

On-line Appendix: The Partisan Logic of City Mobilization: Evidence From State Lobbying Disclosures

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Supplementary information intended for on-line publication

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1 50-State Lobbying Database Information

Table A1 shows the sources and structure of the state-level lobbying data used in this paper. Every state requires the names of clients that engage in lobbying to be disclosed. 42 states also make it possible to link clients to the names of the lobbyists that represent them. Only 9 states also include the name of the lobbying firm, which makes it difficult to systematically estimate whether cities are hiring internal or external lobbyists. However, in-house lobbying tends to be quite constant from year-to-year, and the key source of variation in the data comes from cities starting and stopping their contracts with external lobbyists over time. The unit of observation is the client-year, and the key variable of interest is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if client had any reported lobbying in a particular year.

Although there are some minor differences in the lobbying disclosure requirements across states,¹ the use of state-year fixed effects can account for such differences by only comparing changes in city lobbying within the same state over time. Table A1 also discusses the availability of expenditure data by state. Because only a third of states had complete expenditure data available, most of the analyses in this paper rely on a binary measure that simply indicates whether a city lobbied or not in a given year. Table A2 shows descriptive statistics on the number of cities lobbying in each state as well as their reported expenditures for the states where this information is available. Lobbying intensity varies dramatically from state to state, and explaining this cross-state variation is a topic ripe for further research.

¹<http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-lobby-definitions.aspx>

Table A1: State Lobbying Data Summary

State	Abbr	Disclosure Website	Structure	Expenditure Data
Alabama	AL	http://ethics.alabama.gov/LobbyistList.aspx	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
Alaska	AK	http://doa.alaska.gov/apoc/SearchReports/reports.html#lobbying	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Arizona	AZ	http://www.azsos.gov/elections/lobbyists/historical-expenditure-summaries	Client	All expenditures
Arkansas	AR	http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/lobbyist_search/index.php/search/advanced/new	Client, lobbyist, firm	Partial expenditures
California	CA	http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/lobbying/	Client, lobbyist, firm	All expenditures
Colorado	CO	https://www.sos.state.co.us/lobby/Home.do	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
Connecticut	CT	https://www.oseapps.ct.gov/NewLobbyist/security/loginhome.aspx	Client, lobbyist, firm	All expenditures
Delaware	DE	https://egov.delaware.gov/lobs/Explore/ExploreLobbyists	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
Florida	FL	https://floridalobbyist.gov/	Client, lobbyist, firm	All expenditures
Georgia	GA	http://media.ethics.ga.gov/search/Lobbyist/Lobbyist_Menu.aspx	Client, lobbyist	Partial expenditures
Hawaii	HI	http://ethics.hawaii.gov/orgexp/	Client	Client names only
Idaho	ID	http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/lobbyist/disclosures.html	Client, lobbyist	Partial expenditures
Illinois	IL	http://www.ilsos.gov/lobbyistsearch/	Client, lobbyist, firm	Partial expenditures
Indiana	IN	http://www.in.gov/ilrc/2335.htm	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Iowa	IA	https://www.legis.iowa.gov/lobbyist/reports	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Kansas		http://www.kssos.org/elections/elections_lobbyists.html	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
Kentucky	KY	http://apps.klec.ky.gov/SearchRegister.asp	Client, lobbyist	Partial expenditures
Louisiana	LA	http://ethics.la.gov/LobbyistData/SearchByCompRep.aspx	Client, lobbyist	Partial expenditures
Maine	ME	http://www.maine.gov/ethics/disclosure/lobbyists.htm	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Massachusetts	MA	http://www.sec.state.ma.us/LobbyistPublicSearch/	Client, firm	All expenditures

State	Abbr	Website	Data Structure	Expenditure Availability
Michigan	MI	http://miboecfr.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/cfr/lobby_stats.cgi	Client	All expenditures
Minnesota	MN	http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/lob_lists.html	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
Mississippi	MS	http://sos.ms.gov/elec/portal/mse1/page/search/portal.aspx	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Missouri	MO	http://mec.mo.gov/MEC/Lobbying/LB14_PrinExpSrch.aspx	Client, lobbyist	Partial expenditures
Montana	MT	https://app.mt.gov/cgi-bin/camptrack/lobbysearch/lobbySearch.cgi	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Nebraska	NE	http://nebraskalegislature.gov/lobbyist/view.php	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Nevada	NV	https://www.leg.state.nv.us/AppCF/lobbyist/	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
New Hampshire	NH	http://sos.nh.gov/LobReports.aspx	Client, lobbyist, firm	Client names only
New Jersey	NJ	http://www.elec.state.nj.us/publicinformation/gaa_annual.htm	Client, lobbyist, firm	All expenditures
New Mexico	NM	https://www.cfis.state.nm.us/media/	Client	Partial expenditures
New York	NY	https://onlineapps.jcope.ny.gov/LobbyWatch/Menu_reports_public.aspx	Client, firm	All expenditures
North Carolina	NC	https://www.sosnc.gov/divisions/lobbying	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
North Dakota	ND	http://sos.nd.gov/lobbyists/registered-lobbyists	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
Ohio	OH	http://www2.jlec-olig.state.oh.us/olac/	Client, lobbyist	Partial expenditures
Oklahoma	OK	https://www.ok.gov/ethics/lobbyist/public_index.php	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
Oregon	OR	http://www.oregon.gov/ogec/pages/public_records.aspx	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Pennsylvania	PA	https://www.palobbyingservices.state.pa.us/Public/wfSearch.aspx	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Rhode Island	RI	https://www.lobbytracker.sos.ri.gov/Public/LobbyingReports.aspx	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
South Carolina	SC	http://apps.sc.gov/LobbyingActivity/LAIndex.aspx	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
South Dakota	SD	https://sos.sd.gov/Lobbyist/LRPrintableList.aspx	Client, lobbyist	Client names only

State	Abbr	Website	Data Structure	Expenditure Availability
Tennessee	TN	https://apps.tn.gov/ ilobbysearch-app/search.htm	Client, lobbyist	Partial expenditures
Texas	TX	https://www.ethics.state. tx.us/	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Utah	UT	http://lobbyist.utah.gov/ Search/AdvancedSearch	Client	Client names only
Vermont	VT	https://www.sec.state.vt. us/elections/lobbying/	Client, lobbyist	Partial expenditures
Virginia	VA	https://solutions.virginia. gov/Lobbyist/Reports/ Database	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Washington	WA	https://www.pdc.wa.gov/ browse/more-ways-to- follow-the-money/lobbying/ agents?category=Lobbying	Client, lobbyist, firm	All expenditures
West Virginia	WV	http://www.ethics.wv. gov/lobbyist/Pages/ ListsandForms.aspx	Client, lobbyist	Client names only
Wisconsin	WI	https://lobbying.wi.gov/ Who/Principals/2015REG/ SearchNames	Client, lobbyist	All expenditures
Wyoming	WY	https://lobbyist.wyo.gov/ Lobbyist/Default.aspx	Client, lobbyist	Client names only

Table A2: City Lobbying Rates and Expenditures by State

State	# Cities (Pop. > 20,000)	# Lobbying Cities	Min. Exp.	Median Exp.	Mean Exp.	Max Exp.
Alabama	16	9				
Alaska	3	1	40,720	44,192	44,301	48,099
Arizona	20	16	1,366	74,548	118,885	395,736
Arkansas	13	4				
California	242	78	2,000	45,065	82,620	3,579,279
Colorado	19	13	1,788	27,648	35,957	200,360
Connecticut	18	8	2,100	55,000	64,340	231,000
Delaware	3	2				
Florida	75	67	5,000	60,000	67,337	960,000
Georgia	21	8	1,367	1,546	1,954	3,360
Idaho	9	5	1,281	1,463	1,436	1,599
Illinois	79	20	2,724	3,367	3,456	4,366
Indiana	32	18	1,656	24,108	57,722	648,800
Iowa	20	10	6,500	33,574	66,184	758,731
Kansas	16	9				
Kentucky	10	2	2,100	6,253	6,252	10,405
Louisiana	12	6				
Maine	3	3	4,333	9,160	12,207	42,243
Maryland	7	4				
Massachusetts	38	2	16,012	17,706	17,706	19,400
Michigan	45	19	1,045	11,979	17,829	115,346
Minnesota	33	16				
Mississippi	11	5	18,025	24,055	29,026	60,000
Missouri	25	19				
Montana	6	4	2,326	23,260	22,818	41,682
Nebraska	6	4	15,215	59,786	64,132	110,610
Nevada	6	6				
New Hampshire	5	4				
New Jersey	32	9	304,000	440,000	440,000	576,000
New Mexico	10	7				
New York	33	10	7,200	42,000	97,989	630,000
North Carolina	23	17	1,622	25,436	35,629	126,686
North Dakota	4	2				
Ohio	56	20				
Oklahoma	14	4				
Oregon	16	10	1,587	54,660	83,102	348,049
Pennsylvania	20	4	199,992	225,000	254,164	337,500
Rhode Island	7	3				
South Carolina	14	6	3,000	24,000	29,357	50,050
South Dakota	2	2				
Tennessee	18	9	47,500	47,500	47,500	47,500
Texas	93	70	5,000	60,000	115,375	1,130,000
Utah	20	3				
Vermont	1	1				
Virginia	18	14	1,617	30,100	49,604	317,802
Washington	36	33	2,000	35,065	37,751	120,000
West Virginia	5	0				
Wisconsin	26	3	59,965	98,737	142,008	334,725
Wyoming	3	3				

2 What Do Cities Want When They Hire Lobbyists?

Cities are generally quite transparent with their lobbying aims, and open meeting laws often require cities to publicly post correspondence related to their lobbying activity (Fernandes 2009). Figure A1 provides an excerpt from a memo outlining the reasons why the city of Palo Alto opted to hire a state lobbyist in 2013.

Figure A1: Palo Alto City Council Meeting Memo.



City of Palo Alto City Council Staff Report

From: City Manager

Lead Department: City Manager

Recommendation

1. Approve a recommendation from the Policy & Services Committee to hire a state lobbyist.
2. Approve the staff recommendation to issue a request for proposals (scope attached) for state legislative advocacy services and return to the Policy & Services Committee for direction on final contract scope of services.
 1. Protect local revenue sources and prevent unfunded mandates.
 2. Protect and increase local government discretion, balancing that with City values and priorities.
 3. Ensure that legislation, policies and budgets retain or increase, but generally don't decrease, the amount of local discretion held by the City and protect local decision making.
 4. Oppose legislation, policies and budgets that reduce the authority and/or ability of local government to determine how best to effectively operate local programs, services and activities. The City retains the right to exceed State goals, standards or targets.
 5. Protect and increase funding for specific programs and services.
 6. Proactively advocate on behalf of the City.
 7. Identify key legislative areas to monitor annually. Take a proactive role in working with Federal and State legislators to draft and sponsor legislation around key City priorities.

Source: <https://www.cityofpaloalto.org/civicax/filebank/documents/35524>

Unfortunately, while individual cities are often forthcoming about their lobbying goals, it becomes difficult to systematically quantify what cities are actually doing using the state disclosure data. Most states do not require lobbyist clients to detail their activity beyond vague terms. A typical, example is Massachusetts, where the City of Everett enumerated its lobbyist efforts in the following way: “We have retained the services of this lobbyist for to assist in our pursuit of Federal and State grants and funding programs and transportation projects.”

However, a few states do require cities (and other lobbying clients) to report their lobbying activity in more detail, including the names of bills lobbied. These include New York, California, Montana, Iowa, Colorado, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. To further probe what cities are hoping to accomplish when they hire lobbyists, I examined the universe of 1,361 lobby disclosure reports filed by cities in California during the 2015-16 legislative session. The data reveal two main patterns. First, the vast majority of municipal lobbying targets the legislature rather than the executive branch or state agencies. 894 reports mention specific house or senate legislation (65%), and 410 mention specific legislators or the legislative branch. In contrast, only 55 filings mention the executive branch or state agencies, and a mere 16 mention grants. The two pieces of legislation that cities were by far the most likely to lobby were the State Budget Act of 2015 and State Budget Act of 2016. Cities also enumerated 956 individual bills that they lobbied during this session. Most of these bills originated in either the Appropriations Committee (30%), the Budget and Fiscal Review Committee (10%), or the Local Government Committee (10%).

I assume that there are a variety of possible channels through which local government lobbying might increase the responsiveness of district representatives. Qualitative work on intergovernmental advocacy indicates that local officials primarily engage in informational lobbying aimed at informing state legislators about local needs and priorities (e.g. Berman 2003; Zimmerman 2012). Such lobbying might also subsidize the workload of legislators (Hall and Deardorff 2006), making it easier for them to pursue actions that benefit the

local governments in their district. More recent political economy work on the value of connections also suggests that lobbyists sometimes serve a gate-keeping role, exploiting the fact that they enjoy access to certain politicians due to personal or financial connections (e.g. Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen 2012; Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014). Future work in this area should focus on disentangling the mechanism that leads city leaders to believe that paid lobbying can help compensate for vertical representation.

3 Descriptive Information About City Lobbying

Before implementing the difference-in-differences design, I begin by establishing some general correlations between city characteristics and lobbying activity across cities. Table A4 shows the predicted probability of lobbying across several covariates for every city in the sample. These covariates were selected from a battery of financial and demographic variables due to their predictive power, and I later use these them as controls in the fixed effects models. These variables include measures of city population, median income, local own source revenue, racial diversity, and median house value. Descriptive statistics for all of these variables can be found in Table A3.

Consistent with other findings from the interest group literature, there is a strong correlation between city size and the decision to lobby. Each time the size of a city's population doubles, the probability of lobbying increases by about 13 percentage points—holding other city characteristics fixed. In fact, 63% of the 100 most populous cities reported hiring lobbyists in every year between 2006 and 2014. After accounting for size, city property values and municipal own-source revenue are also important correlates of lobbying, indicating that cities with more resources are more likely to spend money on lobbyist representation.

Table A3: Municipal Descriptive Statistics, 2006-2014

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Lobby State Government					
All Cities	10,617	0.40	0.49	0	1
Never Lobby	4,668	0.00	0.00	0	0
Sometimes Lobby	5,949	0.72	0.45	0	1
# of State Lower Representatives					
All Cities	11,187	2.86	3.46	1	67
Never Lobby	4,950	2.30	1.86	1	18
Sometimes Lobby	6,237	3.30	4.27	1	67
Population					
All Cities	11,195	105,530	303,967	17,432	8,491,079
Never Lobby	4,958	55,507	54,346	17,432	668,347
Sometimes Lobby	6,237	145,296	399,921	22,224	8,491,079
Median Income					
All Cities	11,193	55,593	20,800	19,161	187,656
Never Lobby	4,956	56,345	22,015	19,592	187,656
Sometimes Lobby	6,237	54,996.09	19,762.58	19,161	169,579
Own Source Revenue (Log)					
All Cities	9,366	18.53	1.05	15.54	25.09
Never Lobby	4,108	18.11	0.80	15.59	22.02
Sometimes Lobby	5,258	18.85	1.11	15.54	25.09
% White					
All Cities	11,193	0.71	0.18	0.01	0.97
Never Lobby	4,956	0.73	0.18	0.03	0.97
Sometimes Lobby	6,237	0.68	0.18	0.01	0.97
Median House Value					
All Cities	11,193	251,314	178,888	37,100	2,000,000
Never Lobby	4,956	239,064	170,474	37,100	2,000,000
Sometimes Lobby	6,237	261,047.90	184,737.30	44,900	1,862,200
Democratic Vote 2008					
All Cities	9,972	0.59	0.15	0.22	0.99
Never Lobby	4,095	0.58	0.15	0.22	0.98
Sometimes Lobby	5,877	0.59	0.15	0.23	0.99

Table A4: Correlates of City Lobbying State Government, 2006-2014.

	Probability of Lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
Population (Log)	0.137* (0.012)	0.134* (0.012)
Median Income (Log)	1.666* (0.701)	1.660* (0.710)
Median Income Squared (Log)	-0.080* (0.032)	-0.080* (0.033)
Own Source Revenue (Log)	0.058* (0.009)	0.058* (0.009)
% White	-0.190* (0.031)	-0.192* (0.031)
Median House Value (Log)	0.051* (0.018)	0.056* (0.019)
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.42	0.42
State FEs	✓	
Year FEs	✓	
State-Year FEs		✓
Observations	8,919	8,919
# Cities	1,244	1,244

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

4 Robustness Checks: Difference-in-Differences Design

Table A5: Effect of Partisan Mismatch on City Lobbying: Different Mismatch Thresholds. For cities with multiple state legislators, the main results define a mismatch as occurring when more than 50% of the state legislators come from the opposite party. The results are robust to using higher thresholds.

	Probability of Lobbying			
	50%	60%	80%	100%
Partisan Mismatch	0.055* (0.016)	0.057* (0.017)	0.048* (0.021)	0.048* (0.021)
Population (Log)	0.260* (0.118)	0.256* (0.118)	0.268* (0.118)	0.269* (0.118)
City FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Full Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	7,850	7,883	8,053	8,084
# Cities	1,135	1,144	1,169	1,172
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.45	0.45	0.44	0.44

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Table A6: Effect of Partisan Mismatch on City Lobbying: City Median Specification. Binning cities into medians rather than terciles to define a partisan mismatch produces similar estimates to the tercile specifications.

	Probability of Lobbying		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Mismatch	0.037* (0.014)	0.041* (0.016)	0.055* (0.017)
Population (Log)	0.250* (0.106)	0.236* (0.115)	0.260* (0.126)
City FEs	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓		
State-Year FEs		✓	✓
Full Controls			✓
Observations	9,535	9,535	7,850
# Cities	1,135	1,135	1,135
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.43	0.43	0.45

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Table A7: Effect of Partisan Mismatch on City Lobbying Expenditures. Becoming mismatched leads to an increase in lobbying expenditures of approximately 9% - 16%.

	Lobbying Expenditures (Log)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Mismatch	0.089 (0.110)	0.086 (0.109)	0.163 (0.140)
Population (Log)		-0.461 (0.655)	-1.424 (0.955)
City FEs	✓	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓
Full Controls			✓
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,082
# Cities	295	295	282
Mean Expenditures (Log)	10.6	10.6	10.62

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Table A8: Effect of Partisan Mismatch on Republican and Democratic Cities.
 When an election leads to a partisan mismatch between a city’s residents and the party of their state representative, the probability of lobbying increases at a similar rate for both Republican and Democratic cities.

	Probability of Lobbying		
	(All Cities)	(Democratic)	(Republican)
Partisan Mismatch	0.070* (0.026)	0.066* (0.033)	0.072 (0.040)
Population (Log)	0.318* (0.157)	0.479* (0.205)	0.259 (0.229)
City FEs	✓	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓
Full Controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	5,192	2,563	2,629
# Cities	738	369	369
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.46	0.49	0.44

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Table A9: Effect of Partisan Mismatch on City Lobbying (Excluding Largest Cities). The effects of a partisan mismatch are even larger when restricting the sample to cities with a population below 100,000.

	Probability of Lobbying		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Mismatch	0.053* (0.025)	0.063* (0.029)	0.081* (0.032)
Population (Log)	0.331 (0.171)	0.399* (0.196)	0.453* (0.201)
City FEs	✓	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓
Full Controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	4,938	4,938	3,858
# Cities	590	590	590
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.37	0.37	0.36

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Table A10: Effect of Partisan Mismatch on City Lobbying (Excluding California, Washington, and Texas). While a large number of cities lobby in the states of CA, WA, and TX, the results are robust to dropping these states from the analysis.

	Probability of Lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Mismatch	0.070* (0.026)	0.070* (0.026)
Population (Log)	0.318* (0.157)	0.579* (0.194)
City FEs	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓
Full Controls	✓	✓
Observations	5,192	3,663
# Cities	738	468
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.46	0.39

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Table A11: Effect of Partisan Mismatch on City Lobbying: Leads and Lags.
 There is some indication that cities that become mismatched were also more likely to lobby before that election. However, there doesn't appear to be a trend to this behavior.

	Probability of Lobbying			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mismatch, t+2			0.034 (0.023)	0.046 (0.026)
Mismatch, t+1		0.049* (0.021)	0.025 (0.016)	0.026 (0.016)
Mismatch	0.070* (0.024)	0.047* (0.020)	0.036 (0.020)	0.041* (0.020)
Mismatch, t-1				-0.006 (0.024)
City FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	5,192	5,192	4,653	4,374
# Cities	738	738	738	738
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

Figure A2: Parallel Trends. When a city elects a statehouse delegation with members from the opposite political party, they become more likely to lobby.




Table A12: Effect of Representative Ideology on City Lobbying. Cities are especially likely to lobby when they are represented by a house member with a relatively extreme opposing ideology. Omitted category is Most Liberal.

	Probability of Lobbying	
	Liberal Cities	Conservative Cities
	(1)	(2)
Liberal Rep.	0.033 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.064)
Moderate Rep.	0.050 (0.043)	-0.051 (0.066)
Conservative Rep.	0.067 (0.049)	-0.087 (0.066)
Most Conservative Rep.	0.131 (0.075)	-0.116 (0.070)
City FEs	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓
Observations	2,617	2,845
# Cities	376	408
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.5	0.36

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

5 Robustness Checks: RDD

Table A13: Number of Elections Within Margin of Victory Bandwidths. There are a good number of elections falling close to the treatment threshold in the RDD analysis.

Margin of Victory	N
+/-2	61
+/-5	166
+/-10	319
+/-20	595

Table A14: RDD Results: Tercile Specification. Effect of narrowly electing either a copartisan or non-copartisan state representative on the probability of lobbying. Results are even larger when cities are defined as being Democratic or Republican based on their tercile distributions (rather than medians).

	Probability of Lobbying					
	Simple RDD			Covariate Adjusted		
Mismatched Candidate Wins	0.19 (0.12)	0.24 (0.14)	0.29 (0.16)	0.25 (0.12)	0.32 (0.15)	0.37 (0.16)
N	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414
RDD Bandwidth	12.77	20.84	29.34	13.44	19.62	27.49
Polynomial	1	2	3	1	2	3


Triangular kernels. Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) MSERD optimal bandwidths with robust standard errors clustered by city. Adjusted models include log population as a covariate.

Table A15: RDD Results: Lagged DV. Effect of narrowly electing either a copartisan or non-copartisan state representative on the probability of lobbying in the year before the election. Estimates are smaller and noisier than main results.


	Probability of Lobbying					
	Simple RDD			Covariate Adjusted		
Mismatched Candidate Wins	0.063 (0.085)	0.073 (0.110)	0.066 (0.122)	0.076 (0.075)	0.090 (0.108)	0.079 (0.117)
N	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414
RDD Bandwidth	21.365	27.748	39.983	24.903	26.501	39.751
Polynomial	1	2	3	1	2	3

Triangular kernels. Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) MSERD optimal bandwidths with robust standard errors clustered by city. Adjusted models include log population as a covariate.


Figure A3: RDD Balance Checks. Cities that elect either aligned or mismatched state legislators have similar observable characteristics around the cutpoint.




Margin of Victory for Unaligned Candidate



Margin of Victory for Unaligned Candidate



Margin of Victory for Unaligned Candidate



Margin of Victory for Unaligned Candidate

6 Additional Results

Table A16: Effect of Individual Representative vs. Chamber Mismatch on City Lobbying.

	Probability of Lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
District Mismatch	0.069* (0.024)	0.070* (0.024)
Chamber Mismatch	0.014 (0.025)	
Governor Mismatch		0.002 (0.021)
City FEs	✓	✓
State-Year FEs	✓	✓
Full Controls	✓	✓
Observations	5,156	5,192
# Cities	734	738
Mean Lobbying Probability	0.47	0.46

Robust standard errors clustered by city. *p<0.05

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