Supplementary Materials

Executive Power in Crisis

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A Sample characteristics

Table A.1 – Sample Characteristics

Category	*n*	Percentage
Gender		
Men	4054	49.1
Women	4211	50.9
Age		
18-29	1860	22.5
30-44	2369	28.7
45-64	2724	33.0
65+	1312	15.9
Education		
Some high school	216	2.6
High school diploma	1821	22.1
Some college	2708	32.8
Bachelors degree or higher	3499	42.4
Income		
Below $20,000	1605	19.7
$20,000 to $34,999	1470	18.1
$35,000 to $49,999	1177	14.5
$50,000 to $74,999	1600	19.7
$75,000 to $99,999	890	10.9
$100,000 to $150,000	820	10.1
$150,000 or more	569	7.0
Race/ethnicity		
Asian American/Pacific Islander	551	6.7
Black	909	11.1
Hispanic	896	10.9
White	5708	69.7
Other/not specified	130	1.6
Partisanship		
Democrat (inc leaners)	3907	47.3
Republican (inc leaners)	3215	38.9
Independent	1143	13.8
Region		
Northeast	1681	20.3
Midwest	1579	19.1
South	3198	38.7
West	1807	21.9

B Survey diagnostics



Figure B.1 – No detectable difference in confirmed case counts across treatment groups. Plots the density of county-level confirmed cases as of March 29, 2020. Source: `https://github.com/CSSEGISandData` (accessed April 13, 2020)

Variable	Population	Trump Voteshare
Population	–	–
Trump Voteshare	-0.447	–
Confirmed Cases	0.138	-0.294
Deaths	0.104	-0.276

Table B.1 – Moderate, negative correlations between COVID-19 and Trump 2016 voteshare. Reports raw correlations between confirmed cases and deaths as of March 29,2020, population based on the 2018 American Community Survey, and the percentage of votes for Donald Trump in 2016; all measured at the county-level. All correlations significant at the $p < 0.0001$ level.

Variable	Statistic	Type	L1
Age	-0.54	(diff)	0.00
Gender	1.00	(Chi2)	0.01
Race	6.64	(Chi2)	0.01
Education	2.33	(Chi2)	0.02
Income	0.02	(diff)	0.01
Democrat	-0.01	(diff)	0.01
State	34.37	(Chi2)	0.02
Confirmed Cases	-101.12	(diff)	0.00
Deaths	-2.28	(diff)	0.00
Population	-35307.11	(diff)	0.00
Trump Voteshare	0.01	(diff)	0.00

Table B.2 – Balance across executive order and legislation conditions on pre-treatment observables. Reports univariate imbalance statistics and measures across survey wordings; calculated with the 'cem' package.

Table B.3 – Marginal Effects of Respondent Characteristics on the Probability of Correct Attention Check. Reports coefficients and standard errors from a linear probability model of correct answers to the attention check question, which asks whether respondents could recall how the policy was enacted. The unconditional probability of a correct answer is 0.63.

	Dependent variable:
	Attention Check
Independent	-0.08^{***} (0.02)
Republican	-0.02^{*} (0.01)
Age	0.001^{*} (0.0003)
Black	-0.11^{***} (0.02)
AAPI	-0.07^{***} (0.02)
Other	-0.04 (0.04)
Hispanic	-0.07^{***} (0.02)
High School	0.13^{***} (0.04)
Some College	0.18^{***} (0.04)
College+	0.20^{***} (0.04)
Women	-0.01 (0.01)
Income (20-35k)	0.03^{*} (0.02)
Income (35-50k)	0.06^{***} (0.02)
Income (50-75k)	0.06^{***} (0.02)
Income (75-100k)	0.04^{**} (0.02)
Income (100-150k)	0.08^{***} (0.02)
Income (150k+)	0.02 (0.02)
Executive Order	-0.08^{***} (0.01)
Under 2 mins.	-0.16^{***} (0.02)
Over 15 mins.	-0.07^{***} (0.02)
Constant	0.49^{***} (0.04)
Observations	8,061
R^2	0.04
Residual Std. Error	0.47 (df = 8040)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Robustness to Model Specification

Table C.1 – Evaluations of Unilateral Power (Logistic regression, with controls)

Unilateral condition	0.033	0.003	−0.086	0.026	0.059	0.007	−0.023	0.092	0.251*	−0.124	0.049
	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.050)
(Intercept)	−0.523*	0.336	−0.425*	−0.670*	0.454*	−0.229	−0.287	0.142	−0.345	−0.461*	−0.139
	(0.189)	(0.206)	(0.193)	(0.201)	(0.191)	(0.206)	(0.241)	(0.197)	(0.191)	(0.228)	(0.186)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,010	7,013	7,012	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,014	7,011

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table C.2 – Evaluations of Unilateral Power (Linear probability model, with controls)

Unilateral condition	0.006	0.0004	−0.018	0.005	0.012	0.001	−0.002	0.019	0.049*	−0.015	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)
(Intercept)	0.408*	0.608*	0.391*	0.338*	0.573*	0.408*	0.346*	0.547*	0.445*	0.332*	0.470*
	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.043)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,010	7,013	7,012	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,014	7,011

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table C.3 – Evaluations of Unilateral Power (Linear regression, with controls)

Unilateral condition	0.021	0.004	−0.037	−0.021	0.020	0.002	−0.027	0.049	0.114*	−0.034	0.035
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.024)
(Intercept)	3.175*	3.754*	3.427*	3.424*	3.721*	3.233*	2.987*	3.609*	3.413*	2.905*	3.542*
	(0.105)	(0.085)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.097)	(0.111)	(0.090)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,010	7,013	7,012	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,014	7,011

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table C.4 – Evaluations of Unilateral Power (Ordered Probit, with controls)

		loans	election	congress	easter	media	vaccine	travel	socialism	prisons	tariffs
Unilateral condition	0.017	0.011	−0.030	−0.018	0.009	−0.006	−0.027	0.043	0.115*	−0.026	0.044
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,010	7,013	7,012	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,014	7,011

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table C.5 – Evaluations of Unilateral Power (with controls and state fixed effects)

Unilateral condition	0.034	−0.004	−0.093	0.022	0.061	0.007	−0.027	0.087	0.240*	−0.124	0.046
	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.051)
(Intercept)	−0.701*	0.605	0.114	−0.629*	0.358	−0.178	−0.626	−0.204	−0.196	−0.474	−0.095
	(0.285)	(0.336)	(0.282)	(0.296)	(0.294)	(0.309)	(0.402)	(0.286)	(0.293)	(0.356)	(0.277)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,010	7,013	7,012	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,014	7,011

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).

D Partisanship, context, and unilateral action



Figure D.1 – Tolerance for executive power does not vary by partisanship. Plots average treatment effects conditional on partisan identification (leaners coded as partisans) by policy intervention. Values simulated from logistic regressions with log-transformed county-level cases (as of March 29), treatment condition, income, age, party, race and education as covariates. Within each policy, no conditional treatment effect is statistically distinguishable by convention.



Figure D.2 – Tolerance for executive power does not vary by Trump support. Plots average treatment effects conditional on indication that they approval of Trump's handling of the crisis (leaners coded as Trump supporters), by policy intervention. Values simulated from logistic regressions with log-transformed county-level cases (as of March 29), treatment condition, income, age, party, race and education as covariates. Within each policy, no conditional treatment effect is statistically distinguishable by convention.



Figure D.3 – Moderator: Individual-level level perception of cases. "To the best of your knowledge, how many cases of COVID-19 have been found in your state?".



Figure D.4 – Tolerance for executive power does not vary by misperceptions of the crisis. Plots average treatment effects conditional on overestimation, underestimation, and correct estimation of local level cases, by policy intervention. Values simulated from logistic regressions with log-transformed county-level cases (as of March 29), treatment condition, income, age, party, race and education as covariates. Within each policy, no conditional treatment effect is statistically distinguishable by convention.

Table D.1 – Partisanship, Crisis Severity, and Policy Evaluations

ln(1+ county cases)	−0.078*	−0.040	−0.028	−0.020	0.039	−0.047	−0.002	−0.001	−0.006	−0.015	−0.001
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.030)
Democrat	−0.092	0.222	−0.277	−0.110	−0.131	−0.434*	0.032	0.278	0.535*	0.261	0.190
	(0.171)	(0.182)	(0.179)	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.204)	(0.242)	(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.236)	(0.162)
Republican	0.275	0.528*	0.562*	0.565*	0.527*	0.725*	0.154	0.734*	0.568*	−0.097	0.431*
	(0.175)	(0.190)	(0.172)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.189)	(0.235)	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.240)	(0.162)
Democrat x Cases	0.042	0.039	0.040	0.015	−0.036	0.038	−0.003	0.013	−0.007	0.036	0.022
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.034)
Republican x Cases	0.106*	0.092*	0.080*	0.061	0.012	0.076	0.104*	0.016	0.018	0.111*	0.028
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.035)
(Intercept)	−0.212	0.506*	−0.297	−0.580*	0.309	−0.036	−0.248	0.153	−0.320	−0.373	−0.124
	(0.228)	(0.245)	(0.232)	(0.243)	(0.235)	(0.251)	(0.300)	(0.232)	(0.227)	(0.289)	(0.220)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,010	7,013	7,012	7,013	7,009	7,010	7,014	7,011

Note: * indicates $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).