-13.".

Interview with Panamanian journalist and former government official. 2018. "Interview with former Panamanian high-ranking government official and journalist, 2018-07-12.".

Kruschke, John K. 2015. *Doing Bayesian Data Analysis*. Second ed. New York, NY: Academic Press.

LAPOP. 2014. "The Americas barometer.".
URL: *www.LapopSurveys.org*

Leeds, Brett Ashley and Burcu Savun. 2007. "Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements?" *The Journal of Politics* 69(4):1118–1132.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Andrew G Long. 2002. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815–1944." *International Interactions* 28(3):237–260.

Marshall, Monty G, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr. 2011. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010.".
URL: *http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm*

Meernik, James, Eric L Krueger and Steven C Poe. 1998. "Testing models of US foreign policy: Foreign aid during and after the Cold War." *The journal of Politics* 60(1):63–85.

Milner, Helen V, Daniel L Nielson and Michael G Findley. 2016. "Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda." *The Review of International Organizations* 11(2):219–245.

Milner, Helen V and Dustin Tingley. 2013. "Public opinion and foreign aid: A review essay." *International Interactions* 39(3):389–401.

Moon, Katharine HS. 1997. *Sex among allies: Military prostitution in US-Korea relations*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Nisbet, Erik C, Matthew C Nisbet, Dietram A Scheufele and James E Shanahan. 2004. "Public diplomacy, television news, and Muslim opinion." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 9(2):11–37.

Oxley, Douglas R, Kevin B Smith, John R Alford, Matthew V Hibbing, Jennifer L Miller, Mario Scalora, Peter K Hatemi and John R Hibbing. 2008. "Political attitudes vary with physiological traits." *science* 321(5896):1667–1670.

Pew Research Center. 2016. "A wider ideological gap between more and less educated adults.".
URL: *http://www.people-press.org/2016/04/26/a-wider-ideological-gap-between-more-and-less-educated-adults/*

Public Affairs Officer Interview. 2018. "Interview with US Embassy Public Affairs Officer in Panama, 2018-07-12.".

Rodriguez, Javier M. 2018. "Health disparities, politics, and the maintenance of the status quo: A new theory of inequality." *Social Science & Medicine* 200:36–43.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institite (SIPRI). 2019. "SIPRI military expenditure database." Online.
URL: *https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex*

United States Department of Defense. Various Years. Military construction, family housing, and base realignment and closure program (C-1). Technical report U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Vine, David. 2015. *Base nation: How U.S. military bases abroad harm America and the world*. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt.

Voeten, Erik, Anton Strezhnev and Michael Bailey. 2009. "United Nations General Assembly voting data.".
URL: *https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ*

World Bank. 2018. "World Development Indicators.".
URL: *https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators*