

# Supplementary Materials

## A Validity of Outcome Variable

For our outcome variable, we use the individual-level responses to the following question in the Gallup World Poll (GWP): “*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of (the name of a country)?*” We posit two causal processes underlying our hypotheses. First, public diplomacy activities change *general* images of the visiting leader’s country. Second, they also change more *specific* images of the visiting leader himself/herself. We assume that these two possible changes in country images among the host country’s citizens are captured by the GWP’s question.

We test this assumption by merging the GWP data with another series of cross-national public opinion surveys commonly used in social science research, Pew Research Center’s *Global Attitudes and Trends*.<sup>1</sup> We then examine the correlation between our outcome variable from the GWP and Pew Research Center’s survey questions, which capture public opinion of both the general image of the country in question as well as the specific image of the individual leader.

Specifically, for the dependent variable, we use the difference between the percentage of respondents (in Country  $b$ ) who approve of the job performance of the leadership of Country  $a$  ( $\neq b$ ) and the percentage of respondents who disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Country  $a$ , where Country  $a$  is China, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, or the United States. This question is from the GWP. The independent variables are based on the questions regularly asked in the *Global Attitudes and Trends* surveys. The first variable is the difference between the weighted percentage of respondents (in Country  $b$ ) who have a favorable opinion of Country  $a$  ( $\neq b$ ) and the weighted percentage of respondents

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<sup>1</sup>Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/> (last accessed on February 7, 2021).

who have an unfavorable opinion of Country  $a$ .<sup>2</sup> We assign the weights 1 to “very favorable” and “very unfavorable” and 0.5 to “somewhat favorable” and “somewhat unfavorable.” The second independent variable is the difference between the weighted percentage of respondents who are confident in Leader  $a$  to do the right thing regarding world affairs and the weighted percentage of respondents who are not confident in Leader  $a$  to do the right thing regarding world affairs, where Leader  $j$  is Chinese President Hu Jintao, Chinese President Xi Jinping, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Russian President Vladimir Putin, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, British Prime Minister David Cameron, U.S. President George W. Bush, U.S. President Barack Obama, or U.S. President Donald Trump. We assign the weights 1 to “a lot of confidence” and “no confidence at all” and 0.5 to “some confidence” and “not too much confidence.”

The unit of aggregated observations in both GWP and the Pew surveys is each surveyed country in each year (from 2008 to 2019). We match the two data sets by country-year. The total number of observations used for this analysis is 917. Figure A.1 shows the correlation between our outcome measure on the vertical axis and Pew Research Center’s two questions about country images on the horizontal axis. It indicates that evaluating a foreign leader’s job performance is positively and strongly correlated with that country’s general image (on the left panel) and the valence of that leader’s perceived image (on the right panel). The correlation coefficients are 0.809 for the analysis on the left panel and 0.807 for the analysis on the right panel.

We can test these associations more formally by running a mixed-effect model. The model includes both of the independent variables as “fixed” effects and “random effects” for the evaluative target countries (China, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States), survey years, and countries surveyed. After controlling for all these factors, the marginal effect of the favorability rating is 0.37 (confidence interval: [0.30, 0.44]) and the

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<sup>2</sup>The *Global Attitudes and Trends* surveys ask questions about Great Britain, rather than the United Kingdom. We need to be cautious in interpreting the results for the United Kingdom.




Figure A.1: Correlation between job-approval of a country’s leader and favorability toward that country or confidence in that leader. *The vertical axis is the difference between the percentage of approval and the percentage of disapproval of the job performance of the leadership of a particular country (source: the GWP). The horizontal axis is the difference between the percentage of favorable and the percentage of unfavorable opinion of that country or the difference between the percentage of being confident and the percentage of being not confident in that country’s leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs (source: Global Attitudes and Trends). The evaluative countries include China, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.*

effect of the confidence rating is 0.54 (confidence interval: [0.49, 0.61]). Both effects are significant at the 0.05 level and substantially large.

With these results of the analysis, we conclude that the measure of our outcome variable, the job performance rating, is a proxy for the two latent variables closely relevant to the theory of soft power – the general image of a foreign country and the specific image of the political leader of that country.

## B High-Level Visits: Sources

**Brazil:** The Library of the Presidency of the Republic provides bibliographic information about former presidents: <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/> (last ac-

cessed on February 7, 2021). During the sampling periods of Gallup World Poll fielded in Brazil (i.e., 2008–2010), the president was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. We downloaded PDF files from the “Viagens” (Travels, in English) section and manually entered the data into a spreadsheet.

**Canada:** The Canadian government archives its Prime Minister’s website (<http://www.pm.gc.ca>, last accessed on February 7, 2021) using the “bac-lac” machine (<http://webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca/>, last accessed on February 9, 2019). We used the website captured on October 1, 2013, and the one captured on January 27, 2010. We then scraped the “news releases” within the “media” section. Additionally, due to their different format, we hand-coded the cases from April 22, 2010 to January 26, 2011. Many of the hyperlinks from the website captured and archived are invalid, unfortunately. Therefore, we recorded only the data available. Finally, we removed the cases where the destination was within Canada.

**China:** The China Vitae archives information about travels by leading Chinese officials: <http://www.chinavitae.com/vip/> (last accessed on February 7, 2021). For Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, we scraped tables of travels in each year. We then selected international travels, while omitting domestic travels.

**Germany:** The German government publishes press releases of the Chancellor’s activities: <https://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/bkin-en/news/> (last accessed on February 7, 2021). We scraped these press releases and used them to identify international trips.

**India:** Information about Indian presidents’ and prime ministers’ international travel is available from Indian governmental websites and these leaders’ official personal websites (last accessed on February 7, 2021): President Mukherjee, <http://pranabmukherjee.nic.in/>; President Patil, <http://www.pratibhapatil.info/international/>; Prime Minister Modi, <https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/details-of-foreigndomestic-visits/>;

and Prime Minister Singh, <https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/pmsvisits.php>. These data were manually collected and entered into a spreadsheet. Data covering travels by President Kalam, in office from July 25, 2002 to July 25, 2007, is not available.

**Japan:** The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs annually publishes the Diplomatic Blue Book: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/index.html> (last accessed on February 7, 2021). In the supplementary materials of the online edition, each report includes the “Yōjin ōrai” section, which lists all high-level visits to Japan and from Japan. We scraped data from these lists and select visits by the Prime Minister to foreign countries.

**Russia:** The Russian government publishes travel data for both the president and the premier: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/trips> and <http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/world/> (last accessed on February 7, 2021). Premier travel data is only available after May 2012, so we additionally collected the premier “events” data for time period before May 2012 in order to identify his international trips: <http://premier.gov.ru/en/events/> (last accessed on February 7, 2021).

**United Kingdom:** The British government publishes the Prime Minister’s international travel in the Minister’s Transparency Publications: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ministers-transparency-publications> (last accessed on February 7, 2021.) We downloaded the files that contain the Prime Ministers “travel” or “overseas travel” and manually entered these cases into a spreadsheet.

**United States:** The Office of the Historian in the U.S. Department of State publishes lists of travel abroad by presidents. <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels> (last accessed on February 7, 2021). We scraped data from these lists.

## C High-Level Visits: Valid Cases

The tables in this section show the “valid” cases of high-level visits by political leaders from 9 countries we focus on. Each row in each table shows the name of the host country (*Country*), the first day of the visit (*Begin* in year-month-day), the last day of the visit (*End* in year-month-day), the number of nights spent in the host country (*Length*), the number of respondents interviewed within 30 days before the first day of the visit ( $n_{30}^C$ ), the number of respondents interviewed within 30 days after the first day of the visit ( $n_{30}^T$ ), the number of respondents interviewed within 5 days before the first day of the visit ( $n_5^C$ ), and the number of respondents interviewed within 5 days after the first day of the visit ( $n_5^T$ ). The superscripts for the last four columns indicate respondents in the control group (*C*) or the treated group (*T*). The respondents interviewed on the day of the first day of the visit are excluded from our analysis because we cannot determine their treatment status.

There are 89 visit cases altogether. But when we use the narrower bandwidth for our main analysis, the number of valid cases becomes 86. This is because  $n_5^C = 0$  and/or  $n_5^T = 0$  for three cases—Xi Jinping’s visit to the U.S. in 2015, Angela Merkel’s visit to India in 2011, and Vladimir Putin’s visit to the U.S. in 2015.

Table C.1: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Argentina	2008-08-03	2008-08-04	1	146	827	120	283
2	Paraguay	2010-07-30	2010-07-30	0	624	322	196	187
3	Uruguay	2010-07-30	2010-07-30	0	510	473	198	203
4	Venezuela	2010-08-06	2010-08-06	0	405	429	271	165

Table C.2: Stephen Harper (Canada)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	India	2009-11-16	2009-11-17	1	2,203	690	571	459
2	Hong Kong	2009-12-06	2009-12-06	0	355	366	195	189

Table C.3: Hu Jintao (China)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Russia	2010-05-08	2010-05-09	1	95	1,844	92	363
2	Kazakhstan	2010-06-12	2010-06-12	0	831	99	500	67
3	Kazakhstan	2011-06-12	2011-06-15	3	103	793	103	466
4	Russia	2011-06-15	2011-06-18	3	1,794	151	272	97
5	Russia	2012-09-06	2012-09-09	3	87	1,381	65	409

Table C.4: Xi Jinping (China)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Greece	2014-07-13	2014-07-13	0	640	298	281	204
2	Argentina	2014-07-18	2014-07-19	1	10	958	10	184
3	India	2014-09-17	2014-09-19	2	1,170	1,750	560	440
4	Russia	2015-07-08	2015-07-10	2	137	1,723	128	493
5	United States	2015-09-22	2015-09-28	6	105	28	61	0
6	Kazakhstan	2017-06-07	2017-06-10	3	43	918	43	412
7	Hong Kong	2017-06-29	2017-07-01	2	205	48	25	24
8	Russia	2017-07-03	2017-07-04	1	1,911	33	113	19
9	Rwanda	2018-07-23	2018-07-23	0	305	582	305	577
10	Russia	2018-09-11	2018-09-13	2	444	289	68	99

Table C.5: Angela Merkel (Germany)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Denmark	2009-12-18	2009-12-18	0	687	303	451	303
2	France	2011-05-27	2011-05-27	0	495	461	165	149
3	India	2011-05-31	2011-05-31	0	1,060	697	0	0
4	Belgium	2013-05-22	2013-05-22	0	69	933	18	28
5	France	2013-05-30	2013-05-30	0	379	309	78	73
6	Latvia	2014-08-18	2014-08-18	0	306	382	25	27
7	Belgium	2015-04-23	2015-04-24	1	495	505	127	140
8	United States	2015-09-25	2015-09-25	0	105	28	16	18
9	France	2016-04-07	2016-04-07	0	239	723	144	141
10	Japan	2016-05-27	2016-05-27	0	466	336	167	133
11	Mongolia	2016-07-15	2016-07-15	0	795	167	329	136
12	Italy	2017-03-25	2017-03-25	0	513	454	251	209
13	Belgium	2017-04-29	2017-04-29	0	200	485	119	99
14	Belgium	2017-05-25	2017-05-25	0	530	351	107	78
15	Mexico	2017-06-09	2017-06-10	1	79	875	79	248
16	United Kingdom	2018-07-11	2018-07-11	0	642	332	134	174

Table C.6: Manmohan Singh (India)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Thailand	2009-10-23	2009-10-25	2	983	35	288	31
2	Denmark	2009-12-17	2009-12-17	0	640	313	416	313

Table C.7: Yasuo Fukuda (Japan)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Italy	2008-06-02	2008-06-04	2	33	975	33	337

Table C.8: Yukio Hatoyama (Japan)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Thailand	2009-10-23	2009-10-25	2	983	35	288	31
2	Denmark	2009-12-16	2009-12-19	3	517	360	315	229



Table C.9: Shinzo Abe (Japan)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	South Korea	2015-11-01	2015-11-02	1	299	498	85	101
2	Russia	2016-05-06	2016-05-07	1	675	1,133	343	496
3	Mongolia	2016-07-14	2016-07-16	2	735	205	340	158
4	Italy	2017-03-21	2017-03-21	0	315	637	176	183

Table C.10: Vladimir Putin (Russia)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Kazakhstan	2008-10-30	2008-10-30	0	500	492	145	273
2	Finland	2010-05-27	2010-05-27	0	887	88	84	34
3	Sweden	2011-04-27	2011-04-27	0	875	104	17	104
4	Ukraine	2012-07-12	2012-07-12	0	959	36	98	34
5	United Kingdom	2012-08-02	2012-08-02	0	131	778	73	95
6	India	2012-12-24	2012-12-24	0	950	1,520	430	340
7	Kazakhstan	2013-07-07	2013-07-07	0	820	131	213	99
8	Ukraine	2013-07-27	2013-07-28	1	970	19	14	19
9	Belarus	2014-07-02	2014-07-02	0	1,003	33	142	31
10	United States	2015-09-28	2015-09-29	1	105	48	0	18
11	Kazakhstan	2017-06-08	2017-06-09	1	82	862	82	405
12	Austria	2018-06-05	2018-06-05	0	492	461	188	173

Table C.11: Dmitry Medvedev (Russia)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Tajikistan	2009-07-30	2009-07-31	1	135	775	135	434
2	Denmark	2009-12-18	2009-12-18	0	687	303	451	303
3	Germany	2010-06-04	2010-06-05	1	554	254	87	70
4	Algeria	2010-10-06	2010-10-06	0	510	376	138	152
5	France	2011-05-26	2011-05-27	1	447	506	151	160
6	Kazakhstan	2011-06-14	2011-06-15	1	298	598	298	542
7	Ukraine	2012-06-27	2012-06-27	0	408	548	302	265
8	Vietnam	2015-04-06	2015-04-07	1	162	766	162	316
9	Mongolia	2016-07-14	2016-07-16	2	735	205	340	158
10	Turkey	2017-05-22	2017-05-22	0	142	831	131	303

Table C.12: David Cameron (United Kingdom)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	France	2010-05-20	2010-05-20	0	386	595	209	162
2	Germany	2010-05-21	2010-05-21	0	514	444	93	73
3	France	2011-05-26	2011-05-26	0	447	506	151	160
4	France	2012-02-17	2012-02-17	0	102	840	102	197
5	Malaysia	2012-04-12	2012-04-13	1	127	699	68	116
6	Belgium	2012-05-23	2012-05-23	0	294	654	228	164
7	Norway	2012-06-06	2012-06-07	1	17	956	17	83

Table C.13: George W. Bush (United States)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Egypt	2008-05-17	2008-05-18	1	1,030	37	148	37
2	Italy	2008-06-11	2008-06-13	2	628	364	356	243
3	France	2008-06-13	2008-06-15	2	397	506	289	355
4	United Kingdom	2008-06-15	2008-06-16	1	381	620	349	237
5	Thailand	2008-08-06	2008-08-07	1	494	498	109	155

Table C.14: Barack Obama (United States)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Ghana	2009-07-10	2009-07-11	1	50	893	50	77
2	Denmark	2009-12-18	2009-12-18	0	687	303	451	303
3	United Kingdom	2011-05-23	2011-05-26	3	395	386	71	65
4	France	2011-05-26	2011-05-27	1	447	506	151	160
5	Japan	2016-05-25	2016-05-29	4	413	380	170	118
6	Canada	2016-06-29	2016-06-29	0	249	232	95	64

Table C.15: Donald Trump (United States)

	Country	Begin	End	Length	$n_{30}^C$	$n_{30}^T$	$n_5^C$	$n_5^T$
1	Palestinian Authority	2017-05-23	2017-05-23	0	935	52	334	50
2	Belgium	2017-05-24	2017-05-25	1	521	361	91	53
3	United Kingdom	2018-07-12	2018-07-15	3	668	284	108	168

## D Balance Tests

We test the assumption that the treatment assignment *within each valid case* is as-if random using a total of fifteen demographic attributes, all of which are binary. Each variable is regressed on the treatment variable and case fixed effects in an OLS regression model. As in our main analysis, we select respondents who were interviewed within five days before or after the first day of each visit. Respondents interviewed on the first day are excluded. The regression coefficient of the linear probability model shows the difference (in percentage points) between respondents interviewed before a visit and respondents interviewed after. Our expectation is that the regression coefficients from the fifteen models are not statistically discernible.

The fifteen variables used for this analysis are (1) whether or not a respondent completed no more than elementary education (up to eight years of basic education), (2) whether or not a respondent completed some secondary education or up to three years of tertiary education (nine to fifteen years of education), (3) whether or not a respondent completed four years of tertiary education and/or received a four-year university-level degree, (4) whether or not a respondent is employed full time (including self-employed), (5) whether or not a respondent is employed part time (combining those who do not want to work full time and those who want to work full time), (6) whether or not a respondent is not employed (unemployed or out of the workforce), (7) whether or not a respondent's household income is above the median among the respondents included in each case, (8) whether or not a respondent is male, (9) whether or not a respondent's age is above the median among the respondents included in each case, (10) whether or not a respondent is single and has never been married, (11) whether or not a respondent is married or has a domestic partner, (12) whether or not a respondent is separated or divorced, (13) whether or not a respondent is widowed, (14) whether or not a respondent was born in another country, and (15) whether or not a respondent has at least one child. If a given question includes "Don't know" and "Refused" options, we treat them




Figure D.1: Balance test results. *Each point estimate shows the difference between respondents in the treatment group and respondents in the control group. Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals. The estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in black.*

as missing values.

The results of testing the balance of these variables are presented in Figure D.1. As we expect, most coefficients are statistically insignificant. The exceptions are whether or not a respondent's age is above the median ( $\hat{b} = 2.49$ ), whether or not a respondent is widowed ( $\hat{b} = 0.71$ ), whether or not a respondent completed at most elementary education ( $\hat{b} = -1.23$ ), whether or not a respondent is employed full time ( $\hat{b} = -1.28$ ), and whether or not a respondent has at least one child ( $\hat{b} = -1.35$ ). We control these variables in our robustness test.

## E Main Results

Table E.1: The average treatment effects by outcome variables

	<i>Outcome variable:</i>		
	Approve	Neither	Disapprove
Treatment	2.269*** (0.530)	-0.881* (0.526)	-1.387*** (0.477)
Case-specific fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	32,456	32,456	32,456
R <sup>2</sup>	0.180	0.138	0.183
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.177	0.135	0.181
Residual Std. Error	44.369	44.018	39.895
F Statistic	82.425***	60.115***	84.575***

*Note:* The standard errors are in parentheses. The dichotomous outcome variable is whether a respondent approves, neither approves nor disapproves, or disapproves of the job performance of the leadership of a visiting country. The treatment variable is whether a respondent was interviewed within five days before the first day of a high-level visit (control group) or within five days after the first day of a high-level visit (treatment group). To make interpretation easier, the coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. All regression models include case-specific fixed effects. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$  (two sided).

## F Results by Varying Bandwidths

In our main analysis, we use a 5-day bandwidth. As a robustness check, we examine different bandwidths. Figure F.1 shows the results for 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 day bandwidths. The increase in approval is statistically significant for bandwidths greater than 3. It is insignificant at a 3 day bandwidth, which we consider to be likely due to the decrease in statistical power. The decrease in ambivalence is significant at 6 and 7 day bandwidths, and the decrease in disapproval is significant at 4, 5, and 6 day bandwidths. These results support Hypothesis 1. The support for Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 is less robust.




Figure F.1: OLS regression results by varying the bandwidth. *The figure shows treatment effects using the respondents interviewed within three to seven days before/after the first day of a high-level visit. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. The estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in black.*

## G Results of Ordered Probit Regression

As a robustness test, we run an ordered probit model with a 5-day bandwidth. As we discuss in the main text, however, we need to interpret these results with reservation because the model does not include visit-specific fixed effects, which are necessary to leverage only on *within-visit* variations to estimate the treatment effects. Adding the fixed effects to the ordered probit model would introduce the incidental parameter problem.

The results are presented in Figure G.1. The vertical bars illustrate the 95% confidence intervals. The figure shows that a high-level visit increases approval from 37.5% to 41.6% and decreases disapproval from 28.3% to 24.9%. The effects are highly significant at any conventional level. These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2.2. The percentage of “neither” responses decreases marginally, from 34.2% to 33.5%. Thus, Hypothesis 2.1 is also supported empirically.




Figure G.1: Ordered probit regression results. *The figure shows treatment effects using the respondents interviewed within five days before/after the first day of a high-level visit. Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 simulations. The estimates that are significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in black.*

## H Annual Fluctuation in Foreign Public Opinion

To assess the substantive magnitude of these effects, we create a benchmark measure of the average fluctuation in foreign public approval/disapproval of leaders. First, we calculate the percentage (in each country in each calendar year) of respondents who approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of each of the nine visiting countries. Second, we measure the change in this percentage (in absolute value) in each country compared to the previous year. Finally, for each outcome variable (the absolute value of the change in approval or disapproval percentage), we run a mixed-effect model with (i) a fixed-effect to calculate the overall average change, our quantity of interest, (ii) random effects for the nine different questions (about the job performance of the leadership of the nine countries), (iii) random effects for all countries surveyed, and (iv) random effects for all years. The total number of observations used for this aggregate data analysis is 5,486.



# I In-Time Placebo Tests

To verify that it is a high-level visit that causes the differences in approval and disapproval ratings, rather than other temporally proximate events or artifacts of sampling processes, we undertake “in-time” placebo tests. As we noted earlier, our data structure is cross-section. Our tests are based on the varying time of respondents’ date of interview.

Specifically, we use an adjusted running variable  $Z'_{ij} = Z_{ij} + w$ , where  $w$  is an integer from  $-5$  to  $5$ , and re-assign each respondent’s treatment status:  $X'_{ij} = 1$  if  $Z'_{ij} \geq 0$ , and  $X'_{ij} = 0$  otherwise. To make the placebo test results comparable to the main results, we maintain the same bandwidth of 5 days ( $k = 5$ ) to select respondents for each test. For our main analysis, we exclude respondents who were interviewed on the first day of each high-level visit. To be comparable, we do not add these respondents back in our data. If  $w = 3$ , for example, the interview dates for respondents in the adjusted treated group are  $+4$  to  $+8$  days from the first day of a high-level visit, whereas the interview dates for respondents in the adjusted control group are  $-2$  to  $+2$  days from the first day of the visit. If our main results are not merely statistical artifacts, and if the effects are particularly large among respondents interviewed right after (or during) high-level visits, the treatment effects should be the largest when there is no adjustment ( $w = 0$ ).

The results are presented in Figure I.1. For approval and disapproval, the treatment effects are largest when  $w = 0$ , as we expect. For indifferent responses, the effect is the largest when  $w = -2$ . This may be due to some noise in our data or to an issue with running an OLS regression model without adding a constraint that the sum of three responses for each respondent must be one. But it may also reflect reality: the media coverage of a visit may start a few days before a foreign leader’s arrival and it may shape foreign public opinion. We leave further examination of this slightly unexpected result for future research.




Figure I.1: The results of in-time placebo tests. *The figure shows treatment effects using the respondents interviewed within five days before/after the first day of a high-level visit based on varying adjusted running variables. Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals. The estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in black.*

## J Sensitivity Tests

To test whether the estimated average treatment effects are primarily driven by the visits of a particular country's political leaders, we undertake a set of sensitivity tests. Specifically, we estimate the treatment effects excluding all the visits from each country in turn, thereby producing nine sets of estimates. The results are presented in Figure J.1. As it clearly shows, our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of any one country.




Figure J.1: The results of sensitivity tests. *The figure shows treatment effects using the respondents interviewed within five days before/after the first day of a high-level visit. Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals. The estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in black.*

## K High-Level Visits: Inducements or Threats

For our robustness analysis, we carefully checked whether each high-level visit was accompanied by any threat or inducement.

**Economic Aid:** These visits include an announcement of economic or development aid from the visiting country to the host country during the visit (e.g., food aid, loans for infrastructure projects, direct monetary aid to the state budget, loan guarantees, loans on favorable terms, financial transfers for infrastructure or agricultural projects, etc). Loans can be considered aid because they often are on favorable terms or are extended to unstable countries that would otherwise not be able to get loans from international organizations or banks.

Visitor	Host Country	Begin	End
Hu Jintao (China)	Kazakhstan	2010-06-12	2010-06-12
Hu Jintao (China)	Kazakhstan	2011-06-12	2011-06-15
Xi Jinping (China)	Argentina	2014-07-18	2014-07-19
Xi Jinping (China)	India	2014-09-17	2014-09-19
Xi Jinping (China)	Russia	2015-07-08	2015-07-10
Xi Jinping (China)	Russia	2017-07-03	2017-07-04
Xi Jinping (China)	Rwanda	2018-07-23	2018-07-23

**Military Aid:** These visits include an announcement of military aid from the visiting country to the host country during the visit (e.g., weapons sales or transfers, sending more troops to help fight rebels, intelligence sharing, military technology sharing, a clear and immediate commitment to fight with or defend the host country). We do not count a mere reaffirmation of existing alliance ties. Sales can be considered aid, since they are also strategic decisions that show support for the purchasing country.

Visitor	Host Country	Begin	End
Angela Merkel (Germany)	Latvia	2014-08-18	2014-08-18

**Other Aid:** These visits include an announcement of other kinds of material or financial aid extended that we do not think qualifies as military or economic/developmental (e.g., sharing data on health or natural disaster prediction).

Visitor	Host Country	Begin	End
Angela Merkel (Germany)	France	2016-04-07	2016-04-07
Dmitry Medvedev (Russia)	Turkey	2017-05-22	2017-05-22
David Cameron (U.K.)	Malaysia	2012-04-12	2012-04-13

**Threat:** During these visits, the visiting-country leader makes a military, economic or other type of threat against the host country. In the stage of coding, we considered identifying different types of threats. However, the only case we identified (below) is a visit with a military threat.

Visitor	Host Country	Begin	End
Xi Jinping (China)	Hong Kong	2017-06-29	2017-07-01

**Business Deals:** These visits include an announcement of agreements between business entities (even if state-owned) of the visiting and host countries, such as for the sale of oil or gas, the building of a factory, the export of goods, etc. We do not count the mere presence of business executives and/or the announcements of negotiations. Each identified case must include some actual deal announced.

Visitor	Host Country	Begin	End
Xi Jinping (China)	Russia	2015-07-08	2015-07-10
Xi Jinping (China)	Russia	2018-09-11	2018-09-13
Angela Merkel (Germany)	India	2011-05-31	2011-05-31
Dmitry Medvedev (Russia)	Vietnam	2015-04-06	2015-04-07
Dmitry Medvedev (Russia)	Mongolia	2016-07-14	2016-07-16
David Cameron (U.K.)	France	2012-02-17	2012-02-17
David Cameron (U.K.)	Norway	2012-06-06	2012-06-07

## L Additional Figures




Figure L.1: Results of testing the effect duration. *We estimate the effects using respondents interviewed within five days before the first day of each visit and respondents interviewed in a rolling five-day period after the visit. The estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in black. Unlike Figure 2, the data for this analysis exclude the cases with threats or inducements.*




Figure L.2: OLS regression results by the power ratio of the visiting country relative to the host country. *Treatment effects using the respondents interviewed within five days before/after the first day of a high-level visit. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. Estimates statistically significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in black. To divide the cases into two groups, we use the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) from the Correlates of War project. We divide the cases into three groups with the roughly same number of observations sorted by the power ratio.*




Figure L.3: OLS regression results (approval of the job performance of own country's leader). *The figure shows treatment effects using the respondents interviewed within five days before/after the first day of a high-level visit. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. The estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in black.*