**The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload:**

**Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India**

**Contents**

**Figure A1: Focus Group Discussion Instrument**

| 1) Morale<br><br>Degree to which BDOs express enthusiasm and motivation with regard to their role as agents of local development.<br><br>Score:<br><br>☐1  ☐2  ☐3  ☐4  ☐5 | 1) How would you describe the work and duties of a BDO?<br><br>2) If you were to compare your daily work to a common type of job (e.g. postal worker, fire fighter, soldier, cricket player, etc.), what would you choose and why?<br><br>3) Can you give some examples of accomplishments you are particularly proud of?<br><br>4) Do you feel that you are able to promote meaningful development in your blocks? | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Score 1: Purely functional description of duties; total apathy or disappointment with content of work; difficulty mentioning examples of accomplishments; apathy or no ability to promote meaningful development. | Score 3: Mostly functional description of duties but some mention of broader goals; mix of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with content of work; some examples of accomplishments; some ability to promote meaningful development. | Score 5: Enthusiastic sense of broader goals; enthusiasm about content of work; abundant examples of accomplishments; strong sense of efficacy as agents of development. |

Discussion Notes:

| 2) Resources<br><br>Degree to which BDOs express satisfaction with the availability of resources relative to the work they need to complete.<br><br>Score: | 1) Are you provided with enough physical resources to do your job effectively?<br><br>2) What are some ways that an absence of resources slows down your work?<br><br>3) If the state were to allocate money to improving resources and facilities, where should that money be spent? | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5 | Score 1: Strong frustration with lack of resources; abundant examples of resource shortages; dire need for resources and many suggestions about where additional money could be spent. | Score 3: Mix of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with resources; some examples of resource shortages; moderate need for resources and some suggestions about where additional money could be spent. | Score 5: High degree of satisfaction with resources; no or very few examples of resource shortages; mild need for resources and no or very few suggestions about where additional money could be spent. |

Discussion Notes:

| 3) Management<br><br>Degree to which the BDO and lower-level employees work together effectively as a team.<br><br>Score:<br><br>☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5 | 1) How reliable and effective are the staff in your offices?<br><br>2) How do you monitor the activities of your field staff?<br><br>3) Is it difficult to motivate your staff? How do you make sure they are doing their work properly? | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Score 1: Strong frustration with laziness or dishonesty on the part of employees; no concrete examples of monitoring strategies; total inability to motivate junior employees to work properly and no examples of motivating strategies. | Score 3: Mix of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with quality of employees; a few concrete examples of monitoring strategies; some ability to motivate junior employees to work properly, but skewed toward punishment. | Score 5: High degree of confidence in employees; abundant examples of concrete monitoring strategies; strong sense of ability to motivate employees, using a balance of rewards, punishments, and trainings. |

Discussion Notes:

| 4) Meritocracy<br><br>Degree to which BDOs are rewarded for good performance with predictable career advancement.<br><br>Score:<br><br>☐ 1  ☐ 2  ☐ 3  ☐ 4  ☐ 5 | 1) How do you feel about the frequency of transfers?<br><br>2) Do you have any influence over where you are posted and is the system fair?<br><br>3) If you work hard, is there a chance of promotion to a higher position in the long run?<br><br>4) What role do elected politicians play in the transfer system? | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Score 1: Extremely excessive transfers; no control over arbitrary or unfair transfers; no prospect for career advancement; intense political interference and strong desire to reduce influence of politicians. | Score 3: Somewhat excessive transfers; little influence over postings and partly fair transfer system; some chance of promotion; moderate political interference. | Score 5: Appropriate frequency of transfers; some influence over postings and relatively fair transfer system; good chance of promotion; minor political interference. |

Discussion Notes

| 5) Hierarchy and Flexibility<br><br>Degree to which BDOs are empowered and provided with flexibility to do their jobs effectively.<br><br>Score:<br><br>☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 | 1) BDOs have many responsibilities and schemes to implement. How do you decide what tasks to prioritize when you come in to the office?<br><br>2) If an unusual challenge arises, do you feel empowered to take decisions on your own or do you need to seek approval from superiors?<br><br>3) Do you have enough flexibility to adjust schemes to the needs of different villages or are the rules excessively rigid? Can you provide some examples? | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Score 1: Prioritize mainly on the basis of targets, orders, and requests from superiors and politicians; no flexibility to adapt schemes to specific needs; need to seek approval, which is difficult or time-consuming to obtain. | Score 3: Prioritize partly on the basis of targets, orders, and requests from others but partly own judgment; some flexibility to adapt schemes to specific needs; need to seek approval, which is moderately difficult to obtain. | Score 5: Prioritize largely on the basis of own judgment; considerable flexibility to adapt schemes to specific needs; can usually take decision on own, possibly after quick consultation with superiors. |

Discussion Notes:

We have hypothesized that ruling parties invest more heavily in local bureaucracies located within aligned constituencies in order to claim credit for resulting improvements in the performance of development programs. Another potential channel is that additional public sector employment provides opportunities for corruption through office-selling (Wade 1985). It should be noted that we find that additional employment is greater for contract employment than for regular employees, consistent with the much greater legal hurdles in the case of the latter.

To gauge the prevalence of such kick-backs, we conducted a list experiment with BDOs to estimate the extent of office-selling, randomly providing some BDOs with a list of four items and other BDOs with a list of five items, including office selling, that BDOs may have witnessed in the previous six months. Figure A2 includes the items that were provided in the treatment and control conditions. The benefit of a list experiment is that it statistically protects respondent anonymity, mitigating bias in answers to sensitive questions (see e.g. Glynn 2013). The difference in the average counts reported in the control and treatment conditions represents the estimated share of BDOs who have witnessed office-selling in the previous 6 months. The overall estimate of office selling is 23.2 percent (standard error: 10.47 percent).

Figure A3 reports list-experimental estimates separately for blocks with headquarters located in aligned versus opposition-party constituencies. In blocks with an aligned headquarters constituency the estimate is 33.92 percent (standard error: 13.37 percent). In blocks with an opposition-party controlled headquarters constituency the estimate is 13.13 percent (standard error: 16.86 percent). While the coefficients indicate increased office-selling in aligned constituencies, the difference between the estimates (20.79 percent) is not statistically distinguishable (standard error of 21.27 percent).

This suggests that the improvements in bureaucratic resources in aligned constituencies are not simply a byproduct of patronage politics but potentially consistent with credit-claiming motivations, with political alignment making it easier for ruling parties to claim credit for improvements in local state capacity. We cannot fully rule out a complementary "efficient grease" channel, however, in which ruling parties increase staffing in aligned constituencies, which results in increased kick-backs to co-partisan politicians but also, perhaps inadvertently, improves the performance of development programs by increasing bureaucratic resources in these areas. This would be an interesting area for further research.

**Figure A2: List Experiment on Office-selling**

| Control | Treatment |
|---|---|
| *I am now going to give you a list of 4 statements. Please tell me HOW MANY of them are true for you. I don't want to know which ones, just HOW MANY:* <br><br> 1. I have incurred out-of pocket expenses as BDO in the last 6 months. <br><br> 2. I have worked past 9 pm in the last 6 months. <br><br> 3. I have had to file an FIR against an employee in the last 6 months. <br><br> 4. A computer in the office has broken down in the last 6 months. <br><br><br><br><br><br> How many out of 4 apply? | *I am now going to give you a list of 5 statements. Please tell me HOW MANY of them are true for you. I don't want to know which ones, just HOW MANY:* <br><br> 1. I have incurred out-of pocket expenses as BDO in the last 6 months. <br><br> 2. I have worked past 9 pm in the last 6 months. <br><br> 3. I have encountered an official who has made a payment to a politician or higher official for a posting. <br><br> 4. I have had to file an FIR against an employee in the last 6 months. <br><br> 5. A computer in the office has broken down in the last 6 months. <br><br> How many out of 5 apply? |
| Mean: 2.09 (N=222) | Mean: 2.32 (N=201) |
| Difference: 23.2 percentage points (SE: 10.5) | |

**Figure A3: Comparison of Office-selling Estimates in Blocks with Aligned and Opposition legislators**

| BDOs with Aligned Legislator in HQ | | BDOs with Opposition Legislator in HQ | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Control Mean: 2.03 | Treatment Mean 2.37 | Control Mean: 2.16 | Treatment Mean: 2.29 |
| Difference: 33.9 percentage points (SE: 13.4) | | Difference: 13.1 percentage points (SE: 16.9) | |
| Difference in Estimates (Aligned-Opposition): 20.8 percentage points (SE: 21.3) | | | |

Below, we report analyses including variables representing important alternative explanations for bureaucratic behavior and effectiveness. To control for the strength of career incentives, we include a variable, $INCENTIVES_i$, which represents the reported probability of career advancement linked to effort. BDOs were asked: "If a BDO works hard, is there a chance of promotion to a higher position over the next 10 years? If so, what is the likely next post?" BDOs were given the following choice set of responses: Very Likely (10 out of 10 times), Somewhat Likely (7-9 out of 10 times), Possibly (4-6 out of 10 times), Unlikely (1-3 out of 10 times), No chance (0 out of 10 times). To quantify the response, we assign the median probability corresponding to his or her response (for example a "Very Likely" response is coded as 1.0 while a "Somewhat Likely" response is coded as an 0.8 probability).

To control for the flexibility of organizational norms, which plays a crucial role in bureaucratic adaptation to unforeseen challenges, we include a variable, $FLEXIBILITY_i$, which measures the probability with which a BDO reports he or she could re-purpose funds in the context of a vignette about an approved public works project that has been rendered infeasible due to monsoon rainfalls. BDOs were asked: "Suppose a project for a NREGA road has been officially sanctioned, but early monsoon rainfalls have made it impossible to build, and village officials have come to your office to ask what to do. In this scenario, what is your first course of action? Ultimately, how likely do you think the funds are to be allocated to a new project?" BDOs were given the following choice set: Very Likely (10 out of 10 times), Somewhat Likely (7-9 out of 10 times), Possibly (4-6 out of 10 times), Unlikely (1-3 out of 10 times), No chance (0 out of 10 times). To quantify the response, we assign the median probability corresponding to his or her response.

Finally, to control for the degree of bureaucratic autonomy, which canonical theories hold to be important for state capacity, we include a variable, $AUTONOMY_i$, which measures each BDO's perceived autonomy from political interference by averaging the share of a list of different types of politicians (national, state, local) over whom the BDO expects to prevail over in a hypothetical dispute about where to allocate a project across villages. This variable also ranges between zero (low) and one (high). The distribution of responses across BDOs for these variables is depicted in Figure A4.

Table A1 reports the regression results looking at the impact of bureaucratic resources on implementation while also additionally controlling for the perception-based autonomy, incentives, and flexibility variables. The impact of bureaucratic resources is substantively identical to those reported in the main paper, while these alternative explanatory variables have little predictive power regarding the performance of NREGA.

Table A2 reports the regression results looking at the impact of bureaucratic resources on bureaucratic behavior while also additionally controlling for the perception-based autonomy, incentives, and flexibility variables. The impact of bureaucratic resources is substantively identical to those reported in the main paper, while these alternative explanatory variables have little predictive power regarding bureaucratic time allocation across tasks.

Figure A4: Distribution of Responses to Autonomy, Incentives, and Flexibility Questions

**Autonomy**



Share of Politicians over Whom BDO Prevails

**Incentives**



Probability of Promotion Linked to Effort

**Flexibility**



Probability that Project Can be Re-purposed

## Table A1: Implementation Regression with Additional Controls

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Employment (Days/Capita) | | | Total Expenditure (Rupees/Capita) | | | Wage Payments(Rupees/Capita) | | |
| | Cross-state | Within-state | Within-district | Cross-state | Within-state | Within-district | Cross-state | Within-state | Within-district |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Resource Index | 1.156*** | 0.685*** | 0.991*** | 216.548*** | 117.411*** | 207.297*** | 162.548*** | 100.413*** | 147.922*** |
| | (0.221) | (0.119) | (0.187) | (32.590) | (16.084) | (35.324) | (27.673) | (16.462) | (28.872) |
| Autonomy | −0.273 | −0.331 | −0.644 | −9.691 | −60.931 | −85.025 | −18.116 | −69.112 | −119.685 |
| | (0.610) | (0.410) | (0.507) | (129.750) | (99.922) | (113.952) | (114.533) | (73.170) | (93.047) |
| Incentives | −0.189 | −0.132 | −0.307 | −57.143 | −15.463 | −66.349 | −19.935 | 15.068 | −45.164 |
| | (0.512) | (0.296) | (0.314) | (91.101) | (58.153) | (85.921) | (71.379) | (43.737) | (67.864) |
| Flexibility | 0.486 | 0.625 | 0.483 | −34.056 | 102.099 | 134.121 | −36.999 | 54.984 | 87.946 |
| | (0.598) | (0.447) | (0.527) | (103.002) | (105.384) | (109.338) | (87.647) | (78.036) | (86.132) |
| Observations | 397 | 397 | 397 | 397 | 397 | 397 | 397 | 397 | 397 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.293 | 0.679 | 0.844 | 0.332 | 0.607 | 0.821 | 0.315 | 0.619 | 0.817 |

*Notes*: Unit of analysis is rural development block. Outcome is total days of NREGA employment provided per rural capita in 2016-17 or per capita program expenditures in 2016-17. Within-state specifications control for state fixed effects and within-district specifications control for district fixed effects. All specifications control for BDO-level controls (gender, education, method of civil service entry) and block-level controls (minority share of population, remoteness, literacy rate, and total block rural population). Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within states. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$.

Table A2: Bureaucratic Behavior Regression with Additional Controls

| | Forms | Managing | Planning | Field | Politicians | Citizens | Unrelated | Task Frac |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| *Panel A: Cross-state* | | | | | | | | |
| Resource Index | 3.027*** | 1.711*** | 1.223** | 0.767 | −1.083* | −0.968 | −0.259 | 0.004 |
| | (0.849) | (0.481) | (0.603) | (0.833) | (0.597) | (0.753) | (0.378) | (0.008) |
| Autonomy | 2.480 | 4.470 | −3.693 | 3.302 | −1.792 | 0.753 | 2.013 | 0.068 |
| | (2.904) | (4.013) | (3.386) | (4.041) | (2.852) | (4.292) | (3.183) | (0.049) |
| Incentives | 1.480 | −0.509 | −0.373 | −1.536 | 0.092 | −1.096 | −0.546 | −0.030 |
| | (2.875) | (2.673) | (2.731) | (2.221) | (2.604) | (3.076) | (2.382) | (0.031) |
| Flexibility | 1.076 | −2.524 | 1.168 | 1.131 | 4.435 | 6.522* | −4.736 | −0.025 |
| | (2.525) | (2.924) | (2.571) | (3.485) | (3.500) | (3.634) | (3.313) | (0.044) |
| *Panel B: Within-state* | | | | | | | | |
| Resource Index | 3.276*** | 1.703*** | 1.077 | 0.094 | −0.444 | 0.014 | 0.222 | 0.011 |
| | (1.073) | (0.471) | (0.656) | (0.738) | (0.542) | (0.707) | (0.356) | (0.007) |
| Autonomy | 3.240 | 2.887 | −4.899 | 4.426 | 0.862 | 2.688 | 2.239 | 0.077* |
| | (3.108) | (3.445) | (3.731) | (3.967) | (2.375) | (4.887) | (2.884) | (0.040) |
| Incentives | 2.524 | 0.568 | −0.449 | −0.947 | 2.344 | 0.625 | 0.138 | 0.007 |
| | (2.567) | (2.821) | (2.249) | (2.406) | (2.634) | (2.957) | (2.333) | (0.028) |
| Flexibility | 2.952 | −3.654 | 3.252 | 0.734 | 4.544 | 7.234*** | −7.202* | −0.043 |
| | (2.248) | (3.020) | (2.939) | (3.475) | (3.176) | (2.413) | (3.630) | (0.044) |
| *Panel C: Within-district* | | | | | | | | |
| Resource Index | 2.966*** | 1.098** | 1.637 | −2.095** | −1.537*** | −1.492*** | 0.719 | 0.001 |
| | (0.826) | (0.528) | (0.977) | (0.939) | (0.489) | (0.522) | (0.439) | (0.005) |
| Autonomy | −6.173* | −2.074 | −2.375 | 0.189 | −2.162 | 0.775 | 0.947 | −0.034 |
| | (3.116) | (3.113) | (3.325) | (4.029) | (2.375) | (4.389) | (2.171) | (0.031) |
| Incentives | 1.841 | −0.378 | −1.356 | −1.060 | −1.433 | −1.814 | 0.356 | 0.025 |
| | (2.550) | (2.127) | (2.786) | (2.451) | (2.331) | (2.106) | (1.613) | (0.032) |
| Flexibility | 5.719 | 1.543 | 2.227 | −5.526 | 0.621 | 1.168 | −1.051 | −0.031 |
| | (3.574) | (3.896) | (4.147) | (4.292) | (2.979) | (2.573) | (3.373) | (0.040) |
| Observations | 1,042 | 1,042 | 1,042 | 1,042 | 1,042 | 1,042 | 1,042 | 1,042 |

*Notes*: Unit of analysis is time-usage diary. Outcome is percentage of hours between 10 am and 5 pm allocated to different types of activities. Panel A includes no fixed effects. Panel B controls for state fixed effects and Panel C controls for district fixed effects. All specifications control for BDO traits (gender, education, method of civil service entry) and block-level controls (minority share of population, remoteness, literacy rate, and total block rural population). Analysis estimated by weighted least squares, with weights assigned in inverse proportion to the number of time-usage diaries completed by each BDO. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within states. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Below, we report additional results and robustness tests related to the fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) analysis in the paper looking at the impact of party alignment on the provision of bureaucratic resources across rural development blocks. In Table A3, we report the reduced-form RDD analysis of the impact of (narrowly) electing an aligned legislator in the constituency containing the block headquarters, without instrumenting to account for imperfect compliance arising from the imperfect congruence of block and constituency boundaries. The results, predictably, indicate the same pattern of results: blocks overseen by ruling-party legislators tend to be provided with greater bureaucratic resources, especially personnel. This is true across estimation approaches based on global (cubic) polynomials, local linear regression, robust local linear regression, as well as a local difference in means.

Table A4 reports placebo tests based on running the fuzzy RDD analysis on placebo discontinuities on either side of the true discontinuity at zero. None of these estimates is statistically significant. Note that none of the estimates are statistically significant, though some are very large (with equally gigantic standard errors) due to the weak first stage results arising from the absence of a strong correlation between the placebo discontinuities and the measure of compliance (share of villages located in an aligned constituency). This blows up the coefficients as well as their standard errors. Overall, the results indicate that it is highly unlikely that we arrived at our set of results reported in the main paper by chance.

Table A5 reports placebo tests based on running the fuzzy RDD analysis on additional outcomes variables which are theoretically "downstream" or consequences of bureaucratic resources, which previous results have shown are shaped by party alignment. Utilizing a close-elections fuzzy RDD, where we instrument for the share of villages located in an aligned constituency with the narrow election of an aligned legislator in the constituency containing the block headquarters, we look at the impact of party alignment on various indicators of implementation of NREGA. Unfortunately, these estimates are extremely noisily estimated, with 95 percent confidence intervals that span zero as well as implausibly large effect sizes. This is largely due to the fact the implementation outcomes are characterized by a great deal of variance. We attempt to take the natural log of the outcome variables in some specifications to address this, but still get extremely imprecise estimates.

Our conclusion is that a much larger dataset is needed to appropriately analyze the impact of party alignment on implementation and then to conduct an analysis of intermediate mechanisms with a mediation analysis looking at the role of bureaucratic resources and managerial focus as channels. Future research could also take an experimental approach, potentially seeking to improve staffing or fill vacancies in selected administrative units through an encouragement design. These are both promising pathways for future cumulative research.

However, in the paper, we have provided other forms of evidence for mechanisms. Qualitative evidence based on focus groups suggests that bureaucrats view an inability to focus on managerial tasks as an important consequence of bureaucratic overload as well as a cause of poor implementation. Comparison of the impact of bureaucratic resources on a managerially complex (NREGA) versus a managerially less complex program (Swachh Bharat) also suggests that bureaucratic overload is more detrimental to the implementation of the managerially complex program, highlighting managerial focus as an important channel.

Table A3: Reduced-form RDD Estimates of Aligned Legislator in Block HQ

| | Resource Index | Full-time Employees | Contract Employees | 4-wheel Vehicles | Computers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| *Panel A: Cubic Polynomial* | | | | | |
| Aligned legislator in HQ | 0.59** | 12.77** | 18.66* | 0.51 | 2.74 |
| | (0.30) | (5.68) | (9.87) | (0.49) | (1.78) |
| *Panel B: Local Linear Regression* | | | | | |
| Aligned legislator in HQ | 0.55** | 11.52** | 16.92* | 0.55 | 2.55 |
| | (0.28) | (5.71) | (9.41) | (0.48) | (1.61) |
| *Panel C: Robust Local Linear* | | | | | |
| Aligned legislator in HQ | 0.44 | 12.50* | 14.10 | 0.33 | 1.50 |
| | (0.39) | (7.43) | (10.69) | (0.83) | (2.06) |
| *Panel D: Local Difference in means* | | | | | |
| Aligned legislator in HQ | 0.48** | 8.89** | 13.95* | 0.53 | 2.52* |
| | (0.23) | (4.13) | (7.22) | (0.36) | (1.35) |

*Notes*: Unit of analysis is block. Resource Index is standardized index based on number of full-time employees, contract employees, four-wheel vehicles, and computers per 100,000 residents, with weights assigned on the basis of a principal components analysis. Aligned legislator in HQ is indicator for a ruling-party legislator in constituency containing block headquarters. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: Placebo Tests: Fuzzy RDD Estimates Based on Placebo Discontinuities in Running Variable

| | | | | | | | | | Dependent variable: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Placebo discontinuity | -0.10 | -0.09 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.06 | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| *Panel A: Cubic Polynomial* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aligned | 40.061 | 1.195 | 1.195 | -6.809 | 92.146 | 10.785 | -3.772 | -5.446 | 25.328 | -5.399 | -20.898 | -19.576 | 9.873 | 4.307 | -166.695 | -3.147 | 1.412 | 0.227 |
| | (567.874) | (17.042) | (17.042) | (12.456) | (1,587.175) | (21.868) | (3.898) | (3.888) | (103.011) | (5.295) | (25.074) | (146.951) | (57.561) | (8.677) | (8,541.349) | (8.043) | (2.513) | (1.040) |
| *Panel B: Local Linear Regression* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aligned | -3.368 | -1.387 | -0.565 | 4.747 | 7.123 | 25.393 | -1.332 | -1.691 | -2.125 | -29.005 | 43.778 | 7.713 | -0.470 | -2.529 | -2.563 | -0.881 | -13.173 | 3.977 |
| | (2.259) | (1.633) | (2.037) | (12.510) | (15.709) | (151.412) | (1.869) | (2.145) | (2.422) | (131.358) | (453.303) | (13.429) | (3.753) | (5.274) | (4.242) | (4.167) | (23.939) | (4.991) |
| *Panel C: Robust Local Linear* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aligned | -3.368 | -1.387 | -0.565 | 4.747 | 7.123 | 25.393 | -1.332 | -1.691 | -2.125 | -29.005 | 43.778 | 7.713 | -0.470 | -2.529 | -2.563 | -0.881 | -13.173 | 3.977 |
| | (2.259) | (1.633) | (2.037) | (12.510) | (15.709) | (151.412) | (1.869) | (2.145) | (2.422) | (131.358) | (453.303) | (13.429) | (3.753) | (5.274) | (4.242) | (4.167) | (23.939) | (4.991) |
| *Panel D: Local Difference in means* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aligned | -2.350 | -1.910 | -2.222 | -1.596 | 0.432 | 0.688 | 2.445 | -1.905 | -0.928 | 494.702 | 107.075 | -5.899 | -11.409 | -8.702 | -28.098 | 8.128 | 7.051 | 1.356 |
| | (1.695) | (1.390) | (1.382) | (1.374) | (1.008) | (0.983) | (5.862) | (3.007) | (2.406) | (54,944.450) | (1,736.639) | (8.982) | (12.324) | (10.114) | (65.815) | (9.402) | (6.420) | (1.063) |

*Notes*: Unit of analysis is block. Outcome is standardized bureaucratic resource index based on number of full-time employees, contract employees, four-wheel vehicles, and computers per 100,000 residents, with weights assigned on the basis of a principal components analysis. Each specification runs fuzzy RDD analysis based on a placebo discontinuity in the running variable on either side of the true discontinuity at zero, with different estimation approaches utilized in the different panels. Note that none of the estimates are statistically significant, though some are very large (with equally gigantic standard errors) due to the weak first stage results arising from the absence of a strong correlation between the placebo discontinuities and the measure of compliance (share of villages located in an aligned constituency). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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### Table A5: Fuzzy RDD Analysis of Downstream Variables

| | Days Employment | Total Expenditures | Wage Expenditures | Log Days | Log Expenditure | Log Wages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| *Panel A: Cubic Polynomial* | | | | | | |
| Aligned | −0.34 | 12.63 | 11.32 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.13 |
| | (1.78) | (284.63) | (233.74) | (0.54) | (0.45) | (0.46) |
| *Panel B: Local Linear Regression* | | | | | | |
| Aligned | −0.13 | 67.53 | 54.67 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.25 |
| | (1.53) | (254.02) | (202.09) | (0.45) | (0.37) | (0.38) |
| *Panel C: Robust Local Linear* | | | | | | |
| Aligned | -0.23 | -45.18 | 24.24 | 0.23 | 0.31 | 0.31 |
| | (3.31) | (491.53) | (406.06) | (0.87) | (0.71) | (0.71) |
| *Panel D: Local Difference in means* | | | | | | |
| Aligned | 0.35 | 180.35 | 145.38 | 0.42 | 0.44 | 0.39 |
| | (1.35) | (231.22) | (188.72) | (0.41) | (0.34) | (0.35) |

*Notes*: Unit of analysis is block. Aligned is share of block villages located in an aligned constituency. Running variable is the win/loss vote share of the (eventual) ruling-party candidate in the constituency containing the block headquarters. Each panel utilizes a different fuzzy RDD estimation approach, as described in the paper. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$