Supplemental Materials: Appendix

Balance

Tables 7, 8, and 9 provides balance statistics across all treatment arms in each our studies. As is clear, there is substantial balance across all treatment arms with respect to two plausible demographic confounders as well as three plausible attitudinal confounders.

	Control	Study	Vague	Cost	SES	No Cov.
Age	38	36	37	38	36	37
	(13.5)	(12.9)	(13.6)	(13.3)	(13.3)	(13.7)
Female	.57	.56	.56	.53	.55	.57
Judicial Legitimacy	3.98	4.05	4.00	3.93	4.05	–
	(1.73)	(1.74)	(1.73)	(1.64)	(1.79)	
Rule of Law	2.95	2.80	2.91	3.05	2.90	–
	(1.35)	(1.32)	(1.39)	(1.44)	(1.43)	
Social Trust	3.92	3.86	3.92	3.94	3.72	–
	(1.51)	(1.57)	(1.50)	(1.55)	(1.68)	

Table 7: *Sample Balance (Study 1).* Table shows means and standard deviations of salient pre-treatment variables across all treatment arms in Study 1.

	Control w/prior	Study w/prior
Age	35	36
	(12.5)	(12.4)
Female	.58	.57
Judicial Legitimacy	4.08	4.04
	(1.79)	(1.72)
Rule of Law	3.00	2.87
	(1.38)	(1.39)
Social Trust	3.75	4.00
	(1.51)	(1.46)

Table 8: *Sample Balance (Study 2).* Table shows means and standard deviations of salient pre-treatment variables across the treatment arms in Study 2.

	Control w/prior	Study w/prior
Age	39	40
	(16.1)	(16.5)
Female	.51	.47
Judicial Legitimacy	3.90	4.20
	(1.93)	(1.90)
Rule of Law	5.23	5.20
	(1.46)	(1.53)

Table 9: *Sample Balance (Study 3).* Table shows means and standard deviations of salient pre-treatment variables across the treatment arms in Study 3.

Manipulation Checks

In addition to randomization, a precise estimate of the causal effect depends on successfully treating respondents. To that end, our survey concluded by asking respondents to identify which of a list of facts they encountered in the course of the study. The bolded numbers identify fact-treatment arm combinations in which respondents were given the information we ask them. The manipulations were successful. All treatment groups display higher proportions of correct answers for the unique information that they received. Interestingly, all of the groups that we informed about the non-compliance rate reported lower correct answers for the *tutela* question than the control groups. Large majorities in all samples remembered learning the simple description of the *tutela*. That said, all treatment groups were less accurate than the control group about this simple fact. Since the information we delivered was randomized the differences displayed in Table 10 can be interpreted as causal effects regarding the provision of information on a respondent's accurate identification of the *tutela* summary. Grouping together all groups that received the study information, we find a ten (10) percentage point drop in accuracy among the treatment groups.

Facts	Control	Control w/prior	Study	Study w/prior	Vague	Cost	SES	No Cov.
Present tutela	**.83**	**.74**	**.76**	**.60**	**.69**	**.69**	**.70**	**.67**
Non-Compliance rate is 30%	.14	.16	**.53**	**.65**	**.56**	**.54**	**.48**	**.59**
Vague Orders	.07	.09	.09	.07	**.35**	.11	.09	.08
High Costs	.05	.05	.05	.03	.04	**.34**	.08	.05
Low Education of Claimants	.04	.03	.03	.01	.02	.02	**.33**	.03
Learned Nothing	.07	.09	.04	.04	.03	.04	.05	.04

Table 10: *Manipulation checks.* Columns display treatment arms and rows display the facts that respondents were asked to identify. The first row reflects a fact that all participants in the study learned. All respondents in the Study group learned the second fact. Only respondents in the Vague Orders treatment arm learned the third fact; only respondents in the High Costs arm learned the fourth fact; and, only respondents in the Low Education arm learned the fifth fact.

Results with controls

In order to estimate more precise treatment effects we also fit the models described in the paper controlling for a a gender dummy variable; age dummies for the ranges $18-24$, $25-34$, $35-44$, $45-54$, $55-64$, $65-74$, and $75+$; dummies for regions of Colombia, an index for a respondent's rule of law values, and an index for a respondent's perceptions of judicial legitimacy.

Our rule of law index is derived from four rule of law measures asked prior to treatment assignment. Answers to each question fall on a 7-point scale from "strongly disagree to strongly agree." Our index takes on the average of these scores.

1. There are times in which it is necessary to disobey the law. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
2. There are times in which it is necessary for public officials to disobey the law.
3. Breaking the law is not so bad, it is only bad if you are caught.
4. It is difficulty to obey the law when many people do not.

To measure judicial legitimacy we relied on two items tapping into the dimensions of judicial legitimacy described in **?**:

1. The capacity of judges to decide certain types of controversial topics should be reduced.
2. If judges started making decisions that many people disagreed with, it would be better to reduce the power of the judges.

Answers to these questions were again measured on a 7-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. We also considered including an item on judicial trust ("In general, you can trust judges to make decisions that are right for the country."); however, it did not scale with the other two measures.

	Acceptability	Acceptability	Donation	Donation
Control Group Outcome	2.61	3.67	4.95	2.62
Study	-0.13	-0.08	-0.02	0.10
	(0.13)	(.13)	(0.42)	(0.41)
Vague Orders	-0.19	-0.16	-0.17	-0.09
	(0.13)	(.13)	(0.42)	(0.41)
High Costs	-0.09	-0.10	-0.12	-0.05
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.42)	(.41)
Low Education	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.21
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.42)	(.41)
No covariates	-0.09	–	0.25	–
	(0.13)		(0.42)	
N	2145	1778	2145	1778
R^2	0.002	0.04	0.0007	0.07
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table 11: *Effects of Learning about the Non-Compliance Rate:* The comparison category in all models is the study's pure control group. $*p < .10$; $**p < .05$; $***p < .01$

	Acceptability	Acceptability	Donation	Donation
Control Group Outcome	2.56	2.92	4.19	3.69
Study	-0.15	-0.12	0.94**	0.79*
	(0.12)	(.12)	(0.43)	(0.42)
Prior Above 30%	-0.40	-0.49	0.12	-0.28
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(1.12)	(1.09)
Study × Prior Above 30%	0.58	0.61	-0.68	-0.48
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(1.53)	(1.48)
N	687	686	687	686
R^2	0.004	0.03	0.01	0.10
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table 12: *Effects of Learning the Non-Compliance Rate Conditional on Prior Beliefs* The baseline category in these models in the pure control group in the study who had prior beliefs about the non-compliance rate below 30%. $*p < .10$; $**p < .05$; $***p < .01$

	Tutela Support	*Tutela* Support	*Tutela* Support	*Tutela* Support
Control Group Outcome	5.97	5.52	6.39	6.09
Study	0.10	0.05	-0.33	-0.56**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Prior Above 30%			-0.58***	-0.75***
			(0.19)	(0.21)
Study × Prior Above 30%			0.61**	0.84***
			(0.44)	(0.29)
N	416	366	416	366
R^2	0.001	0.04	0.02	0.08
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table 13: *Effects of Learning the Non-Compliance Rate on Support for Tutela* The baseline category in these models are individuals in the control group who had prior beliefs about the non-compliance rate below 30%. $^{*}p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Study 1 and Study 2 Flow Diagram

The following figure describes the flow of information to which respondents are exposed in each arm of Study 1 and Study 2.

Who do Colombians Blame for Non-compliance?

It is also possible that our respondents blame the judges for higher-than-expected non-compliance. Although we lack direct evidence of blame attribution, we possess evidence which suggests that respondents largely place the blame on bureaucrats. At the end of our study, we asked respondents to select the best approach for improving compliance in the *tutela*:(1) increase criminal penalties for people who fail to comply with a *tutela* order, (2) require judges to complete a training program on writing clear orders in *tutela*, and (3) inform the public about the rates of non-compliance with *tutelas*.

Table 14 shows distributions of the answers for the full sample. It also shows the response distributions for sub-samples of individuals who found the non-compliance rate unacceptable (a score of 3 or lower); individuals in the judicial vagueness group; and individuals who both had low prior perceptions of non-compliance and found the rate unacceptable. The key point is that, in each sample, respondents



Figure 5: *Information Flow Chart. The figure shows the flow of information flow for each arm of the study. Nodes in the flow chart reflect text, questions or batteries of questions to which respondents are exposed. Links between notes are labeled with the arm number, as described in the legend.*

overwhelmingly chose increased sanctions on non-compliant agents at the best solution. There is no difference (statistical or substantive) between respondents in the vagueness group relative to the full sample. So even when informed that judges are vague, Colombians rarely suggest that the problem could be solved via training designed to increase clarity.

	Increase the Sanctions (%)	Train the Judges (%)	Inform the Public (%)	N
Full Sample	73	17	10	1801
Found Rate Unacceptable	78	14	8	1292
Learned about Vagueness	71	17	12	362
Low Prior Beliefs & Found Rate Unacceptable	80	12	8	456

Table 14: *How to Address Non-Compliance*

Survey instruments

Our replication materials at Dataverse include the full text of the English and Spanish versions of the survey instruments.