Appendix

The long-term effects of oppression: Prussia, Political Catholicism and the Alternative für Deutschland

Content

A: Data Sources and descriptive statistics

Control variables used in the analyses of West German municipalities

In Table A1, I summarize the data used in the main analyses for West Germany. The municipal data were collected and generously shared by Philip Manow. I complement them with data on Catholicism from the German census and data on university locations taken from Apfeld (2019).

	N	mean	sd	min	max
AfD share	8387	11.04	4.01	0.00	33.33
Share Catholics	8392	41.07	30.26	0.00	100.00
Prussia	8392	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Unemployment	8230	1.68	0.96	0.00	9.59
Marginal employment	8323	10.37	2.18	0.00	67.86
Regular employment	8318	37.87	4.74	0.57	64.15
Population (in 1,000)	8392	7.66	36.46	0.01	1706.70
University	8392	0.01	0.07	0.00	1.00
Share Foreigners (in %)	8368	21.73	4.98	0.00	85.91
Population > 65 (in %)	8392	19.52	4.18	0.00	68.18
Female Population Share	8392	50.31	1.98	21.23	83.33
Close to border	8392	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00

Table A1: Descriptive statistics on variables used in the main analysis

A main reason for the inclusion of these variables is their availability at the municipal level. Other variables such as per capita income are not available at this fine-grained level.

Four of my measures seek to control for the economic structure of the municipality: the unemployment rate is a standard measure for economic deprivation. Marginal employment and regular employment proxy the structure of the local economy. In particular, they seek to distinguish between two alternative interpretations of the relationship between economic conditions and radical right voting: is it voters at the bottom of the economic ladder or rather those who feel that they have something to lose who support the radical right (Kurer 2020; Manow 2018)?

Five control variables seek to control for the socio-demographic structure of the population which could in many ways correlate with religiosity. The size of the population is a proxy measure for urbanization. For an analysis on the municipal level, this is a better measure than population density, since some German cities have a very large area and thus a relatively small population density, even if almost all of their inhabitants live in a strongly urban context. This measure is included since the rise of the AfD is often interpreted as an expression of a growing urban-rural divide. The presence of a university is a proxy for both a young and a highly educated population. This measure is included since the rise of the AfD is often interpreted as an

expression of a growing educational cleavage. The share of foreigners is a measure for potential exposure which is thought to reduce anti-immigrant attitudes and, thus, AfD support. The share of the elderly population and the female population share are proxies for "left behind" places, since it is often younger and female citizens that leave shrinking municipalities. Moreover, as with other radical right parties, women and younger voters are less likely to support the AfD than men and older voters. Finally, closeness to the Austrian and Czech border measures exposure to the "refugee crisis" in 2015, which was a main source of growing AfD support (Jäckle, Wagschal, and Kattler 2018). This is important since the border region is also highly Catholic.

Construction of Kulturkampf Kalender

To construct the index of regional Kulturkampf intensity used in my analyses, I use the "Kulturkampf Kalender" published by the Frankfurter Zeitung in 1875/76. Typical entries of this calendar read:
"19/07/1875 – Steinfeld - Kaplan Weyrauch from Pfalzel near Trier has been banned from the German empire"
"15/06/1875 – Freiburg – Pastor Gerber was sentenced to five months, copy editor Dilger to two months in prison because of press delicts."
While the first entry refers to a specific municipality in which the event occurred, the second entry only refers to the court district. Moreover, some events refer to dioceses, not to districts. Typically, they refer to measures against bishops. An example is:
"07/07/1875 – Minden – the Royal government has instructed the bishop of Paderborn to take residence in the fortress Wesel."
Finally, a number of entries refer to measures against newspapers, such as:
"19/07/1875 – Bochum –The editorial office of the Westfälische Volkszeitung is searched twice by a police commissioner for the manuscript of two articles"
To code whether a newspaper was a Catholic newspaper, I rely on "Woerl's Statistik der katholischen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften" (Woerl 1879).
In total, of the 512 Kalender entries that refer to events in West Germany, I can code 322 as municipality-specific, 159 as court -specific, and 31 as diocese-specific. While the majority of events is thus municipality-specific, these events clearly cluster in bigger towns and cities. This suggests that it may have been easier for the Frankfurter Zeitung to obtain news from bigger cities. Therefore, I aggregate the data to the court level.

My data on the court districts comes from the summaries by Hauff (1856) and Pfafferoth (1880). The German court system was re-organized in 1878, and Pfafferoth (1880) summarizes the new, unified system of Landgerichte. However, the events in the Kulturkampfkalender refer to the period of 1875-76 when the different court systems of the individual German states were still in place. Comparing the data in Pfafferoth (1880) with Hauff (1856) allows me to match 1875 courts to 1878 court districts. This results in 89 court

districts (fully or partly) in what is today West Germany. Therefore, aggregating the data at this level gives me a relatively fine-grained measure of regional oppression.

Pfafferoth (1880) contains data on the number of inhabitants per court district, which I use to normalize the data. Most court districts were of a roughly similar size – 75% of them had between 150,000 and 350,000 inhabitants in 1878. Still, the variation between the biggest and the smallest districts is quite substantial and could bias the measure. Therefore, I count the number of oppression events per court district, multiply them with 100,000 and divide them by the number of inhabitants to calculate the number of oppression events per 100,000 inhabitants.

To include the diocese-specific events in this measure, I divide the number of diocese-specific events by the number of inhabitants in the diocese and assign the resulting number to all court districts in the diocese. The resulting regional distribution of the Kulturkampf index is illustrated by Figure 2 in the main paper. Table A2 lists the court districts with the highest number of oppression events. There are 27 districts without any oppression event, most of them in Bavaria or in the Protestant regions in Northern Germany.

The median court district had 0.87 oppression events per 100,000 inhabitants with a standard deviation of 2.57.

District	**State**	*events per 100,000 inhabitants*
Kleve	Prussia	13.0
Münster	Prussia	8.3
Hanau	Prussia	8.0
Düsseldorf	Prussia	7.8
Arnsberg	Prussia	7.2
Trier	Prussia	6.8
Waldshut	Baden	6.2
Wiesbaden	Prussia	6.1
Hechingen	Prussia	6.0
Mainz	Hesse	5.8

Table A2: Court districts with highest intensity of oppression

Statistics on the intensity of Catholic mobilization

Table A3 shows the share of all Catholics organized in the "Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland" in 1913 and 1927 on the diocese level. The data come from the book on the *Volksverein* by Heitzer (1979) and Klein (1996).

At both points in time, the *Volksverein* organized a substantially higher share of Prussian Catholics than of non-Prussian Catholics.

Diocese	Membership 1913	Membership 1927
	Prussia	
Münster	6.8	2.99
Paderborn	6.5	3.85
Cologne	6.1	2.17
Hildesheim	5.7	4.17
Apostolisches Vikariat	5.7	2.92
Osnabrück	5.6	2.92
Fulda	5.5	3.89
Limburg	5.0	2.41
Trier	2.2	2.11
	Outside Prussia	
Speyer	5.3	2.07
Rottenburg	5.0	3.18
Freiburg	4.8	2.16
Mainz	4.0	2.82
Würzburg	2.9	1.35
Bamberg	2.2	0.73
Augsburg	2.1	0.80
Munich	1.9	0.75
Regensburg	1.3	0.42
Passau	1.1	0.23
Eichstätt	0.8	0.19

Table A3: Membership share of the "Volksverein" among all Catholics in 1913 and 1927

Table A4 shows the measure of Katholikentag participation by diocese. To calculate this measure, I divide the share of participants from a diocese by the share of German Catholics living there and regress this relative participation on the distance and squared distance between a diocese's diocesan town and the Katholikentag location. Relative participation is then measured as the mean residual from this regression.

Diocese	Relative Participation	Diocese	Relative Participation
Prussia		*Outside Prussia*	
Osnabrück	1.36	Mainz	0.80
Hamburg	1.23	Speyer	0.30
Hildesheim	1.06	Freiburg	0.13
Köln	0.84	Rottenburg-Stuttgart	-0.35
Münster	0.51	Würzburg	-0.42
Limburg	0.29	München und Freising	-0.75
Paderborn	0.17	Augsburg	-0.76
Fulda	0.02	Regensburg	-0.86
Aachen	-0.09	Bamberg	-0.87
Trier	-0.26	Eichstätt	-0.95
Essen	-0.35	Passau	-0.99

Table A4: Mean relative Katholikentag participation, controlling for distance to location

B: Alternative standard errors for main analysis

In the main specification in the paper, I estimate Conley standard errors with a cutoff of 50km using the procedure developed by Colella et al. (2019). However, these standard errors may still be too optimistic. In models 2 and 3 of Table B1, I thus set the cutoff to 20 km and to 100 km respectively. For simplicity, I report two specifications: the pure interaction between Prussia and Catholicism and the full model. While these changes affect the size of the standard errors, significance levels remain largely identical.

DV: AfD vote share in 2017	**Cutoff 20km**		**Cutoff 100km**	
	(1) Interaction	**(2) Full Model**	**(3) Interaction**	**(4) Full Model**
Share Catholics	0.029*	0.022**	0.029	0.022
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Prussia	1.468**	1.299***	1.468*	1.299**
	(0.483)	(0.313)	(0.673)	(0.457)
Prussia x Catholic	-0.080***	-0.053***	-0.080**	-0.053**
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.026)	(0.018)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
N	8370	8178	8370	8178
r2	0.318	0.536	0.318	0.536

All models contain state fixed effects. + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B1: Main specification with alternative standard errors

In the specification with my detailed measure of the intensity of oppression, the paper reports a specification in which standard errors are clustered at the level at which historical oppression is measured. For comparison, Tables B2 and B3 report Conley standard errors with cutoffs of 20km, 50km, and 100km (without and with controls in the regression model). The clustered standard errors are very similar to the 50km errors reported in the other specifications.

DV: AfD vote share in 2017	**(1) Clustered**	**(2) Cutoff 20**	**(3) Cutoff 50**	**(4) Cutoff 100**
Share Catholics	0.029+	0.029**	0.029+	0.029
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Kulturkampf intensity	0.319+	0.319*	0.319*	0.319*
	(0.162)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.155)
Kulturkampf x Catholic	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Controls	NO	NO	NO	NO
N	8370	8370	8370	8370
r2	0.326	0.326	0.326	0.326

All models contain state fixed effects. + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B2: Intensity specification without controls, alternative standard errors

DV: AfD vote share in 2017	(1) Clustered	(2) Cutoff 20	(3) Cutoff 50	(4) Cutoff 100
Share Catholics	0.025*	0.025***	0.025*	0.025+
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Kulturkampf intensity	0.361**	0.361***	0.361***	0.361***
	(0.109)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.092)
Kulturkampf x Catholic	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	8178	8178	8178	8178
r2	0.546	0.546	0.546	0.546

All models contain state fixed effects. + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B3: Intensity specification with controls, alternative standard errors

C: Robustness Checks

East Germany and Catholic regions only

In the main paper, I analyze all municipalities in West Germany. In Table C1, I study whether the effect of Prussian rule also holds for East Germany. As expected, there is no such effect. In fact, there is a weak negative direct effect of Catholicism in a model for East Germany, but no significant difference between Prussian and non-Prussian Catholics (Models 1 and 2). Moreover, I replicate the regression for those 2,586 municipalities only in which Catholics are at least two thirds of the population in order to reduce the danger of an ecological fallacy. Indeed, in this regression with very Catholic regions, the estimated effect of Catholicism remains statistically significant and becomes substantively bigger (Models 3 and 4).

DV: AfD vote share in 2017	**(1) East**	**(2) East controls**	**(3) Cath Regions**	**(4) Cath Regions controls**
Share Catholics	-0.109	-0.051+	0.139*	0.148**
	(0.096)	(0.029)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Prussia	0.722	0.254	21.922***	17.667***
	(1.196)	(0.776)	(4.711)	(4.058)
Prussia x Catholic	0.016	-0.024	-0.314***	-0.245***
	(0.096)	(0.030)	(0.064)	(0.055)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
N	2644	2620	2586	2498
r2	0.325	0.640	0.577	0.611

All models contain state fixed effects. Conley standard errors with a cutoff at 50km in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C1: Robustness Checks for East Germany and Catholic municipalities

Models without state fixed effects

In the main models, I add state fixed effects to control for institutional or other differences between German states that emerged after 1945. This is a common strategy in analyses of German election results since federal elections are organized by state and voters vote for state-level party lists in each state. However, these fixed effects run the risk to soak up most of the effect that I am interested in. After all, of the 10 West German states, only four (Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Saarland) are at least somewhat equally split between formerly Prussian and non-Prussian areas. In North Rhine Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein, Prussian areas clearly dominate. In Baden-Württemberg, there is a large non-Prussian majority, while Bavaria and the city states Hamburg and Bremen are fully non-Prussian. In Table C2, I thus replicate Table 1 from the paper but remove the fixed effects. Reassuringly, results are very similar.

DV: AfD vote share in 2017	(1) Catholic	(2) Interaction	(3) Full Model	(4) Intensity	(5) Intensity full
Share Catholics	0.019	0.046***	0.042**	0.062***	0.054***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Prussia		0.416	-0.636		
		(0.744)	(0.591)		
Prussia x Catholic		-0.069***	-0.053***		
		(0.016)	(0.015)		
Kulturkampf intensity				0.534***	0.481***
				(0.122)	(0.098)
Kulturkampf x Catholic				-0.019***	-0.017***
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
N	8370	8370	8178	8370	8178
r2	0.020	0.202	0.414	0.193	0.374

Conley standard errors with a cutoff at 50km (Model 1-3) or clustered at historical court district level (model 4-5) in parentheses. + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C2: AfD vote share on the municipal level 2017, West Germany, no state fixed effects

In Table C3, I replicate Table 4 from the main paper, which studies the role of Catholic civil society organizations. Again, removing the fixed effects leaves the results relatively unchanged.

DV: AfD vote share in 2017	(1) Volksverein 1913	(2) Volksverein 1927	(3) Katholikentag	(4) Attendance
Share Catholics	0.062	0.075**	-0.013	-0.081
	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.053)
Volksverein 1913	0.016			
	(0.380)			
Volksverein '13 x Catholic	-0.013+			
	(0.007)			
Volksverein 1927		0.554		
		(0.466)		
Volksverein '27 x Catholic		-0.029**		
		(0.010)		
Katholikentag participation			-1.085	
			(0.744)	
Katholikentage x Catholic			-0.034*	
			(0.016)	
Church Attendance				0.128
				(0.276)
Attendance x Catholic				0.009+
				(0.005)
Constant	10.492***	8.913***	11.357***	9.304**
	(1.995)	(1.608)	(0.563)	(2.848)
N	8368	8368	8368	8368
r2	0.152	0.118	0.236	0.133

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors clustered on the level of dioceses in parentheses.

Table C3: Analysis of mechanism, no state fixed effects

Models with historical controls

In the main paper, I present models without controls and with contemporary controls. However, it is also possible that the persistence that I observe is due to other historical differences between the different regions. In Table C4, I thus add historical controls and control for the non-German speaking population share in 1900, the degree of urbanization in 1900, the share of workers in industry and the share of workers in agriculture in 1895 (Thome 2006) and for the inequality of landholding in 1895 (Ziblatt 2009). Indeed, the AfD is stronger today in regions that were historically less urbanized and dominated by the first and/or second sector. However, the effect of historical oppression and Catholicism remains unaffected by the addition of these controls.

DV: AfD vote share in 2017	**(1)**	**(2)**
	Prussia	**Intensity**
Share Catholics	0.023+	0.023+
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Prussia	1.116*	
	(0.451)	
Prussia x Catholic	-0.072***	
	(0.016)	
Kulturkampf intensity		0.369*
		(0.144)
Kulturkampf x Catholic		-0.013***
		(0.002)
Agricultural empl	0.042***	0.045***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Urban share	-0.032***	-0.030***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Industry empl	0.091***	0.082***
	(0.011)	(0.014)
Language	0.006	0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Land Inequality	1.287	1.724
	(2.227)	(2.504)
Constant	3.118	3.447
	(2.179)	(2.345)
N	8206	8206
r2	0.425	0.430

All models contain state fixed effects. + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C4: AfD vote share on the municipal level 2017, West Germany, historical controls

Alternative measure of Kulturkampf intensity

In the main paper, I use a specification with the number of Kulturkampf events per 100,000 inhabitants on the level of court districts. One problem with that measure is that the number of events per 100,000 inhabitants may be less meaningful than the number of events per 100,000 Catholics. After all, only Catholics constituted the potentially targeted population and experienced the intensity of oppression.

Unfortunately, I don't have data for the number of Catholics on the court district level in the 1870s. Fine-grained data for the number of Catholics on the regional level is only available for the 1890s. Given the huge population movements in the 19th century, I am hesitant to use these data for normalization. For the 1870s, I only have data on the level of administrative districts, of which there were only 47.

To develop an alternative measure of Kulturkampf intensity, I thus aggregate events at the level of administrative districts and divide them by the number of Catholics in a district. I have data on the Catholic population per district for 1871 and 1880 and estimate the number of Catholics in 1875 using the average annual growth rate between 1871 and 1880. Since this number can be very low, I logarithmize the resulting measure to prevent events in Protestant regions from having an outsized influence. I thus estimate:

$$\text{Intensity} = \ln\left(1+\frac{100{,}000 * \text{no. of oppresion events}}{\text{no. of Catholics in district}}\right)$$

Figure C1 compares the distribution of this measure to the distribution by court district. The two figures look very similar, although Protestant regions in Northern Germany generally have higher values with the second measure.



Figure C1: Kulturkampf intensity on court and administrative district level

In Table C5, I replicate the regression for Kulturkampf intensity with these alternative measures. As the table demonstrates, the results remain largely identical: Kulturkampf intensity significantly conditions the effect of Catholicism on AfD vote shares, independently of how the Kulturkampf measure is constructed.

DV: AfD vote share in 2017	(1) Court districts	(2) Court controls	(3) Administrative districts	(4) Admin Level Controls
Share Catholics	0.029+	0.025*	0.046*	0.034*
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Kulturkampf intensity	0.319*	0.361***		
	(0.158)	(0.100)		
Kulturkampf x Catholic	-0.013***	-0.011***		
	(0.003)	(0.002)		
Oppression Admin Level			0.856**	0.707**
			(0.284)	(0.254)
Oppression Admin x Catholic			-0.041***	-0.028**
			(0.011)	(0.009)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
N	8370	8178	8370	8178
r2	0.326	0.546	0.324	0.540

All models contain state fixed effects. Conley standard errors with a cutoff at 50km in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C5: AfD vote share on the municipal level 2017, alternative Kulturkampf measure

D: Differences between Catholics before 1815

Historical literature

A crucial assumption underlying my analysis is that that the political mobilization of Catholics inside and outside of regions that became Prussian in 1815 did not differ before 1815. Thus, oppression was not a reaction to pre-existing differences in Catholic mobilization. One strategy to plausibilize this assumption is the RDD for the historical Prussian-Bavarian border. I discuss the historical emergence of this border in appendix E.

Here, I summarize two types of evidence that apply to the analyses for West Germany as a whole. The first piece of evidence comes from the historical literature on German Catholicism while the second piece comes from an analysis of beatification and canonization processes.

Historians of German Catholicism agree that the political mobilization of Catholics only started in the 19th century. Bastian Scholz argues that the year 1803 was the "initial critical juncture" in the relationship between the Catholic church and the German states (Scholz 2016: 111ff.). Before 1803, "territorial borders

and confessional borders" were identical (ibid: 104). Therefore, „an independent stance of the Church towards the state was not possible before 1803, because empire and church were fused" (ibid: 119). In particular, "the Catholic confession did not play a role in Prussia" in the 17th and 18th century (ibid: 105).

This changed in 1803, when the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* secularized 66 ecclesiastical states: 3 archdioceses, 19 dioceses and 44 abbeys (ibid: 114). "Almost three million people got a new authority, the confessional unity in the territories was now a thing of the past. In most cases, Catholics came under the rule of Protestant rulers." (ibid: 114). Thus, 1803 "was the birth hour of an independent catholic stance toward the state" (ibid: 120).

The new phenomenon that Catholics now lived in Protestant states was reinforced by the congress of Vienna, when the Rhineland and Westphalia came to Prussia. There is no evidence that Catholics in these regions were particularly mobilized in the early 19th century. Jonathan Sperber, who studies the Rhineland and Westphalia, describes the low level of Catholic commitment in the 1820s and 1830s (Sperber 1984: 14-17). Moreover, from roughly 1830 to 1850, Catholics were becoming more and more secular. At mid-century, however, political and subsistence crises reversed the trends (Anderson 1995: 650). In fact, many historians identify a "religious revival" after 1850 (Sperber 1984: 55), which implies that religious activities had been on the decline before. For example, the second half of the 19th century saw a massive increase in the number of pilgrimages (ibid: 64).

This increase in Catholic activities did not just concern strictly religious activities but also political activities. According to Scholz (2016: 137), the formation of the Catholic milieu started around the revolution of 1848 and was ultimately a response to the structurally defensive position of German Catholics in the 19th century. Similarly, Sperber (1984: 47) speaks of a "nascent" political Catholicism in 1848. In line with this, the Arbeitskreis für kirchliche Zeitgeschichte (2000: 369) describes a protest in 1833 as an "early politicization and mobilization of the population". Similarly, the formation of the Catholic milieu in the Emsland region, one of the hotbeds of Catholic mobilization, "happened in two phases, after 1848 and after the Kulturkampf" (ibid.). A similar observation holds for the Rhineland: "in rural Geldern, there were no political associations at all before 1871, until 1890 there emerged 22 with connections to the Centre Party and 193 semi-political." (ibid.: 370)

Finally, the literature agrees that the sources of this mobilization were directly related to the new situation of being a minority in a Protestant state. For example, the "Cologne Troubles", the most prominent pre-1848 conflict between the Catholic church and the Prussian state had its origins in a conflict about interconfessional marriages (Lönne 1986: 76ff.). The Prussian civil servants who now governed in the Rhineland had started to marry women from the local Catholic elite. In order to keep the families of these civil servants Protestant, the government issued a decree in 1825 that the sons from interconfessional marriages had to be educated in the confession of the father. However, the Catholic church demanded a promise of a Catholic education as a precondition for blessing these marriages. After a decade of negotiations, archbishop Clemens August von Droste-Vischering declared that the church would not bless interconfessional marriages otherwise. In response, the Prussian government suspended him and even put

him into prison. In reaction to this, Catholics all over the Rhineland and Westphalia flooded the government with petitions and there were riots in Cologne and Münster (Lönne 1986: 76ff.). Thus, the trigger for this first major conflict between the Prussian state and the Catholic church was that the Prussian government elite was protestant – a similar conflict could simply not have occurred in a Catholic state.

In summary, the historical literature does not provide any evidence that Catholics in the Rhineland or Westphalia were already politically mobilized before they became Prussian and that Prussian oppression was a reaction to some preexisting mobilization. The mobilization that I observe in the second half of the 19th century can thus be interpreted as a reaction to Prussian oppression.

Evidence from canonization/beatification processes

The second piece of evidence comes from an analysis of beatification and canonization processes. Such processes have been analyzed in detail by historians and theologists (Painter 2018; Samerski 2002) but also quantitatively by economists and sociologists (Barro and McCleary 2016; Bienfait 2006; McCleary and Barro 2020). Following these literatures, I argue that beatification/canonizations provide a rare possibility to develop a regionally specific measure of Catholic mobilization for the period before 1815. Admittedly, this is a very rough measure with clear limits. However, since there are no electoral or other directly political data available for the pre-treatment period, an analysis of these processes may at least provide some suggestive evidence.

Both the qualitative historical and the quantitative literatures underline the eminently political character of beatifications and canonizations. Both have often been used to strengthen the Catholic church in broader political conflicts (Samerski 2002). Most importantly for my purposes, Barro and McCleary (2016) show that the Catholic church tends to canonize and beatify more individuals from regions in which it faces pressure or competition, either from Protestantism or from secularism. This holds both in the pre-1648 period and in the 20th century.

Following this logic, a higher number of canonization or beatification processes may indicate greater pressure on the Catholic church and a greater mobilization of lay Catholics. This may be due to two potential mechanisms. Firstly, there may emerge more individuals whose life qualifies them as potential candidates for canonization in regions where the church is under pressure, e.g. because more believers actively defend their faith. Secondly, lay Catholics may be more likely to develop a cult around specific individuals when they feel that their identity is under pressure. Painter (2018) shows this mechanism in her study of the movement for the canonization of Anna Katharina Emmerick.

The observable implication of this argument is that the share of canonization processes for candidates from regions that belonged to Prussia in the 19th century should have increased substantially after 1815, compared to candidates from non-Prussian regions. This would indicate that the pressure on Catholics in these regions – and the countermobilization of these Catholics – indeed increased substantially after 1815, i.e. when these regions came to Prussia.

To study whether this is indeed the case, I use data from the "Ökumenisches Heiligenlexikon" [ecumenical encyclopedia of saints], which systematically collects data on the biographies of Saints and Blesseds (Schäfer 2018). I code all individuals that were born in the area of the German empire and for whom the beatification process has been officially started. I restrict my analysis to individuals that were born after 1600 and died before 1933 (because of the high number of beatifications related to opposition against Nazism, which would otherwise completely dominate the analysis).

In total, the church has started the beatification process for 49 individuals that lived between 1600 and 1933. I code for all individuals whether their birthplace belonged to Prussia in 1871 or not. Table D1 shows the distribution of birthplaces by German state (in 1871).

State	Number of individuals
Prussia	26
Bavaria	18
Württemberg	2
Hessen	2
Baden	1

Table D1: Birthplaces of candidates for beatifications or canonizations

Of these 49 individuals, 13 were born before the year 1800 and 36 were born in the 19th century. Table D2 shows how the distribution of birthplaces differs between the two periods. In the 17th and 18th century, 4 out of 13 (31%) candidates were born in areas that already belonged or would later belong to Prussia. In the post 1800-period, this share almost doubled to 22 out of 36 (61%). According to a $\chi 2$ test, the hypothesis that both the share of Prussians is the same in both periods can be rejected at the 10% level ($p=0.06$).

	Prussia	Outside Prussia	
Born before 1800	4	9	13
Born after 1800	22	14	36
	26	23	49

Table D2: Regional distribution of birthplaces, by time period

This analysis thus suggests that Catholics in Prussian regions were not more mobilized than their Co-religionists outside of Prussia before 1815. After 1815, however, the mobilization of Prussian Catholics increased substantially.

E: RDD

The crucial identifying assumption of the RDD along the former Prussian-Bavarian border in Rhineland-Palatinate is that this border emerged through an effectively random historical process that did not follow any pre-existing systematic differences between Catholics that ended up on either side of the border.

This assumption can be supported by an analysis of the emergence of this border in three periods: the period before 1789, the years of French occupation between 1798 and 1814, and the years after the congress of Vienna.

Before 1789, the region in question was divided between the Electorate of Trier, the Electoral Palatinate, as well as a number of other states such as the County Palatine of Zweibrücken and even smaller territories such as Salm-Kyrburg and Salm-Grumbach. A map that overlays the later Prussian border over the pre-1789 borders shows that the Prussian border cross-cut many of the historical borders.[1]



Many of these states were dissolved when France annexed the left bank of the Rhine in 1798. In the newly annexed regions, France created four departments: Département de la Sarre, Département du Mont-

[1] I would like to thank the LVR-Institut für Landeskunde und Regionalgeschichte for the permission to reproduce this map here. The original map can be accessed at: http://www.rheinische-geschichte.lvr.de/Orte-und-Raeume/Vom-Mittelalter-bis-heute#de-2086lido57a1ba66bf456432348908

Tonnerre, Département de Rhin-et-Moselle and Département de la Roer. In doing so, the French "did not respect former political or religious connections" (Paul 2016). The territories used in the RDD analysis were parts of the Departements Sarre and Mont-Tonnerre, with the large majority of them in the Département de la Sarre. This Departement was in turn divided into 34 cantons, which had on average about 8,000 inhabitants.

After the Congress of Vienna, the department was divided between Prussia, Bavaria, and three smaller German states in a way that did not preserve preexisting administrative borders but rather aimed to form territories with a pre-determined number of inhabitants. The congress of Vienna had decided that five smaller German states should receive territorial compensation for losses or unfulfilled promises in other parts of Germany and that the necessary territories would be taken from the region between Prussia and Bavaria. Article 49 of the Congress Act gave very specific definitions regarding the size of these territories:

> "In the former department of the Sarre, on the frontiers of the states of his Majesty the King of Prussia, there is reserved a district, containing a population of 69,000 souls, to be disposed of in the following manner: the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and the Duke of Oldenburg shall obtain each a territory comprising 20,000 inhabitants. The Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz and the Landgrave of Hesse-Homburg, each a territory comprising 10,000 inhabitants; and the Count of Pappenheim a territory comprising 9,000 inhabitants. The territory of the Count of Pappenheim shall be under the sovereignty of his Prussian Majesty." (Final Act of the Congress of Vienna 1815)

While Mecklenburg-Strelitz and Pappenheim in the end received other compensations in line with Article 50 of the Congress Act ("The acquisitions assigned by the preceding Article […] not being contiguous to their respective states, their Majesties […] promise […] to procure for the said Princes, either by exchanges or any other arrangements, the advantages that they are disposed to insure to them"), Saxe-Coburg, Oldenburg and Hesse-Homburg indeed received the promised compensation. Hence, borders were drawn to create the necessary numbers and did not necessarily respect historical attachments. Lancizolle (1830: 128) summarizes the division of the Saar departement's territory as follows:

> "Sachsen-Coburg receives the cantons of Grumbach (with the exception of 6 villages), Baumholder (4 villages excepted), Sankt Wendel (19 villages excepted), moreover 6 villages from the canton Kusel, 12 villages from the canton Tholey, 8 villages from the canton Ottweiler.
>
> Oldenburg receives, partly in full, partly with exceptions, the cantons Herrstein, Birkenfeld, Hermeskeil, Wadern, St. Wendel, Baumholder, Rhaunen.
>
> Hessen-Homburg receives the canton Meisenheim and 4 villages from the canton Grumbach."

Of the remaining cantons of the Departement, 3 cantons came to Bavaria and 20 cantons to Prussia. Moreover, Bavaria received a few villages from the cantons Sankt Wendel and Grumbach (Paul 2016).

The territories given to Sachsen-Coburg were on the Southern bank of the river Nahe, which would have been the most natural border in the region, while the territories given to Oldenburg were on the northern bank of the river. However, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld sold his territory to Prussia in 1834.

Moreover, the Homburgian territory of Meisenheim was annexed by Prussia in 1866. Hence, the Prussian-Bavarian border during the Kulturkampf was not along the most natural geographic border (the river Nahe), but to the south of it.

Moreover, diocesan borders were also adapted to follow the new political borders. While most Catholics along the new border had belonged to the diocese of Mainz before 1803, all Prussian Catholics came to the diocese of Trier after 1815 and all Bavarian Catholics came to the diocese of Speyer. Finally, the new border did not follow any obvious linguistic border, which would potentially signal differences in parochialism (Ziblatt, Bischof, and Hilbig 2021), since the main linguistic border in the region, the "Hunsrück-Schranke" runs to the north of the river Nahe.

Taken together, this history of the emergence of the Prussian Bavarian border suggests that this border did not follow any pre-existing differences in the political mobilization of Catholics. To the extent that such differences later existed, they most likely emerged after 1815.

Nevertheless, as explained in the main paper, this is not a clean RDD, since the municipalities on both sides of the border are not statistically indistinguishable. As Table E1 shows, Prussian municipalities are on average more Catholic. If an effect of Prussian rule was to persistently mobilize Catholics, this may in itself be a treatment effect. In any case, the differences between the municipalities are relatively minor, so that this is still the best possible comparison. Moreover, there is enough variation in the variables on either side of the border. The share of Catholics in the 201 Bavarian municipalities reaches from 5.1% to 79.4%, while the share of Catholics in the 155 Prussian municipalities reaches from 3.0% to 80.9%. Similarly, the range of AfD vote shares in Bavaria is 5.4% to 28.3%, while it is 2.2% to 28.1% in Prussia.

	(1) Bavaria	(2) Prussia	(3) Difference
Catholic share	28.285	33.401	5.116***
	(13.107)	(14.012)	(1.445)
Unemployment	-13.047	9.355	22.402***
	(6.680)	(6.339)	(0.699)
Marginal employment	2.671	3.089	0.418***
	(0.968)	(1.585)	(0.137)
Regular employment	20.433	19.683	-0.750
	(12.474)	(10.427)	(1.283)
Share Foreigners	37.246	36.815	-0.432
	(2.810)	(3.141)	(0.316)
Population > 65	8.388	15.587	7.199***
	(12.110)	(20.738)	(1.755)
Female Population Share	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	201	155	356

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table E1: Balance of the RDD, averages weighted by population

In the main paper, I only report the findings from the RDD graphically. Here, I present the full model from which Figure 6 in the paper is derived in Table E2. As always, I also present models that include my standard

set of control variables. In terms of the main interaction effect of interest (Prussia x Catholic), the inclusion of controls hardly changes the results at all.

Model 1 presents the model used in the paper with a cutoff of 25km. Model 2 adds the contemporary control variables to this model. Models 3 to 6 then present slightly smaller and bigger cutoffs. As models 3 and 4 shows, the results become insignificant when the cutoff gets too small, also because the balance between the municipalities becomes worse.

	Cutoff 25km		Cutoff 20km		Cutoff 30km	
	No controls	Controls	No controls	Controls	No controls	Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prussia	1.183	1.339	-0.294	0.472	1.311	1.324
	(1.562)	(2.132)	(1.913)	(2.519)	(1.359)	(1.772)
Share Catholics	0.024	0.041	-0.001	0.015	0.043	0.042
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Distance to border	0.017	0.024	0.107	0.077	0.037	-0.009
	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Prussia x Catholic	-0.123**	-0.145*	-0.079	-0.107	-0.142**	-0.139**
	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.049)
Prussia x Border	-0.124	-0.172	-0.068	-0.139	-0.164	-0.120
	(0.165)	(0.151)	(0.240)	(0.235)	(0.101)	(0.104)
Border x Catholic	-0.001	0.000	-0.004	-0.003	0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pruss x Cath x Border	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
N	356	351	305	300	433	427
r2	0.258	0.312	0.256	0.290	0.228	0.305

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses

Table E2: Full model of the RDD with different cutoffs

F: Mechanism analysis including contemporary controls

In Table 4 of the paper, I analyze the relationship between my measures of Catholic mobilization and AfD vote shares today. Here, I add the familiar contemporary control variables to the analysis. This leaves the results of the analysis largely unaffected in terms of both effect size and significance levels.

	(1) Volksverein 1913	(2) Volksverein 1927	(3) Katholikentag	(4) Attendance
Share Catholics	0.088***	0.062**	-0.005	-0.152***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Volksverein 1913	1.047**			
	(0.314)			
Volksverein '13 x Catholic	-0.021***			
	(0.004)			
Volksverein 1927		1.037***		
		(0.198)		
Volksverein '27 x Catholic		-0.028**		
		(0.008)		
Katholikentag participation			1.202	
			(0.767)	
Katholikentage x Catholic			-0.054**	
			(0.015)	
Church Attendance				-0.387**
				(0.116)
Attendance x Catholic				0.015***
				(0.001)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	8176	8176	8176	8176
r2	0.560	0.548	0.554	0.558

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors clustered on diocese level in parentheses.

Table F1: Analysis of mechanism including contemporary control variables

G: Voting in the German Empire

Figure 9 of the paper shows the results of an analysis of the Centre Party's vote share in the elections to the German Reichstag between 1871 and 1912. This appendix shows this analysis more systematically and presents a range of alternative model specifications.

Table G1 analyzes the vote share of the Centre Party on the electoral district level for each of the 13 elections to the Reichstag that took place between 1871 and 1912. Specifically, I regress the Centre's vote share on the Catholic population share in 1895, a dummy for whether the district belonged to Prussia, and the interaction between the two. Unfortunately, there is no panel data on Catholic population shares, so there is some measurement error for the most quickly industrializing areas in which the composition of the population changed most strongly.

I also control for the three other main political cleavages by including controls for the non-German speaking population share in 1900, the degree of urbanization in 1900, the share of workers in industry and the share of workers in agriculture in 1895 (Thome 2006) and for the inequality of landholding in 1895 (Ziblatt 2009).

The results show a remarkable correlation between the Catholic population and the Centre Party's vote share: in the 1870s, a one percentage point higher share of the Catholic population was associated with a roughly 0.7 percentage points higher result for the Centre Party outside of Prussia. This association became somewhat weaker afterwards but remained very strong. However, it was even stronger in Prussia, where a one percentage point higher share of the Catholic population translated into a 0.9 percentage points higher vote share of the Centre Party. Moreover, this association did not decline after the 1880s. There was, thus, already a substantial difference between Catholic voting inside and outside of Prussia in the German empire.

In Table G2, I repeat the same set of regressions, but only for those 196 electoral districts that are in what is today West Germany. This analysis is the basis for Figure 9 in the paper. Here, the results are even stronger than for the entire German empire, which can be explained by the fact that a number of highly Catholic Prussian districts with a Polish majority population did not vote for the Centre Party. In the Western parts of Prussia, a higher Catholic population share effectively translated 1:1 into a higher vote share for the Centre Party. Again, this effect is significantly stronger than the effect in the non-Prussian parts of Western Germany.

Finally, in Table G3, I repeat the same set of regressions as in Table G2 but replace the Prussia dummy with my continuous measure of Kulturkampf intensity. Here, while the interaction between Catholicism and oppression becomes substantively relevant in the 1880s, it only becomes statistically significant in the 1890s. this may have to do with the fact that the Centre Party's vote share held up in all Catholic parts of Prussia throughout the 1880s, so that the within-Prussia variation of the Kulturkampf measure does not correlate with within-Prussia differences in voting. In any case, from the 1890s onward, this regression shows the same effects as the models in tables G1 and G2.

DV: Centre Party vote share	(1) 1871	(2) 1874	(3) 1877	(4) 1878	(5) 1881	(6) 1884	(7) 1887	(8) 1890	(9) 1893	(10) 1898	(11) 1903	(12) 1907	(13) 1912
Share Catholic	0.500**	0.802**	0.684**	0.682**	0.670**	0.628**	0.601**	0.592**	0.488**	0.438**	0.487**	0.640**	0.530**
	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.034)
Prussia	0.023	0.022	0.008	0.012	0.009	-0.006	-0.007	-0.008	-0.008	-0.014	-0.023	-0.006	-0.023
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Catholic x Prussia	0.114*	0.063	0.185**	0.182**	0.286**	0.333**	0.286**	0.304**	0.421**	0.487**	0.385**	0.191**	0.325**
	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.042)
Agricultural empl	0.002*	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Industry empl	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urban share	0.002*	0.002**	0.002**	0.001*	0.001*	0.002**	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*	0.001*	0.001*	0.001+	0.001+
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Land Inequality	-0.035	-0.107	-0.218*	-0.146	-0.241*	-0.283**	-0.107	-0.203+	-0.350**	-0.366**	-0.346**	-0.119+	-0.096
	(0.101)	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.072)	(0.086)
Language	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	377	392	392	392	392	392	392	392	392	392	392	392	392
r2	0.641	0.846	0.814	0.806	0.778	0.766	0.757	0.751	0.758	0.801	0.816	0.857	0.794

Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table G1: Effect of Prussia and Catholicism on Centre Party vote shares in Reichstag elections, entire German empire

DV: Centre Party vote share	(1) 1871	(2) 1874	(3) 1877	(4) 1878	(5) 1881	(6) 1884	(7) 1887	(8) 1890	(9) 1893	(10) 1898	(11) 1903	(12) 1907	(13) 1912
Share Catholic	0.577**	0.865**	0.799**	0.827**	0.931**	0.875**	0.843**	0.818**	0.671**	0.593**	0.627**	0.726**	0.717**
	(0.055)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)
Prussia	0.047	-0.021	-0.044+	-0.026	-0.037	-0.053	-0.031	-0.067*	-0.053	-0.068*	-0.068**	-0.051*	-0.057+
	(0.046)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Catholic x Prussia	0.088	0.126**	0.192**	0.155**	0.128**	0.192**	0.143**	0.204**	0.350**	0.418**	0.324**	0.214**	0.258**
	(0.075)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.047)
Agricultural empl	0.004**	0.003**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.005**	0.005**	0.006**	0.005**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Industry empl	-0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urban share	0.002*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Land Inequality	0.454*	0.318**	0.358**	0.485**	0.475**	0.382**	0.601**	0.647**	0.269+	0.129	0.135	0.296**	0.481**
	(0.185)	(0.091)	(0.101)	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.139)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.136)	(0.116)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.117)
Language	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195
r2	0.643	0.939	0.923	0.895	0.918	0.885	0.881	0.886	0.864	0.890	0.918	0.919	0.890

Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table G2: Effect of Prussia and Catholicism on Centre Party vote shares in Reichstag elections, West Germany

DV: Centre Party vote share	(1) 1871	(2) 1874	(3) 1877	(4) 1878	(5) 1881	(6) 1884	(7) 1887	(8) 1890	(9) 1893	(10) 1898	(11) 1903	(12) 1907	(13) 1912
Share Catholic	0.613**	0.939**	0.874**	0.905**	0.999**	0.957**	0.910**	0.915**	0.760**	0.681**	0.719**	0.794**	0.781**
	(0.055)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.036)
Oppression	0.009	0.001	-0.005	-0.002	-0.012	-0.018+	-0.018*	-0.014	-0.008	-0.010	-0.003	-0.013+	-0.019*
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Catholic x Oppression	-0.002	-0.001	0.012	0.004	0.011	0.021	0.018	0.015	0.034*	0.045**	0.024*	0.023*	0.035**
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Agricultural empl	0.005**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.005**	0.005**	0.005**	0.006**	0.005**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Industry empl	-0.000	0.002+	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.003*	0.002+	0.002	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urban share	0.002+	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Land Inequality	0.687**	0.436**	0.457**	0.612**	0.541**	0.463**	0.691**	0.715**	0.463**	0.325**	0.275**	0.380**	0.570**
	(0.169)	(0.085)	(0.096)	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.135)	(0.122)	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.112)
Language	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195
r2	0.629	0.933	0.912	0.886	0.916	0.879	0.877	0.878	0.833	0.848	0.889	0.907	0.875

Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table G3: Effect of Kulturkampf and Catholicism on Centre Party vote shares in Reichstag elections, West Germany

H: Voting in the Weimar Republic

In Table 5 of the main paper, I analyze whether the same split in Catholic voting behavior also occurred in the Weimar Republic, since Catholic voting in Weimar is one of the main reasons for expecting a negative effect of Catholicism on radical right support. In their very detailed analysis of the elections of 1930, 1932 (July and November) and 1933, Spenkuch and Tillmann (2018), however, do not find any difference between Catholic voting behavior inside and outside of Prussia.

In principle, this non-finding can be explained by the fact that Spenkuch and Tillmann (2018) focus on an elite-driven process that did arguably not differ between Prussia and other parts of Germany. Indeed, the clergy became generally more influential in political Catholicism in the 1920s and 1930s (Reytier 2007: 179). For example, the Centre Party elected a priest, prelate Ludwig Kaas, as party chairman in 1928 (Scholz 2016: 279).

However, as the analysis in the paper also shows, this non-finding is to some extent driven by the fact that Spenkuch and Tillmann stack their deck against finding a Prussia effect by including electoral district fixed effects. Since the majority of the districts was either completely within Prussia or completely outside of Prussia, including these fixed effects soaks up most of any potential Prussia-effect.

When removing the fixed effects, the results in Table 5 are rather inconclusive. The size of the Prussia effect is considerably bigger in the models without fixed-effects than the models with fixed effects (a similar effect does not arise for removing state-fixed effects in the contemporary analysis, see Tables C2 and C3 in this appendix). However, it only reaches conventional levels of significance in the election of 1930 and, marginally, in the election of 1933. Interestingly, however, the effect is clearly strongest for the election of 1930, that is, before the Catholic bishops hardened their stance against the NSDAP (Scholder 2000[1977]: 343). This would suggest that the elite-based mechanism was less powerful in 1930 than in the later election and that there was more room for the civil-society based mechanism.

As mentioned in the main paper, however, there is one case in the electoral history of the Weimar Republic where the Catholic vote was split more clearly. This was the second round of the presidential election of 1925, when the Bavarian Catholic party, the Bavarian People's Party (BVP), supported the national-conservative (and Protestant) candidate Paul von Hindenburg instead of the Rhenish Centre politician Wilhelm Marx. This was not the same split as investigated in the paper, since it was not a split between Prussia and the rest of the German states, but rather a split between the biggest state outside of Prussia and all other states. Still, this split had a decisive effect on the election, since more than a quarter of all German Catholics lived in Bavaria. Indeed, Falter (1990) estimates that about 500,000 voters who had supported the BVP's own candidate Heinrich Held on the first ballot switched to Hindenburg on the second ballot.

In Table H1, I estimate two regression models in which I estimate the relationship between Catholic population shares and Marx's vote shares on the county level. Data on vote shares come from the Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1925). In Model 1, I look at all German counties and interact the Catholic population share with a dummy for whether a county is in Bavaria (n=221) or outside of it (n=845). I weight all

observations by the number of valid voters and again cluster standard errors on the level of the 35 electoral districts. The results show that Catholicism did not have any relationship with the vote share of the Catholic candidate in Bavaria, which serves as the reference category, but an extremely strong relationship outside of this state.

In Model 2, I only look at those counties that would later come to form the state of Rhineland-Palatinate. These are the Prussian *Regierungsbezirke* (administrative districts) of Koblenz and Trier and the Bavarian Palatinate. This model thus replicates the analysis from Table 2 of the main paper. Indeed, in this analysis, we can already observe the same split that would occur almost 100 years later in the election of 2017: In the Palatinate, there is a modest relationship between Catholicism and support for Marx. In the Prussian administrative districts of Koblenz and Trier this relationship is much stronger.

In summary then, there is rather mixed evidence regarding systematic patterns in the voting behavior of Catholics during the Weimar Republic. On the one occasion where such a pattern can be detected, however, it was quite similar to the pattern in 2017. It reflected a deeper split in political Catholicism which existed between the national Centre Party and the Bavarian Catholic party.

	(1) National	(2) RLP
Non-Bavaria	-4.459	-16.516*
	(6.051)	(7.002)
Catholic	-0.048	0.238*
	(0.096)	(0.118)
Non-Bavaria x Catholic	0.479***	0.365**
	(0.105)	(0.131)
Constant	39.671***	38.475***
	(5.774)	(5.294)
N	1066	47
r2	0.569	0.804

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table H1: Support for Catholic candidate in the Weimar presidential election of 1925, second ballot

I: Individual level analysis including non-Catholics

In Table 6 in the main text, I use data from the German Longitudinal Election Study to investigate differences in the voting behavior of individual Catholics. Since my main interest is in the differences between Catholics, I restrict that analysis to Catholic respondents. In Table I1, I replicate the same analysis for all respondents and include an interaction effect between Catholicism and my indicators of oppression/mobilization. The results are very similar to the analysis from the main paper: the only difference to the main model is that the effect of Katholikentag participation at the diocese level loses its significance.

	(1) Prussia	(2) Kulturkampf	(3) Volksverein 1913	(4) Volksverein 1927	(5) Katholikentag
Catholic	0.210	0.178	0.502+	0.421+	-0.106
	(0.160)	(0.167)	(0.264)	(0.225)	(0.113)
Prussia	0.085				
	(0.129)				
Prussia x Catholic	-0.474*				
	(0.215)				
Kulturkampf intensity		0.038+			
		(0.023)			
Catholic x Kulturkampf		-0.061			
		(0.038)			
Volksverein 1913			0.013		
			(0.040)		
Catholic x VV 1913			-0.118*		
			(0.055)		
Volksverein 1927				0.010	
				(0.061)	
Catholic x VV 1927				-0.211*	
				(0.086)	
Katholikentag particip					-0.216*
					(0.089)
Catholic x Katholikentag					-0.146
					(0.165)
Female	-0.724***	-0.721***	-0.725***	-0.726***	-0.727***
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Age	-0.009**	-0.009**	-0.009**	-0.009**	-0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education high	-0.628***	-0.631***	-0.614***	-0.613***	-0.616***
	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.104)
Unemployed	-0.079	-0.097	-0.065	-0.069	-0.064
	(0.155)	(0.159)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.153)
Household income	-0.107**	-0.110**	-0.108**	-0.106**	-0.104**
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Constant	1.716***	1.676***	1.684***	1.719***	1.804***
	(0.347)	(0.337)	(0.389)	(0.369)	(0.342)
N	2281	2281	2281	2281	2281
r2	0.044	0.043	0.044	0.045	0.047

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table I1: Predicted affinity toward the AfD, GLES 2017

J: Statements of Catholic associations regarding the AfD

As mentioned in the main text, several Catholic associations have issued very clear statements against the AfD. In particular, several associations have declared a membership in the AfD as incompatible with an association membership. For example, the Catholic Women's Association of Germany (kfd), which has about 450.000 members, decided in September 2020 that a membership is incompatible with a membership in the AfD and declared that "the positions of the kfd stand in contrast to those of the AfD" (Katholische Frauengemeinschaft Deutschlands 2020). The Catholic Workers' Movement (KAB) had already made the same decision in March 2020 and declared the positions of the AfD to be "unchristian" and "inhuman" (Katholische Arbeitnehmer-Bewegung 2020). The Bund der Deutschen Katholischen Jugend (BDKJ), the umbrella of Catholic youth organizations, already in 2018 demanded that AfD representatives would not be invited to participate in public discussions at the Katholikentag (Bund der Deutschen Katholischen Jugend 2018). The Kolpingwerk declared in 2019 that "the AfD is no alternative" and described it as "antisemitic", "racist", and "inhuman" (Kolpingwerk 2019a). Both Kolpingwerk and BDKJ also issued guidelines on how to deal with the AfD (Kolpingwerk 2019b; BDKJ 2017).

As argued in the main text, these statements are not very different from those by the church, which also condemns the AfD in very clear words. However, they are representative of the political culture that characterizes the milieu that is underpinned by these associations.

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