Seniority-based Nominations and Political Careers*

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Ònline Appendix

Abstract

This paper investigates party use of seniority systems to allocate nominations for elected and appointed offices. Such systems, which can regulate party members' access to offices at multiple levels of their careers, are defined by two main rules or norms: an incumbent renomination norm, and a seniority progression norm. Using comprehensive electoral and candidate data from Norwegian local and national elections from 1945-2019, we find systematic patterns consistent with these two norms. Our work illuminates an institutional aspect of candidate selection that the current literature has ignored, while noting some of the important consequences of seniority-based nominations for party cohesion and stability.

Keywords: seniority systems; political selection; returns to office.

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Figure A.1: Political careers before entering Parliament for the first time



Note: Sample is restricted to candidates winning a seat in parliament for the first time in the 1977-2009 period (N=574). Direct elections for the regional office are first held in 1975. A small fraction of candidates that started their career simultaneously at the local and regional level are classified as "local-regional-national".

Figure A.2: Main parties' position on the left-right scale by county



Note: The figure displays local council members' average self-placement on a scale from 0 (the extreme left) to 10 (the extreme right) by party and county. The survey data, which comprise 120 municipalities, are collected in 2007 (N = 2180) and 2011 (N = 2266). The main parties are: the Socialist Left Party (SV), the Labor Party (AP), the Center Party (SP), the Christian Peoples' Party (KRF), the Liberal Party (V), the Conservative Party (H), and the Progress Party (FRP). The figure is reproduced from Fiva, J. H., T. Hagen and R. J. Sørensen (2014). 'Kommunal Organisering: Effektivitet, styring og demokrati', Universitetsforlaget, 7th edition.

Figure A.3: Covariate balance for councilor analysis



Note: The top panels display standard RD plots using a bandwidth of 10 percentage points. Separate linear lines are estimated below and above the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatter points. The solid vertical line represents a zero win margin, indicating the transition from barely missing out on a seat to barely winning. Each dot represents a binned average for 1 percentage point intervals. The baseline sample consists of all candidates running for municipal office for the main parties in the 2007-2011 period (N=104,393). We exclude candidates running for lists that do not win any seats (2,647 observations), candidates where we lack information about personal votes (8,873 observations), and cases with ties between two candidates (which are broken by the initial ranking on the list) (444 observations). The final sample is restricted to candidates which are next in line to win a seat or first in line to lose a seat (N=7,734). The bottom panels display the RD estimates and 95% confidence intervals as a function of the bandwidth chosen. The black triangles correspond to the point estimate from the optimal bandwidth chosen by the Calonico et al. (2014) algorithm, as obtained by the rdrobust module in Stata.

Figure A.4: National career returns to local office



Note: The top panels display standard RD plots using a bandwidth of 10 percentage points. Separate linear lines are estimated below and above the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatter points. The solid vertical line represents a zero win margin, indicating the transition from barely missing out on a seat to barely winning. Each dot represents a binned average for 1 percentage point intervals. In addition to the sample restrictions mentioned in Figure 5, we also exclude candidates that previously ran for national office (919 observations). The bottom panels display the RD estimates and 95% confidence intervals as a function of the bandwidth chosen. The black triangles correspond to the point estimate from the optimal bandwidth chosen by the Calonico et al. (2014) algorithm, as obtained by the rdrobust module in Stata.

Figure A.5: Getting elected as mayor leads to future national success in small municipalities



*Note: The top-row displays averages of Run, Win, and Days for lists with and without the mayor, by list rank of the candidate. The second row provides estimates of $\lambda_1, ..., \lambda_{10}$ based on equation (4). The sample is restricted to candidates ranked in position $1-10$ for one of the seven main parties in municipalities with below median population size in the 2003-2011 period (N=26,231). We exclude candidates that previously ran for national office, municipalities with directly elected mayors, and lists where the elected mayor is not in the top-ranked position. Standard errors are clustered at the party-parliamentary district-year level (**367** clusters).*

Figure A.6: Getting elected as mayor leads to future national success in large municipalities



*Note: The top-row displays averages of Run, Win, and Days for lists with and without the mayor, by list rank of the candidate. The second row provides estimates of $\lambda_1, ..., \lambda_{10}$ based on equation (4). The sample is restricted to candidates ranked in position $1-10$ for one of the seven main parties in municipalities with above median population size in the 2003-2011 period (N=35,548). We exclude candidates that previously ran for national office, municipalities with directly elected mayors, and lists where the elected mayor is not in the top-ranked position. Standard errors are clustered at the party-parliamentary district-year level (**398** clusters).*

Figure A.7: Density plot



Note: This figure shows a McCrary (2008) density plot for the forcing variable used in the analyses of RQ3 and RQ4. There is no evidence of any sorting around the threshold for winning a seat in parliament.

Figure A.8: Covariate balance for national-level analysis



Note: The full sample covers national election candidates running for one of the seven main parties in the 1953-2013 period. Candidates who list an occupation on the ballot within the following categories are categorized as white-collar: Managers, professionals, technicians, clerical support workers, and service and sales workers. We limit the RD analysis to candidates that are less than 5 percentage points away from the seat threshold in the current election, and that never previously won a seat in parliament or was close to doing so (i.e. within the five-percentage window) (N=1,000). Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatterpoints. The bottom panels show how the RD estimate varies as a function of the bandwidth chosen. The black triangles correspond to the point estimate from the optimal bandwidth chosen by the Calonico et al. (2014) algorithm, as obtained by the rdrobust module in Stata.

Figure A.9: Intra-party fights over nominations



Note: The left-hand panel plots the fraction of spots contested by list rank. The right-hand panel plots the fraction of spots contested by candidates' seat rank security. The sample is limited to candidates running for one of the seven main parties in the 2017 election (N=1,955). A candidate's seat rank security is defined as the number of seats won by his or her party in the last election (in a given district), minus the candidate's rank on the list in the current election. Seat rank securities of less than -10 and more than 4 are grouped with -10 and 4, respectively. We define a winnable spot as a position on the ballot that would secure a seat in parliament if the election outcome was as in the previous election, i.e., non-negative seat securities.

Figure A.10: Future party switching for councilors and mayors elected in 2003



Note: This figure displays the fraction of councilors (N=9597) and mayors (N=397) elected in 2003 that run for a different main party in the 2005-2019 period. Local elections are held in 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019. National elections are held in 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017.

Figure A.11: National-level re-nomination, overall and in winnable spots, by four categories. Cases with long illnesses excluded.



Note: This figure displays the fraction re-nominated (left-hand panel), the fraction re-nominated in a winnable spot (center panel) and the fraction elected (right-hand panel), and corresponding 95% confidence intervals, by four categories: Deputies that did not replace an MP that died in office (N=6542), elected candidates (N=933), deputies that replace MPs that die early in their election period (below the median; N=12) and deputies that replace MPs that die late in their election period (above the median; N=13). We exclude five deputies promoted less than six months before the next election because they are promoted after the lists for the next election must be ready. We also drop seven cases of "long illness". The sample is limited to candidates that never previously won a seat in parliament.

Figure A.12: Returns to local office



Note: Panel A displays RD plots using a bandwidth of 10 %-points. The outcome variable is the change in income from year $t-4$ to year $t-3, ..., t+8$, respectively. The election takes place in September of year t. Income is measured in constant (2015) NOK 1000, and is truncated at NOK 5,000,000. We use income data for the 1999-2017 period. The solid vertical line represents a zero win margin, indicating the transition from barely missing out on a seat to barely winning. Each dot represents a binned average for 1 percentage point intervals. The baseline sample consists of all candidates running for municipal office for the main parties in the 2003-2011 period (N=160,540). We exclude candidates running for lists that do not win any seats (3,726 observations), candidates where we lack information about personal votes (11,258 observations), and cases with ties between two candidates (which are broken by the initial ranking on the list) (665 observations). The final sample is restricted to candidates which are next in line to win a seat or first in line to lose a seat (N=12,336). Panel B displays RD estimates and 95% confidence intervals as a function of the bandwidth chosen.

Figure A.13: Returns to office for mayors



Note: The sample is limited to first-ranked candidates running for one of the seven main parties in the 2011 election (1833 candidates; N=27,371). We exclude party lists with an incumbent mayor. Income is measured in constant (2015) NOK 1000, and is truncated at NOK 5,000,000. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level (425 clusters).

Figure A.14: Split-sample analysis of mayors' returns to office



Note: This figure show how incomes change over time for those who become mayor for just one term (2011-2015), those who become mayor for two terms (2011-2019), and mayoral candidates who are not appointed to mayor in 2011. In total there are 204 new mayors appointed for main party lists in 2011. 108 of these are not reappointed in 2015. Their average income is given by the black line in the top panel. The average income for the 96 re-appointed mayors is given by the black line in the bottom panel. Otherwise the samples are constructed as in Figure A.13.

Figure A.15: Returns to national office



Note: Panel A displays standard RD plots where the outcome variables are the change in income from year $t-4$ to year $t-3, ..., t+8$, respectively. The election takes place in September of year t. Separate linear lines are estimated below and above the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatter points. Income is measured in constant (2015) NOK 1000, and is truncated at NOK 5,000,000. We use income data for the 1969-2017 period, and national election candidates running for one of the seven main parties in the 1973-2009 period. We limit the RD analysis to candidates that are less than 5 percentage points away from the seat threshold in the current election, that never previously won a seat in parliament or was close to doing so (i.e. within the five-percentage window), and that have no previous experience from cabinet. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatterpoints. The black triangles correspond to the point estimate from the optimal bandwidth chosen by the Calonico et al. (2014) algorithm, as obtained by the rdrobust module in Stata.

Table A.1: Observations by Year

Election Year	N
1945	117
1949	62
1953	51
1957	42
1961	42
1965	52
1969	68
1973	69
1977	67
1981	52
1985	59
1989	69
1993	72
1997	68
2001	59
2005	69
2009	59
Total	**1,077**

Note: This table provides the number of observations in each year in the analysis presented in Figure 1. The sample is restricted to candidates winning a seat in parliament for the first time in the 1945-2009 period (N=1,077).

Table A.2: Mayoral effects

	(1) Run	(2) Run	(3) Win	(4) Win	(5) Days	(6) Days
Rank 1 X Mayor	0.151***	0.132***	0.025***	0.025***	52.643***	54.323***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(13.814)	(14.589)
Rank 2 X Mayor	-0.028**	0.002	-0.001	0.001	3.352	7.212
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(5.748)	(6.138)
Rank 3 X Mayor	-0.001	0.020**	0.002	0.003	8.596	11.278
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(7.243)	(7.786)
Rank 4 X Mayor	-0.009	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	2.722	4.109
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(6.750)	(7.252)
Rank 5 X Mayor	0.006	0.008	-0.000	0.000	0.584	1.360
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(4.474)	(4.855)
Rank 6 X Mayor	0.024***	0.030***	0.001	0.001	-0.248	0.182
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(1.294)	(1.406)
Rank 7 X Mayor	0.013**	0.014***	-0.001**	-0.001**	-2.430**	-2.496*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(1.194)	(1.297)
Rank 8 X Mayor	0.027***	0.025***	-0.000	-0.000	1.398	1.031
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(4.357)	(4.711)
Rank 9 X Mayor	0.023***	0.021***	-0.001**	-0.001**	-1.925**	-2.165**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.929)	(1.035)
Rank 10 X Mayor	0.024***	0.023***	0.002	0.001	0.689	0.502
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(2.584)	(2.775)
Personal votes (share of party total)		0.458***		0.024***		52.548***
		(0.020)		(0.005)		(10.698)
Gender (Female=1)		0.018***		0.001**		2.027**
		(0.002)		(0.000)		(0.887)
Age in election year		-0.002***		-0.000***		-0.193***
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.037)
Mean of outcome var.	0.057	0.058	0.002	0.002	3.521	3.715
R-squared	0.07	0.10	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Observations	61689	57042	61689	57042	61689	57042

*Note: This table provides estimates of $\lambda_1, ..., \lambda_{10}$ based on equation (4). The sample is restricted to candidates ranked in position $1-10$ for one of the seven main parties in the 2003-2011 period. Standard errors are clustered at the party-parliamentary district-year level (**398** clusters). * $p < 0.10$,** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Summary statistics of control variables are as follows: Personal vote, N=57,042, Mean=.11, SD=.10, Min/Max=0/1; Gender, N=61,655, Mean=.42, SD=.50, Min/Max=0/1; Age, N=61,683, Mean=46.34, SD=13.05, Min/Max=18/104.*