

Supplementary Materials for Crossing Over: Majority Party Control Affects Legislator Behavior and the Agenda

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A Regimes

Nine senators died and were replaced during the 83rd Senate (1953-54). Given the timing of deaths and replacements, there were 15 total regimes, all listed below; but only 9 of the regimes had a sufficient number of scalable roll calls to analyze. For instance, Regime 4.1 (displayed in Table A.1 below) had zero roll calls in the period in which a senator died and his replacement was named and sworn in. Table A.1 displays the fifteen regimes, when they occurred, which party controlled a majority of the seats and why the regime ended. Regimes included in the analysis are those with at least ten votes; and are labeled with an integer below (Regime 1, Regime 2, . . . , Regime 9). Regimes in which there were not enough roll calls to scale are labeled otherwise (e.g., Regime 4.1, Regime 5.1). Some of the replacements were seated while the Senate was adjourned and therefore are not listed in this table, but all deaths and replacements are listed in table A.2 below.

Table A.1: Regimes

Regime	Time Period	Party Control	Reason for End
Regime 1	Jan 3, 1953-Jun 26, 1953	Republican	Smith (D-NC) dies
Regime 2	Jun 26, 1953-Jul 15, 1953	Republican	Smith replaced by Lennon (D-NC)
Regime 3	Jul 15, 1953-Jul 24, 1953	Republican	Tobey (R-NH) dies
Regime 4	Jul 24, 1953-Jul 31, 1953	Republican	Taft (R-OH) dies
Regime 4.1*	Jul 31, 1953-Aug 3, 1953	Republican	<i>Sine die</i> adjournment of first session [†]
Regime 5	Jan 6, 1954-Apr 12, 1954	Republican	Griswold (R-NE) dies
Regime 5.1*	Apr 12, 1954-Apr 26, 1954	Democratic	Griswold replaced by Bowring (R-NE)
Regime 6	Apr 26, 1954-May 12, 1954	Democratic	Hoey (D-NC) dies
Regime 7	May 12, 1954-Jun 11, 1954	Republican	Hoey replaced by Ervin (D-NC)
Regime 7.1*	Jun 11, 1954-Jun 19, 1954	Republican	Hunt (D-WY) dies
Regime 7.2*	Jun 19, 1954-Jun 28, 1954	Republican	Hunt replaced by Crippa (R-WY)
Regime 7.3*	Jun 28, 1954-Jul 1, 1954	Republican	Butler (R-NE) dies
Regime 7.4*	Jul 1, 1954-Jul 7, 1954	Republican	Butler replaced by Reynolds (R-NE)
Regime 8	Jul 7, 1954-Aug 20, 1954	Republican	Senate concludes regular session [‡]
Regime 9	Nov 29, 1954-Dec 2, 1954	Republican	Last vote during lame duck session

*Excluded from analysis

[†] Between regimes 4.1 and 5, Charles W. Tobey (R-NH) and Robert A. Taft (R-NH) were replaced by Robert Upton (R-NH) and Thomas A. Burke (D-OH), respectively.

[‡] Between regimes 8 and 9, two senators, Burnet Maybank (D-SC) and Pat McCarran (D-NV), died and were replaced by Charles Daniel (D-SC) and Ernest Brown (R-NV), respectively.

Table A.2 displays which senators died, when, their cause of death, and who replaced them. All states used gubernatorial appointments to fill Senate vacancies. More detail about each death follows the table from a systematic search using the *New York Times* historical database and other historical periodicals; we read every *New York Times* article from the day of their death to a month after their death. We also consulted three secondary sources that

were book-length biographies of Senators Robert Taft and Lester Hunt. Below is a summary of the circumstances surrounding their deaths.

Table A.2: Deaths

Death	Death Date	Cause of Death	Replacement	Replacement Date	Governor's Party
Willis Smith (D-NC)	June 26, 1953	Coronary thrombosis	Alton Lennon (D-NC)	July 15, 1953	Democratic
Charles W. Tobey (R-NH)	July 24, 1953	Coronary thrombosis	Robert Upton (R-NH)	January 6, 1954	Republican
Robert A. Taft (R-OH)	July 31, 1953	Cerebral hemorrhage	Thomas A. Burke (D-OH)	January 6, 1954	Democratic
Dwight Griswold (R-NE)	April 12, 1954	Heart attack	Eva Bowring (R-NE)	April 26, 1954	Republican
Clyde Hoey (D-NC)	May 12, 1954	Stroke	Samuel Ervin (D-NC)	June 11, 1954	Democratic
Lester Hunt (D-WY)	June 19, 1954	Suicide by firearm	Edward Crippa (R-WY)	June 28, 1954	Republican
Hugh Butler (R-NE)	July 1, 1954	Stroke	Sam Reynolds (R-NE)	July 7, 1954	Republican
Burnet Maybank (D-SC)	September 1, 1954	Heart attack	Charles Daniel (D-SC)	November 8, 1954	Democratic
Pat McCarran (D-NV)	September 28, 1954	Heart attack	Ernest Brown (R-NV)	November 8, 1954	Republican

Willis Smith. Willis Smith of North Carolina died on June 26, 1953 at age sixty five of coronary thrombosis which lead to a heart attack.¹ Shortly before his death, Willis said he was intending to run for reelection in 1955, indicating his death was not expected.²

Charles W. Tobey. Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire died on July 24, 1953 at age seventy three of coronary thrombosis leading to a heart attack.³ Upon learning of Tobey's death, President Eisenhower remarked, "I was *shocked* and grieved at the sudden passing of [Senator Tobey]" (emphasis added), suggesting his death was not expected.⁴

Robert A. Taft. Robert A. Taft of Ohio died on July 31, 1953 at age sixty three of a cerebral hemorrhage associated with malignant tumors that put him in a thirteen-hour coma.⁵ The president of Yale University, Taft's alma mater, eulogized, "We are all *shocked* and saddened by this *sudden* tragedy" (emphasis added), suggesting his death was not expected.⁶

Dwight Griswold. Dwight Griswold of Nebraska died on April 12, 1954 at age sixty of a heart attack.⁷ The *Beatrice Daily Sun* reported his death as an "unexpected death" and a "shock"⁸ and the *Lincoln Star* reported that Griswold was "stricken while enroute home" after a dinner with his wife and he "died before regaining consciousness"⁹

Clyde Hoey. Clyde Hoey of North Carolina died on May 12, 1954 at age seventy six of a

¹"Willis Smith, 65, Senator, Is Dead." *New York Times*. 27 June 1953.

²"North Carolina Senator Dies." *New Orleans States*. 26 June 1953.

³"Senator Charles Tobey Dies at 73; Won Fame in Crime Investigation." *New York Times*. 25 July 1953.

⁴"Capital Mourns Passing of Tobey." *New York Times*. 26 July 1953.

⁵"Senator Taft is Dead at 63; Eisenhower Leads Tributes; Republicans' Unity Shaken." *New York Times*. 1 August 1953.

⁶"Taft is Eulogized by Friends and Foes." *New York Times*. 7 August 1953.

⁷"Sen. Griswold, Republican of Nebraska, Dies." *Chicago Tribune*. April 12, 1954.

⁸"Sen. Griswold Dies after Heart Attack: Leaders of Both Parties Express Loss, Unexpected Death of State Public Figure Is Shock." *Beatrice Daily Sun*. 12 April 1954.

⁹"Senator Griswold Dies: Heart Attack Fatal to Nebraska Solon, Passes Away at Navy Hospital ; Death Sudden, Death is Attributed to Cornoary Occlusion, Ex-Governor was 60. *Lincoln Star*. 12 April 1954.

stroke “as he slept in a chair by his desk.”¹⁰ A *Washington Post and Times Herald* headline the day following his death read “News of Hoey’s Death Shocks Colleagues,” indicating that his death was unexpected.¹¹

Lester Hunt. Lester Hunt of Wyoming died on June 19, 1954 at age sixty one of suicide by firearm.¹² Some attribute his suicide to his kidney illness, but before his death, Hunt had been blackmailed by Republican senators Styles Bridges and Herman Welker to resign or they would publicize that Hunt’s son had solicited a male undercover police officer in the midst of the federal government’s attempt to oust gay people during the height of McCarthyism and the Lavender Scare.¹³ In October 1953, his son paid a fine to avoid jail time,¹⁴ although it was not widely publicized. As the 1954 election neared, Bridges and Welker continued to threaten to make Hunt’s son’s solicitation public by sending fliers to Wyoming voters to hurt his reelection chances.¹⁵ Although Hunt’s death may have been expected, either due to his illness or the turmoil caused by the homophobic extortion, his death did not change party control of the chamber, and the models in the main text that rely only on regimes 5–7 do not include Hunt’s death so the results are robust to excluding this tragic and unusual death.

Hugh Butler. Hugh Butler of Nebraska died on July 1, 1954 at age seventy six of a stroke.¹⁶ A *New York Times* article published the day after his death reads, “The Senator had shown no signs of illness yesterday. He put in a full day at his office and took part in consideration of the tax bill on the floor of the Senate,” indicating that his death was unexpected.¹⁷

Burnet Maybank. Burnet Maybank of South Carolina died on September 1, 1954 at age fifty five of a heart attack.¹⁸ A *New York Times* article published the day after his death called his death “sudden,” noting that he had been renominated without opposition in the Democratic primary in June of 1954, indicating he was planning to run for reelection and his death was unexpected.¹⁹

Pat McCarran. Pat McCarran of Nevada died on September 28, 1954 at age seventy

¹⁰“Clyde Hoey Dies in Senate Office at 76; News of Hoey’s Death Shocks Colleagues.” *Washington Post and Times Herald*. 13 May 1954.

¹¹“Clyde Hoey Dies in Senate Office at 76; News of Hoey’s Death Shocks Colleagues.” *Washington Post and Times Herald*. 13 May 1954.

¹²“Hunt Takes Life in Senate Office; Wyoming Democrat Fires Shot Through Brain—Kidney Ailment Is Blamed.” *New York Times*. 20 June 1954.

¹³Drew, Pearson. “The Washington Merry-Go-Round.” *Detroit Free Press*. 22 June 1954

¹⁴“Senator Hunt’s Son Pays Fine.” *New York Times*. 8 October 1953.

¹⁵Storrow, Benjamin. “A Death Untold: The Suicide of Wyoming Sen. Lester Hunt.” *Casper Star Tribune*. 14 April 2013.

¹⁶“20 Senators Attend Hugh Butler Rites.” *New York Times*. 4 July 1954.

¹⁷“Senator Butler of Nebraska Dies.” *New York Times*. 2 July 1954.

¹⁸“Senator Maybank Dies at Age of 55.” *New York Times*. 2 September 1954.

¹⁹“South Carolina Sees Rare Political Battle.” *New York Times*. 2 September 1954.

eight of a heart attack.²⁰ A *New York Times* article published the day of his death read, “Senator Pat McCarran...collapsed and died tonight while addressing a Democratic rally,” certainly a surprise.²¹

A.1 Brief Narrative of the 83rd Senate

When voters went to the polls in November of 1952, they briefly punctured the New Deal Democrats’ bubble. After swearing in the 83rd Congress and 34th President in January of 1953, Republican majorities ousted Democratic ones in both the House and the Senate, and Democratic President Truman was replaced by Republican Eisenhower. Only twice before in American history had a party controlling neither the House, Senate, nor presidency won all three: 1800 and 1840 (Mayhew 2005, 95).

Since Republicans commanded a numerical majority in the Senate (48 Republicans, 1 independent who caucused with Republicans, and 47 Democrats), the chamber was organized under Republican control with the Republican presidential primary runner up Robert Taft serving as majority leader, Lyndon Baines Johnson as minority leader, and Vice President Nixon as president of the Senate. A few months later in May 1953, President Eisenhower signed into law the first significant piece of legislation of the 83rd Congress: the Submerged Land Act which “confirm[ed] and establish[ed] the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable waters within State boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands and waters, provide[d] for the use and control of said lands and resources, and confirm[ed] the jurisdiction and control of the United States over the natural resources of the seabed of the Continental Shelf seaward of State boundaries” (P.L. 83-31). This bill was a signature part of the Eisenhower and Republican policy program, and when on the Senate floor, it passed with most Republicans in favor and most Democrats opposed.

On June 26, 1953, Democratic Senator Willis Smith of North Carolina died of a heart attack at age sixty five, briefly increasing Republicans’ majority from 49–47 to 49–46.²² Smith was replaced about three weeks later on July 15 by Alton Lennon, also a Democrat, reverting control back to a two-seat lead for Republicans. The next death, however, would push Republicans’ majority down to a slim one-vote margin. On July 24, 1953, Charles W. Tobey, Republican of Ohio, died of a heart attack at age seventy three, shrinking Republicans’ majority from 49–47 to 48–47.²³ Tobey would not be replaced until January of 1954 as the

²⁰ “Senator McCarran is Dead in Nevada.” *New York Times*. 29 September 1954.

²¹ “Senator McCarran is Dead in Nevada.” *New York Times*. 29 September 1954.

²² “Willis Smith, 65, Senator, Is Dead.” *New York Times*. 27 June 1953; “North Carolina Senator Dies.” *New Orleans States*. 26 June 1953.

²³ “Senator Charles Tobey Dies at 73; Won Fame in Crime Investigation.” *New York Times*. 25 July 1953; “Capital Mourns Passing of Tobey.” *New York Times*. 26 July 1953.

Senate was about to adjourn its first year session. But before the Senate could adjourn at the end of July, Majority Leader Taft died of cerebral hemorrhage associated with malignant tumors at the age of sixty three, bringing partisan control of the Senate to an even 47–47.²⁴ Like with Tobey, Taft would not be replaced until January of 1954.

During the recess, Taft was replaced by Thomas A. Burke, a Democrat since the governor of Ohio, Frank Lausche, was a Democrat and tasked with appointing a replacement. Tobey, however, was replaced by a Republican, Robert Upton. Thus, when the Senate reconvened for its second session, the parties were deadlocked 48–48: an unprecedented split other than a brief period in 1881 when Republicans and Democrats each held thirty-seven seats in the Senate (the US Senate of course also had a party tie most recently in 2001 and 2021). Despite the now balanced Senate, the parties elected not to reorganize, instead maintaining Republican control of committees and other tools of the majority party (Riddick 1954). The vice president was a Republican. During this period, the Senate passed the second and third significant law of the 83rd Congress. First, the Senate passed the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-324), a major overhaul of the tax schedule that was an important GOP policy priority. Second, the Senate passed the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation Act (P.L. 83-358) to construct part of a seaway in the Great Lakes region. The bill passed 57–36 with significant support from the Republican majority and also from Democrats. Both of these bills were considered significant laws by Mayhew (2005).

But bad news for Republicans was on the horizon. On April 12, 1954, Republican Dwight Griswold of Nebraska died of a heart attack at age sixty, giving Democrats a 48–47 majority for a few weeks.²⁵ During this period of a Democratic numerical majority, Democrats recommitted without instruction two bills favored by Republicans, effectively killing them and “rolling” Republicans in the process (Republicans technically maintained organizational control of committees, but had fewer seats on the floor than Democrats). Democrats voted to kill an amendment to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and a bill regulating transportation rates in interstate commerce. Both motions barely passed with all or almost all Democrats voting yes and all or almost all Republicans voting no.

Concerning the Democratic motion to recommit the amendment to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, one journalistic account of opposition to Republican attempts to revise the Labor Management Relations Act has been described as going for the “jugular

²⁴“Senator Taft is Dead at 63; Eisenhower Leads Tributes; Republicans’ Unity Shaken.” *New York Times*. 1 August 1953; “Taft is Eulogized by Friends and Foes.” *New York Times*. 7 August 1953.

²⁵“Sen. Griswold, Republican of Nebraska, Dies.” *Chicago Tribune*. April 12, 1954; “Sen. Griswold Dies after Heart Attack: Leaders of Both Parties Express Loss, Unexpected Death of State Public Figure Is Shock.” *Beatrice Daily Sun*. 12 April 1954; “Senator Griswold Dies: Heart Attack Fatal to Nebraska Solon, Passes Away at Navy Hospital ; Death Sudden, Death is Attributed to Coronary Occlusion, Ex-Governor was 60. *Lincoln Star*. 12 April 1954.

vein” of the “Republican program” (White 1956, 186). With the election of Eisenhower prior to the 83rd Senate, Republican party leaders in the Senate planned to make significant revisions to this landmark labor law. Many of these proposed revisions were opposed by labor unions and Democrats. The change from a Republican majority to a Democratic majority derailed revisions to this previously passed legislation. According to an account in *Congressional Quarterly’s Congress and the Nation, 1945-64*, once the Senate Democratic numerical majority killed these revisions to this labor law, Republican legislators lacked time to return to it given other policy priorities facing them in the waning days of 1954.

The period of Democratic control, however, came to an end with the death of Democrat Clyde Hoey of North Carolina of a stroke at age seventy six.²⁶ Once Hoey’s and Griswold’s replacements were seated, Republicans regained their majority and would keep it until the end of the 83rd Congress, passing several other significant laws (as defined by Mayhew) favored by Republican senators in the process.

Republicans’ majority, however, would again grow when Democrat Lester Hunt of Wyoming committed suicide on June 19, 1954 and was replaced by Republican Edward Crippa by Wyoming’s Republican governor, bringing party control back to the original 49–47 Republican majority.²⁷ Over the next six months, three more senators died. First, Republican Hugh Butler of Nebraska died of a stroke to be replaced by fellow Republican Sam Reynolds six days later.²⁸ Next, Democrat Burnet Maybank of South Carolina, whose obituary described him as a public opponent of the Ku Klux Klan, died of a heart attack and was replaced by Southern segregationist Strom Thurmond.²⁹ Finally, Democrat Pat McCarran of Nevada died of a heart attack and was replaced by Republican Ernest Brown, bringing partisan control of the Senate to a Republican majority of 48–47.³⁰ On December 31, 1954, well after the Senate’s business had adjourned, Hazel Abel (R-NE) resigned, creating a final, balanced Senate. Again, though, the Republicans had a numerical majority because of the vice president.

Considering this historical narrative of some major legislation in the 83rd Senate, the mechanisms behind how numerical majorities affect the agenda becomes clearer. In this Senate, a number of levers of party control did not vary. When the party majority on the

²⁶ “Clyde Hoey Dies in Senate Office at 76; News of Hoey’s Death Shocks Colleagues.” *Washington Post and Times Herald*. 13 May 1954.

²⁷ “Hunt Takes Life in Senate Office; Wyoming Democrat Fires Shot Through Brain—Kidney Ailment Is Blamed.” *New York Times*. 20 June 1954.

²⁸ “20 Senators Attend Hugh Butler Rites.” *New York Times*. 4 July 1954; “Senator Butler of Nebraska Dies.” *New York Times*. 2 July 1954.

²⁹ “Senator Maybank Dies at Age of 55.” *New York Times*. 2 September 1954; “South Carolina Sees Rare Political Battle.” *New York Times*. 2 September 1954.

³⁰ “Senator McCarran is Dead in Nevada.” *New York Times*. 29 September 1954.

floor changed in the 83rd Senate, party control and party margins of control of committees did not change; the president did not change; party control of the U.S. House did not change; and the gridlock interval effectively did not change. However, when the party majority changed from Republican to Democrat, the Senate Democrats utilized procedural motions on the floor to pass votes preferred by their party's members and not preferred by a majority of the Republican party. Democrats used procedural motions on the floor to block Republican-preferred bills when they had a numerical majority on the floor. Republicans similarly used procedural motions on the floor, along with levers of majority control, when they had more legislators in the 83rd Senate.

A conclusion is that numerical majorities for a party allow for floor behavior to benefit that party, and this has been less frequently identified as a key causal mechanism underlying majority party power in the U.S. Senate. The slim numerical majority led to the importance of party loyalty and the importance of party leaders enforcing party loyalty on the Senate floor (see Huitt 1957). Even though the 83rd Senate is considered to be in an era of weak parties, this historical evidence presented in the appendix - and the quantitative evidence presented in the text - show that majority party is influential even in this time period.

Through our analysis of the 83rd Senate, we show that parties use floor procedures; not only pre-floor tools like standing committees. Particularly, a political party can use its numerical floor majority and tools like the motion to recommit and the motion to table to exert negative agenda control despite not having control of the pre-floor agenda setting mechanisms like committee majorities. We think this is an important advance that goes beyond the party cartel model and the preferences model and identifies party leadership and agenda-setting on the floor as a key explanation for the role of parties on legislator behavior and cutpoint locations in the Senate in an era considered to have weak parties.

B Probing the Exogeneity of Deaths

The most serious threat to our identification strategy is whether the deaths that resulted in changes in majority party control were neither random nor exogenous. If members could predict with some degree of certainty who would die, or at least to which party the deceased belonged, members may act strategically in unobservable ways. To probe whether the deaths were random or exogenous, we conduct a series of balance tests. First, we compare the mean age of senators in the Democratic and Republican parties. If one party comprised much older members than the other, senators might reasonably believe that a senator from the older party is more likely to die. We are unable to reject the null that the parties comprised members of significantly different ages (difference in means = 0.881 years, $p = 0.652$). In addition, simply perusing the causes of deaths of the senators listed in Table A.2 show that the deaths were mostly quite sudden with strokes and heart attacks the leading causes of deaths of these nine senators. As detailed in Appendix A, it is unlikely senators would have learned of these deaths in advance given most were sudden heart attacks or strokes.

Additionally, we attempt to predict senator deaths by regressing a binary indicator of whether each senator died on a host of potential explanatory variables. Age is the only significant predictor of death, and the effect of age does not vary by party, providing further evidence that the deaths were exogenous. Table B.1 reports coefficients from estimating ordinary least squares and logistic regressions of death on a host of covariates. The F test is only significant when including age as a covariate.

Further, our identification strategy is only threatened if deaths are correlated with anything else that is causally related to the agenda. The advantage of our empirical situation is that all of the factors causally related to the agenda remained constant during the 83rd Senate. The partisan composition of other branches of government did not change (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007), distance between pivots did not meaningfully change (Krehbiel 1998), and party control of committees did not change (Cox and McCubbins 2005). These three factors—party control of other institutions of the federal government, distance between pivots, and party committee control—are all causally related to the agenda, yet did not vary during the 83rd Senate. Instead *only* floor majority party control changed in the Senate as a result of an exogenous death, which was not correlated with any of the three aforementioned factors.

Since these pre-floor mechanisms of party control did not vary, it must be floor procedures that allowed for Democrats to exert negative agenda control during their period of numerical majority control. For instance, Roberts (2005) studies procedural votes from 1909 to 2002 in the U.S. House on motions to recommit (MTRs) to reject a pure preference-based theory in

Table B.1: Predicting Senator Deaths

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Senator Died	
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>Logit</i>
Age	0.011* (0.004)	0.205* (0.090)
Republican	0.421 (0.346)	8.695 (6.984)
Age \times Republican	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.119 (0.100)
NOMINATE First Dimension	0.242 (0.163)	3.447 (2.558)
NOMINATE Second Dimension	0.024 (0.076)	0.721 (1.273)
Constant	-0.633* (0.264)	-16.236** (6.010)
Observations	109	109
Adjusted R ²	0.070	
Log Likelihood		-24.163
F Statistic	2.636**	

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

favor of predictions found in conditional party government, but does not examine the U.S. Senate. Others have also examined procedural votes such as the motion to table (MTT) in the U.S. Senate in order to study majority party effects. Work studying MTTs has found some party effects on motions-to-table in the contemporary era only (e.g., King, Orlando and Rohde 2016 test majority party effects but only in the 1970s to the present; Monroe, Roberts and Rohde 2009 examine MTTs from 1993 to 1996).

Historical work on procedural votes in earlier periods closer to the time that we study finds null or mixed party effects on MTTs (e.g., Carson, Madonna and Owens 2016 study the U.S. Senate from 1865 to 1946, and find no effect of majority party control in the chamber on MTTs generally, but some evidence on successful MTTs). Other research on managing the floor in the U.S. Senate during the era we study has focused on the weakness of the majority party as individual senators' preferences and prerogatives have often dominated in the mid-20th century relative to strong parties in use of floor procedures in the U.S. House (e.g., Roberts and Smith 2007, Sinclair 1989). On balance, past research implies that the numerical party majority in the U.S. Senate has had difficulty using floor procedural tools to achieve outcomes preferred by the majority party and majority party leader during the historical era that we study—even if there is some attenuated evidence of party effects via procedural votes. Our research stands in contrast to some of this research, and does allow a clean test of majority party status on the floor in the U.S. Senate on Senate roll-call outcomes. Our statistical analyses in the text and our qualitative reading of the Congressional Record and other historical sources suggest the floor majority party in the 83rd Senate utilized both MTTs and MTRs when in the numerical majority.

Further, the role of the majority party status has been studied in periods where all pre-floor agenda setting tools such as committee organization are also simultaneously alongside floor procedural tools used to benefit the majority party. Further, our finding of negative agenda control on the floor by the party with the majority of the seats more precisely specifies how the majority party can exert control over a legislature than has been previously demonstrated by other scholars. In addition to our analysis being novel due to the exogenous and unexpected changes to the party majority, it also leverages our ability to rule out several explanations that did not vary during this Senate. Our finding that the numerical floor majority affects ideal point and cutpoint estimates, especially on procedural votes, is in contrast to much of the extant literature that argues that agenda control occurs via standing committees prior to action on the floor. To be clear, we do not reject the idea that standing committees help the majority party set the agenda, but we are able to empirically demonstrate that floor procedures for the majority party are also an avenue of negative agenda control.

C Second Dimension

This section replicates the main analyses from the text but with second dimension ideal points. Table C.1 displays the effect of Democratic control on second dimension cutpoints and uncovers null effects in two of three models estimated. The agenda setting power of the Democratic party consistently found on first dimension cutpoints in Table 1 in the text is not found in the analysis of the second dimension in Table C.1, likely because the Senate of the 1950s was so divided over racial and social issues that the second dimension measures.

Table C.1: Effect of Party Control on Second Dimension Cutpoints

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Second Dimension Cutpoint		
	All Regimes	Regimes 5-7	Second Session Regimes
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Democratic Majority	0.042 (0.098)	0.239* (0.117)	-0.063 (0.158)
Observations	237	70	114

*p<0.05

Note: Unit of analysis is the bill/roll call. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors clustered by regime reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

Table C.2 displays the effect of Democratic control on second dimension ideal point estimates by party. There is some evidence that majority party control shifted revealed preferences of Democratic and Republican legislators, but this evidence is not consistently found across all three models in Table C.2.

Therefore, in Table C.3, we examine the heterogenous effect of Democratic control on northern and southern Democrats. The coefficients show mixed results across all three models. However, unlike the results for northern Democrats, southern Democrats' revealed preferences moved to the right (toward more racist policy preferences) when Democrats controlled a majority of seats in the analysis of all regimes in the 2nd session (year 1954) of the 83rd Senate.

Table C.2: Effect of Party Control on Second Dimension Ideal Points

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Second Dimension Ideal Point					
	All Regimes		Regimes 5-7		Second Session Regimes	
	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Majority	0.533** (0.144)	0.453** (0.094)	0.045 (0.314)	0.568 (0.336)	0.675** (0.180)	0.512* (0.232)
Observations	395	408	134	135	175	180
Senator FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Unit of analysis is the senator-regime. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority. Heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by regime reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

Table C.3: Heterogenous Effect of Party Control on Second Dimension Ideal Points, Democrats Only

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Second Dimension Ideal Point		
	All Regimes	Regimes 5-7	Second Session Regimes
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Democratic Majority	0.193 (0.184)	-0.246* (0.081)	0.155 (0.262)
Democratic Majority × Southern Democrat	0.765 (0.393)	0.657 (0.907)	1.195* (0.202)
Observations	395	134	175
Senator FEs	YES	YES	YES

*p < 0.01

Note: Unit of analysis is the senator-regime. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority and nonsouthern Democrat. There is no dummy variable for southern Democrat since it does not vary within-senator and we include senator fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by regime reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

D Estimation Details

Our ideal point estimates and bill parameters are estimated via Bayesian MCMC using the Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) model as described in the text, though we want to elaborate on those estimation details here. The ideal point estimates for all but four of the US senators vary over each regime, so that we can compare changes in revealed preferences under Democratic and Republican party control of the floor. Four senators we held fixed in their ideal points across all of the regimes, and they were chosen because two were among the most ideologically extreme members on the first dimension and two were among the most ideologically extreme members based on the second dimension (we consulted NOMINATE estimates that were static across each legislator for the 83rd Senate; and qualitatively examined the historical record). We identified the parameters by fixing Senator Morse at $(-1,0)$, Senator Ives at $(0,-1)$, and Senator Goldwater at $(1,0)$. Along with these three fixed Senators, we also bridged with Senator Eastland. Eastland’s ideal point was assumed to be static across all nine regimes in addition to these other three senators even though fixing only three senators is sufficient to identify the model – but four bridge senators allow for more reliable bridged estimates (Shor, McCarty and Berry 2011).

After estimation, we obtained a dataset with 807 observations at the senator-regime level that we use for our analyses in the appendix and in the manuscript text. Then the four bridge legislators are removed before analysis since we assume they do not change over regimes, leaving 803 senator-regime observations at the unit of analysis of the legislator (395 Democrats and 408 Republicans over the nine regimes in the 83rd Senate; see Table 2 in the manuscript text). We obtain another dataset based on our original estimation with 237 observations at the roll-call vote/bill parameter level of analysis (see Table 1 in the manuscript text).

E Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models of Lawmaking: Cutpoints

The procedural cartel model predicts that the only status quo policies that will be considered for revision are those that are outside the interval $[2M - F, F]$ where M is the majority party median and F is the floor median. For any status quo q , let $b^*(q)$ be the policy that would result in equilibrium if a bill revising q is put on the agenda. Then, the cutpoint associated with the final bill vote is $c = \frac{b^*(q)+q}{2}$. Therefore, we can map status quos to cutpoints without explicitly identifying status quo policies (which we cannot with our estimation procedure). So, mapping status quos to cutpoints, the interval of cutpoints we should not observe is $[M, F]$ since $c = \frac{F+F}{2} \Rightarrow c = F$ and $c = \frac{F+(2M-F)}{2} \Rightarrow c = M$. Let M_R be the Republican party median, M_D be the Democratic party median, and F be the floor median. Then, $[F, M_R]$ represents the range of cutpoints we should not observe during periods of Republican control and $[M_D, F]$ represents the range of cutpoints we should not observe during periods of Democratic control. Figure E.1 displays these predictions.




Figure E.1: Cutpoint Predictions

This implies that during periods of Republican control, we should observe cutpoints on the interval $[M_D, F]$, leading to, on average, lower estimated cutpoints (and vice versa for Democrats), which we observe in cutpoint analysis in table 1 in the main text.

The analysis in Figure 1 and Table 1 in the text are the cutpoint analyses. As we describe in the text and elaborate on in this appendix, precise status quo point estimates are not estimable in the Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) model and nearly all other analogous ideal-point models such as NOMINATE, but cutpoints are estimable and uncover information to assess agenda setting. In the text, we described the case of a legislator indifferent between a status quo and a new policy proposal located at 0 on one dimension on an ideal point scale. Considering the intuition from the text where the status quo policy was at -0.5 and the proposal policy was at 0.5 , this implies a cutpoint of 0. If the status quo were instead at -1 and the policy proposal at 1, the cutpoint would be exactly the same. Cutpoints, however, are identified by $\frac{\alpha_j}{\beta_j}$ and can be mapped directly from status quos (see Krehbiel, Meirowitz and Woon 2005 for more information on mapping status quos to cutpoints).

E.1 Generalizability of Cutpoint Analysis: Correlational Analysis of 80th–116th Senates

If the results uncovered in the main text about the 83rd Senate hold outside of its unique empirical setting, we should observe similar results at the Congress level over time. That is, when Democrats control a majority of seats in the Senate, we should observe, on average, higher cutpoints. Figure E.2 displays mean cutpoints for each Congress from the 80th–116th (1947 to 2020). These cutpoints are rescaled to be mean zero and standard deviation one, as we also did with the cutpoints estimated for the different regimes in the 83rd Senate in the manuscript text. The 116th Senate estimates are based on all roll calls through summer 2020, at the time of writing this section of the Appendix.




Figure E.2: Cutpoints. Each point represents the mean cutpoint for each Congress and error bars represent 95% CIs. Cutpoint estimated with the NOMINATE algorithm and retrieved from voteview.com.

Table E.1 displays differences in mean cutpoints between Democratic and Republican control of the Senate. The broader analysis supports the results from the main text since cutpoints during periods of Democratic control are significantly higher than those during periods of Republican control. Overall, this additional analysis provides confidence that our causal analysis of the 83rd Senate is externally valid and generalizable, and not simply confined to legislative politics in the 1950s. This supplemental evidence is correlational, while the 83rd Senate analyses in the text are causal.

Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect is much bigger for the causal estimates presented in the text (Table 1) compared to these correlational results in Table E.1 (and both are rescaled to be mean zero and standard deviation one). Given that the 1950s is an era previously thought to have weaker parties relative to contemporary periods (Den Hartog and Monroe 2019), a comparison of these correlational results with the causal results in the text is particularly illuminating. Given the causal effect size of majority party control

(Table 1 in the text), extant research examining the role of parties in the US Senate via correlational studies is likely underestimating the overall effect size of majority party control on the agenda.

Table E.1: Cutpoints by Party Control, 80th-116th Congress

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
First Dimension Cutpoint Location	
Democratic	0.105*
Majority	(0.054)
Observations	23,909

*p<0.1

Note: Unit of analysis is the bill/roll call. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority. Heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by Congress reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean zero and standard deviation one.

F More on Ideal Points

This appendix displays senators' first and second dimension ideal points that we estimated across nine party-control regimes in the 83rd Senate. Figure F.1 displays first dimension ideal points by regime and Figure F.2 displays second dimension ideal points by regime to assess within-senator revealed preference change. Figures F.1 and F.2 include senators who served in at least two regimes. We do not display the four bridge legislators as they do not vary.

Figure F.3 displays correlations by regime between first dimension NOMINATE estimates of ideal points and our dynamic ideal points estimated via Bayesian MCMC. For face validity purposes, our regime-varying ideal point estimates correlate well with NOMINATE estimates for the entire 83rd Senate. Recall that NOMINATE yields only one ideal point for the entire two-year Senate session per senator, but our ideal point estimates vary in each of the nine different party-control regimes of the 83rd Senate.




Figure F.1: First Dimension Ideal Points at the Individual Senator Level




Figure F.2: Second Dimension Ideal Points at the Individual Senator Level




Figure F.3: Regime-by-Regime Correlation between Ideal Point Estimates. Each point represents a senator and lines display the best fit linear relationship via OLS. Correlation coefficient displayed in the top left of each panel.

G Ideal Point Analysis Separating Southern from Nonsouthern Democrats

Table G.1 displays OLS estimates of the effect of party control on first-dimension ideal points for southern and non-southern Democrats. In each model, the effect of Democratic majority is around 0.3 standard deviations, indicating that Democrats generally moved to the right, as in Table 2 in the text. The coefficient on the interaction between Democratic majority and southern Democrat, however, is consistently negative and of a similar magnitude to the effect of Democratic majority, offsetting the effect. This indicates that the change in ideal points among Democrats when they controlled a majority of seats in the 83rd Senate occurred only among non-southern Democrats. Southern Democrats, on the other hand, behaved similarly on the floor regardless of party control.

Table G.1: Heterogenous Effect of Party Control on Ideal Points, Democrats Only

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	First Dimension Ideal Point		
	All Regimes	Regimes 5-7	Second Session Regimes
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Democratic Majority	0.361* (0.118)	0.281* (0.024)	0.347 (0.279)
Democratic Majority × Southern Democrat	-0.369 (0.151)	-0.579 (0.380)	-0.186 (0.121)
Observations	395	134	175
Senators FE	YES	YES	YES

*p<0.01

Note: Unit of analysis is the senator-regime. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority and nonsouthern Democrat. There is no dummy variable for southern Democrat since it does not vary within-senator and we include senator fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by regime reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

H Replicating Ideal Point Analysis with Fully Aggregated Regimes

In the main text, we separate the 83rd Senate into nine distinct regimes where each regime represents an unchanging senatorial composition. In the main text, regimes end when someone dies or is replaced. In this section, we divide votes into only three regimes where each regime represents all votes that occurred with the same party commanding a numerical majority. In this appendix, regimes end when the party with a numerical majority loses it. So the first regime is the period of time from the beginning of the 83rd Congress to the time when Republicans lost their numerical majority, the second is the period from when Democrats commanded a numerical majority to when they lost it, and the third is the period after Republicans retook their numerical majority until the end of the session. Table H.1 displays results from the same model as table 2 in the main text, but reestimating ideal points with only these three regimes. We use the same bridge legislators and the same anchor legislators as described in appendix D.

Table H.1: Effect of Party Control on Ideal Points (Three Regimes)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	First Dimension Ideal Point Democrats	Republicans
	(1)	(2)
Democratic Majority	-0.381* (0.007)	1.004* (0.114)
Observations	156	159
Senator FEs	YES	YES

*p<0.01

Note: Estimated via OLS. Unit of analysis is the senator-regime. Baseline condition is Republican majority. Coefficients are reported and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors clustered by regime are reported in parentheses. P-values use two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was scaled to mean zero and standard deviation one.

I Placebo Tests

I.1 Testing for Secular Trends in the US House

A threat to validity of our research design is if there was something correlated with the change in party control in April and May of 1954 and causally related to the agenda. If there were something else confounding the analysis, we would observe similar effects in the US House of Representatives. For example, if there was a government scandal, economic or military threat, or other shock, both the House and the Senate would be affected and their agenda might change in tandem. To test whether some other factor might account for our results and render them spurious, we estimated cutpoints for the US House splitting House votes into regimes that span the same set of days of the regimes in the Senate created by deaths. Party control did not change in the US House, and therefore we are able to determine whether secular trends in the agenda account for our findings in the Senate.

Table I.1: Cutpoints: Placebo Tests Using the US House

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	First Dimension Cutpoint					
	Senate (Not Placebo)			House of Representatives (Placebo)		
	All Regimes	Regimes 5–7	Second Session	All Regimes	Regimes 5–7	Second Session
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Democratic Majority	1.135* (0.041)	1.216* (0.042)	1.170* (0.028)	−0.002 (0.105)	0.130* (0.028)	0.054 (0.056)
Observations	237	70	151	120	28	58

*p<0.01

Note: Estimated via OLS. Unit of analysis is the bill/roll call. Baseline condition is Republican majority. Coefficients are reported and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors clustered by regime are reported in parentheses. P-values use two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was rescaled to have mean zero and standard deviation one.

We conduct a placebo test for the cutpoints analysis. Table I.1 reproduces the main finding from the text for the Senate and the placebo results for the US House. In models one and four, we estimate the effect of Senate Democratic majority control across all regimes: we find no effect in the US House, instead we uncover a null estimate almost precisely zero. In models two and five, we estimate the effect for regimes five through seven and although we find a positive effect in the House as well, it is only about ten percent of the effect size in the Senate, providing evidence that secular trends do not account for the strong findings in the Senate reported in the main text. Finally, models three and six estimate the effect of regimes in the second session: we uncover null results for the House.

To visualize the changes in cutpoints, figure I.1 plots mean cutpoints and 95% con-

fidence intervals. In the Senate, there is a clear increase in cutpoints in the US Senate when Democrats took numerical control, but there is no such increase in the US House.




Figure I.1: Cutpoints by Regime in the House and Senate.

I.2 Permutations

A benefit of estimating ideal points for each senator in each of nine regimes is that it allows us to isolate the effect of party change from the effects of deaths or replacements generally. If the effect is really driven by change in party control and not simply changes in composition, we should only observe our results when party control changed. In other words, only the regime of Democratic control should be different from the periods of Republican control, and there should be no difference between the Republican regimes. To test this, we conducted several placebo tests permuting the categorization of the regimes. We first assumed the first regime was the Democratic one rather than the sixth and estimate our models assuming this; then we assume the second regime was the Democratic one and estimate our models; then we assume the third is; and so on. If our main results are driven by party control changes and not composition changes, we should *only* observe an effect for the model that correctly classifies the sixth regime as the Democratic one. We conduct these placebo permutation tests for both the cutpoint and ideal point results.

Table I.2 displays the estimated effect on first dimension cutpoints from the placebo permutation tests. The placebo tests recover null or negative effects for all but one permutation. Regime three, where Republicans controlled a numerical majority, had higher cutpoints than other regimes. However, the proper effect of Democratic control recovered by proper categorization of the sixth and only the sixth regime (in bold) as the period of Democratic control recovers a much larger estimate of the effect of Democratic control (1.135) and is statistically distinguishable ($p < 0.001$) from the placebo test (0.465). Taken together, these placebo tests provide confidence that we have uncovered the effect of party control and not simply the effect of changes in composition by death or replacement. If death or replacement caused significant changes in the agenda, we would have recovered estimates statistically distinguishable from zero in many regimes. Next, we conduct equivalent placebo tests by permuting which regime had Democratic control, but for our ideal point results separately for each party.

Table I.2: Placebo Tests of Party Control on First Dimension Cutpoints

<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
First Dimension Cutpoint									
	Regime 1	Regime 2	Regime 3	Regime 4	Regime 5	Regime 6	Regime 7	Regime 8	Regime 9
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democratic Control	-0.084 (0.094)	-0.004 (0.079)	0.465* (0.070)	-0.301* (0.079)	-0.120 (0.089)	1.135* (0.041)	-0.225* (0.082)	-0.077 (0.105)	-0.087 (0.079)
Observations	237	237	237	237	237	237	237	237	237

* $p < 0.01$

Note: Unit of analysis is the bill/roll call. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors clustered by regime reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

Table I.3 displays the estimated effect on first dimension ideal points by party. The placebo tests for Republicans uncover null or negative effects for all but one permutation. Like above, regime three uncovers results in the same direction as in the main text. However, like above, the proper effect (regime six, in bold) is larger than the placebo effect ($p < 0.1$, one-tailed). Two of the placebo tests for Democrats are statistically distinguishable from zero and positive, but since we recovered null results in the main text, the placebo tests do not provide any additional information.

Table I.3: Placebo Tests of Party Control on First Dimension Ideal Points

<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
First Dimension Ideal Point									
	Regime 1	Regime 2	Regime 3	Regime 4	Regime 5	Regime 6	Regime 7	Regime 8	Regime 9
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democrats	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democratic Majority	-0.117 (0.120)	-0.120 (0.120)	-0.138 (0.119)	0.116 (0.120)	0.371* (0.113)	0.197 (0.121)	-0.049 (0.125)	0.468* (0.117)	-0.821* (0.072)
Senator FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	395	395	395	395	395	395	395	395	395
Republicans	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Democratic Majority	0.072 (0.110)	-0.066 (0.110)	0.355* (0.101)	-0.274* (0.104)	0.122 (0.116)	0.527* (0.094)	0.005 (0.108)	-0.155 (0.125)	-0.587* (0.091)
Senator FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408

*p<0.01

Note: Unit of analysis is the senator-regime. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority. Heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by regime reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

J Reanalysis Subsetting by Type of Bill

In this section, we replicate the cutpoint and ideal point analysis separating the data into final passage and other votes. Extreme caution is warranted in interpreting these results as the sparsity of the data introduces large variance and uncertainty for the final passage votes. Table J.1 reports the effect of Democratic control on first dimension cutpoints for final passage and other votes and table J.2 reports the effect of Democratic control on first dimension ideal points by party. For the ideal point analysis, we separately estimated ideal points for final passage and other votes. Results suggest numerical party majority floor control influenced procedural votes and amendments, which as we describe in Appendices A and B affected policy outcomes.

Table J.1: Effect of Party Control on Cutpoints, Subsetted by Type of Vote

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	First Dimension Cutpoint Final Passage	Other
	(1)	(2)
Democratic Control	-0.109 (0.180)	1.193* (0.187)
Observations	28	229

* $p < 0.01$

Note: Unit of analysis is the bill/roll call. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors clustered by regime reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

Table J.2: Effect of Party Control on Ideal Points, Subsetted by Type of Vote

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	First Dimension Ideal Point			
	Final Passage		Other	
	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democratic Majority	0.691** (0.211)	-0.688 (0.166)	0.391* (0.164)	0.541** (0.158)
Observations	395	408	395	408
Senator FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Unit of analysis is the senator-regime. Estimated via OLS. Baseline condition is Republican majority and nonsouthern Democrat. Heteroskedasticity-corrected errors clustered by regime reported in parentheses. P-values based on two-tailed tests. Dependent variable was first scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

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