

Online Appendix to
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Note: *Democratization Synopses* and Excel workbook showing construction of tables and figures available at: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/PYRVKV>.

Table A1: Cases of Democratization

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Democratization concept</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Democratization concept</i>
Albania	1990-92	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6	Kyrgyzstan	2010-11	P MDT MDT6
Albania	1997	BMR L4 L5 L6	Latvia	1920	L4 L5 L6 V V+
Algeria	1989	P	Latvia	1993	BMR
Antigua and Barbuda	2004	BMR L4 L5 L6	Lebanon	1951-2	L4 L5 L6
Argentina	1912	BMR L4 L5	Lebanon	1971 ¹	BMR
Argentina	1939 ^a	P MDT	Lesotho	1993	P MDT MDT6
Argentina	1946	L4 L5 V	Lesotho	2002	BMR L4 L5 L6
Argentina	1955-8	P BMR L4 L5 L6 V	Liberia	2006	BMR L4 L5 L6 V V+
Argentina	1963	BMR L4 L5 L6	Libya	2012	L4 L5 L6 V
Argentina	1973	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V	Lithuania	1920	L4 L5 L6 V V+
Argentina	1983	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Lithuania	1992	BMR L4 L5 L6
Armenia	1998	P MDT	Luxembourg	1919	L5 L6 V V+
Austria	1918-20	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Madagascar	1991-3	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V
Austria	1940-46 ^b	P BMR MDT MDT6	Madagascar	2013	L4 L5 L6
Bangladesh	1986	L4 L5 L6	Malawi	1993-4	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Bangladesh	1991	P BMR MDT MDT6	Maldives	2009	BMR L4 L5 L6
Bangladesh	2008-9	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6	Maldives	2013	L4 L5 L6
Belarus	1994	L4 L5 L6	Mali	1991-2	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Belgium	1848-53 ^c	P MDT MDT6	Mali	2013	L4 L5 L6
Belgium	1894	BMR L5	Mauritania	2005-7	P MDT
Benin	1990-91	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Mexico	1997-2000 ^j	BMR L4 L5 L6
Bhutan	2008	P MDT L4 L5 L6 V	Moldova	1994	L4 L5 L6
Bolivia	1880	P MDT	Mongolia	1990-92	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Bolivia	1931	L4	Mozambique	1994	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6
Bolivia	1956	L4 L5 L6	Myanmar	1960	BMR L4 L5 L6
Bolivia	1979	BMR L4 L5 L6	Myanmar	2015	L4 L5 L6
Bolivia	1982	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Nepal	1957-9	P MDT
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1996-9	V, V+	Nepal	1981	P
Brazil	1945-6	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 V	Nepal	1990-91	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6
Brazil	1979-85	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Nepal	2006-8	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V
Bulgaria	1918-19	P MDT L4 L5	Netherlands	1848	L4
Bulgaria	1931	L4 L5	Netherlands	1897	BMR
Bulgaria	1990	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Netherlands	1917-18	P MDT MDT6 L5
Burkina Faso	1977-8	P MDT	Nicaragua	1929	L4 L5
Burkina Faso	1991-4	V	Nicaragua	1984	BMR L4 L5 L6
Burkina Faso	2015	P MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Nicaragua	1990	P MDT MDT6
Burundi	2005	BMR L4 L5 L6	Niger	1991-3	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6
Cambodia	1998	P MDT	Niger	1999	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6
Cape Verde	1990-91	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Niger	2010-11	P MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
CAR	1993	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6	Nigeria	1978-9	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6
Chile	1894	L4	Nigeria	1999	P MDT V
Chile	1932-4	BMR L4	Nigeria	2011	L4 L5 L6
Chile	1970	L5 L6	Norway	1898	P MDT MDT6
Chile	1989-90	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Pakistan	1962	P MDT
China	1911-12	P MDT	Pakistan	1972-3	BMR L4 L5 L6
Colombia	1867-8	P MDT MDT6 L4 L5	Pakistan	1988	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6
Colombia	1936-7 ^d	P BMR MDT	Pakistan	2007-8	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6
Colombia	1957-8	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Panama	1932	L4 L5
Comoros	1990	P MDT	Panama	1956	L4 L5 L6
Comoros	1996	L4 L5 L6	Panama	1989-91	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Comoros	2000-06	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Paraguay	1869-70	P
Congo, Rep.	1991-2	P MDT V	Paraguay	1937	P MDT
Costa Rica	1890	L4	Paraguay	1989	P MDT L4 L5 L6 V
Costa Rica	1894	L4	Peru	1824-8	P MDT
Costa Rica	1919	L4	Peru	1912	L4
Costa Rica	1949	BMR L4 L5 L6 V V+	Peru	1915	L4
Croatia	1999-2000	P BMR MDT MDT6	Peru	1930-3	P MDT L4
Cuba	1940	BMR L4 L5 L6	Peru	1939	L4
Czechoslovakia	1920	L4 L5 L6 V V+	Peru	1956	P BMR MDT L4
Czechoslovakia	1989-90	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Peru	1963	P BMR MDT L4
Denmark	1849	P MDT	Peru	1978-80	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Denmark	1901	BMR L4	Peru	2001	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Denmark	1915	L5 L6	Philippines	1944-46	BMR
Dom. Rep.	1961-2	P MDT MDT6	Philippines	1986-7	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Dom. Rep.	1978	P MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Poland	1919	L4 L5 L6 V V+
Dom. Rep.	1996	L4 L5 L6	Poland	1989-91	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+

Ecuador	1934	L4	Portugal	1908-11	P BMR MDT MDT6
Ecuador	1944	L4	Portugal	1974-6	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Ecuador	1948	BMR L4	Romania	1919	L4 L5
Ecuador	1968	P MDT L4	Romania	1928	L4 L5
Ecuador	1979	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Romania	1989-92	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6 V V+
Ecuador	2003	BMR	Russia	1991-93	BMR L4 L5 L6 V
Egypt	1934-5	P MDT	Samoa	1990	L4 L5 L6
El Salvador	1930	L4 L5	Sao Tome & Principe	1991	BMR L4 L5 L6 V V+
El Salvador	1979-84	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Senegal	2000	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6
Estonia	1919	L4 L5 L6 V V+	Serbia	1838 ^k	P MDT
Estonia	1992-5	V, V+	Serbia	1860-1	P
Fiji	1990-93	P MDT L4 L5 L6 V V+	Serbia	1903	P MDT
Fiji	2001	L4 L5 L6 V V+	Serbia	1920	L4 L5
Fiji	2014	P MDT L4 L5 L6	Seychelles	1993	L4 L5 L6
Finland	1919	L4 L5 L6	Sierra Leone	1968	P MDT
Finland	1944	P MDT MDT6	Sierra Leone	1996	P MDT
France	1848-51	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5	Sierra Leone	2001-2	BMR L4 L5 L6 V
France	1870-77	BMR L4 L5	South Africa	1994	BMR L5 L6 V V+
France	1944-46	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	South Korea	1960	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6
Gambia	1970-72 ^e	BMR L4 L5 L6	South Korea	1963	P MDT
Georgia	2004	BMR L4 L5 L6	South Korea	1987-8	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Georgia	2012	L4 L5 L6	Spain	1930-31	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V
Germany	1919	BMR L4 L5 L6 V V+	Spain	1975-8	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Germany, West	1947-9	P BMR V V+	Sri Lanka	1989-91	BMR L4 L5 L6
Ghana	1969-70	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6	Sri Lanka	2015	L4 L5 L6
Ghana	1978-9	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Sudan	1964-5	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6
Ghana	1991-7	P BMR L4 L5 L6 V	Sudan	1985-6	P BMR MDT MDT6
Greece	1862-4	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5	Suriname	1988	BMR L4 L5 L6 V V+
Greece	1926	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5	Suriname	1991	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6
Greece	1941-6	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5	Sweden	1911 ^l	BMR
Greece	1974-5	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	Sweden	1917-19	L4 L5 L6
Grenada	1984	BMR L4 L5 L6	Switzerland	1848	L4 V V+
Guatemala	1879	P MDT	Syria	1950	P MDT
Guatemala	1921	P MDT	Syria	1954	P MDT MDT6
Guatemala	1944-5	P BMR MDT L4 V	Taiwan	1986-7	P
Guatemala	1958	BMR	Taiwan	199216	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Guatemala	1966	P BMR MDT	Thailand	1969	P MDT
Guatemala	1984-6	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6	Thailand	1973-5	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6
Guinea-Bissau	1994	P BMR MDT L4 L5 L6	Thailand	1977-8	P MDT
Guinea-Bissau	2000	L4 L5 L6	Thailand	1983	BMR L4 L5 L6
Guinea-Bissau	2005	P MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Thailand	1992	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6
Guinea-Bissau	2014	L4 L5 L6	Thailand	2007-8	P MDT
Guyana	1992	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Thailand	2011	L4 L5 L6
Haiti	1986-90	P MDT MDT6	Tonga	2010	L4 L5 L6
Haiti	1994	P MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Tunisia	2011-14	P MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Haiti	2004-6	P MDT L4 L5 L6	Turkey	1876	P
Honduras	1852	L4	Turkey	1908-9	P
Honduras	1894	P MDT	Turkey	1946	P MDT MDT6
Honduras	1929	L4 L5	Turkey	1961	BMR L4 L5 L6
Honduras	1957	BMR L4 L5 L6	Turkey	1973	P MDT MDT6
Honduras	1971	BMR L4 L5 L6	Turkey	1983	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V
Honduras	1980-2	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6	Uganda	1980	P BMR MDT
Honduras	2010-13	BMR L4 L5 L6	Ukraine	1994	L4 L5 L6
Hungary	1920	P	UK	1832	L4
Hungary	1988-90	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	UK	1885	BMR
Indonesia	1946-55 ^f	P BMR MDT V	UK	1918	L5
Indonesia	1998-9	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	United States	1965	L5 L6
Iran	1941	P	Uruguay	1903	L4
Iran	1997	P MDT	Uruguay	1918-19	BMR L5
Ireland	1922-23	BMR L6 V V+	Uruguay	1938-42	BMR L4 L5 L6 V V+
Italy	1913-19 ^g	BMR L4 L5	Uruguay	1985	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Italy	1943-8	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+	USSR	1988-90	P
Ivory Coast	1999-2000	P MDT	Venezuela	1946	L4 L5 L6
Ivory Coast	2011	L4 L5 L6	Venezuela	1957-9	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Japan	1918	L4	Yemen, North	1967-71 ^m	P MDT
Japan	1925	L5	Yugoslavia	2000	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6 V V+
Japan	1952	BMR V V+	Zambia	1991	P MDT L4 L5 L6 V
Jordan	1951-2 ^h	P			
Kenya	2002	P BMR MDT MDT6 L4 L5 L6			

Kenya	2013	L4 L5 L6
Kyrgyzstan	2005-6	P MDT

Sources: Polity IV; Boix, Miller, Rosato (2013), Skaaning et al. (2015), VDEM.

Notes: P: Increase of 6 or more points on Polity2 scale within 3 years; BMR: Movement from “Non-democracy” to “Democracy” (Boix, Miller, Rosato 2013); MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” (Rise of at least 6 points on Polity2 within three years and move from [-10, 0] to (0, 10] or from (0, 6) to [6,10]); MDT6: Rise of at least 6 points on Polity2 within three years and move from [-10, 6) to [6, 10]; L4: Increase from < 4 to ≥ 4 on Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy; L5: Increase from < 5 to ≥ 5 on Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy; V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75).

Dating of episodes is approximate, based on the indicators and an examination of the history.

^a Polity says 1937, but I adjust to 1939 to coincide with Ortiz reforms.

^b Interpolating through the wartime interregnum, the year of “democratization” comes out as 1940. Based on the history of the case, 1946, the first year after “interregnum,” is more appropriate.

^c Polity date is 1853; Polity III notes say “1853 is an arbitrary date.” I was unable to find any act of democratization in 1853. In a comprehensive chronology of political events during 1846-78 (Witte et al. 2005, part 2, pp.199-200), 1853 has no entry. Major reforms were made in 1848, so I treat it as the year of change.

^d Polity says 1930 is “an arbitrary date.” I change to 1936, year of López Pumarejo’s 1936 constitutional reform, which granted voting and citizen rights to all male citizens over 21, regardless of literacy or income. BMR records democratization in 1937. Note that considerable electoral fraud throughout this period.

^e Apparently BMR code democracy as beginning in 1972 because this was the date of the first national election after the head of state changed from Governor General on behalf of Queen Elizabeth to president indirectly elected by parliament. But the referendum on republic status and the change of head of state occurred in 1970. And independence was granted in 1965, when executive power passed to a prime minister, who won a parliamentary majority in election of 1966. 1970 seems more appropriate.

^f BMR date this at 1955.

^g Dating controversial. In 1912, reforms under Giolitti established almost universal male suffrage. This increased the electorate from 3 to 8.5 million, leaving disenfranchised “only about half a million adult males” (Larcinese 2011, p.2). However, some scholars consider 1913 election too corrupt to be considered democratic, while 1919 election was less corrupt. BMR use 1919 as date.

^h Polity calls 1951-2 an “arbitrary date,” but it actually makes some sense.

ⁱ Perhaps should be 1970, when the legalization of parties occurred.

^j BMR go by date of election in which their conditions first met, 2000, but changes that produced this outcome came in 1996-7.

^k Dating complicated. In 1835, there was a move towards more democratic government, quickly reversed. In 1838, there was an increase in checks on the executive—a move from absolute monarchy to oligarchy. In the early 1840s, principle of local election of prince was established. In general, the dates for Serbia are quite arbitrary: one could justify a different set of turning points.

^l The reform occurred in 1907-9; in 1911 was the first election under broader franchise.

^m Polity has 1962; but this is largely due to change from hereditary monarchy to military regime, which it grades higher. No evidence of democratization in 1962. “The new regime, led by Brig.-Gen. Abdullah al-Sallal, was a republic in name only. Dominated by the military and faced with a royalist uprising in the northeastern part of the country, the regime did not initially provide for a legislature that might restrict the powers of the executive” (Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg 1999, p.203). However, significant reforms occurred in 1967-71.

Notes on excluded cases

Country	Year	BMR cases
<i>BMR's measure turns positive when democratic countries acquire full sovereignty, even if institutions are otherwise unchanged. Three such cases excluded.</i>		
Cuba	1909	Return to sovereignty after withdrawal of US troops.
Pakistan	1950	Coding apparently based on establishment of sovereignty, not democratization.
Luxembourg	1890	No democratization. Just change of royal dynasty from the House of Orange-Nassau to the House of Nassau-Weilburg, ending the "personal union" with the Netherlands and thus firmly establishing the Duchy's independence.
<i>BMR's definition includes requirement that 50 percent of males have vote; when literacy requirement for voting exists, countries can pass this threshold due to literacy increase (without any political reform). One case excluded.</i>		
Chile	1909	No political reform—just demographic change. “For example, in Chile, where being literate was a necessary requirement to vote until the mid-20th century, it was only by 1909-10 that a majority of adult males were recorded as being literate. Accordingly, we code Chile as fulfilling condition (3) at that point in time” (Boix, Miller, Rosato 2013).
<i>Reason for coding as a significant increase in democracy unclear, so excluded</i>		
Panama	1950 & 1952	<p>Does not appear to have been any democratization in these years. Politics remained dominated by the caudillo José Antonio Rémon.</p> <p>“[T]he immediate postwar period saw a temporary shift in the locus of power from the civilian aristocracy to the National Police under Commander José Antonio Rémon. Between 1948 and 1952 he installed and removed presidents with unencumbered ease. Among his behind-the-scenes manipulations were the denial to Arnulfo Arias of the presidency he apparently had won in 1948, the installation of Arias in the presidency in 1949, and the engineering of his removal in 1951. Meanwhile, Remón increased salaries and fringe benefits for his men and modernized training methods and equipment; in effect, he transformed the National Police from a police into a paramilitary force. In the spheres of security and public order, he achieved a long sought goal by transforming the National Police into the National Guard and introduced greater militarization into the country's only armed force” (Nyrop 1980, p.33).</p> <p>“In July of 1948, the commandant's support for yet another scandalous vote swindle prepared the way for Domingo Díaz Arosemena's assumption of the presidency, to the detriment of Arnulfo Arias. Following President Díaz's death the next year, his successor Daniel Chanis requested Remón's resignation based on the latter's graft-related activities... Remón responded by overthrowing Dr. Chanis and handing over power to Second Vice-President Roberto Chiari (who, incidentally, was a first cousin to the police chief). But when the Supreme Court (remarkably) sustained Daniel Chanis' right to the presidency, Acting President Chiari notified the commandant that he would honor the ruling” (Mann 1996, p.68). A protest strike “paralyzed urban life” (Mann 1996, p.68). “Seeking a way out of the crisis, Remón opportunistically fetched Arnulfo Arias and installed him in the presidency... This action was justified with a recount of the ballots cast in 1948. It turned out that the <i>caudillo</i> had in effect won the election, but Domingo Díaz had ‘mistakenly’ been declared victor” (Mann 1996, p.68).</p> <p>“By 1951 President Arias had once more antagonized substantial segments of the population, not least because he decreed the replacement of the 1946 Constitution with his 1941 charter. On 8 May a large crowd demanded that the police chief remove the president. Remón hesitated until the National Assembly impeached Arias and elevated Vice-President Alcibíades Arosemena to the presidency, in a move sustained by the Supreme Court.” After a gun battle with Arias' supporters, Arias was deposed (Mann 1996, pp.68-9).</p> <p>“The strongest opposition to Remón's 1952 election bid came from Harmodio Arias and the students, while the police provided his most valuable support. Remón was unpopular because of his repression of students and torture of prisoners since becoming police chief in 1947.... He was connected through family or business with about a quarter of Panama's elite” (Conniff 1990, p.628). After his election in 1952, “Remón reduced his possible future opposition by instituting a law, called the <i>Ley de 45,000</i>, which required that particular number of registered followers before a party would be officially recognized. This left Remón with only the weakened <i>Partido Liberal</i> to oppose him, leaving essentially a one-party, military-based, or, at least, military-led, system in place” (Harding 2001, pp.38-9).</p>

		<p>“Remón followed national tradition by enriching himself through political office. He broke with tradition, however, by promoting social reform and economic development. His agricultural and industrial programs actually reduced, temporarily, the country’s overwhelming economic dependence on the canal and the zone” (Nyrop 1980, p.34).</p> <p>Remón required 45,000 signatures for legal recognition of parties, “prohibited strikes, outlawed radical groups, jailed Communists and imposed a ‘voluntary’ censorship on the press. At the same time, the judiciary was weakened through political appointments and intimidation. These changes created a quasi-dictatorship not unlike that of Remón’s fellow strongman Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua” (Conniff 1990, p.629) Remón was assassinated in 1955.</p>
Paraguay	2003	<p>Does not seem to have been any clear improvement in the quality of the 2003 election or other evidence of democratization that year. See, for instance, Abente-Brun: “for the last century [Paraguay] has had a largely noncompetitive two-party system dominated alternatively by the Colorado Party (1887–1904 and 1947–2008) and the PLRA (1904–40), with two brief military interludes in 1936–37 and 1940–47. The Colorado Party ruled as a civilian hegemonic party between 1947 and 1954, then evolved into a military-civilian authoritarian regime under General Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89), and after a coup in 1989 transitioned back to a civilian hegemonic party for the next nineteen years until its defeat in 2008. Hence, civilian and military presidents came and went, and authoritarian, transitional, and democratic regimes alternated, but the Colorado Party always remained on top” (Abente-Brun 2009, p.144). Or Nickson, who doesn’t distinguish 2003 from previous elections: “Previous ‘democratic’ elections [were] held in 1989, 1993, 1998, and 2003. Although they were multiparty elections, accusations of vote-buying and vote-rigging continued” (Nickson 2009, p.145).</p> <p>Perhaps one could make a case that the 2008 election—in which the Colorado Party lost for the first time—was a major political liberalization; see Nickson (2008): “The victory of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay’s presidential election on 20 April 2008 marks an unforgettable turning-point to rank with any in the country’s tortured history.... the real triumph and joy belongs “inside”, in the dignified achievement of a fair election and the prospect of a peaceful transition of power in an environment where effective one-party rule has unbalanced the institutional and political culture for so long.... The good news is that Paraguay is finally embarking on a genuine democratic process, one that had been postponed for nearly twenty years since the Stroessner dictatorship ended in 1989” (Nickson 2008). But nothing comparable in 2003.</p>
Zambia	2006-2008	<p><i>The rationale for coding Zambia as significantly more democratic in 2006 or 2008 is presumably that the elections held in those years were perceived to be somewhat fairer than the previous one in 2001. According to Larmer and Fraser (2007, p.620), for instance:</i></p> <p>The 2006 elections marked a high water mark for the expression of democratic opinion in Zambia. A new electoral roll significantly increased the number of registered voters to 3,941,229. There was also a particularly high turnout of 71 percent. This reflected a continued steady increase in voter registration and turnout seen since democratization. Data from 1991 are unreliable. However, using as a baseline the earliest set of reliable data, in 1996, the voters’ roll increased from 2.2 million then to 3.9 million in 2006, with the total number of votes cast more than doubling over the same period. The percentage of registered voters that turned out also increased from 58 to 71 percent. Secondly, whilst the 1996 and 2001 elections were marked by significant rigging, much of it organized from State House, the 2006 poll was widely recognized as free and fair. Although the verification process revealed some anomalies, and a few parliamentary results have since been nullified by the courts, for the first time since 1991 defeated presidential candidates did not dispute the results in the courts.</p> <p><i>There are several points here.</i></p> <p>A) <i>More voters were registered in this election than previously.</i> A total of 3,940,053 people were registered to vote in the 2006 elections; 2,604,761 voters were registered in 2001 (European Union 2006, p.14). Based on available demographic statistics, this means that the registration rate of eligible voters was <i>roughly</i> 28 percent in 2006, compared to 17 percent in 2001. (Only <i>roughly</i>, since all those 18 and older were eligible to vote, but population statistics were only available for 20 and older. From Statistics Zambia: Population aged 20 and older in 2001-2: 14.9 million. https://www.zamstats.gov.zm/index.php/publications/category/30-demography?download=747:zdhs-repot-2001-2. Population aged 20 and older in 2007: 13.9 million. https://www.zamstats.gov.zm/index.php/publications/category/30-</p>

	<p>demography?download=539:demography.) Although this is progress, it still suggests that the vast majority of citizens legally eligible to vote were not registered. The question is whether the increase from 17 to 28 percent represents a qualitative change.</p> <p>B) <i>Turnout was higher than in 2001.</i> While high turnout is desirable, it is not usually taken to be a defining characteristic of democracy—especially when it is high turnout within the small minority registered to vote.</p> <p>C) <i>“[W]hilst the 1996 and 2001 elections were marked by significant rigging, much of it organized from State House, the 2006 poll was widely recognized as free and fair.”</i> Within Zambia, the opposition certainly did not consider the 2006 election free and fair. The incumbent’s rival accused him of “stealing the election,” claiming that “400,000 votes in his strongholds” had gone missing, and his supporters rioted for several days (Wines 2006).</p> <p>With regard to international observers, one group that had been particularly critical of the 2001 election, the Carter Center, declined to observe the election at all out of “disappointment over Zambia’s failure to enact meaningful electoral and constitutional reforms” (Carter Center 2006). The EU did send observer missions to both elections. It had been critical of the 2001 election, but was more positive about the 2006 one (European Union 2006). In the monitors’ view, the 2006 elections “demonstrated improvement in comparison to the elections of 2001.” Still, its 2006 report was also critical. It did not contain the words “free and fair.” And it noted that “the counting, tabulation and transmission of results processes encountered numerous problems,” which resulted in “decline in confidence among some stakeholders during the final stages of the elections” (European Union 2006, p.1).</p> <p>Moreover, a member of the EU’s 2001 observer mission later denounced the international monitors who observed Zambia’s 2001 election for distorting the perception of that election: “There is consensus amongst election monitors and official observers that the 2001 Zambian general elections were flawed and did not express the preferences of Zambian voters. This article argues on the basis of participant observation in the EU Observer Mission that this consensus was more a socially constructed narrative than a reasoned judgement based on observation” (Van Donge 2008, p.296).</p> <p>D) <i>“[F]or the first time since 1991 defeated presidential candidates did not dispute the results in the courts.”</i> This was not because opposition leaders had no claims of fraud—on the contrary, they complained of massive fraud—but because they had given up on bringing cases to a court that they considered to be biased. “Both Mr Sata and Mr Hichilema have voiced unhappiness about the counting process, with the Patriotic Front alleging that some 400 000 ballots had gone missing. But Mr Sata’s campaign manager said yesterday that the party saw no point in pursuing the case through the courts. “There are some rural areas where there has been massive fraud (but) experience has shown that the Supreme Court fails to provide remedy in a timely manner for fixed elections,” Mr Guy Scott, the campaign manager, said in a radio interview” (Africa News 2006).</p> <p><i>After 2001, the incumbent, President Mwanawasa, had appointed a Constitutional Review Commission, which had made recommendations for changes to the constitution and electoral law. But Mwanawasa failed to act on most of these. This was one reason why the Carter Center refused to observe the 2006 election. In the view of local analysts, writing before the 2006 election:</i></p> <p>“The government’s decision not to introduce a new republican constitution and electoral reforms prior to these elections... has cast serious doubts on the integrity of the electoral process and the probable legitimacy of the outcomes... Irrespective of who wins power in Lusaka, it is painfully clear that Zambia’s democracy will, yet again, emerge as the net loser in the polls... Plunging into the 2006 polls under the old undemocratic constitutional framework dealt a fatal blow to the overall integrity of the electoral process and stoked the ire of domestic and international actors... Apparently, the shelving of the constitution is part of a grand strategy by the ruling elite to exploit divisions within the opposition to snatch a narrow victory by retaining the current simple majority system” (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2006, pp.1-2).</p> <p><i>On the 2008 election, Cheeseman and Hinfelar (2010, p.69) write:</i></p> <p>“Zambia is far from a consolidated democracy, as the stalled constitutional review process, state-dominated media, and the use of government resources to support the MMD’s election</p>
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		<p>campaign ably demonstrate. While the polls were no doubt far cleaner than the controversial election of 2001, representatives of foreign governments have admitted in private that they saw evidence of vote buying on both sides, and have grave doubts about the reliability of the results. As in previous elections, credible opinion polls suggested that Sata was set for a substantial victory, and the announcement of his defeat was met with incredulity in urban areas.”</p> <p><i>A tough call, but it is hard to see either the 2006 or 2008 elections as representing a significant jump in the democracy level in Zambia. In both, the incumbent was reelected, in a flawed and incompletely credible election. The claims of international observers that the quality improved between 2001 and 2006 have been subjected to scathing criticism by a member of the EU team. If the quality did, in fact, improve, the change was probably marginal.</i></p>	
Dominican Republic	1966	<p>No evidence of democratization. I think BMR judge this to be democratization because there was an election in 1966. But much evidence suggests this election should not be considered sufficiently free and fair.</p> <p>“The elections of 1966 took place while the country was under military occupation by U.S. Marines, an occupation that had come about precisely to prevent a victory by the Constitutionals (of Bosch) and the reinstatement of Bosch in the presidency. A former CIA officer, Ray Cline, has recounted a meeting with President Johnson in which he described Balaguer. . . Johnson’s response, he says, was, ‘Get this guy in office down there!’” (Knippers Black 1986, p.41). “[T]here were reports, generally overlooked by the major media in the United States, of irregularities at the polls: of voters being transported from one place to another, of widespread forgery of identification cards, and of commandeering and switching of ballot boxes. It was also reported that soldiers and policemen staged an impressive show of force in every sizable town on election day and that some PRD supporters spoke of feeling intimidated” (Knippers Black 1986, p.41). “The overall total of votes cast in 1966 was 25 percent higher than the total for 1962 and 87 percent higher in Santo Domingo, where Bosch’s 80 percent margin in 1962 was shaved to 63 percent. Balaguer’s margin of victory corresponded almost exactly to the increase in the overall vote, as officially reported.” The pro-Balaguer faction was “exercising a monopoly on armed force” and was backed by US Marines. “In the countryside and in lower-income districts of Santo Domingo, thousands of PRD activists were beaten and/or imprisoned during the electoral campaign, and several hundred were murdered. Many more were deported or fled into exile. Those who remained had good reason to be cautious” (Knippers Black 1986, p.42). One of Bosch’s bodyguards was killed and his son was shot, which led him to eschew active campaigning; “he had good reason to fear for his life” (Knippers Black 1986, p.42).</p>	
Cyprus	1977	<p>Not clear what happened in 1977 to explain this. Makarios, the elected president had been restored in 1974 after the coup collapsed. Nothing major changed in 1977; a vague declaration of goals by Makarios and Denktash, but no institutional reform. Then Makarios died. Election to replace him held only in early 1978. The restoration of Makarios in 1974 was a return to the status quo ante after a short-lived coup period, not a democratization.</p>	
Solomon Islands	2006	<p>No evidence of democratization. After ethnic civil war breaks out, the prime minister invites an Australian-led military and police intervention to restore order. After the militias are disarmed, an election is held in 2006. Initially, the bargaining in parliament results in a prime minister from the same faction as before. But rioting leads parliament to reject that candidate and pick another. The 2006 election is apparently not more democratic than the 2001 election. So a case of restoration of (imperfect) democracy after civil war interlude and foreign intervention, not a move from autocracy to democracy.</p>	
Country	Years	Polity2 change	Notes
<i>Polity I notes say the given year is an “arbitrary date”</i>			
Yugoslavia	1937-9	from -9 to 2	Could find no <i>non</i> -arbitrary date around that year, so excluded.
Colombia	1930	from -5 to 5	Re-dated to 1936, when López Pumarejo’s 1936 constitutional reform granted voting and citizen rights to all male citizens over the age of 21, regardless of literacy level or income (Osterling 1989, p.82). Note that levels of fraud remained high after 1936.
Belgium	1853	from -4 to 6	Re-dated to 1848, when the government expanded the franchise, extending the right to vote to all men who paid 20 florins (42.2 francs) in tax. This increased the electorate from 46,000 to 79,000 (Witte et al. 2005, part 2, pp.24-5).
<i>Could not find any evidence of democratization, so excluded</i>			

Venezuela	2012-13	from -3 to 4	<p>Polity, which codes “authority patterns,” apparently increased the country’s Polity2 score because of the weaker authority position of Maduro compared to Chavez, based on the former’s lack of charisma. However, for my purposes, the replacement of a more charismatic with a less charismatic leader does not constitute a case of democratization. No evidence that political institutions and practices became more democratic under Maduro.</p> <p>“This irregularity-prone electoral environment has only deteriorated since Chávez’s death in March 2013, beginning with the election for his successor the following month. In that contest, Maduro, who was then acting president, prevailed over his opponent, Henrique Capriles Radonski, by a mere 235,000 votes (a 1.5 percent margin). The opposition claimed that, in the run-up to the election and on election day itself, there were repeated and new irregularities (for example, PSUV sympathizers were seen escorting voters to polls under the pretense of assisting them; harassing electoral observers and voters; paying citizens to bring people to the polls; and maybe even engaging in fraud at a few polling centers), which gave Maduro his narrow victory. After the results were announced, protests broke out in Caracas and several other cities. The government put down the demonstrations; in the end, seven people were killed and dozens were injured. The opposition called for a full audit, which was refused (although the CNE did conduct an audit of the electronic tallies versus the paper ballots), and then—for the first time since 2005—the opposition challenged the election, formally calling for the election either to be annulled or done over in roughly 5,700 voting tables (in Venezuela, each voting table or mesa electoral is associated with a particular touchscreen voting machine)” (Corrales 2015, p.43).</p>
Djibouti	1998-9	from -6 to 2	<p>The long-time dictator retires because of poor health in 1999 (Alwan and Mibrathu 2000, p.62); his nephew and former security service chief is then elected with 74% of the vote in what international observers say is a relatively fair election (U.S.A State Department 2010); a few months later, police arrest the new president’s single challenger and jail him for four months (later released with amnesty)(Europa Publications 2002, p.336). In the next legislative election in 2003, the incumbent’s party wins 100% of the seats, amid accusations of rigging (IRIN News 2005a); the opposition boycotts subsequent presidential elections, so the incumbent wins unchallenged (IRIN News 2005b). Not clear that any kind of democratization occurred.</p>
Uruguay	1951-2	from 0 to 8	<p>The only change was the replacement of a strong presidency with a collegial executive, modeled on that of Switzerland. Since we do not usually consider a non-collegial executive to be undemocratic, this does not seem enough to merit the characterization of democratization.</p>
Gabon	2008-9	from -4 to 3	<p>The only thing that seems to have changed in 2009 is that the authoritarian leader of 42 years, Omar Bongo, died and was replaced by his son, Ali Bongo, who won the presidency in an election that does not seem to have been more honest than the previous elections in which his father repeatedly won.</p>
Pakistan	1947-9	from -4 to +4	<p>Polity, focusing on “authority patterns,” appears to have coded an increase in Polity2 based on the lower charisma of the leaders that succeeded Jinnah. For present purposes, given the lack of institutional changes, this does not seem to constitute a case of democratization. A new constitution was only enacted in 1956, and the first national election occurred in 1970.</p>
<i>Date corrected</i>			
Yemen North	Was 1962, now 1967-71	from -6 to 0	<p>Polity, which codes “authority patterns,” not democratization per se, codes Yemen’s “executive recruitment” score as increasing in 1962 because a coup replaces hereditary monarchy with a military regime. I do not consider this an instance of democratization. However, there is a plausible case of political reform in 1967-71, when the new leader, al-Iryani, introduces a new constitution based on post-civil-war reconciliation.</p>
Argentina	Was 1937, now 1939	from -8 to 5	<p>Unclear what happened in 1937, other than the election of a slightly more scrupulous president, who took office in 1938. The election was manipulated to ensure Ortiz’s victory. “Opposition candidates... had their efforts repressed by violence and fraud” (Lewis 2003, p.89). “[I]n many districts the number of votes cast significantly outnumbered registered voters” (Hedges 2011, p.50). If the increase in Polity2 is meant to capture Ortiz’s reforms, the date should be 1939 or 1940.</p>

Country	Years	LIED cases
<i>LIED cases where reason for coding as increase in democracy unclear to me</i>		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2008	<p>LIED shows a jump from 2 to 6 for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2008, along with jumps from 0 to 1 for competitiveness and for executive selection. This implies that the head of executive went from being not elected to elected that year and that the elections are competitive, “characterized by uncertainty” (Skaaning et al. 2015, p.1501). However, there were no elections for the chief executive that year or change in the manner of his/her election. Nor could I find any evidence of change in competitiveness of executive elections around that time. Perhaps Bosnia was coded in this way because the question was raised in 2007 of ending the institution of the High Representative for B-H, a position created by the Dayton Peace Agreement, and externally appointed. Since 1997, the High Representative has had the authority to impose legislation and dismiss elected officials. However, the High Representative office has not yet (as of July 2018) been closed, and continues to function, with the same powers (see http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1161). Therefore, I was unable to discover the reasoning for this coding.</p>
Canada	1897	<p>LIED codes Canada as moving from restricted suffrage to universal male suffrage in 1897. This appears to be based on the PIPE dataset, which codes Canada as acquiring universal male suffrage in 1897. The only source specifically related to Canada referenced in the PIPE codebook is Elections Canada On-Line (Elections Canada N.d.). From the materials on this website, this appears to be a miscoding.</p> <p>Before 1885, the provinces had determined eligibility to vote in both provincial and federal elections. Almost all provinces had property requirements and exclusions based on race (Indians, Chinese immigrants) and/or occupation. An act passed in 1885 under the Conservative government of John Macdonald asserted federal authority to set voting requirements for federal elections and imposed comprehensive property requirements (although exempting existing voters in British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, which had not had property requirements before, imposing the property requirements only on new voters there). In 1896, a new act passed by the Liberal government of Wilfrid Laurier returned responsibility for setting voting eligibility in federal elections to the provinces and prohibited disqualifying voters on the basis of occupation or belonging to a particular class of people. This led to the enfranchisement of Chinese and Japanese men in British Columbia. But it did not lead to universal enfranchisement of Indians. Moreover, property requirements remained in four provinces.</p> <p>... the federal government refused Indian persons the right to vote in the Northwest Territories and Yukon, both of which were under direct federal control... In 1898, most provinces already applied significant restrictions on Indians' right to vote. No Indian was allowed to vote in British Columbia or New Brunswick. In Manitoba, the right to vote was reserved for Indian persons who received no benefit from the Crown and had received no such benefit during the three years preceding an election. In Ontario, the right was given only to enfranchised Indians or Indians living outside a reserve, on condition that the latter own real property assessed at \$200 or more in a city or town or \$100 or more in a village or township... The situation did not improve in the years that followed. In 1915, Quebec withdrew the voting rights of Indians living on reserves, and by July 1919, Indians living on reserves anywhere in the country were no longer entitled to vote in federal by-elections.</p> <p>Before adoption of the 1898 act, property-based qualifications were the main curb on expansion of the electorate. At that time, this restriction still existed in only four provinces: Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Quebec.</p> <p>In Prince Edward Island, property-based qualifications affected only persons 60 years of age or over, who were required to own real property assessed at at least \$100 or generating a minimum annual income of \$6. In 1902, the province achieved universal male suffrage when it abolished the requirement. To qualify to vote in New Brunswick, it was necessary to own real property assessed at \$100 or more, or real property and personal property with a combined value of \$400. Persons earning an annual income of \$400 were also qualified to vote. This threshold was very high; at the turn of the century, a textile worker, for example, earned an average of \$240 per year. New Brunswick abolished property- and income-based qualifications in 1916.</p> <p>In Nova Scotia, the situation had remained unchanged since 1885. To be qualified to vote in the province in 1898, it was still necessary to own, rent or occupy property assessed at \$150 or more. Furthermore, an individual who owned personal property and leased or occupied</p>

		<p>property whose value, added to that of the personal property, totalled \$300, was qualified to vote. Co-owners, co-tenants, sons of men qualified to vote and widows who owned, occupied or leased property with a value sufficient to confer the right to vote could vote under the same conditions as those that existed before 1885. The province later qualified as electors persons earning an annual income of at least \$250 and fishermen who owned real property, boats, nets and fishing tackle with a combined value of \$150 or more. Property- and income-based qualifications were eventually eliminated in the province in 1920.</p> <p>In Quebec, where urbanization was in full swing, the property-based qualifications in force in 1898 still favoured residents of rural areas. In urban areas, owners or occupants in good faith of premises assessed at \$300 could vote; in rural areas, the minimum required value was just \$200. A similar disparity existed between tenants in urban areas, where the minimum annual rent was \$30, and tenants in rural areas, where it was \$20. Persons receiving a minimum annual income of \$300 were also qualified to vote. Fishermen could vote if they owned boats, nets, seines and fishing tackle worth a total of \$150 or more. Furthermore, retired farmers and property owners (referred to as life annuitants) could also vote if their annuity – in cash or in kind – was \$100 or more. Teachers were exempt from any property-based requirement. In 1912, Quebec substantially reduced financial qualifications, a measure that gave the right to vote to the great majority of men in the province.</p> <p>Based on this, it appears that the male franchise, although it may have increased after 1898, was not universal. Property requirements were variously eliminated between 1902 and 1920, although disqualifications of Indians may have remained.</p>
Colombia	1880	<p>Colombia appears to be coded as not a minimally competitive electoral democracy in the years 1878 and 1879 because the president elected in 1878 had run unopposed (the PIPE dataset gives such cases a score of 0 on its “OPPOSITION” variable).</p> <p>In 1876-7, a civil war in Colombia had pitted the Liberals against the Conservatives. The main issue was education: the Conservatives favored entrusting education to the Catholic Church, while the Liberals favored public education. The Liberals won.</p> <p>In the 1878 election, the only candidate was General Julián Trujillo, who got support from both Liberal factions. In 1880, the next presidential election was held, this time with two Liberal candidates (still no Conservative). This is coded as an increase in democracy on the LIED index from 1 to 5. (Again, in 1882 and 1884, both candidates were Liberal, with no Conservative.)</p> <p><i>Thus, although the coding rule makes sense and is not misapplied, it is hard to see 1880 as a case of any kind of political liberalization or democratization that might require explanation in terms of any of the theories examined. It just appears to be one because the two factions of the Liberal party had agreed on a single candidate in 1878. There was no change in institutions or practices other than that. I therefore exclude this case.</i></p>
Iraq	2010	<p><i>It is not clear why the 2010 election was considered competitive but the December 2005 election was not. The main difference seems to be that voters voted strongly on the basis of ethnic identity in 2005, but less so in 2010. But such voting—although perhaps undesirable—does not contradict any definition of democracy (definitely using the electoral competition threshold of LIED). Another possibility is that in 2010 the top vote-getting party was not that of the incumbent PM. However, the incumbent PM still managed, by reassembling a coalition, to remain as PM. There were claims of fraud after both elections, but the electoral commissions ruled in both cases that fraud had not significantly affected the outcome. In both cases, there were still significant numbers of US troops occupying the country.</i></p> <p>“Both the 2010 and 2005 elections were unquestionably genuine (notwithstanding allegations to the contrary from many interested parties inside Iraq)” (Makiya 2010, p.2).</p> <p><i>On the 2005 election:</i> “[I]n the previous general election, held on 15 December 2005 amid pervasive instability and recurrent violence, voters en masse turned to their primordial loyalties, with the secular al-Iraqiya coalition of former premier Ayad Allawi receiving barely 8 percent of the total vote. The largest vote getter (46.5 percent) was the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a coalition defined solely by Shia solidarity. The</p>

	<p>Kurdistan Alliance received its votes almost exclusively from the Kurds who predominate in the northernmost trio of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, and the Sunni-sectarian Tawafuq group (also known as the Iraqi Accord Front) ended up with over 80 percent of the Sunni vote. The spectacle of an election in which the vote breakdown almost perfectly mirrored Iraq’s major ethnic and sectarian cleavages left analysts less than sanguine about democracy’s prospects there” (Dawisha 2010, p.26).</p> <p>In December 2005: “To ensure the integrity of the elections, the IECI deployed 126,125 observers in all 18 provinces... As the chief electoral officer remarked, ‘This election has been one of the most observed in the whole world’” (Dawisha and Diamond 2006, p.99).</p> <p>“[W]hen partial results were announced a few days after the election, showing a victory for the UIA, a deluge of complaints alleging widespread fraud erupted in Baghdad and Sunni areas. Thousands of demonstrators took to the streets denouncing the IECI and accusing it of doing the UIA’s bidding. The pressure became so intense that the IECI refrained from publishing the full and final results until an international commission, which arrived in Baghdad in late December, looked into the 1,985 complaints received by the IECI. The international commission decided that while infractions had indeed occurred, they had been mostly minor and would not affect the final distribution of Assembly seats” (Dawisha and Diamond 2006, p.99).</p> <p><i>In 2009:</i> “Maliki now faced a new challenge: opposition from all of his other mainstream competitors. His successful manipulation of appointments and his moves to dominate the political process during the previous two years had alienated all of his rivals. The Sadrist, originally his key supporters, had borne the brunt of his military attacks and were unwilling to support him again. The Sahwa forces were alienated by his foot-dragging on hiring them and his weak efforts at national reconciliation. The Kurdish parties, openly opposed to his efforts to push them out of disputed territory in the north, had taken to calling him ‘a new Saddam.’ ISCI and its chief foreign supporters in Iran also had reason to turn against him because they had been weakened by his refusal to join them in a common Shi’i front” (Marr 2018, pp.265-6).</p> <p>There had been a reduction in violence, although there were still some major terrorist attacks. “The Iraqi death toll declined dramatically” (Marr 2018, p.266). But spectacular attacks suggested ISIS was a threat. “A second continuing challenge for Maliki, as for all previous governments, was corruption, which ate away at economic development, prospects for increased investment, and confidence in the government and its legitimacy” (Marr 2018, p.266).</p> <p>A withdrawal of US troops from cities took place on schedule by mid-2009.</p> <p>Discussions of a new electoral law “soon stalled and elections were postponed until 7 March 2010, five weeks later than constitutionally mandated” (Marr 2018, p.267). The main groupings were “Maliki’s State of Law, Shi’i Islamists [including the Sadrists], the Kurdish parties, and finally a combination of secularists and Sunnis” (Marr 2018, p.268). “The Arab Shi’i parties were divided between Maliki’s State of Law and the rival INA coalition. The Arab Sunni parties were divided between the Iraqiyya, headed by Allawi, a secular Arab Shi’a, and the IAF. The Kurdish parties were divided among the traditional KDP-PUK alliance and the opposition Gorran party” (Marr 2018, p.271).</p> <p>“The most important controversy occurred in mid-January 2010 when the supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice..., charged with vetting candidates associated with the Ba’ath Party, disqualified over five hundred candidates, almost a sixth of the total. The charge reopened the wounds of sectarianism and raised countercharges by Sunnis that the move was targeting them” (Marr 2018, p.271).</p> <p>“Some violence ensued before, during, and after—between 12 February and 7 March, some 228 people were killed—but that did not stop people from all areas and provinces from going to the polls” (Marr 2018, p.271).</p> <p>“Four major blocs emerged as dominant, but the winner was unexpected. The top vote-getter, by a razor-thin, two-seat margin was Allawi’s Iraqiyya coalition with ninety-one seats (28 percent). Maliki’s State of Law took eighty-nine seats (27.4 percent). The INA came in third with seventy seats (21.5 percent). The Kurdistan Alliance, in fourth place, garnered forty-three seats (13.2 percent)” (Marr 2018, p.271).</p>
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	<p>“At its most basic level, this election was free and fair. As already pointed out, there were a number of complaints from parties and coalitions about irregularities, even fraud, but on the whole these were dismissed by independent local and outside organizations that monitored the election. Governmental engineering of election outcomes, so rampant in electoral authoritarian regimes, was simply not an issue” (Dawisha 2010, p.38).</p> <p>“Overall, the most striking result of the election was fragmentation... A postelections stalemate went on for months” (Marr 2018, pp.272-3). Maliki and others demanded a recount, but this found “no signs of fraud” (Marr 2018, p.273).</p> <p>“After the 2009 provincial balloting, Maliki had expected to sail through to victory in 2010, garnering enough votes to let him dictate coalition terms or even, with a bit of luck, win an outright majority. But it soon became clear, once the election date was set, that the final outcome was genuinely in doubt” (Dawisha 2010, p.38).</p> <p>Shi’a parties re-coalesced to claim the largest bloc. The Supreme Court agreed that this should give Maliki the right to form a coalition on this bloc’s support (Marr 2018, p.273). The bargaining over the prime minister’s job “went on for a record eight months after the election and was only settled in mid-November 2010” (Marr 2018, p.273).</p>
Lebanon	<p><i>It is not so clear what changed in 2009 to explain the upward coding in LIED from uncompetitive to competitive. A parliamentary election had already been held in 2005 after the Syrian troops withdrew. It may be that the coding relates to the change in the electoral law that occurred between 2005 and 2009, responding to the recommendations of a special commission (the Boutros Commission). This new law, passed in September 2008, included some reforms of campaign finance and media regulations.</i></p> <p>“On September 29, 2008, the Parliament adopted a new electoral law after it was thoroughly studied in the Justice and Administration Committee during 35 meetings... the law that ultimately passed included some of the reforms recommended by the Boutros Commission—campaign finance and media regulations and a single-day election” (NDI 2009, p.15).</p> <p>“Newly introduced reforms included in the 2008 Electoral Law are outlined below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lebanon is divided between 26 electoral districts, an increase from 14 electoral districts mandated by the 2000 Electoral Law. • Elections are held on one day in all districts. All post-war parliamentary elections in Lebanon were held over multiple consecutive weekends due to security concerns. • The Supervisory Commission for Electoral Campaigns (SCEC) is created and charged with supervising compliance with campaign finance, media, and advertising regulations. • National identification cards and Lebanese passports replace the voter card used in past elections to identify voters on election day. • A campaign silence period is introduced starting midnight the day before the election. • Domestic and international election observers are invited to observe election day as well as the pre- and post-election periods. • The MOIM is required to publish the voter register on the Internet. • Polling stations are required to be accessible for people with disabilities.” (NDI 2009, p.16). <p><i>While these seem generally worthwhile changes, they are mostly technical and do not seem to constitute a qualitative jump in the competitiveness of elections.</i></p> <p>“Another significant change in the electoral law was the return to districting based on the 1960 law, creating smaller districts that had the effect of increasing the ability of Christian communities to elect their own leaders. Under the 2000 electoral law, which also governed the 2005 parliamentary elections, Christian communities were grouped into larger Muslim districts. The redistricting, however, had the effect of creating districts of very different sizes, which resulted in significant disparities in the number of votes required to be elected in different constituencies” (NDI 2009, p.16). <i>It is not immediately clear that small, religiously homogeneous districts are more or less democratic than larger, religiously heterogeneous ones.</i></p> <p><i>At the same time the politically controversial recommendations of the Boutros Commission were not included in the law:</i> “While the law that ultimately passed included some of the reforms recommended</p>

		<p>by the Boutros Commission—campaign finance and media regulations and a single-day election—MPs defending elements of the status quo from both the governing and opposition coalitions prevented the adoption of other amendments. Proportional representation, a quota for women, lowering the voting age from 21 to 18, and the adoption of a pre-printed, standardized, and official ballot failed to make it into law” (NDI 2009, pp.15-16).</p> <p><i>It is hard to see these technical changes as a case of political liberalization or democratization that might require explanation in terms of any of the theories examined.</i></p>
Nepal	2013	<p><i>LIED codes Nepal as 6 in 2011 and 2013 but 0 in 2012. This is because in 2012 the elected Constituent Assembly reached the end of its term and dissolved without agreeing on a draft constitution. Thus, the electoral basis of the government was no longer clear. An election for another constituent assembly was held in 2013. In the interim, the previous prime minister at first continued in power and then, by agreement of the main parties, a “caretaker” technical government was appointed to administer the election. Since this was more a technical gap than a change of regime, I do not include this as a case of democratization.</i></p> <p>In 2012, the elected Constituent Assembly that had been formed in April 2008 after the monarchy was abolished, dissolved without managing to agree on a draft constitution (Kantha 2014, p.206). The Supreme Court had refused to once again extend its deadline. The incumbent prime minister, Baburam Bhattarai, “said that he would remain in power and that his government would hold November elections for a new assembly.” He said this option “was consistent with options outlined by the Supreme Court, in case the deadline was missed” (Chapagain and Yardley 2012). However, opposition politicians “quickly denounced the plan as a power grab” (Chapagain and Yardley 2012).</p> <p>Eventually: “On March 14 [2013], Nepal’s four major political forces—the UCPN-Maoist, the NC, the CPN-UML, and the United Madhesi Democratic Front (UMDF)—inked an 11-point deal to form an “election government,” i.e., a government with a mandate to hold elections. This election government’s chair is held by sitting Chief Justice of Nepal’s Supreme Court Khil Raj Regmi; his cabinet’s members were drawn from the ranks of Nepal’s retired senior bureaucrats” (Kantha 2014, pp.206-7).</p> <p>“The election to choose the Second Constituent Assembly was held at last in November 2013 under an interim government headed by the sitting chief justice of Nepal’s Supreme Court (who refused to resign from his judicial post despite widespread urging to do so in the name of separation of powers). The caretaker arrangement was preferred because the opposition parties refused to take part in any election while the government was in Maoist hands” (Lawoti 2014, p.140).</p> <p>“The successful CA elections on November 19, 2013, defied pre-poll projections in many respects. A nationwide voter turnout of over 70% proved that concerns over voter apathy was unfounded, delivering a blow to boycotting parties. The elections were hailed as fair by most observers despite allegations of irregularities issued by the UCPN-Maoists and some Madhesi parties” (Kantha 2014, p.209). The NC and the CPN-UML parties came first and second. “The UCPN-Maoists, the largest party in the first CA, saw its popular vote plummet to 15% from 30% in the first CA... The voters’ wrath fell even more harshly on the fractured Madhesi parties, which together won less than 50 seats in the new CA” (Kantha 2014, p.209).</p>
Philippines	2011	<p><i>LIED codes the Philippines as dropping from 1 to 0 in competitive_elections in 2007 and rising back to 1 in 2011. It was not clear to me what accounts for this. I therefore exclude this case.</i></p> <p>There was a midterm election (of House and Senate) in 2007. It resulted in a good performance for allies of President Arroyo in the House but a big defeat in the Senate. “Despite having the machinery of government at its disposal, including the active support of the senior military leadership, the administration’s alliance, TEAM Unity, captured only three of 12 Senate seats up for grabs—an unprecedented defeat for a sitting president” (Hicken 2008, p.77). There was considerable electoral violence, but that is not unusual: “As in past elections, the 2007 contest was a violent affair, with 126 people killed and 148 injured in election related violence” (Hicken 2008, p.77). Hicken does not mention significant fraud.</p> <p>Another possible explanation for the downgrading is the revelation of an extensive attempt by the presidential administration to use bribery of House members to prevent the president’s impeachment. “Invited to the meeting were the speaker of the House, Jose De Venecia, Jr., and nearly 200 members of the president’s party, Kabalikat ng Mamamayang Pilipino (Kampi). Those present were reportedly</p>

		<p>given bags of cash ranging in value from \$1,200 to \$12,000 in exchange for their support of the president. This included supporting and then derailing a “sham” presidential impeachment proceeding in a bid to ensure that a more threatening legitimate attempt would not unfold. Most alleged recipients of the cash denied receiving the gifts or asserted that the money was intended for their constituents, and Arroyo denied any role in or knowledge of the cash payouts. Nonetheless, the belief that the president was involved was bolstered by the fact that the handouts took place in the presidential palace and allegedly involved top officials in Kampi” (Hicken 2008, pp.76-7). While this suggests high level corruption, it’s not clear why it would motivate a downgrade for electoral competitiveness in the absence of some link to elections. Hicken (2009, p.196) notes that attempts by opponents to impeach the president are “near-annual” events.</p> <p>In 2006, a movement of citizens and army rebels had sought unsuccessfully to overthrow the president. “Gloria Macapagal Arroyo... moved quickly to frustrate attempts in 2006 to oust her. She got the armed forces top brass on her side and declared a state of emergency on the morning that rebel soldiers and their civilian sympathizers were to march from their camps to the People Power monument on EDSA” (Coronel 2007, p.176). “The attempted uprising fizzled as water cannons and truncheons were unleashed on protesters. The state of emergency lasted only three weeks: Arroyo faced widespread opposition to repressive measures. Months later, the Supreme Court declared illegal the official acts committed under the emergency proclamation” (Coronel 2007, p.176). Not clear, either, why this would lead to a downgrading of electoral competitiveness for the next four years. An unpopular but elected president survives an attempt at unconstitutional overthrow.</p>
Switzerland	1879	<p>The source of this entry seems to be the Przeworski et al. PIPE dataset, which codes Switzerland as passing in 1879 from restricted male suffrage to unrestricted male suffrage (6 to 7). The codebook does not provide any information on this change. This appears to be an error. I could find no report of an electoral reform in 1879. Switzerland had had universal and equal male suffrage since 1848. In 1872 a unified confederal electoral law had been passed, including adoption of the secret ballot. (Subsequent parliamentary elections were held in 1875 and 1878).</p>
Tanzania	2010	<p><i>LIED codes Tanzania as non-competitive until 2009, but competitive from 2010. Freedom House also raised its rating of Tanzania that year from 4 to 3. For the reasons explained below, I do not find evidence of a significant political liberalization or democratization in this year.</i></p> <p><i>Why is the 2010 viewed as marking an advance in democracy?</i></p> <p>Freedom House notes: “While the CCM retained its majority in concurrent legislative elections, winning 186 seats, the results gave the opposition its largest representation in parliament in Tanzania’s history” (Freedom House 2011).</p> <p><i>However:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) <i>the exact level of opposition representation is not, in itself, a good measure of competitiveness since this changes in part because of changes in voters’ preferences, party organization, etc. Babeiya (2011, p.84) sees the 2010 result as fitting into the “unstable and zigzagging trend of opposition parties since Tanzania reintroduced multiparty politics”—in other words, consistent with the pre-existing regime, not an indicator of major regime change.</i> b) <i>the level of opposition representation in 2010 was roughly the same as in 1995—but that year was coded “non-competitive,”</i> c) <i>the percentage of the vote going to opposition presidential candidates was also about the same as in 1995,</i> d) <i>the level of opposition representation in the parliament was still only 25%.</i> <p>Freedom House also notes: “While there were some protests alleging vote rigging and poor administration of the elections, the 2010 polls represented a considerable improvement over previous elections” (Freedom House 2011).</p> <p><i>However:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) <i>reports suggest that claims of vote rigging and problematic election administration were significant. “CCM’s victory was... vehemently challenged by CHADEMA who claimed that the elections were rigged” (Babeiya 2011, p.87). The 2010 vote was “marred by relatively poor turnout, unusual delays, street protests and accusations of vote rigging” (Gettleman 2010).</i> b) <i>The week after the election witnessed “riots,” and unexplained delays in counting the votes. “The elections were held Sunday, and it took a full workweek to count the votes. On Monday, opposition supporters rioted, accusing the government of intentionally delaying. On</i>

	<p>Tuesday, European observers said the delays were creating suspicion and that the tallying process was hardly transparent. ... On Wednesday, Willibrod Slaa, the former Roman Catholic priest running against Mr Kikwete, accused Tanzania's secret police of helping steal votes for the president and called for a recount. On Thursday, other opposition parties echoed that call and said the election had been rigged. The election commission, which many Tanzanian analysts contend is beholden to the president, swatted away the complaints" (Gettleman 2010).</p> <p>c) <i>reports of greater intimidation by security forces than in the past.</i> Babeiya points to "an increase in reliance on security forces to silence the opposition, as has been the case in other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Uganda, Cameroun, Ivory Coast and Gambia, where the ruling parties are not willing to leave office peacefully. It was observed that in most of the constituencies where opposition parties were popular excessive force was used to silence pro-opposition supporters who were dissatisfied with the processes of counting and declaration of results" (Babeiya 2011, pp.98-99).</p> <p>d) <i>huge drop in turnout suggests something was discouraging voters from voting:</i> "turnout, which had been 72.4 per cent in 2005, was this time only 42.84 per cent" (Reith 2011, p.111). "'I'm not surprised,' said Azaveli Lwaitama, a political analyst at the University of Dar es Salaam. 'If the turnout was low... that means the incumbent party managed to scare many voters into not even voting'" (Gettleman 2010).</p> <p><i>In sum, this is a case of an election in which the ruling party won both the presidency and control of the legislature—both by margins similar to those in a previous (although not directly preceding) election. The victory was followed by accusations of election rigging and by rioting. Turnout was very significantly reduced from previous elections—according to one local expert, because voters were intimidated by the incumbent party. There may have been less electoral violence than during previous elections, particularly in Zanzibar. However, that could be due to a noted "increase in reliance on security forces to silence the opposition." So it is hard to see the 2010 election as significantly different from the previous elections in 1995, 2000, and 2005.</i></p>
<i>LIED cases that seem to refer to establishment of full sovereignty, rather than political liberalization</i>	
Kosovo 2012, Solomon Islands 2014 (after Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands troops withdraw).	
<i>VDEM increases of 0.3 in 3 years on electoral democracy index that seem to refer to establishment of full sovereignty, rather than political liberalization</i>	
Belgium 1918-21, Botswana 1965-8, Cyprus 1959-62, Denmark 1945-8, India 1951-4, Iraq 2004-7, Israel 1948-51, Luxembourg 1945-8, Malta 1947-50, Malta 1962-5, Mauritius 1967-70, Namibia 1989-92, Netherlands 1945-8, Norway 1945-8, Slovakia 1993-6, Slovenia 1990-93, Sri Lanka 1946-9, Suriname 1948-51, Timor-Leste 2001-4.	
<i>Apparent miscodings of "Major Democratic Transition"</i>	
Guatemala 1879, coded as "minor democratic transition" meets the definition for "major democratic transition"; Burundi 2005, Cambodia 1993, Democratic Republic of Congo 2006, Denmark 1915, Ethiopia 1995, France 1877, Iraq 2010, Japan 1868, Japan 1952, Liberia 2006, Mexico 1997, Pakistan 1973, Philippines 1944, Somalia 2012-14, Spain 1871 and 1879, Sweden 1917, and West Germany 1949 all coded as "major democratic transitions," do not meet the criteria unless transition years ignored.	

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Instructions for Classification of Democratization Episodes

Note on who is the “incumbent.” *Incumbent may be a single leader, the leader together with other members of the ruling elite, or (in some cases) just members of the ruling elite without the leader (for instance, if their “mistake” was their appointment of the given leader). If the country becomes democratic under a caretaker administration shortly after being liberated from occupation by a foreign power, the previous incumbent is the foreign power. (Only consider relevant any mistakes made by this foreign power if the mistake was made during the period that this country was under the foreign occupation.) If democratization is initiated by an occupying foreign power that defeated a previous authoritarian regime, the previous authoritarian regime is the previous incumbent.*

A. Congruence with deliberate choice theories

Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution

1. **Did democratization follow or coincide with anti-elite popular mobilization—protests, strikes, other mass actions?** Do not include here military coups. The answer is also “no” if the mobilization is by part of the elite—e.g., landowning oligarchy revolting against a left-wing military dictatorship that plans land reform. *Yes/No/Maybe.*
2. **If so, were these mobilizations motivated by economic or redistributive demands?** To judge this, consider what historians or other writers have said about the motives. Since motives for any mobilization may be multiple, choose “Yes” if economic and/or redistributive demands were among the motives. Record “No” if there were no anti-elite popular mobilizations. Record “No” if demonstrations were political rather than economic (e.g., protesting the government’s foreign policy decisions, demanding a constitution). *Yes/No/Maybe. Examples:*
 - *protests over poor food supply,*
 - *protests over price increases,*
 - *protests over tax increases,*
 - *general strikes over wages, working conditions, etc.*
3. **In response, did incumbents broaden the political rights of those protesting?** For the reform to be “in response,” it must not come *before* the mobilization. *Yes/No/Maybe. Examples:*
 - *broadening franchise to include the protesters,*
 - *holding a reasonably credible election (or one that is fairer than preceding elections),*
 - *convening a “national conference” including representatives of the protesters,*
 - *introducing other political reforms that empower those protesting.*
4. **Did these reforms credibly commit the elite to redistribute to the protesting groups, demobilizing their protests and protecting the rich from a social revolution?** The answer is “no” if, for instance, incumbents subsequently reneged on commitments to redistribute to the protesters, failed to redistribute in practice, quickly retracted the reforms, or switched to repression against the protesters. Also answer “no” if the incumbents did not broaden the political rights of those protesting. For reforms to credibly commit the elite to increase redistribution, the reforms must in practice give the supposed beneficiaries of such redistribution (or their allies) greater political power. If the incumbents hold a relatively fair election but win reelection and remain with as much power to set policy as before, then the reform did not constitute a credible commitment to change. The answer is also “no” if the protests continued for some time at equal intensity or escalated, or if a revolt led to the overthrow of the incumbents. *Yes/No/Maybe. Example:*
 - *Incumbent broadens franchise (and this is not quickly reversed), the next elected parliament contains more representatives of the newly enfranchised groups, and economic or fiscal policies benefitting the newly enfranchised groups are enacted (and not reversed quickly).*
5. **Does case fit observable implications of theory?**

5: Very probably yes: Y on 1, 2, 3, and 4.
4: Probably yes: Only Ms and Ys; Y on 1 and 3; at least one M on 2 and 4.
3: Maybe/unclear: Only Ms and Ys; M on 1 and/or 3.
2: Probably no: M or Y on 1 and 3, N on 2 and/or 4.
1: N on 1 and/or 3.

Democratization to increase representation of incumbent party/control of government

6. **Is there evidence that the incumbents who reformed expected that the reform would increase support for their party or group and, thus, their odds of controlling the government?** For instance, this is true if a leader believes that expanding the franchise will give more votes to his or his party's supporters than to supporters of opposition candidates or parties. Consider the stated views of participants and the interpretations of historians. If incumbent currently wins close to 100 percent of the seats, reform is unlikely to improve on this, so the answer is usually "no." *But* if the incumbent anticipates a downward trend in his vote and thinks reforms will slow that decline, the answer is "yes." Thus, the "increase" may be relative to a declining trend. Answer "no" if the incumbent did not reform. If the incumbent, while democratizing, created a new party and ran for office, that *might* suggest he thought voters would reward him for the reforms—consider statements by actors and context. Do not answer "yes" if the incumbent reformed to forestall revolution—that should be covered by question 3. *Yes/No/Maybe. Examples:*
- *an incumbent broadens the franchise, thinking the new voters will disproportionately vote for his party;*
 - *an incumbent legalizes previously banned parties believing they will join his coalition.*
7. **Does case fit observable implications of theory?** Indicate level of confidence in answer to 6.

5: Very probably yes:
4: Probably yes:
3: Maybe/unclear:
2: Probably no:
1: Very probably no:

Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war (or demobilize afterwards)

8. **Did democratization occur around the time of war, civil war, or significant threat of these?** "Yes" only if the country was involved in or directly threatened by the war. *Yes/No/Maybe.*
9. **Did the incumbent consciously choose to extend rights (as opposed to being forced to do so—e.g. by foreign occupiers or military—or overthrown)? Did the incumbent extend rights to those needed to fight, or, later, those it sought to demobilize?** Consider the statements of participants and the interpretations of historians. Answer "no" if there was no relevant war. Include if the authorities enfranchised a group as a reward for recent contribution to war effort. *Yes/No/Maybe. Examples:*
- *political rights extended to demobilize former rebel militias,*
 - *franchise extended to working class after many workers enlisted or conscripted into armed forces,*
 - *women given the right to vote as reward for contribution to war effort.*

10. **Does case fit observable implications of theory?**

5: Very probably yes: Y on 8 and 9.
4: Probably yes: Y on 8, M on 9.
3: Maybe/unclear: M on 8 and M on 9
2: Probably no: M or Y on 8, N on 9.
1: Very probably no: N on 8.

Democracy to reduce patronage

11. **Did the incumbent who made the decision to democratize claim that democratization would, by requiring broader electoral appeals, reduce patronage or corruption?** Have historians suggested that reducing patronage or corruption was a motive? *Yes/No/Maybe. Example: reformer changes electoral rule to reduce number of small constituencies that are easily bought with pork.*

12. Does case fit observable implications of theory? Indicate level of confidence in answer to 11.

- 5: Very probably yes:
- 4: Probably yes:
- 3: Maybe/unclear:
- 2: Probably no:
- 1: Very probably no:

Democracy the result of “great compromise” after “prolonged and inconclusive struggle”

13. Did democratization follow a history of “prolonged and inconclusive” conflict between social factions? Factions could be economic classes, regional populations, ethnic groups, political parties and their supporters, etc. A “prolonged” struggle should have lasted more than five years. It could refer to a civil war, but need not. *Yes/No/Maybe.*

14. Did a reconciliation between the factions coincide with democratization? This might be recorded in a formal written pact (but need not be). There should be some explicit agreement on power-sharing or rules of the game. *Yes/No/Maybe.*

Examples:

- *previously warring ethnic groups negotiate a democratic power-sharing pact;*
- *after lengthy protests by workers or middle class, rich elite negotiates a constitution that gives these classes greater political rights.*

15. Does case fit observable implications of theory?

- 5: Very probably yes: Y on 13 and 14.
- 4: Probably yes: Y on 13, M on 14; or M on 13, Y on 14.
- 3: Maybe/unclear: M on 13 and M on 14
- 2: Probably no: M or Y on 13, N on 14.
- 1: Very probably no: N on 13.

B. Evidence of mistakes

16. Was the incumbent overthrown or did he resign under strong pressure from military and/or popular uprising before democratization occurred? Code “yes” if overthrown by mass revolt, foreign invasion or coup, or if assassinated. *Yes/No/Maybe.*

Did the incumbent make significant mistakes that contributed to the regime change? Recall that a “mistake” in this context is a non-optimal (from the incumbent’s point of view) action (or failure to take an action) that increases the probability of having to give up or share power. Consider the following possible types of mistakes.

17. Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that could have been avoided and that strengthen opposition: “slippery slope.” Concessions may be material or institutional. They are “excessive” if it is plausible that the incumbent would have been better off not making them. They are “poorly targeted” if a different concession could have co-opted the opposition with less risk of destabilization (e.g., giving the opposition one seat on the electoral commission and influence over agricultural policy instead of complete control over electoral administration). Concessions are not “avoidable” if it is impossible for some reason for the incumbent *not* to make them or if failing to make them would, in your best judgment, have increased the probability of a short-term overthrow of the incumbent. *Examples:*

- *legalizing opposition parties, which then defeat the incumbent (unless continuing the bans would have been even more explosive);*
- *liberalizing the press, only to have it expose embarrassing scandals and incompetence (unless pressure to liberalize so strong that continuing censorship would have been more explosive);*
- *allowing live broadcast of political events that then reveal regime weakness or unpopularity;*
- *agreeing to early elections if this leads to early removal;*

- *appointing—or neglecting to block appointment of—an actual or potential rival to a powerful position if that rival then uses the position to undermine the incumbent;*
- *calling a “consultative” national conference if that body then asserts sovereignty (unless not calling the conference would have been more dangerous than calling it).*

18. Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized opposition or coopted allies. Concessions may be material or institutional. *Examples:*

- *failing to satisfy limited material demands by protesters, when doing so might well have slowed the growth of protests;*
- *increasing the price of gasoline (rather than continuing subsidies), prompting riots that overthrow the government;*
- *discriminating against ethnic minorities in way that leads them to revolt and overthrow regime;*
- *failing to coopt support groups if this could have been done feasibly and would have increased the regime’s survival odds;*
- *failing to bribe a co-optable media, which then attacks the incumbent.*

19. Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: “counterproductive violence”. *Examples:*

- *brutally attacking opposition activists in a way that sparks mass protests;*
- *using live ammunition rather than tear gas and rubber bullets against protesters if this increases domestic or international pressures on the regime;*
- *jailing those who question government decisions if this drives them into opposition;*
- *ordering assassinations that increase domestic or international pressure on the regime;*
- *sending thugs to beat up opponents if this increases domestic or international pressure on the regime;*
- *brutal violence that provokes external powers to intervene.*

20. Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted opposition.

Examples:

- *failure to quickly disrupt small protests, allowing them to spread nationwide;*
- *failure to hire and train riot police and deploy enough police at key moments and places;*
- *leaving the capital at a time of crisis (when this weakens defense against revolt);*
- *failure to disrupt anti-regime propaganda or opposition communications (when more could have been done along these lines);*
- *failure of security services to identify and foil coup and assassination plots (unless they did all that could reasonably be expected).*

Note that (20) and (19) are not mutually exclusive: both can occur in the same episode at different points or with regard to different actors. The same is true of (17) and (18).

21. Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups. These must be bona fide policy failures rather than just difficult structural conditions (e.g. economic mismanagement or choice of clearly bad policies rather than exogenously caused or inherited economic crisis). *Examples:*

- *conspicuously corrupt acts at a time of national hardship;*
- *blatant nepotism;*
- *avoidably mismanaging the economy in a way that provokes or worsens an economic crisis and/or provokes protests;*
- *bungling the defense in a civil war (in ways that could have been avoided);*
- *unnecessarily provoking a civil war;*
- *failing to address mounting ethnic grievances that then explode into civil war.*

22. Mishandling election or referendum. *Examples:*

- *calling election or referendum when it could have been avoided, or postponed (unless that would have been even more dangerous), and then doing badly;*

- *picking clearly unattractive or incompetent candidates (when better ones were available);*
- *choosing an electoral rule that is not optimal for the incumbent;*
- *failing to campaign as well as reasonably could be expected;*
- *failing to exclude opposition candidates (unless the risk of sparking protests by such exclusions outweighs the benefit of excluding the candidates);*
- *failing to pressure voters and/or falsify results sufficiently to ensure victory (unless such actions more likely to be counterproductive than helpful);*
- *falsifying too blatantly, thus provoking protests;*
- *allowing embarrassing reports to get out about the incumbent's falsification plans (provoking protests).*

23. Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders, leading to replacement of incumbent. Examples:

- *unnecessarily attacking a group in the incumbent's own support base (unless this brings some greater political benefit);*
- *choosing to cling to office when supporters would more likely have united behind an attractive successor who would have been more likely to preserve the regime;*
- *failing to nominate any successor as the leader's term approaches the end or as he approaches death, thus inviting factional conflict;*
- *nominating a controversial successor (e.g., a corrupt relative), thus inviting factional conflict;*
- *alienating allies in the regime through crude nepotism and (selectively permitted) corruption;*
- *doing less than the leader could have to contain divisions within the top leadership or ruling party (if this leads to destructive splits or revolts).*

24. Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity. Examples:

- *failing to pay the troops (unless reallocating resources to do so would have created even greater dangers);*
- *inciting violence when the military prefers conciliation (thus increasing the odds of revolt);*
- *ordering troops to attack when they are so unwilling to do so that they mutiny;*
- *appointing corrupt and/or disliked individuals to leading roles in military or security services (if that increases the odds of revolt);*
- *tolerating corruption (if that increases the odds of revolt);*
- *"dishonoring" the army by, e.g., debauched behavior (in a way that increases the odds of revolt);*
- *changing the rules for promotion of officers (in a way that increases the odds of revolt);*
- *failing to promote officers regularly (if that increases the odds of revolt).*

25. Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it). Note that this may be a mistake of the top leader (picking a subordinate or a successor) or of others in the elite (picking the top leader). You may consider evidence that former incumbents later regretted their choice of agent. Examples:

- *unknowingly picking a leader who favors more democratization than do the majority of the ruling elite;*
- *failing to remove a leader who favors more democratization than do the majority of the ruling elite (if others in the elite could have done so);*
- *unknowingly appointing someone more susceptible to foreign pressures for reform than possible alternative appointees;*
- *unknowingly choosing a leader who is bad at defending the regime (when a likely better alternative was available).*

26. Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent. Examples:

- *unnecessarily initiating a war or military conflict and then performing poorly, thus weakening the incumbent's position;*
- *sparking a war through provocative actions or refusal to negotiate;*

- *encouraging or aiding a guerrilla force fighting a foreign adversary, prompting foreign intervention;*
- *allowing massive migrant flows to provoke neighbors to intervene;*
- *alienating needed foreign allies through unwise commercial policy.*

Some questions require Yes/No/Maybe answers. Others require you to evaluate your confidence level on a five-point scale:

- 5: *Very probably yes:* considerable evidence that the argument fits the evidence (or that the mistake occurred and contributed to the incumbent having to share or give up power). Often supported by statements of participants and/or interpretations of historians.
- 4: *Probably yes:* evidence somewhat less conclusive, but still positive. Often the facts align but little direct evidence available on the thinking of the participants.
- 3: *Maybe/unclear:* some facts align, but some do not; evidence from participants and interpretations of historians mixed or unclear.
- 2: *Probably no:* little evidence that that the argument fits (or that the mistake occurred and contributed to the incumbent having to share or give up power), but no clear evidence against.
- 1: *Very probably no:* no evidence that the argument fits (or that the mistake occurred and contributed to the incumbent having to share or give up power), or there is evidence that this was *not* the case. (For instance, “mishandling election” could not have occurred if no election was held.)

For each “mistake” when you record a confidence level “4 Probably yes” or higher, state the mistake and the associated counterfactual.

Record evidence from the sources that suggests a causal connection between the mistake and the regime change. Record statements by participants and quotes from historians or other sources that support (or conflict with!) this interpretation.

For each “mistake” when you record a confidence level “4 Probably yes” or higher, also evaluate the following:

- A) *Temporal proximity.* Did the incumbent make the mistake within three years of the start of regime change? *Yes/No/Maybe?* The “start of regime change” is the beginning of reforms or of the process of collapse of the former regime.
- B) *Minimal rewriting.* Does the counterfactual satisfy the “minimal rewriting” rule? That is, for the incumbent to *not* have made the mistake, would we need to assume that the preceding history and underlying structural conditions had been different in some significant way? *Yes/No/Maybe? Example:*
- *If the Austrian and German military commanders had understood each other and communicated better before and during World War I, their military strategy would have been better. However, to assume they had understood each other and communicated better would require that their prior education, interactions, and cultures had been different, which involves considerable rewriting.*
 - *By contrast, to suppose that Franz Ferdinand had chosen a different route through Sarajevo on his 1914 visit does not require significant rewriting since that could have been done without assuming any changes in previous history.*
 - *Most acts that seem like mistakes will pass the “minimal rewriting” rule since it is implicit in the notion of “mistake” that alternatives could have been chosen (without assuming a different world), and we are already focusing on just alternatives that were feasible.*
- C) *Who made the mistake?* Was the mistake made by: the central leader (L), another group within the ruling elite (E), or both (B)?

Table A2: Validation exercise (14 randomly selected cases with sources in English)

	<i>Percentage that “probably” or “very probably” fit</i>		<i>Intercoder agreement measures</i>		
	<i>Author (%)</i>	<i>2nd coder (%)</i>	<i>Proportion agreement</i>	<i>Brennan & Prediger</i>	<i>Gwet's AC</i>
Overall assessment:					
Democratization by mistake	86	86	.86	.79	.84
Deliberate democratization	7	14	.93	.89	.92
Unintended but unavoidable	7	0	.93	.89	.93
Deliberate choice arguments:					
<i>Democracy as commitment to redistribute to protesters...</i>	0	7	.93	.89	.93
<i>Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime...</i>	7	7	1.00	1.00	1.00
<i>Democratization to increase support for incumbent party</i>	14	14	.71	.57	.67
<i>Democracy to reduce patronage</i>	0	0	1.00	*	*
<i>Democracy the result of "great compromise"...</i>	7	7	.93	.89	.92
Types of mistakes:					
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions...</i>	0	14	.86	.79	.84
<i>Failure to make concessions...</i>	21	21	.64	.46	.54
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression...</i>	14	21	.71	.57	.63
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship)...</i>	7	7	.79	.68	.76
<i>Major domestic policy failure...</i>	14	50	.64	.46	.53
<i>Mishandling election or referendum...</i>	14	21	.86	.79	.82
<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites...</i>	21	43	.50	.25	.36
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services...</i>	29	29	.86	.79	.81
<i>Delegating to agent...</i>	21	14	.86	.79	.82
<i>Major foreign policy failure...</i>	14	29	.79	.68	.73

Source: Author’s and 2nd coder’s assessments.

Note: Total 14 cases. * perfect correspondence with no variation, so agreement measure cannot be calculated.

As is well-known, measures of intercoder agreement such as Cohen’s kappa, Fleiss’s kappa, and Krippendorff’s alpha are unreliable when the distribution of ratings across categories is uneven, as is the case for most variables here (Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990, Quarfoot and Levine 2016, Gwet 2008). I therefore followed the recommendation of Quarfoot and Levine (2016) and Feng (2014) to use alternatives such as the Brennan Prediger coefficient and Gwet’s AC. I calculated agreement measures using a 3-level scale: yes, maybe, no (i.e. combining “very probably yes” and “probably yes” into “yes,” and “very probably no” and “probably no” into “no”); the finer gradations of confidence are likely to be more subjective. Landis and Koch (1977, p.165), Altman (1991), and Fleiss (1981) suggest the following benchmarks for assessing the strength of measures of agreement:

	<u>Landis and Koch</u>	<u>Altman</u>		<u>Fleiss</u>
< 0.00	Poor	Poor	0.0 - .40	Poor
0.00 – 0.20	Slight	Poor	.40 - .75	Intermediate to Good
0.21 – 0.40	Fair	Fair	.75 – 1.00	Excellent
0.41 – 0.60	Moderate	Moderate		
0.61 – 0.80	Substantial	Good		
0.81 – 1.00	Almost Perfect	Very good		

As can be seen, most measures of agreement are high. Among types of mistakes, some are somewhat lower—in particular, those for “avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites” and “major domestic policy

failure.” Classifications diverged more on these mostly because the second coder saw *more* cases of mistakes than I had. This increases confidence that my original codings were conservative.

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Box 1: An example: Greece in 1974

In 1974, Greece returned to civilian rule after the colonels who had seized power in 1967 lost control amid Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus (Diamandouros 1986). (This qualifies as democratization under all six definitions.) Did a rich elite democratize to commit to redistribute to the poor? First, the incumbents were not a rich elite, but a military faction. Second, the junta—under Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis—had no intention of democratizing. Ioannidis had ousted his predecessor, Giorgios Papadopoulos, fearing the latter might begin liberalization. Large protests did occur, led by students rather than the poor. Far from conceding political rights, the colonels sent tanks to crush them (Gallant 2001, 203-4). As the Cyprus disaster sapped Ioannidis's military support, other officers mutinied and recalled Konstantinos Karamanlis, a charismatic, center-right politician, to serve as prime minister. Nothing here suggests a commitment to redistribute.

Did democratization aim to motivate citizens to fight? The conflict with Turkey did trigger the junta's collapse. However, the military did not democratize to persuade citizens to fight because, after Ioannidis's overthrow, those in charge were determined to avoid war. The joint chiefs "agreed that war was impossible" (Woodhouse 1985, 157). Karamanlis "made it clear that there could be no question of a military confrontation with Turkey" and ordered demobilization (Clogg 1975, 341). Did one elite faction broaden access in the hope of winning votes? The junta was certainly not angling for votes, and, again, it did not mean to democratize. Nor was it motivated to reduce patronage. A "great compromise"? Karamanlis did initially form a government of national unity—but totally excluding the left (Diamandouros 1986, 159-60). He made decisions "explicitly avoiding reaching any 'settlement'—let alone a 'pact'—with other democratic political leaders" (Sotiropoulos 2002, 164). I coded "very probably no" on all deliberate choice arguments.

Did incumbent mistakes prompt the return to democracy? I answered "very probably" for two mistakes and "maybe" for a third. When troops crushed student protests in 1973, killing at least 34, this sparked "widespread revulsion" for the junta (Clogg 1992, p.197). Its unpopularity helped nudge top generals toward democratization the next year. Still, in the short run, the clashes led only to Papadopoulos' replacement by an even tougher hardliner—hence "maybe/unclear." However, Ioannidis' support for the Greek nationalists' coup in Cyprus that provoked the Turkish invasion "very probably" contributed to the junta's fall. Ioannidis himself admitted to a US diplomat that "his hasty decision... might have been stupid" (US Embassy, Greece 1974). The day before the Turks invaded, he brushed off US attempts to negotiate a way out that might have saved his regime (Stern 1975, p.63). And Ioannidis' order to attack the Turks both in Cyprus and along the Greece-Turkey land border was so desperate and inconsistent with Greek capacities that it triggered his colleagues' mutiny, "very probably" precipitating the final collapse. Had Ioannidis instead forged a plan with the military commanders, the regime—if not, his position in it—would have had better survival odds.

For more details, see the synopsis table reproduced below (and the full synopsis).

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Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. 2002. "New Approaches to Post-Authoritarian Greek Politics." *South European Society and Politics* 7 (3): 163-168. doi:10.1080/13608740708539638.

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Table A3: Greece 1974


<i>Congruence with deliberate choice theories</i>	
Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution	
1. Did democratization follow or coincide with anti-elite popular mobilization—protests, strikes, other mass actions?	Yes. From January 1973, students protested and boycotted classes. The regime crushed a student gathering at the Polytechnic University with tanks in November 1973 (Gallant 2001, p.202). “The lead in open opposition to the regime was taken by university students whose initially professional grievances increasingly took on a political colouring” (Clogg 1992, p.196). Later: “[C]rowds... filled the streets of Athens and other major cities on 23 July [1974], when the surrender of power to the civilians was being negotiated” (Diamandouros 1986, p.156).
2. If so, were these mobilizations motivated by economic or redistributive demands?	No—the students had primarily professional and political grievances. “‘The reasons are varied and with deep roots,’ said Nikolaos, a 20-year-old student of civil engineering.... ‘We are tired of decrees against us. We are weary of fraudulent elections for our representatives, who always turn out to be pro-regime. We object to Government commissioners, all ex-generals, sitting in the schools. We want an important voice in drafting the new charter for higher education.’... Several students said that the effort was ideologically mixed, with support from the left, right and center.... [T]he regime, worried about the rising unrest, issued a new decree, signed by Premier Papadopoulos to end military deferment for students who were striking or inciting others to protest... Thus what started out as a campaign involving other issues such as less Government intervention in university life and the desire for a greater say in academic affairs is now centered on the draft decree... ‘Bring back our brothers’ is one of the current slogans used by groups of demonstrators, who, again on Saturday night, surged into Constitution Square here only to be chased away by the police” (Shuster 1973).
3. In response, did incumbents broaden the political rights of those protesting?	No. Tough repression. “[W]hen the Athens Polytechnic students began broadcasting appeals on a clandestine radio for a worker-student alliance to overthrow the dictatorship, Papadopoulos sent in troops and tanks to crush the students” (Clogg 1992, p.197). “The eviction of the students from the Athens Polytechnic was carried out with extreme brutality, and at least 34 students and others were killed... This ruthless demonstration of force in the centre of Athens caused widespread revulsion” (Clogg 1992, p.197). After the Polytechnic uprising, hardliners in the military overthrew Papadopoulos to prevent him moving in the direction of democracy.
4. Did these reforms credibly commit the elite to redistribute to the protesting groups, demobilizing their protests and protecting the rich from a social revolution?	No reforms until after the junta handed over power to Karamanlis.
5. Does case fit observable implications of theory? <i>5: Very probably yes, 4: Probably yes, 3: Maybe/unclear, 2: Probably no, 1: Very probably no.</i>	<i>1: Very probably no.</i>
Democratization to increase representation of incumbent party/control of government	

6. Is there evidence that the incumbents who reformed expected the reform would increase support for their party and, thus, their odds of controlling the government?	The incumbents were military officers, who did not have a party. They did not reform. Reform occurred only after they were forced to give up power.
7. Does case fit observable implications of theory? 5: <i>Very probably yes</i> , 4: <i>Probably yes</i> , 3: <i>Maybe/unclear</i> , 2: <i>Probably no</i> , 1: <i>Very probably no</i> .	<i>1: Very probably no.</i>
Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war (or demobilize afterwards)	
8. Did democratization occur around the time of war, civil war, or significant threat of these?	Yes. At moment of extreme tension with Turkey.
9. Did the elite consciously choose to extend rights—and to those needed to fight, or, later, those it sought to demobilize?	No. The junta did not choose to extend rights—it was forced out. The remaining officers and the Karamanlis government were determined to avoid war, so they were not democratizing in order to motivate soldiers to fight. On July 20 th : “The Chiefs of Staff, meeting separately the same afternoon, agreed that war was impossible... The same afternoon the four of them collectively told Gizikis that operations against the Turkish forces were simply impossible” (Woodhouse 1985, p.157). “Karamanlis’s overriding priority was to defuse the risk of war with Turkey” (Clogg 1992, p.166). Since they were determined not to go to war, they did not democratize to motivate soldiers to fight.
10. Does case fit observable implications of theory? 5: <i>Very probably yes</i> , 4: <i>Probably yes</i> , 3: <i>Maybe/unclear</i> , 2: <i>Probably no</i> , 1: <i>Very probably no</i> .	<i>2: Probably no.</i>
Democracy to reduce patronage	
11. Did those incumbents who made the decision to democratize claim that democratization would, by requiring broader electoral appeals, reduce patronage or corruption?	The junta did not choose to democratize. I found no evidence that this was a motive after its fall.
12. Does case fit observable implications of theory? 5: <i>Very probably yes</i> , 4: <i>Probably yes</i> , 3: <i>Maybe/unclear</i> , 2: <i>Probably no</i> , 1: <i>Very probably no</i> .	<i>1: Very probably no.</i>
Democracy the result of “great compromise” after “prolonged and inconclusive struggle”	
13. Did democratization follow a history of “prolonged and inconclusive” conflict between social factions?	Maybe: the military and different civilian political groups.
14. Did a reconciliation between the factions coincide with democratization?	No. Military handed over to right-wing politicians, but excluding the left. “[I]t was the charismatic founder of ND, K. Karamanlis, who single-handedly engineered democratic transition, explicitly avoiding reaching any ‘settlement’ - let alone a ‘pact’ - with other democratic political leaders” (Sotiropoulos 2002, p.164).
15. Does case fit observable implications of theory? 5: <i>Very probably yes</i> , 4: <i>Probably yes</i> , 3: <i>Maybe/unclear</i> , 2: <i>Probably no</i> , 1: <i>Very probably no</i> .	<i>1: Very probably no.</i>
Evidence of mistakes?	
16. Did the incumbent intend to democratize when the process that led to democratization began? 5: <i>Very probably yes</i> , 4: <i>Probably yes</i> , 3: <i>Maybe/unclear</i> , 2: <i>Probably no</i> , 1: <i>Very probably no</i> .	<i>1: Very probably no.</i> The junta certainly did not intend to hand over power. “Western ambassadors are convinced that nothing is farther from the minds of the new leaders [after Ioannides’ coup] than elections or representative government. The military men firmly believe their compatriots first need several years of disciplined rule” (Modiano 1974).
17. Did the incumbent lose power (was he overthrown, forced to step down, did he lose election and step	Yes. Ioannides strongly pressured to step down by other military chiefs.

<p>down) before any political reform towards democracy occurred?</p>	
<p>18. Could the episode be seen as one in which the incumbent acted optimally given uncertainty? 5: Very probably yes, 4: Probably yes, 3: Maybe/unclear, 2: Probably no, 1: Very probably no.</p>	<p>1: Very probably no. It was clear to most military officers that the army was in no shape to attack Turkey. Given this, Ioannidis' provocation of Turkey seems clearly sub-optimal. Failing to use Sisco's assistance to negotiate a way out was sub-optimal.</p>
<p>19. Summary: What type(s) of mistakes? 5: Very probably yes, 4: Probably yes, 3: Maybe/unclear, 2: Probably no, 1: Very probably no.</p>	<p>A) <i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence."</i> 3: Maybe/unclear. "The eviction of the students from the Athens Polytechnic was carried out with extreme brutality, and at least 34 students and others were killed... This ruthless demonstration of force in the centre of Athens caused widespread revulsion" (Clogg 1992, p.197). However, in the short run this merely led to the overthrow of Papadopoulos by a more extreme hardliner. Hence, only 3.</p> <p>B) <i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly).</i> 5: Very probably yes. The Cyprus coup and mobilization against Turkey.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "On July 6, according to the widely respected Athens correspondent for the <i>Times</i> of London, Mario Modiano, Ioannides and his inner circle decided to assassinate [Cypriot leader Archbishop] Makarios through the national guard. The general was quoted by the <i>Times</i> as assuring junta officers: 'Don't worry. There will be no consequences if the job is done quickly and neatly'" (Stern 1975, p.55). • "Believing that a major nationalist cause would rally the people behind him Ioannides ordered yet another assassination attempt on Makarios. It failed, but it provided Turkey with a pretext to intervene. [Five days after the failed assassination attempt] Turkey invaded Cyprus. Turkish forces swept across the northern part of the island. Ioannides called immediately for a full mobilization of the Greek military: nothing happened. The regime had lost whatever base of support it had previously enjoyed" (Gallant 2001, p.203). • "It seems that Ioannidis was desperately seeking to bolster his regime's popularity by bringing about a spectacular nationalist triumph, namely the union of Cyprus with Greece. Fearing precisely that the coup presaged the <i>enosis</i> which had been specifically excluded under the terms of the 1960 constitutional settlement, Turkey launched an invasion of the northern part of the island on 20 July.... The Greek mobilization proved to be a shambles and the military commanders refused to carry out Ioannidis' orders to attack Turkey" (Clogg 1992, p.162). • In conversation with a US Embassy official on July 16 (before Turkish intervention), Ioannidis admitted that: "his hasty decision on 13 July might have been stupid" although he might not have meant this sincerely (US Embassy, Greece 1974). • <i>But he ignored opportunities to negotiate an end to the crisis before the Turks invaded.</i> On July 19 US special envoy Joseph Sisco "told the Greeks of his contacts with Ecevit and the intolerability of the Sampson regime in Nicosia to the Turks. He asked what steps the Greeks were prepared to take that might lead to a resumption of talks between the two

	<p>governments... Ioannides excused himself without comment after 15 minutes” (Stern 1975, p.63). On July 20, Turkish troops invaded.</p> <p>C) <i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state’s repressive capacity. 5: Very probably yes. By ordering the military chiefs to attack Turkey in Cyprus and along the Greek-Turkish land border, Ioannides provoked a mutiny against himself.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “On the morning of Sunday, July 21, the heads of the Hellenic armed services met in the Pentagon office of General Bonanos when the aide-de-camp to Ioannides, a Colonel Loukoutos, arrived and made a brisk announcement: "Gentlemen," said Loukoutos, "a decision has been taken to attack Turkey on all fronts. Cyprus, Thrace, everywhere. Prepare yourselves, gentlemen, the decision has been made." Army Chief of Staff Andreas Galatsanos was the first to react: "I am not ready to enter an aggressive war," he said. "I'm ready for defense but not for aggression." Others began to express reservations at the decision that was being foisted on them by Ioannides. "The Air Force is ready to carry out its duty," echoed Air Force Chief of Staff Alexander Papanikolaou, "but an air attack would be unwise and have no decisive results." Ioannides had wanted six Phantoms to proceed immediately from Crete to Cyprus to provide air support for the beleaguered Greek forces. The insurrection against Ioannides had begun in those moments” (Stern 1975, p.66). • “Ioannides called immediately for a full mobilization of the Greek military: nothing happened. The regime had lost whatever base of support it had previously enjoyed” (Gallant 2001, p.203). “The Greek military was in a sad state of preparedness and military commanders in the field knew it. Rather than leading their troops into disaster, commanders refused to follow the orders.” Soon after, the military regime began to crumble and senior level officers forced Ioannidis out, beginning the return to civilian rule (Roehrig 2002, p.107). <p><i>If Ioannidis had agreed a plan of response with the top generals instead of simply ordering them to attack on all fronts he would have had better odds of survival.</i></p>
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Figure A1: Modes of democratization over time (percentage of cases). Reverse waves not included.



Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Notes: Percentage of cases (averaged across 8 democratization measures). *Deliberate democratization*: incumbent was not overthrown before reforms started and democratization was not "very probably" or "probably" a consequence of some significant mistake or mistakes by the incumbent. *Unintended but unavoidable*: incumbent was overthrown before reforms started and overthrow was not "very probably" or "probably" a consequence of some significant mistake. *Democratization by mistake*: incumbent "very probably" or "probably" made at least one significant mistake that increased the odds of democratization.

Table A4: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments “probably” or “very probably” fit (percentage of cases).

	Democratization concept								
	<i>Polity</i>	<i>MDT</i>	<i>MDT6</i>	<i>BMR</i>	<i>LIED4</i>	<i>LIED5</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V+</i>	<i>Average</i>
<i>Democracy as commitment to redistribute to protesters thus preventing revolution</i>	5 (0, 5)	5 (0, 6)	4 (0, 4)	6 (1, 9)	5 (0, 7)	6 (1, 8)	4 (1, 4)	6 (2, 6)	5 (0, 9)
<i>Democratization to increase support for incumbent party</i>	3 (0, 10)	3 (0, 9)	3 (0, 11)	8 (2, 15)	7 (0, 15)	7 (1, 17)	7 (1, 16)	6 (2, 12)	5 (0, 17)
<i>Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war</i>	5 (1, 5)	5 (1, 6)	4 (0, 4)	5 (3, 6)	4 (3, 4)	5 (4, 5)	5 (1, 5)	8 (2, 8)	5 (0, 8)
<i>Democracy to reduce patronage</i>	2 (0, 3)	1 (0, 2)	1 (0, 3)	2 (0, 5)	2 (0, 5)	2 (0, 5)	1 (0, 4)	2 (0, 6)	2 (0, 6)
<i>Democracy the result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"</i>	12 (7, 17)	13 (8, 19)	16 (10, 22)	17 (10, 25)	13 (8, 18)	15 (10, 20)	19 (9, 24)	24 (10, 27)	16 (7, 27)
<i>At least one of the arguments</i>	22 (8, 33)	23 (9, 35)	27 (10, 38)	31 (13, 45)	26 (10, 37)	30 (14, 42)	32 (12, 47)	39 (14, 49)	29 (8, 49)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent.

Table A5a: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments “probably” or “very probably” fit (percentage of cases). By wave, including reverse waves.

	Wave	Democratization concept								Average
		Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	
<i>Democracy as commitment to redistribute to protesters thus preventing revolution</i>	1	8 (0, 8)	11 (0, 11)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 13)	6 (0, 13)	8 (0, 15)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	6 (0, 15)
	2	4 (0, 4)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	4 (0, 4)	3 (0, 3)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	2 (0, 4)
	3	4 (0, 5)	4 (0, 5)	4 (0, 4)	8 (1, 10)	6 (0, 7)	7 (1, 8)	6 (2, 6)	9 (3, 9)	6 (0, 10)
<i>Democratization to increase support for incumbent party</i>	1	4 (0, 17)	5 (0, 16)	11 (0, 33)	38 (6, 44)	13 (0, 28)	15 (4, 38)	10 (10, 10)	11 (11, 11)	13 (0, 44)
	2	7 (0, 11)	8 (0, 13)	0 (0, 8)	8 (0, 12)	14 (0, 23)	16 (0, 24)	15 (0, 23)	13 (0, 13)	10 (0, 24)
	3	1 (0, 8)	1 (0, 7)	2 (0, 9)	3 (1, 10)	3 (0, 9)	3 (1, 11)	4 (0, 16)	3 (0, 12)	3 (0, 16)
<i>Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war</i>	1	8 (4, 13)	11 (5, 16)	11 (0, 11)	13 (13, 19)	13 (9, 13)	19 (15, 19)	10 (10, 10)	11 (11, 11)	12 (0, 19)
	2	7 (0, 7)	8 (0, 8)	8 (0, 8)	8 (0, 8)	3 (0, 3)	4 (0, 4)	15 (0, 15)	25 (0, 25)	10 (0, 25)
	3	3 (1, 3)	3 (1, 3)	2 (0, 2)	3 (2, 3)	3 (2, 3)	3 (2, 3)	2 (0, 2)	3 (0, 3)	3 (0, 3)
<i>Democracy to reduce patronage</i>	1	13 (0, 13)	11 (0, 11)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 13)	6 (0, 13)	4 (0, 12)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	6 (0, 13)
	2	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	4 (0, 4)	3 (0, 3)	4 (0, 4)	8 (0, 8)	13 (0, 13)	4 (0, 13)
	3	0 (0, 2)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 2)	0 (0, 3)	1 (0, 3)	1 (0, 3)	0 (0, 4)	0 (0, 6)	0 (0, 6)
<i>Democracy the result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"</i>	1	13 (4, 13)	16 (5, 16)	22 (11, 22)	25 (13, 44)	16 (9, 25)	23 (15, 35)	20 (0, 20)	22 (0, 22)	20 (0, 44)
	2	7 (4, 14)	8 (4, 17)	15 (8, 23)	15 (8, 23)	14 (9, 20)	20 (12, 24)	15 (8, 23)	25 (13, 38)	15 (4, 38)
	3	13 (9, 19)	14 (9, 20)	16 (11, 21)	16 (10, 22)	12 (8, 16)	13 (9, 16)	20 (12, 25)	24 (12, 26)	16 (8, 26)
<i>At least one of the arguments</i>	1	33 (8, 42)	37 (11, 42)	56 (11, 56)	63 (31, 75)	41 (19, 50)	58 (35, 69)	40 (20, 40)	44 (22, 44)	46 (8, 75)
	2	25 (4, 32)	29 (4, 38)	23 (8, 38)	35 (8, 42)	34 (9, 46)	44 (12, 56)	46 (8, 62)	63 (13, 75)	37 (4, 75)
	3	18 (9, 32)	19 (9, 32)	23 (11, 35)	26 (11, 40)	21 (8, 31)	22 (9, 33)	27 (12, 45)	32 (12, 44)	23 (8, 45)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent.


Table A5b: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments “probably” or “very probably” fit (percentage of cases). By wave, excluding reverse waves.

	Wave	Democratization concept								Average
		Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	
<i>Democracy as commitment to redistribute to protesters thus preventing revolution</i>	1	8 (0, 8)	11 (0, 11)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 13)	6 (0, 13)	8 (0, 15)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	6 (1, 15)
	2	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
	3	4 (0, 6)	5 (0, 6)	4 (0, 4)	9 (1, 11)	7 (0, 7)	7 (1, 8)	6 (2, 6)	9 (3, 9)	6 (0, 11)
<i>Democratization to increase support for incumbent party</i>	1	4 (0, 17)	5 (0, 16)	11 (0, 33)	38 (6, 44)	13 (0, 28)	15 (4, 38)	10 (10, 10)	11 (11, 11)	13 (0, 44)
	2	5 (0, 10)	6 (0, 11)	0 (0, 8)	5 (0, 10)	14 (0, 19)	13 (0, 13)	9 (0, 18)	0 (0, 0)	6 (0, 19)
	3	1 (0, 8)	1 (0, 7)	2 (0, 7)	3 (0, 9)	3 (0, 9)	3 (0, 9)	4 (0, 14)	3 (0, 12)	2 (0, 14)
<i>Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war</i>	1	8 (4, 13)	11 (5, 16)	11 (0, 11)	13 (13, 19)	13 (9, 13)	19 (15, 19)	10 (10, 10)	11 (11, 11)	12 (0, 19)
	2	10 (0, 10)	11 (0, 11)	8 (0, 8)	10 (0, 10)	5 (0, 5)	6 (0, 6)	18 (0, 18)	29 (0, 29)	12 (0, 29)
	3	2 (1, 2)	2 (1, 2)	2 (0, 2)	4 (3, 4)	3 (2, 3)	3 (2, 3)	2 (0, 2)	3 (0, 3)	3 (0, 4)
<i>Democracy to reduce patronage</i>	1	13 (0, 13)	11 (0, 11)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 13)	6 (0, 13)	4 (0, 12)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	6 (0, 13)
	2	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	5 (0, 5)	5 (0, 5)	6 (0, 6)	9 (0, 9)	14 (0, 14)	5 (0, 14)
	3	0 (0, 2)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 2)	0 (0, 4)	1 (0, 4)	1 (0, 4)	0 (0, 4)	0 (0, 6)	0 (0, 6)
<i>Democracy the result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"</i>	1	13 (4, 13)	16 (5, 16)	22 (11, 22)	25 (13, 44)	16 (9, 25)	23 (15, 35)	20 (0, 20)	22 (0, 22)	20 (0, 44)
	2	10 (5, 19)	11 (6, 22)	17 (8, 25)	14 (10, 24)	14 (10, 24)	19 (13, 25)	18 (9, 27)	29 (14, 43)	16 (5, 43)
	3	13 (9, 19)	14 (9, 20)	17 (11, 22)	16 (11, 23)	12 (8, 16)	13 (9, 17)	20 (12, 26)	24 (12, 26)	16 (8, 26)
<i>At least one of the arguments</i>	1	33 (8, 42)	37 (11, 42)	56 (11, 56)	63 (31, 75)	41 (19, 50)	58 (35, 69)	40 (20, 40)	44 (22, 44)	46 (8, 75)
	2	24 (5, 33)	28 (6, 39)	25 (8, 42)	29 (10, 38)	33 (10, 43)	38 (13, 44)	45 (9, 64)	57 (14, 71)	35 (5, 71)
	3	19 (9, 32)	20 (9, 33)	24 (11, 35)	27 (11, 41)	21 (8, 32)	22 (9, 32)	28 (12, 44)	32 (12, 44)	24 (8, 44)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent.

Figure A2: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments “probably” or “very probably” fit (percentage of cases, averaged across 8 democratization measures). By wave, including reverse waves.



Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Table A6: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments “probably” or “very probably” fit (percentage of cases). All waves, just democratizations that were not reversed.

	Democratization concept							V	V+	Average
	Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5				
<i>Democracy as commitment to redistribute to protesters thus preventing revolution</i>	4 (0, 4)	4 (0, 4)	5 (0, 5)	9 (1, 12)	6 (0, 9)	7 (1, 10)	0 (0, 0)	7 (4, 7)	5 (0, 12)	
<i>Democratization to increase support for incumbent party</i>	4 (0, 15)	4 (0, 14)	5 (0, 12)	9 (1, 16)	6 (0, 16)	8 (3, 18)	0 (0, 5)	4 (0, 4)	5 (0, 18)	
<i>Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war</i>	6 (2, 6)	6 (2, 6)	5 (0, 5)	4 (1, 6)	3 (0, 3)	4 (1, 4)	5 (0, 5)	4 (0, 4)	4 (0, 6)	
<i>Democracy to reduce patronage</i>	0 (0, 4)	0 (0, 2)	0 (0, 2)	1 (0, 6)	4 (0, 8)	3 (0, 6)	5 (0, 9)	0 (0, 4)	2 (0, 9)	
<i>Democracy the result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"</i>	19 (15, 26)	20 (16, 28)	22 (17, 29)	19 (14, 26)	14 (10, 19)	16 (13, 23)	23 (14, 32)	22 (11, 30)	19 (10, 32)	
<i>At least one of the arguments</i>	28 (15, 43)	29 (16, 43)	33 (17, 43)	33 (16, 46)	28 (10, 39)	32 (16, 43)	27 (14, 41)	33 (11, 41)	31 (10, 46)	

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent. Reversals: for Polity, if in period up to 2015 Polity2 fell below level reached in year condition for Polity “democratization” first met; for MDT, if in period up to 2015 Polity2 fell below level reached in year of “Major Democratic Transition”; for MDT6, if in period up to 2015 Polity2 fell below 6; for LIED4, if in period up to 2015 index fell below 4; for LIED5, if in period up to 2015 index fell below 5; for V, if in period up to 2015 v2x_polyarchy fell below level reached in year condition for V “democratization” first met; for V+ if in period up to 2015 e_v2x_api_5C fell below .75.

Table A7: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments “probably” or “very probably” fit (percentage of cases). All waves, just high information cases.

	Democratization concept								Average
	Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	
<i>Democracy as commitment to redistribute to protesters thus preventing revolution</i>	5 (0, 6)	6 (0, 7)	5 (0, 5)	9 (1, 11)	8 (0, 9)	9 (1, 11)	5 (2, 5)	8 (3, 8)	7 (0, 11)
<i>Democratization to increase support for incumbent party</i>	1 (0, 8)	1 (0, 8)	0 (0, 8)	4 (2, 11)	4 (0, 15)	5 (1, 16)	2 (0, 12)	0 (0, 5)	2 (0, 16)
<i>Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war</i>	3 (1, 4)	3 (1, 4)	3 (0, 3)	5 (3, 6)	6 (3, 6)	7 (4, 7)	5 (2, 5)	8 (3, 8)	5 (0, 8)
<i>Democracy to reduce patronage</i>	2 (0, 4)	1 (0, 2)	2 (0, 3)	2 (0, 5)	3 (0, 6)	2 (0, 5)	2 (0, 5)	3 (0, 8)	2 (0, 8)
<i>Democracy the result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"</i>	13 (8, 17)	14 (9, 19)	19 (12, 24)	18 (13, 25)	13 (9, 18)	16 (12, 21)	19 (12, 25)	24 (14, 27)	17 (8, 27)
<i>At least one of the arguments</i>	22 (8, 35)	23 (9, 36)	29 (12, 41)	32 (16, 44)	28 (11, 40)	32 (16, 45)	28 (14, 44)	35 (16, 43)	29 (8, 45)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: Just cases where source set graded A or B (“no serious disagreement on relevant points” and “a lot” or “a moderate amount” of information). BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 \geq 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C \geq .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent.

Table A8: Democratizations “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes (percentage of cases).

	Democratization concept								
	Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	Average
Relations with regime outsiders									
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: “slippery slope”</i>	9 (2, 16)	8 (1, 14)	10 (1, 19)	9 (4, 16)	8 (3, 14)	9 (3, 14)	11 (3, 16)	12 (2, 16)	10 (1, 19)
<i>Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies</i>	14 (1, 18)	14 (1, 18)	15 (3, 22)	11 (2, 15)	14 (2, 19)	11 (2, 17)	9 (1, 14)	12 (2, 18)	13 (1, 22)
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: “counterproductive violence”</i>	24 (16, 31)	25 (16, 32)	29 (20, 37)	25 (15, 30)	21 (14, 26)	19 (12, 24)	20 (9, 27)	16 (10, 25)	22 (9, 37)
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition</i>	10 (3, 17)	10 (3, 18)	13 (4, 24)	13 (4, 19)	11 (4, 18)	12 (4, 19)	15 (4, 26)	12 (2, 27)	12 (2, 27)
<i>Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups</i>	20 (7, 29)	20 (7, 29)	23 (8, 34)	16 (5, 27)	16 (5, 26)	15 (5, 26)	16 (4, 27)	16 (2, 27)	18 (2, 34)
<i>Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly).</i>	20 (10, 24)	21 (11, 26)	25 (14, 33)	21 (11, 29)	20 (8, 26)	19 (9, 26)	24 (12, 30)	27 (16, 31)	22 (8, 33)
Relations with regime insiders									
<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders, leading to overthrow of incumbent</i>	16 (7, 18)	17 (7, 19)	22 (9, 25)	15 (8, 18)	13 (7, 16)	13 (7, 17)	14 (7, 18)	12 (4, 18)	15 (4, 25)
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state’s repressive capacity</i>	29 (15, 39)	30 (16, 40)	28 (11, 44)	24 (12, 35)	21 (10, 30)	19 (9, 29)	30 (16, 39)	29 (14, 35)	26 (9, 44)
<i>Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)</i>	7 (5, 9)	7 (4, 9)	8 (5, 10)	8 (5, 11)	8 (4, 10)	8 (4, 11)	8 (4, 11)	12 (6, 14)	8 (4, 14)
Relations with international actors									
<i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)</i>	16 (10, 18)	15 (10, 17)	18 (11, 20)	15 (11, 18)	14 (8, 17)	14 (8, 17)	20 (11, 22)	25 (16, 27)	17 (8, 27)
At least one mistake	75 (58, 76)	75 (59, 77)	85 (65, 89)	68 (54, 73)	69 (48, 72)	67 (46, 69)	74 (50, 77)	80 (51, 82)	74 (47, 89)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent.

Table A9a: Democratizations “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes (percentage of cases). By wave, including reverse waves.

	Wave	Polity	MDT	MDT6	Democratization concept					Average
					BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	
<i>Relations with regime outsiders</i>										
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: “slippery slope”</i>	1	17 (4, 17)	16 (0, 16)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 13)	6 (0, 9)	8 (0, 8)	20 (0, 20)	22 (0, 22)	13 (0, 22)
	2	7 (0, 11)	8 (0, 8)	15 (0, 15)	0 (0, 4)	0 (0, 3)	0 (0, 4)	0 (0, 8)	0 (0, 0)	4 (0, 15)
	3	11 (2, 21)	9 (1, 19)	12 (2, 25)	15 (6, 22)	13 (4, 20)	13 (4, 20)	14 (4, 20)	15 (3, 21)	13 (1, 25)
<i>Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies</i>	1	25 (4, 25)	26 (5, 26)	33 (11, 33)	19 (6, 19)	22 (6, 22)	15 (4, 15)	10 (0, 10)	11 (0, 11)	20 (0, 33)
	2	11 (0, 11)	13 (0, 13)	15 (0, 15)	8 (0, 8)	11 (0, 20)	8 (0, 16)	8 (0, 8)	13 (0, 13)	11 (0, 20)
	3	11 (1, 18)	10 (1, 18)	11 (2, 21)	11 (2, 18)	12 (2, 18)	11 (2, 17)	10 (2, 16)	12 (3, 21)	11 (1, 21)
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: “counterproductive violence”</i>	1	17 (4, 17)	21 (5, 21)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 6)	9 (6, 9)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	9 (0, 21)
	2	21 (18, 25)	25 (21, 29)	31 (31, 31)	19 (15, 19)	20 (14, 23)	8 (8, 12)	8 (0, 8)	0 (0, 0)	17 (0, 31)
	3	27 (18, 36)	26 (17, 34)	32 (21, 42)	30 (18, 37)	25 (16, 31)	25 (15, 31)	27 (14, 37)	24 (15, 38)	27 (14, 42)
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition</i>	1	13 (8, 25)	11 (11, 26)	22 (22, 44)	13 (13, 25)	6 (3, 16)	4 (4, 15)	0 (0, 20)	0 (0, 22)	8 (0, 44)
	2	4 (0, 4)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	8 (0, 8)	11 (6, 11)	12 (8, 12)	8 (0, 8)	0 (0, 0)	6 (0, 12)
	3	8 (2, 16)	8 (2, 17)	11 (2, 23)	12 (3, 19)	11 (3, 19)	12 (3, 20)	18 (6, 29)	15 (3, 32)	12 (2, 32)
<i>Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups</i>	1	29 (13, 33)	32 (11, 37)	22 (0, 33)	19 (0, 25)	16 (0, 19)	15 (0, 19)	30 (0, 30)	33 (0, 33)	25 (0, 37)
	2	14 (0, 14)	17 (0, 17)	23 (0, 23)	12 (0, 12)	17 (0, 23)	16 (0, 20)	8 (0, 8)	13 (0, 13)	15 (0, 23)
	3	20 (8, 34)	20 (8, 32)	25 (11, 39)	18 (7, 33)	16 (8, 30)	16 (8, 30)	16 (6, 31)	12 (3, 29)	18 (3, 39)
<i>Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning; and/or manipulating results non-optimally) falsifying too blatantly)</i>	1	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	13 (0, 13)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	2 (0, 13)
	2	25 (11, 25)	29 (13, 29)	31 (15, 31)	23 (15, 23)	20 (9, 20)	20 (12, 20)	23 (8, 23)	13 (13, 13)	23 (8, 31)
	3	23 (13, 30)	23 (13, 30)	28 (16, 39)	24 (11, 36)	22 (10, 32)	22 (10, 32)	29 (16, 37)	38 (21, 44)	26 (10, 44)

Relations with regime insiders										
<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders, leading to overthrow of incumbent</i>	1	8	11	22	6	6	4	0	0	7
		(0, 8)	(0, 11)	(0, 22)	(0, 6)	(3, 6)	(0, 4)	(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, 22)
	2	11	8	8	8	6	4	8	0	6
	(4, 11)	(0, 8)	(0, 8)	(4, 8)	(3, 6)	(4, 4)	(8, 8)	(0, 0)	(0, 11)	
	3	13	14	18	13	12	12	12	15	13
	(7, 16)	(7, 17)	(11, 23)	(9, 19)	(6, 17)	(6, 17)	(4, 18)	(6, 24)	(4, 24)	
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity</i>	1	33	37	11	6	3	4	0	0	12
		(13, 42)	(16, 42)	(0, 22)	(0, 13)	(0, 3)	(0, 4)	(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, 42)
	2	29	29	23	31	37	28	38	25	30
	(25, 43)	(25, 46)	(23, 54)	(23, 42)	(23, 46)	(20, 36)	(38, 46)	(25, 25)	(20, 54)	
	3	29	30	32	26	22	21	35	41	29
	(15, 39)	(16, 40)	(14, 46)	(13, 37)	(12, 34)	(12, 33)	(18, 45)	(18, 47)	(12, 47)	
<i>Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)</i>	1	4	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	2
		(4, 8)	(5, 5)	(0, 0)	(0, 6)	(0, 6)	(0, 4)	(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, 8)
	2	4	4	0	0	6	8	0	0	3
	(4, 11)	(4, 13)	(0, 15)	(0, 4)	(3, 11)	(4, 12)	(0, 8)	(0, 0)	(0, 15)	
	3	9	8	11	12	9	10	12	18	11
	(5, 9)	(4, 8)	(7, 11)	(7, 15)	(5, 11)	(5, 12)	(6, 14)	(9, 21)	(4, 21)	
Relations with international actors										
<i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)</i>	1	29	32	22	19	25	27	30	33	27
		(21, 38)	(21, 42)	(11, 33)	(13, 25)	(9, 31)	(12, 35)	(0, 30)	(0, 33)	(0, 42)
	2	18	17	31	19	11	12	23	38	21
	(18, 18)	(17, 17)	(31, 31)	(19, 19)	(9, 11)	(8, 12)	(23, 23)	(38, 38)	(8, 38)	
	3	12	11	14	12	12	11	18	21	14
	(6, 13)	(6, 13)	(7, 16)	(9, 16)	(8, 16)	(8, 15)	(10, 20)	(15, 24)	(6, 24)	
At least one mistake	1	75	74	67	44	59	46	50	56	59
		(54, 75)	(58, 74)	(44, 67)	(31, 56)	(25, 66)	(19, 50)	(0, 50)	(0, 56)	(0, 75)
	2	64	67	77	65	74	72	62	63	68
	(61, 68)	(63, 71)	(69, 85)	(62, 69)	(51, 77)	(48, 72)	(54, 69)	(50, 63)	(48, 85)	
	3	77	77	89	73	70	70	82	91	79
	(58, 79)	(58, 79)	(67, 93)	(56, 76)	(53, 72)	(53, 73)	(59, 84)	(65, 94)	(53, 94)	

Source: Author's assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDT6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as "democratic" (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence "probably" or "very probably" consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence "very probably" consistent and then percentage for which at least "maybe" consistent.

Table A9b: Democratizations “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes (percentage of cases). By wave, excluding reverse waves.

	Wave	Polity	MDT	MDT6	Democratization concept					Average
					BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	
<i>Relations with regime outsiders</i>										
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"</i>	1	17	16	11	6	6	8	20	22	13
		(4, 17)	(0, 16)	(0, 11)	(0, 13)	(0, 9)	(0, 8)	(0, 20)	(0, 22)	(0, 22)
	2	10	11	17	0	0	0	0	0	5
		(0, 14)	(0, 11)	(0, 17)	(0, 5)	(0, 5)	(0, 6)	(0, 9)	(0, 0)	(0, 17)
	3	11	9	11	15	13	13	14	15	13
		(1, 21)	(0, 19)	(0, 22)	(5, 23)	(4, 20)	(4, 19)	(4, 18)	(3, 21)	(0, 23)
<i>Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies</i>	1	25	26	33	19	22	15	10	11	20
		(4, 25)	(5, 26)	(11, 33)	(6, 19)	(6, 22)	(4, 15)	(0, 10)	(0, 11)	(0, 33)
	2	10	11	17	10	10	6	9	14	11
		(0, 10)	(0, 11)	(0, 17)	(0, 10)	(0, 19)	(0, 19)	(0, 9)	(0, 14)	(0, 19)
	3	11	11	11	13	12	12	10	12	11
		(1, 19)	(1, 19)	(2, 22)	(3, 20)	(2, 19)	(2, 19)	(2, 16)	(3, 21)	(1, 22)
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"</i>	1	17	21	11	6	9	4	0	0	9
		(4, 17)	(5, 21)	(0, 11)	(0, 6)	(6, 9)	(0, 4)	(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, 21)
	2	29	33	33	19	24	13	9	0	20
		(24, 29)	(28, 33)	(33, 33)	(14, 19)	(19, 29)	(13, 19)	(0, 9)	(0, 0)	(0, 33)
	3	28	27	31	32	24	24	28	24	27
		(18, 38)	(16, 36)	(20, 43)	(18, 39)	(14, 31)	(14, 31)	(14, 38)	(15, 38)	(14, 43)
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition</i>	1	13	11	22	13	6	4	0	0	8
		(8, 25)	(11, 26)	(22, 44)	(13, 25)	(3, 16)	(4, 15)	(0, 20)	(0, 22)	(0, 44)
	2	5	6	0	10	14	13	9	0	7
		(0, 5)	(0, 6)	(0, 0)	(0, 10)	(5, 14)	(6, 13)	(0, 9)	(0, 0)	(0, 14)
	3	9	9	11	14	12	12	18	15	13
		(2, 18)	(2, 19)	(2, 24)	(4, 22)	(4, 21)	(4, 20)	(6, 30)	(3, 32)	(2, 32)
<i>Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups</i>	1	29	32	22	19	16	15	30	33	25
		(13, 33)	(11, 37)	(0, 33)	(0, 25)	(0, 19)	(0, 19)	(0, 30)	(0, 33)	(0, 37)
	2	14	17	25	10	14	19	9	14	15
		(0, 14)	(0, 17)	(0, 25)	(0, 10)	(0, 19)	(0, 19)	(0, 9)	(0, 14)	(0, 25)
	3	19	19	24	16	15	15	16	12	17
		(9, 34)	(9, 33)	(11, 39)	(8, 33)	(8, 30)	(8, 30)	(6, 32)	(3, 29)	(3, 39)
<i>Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning; and/or manipulating results non-optimally) falsifying too blatantly</i>	1	0	0	0	0	13	4	0	0	2
		(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, 13)	(0, 4)	(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, 13)
	2	24	28	25	24	19	19	18	14	21
		(14, 24)	(17, 28)	(17, 25)	(19, 24)	(14, 19)	(19, 19)	(9, 18)	(14, 14)	(9, 28)
	3	23	24	28	23	22	22	28	38	26
		(13, 31)	(13, 32)	(17, 39)	(10, 37)	(10, 33)	(10, 32)	(16, 36)	(21, 44)	(10, 44)


Relations with regime insiders

<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders, leading to overthrow of incumbent</i>	1	8 (0, 8)	11 (0, 11)	22 (0, 22)	6 (0, 6)	6 (3, 6)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	7 (0, 22)
	2	14 (5, 14)	11 (0, 11)	8 (0, 8)	10 (5, 10)	10 (5, 10)	6 (6, 6)	9 (9, 9)	0 (0, 0)	9 (0, 14)
	3	14 (8, 18)	15 (8, 19)	19 (11, 24)	15 (10, 22)	13 (7, 19)	13 (6, 19)	12 (4, 18)	15 (6, 24)	15 (4, 24)
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity</i>	1	33 (13, 42)	37 (16, 42)	11 (0, 22)	6 (0, 13)	3 (0, 3)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	12 (0, 42)
	2	24 (19, 43)	22 (17, 44)	17 (17, 50)	33 (24, 48)	43 (29, 57)	38 (25, 50)	36 (36, 45)	29 (29, 29)	30 (17, 57)
	3	29 (13, 39)	31 (14, 40)	33 (15, 46)	27 (13, 38)	22 (12, 35)	22 (12, 34)	36 (18, 46)	41 (18, 47)	30 (12, 47)
<i>Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)</i>	1	4 (4, 8)	5 (5, 5)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 6)	3 (0, 6)	0 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	2 (0, 8)
	2	0 (0, 10)	0 (0, 11)	0 (0, 17)	0 (0, 5)	0 (0, 5)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 9)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 17)
	3	10 (6, 10)	9 (5, 9)	11 (7, 11)	14 (8, 16)	10 (6, 12)	11 (6, 13)	12 (6, 14)	18 (9, 21)	12 (5, 21)
Relations with international actors <i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)</i>	1	29 (21, 38)	32 (21, 42)	22 (11, 33)	19 (13, 25)	25 (9, 31)	27 (12, 35)	30 (0, 30)	33 (0, 33)	27 (0, 42)
	2	24 (24, 24)	22 (22, 22)	33 (33, 33)	24 (24, 24)	14 (14, 14)	13 (13, 13)	27 (27, 27)	43 (43, 43)	25 (13, 43)
	3	12 (7, 13)	12 (7, 13)	15 (7, 17)	13 (9, 16)	11 (7, 15)	11 (7, 15)	18 (10, 20)	21 (15, 24)	14 (7, 24)
At least one mistake	1	75 (54, 75)	74 (58, 74)	67 (44, 67)	44 (31, 56)	59 (25, 66)	46 (19, 50)	50 (0, 50)	56 (0, 56)	59 (0, 75)
	2	67 (62, 71)	67 (61, 72)	75 (67, 83)	71 (67, 76)	71 (62, 76)	69 (56, 69)	64 (55, 73)	71 (57, 71)	69 (55, 83)
	3	80 (60, 82)	80 (60, 82)	91 (69, 94)	76 (58, 80)	71 (54, 74)	71 (54, 74)	82 (60, 84)	91 (65, 94)	80 (54, 94)

Source: Author's assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDT6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as "democratic" (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence "probably" or "very probably" consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence "very probably" consistent and then percentage for which at least "maybe" consistent.

Figure A3: Democratizations that were “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes, (percentage of cases, averaged across 8 democratization measures). By wave, including reverse waves.



- A: Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: “slippery slope”.
- B: Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies.
- C: Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: “counterproductive violence”.
- D: Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition.
- E: Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups.
- F: Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly).
- G: Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders, leading to replacement of incumbent.
- H: Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state’s repressive capacity.
- I: Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it).
- J: Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent.
- K: At least one mistake.

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Table A10: Democratizations “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes (percentage of cases). All waves, just high information cases.

	Democratization concept								Average
	Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	
Relations with regime outsiders									
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: “slippery slope”</i>	13 (3, 23)	11 (1, 20)	14 (2, 25)	13 (5, 21)	13 (4, 20)	13 (4, 21)	14 (4, 21)	16 (3, 22)	13 (1, 25)
<i>Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies</i>	12 (1, 17)	12 (1, 18)	10 (2, 19)	12 (2, 17)	15 (2, 20)	12 (2, 18)	11 (0, 14)	14 (0, 19)	12 (0, 20)
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: “counterproductive violence”</i>	25 (15, 33)	27 (15, 34)	31 (19, 39)	28 (16, 35)	28 (17, 33)	25 (14, 31)	23 (9, 32)	16 (8, 30)	25 (8, 39)
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition</i>	8 (3, 17)	9 (3, 19)	10 (3, 24)	14 (4, 22)	13 (3, 22)	12 (4, 22)	18 (5, 32)	14 (3, 35)	12 (3, 35)
<i>Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups</i>	22 (9, 30)	22 (9, 30)	24 (10, 32)	16 (4, 27)	18 (6, 29)	17 (6, 28)	16 (5, 28)	14 (3, 27)	18 (3, 32)
<i>Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly).</i>	22 (14, 27)	23 (14, 29)	29 (17, 37)	23 (13, 32)	23 (11, 30)	22 (11, 29)	26 (14, 32)	30 (19, 32)	25 (11, 37)
Relations with regime insiders									
<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders leading to replacement of incumbent.</i>	10 (6, 12)	10 (6, 12)	14 (8, 17)	14 (8, 17)	10 (7, 13)	10 (6, 13)	9 (4, 12)	8 (3, 14)	10 (3, 17)
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state’s repressive capacity</i>	31 (18, 43)	32 (19, 43)	29 (15, 46)	25 (16, 38)	22 (15, 34)	21 (14, 33)	35 (21, 44)	35 (16, 38)	29 (14, 46)
<i>Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)</i>	9 (6, 12)	9 (6, 11)	8 (7, 12)	9 (5, 13)	8 (5, 11)	10 (5, 11)	9 (5, 12)	14 (8, 16)	10 (5, 16)
Relations with international actors									
<i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)</i>	13 (6, 14)	12 (6, 13)	14 (7, 14)	15 (11, 16)	16 (9, 18)	14 (9, 16)	21 (11, 21)	27 (16, 27)	16 (6, 27)
At least one mistake	78 (61, 79)	80 (63, 81)	88 (66, 90)	77 (59, 79)	78 (58, 79)	75 (55, 75)	82 (54, 84)	89 (54, 89)	81 (54, 90)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent.

Table A11: Democratizations “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes (percentage of cases). All waves, just cases not reversed.

	Democratization concept								
	Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	Average
Relations with regime outsiders									
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: “slippery slope”</i>	13 (2, 19)	12 (0, 16)	10 (0, 14)	13 (3, 22)	13 (3, 19)	12 (2, 17)	18 (0, 23)	15 (0, 19)	13 (0, 23)
<i>Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies</i>	9 (2, 13)	10 (2, 14)	10 (2, 17)	10 (3, 16)	10 (1, 16)	10 (1, 16)	5 (0, 14)	7 (4, 19)	9 (0, 19)
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: “counterproductive violence”</i>	17 (9, 30)	18 (10, 29)	19 (10, 33)	22 (12, 29)	14 (8, 20)	15 (9, 21)	9 (5, 23)	19 (7, 30)	16 (5, 33)
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition</i>	9 (2, 17)	12 (4, 20)	12 (5, 21)	13 (3, 22)	11 (3, 16)	12 (2, 17)	23 (5, 27)	19 (4, 30)	14 (2, 30)
<i>Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups</i>	19 (9, 20)	20 (10, 22)	24 (10, 29)	16 (7, 26)	13 (5, 23)	12 (5, 22)	9 (0, 18)	15 (0, 22)	16 (0, 29)
<i>Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly)</i>	17 (9, 20)	18 (10, 22)	24 (14, 31)	22 (10, 32)	22 (11, 27)	21 (11, 26)	32 (18, 32)	33 (15, 33)	23 (9, 33)
Relations with regime insiders									
<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders leading to overthrow of incumbent</i>	11 (9, 13)	14 (10, 16)	17 (12, 21)	16 (12, 20)	10 (6, 16)	10 (6, 16)	5 (0, 9)	7 (4, 19)	11 (0, 21)
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state’s repressive capacity</i>	26 (13, 35)	27 (14, 39)	29 (12, 43)	22 (10, 33)	23 (10, 34)	22 (10, 33)	36 (18, 41)	37 (11, 44)	28 (10, 44)
<i>Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)</i>	15 (9, 15)	14 (8, 14)	14 (10, 14)	14 (9, 17)	13 (8, 14)	13 (7, 15)	14 (14, 18)	19 (11, 22)	14 (7, 22)
Relations with international actors									
<i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)</i>	17 (9, 19)	14 (8, 16)	21 (14, 24)	16 (13, 19)	10 (9, 15)	10 (9, 15)	18 (18, 18)	26 (22, 30)	16 (8, 30)
At least one mistake	75 (60, 75)	76 (62, 76)	88 (68, 88)	72 (57, 77)	65 (51, 69)	65 (50, 68)	82 (64, 82)	93 (67, 93)	77 (50, 93)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent. Reversals: for V, if in period up to 2015 v2x_polyarchy fell below level reached in first year in the transition sequence in which v2x_polyarchy rose by .3 or more points; for V+ if in period up to 2015 e_v2x_api_5C fell below .75.

Table A12: Democratizations “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes (percentage of cases). All waves, only temporally proximate mistakes.

	Democratization concept								
	Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	Average
Relations with regime outsiders									
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"</i>	8 (2, 15)	6 (1, 13)	9 (1, 16)	8 (4, 15)	8 (3, 13)	8 (3, 14)	9 (1, 15)	12 (2, 16)	9 (1, 16)
<i>Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies</i>	14 (1, 18)	14 (1, 19)	18 (3, 24)	13 (2, 17)	14 (2, 19)	12 (2, 17)	11 (1, 15)	12 (2, 18)	13 (1, 24)
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"</i>	25 (16, 31)	26 (16, 32)	32 (20, 39)	25 (15, 30)	21 (13, 26)	19 (11, 24)	18 (8, 24)	14 (8, 24)	22 (8, 39)
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition</i>	8 (3, 16)	9 (3, 17)	11 (4, 23)	12 (4, 18)	11 (4, 17)	11 (4, 18)	12 (3, 23)	10 (2, 25)	11 (2, 25)
<i>Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups</i>	16 (7, 25)	16 (6, 25)	16 (6, 28)	11 (4, 21)	10 (3, 21)	11 (4, 21)	8 (1, 19)	8 (2, 20)	12 (1, 28)
<i>Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly).</i>	21 (10, 25)	22 (11, 27)	27 (14, 34)	21 (11, 30)	21 (8, 27)	20 (9, 26)	26 (12, 31)	29 (16, 33)	23 (8, 34)
Relations with regime insiders									
<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders leading to replacement of incumbent.</i>	10 (5, 12)	11 (4, 13)	16 (8, 20)	9 (6, 13)	9 (4, 12)	9 (4, 13)	7 (4, 11)	8 (4, 14)	10 (4, 20)
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity</i>	27 (15, 38)	29 (16, 39)	27 (11, 44)	24 (12, 34)	20 (10, 30)	20 (9, 29)	26 (15, 35)	25 (14, 31)	25 (9, 44)
<i>Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)</i>	7 (4, 9)	7 (4, 9)	9 (4, 11)	8 (4, 11)	8 (3, 10)	8 (4, 11)	9 (4, 12)	14 (6, 16)	9 (3, 16)
Relations with international actors									
<i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)</i>	14 (9, 16)	14 (9, 16)	16 (10, 19)	11 (9, 15)	14 (8, 17)	14 (8, 17)	16 (8, 18)	20 (12, 22)	15 (8, 22)
At least one mistake	72 (53, 76)	73 (54, 77)	82 (58, 87)	63 (46, 71)	64 (42, 70)	65 (43, 69)	70 (41, 73)	76 (45, 78)	71 (41, 87)

Source: Author's assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent. Mistakes judged “temporally proximate” if they occurred within 3 years of the start of the process of regime change.

Table A13: Democratizations “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes (percentage of cases). All waves, only mistakes in which leader participated.

	Democratization concept								
	Polity	MDT	MDT6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5	V	V+	Average
Relations with regime outsiders									
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: “slippery slope”</i>	8 (2, 16)	7 (1, 14)	9 (1, 18)	8 (4, 15)	8 (3, 13)	8 (3, 14)	8 (1, 14)	10 (2, 14)	8 (1, 18)
<i>Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies</i>	16 (1, 20)	16 (1, 20)	19 (3, 26)	15 (2, 18)	16 (2, 21)	14 (2, 19)	12 (1, 16)	14 (2, 20)	15 (1, 26)
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: “counterproductive violence”</i>	25 (16, 31)	26 (16, 32)	31 (21, 38)	26 (15, 31)	22 (14, 26)	20 (12, 24)	19 (9, 26)	16 (10, 25)	23 (9, 38)
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition</i>	10 (3, 18)	11 (3, 19)	13 (3, 24)	13 (3, 19)	12 (4, 19)	13 (4, 20)	14 (3, 24)	12 (2, 27)	12 (2, 27)
<i>Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or unavoidably alienates key groups</i>	21 (8, 31)	22 (8, 31)	24 (9, 36)	18 (5, 28)	17 (5, 28)	17 (6, 28)	19 (5, 30)	20 (4, 31)	20 (4, 36)
<i>Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly).</i>	22 (11, 26)	22 (12, 27)	27 (14, 35)	22 (11, 30)	20 (8, 26)	20 (9, 26)	26 (12, 31)	29 (16, 33)	23 (8, 35)
Relations with regime insiders									
<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders leading to overthrow of incumbent</i>	17 (7, 19)	18 (7, 20)	22 (9, 26)	14 (8, 18)	14 (7, 17)	14 (7, 17)	12 (7, 16)	12 (4, 18)	15 (4, 26)
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state’s repressive capacity</i>	31 (15, 42)	33 (16, 43)	32 (12, 47)	27 (12, 37)	23 (10, 33)	22 (9, 32)	30 (15, 39)	29 (14, 35)	29 (9, 47)
<i>Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)</i>	5 (3, 7)	5 (3, 6)	5 (4, 8)	6 (4, 9)	7 (3, 9)	7 (4, 9)	5 (4, 8)	8 (6, 10)	6 (3, 10)
Relations with international actors									
<i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)</i>	16 (10, 18)	17 (10, 19)	21 (12, 23)	15 (12, 18)	16 (8, 19)	15 (8, 19)	23 (11, 24)	29 (16, 31)	19 (8, 31)
At least one mistake	72 (57, 76)	73 (58, 76)	82 (63, 87)	65 (51, 72)	66 (45, 71)	65 (46, 68)	70 (47, 73)	76 (51, 78)	71 (45, 87)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” under Polity definition; MDT6: “Major Democratic Transition” ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED); V: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years; V+: Increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending as “democratic” (e_v2x_api_5C ≥ .75). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence “probably” or “very probably” consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence “very probably” consistent and then percentage for which at least “maybe” consistent.

Table A14a: Political liberalizations “probably” or “very probably” caused in part by incumbents’ mistakes (percentage of cases).

	Political liberalization concept		
	Polity liberalization	VDEM liberalization	Average
Relations with regime outsiders			
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"</i>	10 (3, 15)	9 (4, 17)	9 (3, 17)
<i>Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies</i>	12 (0, 14)	4 (0, 4)	8 (0, 14)
<i>Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"</i>	19 (11, 25)	30 (9, 30)	25 (9, 30)
<i>Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition</i>	5 (1, 8)	22 (9, 22)	14 (1, 22)
<i>Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups</i>	16 (7, 25)	17 (9, 26)	17 (7, 26)
<i>Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly).</i>	14 (7, 15)	17 (4, 26)	16 (4, 26)
Relations with regime insiders			
<i>Avoidably alienating previously supportive (civilian) elites or creating divisions among regime insiders leading to overthrow of incumbent</i>	7 (3, 7)	9 (4, 9)	8 (3, 9)
<i>Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity</i>	32 (19, 36)	30 (26, 48)	31 (19, 48)
<i>Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)</i>	7 (4, 8)	0 (0, 4)	3 (0, 8)
Relations with international actors			
<i>Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)</i>	12 (8, 14)	9 (0, 9)	11 (0, 14)
At least one mistake	63 (51, 63)	61 (48, 65)	62 (48, 65)

Source: Author's assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: Polity liberalization: increase of at least 6 points on Polity2 scale within 3 years, ending at Polity2 < 6; VDEM liberalization: increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending with e_v2x_api_5C < .75. Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence "probably" or "very probably" consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence "very probably" consistent and then percentage for which at least "maybe" consistent.

Table A14b: Political liberalizations for which deliberate choice arguments “probably” or “very probably” fit (percentage of cases).

	<i>Political liberalization concept</i>		<i>Average</i>
	<i>Polity liberalization</i>	<i>VDEM liberalization</i>	
<i>Democracy as commitment to redistribute to protesters thus preventing revolution</i>	5 (0, 7)	0 (0, 0)	3 (0, 8)
<i>Democratization to increase support for incumbent party</i>	3 (0, 8)	9 (0, 27)	6 (0, 27)
<i>Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war</i>	5 (3, 7)	0 (0, 0)	3 (0, 8)
<i>Democracy to reduce patronage</i>	3 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	1 (0, 6)
<i>Democracy the result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"</i>	7 (4, 12)	9 (9, 18)	8 (4, 27)
<i>At least one of the arguments</i>	16 (5, 29)	17 (9, 43)	17 (5, 49)

Source: Author’s assessments. See *Democratization Synopses* for historical sources.

Note: Polity liberalization: increase of at least 6 points on Polity2 scale within 3 years, ending at Polity2 < 6; VDEM liberalization: increase of at least .3 on the VDEM electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) within 3 years, ending with e_v2x_api_5C < .75. Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence "probably" or "very probably" consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence "very probably" consistent and then percentage for which at least "maybe" consistent.