

Supplementary Materials to the Article:
“Emigrant Inclusion in Home Country Elections:
Theory and Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa”

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1 Dataset Details

This article utilizes an original dataset of emigrant voter access in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that includes all executive and legislative elections where diaspora citizens abroad had voting rights from 1990 to 2015 (n=141). Before 1990, no countries in SSA extended emigrant voting rights; by 2015 32 out of 48 countries in SSA granted diaspora citizens the legal right to vote for at least one type of national election (Table A1). The dataset includes elections from 29 SSA countries that held at least one executive or legislative election between 1990 and 2015 where diaspora citizens had the legal right to vote.¹ Figure A2 maps the extension of *de jure* emigrant enfranchisement across the continent from 1990 to 2015.


Table A1: Emigrant Enfranchisement by Year of Adoption

1990 - 1999	2000 - 2009	2010 - 2019
Cape Verde (1990)	Cote d'Ivoire (2000)	Kenya (2010)
São Tomé & Príncipe (1990)	Republic of Congo (2001)	Cameroon (2011)
Benin (1990)	Rwanda (2003)	Sierra Leone (2012)
Guinea (1991)	CAR (2004)	DRC (2015)
Mali (1991)	Comoros (2005)	Equatorial Guinea (2015)
Angola (1992)	Ghana (2006)	Gambia (2015)
Djibouti (1992)	Burkina Faso (2009)	
Niger (1992)	Mauritania (2009)	
Senegal (1992)	South Africa (2009) ^a	
Togo (1992)		
Burundi (1993)		
Mozambique (1993)		
South Africa (1993)		
Guinea-Bissau (1994)		
Namibia (1994)		
Chad (1995)		
Botswana (1997)		
Gabon (1998)		

[a] South Africa legally ended foreign voting in 1998, but re-instated after the 2009 Constitutional Court ruling.

1. Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and the Gambia legally extended emigrant voting rights in 2015 but did not hold a national election that year.

Figure A2: Extension of *De Jure* Emigrant Enfranchisement (1990 - 2015)



1.1 Data Structure

To construct the dataset I first identified all executive and legislative elections in SSA from 1990 to 2015 using the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (n=412) (Hyde and Marinov 2012).² I then dropped all national elections for the 16 countries that did not extend emigrant voting rights during the time period, as well as the elections that occurred prior to *de jure* enfranchisement for the 32 countries that did; in total, emigrants had the right to vote in 141 executive and legislative elections in SSA from 1990 to 2015.

There are also a number of countries that legally enfranchise emigrants to vote in either presidential or legislative elections, but not both. For example, Kenya only extends *de jure* emigrant voting rights for presidential elections; Cape Verde and Mozambique initially only enfranchised diaspora citizens for legislative elections. I include only elections where a current national law allows emigrants the right to vote for that *specific* type of election; although emigrants are sometimes entitled to vote in other national elections (e.g. constitutional referenda), I only include elections where political office is at stake.³ The number of elections per country in the dataset ranges from 1 (Kenya, Cameroon) to 11 (Togo). Table A3 presents a list of all elections included in the dataset.

For countries that legally include diaspora voters in both executive and legislative elections, and hold these elections in the same year (and often on the same day), a given country-year may have two observations. These elections (particularly if on the same day) usually have the same external voting provisions for both elections. Yet, effectively double counting observations in time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis is problematic. To take the most empirically conservative approach for the panel, I drop the legislative elections from the sample for each country-year that executive and legislative elections occurred and diaspora

2. I used NELDA v5 released in November 2019.

3. As my argument anticipates, countries often increase emigrant voter access when political office is *not* in play. For example, Morocco set up 526 polling stations around the world for the 2011 constitutional referendum (OPEMAM 2011) but did not organize any external polling stations for the 2016 parliamentary election (Idrissi 2016).

citizens had voting rights for both because I have more fine-grained data (e.g. emigrant voter turnout, etc.) on executive elections than legislative ones. Dropping the executive elections (rather than legislative) from the sample does not change the results. Changing the unit of analysis from country-election to country-election year reduces the panel from $n=141$ to $n=114$. I also dropped an additional 7 elections where I have data on the policies governing diaspora voting provision, but do not have evidence of either implementation or non-implementation ($n=107$).

1.2 Data Collection

As a new field of political science research, there is not an extensive amount of data on external voting provisions, particularly in Africa. The main source of cross-national data on external voting is the Voting From Abroad (VFA) Database created by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2020).⁴ IDEA first compiled VFA in 2007 and periodically updates the database online. VFA codes the *First Year* of emigrant enfranchisement for 210 countries and territories, as well as election types and voting modalities. Given its broad global coverage of 210 countries and territories, VFA has served as the primary data source for most of the existing maps, tables, and analyses of emigrant enfranchisement to date (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Brand 2010; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010; Collyer 2013; Lafleur 2013; Turcu and Urbatsch 2015; Jaulin and Smith 2015). However, there are a number of issues with VFA, including inconsistent and unclear coding, missing data, and minimal source documentation.⁵ The VFA database is particularly limited in its coverage of external voting in Africa, listing “no data” or “not applicable” for 30 countries.

An alternative source for global diaspora voting data is the University of Sussex Emigrant

4. See <http://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voting-abroad>. The earliest attempt at a systematic coding cross-national external voting was Blais, Massicotte, and Yoshinaka (2001), which analyzed whether citizens of 63 democracies lost the right to vote following emigration.

5. For an extended discussion on the data challenges associated with the VFA database, see also Turcu and Urbatsch 2015.

Voting Database, which categorizes 183 countries into a typology of External Voting Systems (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Collyer 2013). However, the Sussex database does not code over time and is limited to legislative elections. A few more recent datasets have made important advances in coding variation in emigrant voting restrictions and policies at the electoral level, but their coverage is mostly limited to Europe and Latin America (Schmid, Piccoli, and Arrighi 2019; Pedroza and Palop-García 2017; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Burgess and Tyburski, forthcoming).

For this database on emigrant voter access in sub-Saharan Africa, I collected a variety of primary sources, including constitutions, electoral laws, and court rulings to document initial legal enfranchisement. For the 32 SSA countries that legally extended diaspora voting rights, I coded multiple variables that shape emigrant voter access, including eligibility criteria (e.g. identification and registration requirements), voting modality (e.g. personal, postal, or proxy voting), and polling locations. Some of these policies are codified in the initial legal documents extending the right to vote; others are specified in subsequent electoral laws and policy memos. Finally, I collected evidence of implementation for every executive and legislative election where diaspora citizens were legally eligible to vote. I consulted websites of electoral commissions, diplomatic bureaus, and embassy webpages, as well as electoral observation mission reports, academic articles, news stories, and social media posts of emigrants documenting their experiences voting abroad.⁶ For 63 elections (out of 85 total), I was able to collect at least some data on emigrant voters, whether the number of registered external voters, emigrant voter turnout, and/or the breakdown of the diaspora vote for each candidate or party. See A5 for source documentation by country.

6. I also informally interviewed diplomats familiar with diaspora voting procedures in a few instances.

1.3 The Extraterritorial Voting Rights and Restrictions dataset (EVRR)

Early in my data collection efforts, I discovered another research team was also working on a time-series dataset of external voting rights and restrictions, led by Nathan Allen (St. Francis Xavier University) and Benjamin Nyblade (University of California Los Angeles School of Law); we began to share information and country source files. In June 2017, three years after our initial conversations, we officially joined forces to create the Extraterritorial Voting Rights and Restrictions dataset (EVRR). EVRR is the first time-series panel dataset that covers multiple dimensions of external voting for 190 countries annually from 1980 to 2017 (Allen, Wellman, and Nyblade 2019). In order to systematically integrate our data, we took our respective country documentation and together created a new set of variables and coding criteria, focusing on documenting three areas of potential barriers to emigrant electoral participation: the institutional framework, voter eligibility, and ballot access. Although the structure of the EVRR dataset is a collaborative effort, I alone was responsible for all data collection and coding for the 54 countries in Africa, including North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan).

Although the Africa data is now integrated into the larger EVRR dataset, the data and analysis presented in this article depart from our collective efforts in three significant ways. First, I focus only on countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The dynamics of diaspora voting in North Africa substantively differ from the rest of the continent. Some authoritarian regimes in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), were early adopters, enfranchising emigrants even prior to 1990 (Brand 2006, 2010). Other countries in the region (Libya, Egypt) extended emigrant voting rights following the 2011 Arab uprisings, often with substantive implementation assistance from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations (Brand 2014; Labovitz 2014). Second, given the geographic and temporal scope of EVRR, and the time-series panel structure of the data, EVRR primarily codes *de jure* restrictions, i.e. how governments officially outline the rules by which emigrant cit-

izens are included in elections. For the purposes of my analysis, it is preferable to test hypotheses related to emigrant voter access with variables that reflect external voting as they occurred during elections rather than as legally specified. Thus, I structure my analysis using country-election-year as the unit of observation. I also recoded key outcome variables for analysis in this manuscript, including the provision of extra polling stations (i.e. *Polls*), using both evidence of actual implementation as well as official policy. *Diaspora Support*, the key explanatory variable in this study, is also unique to this article.

2 Variables

2.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A2.1: Summary Statistics for dataset (n = 141)

Continuous and Ordinal Variables				
Variable Name	mean	sd	min	max
Political Regime	2.11	4.82	-7.00	10.00
State Capacity	0.17	0.10	0.03	0.57
(ln)State Capacity	-1.89	0.54	-3.47	-0.56
Relative Diaspora Size	0.07	0.08	0.00	0.37
(ln)Relative Diaspora Size	-3.14	0.83	-5.49	-0.97
EMB capacity	-0.05	1.09	-2.82	1.69
Remittance/GDP	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.22
(ln)Remittance/GDP	-4.20	1.45	-8.84	-1.53
Dummy and Categorical Variables				
Variable Name	Frequency	Percentage		
Polls = 0: No External Polling Stations	47	33.3		
Polls = 1: Diplomatic Bureaus only	46	32.6		
Polls = 2: Neighborhood Polling Stations	48	34.0		
ID Access = 0: No External Registration	47	33.3		
ID Access = 1: 2 or more specific forms of ID	13	9.22		
ID Access = 2: 1 form of id	36	25.5		
ID Access = 3: Flexible id requirements	19	13.5		
ID Access = .: Missing data	26	18.4		
Diaspora Support = 0: Does Not Support Incumbent	29	20.6		
Diaspora Support = 1: Uncertain Support	84	59.6		
Diaspora Support = 2: Supports Incumbent	28	19.9		
French or Portuguese Colony = 1	107	75.9		
Recent Nearby Implementation = 1	30	21.3		
Proportional Representation = 1	87	64.9		
Year of Democracy = 1	12	8.51		

2.2 Measuring Emigrant Voter Access

There are numerous ways governments shape emigrant voter access to maximize or minimize the participation of citizens abroad (Table A2.2).

Table A2.2: Emigrant Voting Access Options

	Restrictive	Expansive
Eligibility	Specific identification Proof of legal status in host country Excludes dual citizens/refugees Required pre-registration (in person)	Flexible identification Legal status irrelevant Includes dual citizens/refugees No pre-registration
Participation	One type of election Limited locations Limited modalities (i.e. proxy)	All national elections Extra polling stations Multiple modalities
Quotas	Maximum % of electorate Direct Representation	

For example, governments can require citizens to register their residency status with the consulate in order to vote. With the exception of Burundi and South Africa, all countries in Africa that organize voting abroad require diaspora citizens to officially register with their embassy or consulate, with at least six countries requiring in-person registration (e.g. Senegal, Namibia, Guinea-Bissau). For emigrants who do not live near a diplomatic office, or have insecure legal status in the host country, this alone may prove overly burdensome. Governments also restrict diaspora participation to a single type of election (e.g. presidential) or establish quotas that limit diaspora participation relative to the domestic electorate.⁷ Of the 21 SSA countries that have organized diaspora voting, eight limit diaspora participation to presidential elections.⁸ Of the thirteen countries that include diaspora voters in legislative

7. For example, external votes in Cape Verdean elections cannot exceed 20% of the domestic electorate.

8. Benin, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, and Kenya.

elections, five of them (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, and Mali) directly vote for their own diaspora representatives.⁹

As opposed to other countries in the world that offer postal or online voting to their citizens abroad, the only way an emigrant from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) can vote is by personally casting a ballot in an external polling station. Therefore, the two dimensions that most significantly shape emigrant voter access in SSA are 1) the number and location of polling stations abroad and 2) diaspora voter identification and registration requirements.

2.3 Polls: Coding and Examples

Ideally I would be able to collect the number and locations of all the external polling stations for every SSA election where emigrant voting occurred. Unfortunately this information is often not available, though I have collected data wherever possible from electoral commission polling station lists and triangulated with secondary source materials, i.e. election observation reports. Given the data I have collected for all SSA elections with *de jure* external voting rights, I am able to create an ordinal measure for the provision of external polling stations (0 = no external stations; 1 = only embassies and consulates; 2 = neighborhood polling stations in addition to diplomatic bureaus). This measure captures my theoretical assumptions that a) placing polling stations within neighborhoods where emigrants live increases accessibility and b) organizing a network of polling stations beyond embassies and consulates is costly and therefore suggests a larger commitment to emigrant inclusion than organizing polling within the existing diplomatic infrastructure.

0 = no external polling stations

Example: Namibia 2004. The 1994 Electoral Amendment Act (Article 18) discusses “polling station(s) outside of Namibia” for presidential and legislative elections. Yet, as an article

9. Angola established diaspora seats in the 1992 constitution, but never organized diaspora voting in any subsequent elections, and then removed them from the legislature in 2010. Senegal recently established diaspora seats in 2017.

from the African Elections Project (AEP) notes that for the 2009 election Namibians living abroad were able to vote “for the first time in the history of elections in Namibia” there were no external polling stations created for the 2004 elections. Thus, *Polls* for Namibia 2004 is coded as 0.


1 = only embassies and consulates

Example: South Africa 2014. The Electoral Amendment Act of 2013 stipulates that the IEC is required to allow South Africans to vote “outside the Republic [at] a South African embassy, high commission, or consulate” for the National Assembly elections. Further, emigrant voter turnout data and internal documents from the IEC shared with me during interviews confirmed that polling was held at all 124 diplomatic bureaus around the world, but no additional polling stations were established outside of diplomatic posts. Thus, *Polls* for South Africa 2014 is coded as 1.

2 = neighborhood polling stations in addition to diplomatic bureaus

Example: South Africa 1994. Electoral Act 1993 states “The commission shall establish such number of foreign voting stations outside the Republic at such locations, including South African diplomatic missions, as it may consider appropriate...” The IEC election report (1994, p. 56) reported the election featured 187 polling stations abroad, including 23 in the United States and 10 in the United Kingdom, many in cities without a diplomatic presence.

Figure A2.3: Emigrant Polling Stations (1990 - 2015)



2.4 ID access: Coding and Examples

In addition to the external polling station measure, identification and registration requirements also shape emigrant voter access. Registration barriers include requiring specific forms of identification (biometric IDs, valid passport), multiple forms of identification, or a work permit in the destination country. I created an ordinal measure utilizing these requirements, with the assumption that more flexible requirements increase accessibility (0 = no external voter registration; 1 = 2 or more specific forms of identification; 2 = 1 form of identification; 3 = flexible identification requirements).

0 = no external voter registration

Examples: Sierra Leone 2012. Although Article 18 in the Public Elections Act 2012 notes that “the Electoral Commission may make provision for the registration outside Sierra Leone of non-resident citizens of Sierra Leone who may wish to be registered as voters,” a member of the national electoral commission (NEC) announced that diaspora voter registration was not going to occur for the 2012 election because the commission did not know the numbers or location of the diaspora (Sheriff 2007).

1 = 2 or more specific forms of identification

Example: Mauritania 2009. Article 8 of the 2009 law outlining external voting policy (Loi Organique No. 2009-022, 2 April 2009) specifies that potential voters must present both a national identity card or valid passport, as well as valid documentation of residence within the country, including a work permit, rental contract, or consular card.

2 = 1 form of identification

Example: Mali 2013. A number of articles added in 2013 to the 2006 electoral code (Loi Electoral No. 06-044 modified by Loi 2013-017, 21 May 2013) specify voters must have biometric NINA cards in order to vote, including voters abroad. Further, A UNHCR article

reported they facilitated external voting of Malian refugees in Mauritania and Burkina Faso during the 2013 elections by distributing the biometric NINA cards that required for Malian citizens to vote.

3 = flexible identification requirements

Example: Mozambique 2004. The SADC Election Observation Mission Report specifies that in order to register to vote, citizens needed proof of nationality that could be either a national identity card, a passport, or even a birth certificate. However, the report also notes that many Mozambicans living abroad “had no documents identifying them as Mozambicans.”

2.5 Diaspora Political Support: Coding and Examples

I wanted to create a systematic and straightforward of *Diaspora Support* that I could apply at the electoral level across all countries and over time. This task is particularly challenging for numerous reasons. First, as outlined in the article, there is significant heterogeneity and uncertainty regarding emigrant populations—in terms of size, demographics, and level of engagement—that varies by country and over time. Second, there is significant variation over electoral stability during this period in sub-Saharan Africa. Although a number of countries held regularly scheduled elections between institutionalized parties, many others featured much more volatile electoral contexts, including: long, irregular time-gaps between elections; the prevalence of transitional, post-conflict elections; fluid party systems and coalitions; electoral boycotts, etc. I thus coded this variable election by election, incorporating uncertainty whenever large time gaps occurred between elections or those organized by interim governments.

Finally, although pre-election public opinion polling is plentiful in OECD countries, that is not the case outside of Europe and North America (Heath, Fisher, and Smith 2005). Political opinion polling is only beginning to gain traction in much of Africa, and often fraught with methodological challenges, political controversy, and subject to pre-election

blackouts ranging from days to weeks prior to the election (Eibl and Lynge-Mangueira 2017). In short, reliable pre-election polling data does not exist for most African elections, let alone surveys of likely diaspora voters. I have found only a handful of state or political party initiatives to survey diaspora citizens; these often fail due to lack of response or an inability to devise a reliable sampling frame given the absence of information about the total size and whereabouts of the citizenry abroad.

The partisan theory of emigrant inclusion highlights how usual sources of information political parties may use to assess voter support may not be reliable (or exist at all) when citizens are abroad and in contexts of greater political uncertainty. Deriving from the argument, as well as drawing on insights from Hutcheson and Arrighi (2015) and Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei (2019), I thus devised a coding strategy based on a) uncertainty over diaspora support being highest at the initial moment of extension; b) what little information is (or might be) available to an incumbent party to assess potential support; and c) and how perceptions of diaspora support may be updated over time (i.e. following elections). *Diaspora Support* takes the value of 0 if the incumbent party perceives the diaspora as unsupportive, 1 if uncertain of diaspora support and 2 if the incumbent perceives diaspora support. If an incumbent party perceives external voters as supportive we should observe increased external voter access (more inclusive registration requirements, neighborhood polling stations); if an incumbent party perceives external voters support their rivals we should observe restrictive implementation or no implementation whatsoever.

For the first election following legal enfranchisement, I code *Diaspora Support* as equal to 1 (uncertain). I also code as uncertain all elections where I have evidence diaspora voting occurred in the prior election but results by party are not available (e.g. Gabon 2009) or where diaspora votes are assimilated into domestic electoral districts (e.g. Botswana 2014). Additionally, I code *DiasporaSupport* = 1 for elections that occur after a long or irregular time gap (e.g. Angola 2008, Burundi 2010) given that the quality of information from electoral results weakens over time (Sommer-Topcu 2009). Finally, I code some elections as

equal to 1 if diaspora support is uncertain because it appears unpredictably split between political parties (e.g. Benin 1996, Ghana 2012). Indeed, the majority of elections are coded as uncertain (60%), underscoring the theoretical argument.

In contexts of low political information prior electoral results are often the strongest signal available to incumbent parties in both established democracies (Sommer-Topcu 2009) as well as non-OECD contexts (Eibl and Lynge-Mangueira 2017). Thus, where diaspora voter turnout results by party are available (n=46), I code *Diaspora Support* as equal to 2 for cases where the majority of the diaspora voted for incumbent party in the prior election and 0 in cases where the majority of diaspora voters supported the opposition.

That said, it is unrealistic to presume that parties in countries that do not implement external voting do not have perceptions of political leanings abroad. In fact, as I argue, negative perceptions of diaspora support abroad may be the reason why governments do not organize external voting. In the absence of electoral results, I assume incumbent parties rely on other sources of information to assess political support abroad—particularly signals of hostility toward the regime. Indeed, emigration has long served as a mechanism to remove political dissidents (e.g. Miller and Peters 2018). Banned as “terrorist organizations” by colonial regimes, numerous liberation movements, including South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC), Namibia’s South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), and the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) parties operated abroad, their top leaders in exile, with training camps located throughout neighboring countries in Africa (Ellis 2013; Williams 2015). Following independence, most African governments operated as one-party states, once again continuing the tradition of banning political opposition inside the country.

The tradition of opposition parties operating abroad continues today, as opposition parties establish international branches to mobilize supporters and resources (e.g. Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and as opposition leaders of numerous African countries live in exile. Finally, emigrants also stage protests abroad, often in front of embassies and consulates. Thus, for elections following the initial election where emigrants

have diaspora voting rights but governments did not organize any voting abroad, I code *Diaspora Support* as 0 if any of the following criteria are met: a) if any prominent opposition politicians live in exile; b) if the diaspora has protested against the incumbent party; or c) if an opposition party has established offices abroad; otherwise, *Diaspora Support* remains equal to 1 (uncertain).

This is not to say that governments that do organize diaspora voting would not also have access to this information, just that these signals are proxies for support abroad and therefore more noisy than actual voter support. The case of Rwanda is instructive here. Many of the signals that I use to code support for non-implementing countries are present in this case: opposition politicians in exile, diaspora protests against the Kagame regime, etc. Yet, Rwanda's external voter results skew dramatically toward supporting the incumbent party (even more than in-country); for example, Rwandans abroad voted for Kagame 14102 to 213 in the 2010 presidential election. Rwanda, in turn, has steadily expanded voter access abroad with every subsequent election, despite hostility abroad.

0 = Diaspora does not support incumbent party

Example A: Guinea 2015 (implementing). The European Union observation report for the prior presidential election in 2010 reported that nearly 75% of the diaspora voted for Cellou Dalein Diallo, who lost in the second round to Alpha Conde.

Example B: Togo 2015 (non-implementing). Togolese diaspora organized multiple protests for electoral reforms in 2011, 2012, and 2014; Opposition party UFC has numerous offices abroad (<http://www.ufctogo.com/-Nous-contacter-.html>).

1 = Incumbent unsure of diaspora support

Example A: Botswana 2009 (implementing). Votes from abroad are integrated into the regional vote totals, and therefore impossible to assess emigrant voter support by party.

Example B: Angola 2008 (non-implementing). For Angola's first election in 16 years (but

second with *de jure* enfranchisement), I code the election as Diaspora Support = 1 due to the long interim gap between elections. I also code Ghana 2012 as uncertain because both major political parties, the NDC and NPP, have established international branches.

2 = Diaspora supports incumbent party

Example A: Mozambique 2014 (implementing). In the prior election (2009), the official results (CNE 2009) reported votes from the diaspora supported incumbent party FRELIMO 33806 votes to 963 for RENAMO.

Example B: (non-implementing). There is no example where a country did not organize external voting and the incumbent party perceived external support abroad.

Coding this variable using election results raises issues of reverse causality, with the premise that governments organize high emigrant voter access in order increase diaspora support for the incumbent party; i.e., an “if you build it they will come” logic to organizing widespread voting abroad. Indeed, extending political rights to diasporas is often discussed in the literature as one of many potential diaspora engagement strategies governments employ to strengthen ties with citizens abroad (e.g. Leblang 2017; Gamlen 2019). If the strategy to expand implementation is to win over potentially disengaged or hostile diaspora populations, we should observe higher levels of external voter access a) across the board, but particularly in competitive electoral contexts; and b) in countries where governments are implementing other diaspora engagement strategies, i.e. tax incentives or other economic programs.

However, there are both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to support why this is unlikely. As outlined in the manuscript, given the disproportionate costs of organizing voting abroad, high stakes elections, and minimal consequences of non-implementation, organizing expansive voter access poses more potential risk than reward for many incumbent regimes. Hucheson & Arrighi (2015) further suggest we should not observe expansive external voting during initial elections because of the uncertainty over the diaspora electorate

and the need for parties to reach a minimal consensus over emigrant inclusion. My theory similarly suggests that incumbents will take an at best, cautious, and at worst, exclusionary, approach to emigrant inclusion until they have a better sense of diaspora electoral support as well as their potential impact. Indeed, many major expansions of diaspora voting that *have* occurred (e.g. Cape Verde, Senegal) follow opposition parties coming into office with electoral knowledge of their support abroad.

Empirically, I interpret the fact that nearly half of all national elections with *de jure* enfranchisement do not have any organized external voting access to suggest that governments are more reluctant than eager to organize voting abroad. There are also numerous cases where governments have policies designed to strengthen economic ties with citizens abroad but do not offer voting abroad (e.g. Nigeria, Zimbabwe). In their recent analysis of European elections, Turcu and Urbatsch (2019) also do not find empirical evidence for what they call the “enfranchisement gratitude model,” i.e. a boost of support for incumbent parties that initially extended the franchise to citizens abroad.

2.6 Control Variables

Political Regime

Prior cross-national analyses of diaspora voting foreground the importance of electoral competition as a key factor driving enfranchisement (e.g. Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010; Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). However, these studies conceptualize increased political competition as democratization writ large, operationalizing electoral competition using the Polity2 variable from the Polity5 dataset (Marshall and Gurr 2020). I also include Polity2, but as a control for regime type, as the partisan logic of emigrant enfranchisement should operate in both democratic as well as authoritarian contexts. The Polity2 variable ranges from -10 for the most autocratic regimes to 10 the most democratic; my sample ranges from -7 to 10, perhaps given that the unit of observation is at the election level.

State Capacity

A leading explanation for limited emigrant voter access is a lack of capacity. Indeed, external voting is disproportionately expensive; the cost per vote abroad is many times more expensive than the cost per vote domestically (Ellis et al. 2007; Erben, Goldsmith, and Shujaat 2012). We would expect countries with higher state capacity to be able to organize more extensive external voting access. I thus include a measure of state capacity from the Government Revenue Dataset by the International Centre for Tax and Development and United Nations University (ICTD/UNU-WIDER 2020). The *State Capacity* variable measures the total revenue excluding grants and social contributions (i.e. social security taxes) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The measure is recommended by the ICTD researchers as the preferred variable for time-series cross-national analysis. Comparative analyses of capacity measures have also identified it as theoretically and empirically preferable to GDP per capita (Hendrix 2010).

Colonial Heritage

Numerous scholars of African politics have identified divergent colonial legacies as an explanatory variable of institutions, particularly as it pertains to citizenship laws and migration trajectories (Herbst 2000; Manby 2016). France extended both citizenship, and in some cases voting rights, to its African colonial subjects (Cooper 2014). Indeed, existing overviews of external voting in Africa link external voting policy in Francophone countries to this inherited colonial tradition (Iheduru 2011; Hartmann 2015). Former Portuguese colonies also appear to have similar approaches to emigrant political inclusion, particularly in their designation of seats for diaspora citizens in national legislatures. Thus, from Treisman (2007), I include a variable for whether the country is a *Former French or Portuguese Colony*.

Relative Diaspora Size

The perceived size of the diaspora relative to the domestic population also likely influences decisions over enfranchisement, but it is unclear in which direction. On one hand, the larger the diaspora, the greater the incentives and demand may be for governments to recognize their citizenry abroad. For example, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, two countries where the relative diaspora size is currently at least 30% of the population, were two of the initial sub-Saharan African countries to implement external voting during transitional multi-party elections in 1991. On the other hand, the larger the diaspora, the greater the electoral risk and logistical challenges of organizing their inclusion. We may observe attempts to limit their impact or disenfranchise them entirely. Cape Verde channels their large diaspora electorate into six legislative seats (out of 72), as well as maintains a quota to ensure diaspora votes do not comprise more than 20% of the total vote.¹⁰ In 2014, the majority coalition of the National Assembly in São Tomé and Príncipe voted 28 to 26 to exclude the diaspora in the upcoming legislative elections, fearing their loss of their slim majority. All 26 opposition MPs voted against diaspora disenfranchisement. After the opposition party ADI won an absolute majority in the 2014 elections, the National Assembly re-instated emigrant voting for the 2016 presidential elections.

To measure *Diaspora Size* I extend Leblang's (2017) estimate of emigrant populations with World Bank bilateral matrix data from 2013 and 2017, then divide the diaspora estimate by the estimated country population from World Bank's World Development Indicators (Leblang 2017; The World Bank 2013, 2017, 2020).¹¹ Although the World Bank estimates of diaspora populations are the best we have for the purposes of cross-national analysis, they should be assessed with skepticism. If anything, they underscore my contention that governments do not have a precise sense of the size of their diaspora populations. Relative diaspora size ranges from from less than 1 percent of the population (Ethiopia, Madagascar, Djibouti)

10. Even with restrictive measures in place, diaspora votes changed the outcome of the presidential election in both 2001 and 2006.

11. Leblang uses World Bank bilateral matrix data from 1960-2010 to construct the original variable.

to 37 percent (Cape Verde). Due to irregular, seasonal, and undocumented migration, these numbers likely significantly underestimate the actual number of non-resident citizens.¹²

2.7 Alternative Explanations

International Diffusion

Turcu and Urbatsch (2015), the pioneering cross-national analysis of emigrant enfranchisement, found that the likelihood of enfranchisement doubles in the two years after a nearby country enacts voting, suggesting diffusion mechanisms of competitive signaling and policy learning. Their main outcome variable is *Recent Nearby Extension* which takes the value of 1 if any of the nearest six countries “enacted” diaspora voting the previous two years.¹³ Their analysis focused only on theorizing the initial extension of diaspora voting rights; they use “First Year” from the VFA database as their primary source of data. To evaluate this hypothesis in the African context, I employ the same measurement strategy as Turcu and Urbatsch (2015), replacing their enfranchisement data with the data I collected. *Recent Nearby Implementation* takes the value of 1 if any of the nearest six countries organized *de facto* external voting in an election in the prior two years.

Bureaucratic Capacity

Many officials I interviewed from electoral management bodies (EMB) or diplomatic bureaus, whether in South African, Kenyan, or Zimbabwean contexts, noted the high costs

12. There is also ample evidence that governments under-report citizens that have left. For example, World Bank estimates of the Ethiopia diaspora in the early 1990s are listed as less than 200,000 people. Out of a population of more than 50 million, this means that if these numbers were accurate, less than one percent of the population lived abroad. However, as a Migration Policy Institute (2007) report describes, during the military regime between 1974 and 1991, “brutal tactics induced hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians to flee from forced resettlement, ethnic violence, and humanitarian disasters. Facing a massive flight of people, in 1981, the Mengistu regime outlawed departure from Ethiopia without government approval. Anyone who fled was labeled a traitor ‘against the country and the people,’ and could receive a punishment of five to 25 years in prison, or, in extreme cases, life imprisonment or execution.” Indeed, numerous sources estimate the current Ethiopian diaspora at around 2 million people.

13. The six nearest countries are measured by centroid using GeoDa software. Special thanks to Nathan Allen for his assistance.

and difficulties associated with organizing external voting, citing them as justification for limiting emigrant voter access, or the absence of any external voting mechanism. Countless news stories of EMBs announcing that the diaspora will not be able to participate in upcoming elections frequently cite capacity issues. The *EMB Capacity* variable is taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al 2020). *EMB Capacity* is a 5-point ordinal scale (0-4) that answers the question “Does the Electoral Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?” (p. 62). They code zero as “no” (EMBs with glaring deficits), 1 as “not really” (EMBs are seriously compromised), 2 as “ambiguous” (EMBs are seriously compromised but potentially for reasons beyond their control), 3 as “mostly” (EMBs with partial deficits but not widespread) and 4 as “yes” (EMB has the staff and resources to run a quality election). I use the relative scale version of the variable preferred for time series regression analysis (p. 30).

2.8 Additional Control Variables

Diaspora Dependence

An alternative explanation views emigrant enfranchisement as a state strategy to strengthen ties to diaspora citizens (e.g. Barry 2006; Gamlen 2008; Waterbury 2010; Leblang 2017; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018). States adopt diaspora engagement policies to reinforce national identity and attract increased investment back into the country, whether economic contributions or eventual return. This framework suggests states where economic remittances are a significant portion of their economies are more likely to extend emigrant voting rights as a signal of recognition. For many countries in Africa, remittances constitute a sizable percentage of GDP, including Liberia (27 percent), the Gambia (21 percent), and Senegal (14 percent), though official figures likely underestimate the total amount from external citizens. I thus operationalize diaspora engagement as the level of remittances as percentage of GDP (The World Bank 2020).

Democratic Transition

I also include a dichotomous variable for *Democratic Transition*, as defined by Acemoglu et al. (2019), to evaluate the explanations of emigrant enfranchisement that foreground democratization. Acemoglu et al. (2019) construct a dichotomous variable of democracy and non-democracy that utilizes Polity IV and Freedom House data, as well as the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) dataset and the Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) dataset, both of which extended the Przeworski et al. (2000) measure of democracy. Democratic transition occurs the year a country switches from non-democracy to democracy. The supplemental appendix to Acemoglu et al. (2019) contains an extensive discussion of the measure, as well as comparisons to other measures of democracy. 27 countries experienced a democratic transition, with five countries (Sierra Leone, Niger, Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, and Comoros) coded as having multiple democratic transitions, as they toggled back and forth between democratic and non-democracy during the time period.

Proportional Representation

Governments may be concerned with diaspora populations tipping elections in competitive contexts and thus more resistant to increase voting access to emigrants in first-past-the-post electoral systems (e.g. Bauböck 2006). As an additional control, I add a dummy variable for *proportional representation* taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Scartascini, Cruz, and Keefer 2018).

3 Elections in Dataset (Transparency Index)

This table includes all 144 national elections held in sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2015 where diaspora citizens had the legal right to vote, i.e. the elections included in the dataset. The table includes the type of election (executive or legislative) and the name or acronym of the incumbent party (i.e. ruling party) at the time of the election. Elections that were preceded by an interim or transitional government are marked as “transitional.” *External Voting* is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if diaspora voting was organized in any capacity during the election. Elections where I do not have evidence of either implementation or non-implementation (e.g. Guinea 2003) are marked with .e. The table also includes the coding for the three original variables I created for the analysis: *Diaspora Support*, *Polls*, and *ID Access*. See Sections A2.3 - A2.5 for the coding designations, procedure, and examples for each of these variables. See Section A5 for source documentation, organized by country.

Table A3.1: Elections in dataset

Country	Year	Election Type	Incumbent Party	External Voting	Diaspora Support	Polls	ID access
Angola	1992	Legislative	MPLA	0	1	0	0
Angola	2008	Legislative	MPLA	0	1	0	0
Benin	1991	Executive	transitional	1	1	1	
Benin	1996	Executive	independent	0	1	0	0
Benin	2001	Executive	independent	0	0	0	0
Benin	2006	Executive	independent	0	1	0	0
Benin	2011	Executive	independent	1	1	1	
Botswana	1999	Legislative	BDP	1	1	2	
Botswana	2004	Legislative	BDP	1	1	2	2
Botswana	2009	Legislative	BDP	1	1	1	2

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Table A3.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Year	Election Type	Incumbent Party	External Voting	Diaspora Support	Polls	ID access
Botswana	2014	Legislative	BDP	1	1	1	1
Burkina Faso	2015	Executive	transitional	0	1	0	0
Burundi	1993	Executive	UPRONA	1	1	1	
Burundi	2010	Executive	CNDD-FDD	1	1	1	2
Burundi	2010	Legislative	CNDD-FDD	1	1	1	2
Burundi	2015	Legislative	CNDD-FDD	1	1	1	2
Burundi	2015	Executive	CNDD-FDD	1	2	1	2
Cameroon	2011	Executive	RDPC	1	1	2	2
Cape Verde	1991	Legislative	PAICV	1	1	2	3
Cape Verde	1995	Legislative	MPD	1	0	2	3
Cape Verde	1996	Executive	MPD	1	0	2	3
Cape Verde	2001	Legislative	MPD	1	0	2	3
Cape Verde	2001	Executive	MPD	1	2	2	3
Cape Verde	2006	Legislative	PAICV	1	2	2	3
Cape Verde	2006	Executive	PAICV	1	2	2	3
Cape Verde	2011	Executive	PAICV	1	2	2	3
Cape Verde	2011	Legislative	PAICV	1	2	2	3
CAR	2005	Executive	transitional	1	1	1	2
CAR	2011	Executive	Kwa Na Kwa	1	1	1	2
CAR	2015	Executive	transitional	1	1	2	2
Chad	1996	Executive	MPS	1	1	1	
Chad	2001	Executive	MPS	.e	0	1	
Chad	2006	Executive	MPS	.e	0	1	

Continued on next page

Table A3.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Year	Election Type	Incumbent Party	External Voting	Diaspora Support	Polls	ID access
Chad	2011	Executive	MPS	1	0	1	2
Comoros	2006	Executive	independent	0	1	0	0
Comoros	2010	Executive	independent	0	1	0	0
Congo	2002	Legislative	transitional	0	0	0	0
Congo	2002	Executive	transitional	0	1	0	0
Congo	2007	Legislative	PCT	0	0	0	0
Congo	2009	Executive	PCT	0	0	0	0
Congo	2012	Legislative	PCT	0	0	0	0
Cote d'Ivoire	2000	Executive	transitional	0	1	0	0
Cote d'Ivoire	2010	Executive	FPI	1	1	2	
Cote d'Ivoire	2015	Executive	RDR	1	2	2	
Djibouti	1993	Executive	RPP	0	1	1	1
Djibouti	1999	Executive	RPP	1	2	1	1
Djibouti	2005	Executive	RPP	1	2	1	1
Djibouti	2011	Executive	RPP	1	2	1	1
Gabon	1998	Executive	PDG	1	1	1	
Gabon	2005	Executive	PDG	1	1	1	
Gabon	2009	Executive	PDG	1	1	1	
Ghana	2008	Executive	NPP	0	1	0	0
Ghana	2008	Legislative	NPP	0	1	0	0
Ghana	2012	Executive	NDC	0	1	0	0
Ghana	2012	Legislative	NDC	0	1	0	0
Guinea	1993	Executive	transitional	1	1	1	2

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Table A3.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Year	Election Type	Incumbent Party	External Voting	Diaspora Support	Polls	ID access
Guinea	1995	Legislative	PUP	.e	1	1	2
Guinea	1998	Executive	PUP	.e	1	1	2
Guinea	2002	Legislative	PUP	.e	1	1	2
Guinea	2003	Executive	PUP	.e	1	1	2
Guinea	2010	Executive	transitional	1	1	2	3
Guinea	2013	Legislative	RPG	1	0	2	3
Guinea	2015	Executive	RPG	1	0	2	3
Guinea-Bissau	1994	Legislative	PAIGC	1	1	2	
Guinea-Bissau	1999	Legislative	PAIGC	0	1	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	2004	Legislative	PRS	0	1	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	2008	Legislative	PAIGC	0	1	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	2014	Legislative	PAIGC	1	2	2	2
Guinea-Bissau	2014	Executive	PAIGC	1	2	2	2
Kenya	2013	Executive	PNU	1	1	1	2
Mali	1992	Executive	transitional	1	1	1	.e
Mali	1992	Legislative	transitional	0	1	1	.e
Mali	1997	Executive	ADEMA-PASJ	1	1	2	2
Mali	1997	Legislative	ADEMA-PASJ	1	1	2	2
Mali	2002	Legislative	ADEMA-PASJ	1	1	2	2
Mali	2002	Executive	ADEMA-PASJ	1	1	2	2
Mali	2007	Executive	ADP	1	1	2	2
Mali	2007	Legislative	ADP	1	1	2	2
Mali	2013	Legislative	ADP	1	1	2	2

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Table A3.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Year	Election Type	Incumbent Party	External Voting	Diaspora Support	Polls	ID access
Mali	2013	Executive	transitional	1	1	2	2
Mauritania	2009	Executive	transitional	1	1	2	1
Mauritania	2013	Legislative	UPR	1	1	1	1
Mauritania	2014	Executive	UPR	1	1	1	1
Mozambique	1994	Legislative	FRELIMO	0	1	0	0
Mozambique	1999	Legislative	FRELIMO	0	0	0	0
Mozambique	2004	Executive	FRELIMO	1	2	2	3
Mozambique	2004	Legislative	FRELIMO	1	2	2	3
Mozambique	2009	Executive	FRELIMO	1	2	2	3
Mozambique	2009	Legislative	FRELIMO	1	2	2	3
Mozambique	2014	Legislative	FRELIMO	1	2	2	3
Mozambique	2014	Executive	FRELIMO	1	2	2	3
Namibia	1994	Legislative	SWAPO	0	1	0	0
Namibia	1994	Executive	SWAPO	0	1	0	0
Namibia	1999	Legislative	SWAPO	0	1	0	0
Namibia	1999	Executive	SWAPO	0	1	0	0
Namibia	2004	Legislative	SWAPO	0	1	0	0
Namibia	2004	Executive	SWAPO	0	1	0	0
Namibia	2009	Legislative	SWAPO	1	1	1	2
Namibia	2009	Executive	SWAPO	1	1	1	2
Namibia	2014	Legislative	SWAPO	1	1	1	2
Namibia	2014	Executive	SWAPO	1	1	1	2
Niger	1993	Executive	MNSD	0	1	0	0

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Table A3.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Year	Election Type	Incumbent Party	External Voting	Diaspora Support	Polls	ID access
Niger	1996	Executive	transition	0	1	0	0
Niger	1999	Executive	transition	0	1	0	0
Niger	2004	Executive	MNSD	0	1	0	0
Niger	2011	Executive	MNSD	0	1	0	0
Rwanda	2003	Legislative	FPR	1	2	1	2
Rwanda	2003	Executive	FPR	1	1	1	2
Rwanda	2008	Legislative	FPR	1	2	1	2
Rwanda	2010	Executive	FPR	1	2	2	2
Rwanda	2013	Legislative	FPR	1	2	2	2
São Tomé	1991	Executive	transition	1	1	1	
São Tomé	1996	Executive	ADI	1	2	1	
São Tomé	2001	Executive	ADI	1	1	1	
São Tomé	2006	Executive	MDFM-PL	1	1	1	
São Tomé	2011	Executive	MDFM-PL	1	2	1	
Senegal	1993	Legislative	PS	1	1	2	
Senegal	1993	Executive	PS	1	1	2	
Senegal	1998	Legislative	PS	1	2	2	
Senegal	2000	Executive	PS	1	2	2	
Senegal	2001	Legislative	PDS	1	0	2	
Senegal	2007	Executive	PDS	1	0	2	1
Senegal	2007	Legislative	PDS	1	0	2	1
Senegal	2012	Legislative	PDS	1	2	2	1
Senegal	2012	Executive	PDS	1	2	2	1

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Table A3.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Year	Election Type	Incumbent Party	External Voting	Diaspora Support	Polls	ID access
Sierra Leone	2012	Legislative	APC	0	1	0	0
Sierra Leone	2012	Executive	APC	0	1	0	0
South Africa	1994	Legislative	NP	1	1	2	3
South Africa	2009	Legislative	ANC	1	0	1	
South Africa	2014	Legislative	ANC	1	0	1	1
Togo	1993	Executive	RPT	0	1	0	0
Togo	1994	Legislative	RPT	0	0	0	0
Togo	1998	Executive	RPT	0	0	0	0
Togo	1999	Legislative	RPT	0	0	0	0
Togo	2002	Legislative	RPT	0	0	0	0
Togo	2003	Executive	RPT	0	0	0	0
Togo	2005	Executive	RPT	0	0	0	0
Togo	2007	Legislative	RPT	0	0	0	0
Togo	2010	Executive	RPT	0	0	0	0
Togo	2013	Legislative	UNIR	0	0	0	0
Togo	2015	Executive	UNIR	0	0	0	0

4 Robustness Checks

Replication files and code available (Harvard Dataverse): <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/SWSY7T>

4.1 All Elections Model

Table A4.1: Emigrant Voter Access: Random Effect GLS Results (All Elections)

Model	(A) Partisan Model	(B) + Alternative Explanations	(C) Diaspora Support	(D) Alternative DV
Outcome Variable:	Polls	Polls	Polls	ID access
Diaspora Support	0.530** (0.161)	0.478** (0.166)		
Uncertain/Mixed (DiasSupport = 1)			0.278 (0.263)	0.392 (0.367)
Supports Incumbent (DiasSupport = 2)			0.963** (0.338)	1.463** (0.503)
Political Regime	0.031 (0.0287)	0.009 (0.0231)	0.008 (0.0215)	0.028 (0.0348)
State Capacity	0.272 (0.208)	0.182 (0.240)	0.148 (0.227)	0.237 (0.311)
Former Portuguese or French Colony	0.544 (0.317)	0.699* (0.308)	0.620+ (0.322)	0.090 (0.493)
(ln)Diaspora Size	0.126 (0.134)	0.125 (0.134)	0.112 (0.126)	0.342 (0.204)
Recent Nearby Imp.		0.031 (0.181)	0.031 (0.182)	0.146 (0.302)
EMB capacity		0.239+ (0.121)	0.227+ (0.125)	-0.0366 (0.197)
constant	0.927 (0.833)	0.750 (0.890)	0.822 (0.885)	2.064+ (1.190)
<i>N</i>	135	135	135	114
Overall R-Squared	0.27	0.32	0.34	0.30

Notes: Observations are country-election given legal emigrant enfranchisement (n=144). Numbers presented are the coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

4.2 Fixed Effects Model

Table A4.2: Emigrant Voter Access: OLS with Fixed Effects

Model	(A) Partisan Model	(B) + Alternative Explanations	(C) Diaspora Support	(D) Alternative DV
Outcome Variable:	Polls	Polls	Polls	ID access
Diaspora Support	0.334** (0.105)	0.326** (0.107)		
Uncertain/Mixed (DiasSupport = 1)			0.083 (0.209)	0.244 (0.251)
Supports Incumbent (DiasSupport = 2)			0.653** (0.213)	0.950** (0.263)
Political Regime	0.012 (0.019)	0.011 (0.021)	0.000 (0.022)	0.042 (0.032)
State Capacity	0.504* (0.245)	0.431 (0.288)	0.349 (0.292)	0.752* (0.357)
(ln)Diaspora Size	-0.353 (0.239)	-0.361 (0.245)	-0.393 (0.245)	-0.798** (0.274)
Recent Nearby Imp.		0.069 (0.139)	0.084 (0.139)	-0.088 (0.172)
EMB capacity		0.0363 (0.121)	0.0173 (0.121)	-0.110 (0.151)
constant	0.399 (0.913)	0.233 (0.970)	0.130 (0.967)	-0.469 (1.101)
<i>N</i>	101	101	101	85
Within R-Squared	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.37

Notes: Observations are country-election-year given legal emigrant enfranchisement. Colonial heritage variable omitted due to collinearity. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

4.3 Ordered Logistic Regression Model

Table A4.3: Emigrant Voter Access: Ordered Logistic Regression Model Results

Model	(A) Partisan Model	(B) + Alternative Explanations	(C) Diaspora Support	(D) Alternative DV
Outcome Variable:	Polls	Polls	Polls	ID access
Diaspora Support	2.283** (0.725)	2.474** (0.787)		
Uncertain/Mixed (DiasSupport = 1)			1.745 (1.183)	2.775 (1.899)
Supports Incumbent (DiasSupport = 2)			4.817** (1.542)	5.172** (1.950)
Political Regime	0.070 (0.0930)	-0.009 (0.103)	-0.029 (0.105)	0.208 (0.156)
State Capacity	2.095+ (1.091)	1.402 (1.102)	1.176 (1.108)	3.855 (2.581)
Former Portuguese or French Colony	1.866 (1.720)	2.768 (1.801)	2.387 (1.812)	2.628 (3.245)
(ln)Diaspora Size	-0.382 (0.810)	-0.325 (0.797)	-0.331 (0.790)	-1.985 (1.322)
Recent Nearby Imp.		0.423 (0.695)	0.409 (0.694)	-0.258 (0.904)
EMB capacity		1.246* (0.608)	1.138+ (0.605)	0.502 (0.988)
Cutpoint 1	0.0487 (3.844)	1.724 (4.027)	1.299 (3.991)	4.330 (6.476)
Cutpoint 2	3.149 (3.933)	4.958 (4.147)	4.560 (4.107)	6.413 (6.593)
Cutpoint 3				10.87 (6.930)
<i>N</i>	101	101	101	85

Notes: Observations are country-election-year given legal emigrant enfranchisement. Standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

4.4 Model with Additional Controls

Table A4.4: Random Effects GLS Regression Results with Additional Controls

Model	Table 1(C)	+ PR	+ Remit	+ Democratic Transition
Outcome Variable:	Polls			
Diaspora Support				
Uncertain/Mixed (DiasSupport = 1)	0.085 (0.207)	0.087 (0.212)	0.074 (0.237)	0.073 (0.206)
Supports Incumbent (DiasSupport = 2)	0.666* (0.334)	0.665* (0.336)	0.666+ (0.342)	0.638+ (0.342)
Political Regime	-0.002 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.024)	0.002 (0.026)	0.010 (0.023)
State Capacity	0.210 (0.180)	0.200 (0.187)	0.336+ (0.201)	0.256 (0.184)
Former Portuguese or French Colony	0.298 (0.341)	0.296 (0.348)	0.376 (0.371)	0.389 (0.339)
(ln)Diaspora Size	-0.126 (0.142)	-0.137 (0.153)	-0.144 (0.133)	-0.146 (0.136)
Recent Nearby Imp.	0.091 (0.158)	0.087 (0.163)	0.109 (0.166)	0.095 (0.154)
EMB capacity	0.095 (0.0976)	0.096 (0.102)	0.070 (0.111)	0.116 (0.100)
Proportional representation		0.0495 (0.164)		
(ln)Remittances			-0.032 (0.0830)	
Democratic Transition				0.254 (0.215)
constant	0.504 (0.812)	0.423 (0.900)	0.497 (0.896)	0.429 (0.805)
<i>N</i>	101	99	89	101
Overall R-Squared	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.24

Notes: Observations are country-election-year given legal emigrant enfranchisement. Numbers presented are the coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

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6 Interview Details

6.1 Ethical Considerations

Semi-structured interviews were conducted under Yale University HSC Protocol 1406014245. I interviewed key actors related to the implementation of external voting, including: politicians (legislators leading the charge to extend (or restrict) voting); political party members organizing campaign activities and mobilization efforts abroad; relevant state officials (e.g. the Electoral Management Body (EMB) organizing the external voting process (i.e. IEC)); and leaders from diaspora organizations. Interviews were confidential, identified by numbers in my notes (i.e. Interviewee 7) and by relevant, but as minimal demographic (non-identifying) detail as possible in the manuscript. Interviews primarily discussed their conduct and perspective from their official capacity.

For these interviews, I collected names and contact information (phone numbers and email addresses) in order to schedule interviews and, if necessary, follow up conversations. I read the verbal consent form for officials and stakeholders prior to the beginning of each conversation, and provided all respondents with a copy of the consent statement as well as contact information for me, my advisor, and the Human Subjects Committee of Yale University. Their verbal consent was audibly recorded; I did not collect signatures in order to maintain confidentiality.

To ensure data confidentiality, in my interview notes I numbered all interview respondents. There is no electronic record of real names and phone numbers, only a handwritten sheet. The key linking numbers to real names is locked in a cabinet in my office. Further, all transcripts and other electronic documents related to the project are password protected.

6.2 Verbal Consent Protocol

Verbal Consent Statement: Officials and Stakeholders

Hi, my name is Elizabeth Iams Wellman and I am a graduate student from Yale University in the United States. I am conducting a research study to examine expatriate voting in national elections. Participation in this study will involve an interview that will take about 30-45 minutes. Although this study will not benefit you personally, we hope that my results will add to the knowledge about how governments engage with citizens that live outside of the country.

Information from this interview may be included in a public presentation or published paper, but I will keep your identity completely confidential at all times and in all finished work. If it is ok with you, I would like to record the interview in order to make sure I don't miss any of what you tell me. The interview may be then transcribed by a confidential transcription service. If you prefer not to have this interview recorded or transcribed, I will write down your responses. All notes from this interview will be kept in a password-protected file. Your interview will be numbered and the code linking your number with your name will be stored in a separate locked file cabinet.

Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate, to end participation at any time for any reason, or to refuse to answer any individual question. Refusing to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled, or affect your relationship with your relevant organization.

If you have any questions about this study, you may contact me through the information on this card, which includes the name and contact information of someone locally who can reach me with any questions or concerns you may have. The card also includes contact information for the people at my university who provide oversight for this study.

Do you have any questions at this time? Do you want to participate in the study?

6.3 Interview List

Original Interviews

Position	Date	Location
Diaspora Civil Society Leader	26 Feb 2015	Johannesburg
IEC Official A	18 March 2015	Centurion
IEC Official B	18 March 2015	Centurion
ANC Source A	25 March 2015	Johannesburg
IEC Official C	27 March 2015	Centurion
IEC Official D	27 March 2015	Centurion
IEC Official E	27 March 2015	Centurion
FF+ Official A	30 March 2015	Pretoria
FF+ Official B	30 March 2015	Pretoria
DA Official (NPLC) A	31 March 2015	Cape Town*
DA Official (NPLC) B	8 April 2015	Johannesburg
ANC Official B (NPLC)	15 April 2015	Johannesburg
ANC Official C	19 May 2015	Johannesburg
EFF Official	25 May 2015	Johannesburg
ANC Source D	10 June 2015	Johannesburg
Stats SA Official	11 June 2015	Pretoria
IEC Official (ret.)	17 June 2015	Johannesburg
Emigration Expert	1 July 2015	Johannesburg
IEC Official (ret.)	2 July 2015	Pretoria

*: Interview conducted over Skype. Location listed is location of interviewee; I was in Johannesburg.

6.4 Glossary

Acronym	Name	Organization
ANC	African National Congress	Political Party
DA	Democratic Alliance	Political Party
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation	Govt. Agency
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters	Political Party
FF+	Freedom Front Plus	Political Party
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission	Govt. Agency
NPLC	National Party Liaison Committee	IEC Committee

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