

WHY AUSTERITY? THE MASS POLITICS OF A CONTESTED POLICY

ONLINE APPENDIX*

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I. DATA

I. Austerity Support Survey

This survey was fielded in May 2015 to samples of the adult population in France, Greece, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Respondents were recruited by Respondi, an international survey firm. Tables A1 and A2 report the distribution of sociodemographics in the samples and the target populations.

II. Austerity Conjoint Survey

This survey was fielded in January 2019 to samples of the adult population in Italy and Spain. Respondents were recruited by Bilendi, an international survey firm. Table A3 reports the distribution of sociodemographics in the samples and the target populations.

*Note: Supplementary Figures A1 - A24 are contained in a separate online appendix document available on the American Political Science Review Dataverse: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JH5UU8>.

Table A1: Distribution of Sociodemographics in 2015 Austerity Support Survey: Samples and Target Populations. Population Statistics taken from Eurostat (Gender, Age, Education), European Social Survey (Income, Ideology except Greece), and European Election Studies (Ideology in Greece).

France ($N = 3886$)		
	Population	Sample
Gender: Female	51.6	55.3
Gender: Male	48.4	44.7
Age: 18-24	11.7	12.5
Age: 25-34	17.4	27.7
Age: 35-44	18.5	17.1
Age: 45-54	19.6	18.7
Age: 55-64	18.1	14.4
Age: 65+	14.6	9.6
Education: Low (ISCED2011 0-2)	24.3	8.7
Education: Medium (ISCED2011 3-4)	44.2	48.5
Education: High (ISCED2011 5-8)	31.5	42.8
Income Quintile 1	20.0	32.4
Income Quintile 2	20.0	19.5
Income Quintile 3	20.0	23.2
Income Quintile 4	20.0	16.4
Income Quintile 5	20.0	8.5
Left	33.8	31.3
Center	30.0	28.6
Right	36.2	40.1
Greece ($N = 2013$)		
	Population	Sample
Gender: Female	51.5	56.8
Gender: Male	48.5	43.2
Age: 18-24	9.9	11.7
Age: 25-34	16.3	35.1
Age: 35-44	20.8	30.4
Age: 45-54	20.4	16.3
Age: 55-64	17.8	5.4
Age: 65+	14.6	1.0
Education: Low (ISCED2011 0-2)	31.3	2.2
Education: Medium (ISCED2011 3-4)	42.2	41.0
Education: High (ISCED2011 5-8)	26.5	56.8
Income Quintile 1	20.0	31.7
Income Quintile 2	20.0	29.6
Income Quintile 3	20.0	20.9
Income Quintile 4	20.0	13.3
Income Quintile 5	20.0	4.5
Left	36.0	41.5
Center	32.2	35.1
Right	31.8	23.4
Italy ($N = 3473$)		
	Population	Sample
Gender: Female	51.4	54.2
Gender: Male	48.6	45.8
Age: 18-24	9.5	8.1
Age: 25-34	15.3	23.6
Age: 35-44	19.7	25.4
Age: 45-54	22.3	21.2
Age: 55-64	18.1	17.6
Age: 65+	15.1	4.1
Education: Low (ISCED2011 0-2)	42.5	12.0
Education: Medium (ISCED2011 3-4)	41.3	49.1
Education: High (ISCED2011 5-8)	16.2	38.9
Income Quintile 1	20.0	29.2
Income Quintile 2	20.0	29.0
Income Quintile 3	20.0	20.9
Income Quintile 4	20.0	14.5
Income Quintile 5	20.0	6.5
Left	35.0	38.5
Center	23.7	27.4
Right	41.2	34.1

Table A2: Distribution of Sociodemographics in 2015 Austerity Support Survey, continued: Samples and Target Populations. Population Statistics taken from Eurostat (Gender, Age, Education) and European Social Survey (Income, Ideology).

Spain ($N = 3471$)		
	Population	Sample
Gender: Female	50.9	45.6
Gender: Male	49.1	54.4
Age: 18-24	9.3	10.4
Age: 25-34	16.2	21.7
Age: 35-44	22.7	26.4
Age: 45-54	21.5	21.9
Age: 55-64	17.1	18.8
Age: 65+	13.1	0.8
Education: Low (ISCED2011 0-2)	44.6	15.6
Education: Medium (ISCED2011 3-4)	23.6	28.8
Education: High (ISCED2011 5-8)	31.8	55.7
Income Quintile 1	20.0	19.6
Income Quintile 2	20.0	39.0
Income Quintile 3	20.0	23.9
Income Quintile 4	20.0	11.2
Income Quintile 5	20.0	6.3
Left	44.8	54.1
Center	30.1	25.6
Right	25.1	20.4
United Kingdom ($N = 2009$)		
	Population	Sample
Gender: Female	50.7	55.6
Gender: Male	49.3	44.4
Age: 18-24	12.4	5.1
Age: 25-34	19.2	13.4
Age: 35-44	17.9	17.8
Age: 45-54	19.9	21.1
Age: 55-64	16.5	25.9
Age: 65+	14.0	16.7
Education: Low (ISCED2011 0-2)	20.4	24.0
Education: Medium (ISCED2011 3-4)	40.4	41.4
Education: High (ISCED2011 5-8)	39.2	34.6
Income Quintile 1	20.0	26.0
Income Quintile 2	20.0	24.5
Income Quintile 3	20.0	19.6
Income Quintile 4	20.0	17.8
Income Quintile 5	20.0	12.0
Left	31.9	28.1
Center	41.7	37.8
Right	26.4	34.0

Table A3: Distribution of Sociodemographics in 2019 Austerity Conjoint Survey: Samples and Target Populations. Population Statistics taken from Eurostat (Gender, Age, Education) and European Social Survey (Income, Ideology).

Italy ($N = 1998$)		
	Population	Sample
Gender: Female	51.4	51.3
Gender: Male	48.6	48.7
Age: 18-24	9.5	9.5
Age: 25-34	15.3	15.3
Age: 35-44	19.7	19.7
Age: 45-54	22.3	22.3
Age: 55-64	18.1	18.1
Age: 65+	15.1	15.1
Education: Low (ISCED2011 0-2)	42.5	29.6
Education: Medium (ISCED2011 3-4)	41.3	49.3
Education: High (ISCED2011 5-8)	16.2	21.1
Income Quintile 1	20.0	36.0
Income Quintile 2	20.0	27.5
Income Quintile 3	20.0	17.2
Income Quintile 4	20.0	12.3
Income Quintile 5	20.0	6.5
Left	33.8	27.9
Center	24.0	28.6
Right	42.2	43.5
Spain ($N = 1970$)		
	Population	Sample
Gender: Female	50.9	50.2
Gender: Male	49.1	49.8
Age: 18-24	9.3	9.4
Age: 25-34	16.2	16.4
Age: 35-44	22.7	23.0
Age: 45-54	21.5	21.8
Age: 55-64	17.1	17.4
Age: 65+	13.1	11.9
Education: Low (ISCED2011 0-2)	44.6	28.5
Education: Medium (ISCED2011 3-4)	23.6	35.2
Education: High (ISCED2011 5-8)	31.8	36.2
Income Quintile 1	20.0	23.6
Income Quintile 2	20.0	28.0
Income Quintile 3	20.0	21.5
Income Quintile 4	20.0	13.1
Income Quintile 5	20.0	13.6
Left	48.3	45.3
Center	24.7	26.3
Right	27.0	28.4

II. QUESTION WORDING AND CODING

- *Ideology*: Self-reported placement on left-right ideology scale. Question wording: “In politics people often talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. On this scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right), where would you classify your own political views?” Respondents are further categorized as far left (0-2), left (3-4), center (5), right (6-7), or far right (8-10).
- *Party Voted For (2019 Survey)*: Self-reported party that respondent voted for in the most recent general election.
- *Household Income*: Self-reported monthly household income. Answer categories are the ten population household income deciles, which vary by country.
- *Employed*: Self-reported employment status; binary version used in analysis with 1 indicating employment as either a paid employee or self-employed, and 0 corresponding to any other answer choice. Question wording: “Which of these options best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?” Answer categories: 1=“Paid employee (including temporary leave of absence due to maternity/paternity, accident, illness or vacation)”, 2=“Self-employed (e.g. freelancer, independent contractor, or family-owned business)”, 3=“Student (excluding employer-sponsored education)”, 4=“Unemployed, actively searching for a job”, 5=“Unemployed, not actively searching”, 6=“Chronic illness or permanent disability”, 7=“Retired”, 8=“Working at home, caring for children or others.”
- *Public Income*: Self-reported indicator for whether a respondent’s primary income source is a type of public source; binary version used in analysis where 1 indicates pensions, unemployment/redundancy benefit, or any other social benefits or grants constituting the respondent’s main source of household income, and 0 otherwise. Question wording: “Please consider the income of all household members and any income which may be received by the household as a whole. What is the main source of income in your household?” Answer categories: 1=“Wages or salaries”, 2=“Income from self-employment (excluding farming)”, 3=“Income from farming”, 4=“Pensions”, 5=“Unemployment/redundancy benefit”, 6=“Any other social benefits for grants”, 7=“Income from investments, savings, etc.”, 8=“Income from other sources.”
- *Public Job*: Self-reported indicator for respondent’s past or present public sector experience. Question wording: “Do you currently or have you ever worked for the government in a full-time public sector job?” Answer categories: 0=“No”, 1=“Yes.”
- *Own Stocks*: Self-reported indicator for whether or not respondent has money invested. Question wording: “Do you currently have money invested in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, money market funds or other listed securities?” Answer categories: 0=“No”, 1=“Yes.”
- *Mortgage*: Self-reported indicator for whether or not respondent has a mortgage. Question wording: “Do you have a mortgage?” Answer categories: 0=“No”, 1=“Yes.”

- *Education*: Self-reported level of education. Answer categories were customized to each country’s educational system. For the 2015 survey, answers were then mapped onto the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 scale, which measures education on a scale from 0 to 8. For the 2019 survey, answers were mapped onto the European Social Survey version of ISCED (ES-ISCED), which measures education on a scale from 1 to 7. For analysis of both surveys, these scales were then mapped onto a set of three categories: Low (ISCED 2011 0-2), Medium (ISCED 2011 3-4), and High (ISCED 2011 5-8).
- *Number of Children*: Self-reported number of children.
- *Voted*: Self-reported indicator for whether or not the respondent voted in the most recent national election.
- *Union Membership (2019 Survey)*: Membership in a trade union or trade association, where 1 indicates current, 2 indicates past, and 3 indicates never.
- *Laid Off (2019 Survey)*: Indicator for having been laid off in last 5 years.
- *Support Intervention*: “Next, we would like you to think more broadly about the purposes of government. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? You may use any number from 1 to 5.” Answer scale: 1 (the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government) and 5 (the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens).
- *Support Redistribution*: “Some people think that the income differences between the rich and the poor ought to be reduced, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means that the government should reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and 5 means that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences? What score between 1 and 5 comes closest to the way you feel?” Answer scale: 1 (the government should reduce the income differences between rich and poor) and 5 (the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences).
- *Empathy*: Index of empathic concern that averages the responses to two questions. Wording of questions: “On a scale from 1 (does NOT describe you well) to 5 (describes you well) how would you rate the following statements? [1] I am often touched by the things that I see happen. [2] When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them.”
- *Perceptions of Government Intentions (2019 Survey)*: “Generally speaking, when looking back over the past several decades, how much of the time do you think the government

has been trying to do the right thing for the country as a whole?” Answer scale: 1 (never) to 10 (always).

- *Perceptions of Government Competence (2019 Survey)*: “Irrespective of whether you believe that the government tries to do the right thing for the country as a whole, how much of the time do you think the government is competent in pursuing its objectives?” Answer scale: 1 (never) to 10 (always).

- *Knowledge (2015 Survey)*: Additive index of whether respondents gave the correct answers to the following questions:

“From what you have read or heard, what is a ‘tariff’?” (3 points for correct answer)

- “A tax exemption for low earners”
- “A tax exemption for buyers of locally produced goods”
- “A tax imposed on imported goods and services”
- “A tax imposed on luxury goods”
- “Don’t know”

“Do you happen to know if one or more of the following countries of the EU has received financial bailout assistance? You can mark none, one, or multiple of these countries.” (+1 point for each correct selection and -1 point for each incorrect selection.)

- Portugal
- Ireland
- Greece
- Slovakia
- France
- The Netherlands

- *Knowledge (2019 Survey)*: Additive index of whether respondents gave the correct answers to the following questions:

“From what you have read or heard, what does ‘inflation’ mean when used in an economic context?” (1 point for correct answer)

- “increase in the general price level of goods and services within an economy”
- “increase in the exchange rate of the national currency relative to a foreign currency”
- “increase in the amount of imports relative to the previous year”
- “increase in employment levels within an economy”
- “increase in the number of overvalued stocks on the stock market”
- “none of the above”

“What is currently the unemployment rate in COUNTRY?” (1 point for correct answer)

- 2
- 4
- 6
- 8
- 10

“What is the length in years of a single term of office for a member of parliament in COUNTRY?” (1 point for correct answer)

- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6

“Which of the following served a period as Prime Minister/Head of State of COUNTRY?” (1 point for correct answer)

- (five answer options)

III. METHODS: ANALYZING SUPPORT FOR AUSTERITY PACKAGES

A point of departure in our analysis is the observation that bailout packages have a wide range of features. In thinking about the dynamics that shape public opinion on bailout packages, we advance two key hypotheses:

- Voters are highly sensitive to the specific features of the bailout package in question and potentially also to some interactions between features (for example, support for cuts in a given program might be higher when a certain important program is left untouched).
- The sensitivities to certain features may vary across different groups of the population (for example, the left may be more sensitive to certain spending cuts than the right).

Since a principal quantity of interest for us is the expected level of support for a given package both at the aggregate level and among specific subgroups in the population, we need an estimation method that is highly flexible and geared toward predictive accuracy. More specifically in our case, it must:

- (a) Be able to handle a high-dimensional experimental design. In our case, we need to be able to assess potential sensitivities to a combination of multiple features of the bailout package, all of which vary on a quasi-continuous support rather than being comprised of a small number of discrete levels.
- (b) Allow us to accommodate additional covariates beyond the features of the package in question. In our case, we need to include a host of socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.
- (c) Facilitate both (a) and (b) in conditions where the researcher does not know in advance what combinations of or interactions between features influence respondents' preferences.

Importantly, our quantity of interest is not an estimand pertaining to any specific feature's impact on support for an austerity package, nor any particular interactions. In other words, our goal is not to estimate particular model coefficients that can then be interpreted with respect to certain causal effect estimands. Instead, our concern is with the overall level of support for concrete austerity packages given its specific *combination* of features, and perhaps also taking into account certain socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. In sum, our aim is not to estimate any individual coefficient or interaction, but rather to model a response surface (or conditional response surface) as accurately as possible.

For this reason, we employ stochastic gradient boosted trees, a machine learning method that achieves both the flexibility we need and high levels of predictive accuracy relative to competing predictive methods. We can, for example, estimate the likely support for a package that has specific features (say, a 3% hike in income tax, a 10% cut in welfare spending, and no change in pensions, etc.) for each respondent, given that they have certain characteristics (education level, gender, income, etc.). Moreover, the method allows us to estimate this

outcome separately for an individual with certain characteristics but who is right-, as opposed to left-leaning. We can then aggregate these predictions and estimate the support for the specific package among any population distribution, given their characteristics (e.g., say, right wing voters). Finally, an important technical feature of our approach is that it allows for easy incorporation of a weighted block bootstrap to model uncertainty, an essential requirement for a meaningful prediction of this type.

Horiuchi, Smith and Yamamoto (2018) also take a flexible modeling approach to conjoint analysis by applying ridge regression to data from a conjoint experiment on voter preferences with respect to party platforms in Japan. Specifically, they model and regularize all two-way interactions between the conjoint attributes within a linear regression framework. In addition, Egami and Imai (2019) similarly propose the use of regularization, specifically through the employment of GASH-ANOVA, for the estimation of interactions between factorial variables, including in conjoint data. Ratkovic and Tingley (2017) combine Bayesian and LASSO estimation to explore higher-order interaction effects between conjoint attributes. For various reasons, these methods are not appropriate in our particular case.

First, they are both geared toward an explicitly factorial experimental setup, where the attributes have a relatively small number of discrete levels, rather than being continuous or quasi-continuous. For both, the regularization is specifically designed to operate with respect to those discrete effects or interaction effects, rather than continuous treatment variables (not to mention covariates). Of course, from a purely mathematical standpoint, our setup could be operationalized as a factorial design. As a practical matter, however, this would be intractable as it would result in a 31^8 factorial design. In addition, adapting these other approaches to continuous treatment variables would also not make sense, as it would impose linearity upon a response surface for which there is no reason to assume linearity. In addition, these approaches are also not immediately well-suited for incorporating covariates, given they are based on regularization of pre-specified parametric forms, which requires explicitly modeling in allowable interactions.

In short, these approaches are instead well-suited to estimating particular marginal effects and interactions of primary theoretical interest—i.e. where the interactions themselves are the estimands of interest—or where the structure of the response surface is known with relative confidence. In contrast, the use of stochastic gradient boosted trees, cross-validated to optimize for out-of-sample fit and evaluated to ensure for high calibrated predicted probabilities, is tailored to our particular setting—a high-dimensional design with quasi-continuous treatment variables, a desire to incorporate covariates, and the underlying objective to flexibly and accurately estimate a response surface to allow for the prediction of support for particular austerity packages.

The stochastic gradient boosted trees models that we train are classification models that employ a bag fraction of 0.5 and a binomial deviance loss function. The tuning parameter values—including the interaction depth and number of boosting iterations (the early stopping point)—are selected via 5-fold cross-validation. Furthermore, given that our data contain multiple observations (evaluated austerity profiles) per respondent, we ensure that each respondent’s data are kept together within the same cross-validation fold so that the cross-validation performance metric (and hence model parameter tuning) is not biased by a respondent’s data

being used to help predict onto itself. Separate models are trained for the Italian sample and the Spanish sample, and each model predicts support for an austerity package as a function of the eight package dimensions (the conjoint attributes) along with respondent background characteristics, including age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, union membership, public sector experience, stock ownership, reliance on public income, having a mortgage, having been laid off recently, having voted in the prior election, and left-right ideology.

To estimate the expected proportion of support for a particular austerity package, the fully trained and tuned models are first applied to predict for each respondent his or her predicted probability of support for that package, as a function of the particular austerity attribute levels that define that package (e.g. 3% income tax increase, 10% welfare spending decrease, etc.) as well as the respondent's personal background characteristics. This results in a predicted probability of support for that package for each respondent, separately in the Italian and Spanish samples. To estimate aggregate support, the proportion of individuals expected to support a given austerity package is then computed via an empirical simulation. In this simulation voters are first randomly sampled with replacement using probabilities proportional to their survey weights. We then model whether or not each individual supports the package as a Bernoulli trial in which the personal predicted probability of support is estimated by the boosted trees models. The simulation is run over a large number (1000) of iterations and then averaged. This can be performed either for the entire sample for a particular country, or for a subpopulation defined by particular background characteristics (e.g. left- or right-wing voters), and then yields an estimate of the expected proportion of support for the package within the voting population or sub-population.

To estimate uncertainty, a weighted block bootstrap is implemented. For each bootstrap iteration, respondents are re-sampled with replacement using probabilities proportional to their sample weights, and all of a respondent's conjoint data are included if that respondent is re-sampled. Those re-sampled data are used to fit a new boosted trees model and output predicted probabilities of support for the specific austerity packages being evaluated for the re-sampled set of individuals. For each iteration, the proportion of individuals expected to support a given austerity package is then computed via an empirical simulation whereby whether or not each individual supports the package is modeled as a Bernoulli trial with their own personal probability.

IV. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

Table A4: **The Correlates of Austerity Support, 2015 Survey, Unweighted.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

	France A	France B	France C	Greece A	Greece B	Greece C	Italy A	Italy B	Italy C	Spain A	Spain B	Spain C	UK A	UK B	UK C
(Intercept)	0.763* (0.029)	0.801* (0.033)	0.886* (0.043)	0.631* (0.077)	0.692* (0.083)	0.904* (0.101)	0.850* (0.029)	0.907* (0.037)	1.039* (0.047)	0.694* (0.032)	0.843* (0.038)	1.091* (0.052)	0.607* (0.050)	0.726* (0.052)	0.813* (0.068)
Age 30 - 39	0.042* (0.021)	0.042* (0.020)	0.044* (0.020)	0.060* (0.030)	0.056 (0.029)	0.071* (0.029)	0.030 (0.024)	0.033 (0.024)	0.038 (0.024)	-0.056* (0.026)	-0.070* (0.025)	-0.046 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.025)	-0.052 (0.044)	-0.051 (0.044)
Age 40 - 49	0.059* (0.021)	0.061* (0.020)	0.067* (0.020)	0.002 (0.034)	-0.000 (0.034)	0.038 (0.035)	0.016 (0.025)	0.018 (0.025)	0.029 (0.025)	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.057* (0.026)	-0.003 (0.026)	-0.047 (0.042)	-0.043 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)
Age 50 - 59	0.026 (0.023)	0.042 (0.022)	0.054* (0.022)	-0.026 (0.046)	-0.016 (0.045)	0.028 (0.045)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.027)	0.023 (0.027)	-0.049 (0.029)	-0.045 (0.028)	0.031 (0.029)	-0.057 (0.041)	-0.066 (0.042)	-0.054 (0.042)
Age 60+	0.097* (0.026)	0.092* (0.026)	0.104* (0.026)	0.092 (0.078)	0.098 (0.077)	0.131 (0.077)	0.036 (0.032)	0.041 (0.032)	0.067* (0.032)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.029 (0.037)	0.047 (0.037)	0.017 (0.044)	0.005 (0.045)	0.017 (0.045)
Female	0.013 (0.013)	0.019 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.045 (0.023)	0.059* (0.023)	0.061* (0.023)	0.012 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	0.067* (0.017)	0.069* (0.016)	0.047* (0.017)	0.021 (0.023)	0.014 (0.022)	0.013 (0.023)
Education Intermediate	-0.005 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.024)	-0.005 (0.024)	-0.051 (0.075)	-0.051 (0.074)	-0.038 (0.075)	-0.086* (0.022)	-0.083* (0.022)	-0.065* (0.023)	-0.087* (0.025)	-0.064* (0.025)	-0.035 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.027)
Education High	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.105 (0.075)	-0.101 (0.074)	-0.075 (0.075)	-0.146* (0.025)	-0.139* (0.025)	-0.116* (0.025)	-0.144* (0.024)	-0.113* (0.024)	-0.070* (0.025)	-0.022 (0.032)	0.011 (0.030)	0.013 (0.030)
Number of Children	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.015 (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.019* (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)
Income Quintile 2	-0.039* (0.019)	-0.047* (0.019)	-0.045* (0.019)	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.020 (0.028)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.104* (0.020)	-0.098* (0.020)	-0.096* (0.020)	-0.035 (0.023)	-0.031 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.037 (0.032)	-0.044 (0.031)	-0.044 (0.031)
Income Quintile 3	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)	0.022 (0.032)	0.019 (0.032)	0.026 (0.032)	-0.070* (0.022)	-0.065* (0.022)	-0.059* (0.022)	-0.108* (0.027)	-0.094* (0.026)	-0.071* (0.026)	0.059 (0.035)	0.051 (0.033)	0.044 (0.033)
Income Quintile 4	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.023 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.036 (0.038)	-0.040 (0.038)	-0.030 (0.038)	-0.086* (0.026)	-0.078* (0.026)	-0.066* (0.026)	-0.084* (0.034)	-0.080* (0.032)	-0.062* (0.032)	0.034 (0.037)	0.038 (0.035)	0.030 (0.035)
Income Quintile 5	-0.030 (0.028)	-0.046 (0.027)	-0.040 (0.027)	-0.026 (0.060)	-0.028 (0.058)	-0.028 (0.058)	-0.087* (0.036)	-0.079* (0.036)	-0.070* (0.036)	-0.033 (0.041)	-0.051 (0.038)	-0.042 (0.038)	0.036 (0.043)	0.023 (0.041)	0.014 (0.041)
Employed	0.053* (0.018)	0.046* (0.017)	0.043* (0.017)	0.007 (0.026)	0.010 (0.025)	0.014 (0.025)	0.031 (0.019)	0.032 (0.019)	0.030 (0.019)	0.038 (0.021)	0.031 (0.021)	0.030 (0.020)	0.011 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.028)	-0.011 (0.027)
Public Job	-0.069* (0.019)	-0.056* (0.018)	-0.056* (0.018)	-0.066* (0.027)	-0.070* (0.027)	-0.072* (0.026)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.062* (0.021)	-0.054* (0.020)	-0.060* (0.019)	-0.062* (0.026)	-0.042 (0.024)	-0.038 (0.024)
Own Stocks	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	0.016 (0.036)	0.006 (0.035)	-0.005 (0.035)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)	0.006 (0.022)	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.021)	0.064* (0.026)	0.025 (0.025)	0.013 (0.025)
Public Income	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.021)	0.014 (0.029)	0.008 (0.029)	0.009 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.022)	0.004 (0.022)	0.040 (0.026)	0.038 (0.026)	0.038 (0.026)	-0.026 (0.033)	-0.050 (0.031)	-0.050 (0.031)
Mortgage	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.025 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.052* (0.018)	0.043* (0.017)	0.038* (0.016)	0.039 (0.025)	0.016 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)
Voted		0.005 (0.021)	0.003 (0.021)		-0.033 (0.035)	-0.025 (0.035)		-0.048 (0.025)	-0.044 (0.025)		-0.033 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.025)		-0.036 (0.032)	-0.035 (0.032)
Far Left		-0.188* (0.023)	-0.172* (0.023)		-0.176* (0.033)	-0.154* (0.033)		-0.096* (0.023)	-0.080* (0.023)		-0.269* (0.022)	-0.217* (0.022)		-0.361* (0.035)	-0.323* (0.036)
Left		0.039* (0.017)	0.041* (0.017)		0.073 (0.040)	0.067 (0.040)		-0.028 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.024)		0.106* (0.032)	0.096* (0.031)		0.065 (0.033)	0.040 (0.034)
Right		-0.140* (0.022)	-0.130* (0.022)		-0.085* (0.029)	-0.076* (0.029)		-0.028 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.023)		-0.234* (0.023)	-0.196* (0.023)		-0.266* (0.032)	-0.246* (0.033)
Far Right		0.036* (0.017)	0.036* (0.017)		0.050 (0.033)	0.044 (0.033)		0.017 (0.022)	0.010 (0.022)		0.076* (0.024)	0.075* (0.024)		0.126* (0.028)	0.113* (0.029)
Support Intervention			-0.004 (0.015)			-0.056 (0.032)			-0.019 (0.018)			-0.069* (0.019)			-0.030 (0.023)
Support Redistribution			-0.027* (0.013)			-0.047 (0.024)			-0.031 (0.016)			-0.101* (0.018)			-0.104* (0.023)
Empathy			-0.010 (0.008)			-0.028 (0.015)			-0.017 (0.009)			-0.018 (0.010)			-0.000 (0.013)
Knowledge			-0.014* (0.003)			-0.017* (0.006)			-0.020* (0.005)			-0.036* (0.005)			-0.003 (0.006)
R ²	0.014	0.060	0.066	0.017	0.044	0.056	0.022	0.030	0.039	0.033	0.121	0.153	0.018	0.129	0.140
Adj. R ²	0.009	0.054	0.059	0.009	0.033	0.043	0.017	0.024	0.032	0.028	0.116	0.146	0.010	0.120	0.129
Num. obs.	3886	3886	3886	2013	2013	2013	3473	3473	3473	3471	3471	3471	2009	2009	2009

Table A6: **The Correlates of Austerity Support by Education, 2015 Survey, with Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. High education pertains to ISCED11 levels 5-8, while low/medium education includes all levels below. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

	France Low/Medium	France High	Greece Low/Medium	Greece High	Italy Low/Medium	Italy High	Spain Low/Medium	Spain High	United Kingdom Low/Medium	United Kingdom High
(Intercept)	0.856*	0.895*	0.742*	0.830*	0.961*	0.902*	0.946*	1.043*	0.760*	0.719*
	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.136)
Age 30 - 39	0.040	0.060*	0.097	0.102*	0.018	0.048	-0.050	-0.078*	-0.024	0.076
	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.060)	(0.073)
Age 40 - 49	0.080*	0.047	0.090	0.061	0.026	-0.003	-0.013	-0.029	0.015	0.001
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.074)
Age 50 - 59	0.047	0.093*	-0.052	0.053	0.042	0.062	0.030	-0.009	0.010	-0.053
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.079)
Age 60+	0.091*	0.134*	0.236	0.103	0.080	0.054	-0.011	0.057	0.063	0.036
	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.128)	(0.103)	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.088)
Female	0.001	0.027	0.057	0.105*	-0.004	0.038	0.069*	0.028	0.049	-0.014
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.042)
Number of Children	0.001	-0.002	-0.006	0.005	-0.013	0.005	-0.016	0.014	-0.007	-0.011
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Income Quintile 2	-0.048	-0.028	-0.020	-0.006	-0.110*	-0.058	-0.029	0.027	-0.066	0.022
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.078)
Income Quintile 3	-0.019	-0.006	0.015	-0.001	-0.066	-0.092*	-0.086	-0.049	0.102*	-0.049
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.073)
Income Quintile 4	-0.002	-0.021	-0.082	-0.042	-0.058	-0.012	-0.083	-0.055	0.093	-0.072
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.080)	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.076)
Income Quintile 5	-0.078	-0.026	-0.275*	0.083	-0.094	-0.038	-0.099	-0.050	0.017	-0.036
	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.103)	(0.087)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.103)	(0.055)	(0.067)	(0.079)
Employed	0.020	0.067*	-0.010	-0.002	0.055*	0.025	0.072*	0.032	0.013	-0.017
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.050)
Public Job	-0.051	-0.070*	-0.043	-0.053	-0.019	-0.039	-0.044	-0.034	0.011	-0.072
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.052)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Own Stocks	-0.040	-0.019	-0.072	0.067	-0.042	0.009	-0.058	-0.065	-0.011	0.042
	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.078)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.041)
Public Income	-0.015	-0.005	-0.076	0.037	0.021	-0.019	0.046	0.009	0.012	-0.041
	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.067)
Mortgage	-0.005	-0.029	0.033	-0.064	0.005	-0.024	-0.001	0.041	-0.006	0.043
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.043)
Voted	0.003	0.008	-0.011	-0.006	-0.015	-0.050	-0.022	-0.031	-0.107*	0.075
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.061)
Far Left	-0.117*	-0.233*	-0.090	-0.201*	-0.072*	-0.092*	-0.170*	-0.250*	-0.265*	-0.355*
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.067)
Left	-0.002	0.075*	0.105	0.102	-0.049	-0.033	0.113*	0.062	0.048	-0.063
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.070)
Right	-0.123*	-0.149*	-0.097	-0.080	-0.028	-0.060	-0.130*	-0.229*	-0.130*	-0.354*
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.060)
Far Right	0.031	0.010	0.120	-0.029	-0.019	0.001	0.054	0.099*	0.089*	0.056
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.052)
Support Intervention	-0.000	-0.020	-0.140*	-0.055	0.016	-0.052	0.013	-0.088*	-0.001	-0.071
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.042)
Support Redistribution	-0.015	-0.055*	0.045	-0.073	-0.024	-0.021	-0.044	-0.122*	-0.118*	-0.063
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.046)
Empathy	-0.003	-0.015	0.012	-0.044	-0.015	-0.011	-0.007	-0.012	-0.011	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Knowledge	-0.011*	-0.017*	-0.023*	-0.008	-0.022*	-0.018*	-0.040*	-0.033*	-0.003	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)
R ²	0.039	0.110	0.089	0.085	0.037	0.031	0.121	0.162	0.098	0.190
Adj. R ²	0.028	0.097	0.063	0.065	0.026	0.013	0.107	0.151	0.081	0.161
Num. obs.	2223	1663	869	1144	2123	1350	1538	1933	1314	695

Table A7: **The Correlates of Austerity Support by Knowledge, 2015 Survey, with Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. $*p < 0.05$.

	France Low/Medium	France High	Greece Low/Medium	Greece High	Italy Low/Medium	Italy High	Spain Low/Medium	Spain High	United Kingdom Low/Medium	United Kingdom High
(Intercept)	0.772*	0.930*	0.575*	1.034*	0.898*	0.958*	0.949*	0.932*	0.669*	0.841*
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.179)	(0.124)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.121)
Age 30 - 39	0.069*	0.016	0.048	0.100*	-0.038	0.069	-0.038	-0.099*	0.013	-0.031
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.061)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.092)
Age 40 - 49	0.080*	0.053	-0.103	0.113*	-0.021	0.049	-0.036	-0.032	0.006	-0.046
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.079)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.089)
Age 50 - 59	0.058	0.040	0.090	-0.081	-0.039	0.079	-0.015	0.002	-0.068	-0.016
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.106)	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.088)
Age 60+	0.103*	0.071	0.210	0.138	0.008	0.107*	-0.086	0.004	0.012	0.046
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.166)	(0.093)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.107)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.091)
Female	0.043	-0.015	0.049	0.099*	-0.012	0.021	0.098*	0.049	0.022	0.044
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Education Intermediate	-0.002	-0.012	0.052	-0.198*	-0.068*	-0.070*	-0.007	-0.068	-0.016	0.025
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.106)	(0.090)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Education High	0.003	-0.036	-0.049	-0.196*	-0.130*	-0.120*	-0.126*	-0.084*	-0.011	0.058
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.107)	(0.092)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.044)
Number of Children	0.001	0.000	-0.017	0.029	-0.018	-0.008	-0.009	-0.000	-0.012	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Income Quintile 2	-0.047	-0.038	0.001	-0.007	-0.134*	-0.072*	-0.024	-0.030	-0.047	-0.030
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Income Quintile 3	-0.032	-0.002	0.030	0.018	-0.115*	-0.036	-0.150*	-0.066	0.082	0.004
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.066)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.059)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Income Quintile 4	-0.012	-0.014	-0.178	0.009	-0.040	-0.039	-0.174*	-0.058	0.123*	-0.062
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.106)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.086)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Income Quintile 5	-0.014	-0.062	-0.264	0.029	-0.068	-0.063	-0.016	-0.083	0.022	-0.007
	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.151)	(0.077)	(0.105)	(0.052)	(0.130)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.064)
Employed	0.057	0.025	0.047	-0.059	0.047	0.059	0.023	-0.071*	-0.018	0.021
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Public Job	-0.066*	-0.052*	-0.024	-0.045	-0.006	-0.024	-0.023	-0.037	0.025	-0.064
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.035)
Own Stocks	-0.054	-0.010	-0.082	0.030	-0.018	-0.039	-0.081	-0.061	0.021	0.020
	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.085)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.060)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.038)
Public Income	0.010	-0.017	-0.077	0.011	-0.008	0.019	-0.027	0.082*	0.056	-0.078
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Mortgage	-0.006	-0.027	-0.021	-0.004	0.013	-0.013	0.023	0.015	0.038	-0.014
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.059)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Voted	-0.007	0.022	-0.017	-0.007	-0.028	0.004	-0.046	-0.025	-0.052	0.022
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.059)
Far Left	-0.102*	-0.197*	-0.100	-0.152*	-0.003	-0.114*	-0.167*	-0.217*	-0.239*	-0.320*
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.083)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.056)
Left	-0.009	0.036	0.145	0.052	-0.039	-0.063	0.096	0.068	-0.074	0.100
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.084)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Right	-0.082*	-0.184*	-0.050	-0.124*	0.004	-0.064	-0.083	-0.202*	-0.164*	-0.273*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.061)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Far Right	0.042	0.002	0.147*	-0.029	0.006	-0.037	0.047	0.067	-0.013	0.164*
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.043)
Support Intervention	0.031	-0.043	-0.059	-0.166*	0.004	-0.004	0.004	-0.047	-0.009	-0.064
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.058)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Support Redistribution	-0.010	-0.052*	0.024	-0.059	-0.018	-0.033	0.028	-0.129*	-0.066	-0.138*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Empathy	-0.005	-0.014	0.029	-0.031	0.021	-0.038*	-0.023	-0.013	0.012	-0.028
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.022)
R ²	0.039	0.082	0.093	0.100	0.050	0.040	0.111	0.118	0.063	0.243
Adj. R ²	0.026	0.071	0.057	0.084	0.030	0.029	0.086	0.109	0.041	0.222
Num. obs.	1784	2102	648	1365	1185	2288	899	2572	1087	922

Table A8: **The Correlates of Austerity Support, 2019 Survey, with Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. $*p < 0.05$.

	Italy A	Italy B	Italy C	Spain A	Spain B	Spain C
(Intercept)	0.713*	0.754*	0.871*	0.664*	0.813*	1.023*
	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.095)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.100)
Age 30 - 39	-0.021	-0.019	-0.008	-0.017	-0.015	-0.011
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Age 40 - 49	0.001	0.004	0.028	-0.048	-0.037	-0.029
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Age 50 - 59	-0.101*	-0.099*	-0.077	-0.053	-0.026	-0.016
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Age 60+	-0.068	-0.065	-0.040	-0.063	-0.044	-0.031
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Female	0.049*	0.043	0.051*	0.025	0.022	0.022
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Education Intermediate	-0.030	-0.029	-0.031	-0.041	-0.024	-0.020
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Education High	-0.033	-0.032	-0.041	-0.076*	-0.063*	-0.063*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Number of Children	0.016	0.017	0.017	0.009	0.004	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income Quintile 2	0.001	0.005	0.006	-0.012	0.004	0.007
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Income Quintile 3	-0.021	-0.017	-0.016	0.025	0.028	0.035
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Income Quintile 4	-0.032	-0.029	-0.024	-0.092*	-0.066	-0.062
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Income Quintile 5	0.020	0.025	0.031	-0.031	-0.035	-0.025
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Employed	-0.027	-0.024	-0.024	0.006	-0.003	-0.006
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Union Member	0.010	0.012	0.016	0.034*	0.018	0.017
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Public Job	0.001	0.006	-0.002	-0.035	-0.045	-0.049
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Own Stocks	0.022	0.028	0.022	0.044	0.024	0.013
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Public Income	-0.017	-0.014	-0.017	0.002	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Mortgage	-0.005	-0.003	-0.006	0.044	0.044	0.044
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Laid Off	-0.010	-0.008	-0.000	-0.025	-0.024	-0.021
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Voted		-0.042	-0.037		-0.084*	-0.078*
		(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.026)	(0.026)
Far Left		0.005	0.015		-0.191*	-0.170*
		(0.035)	(0.036)		(0.033)	(0.033)
Left		-0.003	-0.003		-0.122*	-0.109*
		(0.035)	(0.035)		(0.032)	(0.032)
Right		-0.039	-0.049		0.090*	0.081*
		(0.031)	(0.031)		(0.030)	(0.031)
Far Right		-0.050	-0.051		0.038	0.023
		(0.031)	(0.031)		(0.037)	(0.037)
Support Intervention			-0.018			-0.012
			(0.010)			(0.010)
Support Redistribution			-0.005			-0.025*
			(0.008)			(0.009)
Belief in Government Intentions			0.009			0.003
			(0.007)			(0.008)
Belief in Government Competence			-0.000			-0.008
			(0.007)			(0.009)
Empathy			-0.019			-0.005
			(0.013)			(0.013)
Knowledge			-0.008			-0.013
			(0.011)			(0.013)
R ²	0.015	0.019	0.026	0.021	0.076	0.083
Adj. R ²	0.005	0.007	0.011	0.012	0.065	0.069
Num. obs.	1985	1985	1985	1967	1967	1967

Table A9: **The Correlates of Austerity Support, 2019 Survey, Unweighted.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

	Italy A	Italy B	Italy C	Spain A	Spain B	Spain C
(Intercept)	0.698*	0.740*	0.887*	0.670*	0.813*	1.041*
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.094)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.092)
Age 30 - 39	-0.033	-0.032	-0.020	-0.041	-0.036	-0.034
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Age 40 - 49	-0.009	-0.006	0.015	-0.079*	-0.065	-0.058
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Age 50 - 59	-0.092*	-0.090*	-0.066	-0.076*	-0.046	-0.036
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Age 60+	-0.093*	-0.090*	-0.064	-0.087*	-0.065	-0.051
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Female	0.043	0.037	0.044	0.036	0.035	0.036
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Education Intermediate	-0.027	-0.025	-0.027	-0.045	-0.028	-0.025
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Education High	-0.029	-0.028	-0.038	-0.081*	-0.068*	-0.068*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Number of Children	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.010	0.006	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income Quintile 2	-0.002	0.002	0.004	-0.005	0.008	0.010
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Income Quintile 3	-0.032	-0.029	-0.028	0.011	0.013	0.020
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Income Quintile 4	-0.036	-0.032	-0.025	-0.091*	-0.069	-0.066
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Income Quintile 5	0.023	0.026	0.033	-0.049	-0.053	-0.043
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Employed	-0.020	-0.018	-0.019	0.004	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Union Member	0.017	0.019	0.022	0.040*	0.023	0.022
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Public Job	0.006	0.011	0.002	-0.030	-0.038	-0.043
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Own Stocks	0.028	0.033	0.028	0.072*	0.048	0.035
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Public Income	-0.004	-0.002	-0.005	0.000	-0.008	-0.005
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Mortgage	0.000	0.001	-0.002	0.052*	0.049*	0.049*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Laid Off	-0.008	-0.008	-0.000	-0.047	-0.046	-0.042
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Voted		-0.035	-0.030		-0.082*	-0.076*
		(0.029)	(0.028)		(0.025)	(0.026)
Far Left		-0.006	0.002		-0.194*	-0.169*
		(0.035)	(0.035)		(0.031)	(0.031)
Left		-0.015	-0.016		-0.121*	-0.106*
		(0.034)	(0.034)		(0.030)	(0.031)
Right		-0.047	-0.059		0.095*	0.084*
		(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.029)	(0.030)
Far Right		-0.050	-0.052		0.052	0.033
		(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.034)	(0.035)
Support Intervention			-0.027*			-0.017
			(0.009)			(0.010)
Support Redistribution			-0.005			-0.025*
			(0.008)			(0.009)
Belief in Government Intentions			0.010			0.008
			(0.007)			(0.008)
Belief in Government Competence			-0.003			-0.011
			(0.007)			(0.008)
Empathy			-0.014			-0.003
			(0.013)			(0.012)
Knowledge			-0.009			-0.015
			(0.010)			(0.013)
R ²	0.013	0.016	0.025	0.026	0.083	0.092
Adj. R ²	0.004	0.004	0.010	0.017	0.072	0.078
Num. obs.	1985	1985	1985	1967	1967	1967

Table A10: **The Correlates of Austerity Support, 2019 Survey, with Alternative Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors reported. * $p < 0.05$.

	Italy A	Italy B	Italy C	Spain A	Spain B	Spain C
(Intercept)	0.723*	0.774*	0.755*	0.689*	0.839*	1.095*
	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.136)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.110)
Age 30 - 39	-0.016	-0.016	-0.011	-0.027	-0.020	-0.016
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Age 40 - 49	0.016	0.021	0.029	-0.065	-0.051	-0.042
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Age 50 - 59	-0.039	-0.036	-0.029	-0.064	-0.035	-0.022
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Age 60+	-0.011	-0.011	0.001	-0.064	-0.044	-0.028
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Female	0.053	0.045	0.047	0.022	0.019	0.021
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Education Intermediate	-0.037	-0.039	-0.039	-0.043	-0.025	-0.021
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Education High	-0.019	-0.022	-0.027	-0.077*	-0.059	-0.059
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Number of Children	-0.006	-0.006	-0.004	0.007	0.002	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Income Quintile 2	0.002	0.005	0.005	-0.018	-0.001	0.005
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Income Quintile 3	-0.006	-0.003	-0.002	0.023	0.028	0.039
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Income Quintile 4	-0.033	-0.031	-0.026	-0.108*	-0.081	-0.071
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Income Quintile 5	0.014	0.019	0.026	-0.037	-0.040	-0.024
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Employed	-0.019	-0.015	-0.012	0.014	0.000	-0.003
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Union Member	-0.004	-0.001	0.005	0.029	0.012	0.010
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Public Job	-0.038	-0.027	-0.032	-0.048	-0.060	-0.064*
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Own Stocks	0.026	0.031	0.030	0.037	0.013	-0.000
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Public Income	-0.012	-0.007	-0.009	-0.002	-0.009	-0.006
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Mortgage	0.012	0.015	0.013	0.039	0.043	0.044
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Laid Off	0.028	0.028	0.035	-0.023	-0.027	-0.025
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Voted		-0.030	-0.034		-0.077*	-0.069*
		(0.036)	(0.037)		(0.029)	(0.029)
Far Left		-0.013	-0.009		-0.191*	-0.170*
		(0.044)	(0.044)		(0.035)	(0.036)
Left		-0.018	-0.019		-0.128*	-0.114*
		(0.043)	(0.043)		(0.035)	(0.035)
Right		-0.068	-0.073		0.096*	0.086*
		(0.041)	(0.041)		(0.034)	(0.035)
Far Right		-0.086*	-0.086*		0.049	0.030
		(0.041)	(0.041)		(0.040)	(0.041)
Support Intervention			-0.015			-0.019
			(0.013)			(0.011)
Support Redistribution			0.004			-0.022*
			(0.011)			(0.010)
Belief in Government Intentions			0.010			0.003
			(0.009)			(0.009)
Belief in Government Competence			0.001			-0.009
			(0.010)			(0.009)
Empathy			0.003			-0.006
			(0.018)			(0.015)
Knowledge			-0.008			-0.018
			(0.014)			(0.015)
R ²	0.011	0.018	0.022	0.025	0.081	0.089
Adj. R ²	0.002	0.006	0.007	0.016	0.069	0.075
Num. obs.	1985	1985	1985	1967	1967	1967

Table A11: **The Correlates of Austerity Support by Education, 2019 Survey, with Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. High education pertains to ISCED11 levels 5-8, while low/medium education includes all levels below. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

	Italy Low/Medium	Italy High	Spain Low/Medium	Spain High
(Intercept)	0.849* (0.105)	0.803* (0.217)	1.067* (0.128)	0.786* (0.161)
Age 30 - 39	-0.010 (0.044)	0.031 (0.081)	0.002 (0.047)	-0.016 (0.061)
Age 40 - 49	0.032 (0.041)	0.024 (0.085)	-0.042 (0.048)	0.009 (0.059)
Age 50 - 59	-0.089* (0.045)	0.054 (0.089)	-0.020 (0.049)	-0.000 (0.065)
Age 60+	-0.041 (0.050)	-0.048 (0.099)	-0.026 (0.055)	-0.030 (0.073)
Female	0.045 (0.026)	0.068 (0.052)	0.023 (0.030)	0.030 (0.037)
Number of Children	0.021 (0.012)	0.012 (0.017)	0.001 (0.012)	0.003 (0.016)
Income Quintile 2	-0.013 (0.031)	0.146* (0.072)	0.001 (0.036)	0.049 (0.064)
Income Quintile 3	-0.016 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.076)	0.026 (0.040)	0.075 (0.066)
Income Quintile 4	-0.024 (0.048)	0.029 (0.080)	-0.121* (0.057)	0.034 (0.071)
Income Quintile 5	-0.005 (0.065)	0.135 (0.086)	0.043 (0.053)	-0.056 (0.069)
Employed	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.080 (0.058)	-0.011 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.050)
Union Member	0.011 (0.020)	0.034 (0.038)	0.015 (0.021)	0.021 (0.027)
Public Job	-0.031 (0.039)	0.078 (0.061)	-0.038 (0.039)	-0.069 (0.043)
Own Stocks	0.022 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.055)	-0.003 (0.040)	0.037 (0.039)
Public Income	-0.013 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.075)	-0.005 (0.039)	-0.004 (0.060)
Mortgage	-0.010 (0.028)	0.033 (0.056)	0.040 (0.028)	0.047 (0.038)
Laid Off	0.001 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.063)	0.003 (0.030)	-0.091* (0.044)
Voted	-0.044 (0.032)	-0.060 (0.071)	-0.078* (0.031)	-0.088 (0.048)
Far Left	0.019 (0.041)	-0.023 (0.081)	-0.155* (0.040)	-0.210* (0.059)
Left	0.013 (0.039)	-0.089 (0.079)	-0.124* (0.040)	-0.093 (0.056)
Right	-0.040 (0.034)	-0.094 (0.072)	0.068 (0.039)	0.083 (0.054)
Far Right	-0.059 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.066)	0.007 (0.046)	0.077 (0.065)
Support Intervention	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.028 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.031* (0.015)
Support Redistribution	0.000 (0.009)	-0.025 (0.020)	-0.026* (0.011)	-0.026 (0.015)
Belief in Government Intentions	0.006 (0.007)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.036* (0.014)
Belief in Government Competence	0.003 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.016)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.027 (0.014)
Empathy	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.033)	-0.018 (0.016)	0.032 (0.022)
Knowledge	-0.012 (0.012)	0.012 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.023)
R ²	0.029	0.063	0.078	0.130
Adj. R ²	0.011	-0.004	0.057	0.095
Num. obs.	1566	419	1255	712

Table A12: **The Correlates of Austerity Support by Knowledge, 2019 Survey, with Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. $*p < 0.05$.

	Italy Low/Medium	Italy High	Spain Low/Medium	Spain High
(Intercept)	0.670*	1.037*	0.770*	1.086*
	(0.121)	(0.155)	(0.179)	(0.111)
Age 30 - 39	-0.012	-0.006	0.003	-0.004
	(0.044)	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.049)
Age 40 - 49	0.025	0.037	-0.025	-0.028
	(0.043)	(0.073)	(0.062)	(0.047)
Age 50 - 59	-0.134*	0.012	-0.019	-0.021
	(0.049)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.050)
Age 60+	-0.061	0.002	0.043	-0.061
	(0.056)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.054)
Female	0.065*	0.031	0.024	0.021
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.028)
Education Intermediate	-0.008	-0.067	0.005	-0.034
	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.033)
Education High	-0.009	-0.076	-0.073	-0.071
	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.037)
Number of Children	0.038*	-0.021	0.011	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Income Quintile 2	0.002	0.023	0.027	-0.020
	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.041)
Income Quintile 3	-0.047	0.036	0.005	0.024
	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.042)
Income Quintile 4	-0.011	-0.014	-0.022	-0.087
	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.085)	(0.051)
Income Quintile 5	0.063	0.032	0.121	-0.080
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.049)
Employed	-0.013	-0.041	0.020	-0.015
	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.038)
Union Member	0.038	-0.010	0.022	0.017
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.019)
Public Job	0.013	-0.003	-0.028	-0.046
	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.033)
Own Stocks	-0.016	0.072	0.011	0.020
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.055)	(0.034)
Public Income	-0.003	-0.028	-0.007	-0.001
	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.042)
Mortgage	0.007	-0.011	0.027	0.051
	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.027)
Laid Off	-0.023	0.047	0.034	-0.053
	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.030)
Voted	-0.071*	0.033	-0.055	-0.096*
	(0.034)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.033)
Far Left	0.023	-0.016	-0.137*	-0.175*
	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.041)
Left	0.004	-0.011	-0.086	-0.111*
	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.040)
Right	-0.025	-0.082	-0.016	0.117*
	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.039)
Far Right	-0.039	-0.086	-0.128	0.103*
	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.045)
Support Intervention	0.005	-0.049*	0.015	-0.025*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.012)
Support Redistribution	-0.004	-0.001	-0.018	-0.025*
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Belief in Government Intentions	0.009	0.012	0.010	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)
Belief in Government Competence	0.008	-0.014	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.010)
Empathy	-0.021	-0.021	-0.011	-0.006
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)
R ²	0.045	0.039	0.048	0.117
Adj. R ²	0.021	0.004	-0.001	0.098
Num. obs.	1164	821	595	1372

Table A13: **The Causal Effects of Justification Strategies on Support for Austerity, by Country, with Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. The *Increase Revenue* condition serves as the reference group. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. $*p < 0.05$.

	France	Greece	Italy	Spain	United Kingdom
(Intercept)	0.876*	0.592*	0.770*	0.670*	0.484*
	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Confidence	-0.013	0.032	0.075*	-0.052	-0.023
	(0.019)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.039)
Household	0.012	0.055	0.070*	0.025	0.076*
	(0.018)	(0.048)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Common Sense	-0.010	0.035	0.000	0.009	0.117*
	(0.019)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Morality	0.004	0.064	0.033	-0.015	0.047
	(0.018)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.039)
R ²	0.001	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.010
Obs.	3886	2013	3473	3471	2009

Table A14: **The Causal Effects of Justification Strategies on Support for Austerity Controlling for Pre-Treatment Preferences, by Country, with Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. The *Increase Revenue* condition serves as the reference group. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. $*p < 0.05$.

	France	Greece	Italy	Spain	UK
(Intercept)	0.560*	0.264*	0.442*	0.279*	0.188*
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Confidence	-0.015	-0.011	0.073*	-0.037	-0.044
	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.034)
Household	0.012	0.045	0.082*	0.031	0.032
	(0.017)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Common Sense	-0.012	0.017	0.002	0.004	0.061
	(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.032)
Morality	-0.005	0.048	0.056*	0.005	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.032)
Pre-Treatment Pro-Austerity	0.400*	0.577*	0.426*	0.602*	0.554*
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.021)
R ²	0.238	0.345	0.220	0.378	0.305
Obs.	3886	2013	3473	3471	2009

Table A15: **The Causal Effects of Justification Strategies on Support for Austerity Controlling for Pre-Treatment Preferences (Anti/Pro), by Country, with Weights.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual prefers spending cuts over fiscal stimulus and zero otherwise. The *Increase Revenue* condition serves as the reference group. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. $*p < 0.05$.

	France Anti	France Pro	Greece Anti	Greece Pro	Italy Anti	Italy Pro	Spain Anti	Spain Pro	UK Anti	UK Pro
(Intercept)	0.570*	0.958*	0.258*	0.846*	0.389*	0.884*	0.260*	0.891*	0.189*	0.741*
	(0.046)	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Confidence	-0.110	0.010	0.029	-0.035	0.214*	0.031	-0.050	-0.029	-0.026	-0.058
	(0.064)	(0.011)	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.046)
Household	0.104	-0.013	0.062	0.033	0.180*	0.050*	0.105*	-0.010	0.004	0.050
	(0.061)	(0.013)	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.067)	(0.025)	(0.052)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.041)
Common Sense	-0.027	-0.008	-0.002	0.029	0.033	-0.006	0.025	-0.007	0.080	0.051
	(0.066)	(0.013)	(0.066)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.029)	(0.052)	(0.028)	(0.054)	(0.041)
Morality	-0.041	0.003	0.050	0.046	0.068	0.057*	0.017	-0.000	-0.008	0.017
	(0.064)	(0.012)	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.066)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.044)
R ²	0.021	0.002	0.003	0.007	0.027	0.008	0.013	0.001	0.008	0.008
Obs.	819	3067	830	1183	987	2486	1424	2047	820	1189

Table A16: **Austerity Package Profiles**

	Italy	Spain	Greece
Time frame	2009-2014	2009-2014	2009-2014
Defense Spending Cuts	10.0	0.0	5.0
Education Spending Cuts	10.0	5.0	0.0
Welfare Spending Cuts	10.0	5.0	0.0
Public Sector Job Cuts	10.0	5.0	20.0
Pension Cuts	10.0	5.0	20.0
Income Tax Increase	0.0	5.0	0.0
Sales Tax Increase	20.0	0.0	20.0
Corporate Tax Increase	0.0	0.0	0.0

Sources: “Austerity Measures in the EU – A Country by Country Table”, <https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/112-european-affairs/special-g-20-issue-on-financial-reform/1180-austerity-measures-in-the-eu>; “EU austerity drive country by country” (BBC News, 21 May 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/10162176>); “Fiscal Austerity in Europe Doesn’t Mean Large Spending Cuts” (Rugy, Veronique de, 2012, Mercatus Center–George Mason University), and Alesina et al. (2014).

Table A17: **The Effects of Party Endorsements by Ideological Distance from Endorsing Party on Austerity Package Support, by Country.** The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is the dichotomized rating variable which equals one if a proposal received a score of 6 or higher on a scale from “vote definitely against” (1) to “vote definitely in favor (10)”. * $p < 0.05$.

	Italy	Spain
(Intercept)	0.476* (0.035)	0.443* (0.031)
Distance from Endorsing Party: (0,1]	-0.174* (0.064)	-0.121* (0.038)
Distance from Endorsing Party: (1,2]	-0.136* (0.037)	-0.115* (0.034)
Distance from Endorsing Party: (2,3]	-0.065 (0.041)	-0.106* (0.034)
Distance from Endorsing Party: (3,4]	-0.164* (0.046)	-0.146* (0.036)
Distance from Endorsing Party: (4,7]	-0.157* (0.041)	-0.235* (0.046)
Center	0.034 (0.050)	0.040 (0.063)
Right	0.140* (0.043)	0.070 (0.048)
Distance (0,1] * Center	0.063 (0.083)	-0.135 (0.074)
Distance (1,2] * Center	0.008 (0.055)	0.029 (0.072)
Distance (2,3] * Center	-0.049 (0.067)	-0.100 (0.070)
Distance (3,4] * Center	0.037 (0.063)	-0.014 (0.076)
Distance (4,7] * Center	0.113 (0.073)	0.067 (0.085)
Distance (0,1] * Right	0.022 (0.073)	-0.039 (0.062)
Distance (1,2] * Right	-0.011 (0.048)	0.028 (0.053)
Distance (2,3] * Right	-0.130* (0.058)	0.047 (0.059)
Distance (3,4] * Right	0.034 (0.058)	-0.014 (0.057)
Distance (4,7] * Right	-0.067 (0.053)	0.014 (0.062)
R ²	0.024	0.023
Adj. R ²	0.022	0.021
Num. obs.	7720	7210

* $p < 0.05$

V. SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES

Supplementary Figures A1 - A24 are contained in a separate online appendix document available on the American Political Science Review Dataverse: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JH5UU8>.

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