ONLINE APPENDIX FOR:

"Triggering Ideological Thinking: How Elections Foster Coherence of Welfare State Attitudes"

Tobias Heide-Jørgensen[*]

---
[*]Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

A Full Models

Table A.1: Welfare Attitude Crystallization among Leftists: Full Models

	Support redistribution							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Support welfare spending	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Right-wing majority	-0.05*	-0.10**	-0.16***	-0.04	-0.12	-0.92**	-0.27	-0.10
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.46)	(4.53)	(0.15)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Right-wing majority	0.05*	0.08**	0.09**	0.10**	0.09*	0.09	0.01	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.18)
Right-wing running variable	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.06	0.03	-1.30	
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.30)	(3.03)	
Right-wing running variable^2	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.38	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.84)	
Right-wing majority $\times$ Right-wing running variable	0.00	0.01	0.05***	-0.15	-0.09	0.71	2.66	
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.46)	(4.56)	
Right-wing majority $\times$ Right-wing running variable^2	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*	0.02	-0.00	-0.17*	0.04	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(1.39)	
Age	0.01***	0.00**	0.01***	0.00*	0.01*	0.01*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age^2	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Sex								
Male	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Don't know/no answer	-0.52***	-0.53***						
	(0.01)	(0.02)						
Gross household income								
300,000–499,999 DKK	-0.03***	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.04	-0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
500,000 DKK or more	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Don't know/no answer	-0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Upper Secondary Education?								
Yes	0.02***	0.02*	0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Don't know/no answer	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.11	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.17)
Higher Education?								
Yes	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.09*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Don't know/no answer	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.05	-0.00	-0.20	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.15)
Occupation								
Self-employed	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Unemployed	0.04*	0.03	0.05*	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Student	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.10
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)

Table A.1: Welfare Attitude Crystallization among Leftists: Full Models (continued)

	Full sample	±15 pp.	±10 pp.	±5 pp.	±4 pp.	±3 pp.	±2 pp.	±1.7 pp.
Not in the labor force	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Other occupations	0.01	0.05	0.08	-0.02	-0.01	0.14**		
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.06)		
Don't know/no answer	-0.02	-0.06	-0.04	-0.06	-0.09	-0.10	-0.01	-0.32***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.03)
Survey year								
1994	0.18***	0.16***	0.14***	0.17***	0.17***	0.18***	0.17***	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	
1998	0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.12***	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
1999	0.14***	0.10***	0.07**	0.15***	0.16***	0.14**	0.13*	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	
2000	0.19***	0.16***	0.14***	0.17***	0.16***	0.14***	0.22***	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	
2001	0.15***	0.12***	0.07**	0.11***	0.11**	0.12**	0.35***	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
2002	0.09***	0.07**	0.04	0.07**	0.06*	0.05	0.09	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.12)	
2003	0.15***	0.13***	0.10***	0.12***	0.10***	0.08*	0.08	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	
2005	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.13***	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
2007	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.10	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	
2008	0.10***	0.09***	0.06**	0.06**	0.08**	0.10***	0.12**	-0.15
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.13)
2009	0.31***	0.37***	0.45***	0.44***	0.46***	0.46***	0.47***	
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	
2011	0.07***	0.04*	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.10**	-0.15
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.15)
2015	0.12***	0.10***	0.07**	0.08**	0.09**	0.11***	0.12**	-0.26*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.13)
Constant	0.33***	0.38***	0.35***	0.47***	0.46**	0.43	-0.73	0.80**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.33)	(2.68)	(0.26)
Bandwidth	Full sample	±15 pp.	±10 pp.	±5 pp.	±4 pp.	±3 pp.	±2 pp.	±1.7 pp.
Observations	7,312	5,098	3,877	2,158	1,753	1,473	799	219

Note: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Following categories are used as reference groups: Female, 0-299,999 DKK, no upper secondary education, no higher education, employed, and 1991.

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

Table A.2: Welfare Attitude Crystallization among Rightists: Full Models

	Support redistribution							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Support welfare spending	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	0.09***	0.08**	0.15**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Left-wing majority	-0.04**	-0.05*	0.03	-0.10	0.17	-0.20	3.40	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.47)	(3.08)	(0.06)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Left-wing majority	0.04***	0.04**	0.04*	0.04	0.05*	0.05	0.06	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Left-wing running variable	0.00	0.00	-0.03***	0.05	-0.07	-0.03	0.42	
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.38)	(2.67)	
Left-wing running variable^2	0.00	0.00	-0.00***	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.14	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.74)	
Left-wing majority $\times$ Left-wing running variable	-0.00	-0.00	0.03*	-0.03	-0.03	0.24	-4.59	
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.45)	(3.25)	
Left-wing majority $\times$ Left-wing running variable^2	-0.00	-0.00	0.00**	-0.02	0.04	-0.04	1.01	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.94)	
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age^2	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Sex								
Male	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Gross household income								
300,000–499,999 DKK	-0.03***	-0.03**	-0.03***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
500,000 DKK or more	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.05*	-0.08*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Don't know/no answer	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.10
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Upper Secondary Education?								
Yes	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Don't know/no answer	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.04	-0.23*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Higher Education?								
Yes	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.06**	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Don't know/no answer	-0.03	-0.04	-0.08*	-0.11*	-0.17**	-0.17**	-0.03	
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	
Occupation								
Self-employed	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.05
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Unemployed	0.05***	0.05**	0.05*	0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.00	-0.14
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Student	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.05	-0.16*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Not in the labor force	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.03	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other occupations	0.05	0.02	0.07	-0.12	-0.21***	-0.28***		
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.04)		
Don't know/no answer	-0.09*	-0.02	-0.05	-0.02	0.10	0.12	0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.07)

**Table A.2:** Welfare Attitude Crystallization among Rightists: Full Models (continued)

Survey year								
1994	0.24***	0.24***	0.23***	0.28***	0.28***	0.26***	0.27***	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	
1998	0.06**	0.05	0.05	0.16***	0.16***	0.18**	0.21***	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	
1999	0.24***	0.24***	0.25***	0.33***	0.34***	0.35***	0.41***	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	
2000	0.25***	0.24***	0.24***	0.30***	0.30***	0.32***	0.51***	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	
2001	0.25***	0.25***	0.24***	0.29***	0.28***	0.30***	0.31***	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	
2002	0.17***	0.15***	0.14***	0.21***	0.23***	0.26***	0.41***	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	
2003	0.25***	0.24***	0.22***	0.26***	0.26***	0.25***	0.32***	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)
2005	0.10***	0.09***	0.08**	0.15***	0.17***	0.19***	0.22**	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.04)
2007	0.09*	0.11*	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.12	-0.26
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
2008	0.15***	0.14***	0.12***	0.18***	0.15***	0.16***	0.24***	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
2009	0.25***	0.29***	0.42*					
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.25)					
2011	0.18***	0.17***	0.16***	0.20***	0.17***	0.18***	0.27***	-0.10**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
2015	0.22***	0.21***	0.20***	0.24***	0.25***	0.26***	0.35***	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	0.27***	0.27***	0.25***	0.33**	0.20	0.22	0.47	0.65***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.41)	(2.40)	(0.15)
Bandwidth	Full sample	±15 pp.	±10 pp.	±5 pp.	±4 pp.	±3 pp.	±2 pp.	±1.7 pp.
Observations	9,977	7,382	5,385	2,822	2,365	2,063	1,197	435

Note: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Following categories are used as reference groups: Female, 0-299,999 DKK, no upper secondary education, no higher education, employed, and 1991.

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

B Consonant Majorities and Effect among Centrists

Figure B.1: Consonant Majorities

Note: RDD estimates of effect of exposure to consonant majority (leftists being exposed to a left-wing majority, and rightists being exposed to a right-wing majority) on welfare attitude consistency. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure B.2: Political Majorities and Centrists

Note: RDD estimates of effect of right- and left-wing majority on welfare attitude consistency among centrists. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

C Testing RDD Assumptions

Figure C.1: Fourth-Degree Polynomial Regression

Note: RDD estimates from models using fourth-order polynomial of the running variable. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

Table C.1: Placebo Cutoffs

| | Support redistribution | | | |
| | Leftists | | Rightists | |
	45%	55%	45%	55%
Support welfare spending	0.07**	0.14***	0.09***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Right placebo treatment (45%)	0.01			
	(0.04)			
Right placebo treatment (55%)		-0.05		
		(0.06)		
Left placebo treatment (45%)			0.03	
			(0.05)	
Left placebo treatment (55%)				0.00
				(0.04)
Support welfare spending × Right placebo treatment (45%)	-0.03			
	(0.04)			
Support welfare spending × Right placebo treatment (55%)		-0.03		
		(0.05)		
Support welfare spending × Left placebo treatment (45%)			-0.01	
			(0.03)	
Support welfare spending × Left placebo treatment (55%)				-0.00
				(0.02)
Constant	0.29***	0.41***	0.27***	0.32***
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Running variable	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±5 pp.	±5 pp.	±5 pp.	±5 pp.
Observations	2,400	1,477	2,611	2,774

Note: Placebo cutoffs at 45% and 55% right- and left-wing seat share. Running variables are second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of the cutoff. Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies.

*: p ≤ 0.10; **: p ≤ 0.05; ***: p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed t-test).

Table C.2: Municipality-Level Covariate Analysis: Right-Wing Majority

	Pop. size	Aged 0-29	Non-west. imm.	Avg. fam. inc.	Old mun.	Lag. right maj.
Right-wing majority	15.48	0.02	0.00	-34.91	0.92	0.67
	(14.65)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(52.58)	(1.20)	(1.09)
Constant	14.37	0.36***	0.02**	322.99***	0.80	-1.05
	(11.62)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(32.34)	(0.74)	(0.82)
Running variable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.
Observations	853	853	811	689	853	647

Note: RDD estimates of effect of right-wing majority on municipality covariates in election years 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2013. Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff. 'Pop. size' is municipality population size (1,000 persons), 'Aged 0-29' is proportion aged 0-29 years in the municipality, 'Non-west. imm.' is proportion non-Western immigrants and descendants in the municipality, 'Avg. fam. inc.' is average municipality family income (1,000 DKK), 'Old mun.' is a dummy variable for old, now amalgamated, municipalities, and 'Lag. right maj.' is a dummy variable for right-wing majority in last electoral term. All models, except the last two, which are logit models, are estimated by OLS.

*: p ≤ 0.10; **: p ≤ 0.05; ***: p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed t-test).

Table C.3: Municipality-Level Covariate Analysis: Left-Wing Majority

	Pop. size	Aged 0-29	Non-west. imm.	Avg. fam. inc.	Old mun.	Lag. left maj.
Left-wing majority	-0.82	-0.02	-0.01	61.51	-1.31	1.53
	(13.69)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(44.79)	(1.05)	(1.04)
Constant	31.15***	0.37***	0.03***	302.44***	0.93	-1.31*
	(7.29)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(30.86)	(0.76)	(0.76)
Running variable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.
Observations	710	710	669	565	710	523

Note: RDD estimates of effect of left-wing majority on municipality covariates in election years 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2013. Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. 'Pop. size is' municipality population size (1,000 persons), 'Aged 0-29' is proportion aged 0-29 years in the municipality, 'Non-west. imm.' is proportion non-Western immigrants and descendants in the municipality, 'Avg. fam. inc.' is average municipality family income (1,000 DKK), 'Old mun.' is a dummy variable for old, now amalgamated, municipalities, and 'Lag. left maj.' is a dummy variable for left-wing majority in last electoral term. All models, except the last two, which are logit models, are estimated by OLS.

*: p ≤ 0.10; **: p ≤ 0.05; ***: p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed t-test).

Table C.4: Individual-Level Covariate Analysis: Leftists

	Age	Male	Sec. educ	High. educ.	High inc.	Empl.
Right-wing majority	0.98	0.42	-0.55	-0.36	-0.46	0.07
	(3.15)	(0.26)	(0.52)	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.30)
Constant	44.51***	-0.19	-0.36	-0.40	-0.48*	0.40
	(1.80)	(0.14)	(0.45)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Running variable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.
Observations	4,093	4,093	4,043	4,056	3,642	4,059

Note: RDD estimates of effect of right-wing majority on individual covariates. Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. 'Age' is respondent age, 'Male' is a dummy variable for respondent being male, 'Sec. educ.' is a dummy variable for secondary education, 'High. educ.' is a dummy variable for higher education, 'High inc.' is dummy variable for gross family income equals 500,000 DKK or more, and 'Empl.' is a dummy variable for being employed. Models with binary dependent variables are estimated with logit. Otherwise, OLS is used.

*: p ≤ 0.10; **: p ≤ 0.05; ***: p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed t-test).

## Table C.5: Individual-Level Covariate Analysis: Rightists

	Age	Male	Sec. educ	High. educ.	High inc.	Empl.
Left-wing majority	3.38	-0.20	0.05	0.14	0.24	-0.30
	(2.79)	(0.21)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.22)
Constant	46.52***	0.56***	-0.86***	-0.62**	-0.48**	0.50***
	(2.04)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.16)
Running variable	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.	±10 pp.
Observations	5,617	5,617	5,554	5,569	4,804	5,586

Note: RDD estimates of effect of left-wing majority on individual covariates. Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. 'Age' is respondent age, 'Male' is a dummy variable for respondent being male, 'Sec. educ.' is a dummy variable for secondary education, 'High. educ.' is a dummy variable for higher education, 'High inc.' is dummy variable for gross family income equals 500,000 DKK or more, and 'Empl.' is a dummy variable for being employed. Models with binary dependent variables are estimated with logit. Otherwise, OLS is used.

*: p ≤ 0.10; **: p ≤ 0.05; ***: p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed t-test).

Figure C.2: Density Plot: Right-Wing Seat Share

Note: McCrary (2008) density estimation using default bin size = 0.72 and default bandwidth = 18.47. Density (municipalities) at the y-axis, and right-wing seat share at the x-axis (cutoff indicated at 50% seat share). Log difference in height θ = -0.19 (s.e. = 0.11; p = 0.07).

Figure C.3: Density Plot: Left-Wing Seat Share

Note: McCrary (2008) density estimation using default bin size = 0.75 and default bandwidth = 16.75. Density (municipalities) at the y-axis, and left-wing seat share at the x-axis (cutoff indicated at 50% seat share). Log difference in height θ = -0.03 (s.e. = 0.13; p = 0.83).

9

Table C.6: Donut RDD

	Support redistribution	
	Leftists	Rightists
Support welfare spending	0.05***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Left-wing majority		-0.17*
		(0.09)
Right-wing majority	-0.03	
	(0.08)	
Support welfare spending × Left-wing majority		0.04**
		(0.02)
Support welfare spending × Right-wing majority	0.08**	
	(0.04)	
Constant	0.36***	0.32***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Covariates	✓	✓
Running variable	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±3–15 pp.	±3–15 pp.
Observations	3,625	5,319

Note: Donut estimation (Eggers et al. 2015) where very close elections ($< \pm 3$ pp.) are excluded. Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff.

*: p $\leq$ 0.10; **: p $\leq$ 0.05; ***: p $\leq$ 0.01 (two-tailed t-test).

Table C.7: Testing for Time-Dependent Self-Selection: Rightists

	Support redistribution			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support welfare spending	0.06***	0.03	0.05	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Left-wing majority	-0.05	-0.07*	0.03	-0.13
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.14)
After first year	-0.07	-0.08	0.07**	-0.24***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Support welfare spending × Left-wing majority	0.04	0.06*	0.04	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Support welfare spending × After first year	0.03	0.07**	0.05	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Left-wing majority × After first year	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Support wel. × Left maj. × After first year	0.00	-0.03	0.00	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Constant	0.33***	0.34***	0.18***	0.57***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Running variable	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	Full sample	±15 pp.	±10 pp.	±5 pp.
Observations	9,977	7,382	5,385	2,822

Note: 'After first year' is a dummy variable indicating whether respondent was interviewed more than one year after the last municipal election. Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff.

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

Table C.8: Testing for Time-Dependent Self-Selection: Leftists

	Support redistribution			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support welfare spending	0.07***	0.05*	0.05	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Right-wing majority	-0.10**	-0.17***	-0.25***	-0.20
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.17)
After first year	0.25***	0.24***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Support welfare spending × Right-wing majority	0.09**	0.14***	0.15***	0.16**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Support welfare spending × After first year	-0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Right-wing majority × After first year	0.10**	0.14**	0.17***	0.15**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Support wel. × Right maj. × After first year	-0.09*	-0.13**	-0.14**	-0.13
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Constant	0.09	0.14*	0.13*	0.27**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Running variable	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	Full sample	±15 pp.	±10 pp.	±5 pp.
Observations	7,312	5,098	3,877	2,158

Note: 'After first year' is a dummy variable indicating whether respondent was interviewed more than one year after the last municipal election. Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff.

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

Figure C.4: Time-Heterogeneous Effects: Leftists

Note: Effect of right-wing majority on welfare attitude consistency among left-wing respondents depending on interview date based on estimates from Table C.8. 'Within one year' is respondents interviewed within one year after the last election. 'After one year' is interviews more than one year after the last election. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

D   Auxiliary Analyses

Figure D.1: The Longevity of the Effects

Note: Effect of right-wing and left-wing majority on welfare attitude consistency among leftists and rightists depending on years elapsed between election and interview year. A bandwidth of 10 percentage points is used. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

Table D.1: Does Age Moderate the Crystallization Effect?: Leftists

	Support redistribution	
	(1)	(2)
Support welfare spending	0.05	0.16
	(0.06)	(0.16)
Right-wing majority	-0.11	0.20
	(0.09)	(0.21)
Age	0.00	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age^2		-0.00*
		(0.00)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Right-wing majority	0.07	-0.13
	(0.09)	(0.24)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Age	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Age^2		0.00
		(0.00)
Right-wing majority $\times$ Age	-0.00	-0.02*
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Right-wing majority $\times$ Age^2		0.00
		(0.00)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Right-wing majority $\times$ Age	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Right-wing majority $\times$ Age^2		-0.00
		(0.00)
Constant	0.43***	0.19
	(0.07)	(0.14)
Covariates	✓	✓
Running variable	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.	±10 pp.
Observations	3,877	3,877

Note: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff. Joint significance of 'Support welfare spending $\times$ Right-wing majority $\times$ Age' and 'Support welfare spending $\times$ Right-wing majority $\times$ Age^2': F = 0.47 (p = 0.62).

*: p $\leq$ 0.10; **: p $\leq$ 0.05; ***: p $\leq$ 0.01 (two-tailed t-test).

Table D.2: Does Age Moderate the Crystallization Effect?: Rightists

	Support redistribution	
	(1)	(2)
Support welfare spending	0.11***	-0.10
	(0.04)	(0.11)
Left-wing majority	0.00	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Age	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age^2		0.00*
		(0.00)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Left-wing majority	0.05	0.17
	(0.06)	(0.14)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Age	-0.00	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Age^2		-0.00**
		(0.00)
Left-wing majority $\times$ Age	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Left-wing majority $\times$ Age^2		-0.00
		(0.00)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Left-wing majority $\times$ Age	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Support welfare spending $\times$ Left-wing majority $\times$ Age^2		0.00
		(0.00)
Constant	0.25***	0.35***
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Covariates	✓	✓
Running variable	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.	±10 pp.
Observations	5,385	5,385

Note: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff. Joint significance of 'Support welfare spending $\times$ Left-wing majority $\times$ Age' and 'Support welfare spending $\times$ Left-wing majority $\times$ Age^2': F = 0.46 (p = 0.63).

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

Table D.3: Does Ideological Extremity Moderate the Crystallization Effect?: Leftists

	Support redistribution
Support welfare spending	0.01
	(0.03)
Right-wing majority	-0.17***
	(0.06)
Left-wing orientation	0.09*
	(0.05)
Support welfare spending × Right-wing majority	0.11**
	(0.05)
Support welfare spending × Left-wing orientation	0.11**
	(0.05)
Right-wing majority × Left-wing orientation	0.04
	(0.09)
Support welfare spending × Right-wing majority × Left-wing orientation	-0.07
	(0.10)
Constant	0.36***
	(0.07)
Covariates	✓
Running variable	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.
Observations	3,877

Note: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff. Left-wing orientation indicates left-wing extremity of the respondent (rescaled to 0–1) on the left-right scale.

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

Table D.4: Does Ideological Extremity Moderate the Crystallization Effect?: Rightists

	Support redistribution
Support welfare spending	0.06**
	(0.02)
Left-wing majority	0.03
	(0.05)
Right-wing orientation	-0.05
	(0.04)
Support welfare spending × Left-wing majority	0.05
	(0.04)
Support welfare spending × Right-wing orientation	0.05
	(0.05)
Left-wing majority × Right-wing orientation	0.00
	(0.05)
Support welfare spending × Left-wing majority × Right-wing orientation	-0.03
	(0.07)
Constant	0.28***
	(0.06)
Covariates	✓
Running variable	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.
Observations	5,385

Note: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff. Right-wing orientation indicates right-wing extremity of the respondent (rescaled to 0–1) on the left-right scale.

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

Table D.5: Does Political Sophistication Moderate the Crystallization Effect?

	Support redistribution	
	Leftists	Rightists
Support welfare spending	0.08**	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Right-wing majority	-0.19**	
	(0.07)	
Left-wing majority		-0.04
		(0.04)
Avg. dev. of party l-r placements	0.16	0.36***
	(0.17)	(0.14)
Support welfare spending × Avg. dev. of party l-r placements	-0.05	0.37**
	(0.19)	(0.16)
Support welfare spending × Right-wing majority	0.11*	
	(0.06)	
Right-wing majority × Avg. dev. of party l-r placements	0.10	
	(0.23)	
Support welfare spending × Right-wing majority × Avg. dev. of party l-r placements	-0.14	
	(0.28)	
Support welfare spending × Left-wing majority		0.07*
		(0.04)
Left-wing majority × Avg. dev. of party l-r placements		0.25
		(0.20)
Support welfare spending × Left-wing majority × Avg. dev. of party l-r placements		-0.31
		(0.23)
Constant	0.57***	0.59***
	(0.09)	(0.07)
Covariates	✓	✓
Running variable	✓	✓
Bandwidth	±10 pp.	±10 pp.
Observations	2,794	3,665

Note: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff. Political sophistication is measured as average absolute deviation of respondents' placement of Danish political parties on the left-right scale from the sample average, rescaled to 0-1, following Aldrich et al. (2018). Higher values indicate lower sophistication (greater discrepancy between perceived position and the average perception among respondents).

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

Figure D.2: Consistency between Attitudes toward Unemployment Spending and Social Benefits


Note: RDD estimates from models similar to the main analyses but with attitudes toward spending on unemployment benefits as dependent variable and atttitudes toward the generosity of social benefits as independent variable. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

**Figure D.3:** Cronbach's Alpha of Welfare Attitudes, Comparing Treated and Untreated Individuals

Note: Cronbach's alpha calculated using the four welfare issues just to the left and to the right of the 50% seat share cutoff (±1.7 pp.). 'No divergent majority' denotes respondents below the threshold, and 'Divergent majority' denotes respondents above the threshold.

Figure D.4: Consistency between Anti-Immigration and Crime Attitudes

Note: RDD estimates from models similar to the main analyses but with attitudes toward immigration as dependent variable and atttitudes toward crime as independent variable. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure D.5: Consistency between Anti-Immigration and Crime Attitudes: Pooled Results

Note: Pooled estimates from models where treatment and running variable is defined as the electoral strenght of the ideologically opposing party bloc based on the respondent's ideological position. Only leftists and rightists are included. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

E Additional Robustness Analyses

Table E.1: Interaction Between Running Variable and Support for Welfare Spending

	Support redistribution	
	Leftists	Rightists
Support welfare spending	0.04	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Right-wing majority	-0.09*	
	(0.05)	
Left-wing majority		-0.04*
		(0.03)
Support welfare spending × Right-wing majority	0.09	
	(0.06)	
Support welfare spending × Left-wing majority		0.05
		(0.04)
Constant	0.35***	0.26***
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Covariates	✓	✓
Running variable	✓	✓
Running variable interacted with welfare spending support	✓	✓
Bandwidth	Full sample	Full sample
Observations	7,312	9,977

Note: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-level in parentheses. Covariates are sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies. Running variable is second-degree polynomial specified separately on each side of cutoff. In these models, the running variable is interacted with welfare spending support as well.

*: $p \leq 0.10$; **: $p \leq 0.05$; ***: $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed t-test).

Figure E.1: Estimations without Covariates

Leftists

Rightists

Note: RDD estimates without covariates (sex, age, age^2, secondary education, higher education, occupation, income, and year dummies). Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure E.2: Estimations with Municipality Fixed Effects

Leftists

Rightists

Note: RDD estimates from models with municipality fixed effects. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure E.3: Estimations with Missing Values Imputed

Note: Missing values (including don't know/no answer) imputed using multiple imputations. Four imputations used. Variables that are imputed are ideological group, support for redistribution, support for welfare spending, income, secondary education, higher education, occupation, male, and age. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

F Alternative Explanations

Figure F.1: Substituting Party Identification for Ideological Self-Placement

Note: RDD estimates from models using respondents' left- or right-wing party identi-fication instead of left-right self-placement. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

Figure F.2: Effect of Local Majorities on Left-Right Self-Placement

Note: RDD estimates of effect of right- and left-wing majority on leftists' and right-ists' placement along the left-right scale. The left-right scale runs from most left-wing position (0) to most right-wing position (1). Running variable is second-degree poly-nomial specified separately on each side of cutoff. In the 2-percentage point bandwidth models, a linear non-interactive function for the running variable is used because of extreme collinearity. All covariates are used. Thick and thin error bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.

G   References

Aldrich, John H., Gregory S. Schober, Sandra Ley, and Marco Fernandez. 2018. "Incognizance and Perceptual Deviation: Individual and Institutional Sources of Variation in Citizens' Perceptions of Party Placements on the Left–Right Scale." *Political Behavior* 40: 415–433.

Eggers, Andrew C., Anthony Fowler, Jens Hainmueller, Andrew B. Hall, and James M. Snyder. 2015. "On the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating Electoral Effects: New Evidence from Over 40,000 Close Races." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1): 259–274.

Hjorth, Frederik. 2017. "The Influence of Local Ethnic Diversity on Group-Centric Crime Attitudes." *British Journal of Political Science* 50: 321–343.

McCrary, Justin. 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test." *Journal of Econometrics* 142: 698–714.